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Moscow Defense BriefYour Professional Guide Inside # 2, 2010

MiG: Back From the Brink

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# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 1

#2 (20), 2010

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Cover Photo: MiG Corporation’s best hope: MiG-29K carrier-based fighter

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CONTENTSGlobal SecurityThe Arms Non-Reduction Treaty 2

International RelationsRussia’s Middle East Policy: All Tactics, No Strategy 6

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Deal with Ukraine – the Political Aspects 8

Defense IndustriesRAC MiG: Back From the Brink 11

Iskander-M Missile Triggers Industry Upgrade Program 13

Russian Defense Procurement in 2009 16

Arms TradeRussian Loans for Arms Contracts 20

Armed ForcesRussia’s Army Reform Enters New Stage 22

Facts & FiguresRussian Combat Aviation Losses in Armed Conflict Zones in 1999-2010 24

Our Authors 32

Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief2

Global Security

The Arms Non-Reduction Treaty

The Arms Non-Reduction TreatyMikhail Barabanov

The new US-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed on 8 April in Prague has been hailed as the

new stage of nuclear arms reductions and a worthy successor to the 1991 START-1 agreement. A closer inspection of the terms of the new treaty reveals, however, that the mountain has in fact given birth to a mouse.

The new ceilings for the Russian and American strategic nuclear forces are as follows:

1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads •700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, including •intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and heavy bombers800 deployed and non-deployed strategic delivery •vehicles, including ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombersUnder the new treaty, the exact structure of the nuclear

arsenals is left to the two governments, so long as the overall ceilings are observed. In other words, the treaty does not set individual limits on the numbers of ICBMs, SLBMs or heavy bombers.

The counting rules, however, have been redrawn. For missile delivery systems, the procedure of tallying the multiple warheads that can be fitted onto each missile produces a result that is quite close to the actual numbers. But for strategic bombers, it was decided not to adjust the score for the number of warheads each plane can carry – meaning that one bomber now counts as a delivery vehicle for a single warhead.

At first glance, the treaty promises to cut the two countries’ nuclear arsenals by a third (from 2,200 warheads each) compared to the numbers agreed in the 2002 SORT treaty. This ostensible achievement is being touted as another big step towards universal nuclear disarmament.

It is easy to see, however, that the terms of the new treaty mandate a bare minimum of actual nuclear reductions. Most of the advertized cuts are in fact the product of creative accounting.

The United States now has a total of 450 silo-based Minuteman III missiles (carrying somewhere between 550 and 800 nuclear warheads, as some of those missiles have been fitted with three warheads each). America also has 14 nuclear-powered Ohio-type submarines, each carrying 25 Trident II D-5 SLBMs, fitted with four warheads each – for a total of 336 SLBMs and 1,344 warheads. Finally, it has 111 strategic bombers (93 B-52H’s and 18 B-2A’s) – each now counts as a delivery vehicle for a single warhead. The total US tally is therefore 897 strategic delivery vehicles. But since only

60 of the 111 bombers (44 B-52H’s and 16 B-2A’s) and 12 of the 14 Ohio-type subs count as deployed (at any given time – two of the subs are listed as undergoing maintenance), the United States is now considered to have 798 strategic delivery vehicles. That means that only about 100 of them will have to be cut under the new treaty.

Apparently, Washington’s plan is to cut only 100 silo-based Minuteman III missiles and 12 B-52H bombers (the latter will be given non-deployed status rather than actually destroyed). What is more, the terms of the treaty do not even require the destruction of the silos now housing the ICBMs to be scrapped. Theoretically, that enables the United States to stockpile all 100 Minuteman III missiles to be cut under the new agreement with Russia. And it should not be forgotten that although in theory those missiles are fairly aged, all of them have been thoroughly upgraded in recent years. Their solid-fuel engines and guidance systems have all been replaced, so in essence we are looking at new ICBMs that can remain in service for many years to come.

Once all the cuts under the new treaty have been implemented by 2020, America will still have:

350 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs, each carrying a •single warhead;14 Ohio-type subs armed with 24 Trident II SLBMs each •(that includes the two “non-deployed” subs undergoing maintenance, so the total number of deployed SLBMs will be 1,152);111 bombers (including 48 deployed ones: 32 B-52H’s •and 16 B-2A’s).That means that after all the cuts under the new treaty

the United States will still have 797 strategic delivery vehicles, 686 of them deployed, with a total of 1,550 warheads, as tallied under the new counting rules.

The actual reductions Russia will have to effect in order to comply with the new treaty are even less onerous. The truth is, Russia’s nuclear arsenal is already at or even below the new ceilings. At the time of the signing of the treaty, Russia had a total of just 640 strategic delivery vehicles – only 571 of them deployed. That number includes:

368 land-based ICBMs, namely: •59 heavy silo-based R-36MUTTH (SS-18 Mod 4) and •R-36M2 (SS-18 Mod 5) missiles;70 silo-based UR-100NUTTH (SS-19 Mod 3) •missiles;171 mobile Topol (SS-25) missiles; •50 silo-based Topol-M (SS-27A) missiles; •18 mobile Topol-M (SS-27B) missiles. •

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Global Security

12 nuclear-armed submarines carrying a total of 196 •SLBMs, including:

6 Project 667BDRM (Delta IV class)subs; •4 Project 667BDR (Delta III class); •1 Project 941UM (Typhoon class); •1 Project 955 (Yuri Dolgorukiy). •

76 deployed bombers (13 Tu-160 Blackjack and 63 Tu- •95MS Bear H).Of the 12 Russian nuclear-armed subs, only eight are

deployed - four each of Project 667BDRMs and Project 667BDRs. Each sub carries 16 SLBMs, for a total of 128 deployed missiles.

