Motion and Sugg Deny Def Mot Dismis

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'IN THE 7 JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSOURI

COUNTY OF CLAY - DIVISION 2William Duff, ) CASE NO. 07CY-CV06125

Plaintiff, )) ACTIONv. ) FORTRESPASS, AND) TRESPASS ON THE CASE

OFFICER WILLIAM FRAZIER, (SERIAL 3092) )AND )OFFICER ALAN ROTH (SERIAL #4090) ) VERIFIED

Defendants. )MOTION TO DENY DEFENDANT MOTION FOR DISMISSAL - Filed after 8-16-07

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, William Duff, and moves this court to deny defendants motion todismiss, to wit;Plaintiff invites this court to take cognizance of the suggestions supporting this motion(hereon attached)

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff moves this court to deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for goodcause shown and for all other consideration this court can and should provide.

- e > 7William DuffPlaintiffCc: William Duff to: [email protected],William Frazier and Alan Roth to: 1001 NW Barry Rd. PlaceKansas City, Missouri C/O KCMO Police Department - North DivisionEMILY A. DODGE Assistant Attorney General at; ag(o),ago.mo.gov andemily.dodgefq),ago.mo.gov

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William Duff,Plaintiff,v .

IN THE 7THJUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSOURICOUNTY OF CLAY - DIVISION 2

) CASE NO. 07CY-CV06125) ACTION) FOR TRESPASS, AND) TRESPASS ON THE CASE

OFFICER WILLIAM FRAZEER, (SERIAL 3092)ANDOFFICER ALAN ROTH (SERIAL # 4090)Defendants. ) VERIFIED

SUGGESTIONS FOR MOTION TO DENY D EFENDANT MO TIONS FOR DISMISSAL -Filed after 8-16-07BACKGROUNDPlaintiff, no t waiving his right to default judgment in this case, if any is forthcom ing, recognizes theneed for the premises of this controversy to be clear an d understandable an d that it is long overdue fo rthe Missouri Attorney Generals office to provide a substantive and complete and competent opinionregarding the nature of the freedom of the people an d specifically Plaintiff, within Missouri, takes upthe issues presented by the learned Assistant A ttorney G eneral and her motions to dismiss an d invitessame to show by what authority the City and State profess to act respecting the controversy no w beforethis court respecting Plaintiffs Right of Action emanating from his own private dom ain vs. TheCity/State's Right to enforce regulations emanating from it's public domain.

Plaintiff contends and has adequ ately represented in the documents filed in this case; identifying theLaw, the Principals of Freedom and Self Governance and the attending Rights of Action associatedwith his Life, his Liberty and his Property, al l being solely within his own private domain, and thatsame are superior to statutory rights of governments respecting the attending premise and are at theheart of this controversy, to wit;

Plaintiffs Affidavit of Citizenship Status (exhibit D filed in this action and entered here as if written infull) fairly describes, and supports with Law and Principles of this society, the bright line boun daryexisting around his own private domain, within which he possesses sole Dominion, and across whichthe public domain of the State, city, an d county or their agents may not intrude upon without Plaintiffs

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CONSENT or evidence of his injury to another's person or p roperty (bad act). To do so would be aninjury to plaintiff. As such, there exists no Lawful au thority for the State/City or its agents to trespassinto pla intif fs ow n private domain against his will or without his bad act that could activate a publicdomain interest, even if it appears to some that such trespass m ight well be a "GOOD IDEA".

ANAL OGY; The one Law of this Society no one is excused not to know is; "W e have agreednot to harm (injure) one another". In comprehension of that law, Plaintiffs neighbor has nolawful authority to trespass upon plaintiffs own private domain without injuring plaintiff. Nordoes plaintiffs neighbor enhance his lawful authority or lawful capacity to act in this regard bycombining his lawful authority with others in this society through the democratic process, inthat all those other neighbors also don't possess the lawful authority to injure Plaintiff. If anindividual could not compel plaintiff to comply with his will without injuring plaintiff, underno circum stances could a collection of his equals (peers) do so without injuring Plaintiff. Andfurther, that collective could not lawfully hire an agent to take that action on their behalfwithout injuring Plaintiff. Since the state/city acquire all of its power an d public domain fromthe collective people themselves (as hired agents), through the democratic elements of oursociety, The State/City also could not possibly have lawful authority to trespass upon Plaintiffsow n private dom ain without injuring Plaintiff, in that the collective people did not have thatpower to grant to its agent as a lawful form of action where the action injures one of the peoplethe State was instituted to secure the Rights to Life, Liberty and Property of the peoplethemselves, not even if the collective believed that grant to be a "GOOD IDEA". Thisprinciple operates in the same way an d for the very sam e reasons respecting a state/city'sattempted trespass upo n the public Dom ain of the Federal Government. Federal Su prem eCourt decisions are replete with cases denying the state such trespass, (see in-depth reasoningof "private vs. pu blic domain" at www. wiiliamduff. com ) The State cannot claim it doesn't'understand this principle and at the sam e tim e expect to be taken seriously.

