Motion to Quash Cases

7/29/2019 Motion to Quash Cases

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PP vs. NITAFAN

G.R. No. 81559-60 April 6, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, (public petitioner) and ALLIED BANKINGCORPORATION (private petitioner),

vs.HON. JUDGE DAVID G. NITAFAN (public respondent) and BETTY SIA ANG (private respondent).

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:

This petition forcertiorariinvolves an issue that has been raised before this Court several times inthe past. The petitioner, in effect, is asking for a re-examination of our decisions on the issue ofwhether or not an entrustee in a trust receipt agreement who fails to deliver the proceeds of the saleor to return the goods if not sold to the entruster-bank is liable for the crime of estafa.

Petitioner Allied Banking Corporation charged Betty Sia Ang with estafa in Criminal Case No. 87-53501 in an information which alleged:

That on or about July 18, 1980, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,being then the proprietress of Eckart Enterprises, a business entity located at 756Norberto Amoranto Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully andfeloniously defraud the Allied Banking Corporation, a banking institution, representedby its Account Officer, Raymund S. Li, in the following manner, to wit: the saidaccused received in trust from the aforesaid bank Gordon Plastics, plastic sheetingand Hook Chromed, in the total amount of P398,000.00, specified in a trust receiptand covered by Domestic Letter of Credit No. DLC-002-801254, under the expressobligation on the part of said accused to sell the same and account for the proceeds

of the sale thereof, if sold, or to return said merchandise, if not sold, on or beforeOctober 16, 1980, or upon demand, but the said accused, once in possession of thesaid articles, far from complying with the aforesaid obligation, notwithstandingrepeated demands made upon her to that effect, paid only the amount ofP283,115.78, thereby leaving unaccounted for the amount of P114,884.22 which,once in her possession, with intent to defraud, she misappropriated, misapplied andconverted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said

Allied Banking Corporation in the aforesaid sum of P114,884.22, Philippine Currency.(Rollo, pp. 13-14)

The accused filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do notconstitute an offense.

On January 7, 1988, the respondent judge granted the motion to quash. The order was anchored onthe premise that a trust receipt transaction is an evidence of a loan being secured so that there is, asbetween the parties to it, a creditor-debtor relationship. The court ruled that the penal clause ofPresidential Decree No. 15 on the Trust Receipts Law is inoperative because it does not actuallypunish an offense mala prohibita. The law only refers to the relevant estafa provision in the RevisedPenal Code. The Court relied on the judicial pronouncements inPeople v. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 312[1981] where, for lack of the required number of votes, this Court upheld the dismissal of a chargefor estafa for a violation of a trust receipt agreement; and in Sia v. People, 121 SCRA 655 [1983]where we held that the violation merely gives rise to a civil obligation. At the time the order to quash


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was issued or on January 7, 1988, these two decisions were the only most recent ones. Hence, thispetition.

The private respondent adopted practically the same stance of the lower court. She likewise assertsthat P.D. 115 is unconstitutional as it violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment fornon-payment of a debt. She argues that where no malice exists in a breach of a purely commercial

undertaking, P.D. 115 imputes it.

This Court notes that the petitioner bank brought a similar case before this Court in G.R. No. 82495,entitledAllied Banking Corporation v. Hon. Secretary Sedfrey Ordoez and Alfredo Chingwhich wedecided on December 10, 1990 (192 SCRA 246). In that case, the petitioner additionally questioned,and we accordingly reversed, the pronouncement of the Secretary of Justice limiting the applicationof the penal provision of P.D. 115 only to goods intended to be sold to the exclusion of those still tobe manufactured.

As in G.R. No. 82495, we resolve the instant petition in the light of the Court's ruling in Lee v.Rodil, 175SCRA 100 [1989] and Sia v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 263 [1988]. We have held inthe latter cases that acts involving the violation of trust receipt agreements occurring after 29

January 1973 (date of enactment of P.D. 115) would make the accused criminally liable for estafaunder paragraph 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) pursuant to the explicitprovision in Section 13 of P.D. 115.