It therefore becomes evident that Russia needs no actual reductions to comply. If anything, it may need to bring some of its numbers up to the new limits, not down. Even before the Prague treaty was signed, Russia’s nuclear arsenal had shrunk all of its own accord over the past year or so from 809 to 640 strategic delivery vehicles, following the mass decommissioning of old ICBMs and nuclear-armed subs.

That, in fact, was one of the main bones of contention during the talks. Moscow insisted on lowering the ceiling to 500-550 strategic delivery vehicles – that is how many it will soon be left with, treaty or no treaty, due to the natural attrition of its ageing nuclear arsenal. Washington naturally resisted the idea, and the eventual figure in the treaty of 800 strategic delivery vehicles, 700 of them deployed – is an obvious victory for the Americans, who wanted the new limits to match their already existing numbers. America will have neither to change the structure of its nuclear arsenal, nor, as our calculations indicate, make any serious cuts.

Another obvious cop-out in the treaty is the new counting rules for nuclear warheads carried by strategic heavy bombers. Modern heavy bombers are mainly used as carriers for multiple strategic air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). For instance, America’s B-52H can carry up to 20 AGM-86B cruise missiles, Russia’s Tu-160 can be fitted with up to 12 Kh-55 (AS-15) missiles, and the Tu-95MS with up to 16 Kh-55 missiles, or up to eight of Russia’s new ALCMs. America’s B-2A stealth bomber is not designed to carry ALCM’s - not officially, anyway - but it has enough room in the bay for several nuclear bombs. Neither country is facing a shortage of ALCMs: Russia has up to 1,000 of the Kh-55 missiles, and America 588 of the AGM-86B’s, plus up to 240 “strategic” B61 and B83 nuclear bombs.

Under the START-1 rules, each Soviet strategic bomber counted as a delivery vehicle for eight ALCMs, and each US bomber was deemed to carry 10 ALCMs. Strategic bombers therefore accounted for a big chunk of the warheads to be tallied towards the overall limits. The “one bomber – one warhead” equation in the Prague treaty is therefore nothing but a ruse designed to protect a large number of warheads on both sides from cuts. Under the new counting system, a big portion of the strategic ALCM and nuclear bomb arsenals is

now completely unaccounted for. The biggest beneficiary of this ploy is the Unite States. If each of the 48 deployed strategic bombers the Americans plans to keep were to be counted as a carrier of 10 cruise missiles, Washington would have either to cut almost all of its Minuteman III ICBMs to comply with the new ceilings, or slash the number of warheads fitted onto the Trident II SLBMs.

In essence, the new treaty completely eliminates the existing workable system of controls over strategic aviation (especially considering that America can declare a large part of its bombers as non-deployed). It enables both sides to fudge the numbers of their air-launched nuclear warheads on a truly grand scale - to put it bluntly, America and Russia can now have as many of those warheads as they like.

In order for this ruse to work, the new treaty imposes a ceiling on the total numbers of deployed warheads (1,550), but skirts the issue of non-deployed warheads, which are not subject to any limits whatsoever. In practice that allows each side to have an unlimited number of warheads - so long as they are declared as non-deployed. Meanwhile, both sides can keep 100 non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles each (including combat-ready strategic bombers), and now they don’t even have to destroy the silos left after the decommissioning of ICBMs. In effect, an almost unaccounted build-up of nuclear arsenals now becomes a perfectly legitimate option, making a complete farce of the arms control process. As for the total numbers of the actually deployed “operational” warheads, including the airborne weapons, they will remain quite close to the ceilings imposed by the 2002 SORT treaty – at least in the case of the United States.

In Russia, the main debate during the talks on the new treaty focused on linking any strategic nuclear cuts with legally binding restrictions on America’s missile defense plans. Predictably, Russia failed to secure any concessions here, and had to settle for a unilateral statement on the issue during the signing of the treaty. But the gravity of this problem is greatly exaggerated. During the 10 years left before the treaty expires in 2020, America is unlikely to deploy an ABM system that could pose any real threat to Russia’s nuclear deterrence capability. And when the talks begin on the next treaty to replace the one recently signed in Prague, Russia will in any case have to revise its stance based on the actual situation with ABM at the time. Postponing the resolution of this issue to clear the path for the current deal therefore seems entirely reasonable. The Russian negotiators appear to have thought along similar lines, and merely used ABM as a bargaining chip to extract concessions in other areas. The Americans, meanwhile, had painted themselves into a corner by their inflexible stance on missile defense - and in the end made very real sacrifices in the name of a rather abstract principle.

One of their biggest concessions was on the issue of telemetry. America would have loved to augment its own

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Global Security

R&D effort on missile defense by openly receiving telemetric data from the test launches of Russia’s new ballistic missiles, including the R-30 Bulava (SS-NX-32), RS-24 Yars (SS-X-29), and others. Such information would come in very useful for developing countermeasures against the latest Russian weapons. But Russia has managed to limit the disclosure of telemetry to just five launches a year. Moscow can now make the Americans use up their yearly allowance on the launches of old Russian missiles (fired up for training or testing purposes, if anyone asks) – while the telemetry from the really interesting events will be kept completely secret. Russia has also managed to lift the restrictions on where it can position its mobile missiles.

Any specific terms of the new treaty are, however, quite secondary to Russia’s main concern – namely, that the size of its arsenal is already well below the agreed new ceilings. There has been a mass decommissioning of old Soviet missiles in recent years (especially now that the mobile Topol systems are reaching the end of their service life). New missiles are being built, but not nearly fast enough to replace the old ones.