Obviously, Plaintiff does not consent respecting defendants charges and actions, nor have defendantsasserted that plaintiff has injured anyone or thing. Those facts are material to this controversy andmade unassailable by defendants ow n admissions. The offices held by def end an ts possessed of nolawful au thori ty to exceed its Lawful bounds, and no capacity to do so, save the choices o f action m ade

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by the holder of that office; the defendants. It is manifest to plaintiff that defendants had to havevacated their offices in order to perf orm the acts complained of here.

Plaintiff claims to possess Sovereign Imm unity from the charges by defendants respecting the actionsdefendants complain of, and plaintiff so stated and noticed these facts to defendants prior to defendantsbad acts (see Exhibit A of Plaintiffs action) and to the m uni court in which defendants sought remedyfor the charges they ma de (see plaintiffs answer to the charges) and in plaintiffs Notice and Demand,also filed as exhibit in this action. As such, defendants acts m ust clearly be willful and wanton if infact the actions complained o f by defe ndants are a ctually rights of action belonging to plaintiff asplaintiff contends.

Plaintiffs action sits to determine that very question. A m ere claim of a statutory a uthority by theState is not sufficient evidence that the State actually possesses the authority claimed. When areasonable challenge by one of the people is made to the States/Cities au thority that challengenecessarily implicates an action in the nature of a Writ of Quo Warranto; Show by what authoritydoes the State/City acts. A statutory claim, would not m eet that duty. A statute is a claim by the S tateof authority. It is not proof of the au thority itself.

Should defenda nts wish to claim they were compelled in their bad acts by other office holders, thisPlaintiff will accept affidavits from each defendant naming those office holders and plaintiff willgladly add them as defendan ts in this action seeking trespass on the case or vicarious liability.

REBUTTAL

Plaintiff invites this court to take cognizance of the facts and law applicable to this case as containedherein and in all the documents heretofore filed in this action by plaintiff and that filed as Answer tocharges brought by defendants in the Mu ni Court of Kansas City, M o. a nd all are entered here as ifwritten in full.

Defendant's Motion to dismiss (1) fails to com prehend the nature of this action and (2) wrongly"presumes" the mu ni court to ha ve jurisdiction of the person of this Plaintiff and the subject matter,

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(100 excepting, of course, by unlawful usurpation attended by force of arms. As such, the sufficiency of101 defendants pleading is wanting, to wit;102103 (1) This action seeks damages for injuries done by defendants in that the injurious acts exceeded104 the authority of the office of trust they held and were therefore a colorable assertion of105 authority. This action also seeks, in the nature of Quo Warranto, a clear statement of; By what106 Lawful Authority defendants claim to have acted? That element alone would stay the muni107 proceedingsuntil that question is explored and adjudicated.108 (2) This action seeks to assert Plaintiffs Right ofAction as is referenced above and in the109 documents filed in this case. This action makes no attempt to diminish the Municipal Courts110 lawful jurisdiction bu t only to determine the Rights of Plaintiff. The Municipal Court does not111 have the will, means, or authority to do so in its limited and inferior nature. TheRights of112 action being adjudicated in this court of record must first be decided before it can be assumed113 that the city possesses lawful authority to proceed in said Municipal Action. The State of114 Missouri's Judiciary has never adequately explored the premise presented here, though the115 judiciary claims to have settled the issue. If plaintiff is wrong I invite proof to the contrary.116 Defendants' motion for dismissal fails to comprehend these unassailable facts.117 (3) In rebuttal of defendant's "factual background", defendant's assertions, and all of them are in118 error and obviously only serves as an attempt to obscure Plaintiffs bright line boundary119 guarding his domain so that persons holding an office of trust have a plausible bu t wholly120 unlawful cover story for entering into Plaintiffs domain for the purpose of diminishinghis121 dominion thereof, to wit: plaintiff denies that he "resides" inKansas City when that term is122 legalese for him being a United States citizen "residing" anywhere. He is not and therefore123 does not, He exists within his own private property at all times relevant to this action as has124 been carefully described throughout the documents filed in this case. Defendants and their125 superiors have never provided any competent evidence to the contrary. Cities, counties and126 State office holders merely make the claim of authority, as defendants have done here, without127 any competent proof whatsoever that the claim is actually within their grant of power, and128 typically whatever court is hearing the matter accepts the claim on its face as evidence without129 proof. This act alone injures plaintiff especially when he provides unassailable, competent130 evidence of the facts he provides. Defendants facts are merely claims with nothing to support



