Mpfi Raina

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    1. Amendments to Interoperability Standards forMobile Payments

    2. Discussion paper on Security for Mobile payments

    Dr Gaurav RainaDepartment of Electrical EngineeringIIT Madras

    E-mail : [email protected]

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    Challenges for Mobile Payments

    InteroperabilitySecurityUniversalityUsabilityPrivacyTrust

    CostPerformance

    Cross-border payments

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    Interoperability Standards V1.10

    TSP Telecommunication Service Provider

    MPP Mobile Payment Provider

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    Interoperability Standards V1.A

    MMID Mobile Money Identifier

    Was uploaded to MPFI website: 29 Nov, 2010

    Request for comments by 15 Dec, 2010

    Bank

    Customer

    MPP

    Each mobile number will be linkedto a bank account

    Central Switch/ settlement agency

    Bank

    Customer

    MPPBeneficiarys mobile number,MMID, Amount

    Core BankingSystem (CBS)

    Core BankingSystem (CBS)

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    Discussion paper onSecurity for Mobile payments

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    BackgroundInteroperability Standards for Mobile Payments

    Technology Sub-Committee for Mobile Payments Security Discussion Paper on Mobile Payment Security, 7 th Feb 2011 Discussion Paper to eventually turn into a Standards Document

    Institutions part of the Technology Sub-Committee

    Tata Teleservices Ltd

    IDRBT

    mCheck

    Comviva Technologies LtdICICI Bank

    IIT Madras

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    Objectives and scope of Discussion Paper To undertake an assessment of the key security concerns for mobile

    payments

    Identify the threats and vulnerabilities for mobile payments

    Recommendations for minimizing/eliminating the identified threats

    Identify the main security breach points

    (1) Mobile device level

    (2) Application level

    (3) Channel level

    Then consider each of the breach points from the perspective of(1) Technology

    (2) Interoperability Standards

    (3) Operative guidelines set out by the RBI

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    RBI Security Guidelines

    Authentication banks providing mobile banking services shallcomply with the following security principles and practices forthe Authentication of mobile banking transactions:

    A. All mobile banking shall be permitted only by validation througha two factor authentication.

    B. One of the factors of authentication shall be mPIN, or any otherhigher standard.

    C. Where mPIN is used, end-to-end encryption of the mPIN isdesirable; i.e. mPIN shall not be in clear text anywhere in thenetwork.

    D. The mPIN shall be stored in a secure environment.

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    Interoperability

    Bank

    Customer

    MPP

    Each mobile number will be linkedto a bank account

    Central Switch/ settlement agency

    Bank

    Customer

    MPPBeneficiarys mobile number,MMID, Amount

    Core BankingSystem (CBS)

    Core BankingSystem (CBS)

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    Interfaces in a Transaction flow

    Wireless Interface

    Customer-to-MPP

    Wired InterfacesMPP-to-Bank

    Bank-to-CBS

    Bank-to-Bank

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    Template for evaluating alltechnologies

    Capability of the phone

    Positive features

    Compliance with RBI guidelines

    Other aspectsKey concerns

    Key recommendations

    CustomersBanks

    Etc.

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    IVR

    BTS Base Transceiver Station

    BSC Base Station Controller

    HLR Home Location Registry

    MPP Mobile Payment Provider

    SMSC SMS Message Switching Centre

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    IVRCapability of the phone

    All Handsets

    Positive Features

    Different levels of literacy

    Very secure with voice biometrics

    Easy to use

    Cost per transaction is low

    Compliance with RBI guidelines

    Yes, with voice biometrics

    Other aspects

    Voice biometrics not standardized

    Different implementations / solutions could have different performance

    Interact through the use of voice & DTMF keypad inputs

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    IVR

    key concerns / recommendations

    If DTMF tones used to transfer information possibility of tapping anddeciphering confidential data

    Recommended to use voice biometrics

    Security of database / transaction logs where confidential information maybe stored, either by design or inadvertently

    Security audits can eliminate this concern

    Voice biometrics or other authentication data should be stored inencrypted form

    For concerns over called ID and replay attacks, liveness test should beused.

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    Sub working groupsSMS and USSD

    Comviva and Eko

    IVR

    Comviva, Voxta, Uniphore

    Mobile browsing services Paladion Networks and RS Software

    Advanced application services (J2ME)

    Comviva, Paladion Networks, RS Software and VoxtaSim application ToolKit (STK)

    Syscom

    Emerging Technologies (NFC)

    Samsung

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    Other relevant documents

    1. Working Group on Information Security, Electronic Banking, Technology RiskManagement and Cyber Frauds.

    Report and Recommendations , Reserve Bank of India, Jan 2011

    2. Amended IT Act 2008

    Request for someone in MPFI who has a strong technological and legalunderstanding to work with the TSC to assess the relevance of therecommendations in the context of the Amended IT Act, and vice versa.