Nominally, Russia assembles more than 30 ballistic missiles a year. That includes 16 R-29RMU2 Sineva (SS-N-23 Mod 3) SLBMs for Project 667BRDM subs, which are now undergoing an upgrade program, and about a dozen land-based Topol-M and RS-24 Yars mobile land-based ICBMs. The new Bulava and Yars prototypes make up the rest. At that rate, the Russian nuclear arsenal will continue to shrink as the old land-based ICBMs are being decommissioned. Meanwhile, the schedule of the new Bulava SLBM program continues to slip - the missile won’t be ready for combat duty before 2012. The Kremlin’s decision at the turn of the century to rely predominantly on the submarine component of the strategic nuclear deterrent is increasingly looking like a big and costly mistake. A lot of time and money has already been ploughed into the new Project 955 (Yuriy Dolgorukiy class) submarine, even as the Bulava missile it is supposed to carry is still very much a work in progress.

The new RS-24 Yars mobile ICBM enters mass production in 2010 - essentially this is a Topol-M version with three multiple warheads. But at the expected rate of production, this will not make much of a difference – the decommissioning of the old missiles will still far outpace any new deliveries. The looming loss of 46 R-36M2 (SS-18 Mod 5) heavy ICBMs, which are to be written off over the period of 2016-2019, will make an especially big dent in the Russian nuclear deterrent. Each missile carries 10 nuclear warheads, meaning that Russia will lose half of its deployed warheads in one fell swoop. According to some projections that have surfaced in the media, by 2020 the land-based component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces will include no more than 108 mobile Yars missiles, 27 mobile Topol-M’s, 95 silo-based Topol-M’s, and 30 old silo-based UR-100NUTTH missiles – a

total of 260 ICBMs carrying 626 warheads at the very most. Plans have been unveiled to launch the development of a new liquid-fuel ICBM with a multiple warhead – but first deliveries are unlikely before 2020.

Meanwhile, the future of the sea-based component of Russia’s nuclear deterrent is wholly dependent on the struggling Bulava program and the Project 955 submarines, designed specifically to carry the new missile. The optimistic projection is that by 2020 Russia will still have six of the existing Project 667BDRM submarines (carrying a total of 96 Sineva SLBMs), and the only existing Project 955 sub (the Yuriy Dolgorukiy, carrying 16 Bulava SLBMs) will have begun combat duty. There will also be up to four subs of the redesigned Project 955A class and its modifications, carrying 80 Bulava missiles between them. Since two of the Project 667BDRM subs will probably be listed as non-deployed (undergoing repairs and maintenance), Russia will likely have the capacity to deploy 160 submarine-launched missiles, carrying a total of 640 warheads.

Russia’s strategic aviation fleet is expected to consist of about 50 Tu-95MS and 16 Tu-160 bombers by 2020 – a total of 66 delivery vehicles, which the new treaty counts as 66 warheads.

All this means that under the best-case scenario Russia will have no more than 490 deployed strategic delivery vehicles and 1,330 deployed warheads by 2020. The dilemma Moscow is therefore facing is whether to abandon all attempts to maintain nuclear parity with the United States, despite the new treaty, or revise its plans for nuclear missiles production and launch a mighty effort to build an additional 210 single-warhead carriers (most likely the Topol-M’s, either mobile or silo-based). If Moscow were to opt for the latter scenario, and ramp up new production starting from 2013, it would have to build an additional 30 missiles a year (for a total of 50 missiles annually). That means that the existing targets for Topol-M and Yars production will nearly triple. The problem is that the Votkinsk missile plant, where these missiles will have to be assembled, will already be working flat out on the Bulava to deliver at least 10 or 12 of the new SLBMs every year. Any plans to spur missile production may therefore be unfeasible due to lack of funding and spare manufacturing capacity.

On the whole, the new strategic arms reductions treaty clearly serves America’s interest more than Russia’s, as it enables Washington to maintain the existing structure and basic composition of its strategic arsenal without any substantial reductions. The nuclear cuts agreed under this treaty are in fact phony, for the most part – a product of accounting chicanery rather than the real thing. The new system of counting the bombers and air-based nuclear warheads in particular is nothing short of fraudulent, and clearly designed to mislead the public.

The treaty represents a clear failure of the Kremlin’s bid to institutionalize the ongoing decline (or rather a

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Global Security

managed degradation) of the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent. Predictably, Washington has refused to mirror the rapid dwindling of the Russian arsenal, and the agreed new ceilings are clearly not what Moscow had hoped for. As a result, Russia will now have to brace itself for a massive effort to modernize its nuclear forces or, at the very minimum, to keep them from shrinking well below the limits agreed in the new treaty. Onerous new spending is inevitable if Russia is to maintain genuine nuclear parity with the United States, said

parity being the main reason why the Kremlin had agreed to discuss the new agreement in the first place. All that being the case, the only real outcome of this new “strategic arms reduction treaty” will be a massive Russian program to develop and modernize its strategic arms, prompting, in all likelihood, a similar push in the United States. For Russia, the upcoming decade looks set to become a period of break-neck nuclear rearmament rather than genuine disarmament.

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief6Russia’s Middle East Policy: All Tactics, No Strategy

International Relations

Russia’s Middle East Policy: All Tactics, No StrategyFedor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of the Russia in Global Affairs journal

Since the turn of the century, Russia has been ever more active in the Greater Middle East (an area stretching from

North Africa to the Indian subcontinent). Its policy here, however, is radically different from what it was in Soviet times, when Moscow was a key player in the region. That policy is now completely devoid of ideology. The new goals are, in the descending order of priority: commercial gain, stability in the former Soviet republics, and influence on the international arena.