The relevant penal provision of P.D. 115 provides:

Sec. 13 of P.D. No. 115 provides:

. . . Penalty clause. The failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of thesale of the goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extentof the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to returnsaid goods, documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of inaccordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa,punishable under the provisions of Article Three Hundred and Fifteen, paragraph one(b) of Act Numbered Three Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifteen, as amended,otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. If the violation or offense is committedby a corporation, partnership, association or other juridical entities, thepenaltyprovidedfor in this Decree shall be imposed upon the directors, officers,employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense, withoutprejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense.

Section 1 (b), Article 315 of the RPC under which the violation is made to fall, states:

. . . Swindling(estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the meansmentioned herein below . . . :

xxx xxx xxx

b. By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, orany other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or foradministration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of orto return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed bya bond; or by denying having received such money, good, or other property.


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The factual circumstances in the present case show that the alleged violation was committedsometime in 1980 or during the effectivity of P.D. 115. The failure, therefore, to account for theP114,884.22 balance is what makes the accused-respondent criminally liable for estafa. The Courtreiterates its definitive ruling that, in the Cuevo and Sia(1983) cases relied upon by the accused,P.D. 115 was not applied because the questioned acts were committed before its effectivity. (Lee v.Rodil, supra, p. 108) At the time those cases were decided, the failure to comply with the obligations

under the trust receipt was susceptible to two interpretations. The Court in Sia adopted the view thata violation gives rise only to a civil liability as the more feasible view "before the promulgation of P.D.115," notwithstanding prior decisions where we ruled that a breach also gives rise to a liability forestafa. (People v. Yu Chai Ho, 53 Phil. 874 [1929]; Samo v. People, 115 Phil. 346 [1962]; PhilippineNational Bank v. Arrozal, 103 Phil. 213 [1958]; Philippine National Bank v. Viuda e Hijos de AngelJose, 63 Phil. 814 [1936]).

Contrary to the reasoning of the respondent court and the accused, a trust receipt arrangement doesnot involve a simple loan transaction between a creditor and debtor-importer. Apart from a loanfeature, the trust receipt arrangement has a security feature that is covered by the trust receipt itself.(Vintola v. Insular Bank of Asia and America, 151 SCRA 578 [1987]) That second feature is whatprovides the much needed financial assistance to our traders in the importation or purchase ofgoods or merchandise through the use of those goods or merchandise as collateral for theadvancements made by a bank. (Samo v. People, supra). The title of the bank to the security is theone sought to be protected and not the loan which is a separate and distinct agreement.

The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of moneyor goods to the prejudice of another regardless of whether the latter is the owner or not. The lawdoes not seek to enforce payment of the loan. Thus, there can be no violation of a right againstimprisonment for non-payment of a debt.

Trust receipts are indispensable contracts in international and domestic business transactions. Theprevalent use of trust receipts, the danger of their misuse and/or misappropriation of the goods orproceeds realized from the sale of goods, documents or instruments held in trustfor entruster-banks,and the need for regulation of trust receipt transactions to safeguard the rights and enforce the

obligations of the parties involved are the main thrusts of P.D. 115. As correctly observed by theSolicitor General, P.D. 115, like Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, punishes the act "not as an offenseagainst property, but as an offense against public order. . . ." The misuse of trust receipts thereforeshould be deterred to prevent any possible havoc in trade circles and the banking community (citingLozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 [1986]; Rollo, p. 57) It is in the context of upholding publicinterest that the law now specifically designates a breach of a trust receipt agreement to be an actthat "shall" make one liable for estafa.

The offense is punished as a malum prohibitum regardless of the existence of intent or malice. Amere failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold, constitutes a criminal offensethat causes prejudice not only to another, but more to the public interest.