    Example, recommended to adopt Wireless PKI.

    Q: Does this meet the reliability criteria as given in the Amended IT Act, 2008?

    If yes, the MPFI can recommend Department of Information Technology to includeWPKI legality while framing and notifying rules for Electronic Signature.

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    Summary

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    Next Steps

    Develop a thorough, in depth, understanding of all technologieswith respect to security and end-to-end performance

    Review all recommendations in the context of the Amended IT Act,2008

    Work towards a Standards Document

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    Case 1. bearer services (SMS, USSD, IVR)

    key concerns

    Mobile Device Level

    SMS's being sent & received are automatically saved

    USSD session with AT commands

    Channel Level

    Security might be compromised in

    Telecom Switching network

    Database level

    Real Threat lies in Transaction logs

    Weak Encryption

    Unilateral Authentication

    Over-The-Air cracking

    SMS spoofing

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    Case 1. bearer services (SMS, USSD, IVR)

    key recommendations

    Customer

    Donot store any confidential messages/information on the phoneDelete the already sent mobile payment messages that containsensitive information

    Banks

    Imposing threshold on the amount of transaction based on the riskperspective

    Educating the customers on best practices of Mobile paymentssecurity

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    Case 2. mobile browsing services (HTTPS, WAP)

    BTS Base Transceiver Station

    BSC Base Station Controller

    HLR Home Location Registry

    MPP Mobile Payment Provider

    SMSC SMS Message Switching Centre

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    Wireless Application Protocol (WAP)

    Capability of the phone

    Only in advanced handsets

    Positive feature

    Open standard for application layer network communicationsCompliance with RBI guidelines

    End to end security possible

    Other aspects

    WAP browser access the websites written in WML

    WAP based applications use GPRS as the data transport layer and issecured either by

    Encryption provided by GPRS

    Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS)

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    Case 3. advanced application services (J2ME )

    BTS Base Transceiver Station

    BSC Base Station Controller

    HLR Home Location Registry

    MPP Mobile Payment Provider

    SMSC SMS Message Switching Centre

    M bil t li ti

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    Mobile payment application:in phone memory

    Capability of the phoneToday, most handsets support Java (J2ME)

    Positive feature

    Easy to use, menu drivenCompliance with RBI guidelines

    End to end security possible

    Other aspectsApplications in Java (J2ME) for GSM handsets, BREW for CDMA

    Storage of clients credentials

    Inside the SIM

    RMS (record management system)

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    Case 3. advanced application services (J2ME)

    key concerns

    Mobile Device Level

    Information stored in Record Management System (RMS) can beread easily

    Random numbers used in key generation can be guessed by analert hacker

    Authentication check if performed by the client side applicationposes a serious threat

    Channel Level

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    Case 3. advanced application services (J2ME)

    key recommendations

    Bank

    Store the sensitive information in an encrypted format

    Symmetric key encryption can be used if shared key can bestored in a secure environment

    Hybrid Protocols like SSL (Employs both Symmetric & Asymmetrickey Encryption) is preferred

    Authenticity check should be performed at the server side

    Timestamps/One-time-password can be used to counter replayattacks

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    Case 4. SIM application toolkit (STK)

    BTS Base Transceiver Station

    BSC Base Station Controller

    HLR Home Location Registry

    MPP Mobile Payment Provider

    SMSC SMS Message Switching Centre

    Mobile pa ment application:

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    Mobile payment application:embedded in the SIM

    Capability of the phoneCan be implemented in all handsets

    Positive feature

    Easy to use, no need to install applicationCompliance with RBI guidelines

    End to end secure

    Other aspectsInformation in SIM is protected using crypto algorithms & keys

    Applications developed using SIM Application Toolkit (SAT) & JavaCard

    Application can be stamped either in

    Manufacturing phase or Dynamically installed through Over The Air

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    Case 4 . SIM application toolkit (STK)

    key concerns

    Mobile Device Level

    Downloading of Applets is a time consuming process

    Slowness of the Key generation & Signature process

    Generated signatures may not be qualified

    Mobile malware like keylogging trojan

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    Case 4. SIM application toolkit (STK)

    key recommendations

    Customer

    Ensuring mobile handset free from virus by having an up to date Anti-virus

    Bank Use Symmetric Encryption and store the key inside a SIM in anencrypted format

    Adopt Wireless Public Key Infrastructure (WPKI)

    Telecommunication Service Provider (TSP)Increase the processing abilities a SIM card

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    Some recent references

    Working Group on Information Security, Electronic Banking,Technology Risk Management and Cyber Frauds.Report and Recommendations , Reserve Bank of India, Jan 2011

    Securing Mobile Payments: Modelling, Design, and Analysisby Supakorn Kungpisdan, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010