The commercial considerations are quite obvious. Intense international competition means that in many markets Russia is losing out to other nations due to its lack of technological prowess or political clout. Russian manufacturers (the defense contractors or the atomic industry) find warmer welcome in those countries which, for one reason or another, are at odds with the West. In the Middle East than means primarily Iran and Syria. Libya used to be in the same group – until about five years ago.

The approach has obvious limitations: if a nation falls out with the West, it either becomes victim of political or economic pressure, including sanctions – or sells out its loyalties, as was the case with Tripoli. Moscow has always walked a fine line here, trying to protect its trade without straying beyond the boundaries of international law (i.e. not breaking any sanctions), or allowing its Middle Eastern dealings to sour relations with the West too much. Of course, Russia is trying to expand its presence in the region beyond the “problem” nations. It is also working to break into new markets – either traditional Western turf (the Gulf monarchies) or the former Soviet sphere of influence (the North Africa).

The Russian energy giants, especially Gazprom, are showing great interest in the Middle East. Relations with Turkey, which aspires to become the main energy crossroads in the western part of Central Eurasia, are at an all-time high. Russian officials have aired a number of ideas on supplying gas to Israel, Syria and Lebanon. Another proposal mooted several years ago was to team up with Nigeria and build a pipeline to the Mediterranean coast. So far, however, all these plans remain firmly in the realm of the hypothetical, and look more like an attempt to put some pressure on Russia’s European clients and remind them of the role of Gazprom.

Stability in the former Soviet republics remains another priority of Russia’s foreign policy – and events in the Greater Middle East impinge on that stability very directly.

First, this part of the world (which includes Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) is a source of the radical Islamist threat. Russia has already confronted that threat in the Caucasus, and could well be dragged into a new clash with radical Islam in Central Asia, where Moscow’s allies will count on its support in the event of a crisis. It would hardly be realistic to expect full cooperation from the Middle Eastern governments on this issue. Each of those governments is itself walking on thin ice, constrained by numerous political and religious factors. But pragmatic cooperation is necessary, to try at least to minimize the risks, if not avert them altogether.

Second, nations such as Turkey and Iran have a role to play in at least two regions of the former Soviet Union – the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Both territories are part of Russia’s sphere of vital interests. The way in which Ankara and Tehran will choose to exercise their influence in those territories greatly depends on the nature of their relations with Moscow. Both are potentially capable of wreaking havoc on Russia’s plans in the region, which is why Moscow must try to keep rivalry with the two capitals to a minimum. Relations with Turkey are now on the ascendant. Not so with Iran, for reasons whose origins lie outside the region. But recent history does hold some positive examples of Moscow’s cooperation with Tehran in the former Soviet territories, including the settlement of the Tajik conflict and Iran’s decision to desist from supporting separatism in the Caucasus.

Third, Russia’s policy towards many of its neighbors is largely informed by Moscow’s strategy of maintaining Gazprom’s hold on its Eurasia markets. Turkey and Iran have a key role to play here – Turkey as a leading transit nation and Iran as a potential competitor on the European market. That is why Moscow is interested in Tehran’s continued isolation – and if said isolation is eventually broken, Russia can always fall back on the old idea of a “Gas OPEC”, which includes, apart from Iran, large gas producers such as Algeria and Qatar. Alas, there has been much political talk here, but precious little action.

Finally, as part of its efforts to bolster its international standing, Russia is trying to step up its relations with all the key international players. Moscow is the only capital of the G8 that can sit down at talks with almost every single player in the Middle East – with the possible exception of the Taliban, but including Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel, HAMAS, Hezbollah and Iran. Russia has repeatedly tried to cash in on its unique

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 7Russia’s Middle East Policy: All Tactics, No Strategy


position to secure a greater say in world affairs – but with little success so far, it has to be said. In itself, the ability to engage various players in dialogue does not confer greater sway. From time to time, this ability actually causes some tensions: the other players begin to suspect Russia of double or triple dealing, while expectations of real progress remain unfulfilled.

Russia’s problem in the Greater Middle East is fairly unique. Moscow has too many interests there and too much leverage to be simply one of several players. And yet this leverage isn’t strong enough to shift the course of events or

achieve equal standing with America. Moscow continues to play a complex game in the region, with all three of its key priorities in mind - but there priorities can often clash. Commercial interest sometimes stands in the way of political gains, and vice versa. The need to participate in the global game (on the Iran issue, for example) jeopardizes constructive relations with Tehran on the regional level (in the Caspian and the Caucasus). Nevertheless, for the time being Russia is likely to stick to its tactical course of keeping all its options option, without committing to any definitive strategy.

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief8Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Deal with Ukraine –

the Political Aspects

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Deal with Ukraine – the Political AspectsMikhail Barabanov

On 21 April Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement to extend the lease of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet base in

Sevastopol, which was due to expire in 2017, for another 25 years, with a possibility of a further five-year extension. The agreement, which Ukraine’s new president Viktor Yanukovich signed shortly after his election, has become the clearest testament so far of the new “post-Orange” Ukrainian government’s course towards closer ties with Moscow.

Such an unambiguous overture towards Russia is not something most commentators expected from Yanukovich. They thought the new Ukrainian leader would try to maintain at least a semblance of a balance between Russia and the West. By steering sharply eastwards, Yanukovich is apparently hoping to consolidate his main electorate in Ukraine’s Russian-speaking eastern regions and secure the Kremlin’s unswerving political support.

