Multi-Party Computation for the Masses

Multi-Party Computation for the Masses

David Evanswww.cs.virginia.edu/evans

CROSSING – Where Quantum Physics, Cryptography, System Security and Software Engineering meet Darmstadt, 1 June 2015

(De)Motivating Application

AliceBob

AliceBob

Genome Compatibility Protocol

“Genetic Dating”

GeneticMatchr

WARNING!

Reproduction not

recommended

Your offspring would have

good immune systems!

processing…Start[Don’t sue us.]

GeneticMatchr

WARNING!

Reproduction not

recommended

Your offspring would have

good immune systems!

processing…Start[Don’t sue us.]

(De)Motivating Application

Cost to sequence genome“Moore’s Law”

20012002

20032004

20052006

20072008

20092010

20112012

20132014

$1,000

$10,000

$100,000

$1,000,000

$10,000,000

$100,000,000

“Moore’s Law”

Cost to sequence genome

20012002

20032004

20052006

20072008

20092010

20112012

20132014

$1,000

$10,000

$100,000

$1,000,000

$10,000,000

$100,000,000

“Moore’s Law”

Tomorrow: Jean-Pierre Hubaux“Whole Genome Sequencing: Revolutionary Medicine or Privacy Nightmare?”

Secure Two-Party Computation

AliceBob

Bob’s Genome Alice’s Genome

Can Alice and Bob compute a function on private data, without exposing anything about their data besides the result?

r = f(a, b)

Bob’s Genome

Secure Two-Party Computation

AliceBob

“private”

and “correct”

r = f(a, b)

Alice’s Genome

Can Alice and Bob compute a function on private data, without exposing anything about their data besides the result?

Yao’s Garbled Circuit ProtocolAlice (circuit generator) Bob (circuit evaluator)

Garbled Circuit Protocol

Andrew Yao, 1980s

secret input a secret input bAgree on function f

r = f(a, b)r = f(a, b)Learns nothing else about b Learns nothing else about a

Regular LogicInputs Output

xa b

0 0 00 1 01 0 01 1 1

a b

x

AND

“Obfuscated” LogicInputs Output

xa b

a1 b0 x0

a0 b1 x0

a1 b1 x1

a1 b0 x0

a0 or a1

x

AND

b0 or b1

ai, bi, xi are random values, chosen by generator but meaningless to evaluator.

Inputs Outputxa b

a1 b0 x0

a0 b1 x0

a1 b1 x1

a1 b0 x0

a0 or a1

x

AND

b0 or b1

Leaks information!

“Obfuscated” Logicai, bi, xi are random values, chosen by generator but meaningless to evaluator.

Garbled LogicInputs Output

xa b

a1 b0 Ea1 || b0 (x0)

a0 b1 Ea0 || b1 (x0)

a1 b1 Ea1 || b1 (x1)

a0 b0 Ea0 || b0 (x0)

a0 or a1

x

AND

b0 or b1

Garbled LogicInputs Output

xa b

a1 b0 Ea1 || b0 (x0)

a0 b1 Ea0 || b1 (x0)

a1 b1 Ea1 || b1 (x1)

a0 b0 Ea0 || b0 (x0)

a0 or a1

x

AND

b0 or b1

G

Garbled Table

Gar

bled

Circ

uit P

roto

col Alice (generator)

Sends ai, based on her input

Bob (evaluator)Picks random values for a{0, 1}, b{0, 1}, x{0, 1}

Ea1||b0 (x0)

Ea0||b1 (x0)

Ea1||b1 (x1)

Ea0||b0 (x0) Evaluates circuit,

decrypting one row of each garbled gate

xrSends hashes to decode outputs

r

Gar

bled

Circ

uit P

roto

col Alice (generator)

Sends ai, based on her input

Bob (evaluator)Picks random values for a{0, 1}, b{0, 1}, x{0, 1}

Ea1||b0 (x0)

Ea0||b1 (x0)

Ea1||b1 (x1)

Ea0||b0 (x0) Evaluates circuit,

decrypting one row of each garbled gate

xrSends hashes to decode outputs

r

How does the Bob learn his own input values?

Primitive: Oblivious TransferAlice (generator) Bob (evaluator)

Oblivious Transfer Protocol

b0 , b1 selector i

biLearns nothing else about i

Learns nothing about other value

Rabin, 1981; Even, Goldreich, and Lempel, 1985; …

a0,0 or a

0,1

G0

b0,0 or b

1,0

G1

…

x0 or x1 G2

x1,0 or x1,1

a1,0 or a

1,1

b1,0 or b

1,1

Ea0,1||b0,0(x0,0)

Ea0,0||b0,1(x0,0)

Ea0,1||b0,1(x0,1)

Ea0,0||b0,1(x0,0)

Ea1,1||b1,1(x1,1)

Ea1,0||b1,1(x1,0)

Ea1,1||b1,0(x1,0)

Ea1,0||b1,0(x1,0)

x2,0 or x2,1

Chain gates to securely compute any discrete function!