We are continually re-evaluating the opposite view which insists that the violation of a trust receiptagreement should result only in a civil action for collection. The respondent contends that there is nomalice involved. She cites the dissent of the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in Ong v. Court of

Appeals, (124 SCRA 578 [1983]) to wit:

The old capitalist orientation of putting importers in jail for supposed estafa orswindling for non-payment of the price of the imported goods released to them undertrust receipts (a purely commercial transaction) under the fiction of the trust receiptdevice, should no longer be permitted in this day and age.


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As earlier stated, however, the law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handlingof money or goods to the prejudice of the bank.

The Court reiterates that the enactment of P.D. 115 is a valid exercise of the police power of theState and is, thus, constitutional. (Lee v. Rodil, supra; Lozano v. Martinez, supra) The arguments ofthe respondent are appropriate for a repeal or modification of the law and should be directed to

Congress. But until the law is repealed, we are constrained to apply it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the respondent Regional Trial Courtof Manila, Branch 52 dated January 7, 1988 is SET ASIDE. Let this case be remanded to the saidcourt for disposition in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

GARCIA vs. CA

GO vs BSP

PEOPLE vs TABIO

G.R. No. 179477 February 6, 2008

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,vs.JIMMY TABIO, appellant.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J .:

Appellant Jimmy Tabio was charged with three (3) counts of rape in a single Information,1theaccusatory portion of which reads as follows:

That between June 13, 2002 and June 28, 2002 in [Aurora2] the said accused, did then andthere, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully, have carnal knowledge of mentally retarded

AAA3by means of force and intimidation three times all committed while the victim was aloneinside their house and during nighttime which was taken advantage of to facilitate thecommission of the crime.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora,Branch 96.4Trial on the merits ensued. The victim, AAA testified that one night in June 2002, whileshe was alone in her home, appellant entered her house. He pressed a knife on AAAs breast,removed her clothing, fondled her breast, undressed himself, and mounted her as she was seatedon a bed. He inserted his penis in her vagina and ejaculated. AAA was able to recognize theappellant as her house was lighted with a gas lamp. AAA further testified that the appellant on twosucceeding occasions again entered her home and repeated the same acts on her. 5
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Other witnesses for the prosecution presented testimony concerning AAAs mental condition. Adoctor6who had trained with the National Center for Mental Health testified that he had examined

AAA and concluded that while she was 23 years old at the time of the rape, she nonetheless had themental age of a six-year old child.7AAAs mother and grand aunt also testified on her mentalretardation and the occurrences after she had reported the rape to them.8

Appellant testified in his own behalf, denying that he had raped AAA and offering as alibi that he wasup in the mountain at the time of the rape.9Appellants wife10and his brother-in-law, JaimeBautista,11tried to corroborate his alibi through their own testimony.

On 25 November 2003, the RTC handed down a decision finding appellant guilty and imposing thepenalty of death on three (3) counts of qualified rape, defined in Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) andpenalized under Article 266-B, paragraph 6 (10) of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC also orderedappellant to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.12The records ofthe case were thereafter forwarded to this Court on automatic review. On 7 June 2005, the Courtissued a Resolution13transferring the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.14

The Court of Appeals15affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. The appellate court

found appellant guilty of all three (3) counts for simple rape only and not qualified rape. It alsoreduced the civil indemnity to P50,000.00 and added an award of P25,000.00 as exemplarydamages.16

The case is again before us for our final disposition. Appellant had assigned three (3) errors in hisappeal initially passed upon by the Court of Appeals, to wit: whether the RTC erred in finding himguilty of qualified rape with the penalty of death in view of the prosecutions failure to allege aqualifying circumstance in the information; whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of all three (3)counts of rape despite the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonabledoubt; and whether the RTC erred in awarding P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.