For Moscow, meanwhile, the extension of the lease is less important militarily than politically, as it enables the Russian political and military presence to remain firmly established in Crimea for a long time to come. Populated mostly by ethnic Russians and transferred from Soviet Russia to Soviet Ukraine in 1954 by Nikita Khrushchev in a move many still find mind-boggling Crimea remains a bone of contention and a ticking time bomb in bilateral relations. The vast majority of the Crimeans do not want the peninsula to be part of Ukraine and are quite hostile to the very idea of Ukrainian statehood. Crimea’s Russian-speaking population believes itself a victim of language, ethnic and political discrimination by the Ukrainian government. It considers this government alien to Crimea, with no real mandate to govern the territory, and with a claim to legitimacy based on a historical fluke. In any referendum the Crimeans would undoubtedly vote in droves to split from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation. The situation is compounded by tensions between the Slavic majority and a small Crimean-Tatar minority, with the Slavs accusing Kiev of supporting the Tatars as a counterbalance to the ethnic Russians. And the fact that Crimea also happens to host the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet adds yet another layer to this tangle of Russia’s concerns. The fleet is perceived by the ethnic Russian population of Crimea as a symbol of their links with Russia and a sure guarantee against any oppression by Kiev.

Russian public opinion and large sections of the political establishment find Ukrainian control of Crimea

objectionable, and want the peninsula returned to the Russian fold one way or another. Crimea is one of the key reasons why many Russians are very negative about an independent Ukraine. Were it not for the Crimean problem, Russia would have been far more relaxed about many aspects of Ukraine’s foreign and internal policy. In many ways, the Crimean issue continues to stoke Russia’s “interventionist” potential towards Ukraine.

As part of the historic compromise between Moscow and Kiev reached in 1997, Russia was given a 20-year lease of the Black Sea Fleet’s base in Sevastopol. By dint of this lease Ukraine essentially recognized Russia’s special interests in Crimea, in return for Russia’s recognition of Ukraine in its present borders. The agreement was formalized in the Great Treaty between the two countries. Russia recognized Crimea to be part of Ukraine, and Ukraine reciprocated by accepting the fact of Russia’s comprehensive (as opposed to just military) presence on the peninsula.

That compromise, however, has done nothing to address the crux of the problem, and the 20-year term of the lease was drawing to an end all too quickly – with little to no change in the Crimean situation. The locals’ affinity towards Russia has, if anything, become even stronger over the intervening 13 years – spurred by growing nationalist trends in Ukraine under the Orange government of 2004-2010, as well as Russia’s better economic fortunes. Kiev has failed to strengthen its influence in the province to any perceptible degree, and the nationalist Orange pressure on the Crimean populace has backfired, stoking anti-Ukrainian prejudice. Time has neither solved the Crimean problem nor even dulled its pain.

The approach of the critical year 2017 was sure to enflame the situation even further. Ukrainian nationalists (including President Viktor Yushchenko, whose term expired in the spring of 2010, and Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko) viewed Crimea as the umbilical cord that tethered Ukraine to hated Moscow and stymied its pro-Western course. They were doing everything they could to slash that bond and boot Russia out of Crimea. Furthermore, the Russian naval base in Sevastopol was seen as a drag on the Ukrainian nationalists’ NATO membership aspirations.

For Russia, meanwhile, leaving Sevastopol was completely unacceptable for political reasons, and Russian public opinion would never have forgiven such a move. The


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# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 9Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Deal with Ukraine –

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evacuation of Sevastopol would be seen in Russia as a disgrace and betrayal of the Crimeans, left at the mercy of “evil” Kiev. It would seriously weaken any Russian government, even the popular and autocratic government of Vladimir Putin. What is more, Putin himself clearly loathed the prospect of presiding over the final chapter of the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”, as he once termed the collapse of the Soviet Union.

After years of simmering, Crimea was threatening finally to erupt into a full-blown crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Such a crisis would serve the interests of neither the two political establishments, nor the peoples of the two countries. Ukrainians in particular were uneasy over growing confrontation with Russia, stoked by the incompetent President Yushchenko’s increasingly loony ultranationalism. Those concerns played a large part in Viktor Yanukovich’s victory in the 2010 presidential race.

Yanukovich himself rightly believed that the bust-up with Russia during the tenure of President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko tenure was one of the most dangerous and destabilizing challenges Ukraine would have to face in the years to come. So the new Ukrainian president’s seemingly unexpected decision to jump headfirst into mending fences with Russia straight after his election is in fact entirely reasonable. Having averted the looming crisis with Russia, Yanukovich now has the breathing space to address his country’s other problems, safe in the knowledge that he has the full backing of Moscow.

The only way to defuse the ticking Crimean time bomb before it blew up was to reaffirm the commitment to the historic compromise of 1997 – which is exactly what Yanukovich has done by extending the current status quo for another 25 years. In practice that translated into accepting Moscow’s terms, while at the same time haggling for some practical concessions in return. Being a pragmatist, Yanukovich opted for a tangible prize in the form of lower Russian gas prices, which can give Ukraine’s economy a much-needed breather.

For Russia itself, the Black Sea Fleet deal with Yanukovich is undoubtedly a monumental political feat. On the one hand, it has become clear that Ukraine’s new leadership is determined to achieve a serious improvement in relations with Russia and to make some real concessions if necessary. That opens up some promising vistas for promoting Russia’s interests in Ukraine on a wide range of issues. Ukraine’s political establishment is ready for dialogue, and the era of the nationalist-minded Orange government, unable to function as a serious partner in any negotiations, is well and truly over. On the other hand the new deal strengthens Russia’s position in Crimea and gives it a strong foothold in Ukraine, which can be used to extend Russian influence there even further.