Ex0,0||x1,0(x2,0)

Ex0,1||x1,1(x2,1)

Ex0,1||x1,0(x2,0)

Ex0,0||x1,0(x2,0)

18

Building Computing Systems

Digital Electronic Circuits Garbled Circuits

Operate on known data Operate on encrypted wire labels

One-bit logical operation requires moving some electrons a few nanometers

One-bit logical operation requires performing four encryption operations

Reuse is great! Reuse is not allowed!

Ea1||b0 (x0)

Ea0||b1 (x0)

Ea1||b1 (x1)

20012002

20032004

20052006

20072008

20092010

20112012

20132014

$1,000

$10,000

$100,000

$1,000,000

$10,000,000

$100,000,000

Cost to sequence genome

[Fairplay, USENIX Sec 2004]

>$1M

MPC Cost (“Moore’s Law”)

Estimated cost of 10k x 10k Smith-Waterman, 4T gates

for (i = 1; i <= n1; ++i) { for(j = 1; j <= n2; ++j) { Accum temp = acMin (dp[i][j-1], dp[i-1][j]); obliv bool d = true; obliv if (acLessEq(dp[i-1][j-1], temp)) { acCopy(&temp, &dp[i-1][j-1]); d = (s1[i-1] != s2[j-1]); }

Scaling MPC

Gate Execution

Protocols

Ea0,1||b0,0(x0,0)

Ea0,0||b0,1(x0,0)

Ea0,1||b0,1(x0,1)

Ea0,0,|b0,1(x0,0)

Circuit Construction

Private Biometrics[NDSS 2011]

Machine Learning [S&P 2013]

Personalized Medicine,Medical Research[USENIX Sec 2011]

Private Set Intersection [NDSS 2012]

Obliv-C

Talk

Out

line

Gate Execution

Protocols

Enca0,1,b0,0(x0,0)

Enca0,0,b0,1(x0,0)

Enca0,1,b0,1(x0,1)

Enca0,0,b0,1(x0,0)


This AfternoonFarinaz Koushanfar

“TinyGarble: Synthesis of Highly Compact Circuits for Secure Computation”

Stefan Katzenbeisser“Towards Practical Two-Party Computations”

z1

z2

Two Halves Make a WholeReducing Data Transfer in

Garbled Circuits using Half Gates Samee Zahur, Mike Rosulek, and David Evans. In EuroCrypt 2015.Samee Zahur

(UVa PhD Student)

+ =

Background: Point-and-Permute

Enca0,,b0,(c0)

Enca0,,b1(c0)

Enca0,,b0(c0)

Enca1,b1(c1)

Encoding garble table entries:

Input wire labels(with selection bits)

Output wire label

Beaver, Micali and Rogaway [STOC 1990]

Background: Garbled Row Reduction

Naor, Pinkas and Sumner [1999]

Background: Free-XOR

Kolesnikov and Schneider [2008]

Global generator secret

Background: Free-XOR

Kolesnikov and Schneider [2008]

Global generator secret

XOR are free! No ciphertexts or encryption needed.

Half Gates

Yan Huang, David Evans, and Jonathan Katz. Private Set Intersection: Are Garbled Circuits Better than Custom Protocols? [NDSS 2012]


Journal of the ACM, January 1968

swap gates, configured (by generator) to do random permutation

Generator Half Gate

Known to generator (but secret to evaluator)

Swapper: “Generator Half Gate”

Known to generator (but secret to evaluator)

With Garbled Row Reduction:

Evaluator Half-Gate

Known to evaluator (but secret to generator)

Evaluator Half-Gate

Known to evaluator (but secret to generator)

But, we need a gate where both inputs are secret…

Half + Half = Full Secret Gate

random bit selected by generator

“leaked”unknownknownunknown

Half + Half = Full Secret Gate

random bit selected by generator

generator half gate evaluator half gate

“leaked”unknownknownunknown

Standard Gates Half GatesGenerator Encryptions (H) 4 4Evaluator Encryptions (H) 1 2Ciphertexts Transmitted 3 2XORs Free ✓ ✓Bandwidth 33%Execution Time (edit distance) 25%Energy 21%

Is one ciphertext enough?

Is one ciphertext enough?

No, two is minimum at least assuming garbling schemes use only random oracle and linear operations.

for (i = 1; i <= n1; ++i) { for(j = 1; j <= n2; ++j) { Accum temp = acMin (dp[i][j-1], dp[i-1][j]); obliv bool d = true; obliv if (acLessEq(dp[i-1][j-1], temp)) { acCopy(&temp, &dp[i-1][j-1]); d = (s1[i-1] != s2[j-1]); }

Scaling MPC

Gate Execution

Protocols

Ea0,1||b0,0(x0,0)

Ea0,0||b0,1(x0,0)

Ea0,1||b0,1(x0,1)

Ea0,0,|b0,1(x0,0)


Private Biometrics[NDSS 2011]

Machine Learning [S&P 2013]