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(131 them beyond the testimony of government office holders who are completely incompetent to132 testify before this court on any related issue without there being two non government witnesses133 in support. Defendant's Facts are in error for the following reasons; Plaintiffs 1996 Buick is134 not a "motor vehicle" as such term is comprehended by Missouri Statute. The car is private135 property (chattel) belonging solely to William Duff and if it is anybody's business, he uses it to136 travel upon the "public right of way" for his own personal enjoyment and enterprise, (see City137 of Chicago v. Collins et al., 175 111. 445, 51 N.E. 907 (Oct. 24 , 1898) copy of the full decision138 attached and accented on p o i n t . ) ; Respecting the license plate issue, defendants characterize it139 thusly: "2). Plaintiff also admits that the vehicle was not registered in Missouri and bore a14 0 license plate that Plaintiff fashioned himself" while the simple fact is that plaintiff has141 attached his private tag to his car as an inducement for people like defendants to ignore him14 2 and said tag represents no license as comprehended by the statute. It is merely camouflage14 3 being used for good cause in a world full of predators. Irrespective of that fact, the tag is144 the property of Plaintiff, and defendants taking of it can only be characterized as theft.145146 ARGUMENT147148 The action filed by defendants in the muni court is one of "presumed authority" to compel Mr. Duff to14 9 use his property only in a way that is authorizedby the State/city bu t with willful and wanton disregard150 of plaintiffs unwillingness to consent thereto upon subject matter that exists solely within Plaintiffs151 ow n private domain and without defendants alleging competent facts supporting an injury done by152 plaintiff to another, while this action is one that seeks to explore that presumption and agree or153 disagree therewith. Between the two jurisdictions, this jurisdiction is the only one that ca n fairly154 negotiate and accomplish that exploration and render a dispositive judgment as to its validity. As such155 this court is not robbing the muni court of its jurisdiction, it is simply staying the muni adjudication156 while this court decides the greater issue; That being; if Plaintiff does have a right of action that covers157 the acts complained of by defendants and has not ceded that right of action to the State/city the158 presumption of authority would be unfounded. It must be irrelevant that a decision on the greater issue159 in favor of plaintiff would void the muni action. The greater issue must first be decided before the160 lesser issue can lawfully continue.161



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As an anecdote, Plaintiff recognizes defendant's demur and is grateful for the admissions to all factsalleged herein.COGNIZANCE REQUESTED:Defendants, by and through their attorney and their first motion to dismiss have provided adm ission toall the facts alleged by Plaintiff in this action. Further, it appears that the law is the only rem ainingissue. Plaintiff also invites this court to take cognizance of the fact that defendants have provided nolaw in this case that would or even could assail the law provided by Plaintiff in that, all cases cited bydefendants emanate from a democratic process supporting a statutory jurisdiction that fails tocomprehend, let aione, rebut the su bject m atter at issue.

Defendants, by and through their a ttorney and their m otion to dismiss replevin, have again assertedauthorities applicable only to people operating according to State license and all the cases cited reflectthat fact. Plaintiff has dem onstrated he does not operate his domain according to State license.Defendants also fail to show an ownership interest inPlaintiffs 1996 Buick, by the State, that couldalter Plaintiffs right to own all; right, title and interest, in said property nor that the person whoclaimed to own all right title and interest therein and who passed same to Plaintiff either did not soown. Defendants h ave failed to provide an y com petent evidence that Plaintiff operates or is compelledto operate according to State license respecting his use of his Rights to Liberty and property or thatplaintiff has no right to contract with others respecting his property. Defend ants m ake claims butprovide no substantial proof in support.

AND THERE IS THE ISSUE AT CONTROVERSY; By W hat authority. Not Claim ofauthority (statute, decisional law upo n statutes). But B y what au thority does the state claim todetermine, compel or prohibit Plaintiff's choice of use of Plaintiff's private property tha t exists solelywithin plaintiff's dom ain within which only Plaintiff own s an d possesses sole dominion, and whereplaintiff has caused injury to no other. When the Attorney Generals office provides com petentevidence that comprehends and answers this simple question in favor of the State, Plaintiff will ceasebeing a legal burden on this society and seek a society that actually comprehends and respects theprinciples of freedom and protection of Rights to Life. Liberty and Property this society was foundedon.



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220221 William Du ff22 2 Plaintiff223224 Cc: William Duff to: wdd@ wiIliamdufY.coin,225 William Frazier and Alan Roth to: 1001 NW Barry Rd. Place226 Kansas City, Missouri C/O KCMO Police Department - North Division227 EMILY A. DODGE Assistant Attorney General at; [email protected] and22 8 emily.dodge(5).ago.mo.gov229


Motion and Sugg Deny Def Mot Dismis

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