Russia needs to maintain its presence on the peninsula not just for the sake of Crimea itself. Moscow can always

make use of the Crimean situation as a powerful tool for putting pressure on Ukraine as a whole. Sevastopol serves as a grappling hook to keep not just Crimea, but the rest of Ukraine on a parallel course. That is especially true for Ukraine’s southern regions, which are the most vulnerable to Russian influence. So if ever Kiev starts spoiling for a fight with Moscow (once Yanukovich is gone, for example), Russia will always be able to jerk the strings attached to Crimea, creating a multitude of problems for Ukraine on a wide range of issues. For the fragile Ukrainian state, which is already split along ethnic and cultural lines, the consequences of such pressure could be catastrophic. Crimea will continue to serve as a foothold for Russian intervention in the event of some kind of crisis. And clearly any such intervention, once started, will not stop at Crimea and almost certainly lead either to a complete loss of Ukrainian independence or the country’s territorial disintegration. Such disintegration along existing cultural and ethnic divides would likely lead to eastern and southern Ukraine (the country’s densely populated industrial heartland) being annexed by Russia. The rest of Ukraine would become a smallish landlocked nation, akin to Hungary, and pose no real threat to Russia.

The bottom line is that the new agreement on the Black Sea Fleet has legitimized and institutionalized the Russian military and political presence in Ukraine. It has also allowed Moscow to keep the existing pretexts for intervention, if ever such intervention became necessary. No wonder then that Ukraine’s Orange opposition is having a fit. But the Yanukovych party and the majority of Ukrainians believe than the deal their president has signed is a reasonable price to pay for normalizing relations with their great eastern neighbor. Rather that continue the struggle against “Russian imperialism”, which hasn’t brought Ukraine any good, the new government in Kiev has chosen acquiescence. That is a considerable boost for Russia’s standing in the entire post-Soviet space. The political and geopolitical consequences of the new Black Sea Fleet agreement are truly colossal.

Its economic price, meanwhile, should not be exaggerated. The advertized 41bn dollars which Russia will ostensibly pay for Sevastopol over the next decade is little more than an accounting ploy to dangle before Ukrainian public opinion. The actual discount on the Gazprom gas price for Ukraine will translate into far less grandiose sums, and the annual rent for Sevastopol will still be a drop in the ocean of numerous bilateral debts and settlements. Some estimates put the real consolidated profit Ukraine will garner from the deal at no more than 3 or 4 billion dollars over the coming decade. But even that modest sum will serve as a welcome respite for Ukraine’s languishing economy especially as Yushchenko’s crusade against “Russian nationalism” was raking in nothing but losses.

This deal with Kiev is a real comeback for Russia, reversing all its losses in Ukraine over the past seven years


in one fell swoop. The agreement essentially confirms that Russia remains the key player in the former Soviet Union, and that Russian influence here is bolstered by a whole range of facts on the ground that work in Russia’s favor. These “imperial” facts have in the end outweighed all the efforts

of the Western-backed nationalist anti-Russian forces in the former Soviet Republics. It turns out that the Russian sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, the idea of which Western countries hate so much and refuse to recognize, is based on far stronger foundations than many believed.


Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Deal with Ukraine – the Political Aspects


RAC MiG: Back From the BrinkKonstantin Makienko

The Algerian fiasco

RAC MiG, a world-famous Russia maker of combat aircraft, was staring into a financial abyss in 2007-2008 after a big

Algerian contract fell through. Its very ability to survive in its current shape was in doubt. The Algerian deal for 28 MiG-29SMT and six MiG-29UBT fighters, worth USD 1.284bn, was signed in March 2006. Under the terms of the contract, the aircraft were to come “from the production reserves in the final stages of the technological cycle”. In simple terms, the Russian supplier was going to finish the MiG-29 Fulcrum airframes it had started back in 1992, when MiG continued churning out fighter jets at the Soviet rate, but the Russian Air Force could no longer afford to buy them. The contract also involved trading in 22 old Algerian MiG-29 fighters, 14 MiG-23’s and ten MiG-21’s, for a total of USD 300m.

Over the period of December 2006 to April 2007, Algeria took delivery of 15 aircraft, apparently including four MiG-29UBT two-seat combat-trainer jets. Then in April 2007, the Algerian Air Force raised a number of technical complaints about the quality of the planes it had received, and stopped taking any more deliveries under the contract. All the solutions the Russian side had offered (from repairing any defects to replacing the aircraft) were rejected, and in early 2008 all 15 of the new MiGs were returned to Russia. Algeria’s refusal to compromise suggests that problems with the planes were just an excuse, and the real reason behind the crisis was the internal power struggle between the various clans of the country’s military junta. One hypothesis was that problems with the MiG-29SMT deliveries were used by the head of the Algerian National Defense Ministry’s security and intelligence department, Brigade General Mohamed “Toufik” Mediene, in his turf war with the head of the Army HQ, Brigade General Ahmed Gaid Salah. Mediene was backed by Air Force commander Abdelkader Lounes, the commander of Fighter Aviation, Faycal Boutella, and the chief engineer of the Air Force, M. Zerad- all four belong to the Kabyle clan of the Algerian military and political elite. There is also another piece of evidence pointing at the political nature of the crisis. In summer 2006 – that is, even before the delivery of the first MiG-29UBT planes, which arrived only in December – Algeria was looking to buy new RD-33 turbofan engines of the 3rd series. The engines were to be fitted onto the MiG-29 fighters bought previously from Belarus – those same planes were to be traded in under the Russian contract. That means that the Algerian Air Force was looking into the possibility

of walking away from the trade-in agreement, apparently in the expectation that the 2006 contract for the MiG-29SMT’s would not be fulfilled.