The Court of Appeals properly resolved the first error in appellants favor. The information shouldhave warranted a judgment of guilt only for simple, not qualified rape. We quote with approval the

appellate court when it said:

Under Article 266-B(10)17of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of themental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission ofthe rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty.Rule 110[16of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and aggravatingcircumstances to be alleged with specificity in the information.[16

In the case at bench, however, the information merely states that the appellant had carnalknowledge with a mentally retarded complainant. It does not state that appellant knew of themental disability of the complainant at the time of the commission of the crime. It bearsstressing that the rules now require that the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the

imposition of the death penalty should be specifically stated in the information. Article 266-B(10) of the Revised Penal Code could not, thus, be applied and the supreme penalty of deathcould not be validly imposed.20

Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear and unequivocal that both qualifying andaggravating circumstances must be alleged with specificity in the information.
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The Court also observes that there is duplicity21of the offenses charged in the information, which is aground for a motion to quash.22Three (3) separate acts of rape were charged in one informationonly. But the failure of appellant to interpose an objection on this ground constitutes waiver.23

We turn to the second issue. While the Court affirms that appellant is guilty of simple rape, wenonetheless find that only the first rape was conclusively proven. The second and third rapes of

which appellant was charged and found guilty, were not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Our courts have been traditionally guided by three settled principles in the prosecution of the crimeof rape: (1) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult todisprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must bescrutinized with utmost caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own meritsand cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.24In a prosecution forrape, the complainants candor is the single most important issue. If a complainants testimonymeets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the sole basis thereof.25

We have thoroughly examined AAAs testimony and found nothing that would cast doubt on thecredibility of her account of the first rape. We quote the pertinent portion of her testimony:

PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness

x x x

Q Did you have any occasion to see Jimmy inside your house in June 2002?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What time was that?

A Night time, Sir.

x x x

Q You said that Jimmy went inside your house. What did he do there?

A He fondled my breast, Sir.

Q Did you have your clothes on when Jimmy Tabio went to your house?

A Yes, sir.

x x x

Q Dont be ashamed. You said that you have your clothes on. When Jimmy saw you whatdid he do with your clothes, if any?

A He removed my dress, Sir.

x x x
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Q So you are now without clothes because you said Jimmy removed your clothes.What did he do after removing your clothes?

A He placed himself on top of me.

COURT: to the witness

Q Was he standing when Jimmy mounted on you?

A I was sitting, Sir.


Q When Jimmy placed himself on top of you was he dressed or nude?

A He was naked, Sir.

Q You said that he placed himself on top of you. What did Jimmy do while he was on topof you?

A He pressed a knife on me.

Q On what part of your body did he press the knife?

A Here, Sir. (Witness indicated the upper part of her left breast)

Q What else did Jimmy do aside from pressing the knife near your breast?

A Jimmy was in our house, Sir.

Q Do you know what penis is?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Do you know what Jimmy did with hs penis?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What did he do with his penis?

A He placed his penis to my vagina.

Q What did you feel when Jimmy did that?

A I felt pain, Sir.

Q After Jimmy inserted his penis in your vagina, what else did he do?

A Nothing more, Sir.


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Q Did he move while he was on top of you?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Can you demonstrate his movement while he was on top of you?

A (Witness indicated the movement by moving her body.)

x x x


Q What else did you notice while the penis of Jimmy was in your vagina?

A There was some kind of milk, Sir.

COURT: to the witness

Q Where?

A In my vagina, Sir.


Q Why did you notice that? What did you do?

A I watched my vagina, Sir.

Q That is why you saw that thing which looks like milk?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Now, it was night time when Jimmy went into your house, is it not?

A Yes, Sir.

Q How were you able to see Jimmy while it was night time?

A I have a light, Sir.

Q What kind of light was that?

A Gas l[a]mp, Sir.26(Emphasis supplied.)