Personalized Medicine,Medical Research[USENIX Sec 2011]

Private Set Intersection [NDSS 2012]

obliv-C

48

Fairplay

Malkhi, Nisan, Pinkas and Sella [USENIX Sec 2004]

SFDL Program

SFDL Compiler

Circuit (SHDL)

Alice Bob

Garbled Tables Generator

Garbled Tables Evaluator

SFDL Compiler

Pipe

lined

Exe

cutio

n Circuit-Level Application

GC Framework(Evaluator)

GC Framework (Generator)

Circuit StructureCircuit Structure

Yan Huang(UVa PhD,U Indiana)

Yan Huang, David Evans, Jonathan Katz, and Lior Malka. Faster Secure Two-Party Computation Using Garbled Circuits. USENIX Security 2011.

x1

x2y1

y2z1

z2

20012002

20032004

20052006

20072008

20092010

20112012

20132014

$100

$1,000

$10,000

$100,000

$1,000,000

$10,000,000

$100,000,000

Free-XOR

Pipelining, +

Half G

ates

(Estimates for 2PC, 4T gates)

100s gates/second

100k gates/second

~5M gates/second

Semi-Honest (“Honest but Curious”)Alice Bob

generated circuits

generator oblivious transfer

Evaluates

rr

output decoding/sharing

r = f(a, b)

Only provides privacy and correctness guarantees if circuit is generated honestly!

Standard Fix: “Cut-and-Choose”

Generator(Alice)

Evaluator(Bob)

(1) N instances of generated circuit

(5) If okay, evaluate rest and select majority output

(4) checks all revealed circuits

(2) Challenge: choose a random subset

(3) Keys for selected circuits

Provides security against active attacker, but for reasonable security N > 300

20012002

20032004

20052006

20072008

20092010

20112012

20132014

$100

$1,000

$10,000

$100,000

$1,000,000

$10,000,000

$100,000,000

Semi-Honest

Active Security

SymmetricCut-and-Choose

[HKE 2013]

Semi-Honest is Half-Way TherePrivacy

Nothing is revealed other than the output

(Not) CorrectnessThe output of the protocol is f(a, b)

Generator EvaluatorMalicious-resistant OT

Semi-Honest GCAs long as evaluator doesn’t send result (or complaint) back, privacy for evaluator is guaranteed.

Dual Execution ProtocolsYan Huang, Jonathan Katz, David Evans.

[IEEE S&P (Oakland) 2012]Mohassel and Franklin. [PKC 2006]

Dual Execution ProtocolAlice Bob

first round execution (semi-honest)generator evaluator

generatorevaluatorz=f(x, y)

Pass if z = z’ and correct wire labelsz’, learned outputwire labels

second round execution (semi-honest)

z'=f(x, y)z, learned outputwire labels

fully-secure, authenticated equality test

Security PropertiesCorrectness: guaranteed by authenticated, secure equality testPrivacy: Leaks one (extra) bit on average

adversarial circuit fails on ½ of inputsMalicious generator can decrease likelihood of being caught, and increase information leaked when caught (but decreases average information leaked): at extreme, circuit fails on just one input.

Proving Security: Malicious

A BIdeal World

yx

Adversary receives:f (x, y)

Trusted Party in Ideal W

orld

Standard Malicious Model: can’t prove this for Dual Execution

Real WorldA B

yx

Show equivalence

Corrupted party behaves

arbitrarily

Secure Computation Protocol

Proof of Security: One-Bit Leakage

A BIdeal World

yx

Controlled bymalicious A

g R {0, 1}g is an arbitrary Boolean function selected by adversary

Adversary receives:f (x, y) and g(x, y)

Trusted Party in Ideal W

orldCan prove equivalence to this for Dual Execution protocols

Intuition: 1-bit Leak

Cheating detected

Victim’s Possible InputsInputs where

f (?, y) = r

Broken Circuit for these Inputs

ImplementationAlice Bob

first round execution (semi-honest)generator evaluator

z=f(x, y)

Pass if z = z’ and correct wire labelsz’, learned outputwire labels

generatorevaluator second round execution (semi-honest)

z'=f(x, y)z, learned outputwire labels

Recall: work to generate is 2x work to evaluate!

fully-secure, authenticated equality test

20012002

20032004

20052006

20072008

20092010

20112012

20132014

$100

$1,000

$10,000

$100,000

$1,000,000

$10,000,000

$100,000,000

Semi-Honest

Active Security

Dual Execution

Secure Computation for the Masses?Remarkable progress in past 10 years

Costs reduced by 1012

Beginning to see commercial deploymentsScaling number of parties still very hardChallenge of End-to-End Trust

Trusting Software Understanding leaks from outputUser-understandable information release policies

David [email protected]

www.cs.virginia.edu/evansoblivc.org

mightBeEvil.org

Collaborators (this work): Yan Huang, Jonathan Katz, Mike Rosulek, Samee ZahurFunding: NSF, AFOSR, Google

Not Used

Multi-Party Computation for the Masses

Technology

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