On the brinkThe collapse of the Algerian contract was a severe blow

to RAC MiG corporation’s finances and reputation. After Algeria stopped the payments under the contract (only USD 250m had been paid out of the total of almost USD 1.3bn), MiG’s debts reached 45bn roubles (1bn euros at the early 2009 exchange rate). Heads rolled in the company’s HQ. In January 2008, Director-General Sergey Tsivilev was replaced by Anatoliy Belov. Only a year later, Belov was let go for health reasons. The top job in the company was given to the director-general of its main Russian competitor, Mikhail Pogosyan of the Sukhoi bureau. Pogosyan not only kept his job at Sukhoi, but was soon appointed head of the Combat Aviation division of the United Aircraft Making Corporation (OAK). All those events led commentators to believe that the arrival of Pogosyan had signaled the beginning of RAC MiG’s takeover by its bigger and more successful rival, Sukhoi. There was even talk that RAC MiG could be liquidated altogether. But recent developments in 2009 and early 2010 have proved that those dismal predictions were wide of the mark, and the turnaround in the company’s fortunes is already well under way.

Financial stabilizationMiG’s finances, which were in ruins after the Algerian

fiasco, have been propped up by the government. As part of the economic crisis package and measures to support the aerospace industry, the corporation was given 15bn roubles in early 2009 (about USD 416m at the January 2009 exchange rate) so that it could pay its creditors and ease the debt burden. Another lump sum of 15bn roubles followed at the end of 2009 (USD 0.5bn at the exchange rate at the time). Furthermore, the government also gave the Russian Air Force extra funding (which was not part of the National Armaments Program) to buy the MiG fighters that were to be sold to Algeria. The Air Force even had to abandon its traditional strictures against using any hardware that has foreign-made components. The MiG-29SMT’s previously

Defense Industries

RAC MiG: Back From the Brink

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief12RAC MiG: Back From the Brink

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Customer Order Order status Production status Value

Actual contracts

Burmese Air Force 10 MiG-29B, 6 MiG-29SE

Contract signed on December 6, 2009 From production reserve

About USD 500m

Indian Navy 10 MiG-29K Remaining units to be delivered under a January 20, 2004 contract; six of the total 16 units already delivered

Full-cycle production USD 330m

Indian Navy 29 MiG-29K Contract signed on March 12, 2010 Full-cycle production USD 1.5bn

Not identified 24 MiG-29M2 Contract apparently signed in 2005 or 2006

Full-cycle production USD 1bn-1.2bn (estimate)

Total 79 units USD 3,330m – 3,530m

Potential contract

Russian Navy 26 MiG-29K Pending Full-cycle production 28bn-32bn roubles (estimate)

Source: CAST estimates, media reports.

RAC MiG actual and potential orders portfolio

destined for Algeria had at least one crucial foreign-made component: the Sigma 95 navigation system made by France’s Sagem. By the end of 2009 the Russian Air Force took delivery of 31 former “Algerian” planes, out of the total of 34. The remaining three are to be delivered in 2010. It is not clear how much money MiG has received for those planes – a conservative estimate would be about 20bn roubles (USD 600m). The total amount of government financial support to RAC MiG in 2009 is therefore something in the area of USD 1.5bn. That financial injection was instrumental for MiG’s swift return from its near-death experience.

Thanks to government aid, the corporation was able to continue R&D on its key future fighter programs, the MiG-29K and the MiG-35, which should keep MiG competitive on the international market. On September 28 and 29, one MiG-29K and one MiG-29K-UB carrier-based fighters performed several take-offs and landings on the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier in the Barents Sea, successfully completing a crucial stage in the MiG-29K program. That success has opened up the prospects of new contracts for this fighter with the Indian Air Force and possibly with the Russian Navy as well. Meanwhile, a MiG-35 fighter prototype took to the air in India in October-November 2009 for several demo flights as part of the Russian bid for the Indian Air Force MMRCA contract for 126 multirole fighters. In April 2010, the fighter performed launches of guided air-to air and air-to surface weapons using a guidance system based on the Zhuk-MAE active phased array radar.

Recent progress of the new MiG-29 fighter series programs has been crucial for securing a whole series of new contracts. The company now has orders for a total of almost 80 aircraft, 60 of which are to be built from scratch.

New contractsOn December 6, 2009, Russia signed a 400m euro

contract with the Burmese Air Force for 20 MiG-29 fighters of various modifications. Ten MiG-29B and six MiG-29SE fighters will come from MiG’s reserve of unfinished produce, and the remaining four MiG-29UB’s from the Russian Air Force stock. The contract has become a real trophy for Rosoboroneksport and RAC MiG – they saw off stiff competition from Belarus, who offered a very attractive price. It is also notable that the Burmese military chose the Russian fighter over China’s more advanced FC-1 and J-10 planes, whose price could well have been comparable to the MiG-29 versions.