AAA never wavered in her assertion that appellant raped her. AAAs testimony is distinctively clear,frank and definite without any pretension or hint of a concocted story despite her low intelligence ascan be gleaned from her answers in the direct examination. The fact of her mental retardation doesnot impair the credibility of her unequivocal testimony. AAAs mental deficiency lends greatercredence to her testimony for someone as feeble-minded and guileless as her could not speak so
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tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at thehands of the appellant.27

Appellants denials and alibi, which are merely self-serving evidence, cannot prevail over thepositive, consistent and straightforward testimony of AAA. Alibi is an inherently weak defensebecause it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce

clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time thecrime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of thecrime when it was committed.28We have meticulously reviewed the records and found no

justification to deviate from the findings of fact of the trial court that

Accuseds alibi that he was in the mountain gathering woods during the period when [AAA]was raped deserves no consideration. When the accused took the witness stand, he gave anevasive, confused and vague account of his whereabouts at the time the crime wascommitted as well as with respect to the distance of his whereabouts from the locus criminis.

Accuseds wife and his brother-in-law tried to corroborate his (accuseds) testimony that hewas in the mountain during the commission of rape but to no avail.

x x x

In the instant case, the distance of the place where the accused allegedly was is less thanhalf a kilometer (200 meters) which could be negotiated in less than an hour. x x x29

However, as to the alleged second and third rape, we find that the prosecution failed to establishbeyond reasonable doubt the elements of the offense e.g., carnal knowledge and force orintimidation. The only evidence presented to prove the two other charges were AAAs monosyllabicaffirmative answers to two leading questions if appellant repeated during the second and third timeshe was in her house what he had done during the first time. We quote that only portion of AAAstestimony relating to the second and third alleged rapes, to wit:


Q You said that Jimmy went to your house three times. What did he do during the secondtime?

A He entered our house, Sir.

Q Yes, he entered your house. Did he repeat what he did during the first time.

A Yes, Sir.

Q How about the third time? What did he do?

A He has a knife, Sir.

Q Yes. Did he repeat what he did during the first time?

A Yes, Sir.30(Emphasis supplied)

AAAs testimony on these two later rapes was overly generalized and lacked many specific detailson how they were committed. Her bare statement that appellant repeated what he had done to her
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the first time is inadequate to establish beyond reasonable doubt the alleged second and third rapes.Whether or not he raped her is the fact in issue which the court must determine31based on theevidence offered. The prosecution must demonstrate in sufficient detail the manner by which thecrime was perpetrated. Certainly, the testimony of AAA to the effect that the appellant repeated whathe did in the first rape would not be enough to warrant the conclusion that the second and third rapehad indeed been committed. Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that

each of them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The quantum of evidence in criminalcases requires more than that.

In the case ofPeople v. Garcia,32wherein the appellant was charged with 183 counts of rape, weheld that:

x x x Be that as it may, however, on the bases of the evidence adduced by the prosecution,appellant can be convicted only of the two rapes committed in November, [sic] 1990 and on July 21,1994 as testified to by complainant, and for the eight counts of rape committed in May and June andon July 16, 1994 as admitted in appellants aforementioned letter of August 24, 1994. We cannotagree with the trial court that appellant is guilty of 183 counts of rape because, as correctlyasserted by the defense, each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime sothat each of them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On that score alone, theindefinite testimonial evidence that complainant was raped every week is decidedlyinadequate and grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of appellant therefor with therequired quantum of evidence. So much of such indefinite imputations of rape, which areuncorroborated by any other evidence, fall within this category.33(Emphasis supplied)

We must uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused when theevidence at hand falls short of the quantum required to support conviction.

As to the civil liability of appellant, we affirm the reduction by the appellate court of the civil indemnitytoP50,000.00 only, as well as the additional award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, but onrather different premises, considering our conclusion that he is only guilty of one, not three counts ofrape.

The civil indemnity awarded to the victims of qualified rape shall not be less than seventy-fivethousand pesos (P75,000.00),34and P50,000.00 for simple rape.35This civil indemnity is awarded foreach and every count of rape, such that one found guilty of two counts of simple rape would be liableto pay P50,000.00 for each count, orP100,000.00 in all.

We note that the appellate court implicitly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for all three countsof simple rape. Such award would have been improper for a conviction for three counts of simplerape.36Still, because appellant is guilty of one count of simple rape, P50,000.00 still emerges as theappropriate amount of civil indemnity.

In addition, the victim or heirs, as the case may be, can also recover moral damages pursuant to

Article 2219 of the Civil Code. In rape cases, moral damages are awarded without need of proofother than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitlingher to such an award.37In this respect, we agree with the appellate court in the award of P50,000.00as moral damages. The appellate courts award ofP25,000.00 as exemplary damages by way ofpublic example is also proper.38

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01301 is AFFIRMEDWITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is found GUILTY of only ONE count of simple rape and

ACQUITTED of the TWO other counts of qualified rape. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the
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penalty reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay to the victim P50,000.00 as civilindemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

MIRANDA vs. TULIAO

G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,vs.VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18December 2002 Decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assaileddecision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, theinstant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUECOURSE, and it is hereby ordered:

1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, JointOrder dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two(2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad inCriminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE forhaving been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Orderdated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting PresidingJudge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;

2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in thedocket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City,Isabela; and

3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrantsof Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 AlbertoP. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal CasesNos. 36-3523 and 36-3524.2

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
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On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, whichwere later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of privaterespondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan,SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.

The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of theaccused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who wasyet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automaticreview where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonabledoubt.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a swornconfession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P.Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths ofVicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, andAmado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, ActingPresiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2Maderal.

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, toreinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.

In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence ofpetitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the courtdid not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. Inthe meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to theDepartment of Justice.

On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued aJoint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered thecancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Orderto petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S.Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed forthe inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.

On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition withthis Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from

further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of JudgeAnghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.

On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporaryrestraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly afterthe aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissingthe two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note ofrespondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the


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temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on themerits.

Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, allegingthat Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21

November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to itof respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petitionand ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as theissuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for areconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.

Hence, this petition.

The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following assignmentsof error:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside theJoint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16,2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erredin upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting PresidingJudge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if hedoes not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement ofCriminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of theRegional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issuethe warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering thereinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal casesof Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the publicrespondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issuedtherein having become final and executory.

Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person ofthe accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals rulingthat:

[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of thecourt. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory


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process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when hesurrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdictionover his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V.Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed inthe custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3

Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon andDalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived oftheir liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; toreinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4

Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person ofthe accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming thatsuch jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash thewarrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by theirfiling of the above Urgent Motion.

In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for bail,

petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:

Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over theperson of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the caseeven before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized underSection 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules onSummary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed onmotion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In PaulRoberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of awarrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs.Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from theSandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probablecause.6

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filingof the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D.Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, isaccomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or otherpleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain theprovisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of theaccused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction overthe person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, butis not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mereapplication therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of theaccused.8Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9while

jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntaryappearance.10One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of thecourt over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion beforearraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the
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court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapescustody after his trial has commenced.11Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on theperson, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to thewill of the law.12Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, butis not limited to, detention.

The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr.,13

cited by the Court of Appeals should not have beenseparated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone notyet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:

A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of hisliberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invokethe processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereaboutsof the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before consideringthe application for bail.13

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as ageneral rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of

the court.

15

As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant beingin the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan,16we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secureones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the securityrequired and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law." The rationale behindthis special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practicewherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the

jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirementstherefor.17

There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes

voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of thecourt. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdictionof the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases,motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether ornot other grounds for dismissal are included;18(2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complainton the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash awarrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitutea waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the factthat it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accusedthat is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the

accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief,except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdictionover his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invokethe processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody ofthe law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he mustfirst submit himself to the custody of the law.

In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused isdeemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
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Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The followingcases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in thecustody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court.Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an informationdue to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:

1. In Allado v. Diokno,19

on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lackof probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing thewarrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and,instead, to elevate the records to us.

2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings and toHold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Reviewwith the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist fromfurther proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against theaccused.

3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan totransfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants ofarrest.

We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail arenot present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons notin the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain atlarge, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is provenguilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custodyof the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free.This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or nothe followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny themotion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the

case.

Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues inforce and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time ofthe day and night.22Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him inthe determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.

In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous torequire one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference inthe hierarchy of rights than property rights,23demanding that due process in the deprivation of libertymust come before its taking and not after.

Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary ofJustice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse ofdiscretion.

We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. JudgeAnghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, hequashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filedappeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable causedue to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors
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resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another casewith different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restrainingorder against further proceeding with the case.

After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed theassistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after

assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to JudgeAnghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is butproper."24

Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan aslacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners

just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to theSecretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrantsof arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolutionis not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.

In Webb v. de Leon,25we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the

information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverseresolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrestagainst petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground.

The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true:violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:

In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutionalproscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of CriminalProcedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal ofthe arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contentionof herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26

Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated byJudge Tumaliuan:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects againstunreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, andno search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and thewitnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons orthings to be seized.27

However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to theresolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad

gravely abused his discretion.

According to petitioners:

In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparentfrom the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable cause wasbased on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personallymade by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expresslyand clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscals certification.28
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Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such indication that he reliedsolely on the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:

Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determinethe existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]

The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was accompanied by supportingdocuments, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30and People v. Inting.31The supportingdocuments are the following:

1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;

2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;

3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;

4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de laCruz;

5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;

6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in CriminalCase No. 97-160355;

7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;

8. Information dated 22 June 2001;

9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and

10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.

Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan ofArticle III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part ofsaid section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghadruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was givenafter almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given bysomeone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given inexchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during theelection period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted againsteach other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S.Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32

We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the findings ofprobable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.

It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within theprovince of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb33:

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crimehas been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on
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clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonabledoubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegarv. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less thanevidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over thesuspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summarymanner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.

Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with differentaccused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there wasa petition for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice.However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghadsummarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the followingexplanation:

Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila,and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with himand the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the SupremeCourt absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration offalsehood and lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who were likewisefalsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt thatRodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same iswithout probable value." This Court agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use isMaderals statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence presented andadduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in thesetwo (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his statementsis practically nil.

x x x x

This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, prayingfor the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of theSupreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting theaccused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in thatcase. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordereddismissed.34

This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision andinterpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of theprosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused

therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused forthe same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that ourdecision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leao that the crime did nothappen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, sincethe prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even thesituation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness:Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son,whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before theSenate Blue Ribbon Committee.
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It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leao, "it is nowbeyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and thereforethe same is without probable value."35On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision inLeao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of theprosecutions version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria ofprobable cause.

We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two days after weresolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from furtherproceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. Whilethe dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order,such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Courts resolve to issue a TRO againstJudge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.

Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside bythe nullified proceeding.

In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or

reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad toissue apparently new warrants of arrest.36According to the petitioners, it was an error for the Courtof Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause.

We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest ormerely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely amatter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect thedispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of

Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appealslikewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration ofnullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside bythe nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified;

therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.

Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based ona determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so. Therecords of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are alsoavailable to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine therecords of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in

Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not reston a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable causeof the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can alsooverrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of graveabuse of discretion.

There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment

In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversibleerror in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that theorder of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According to petitioners:

It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliaos
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Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court ofAppeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the following Ordersissued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit:

1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;

2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;

3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and

4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.

Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissedCriminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/JointOrders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the JointOrder of November 14, 2001.38

Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and

Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appealsdecided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Suchpetition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order.Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing withthis Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberatelyand willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred saidmotion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliaos petition forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming

that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order,respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse ofdiscretion.

Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge

Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bondin the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.

While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience tolawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which requirethe granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,39the prayer to cite public

respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should beconstrued to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.

In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitutedouble jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned andit was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40
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