On March 12, 2010, during Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s visit to India, New Delhi exercised its 2004 option to buy 29 MiG-29K carrier-based fighters worth “more than 1.5bn dollars”. The successful MiG-29K take-off and landing tests in September 2009 appear to have persuaded India to place an order for another batch of carrier-based fighters, even though only six aircraft have been delivered so far from the first batch of 16 MiG-29K/KUB jets. The Indian contract greatly improves the chances that another 26 of the MiG-29K carrier-based fighters will be bought by the Russian Navy for the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier. That contract is expect to be signed before the end of 2010, with deliveries in 2011-2012. Once that deal materializes, RAC MiG will have secured orders for about a hundred jets, meaning that the launch of large-scale, full-cycle mass production of the MiG-29K becomes almost a certainty. In practical terms, the damage to the company’s reputation sustained during the Algerian crisis is already a thing of the past.

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Iskander-M Missile Triggers Industry Upgrade ProgramAlexandr Stukalin, Kommersant Publishing House

Russia’s attempts to launch mass production of its latest 9M723 Iskander-M tactical missile have run into serious

difficulties. Many of the Russian missile manufacturing technologies are obsolete. Much of the equipment is decrepit and requires urgent replacement. But now a somewhat belated decision has been made to face the facts and tackle all these problems head-on - even if it means sourcing new machinery from the West.

Grand designsWork on the Iskander program began at the Kolomna

Machine-Building Design Bureau back in Soviet times. For a period after the collapse of the former Soviet Union it was mothballed, along with numerous other Soviet military projects. Years later, Russia brought it back to life, but in a substantially altered form, to reflect the latest requirements. The changes involved replacing electronic components and making use of some other technological advances of the past 20 years.

The Iskander-M system, with a maximum range of 500 km (to comply with the INF treaty requirements) entered service in 2006. In the same year, first deputy premier Sergey Ivanov unveiled plans for the new missile’s rollout. Under the 2007-2015 State Armament Program, five missile brigades were due to receive a total of 60 Iskander battalions. The figures were soon confirmed by Defense Ministry officials and the developers of the new missile. Everyone involved believed back at the time that delivering six or seven Iskander battalions a year for the next nine years was entirely realistic. They were wrong.

Over the past four years, Iskanders were trotted out thrice for the Victory Day parades on Red Square (in 2008-2010), and on a more practical note, used during the war with Georgia in August 2008. But on latest available information, Russia still has only one military unit actually armed with the Iskanders – a single battalion of the 60th missile forces training center in Znamensk (the Kapustin Yar training range). The Russian deputy defense minister for armament, Vladimir Popovkin, promised as far back as June 2009 that the long-awaited second battalion of the Iskanders would soon be delivered to the armed forces. But almost a year on, there has been no news of any of the regular missile brigades receiving the new missiles.

President Dmitry Medvedev pledged in his state of the nation address last year that production of the Iskanders would be stepped up. He said the defense industry had been set the target of delivering five Iskander battalions in 2010. The ambition has at least the merit of grandeur: last year the suppliers managed to come up with only three launchers and 13 missiles, according to Popovkin himself. Meanwhile, Army Commander Vladimir Bondarev has already unveiled the equipment tables for the new missile formations. Each Iskander-M battalion is supposed to have four launchers and eight missiles. If the five battalions promised by Medvedev are to materialize, the industry will therefore have to churn out 20 launchers and at least 40 missiles (not counting the spares mounted on loader-transports). In other words, the current Iskander-M production capacity is a fraction of what is required.

The problems of mass productionIn 2006, when the Iskanders formally entered service, it

was decided to launch their mass production at the Votkinsky plant (Votkinsky Zavod) – one of the former Soviet Union’s largest missile technology centers, with long and glorious history. The plant was founded on the orders of Empress Elizabeth back in 1759 as a metallurgical (“iron-making”) factory. In the 1860s, the plant added a machine-building floor and started making steam engines. Under the new Soviet government it became a producer of artillery in 1937, and then in the 1950s ventured into missile technology. Over the years it has mass-produced the R-17 (SS-1 Scud), Temp-S (SS-12), and Oka (SS-23) short-range missiles; the intermediate-range Pioner (SS-20), as well the mobile intercontinental Temp-2S (SS-16) and Topol (SS-25) missiles. Since the fall of the Soviet Union the plant has launched production of the new universal Topol-M (SS-27) ICBM and of the future strategic Bulava (SS-N-30) SLBM – though the latter missile is still in development, and recent tests have been disappointing.

The choice of the Votkinsky plant was therefore a foregone conclusion. Luckily for Russia, it inherited the former Soviet Union’s leading mass production missile factory that had for decades specialized in short-range and solid-fuel missiles. There was no point looking for another

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief14Iskander-M Missile Triggers Industry Upgrade Program

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contractor – especially since the Votkinsky plant, the maker of the Tochka and Oka missiles, already has a solid record of cooperation with both the developer of the Iskander (the Kolomna Machine-Building Design Bureau) and the main customer, the Defense Ministry. But it turns out that some important considerations had not properly been taken into account. The biggest problem is that the Votkinsky plant’s equipment and technology have not had a serious upgrade for two decades. The company is already working flat out on two other large missile projects – the Topol-M and the Bulava, so there is little spare capacity for the Iskander contract. And it is only now that the search for a solution to this problem has begun in earnest.

Finally, a decisionIn late 2009 the government invited bids for a contract

to develop project documentation for a big program entitled “Upgrade and Retooling of FGUP Votkinsky plant for Mass Production of the Iskander-M Product”. The announcement was published on the official state procurement web site (www.zakupki.gov.ru). The contract, worth 4m roubles, is just the first stage of a program which aims to equip the plant with the latest high-tech hardware (the mechanical and assembly floors being the top priority), and “eliminate the existing deficit of manufacturing capacity”. The government has stressed that the “deficit” is not the result of any plans to boost the plant’s nominal capacity: back in Soviet times the existing stock of production tools was sufficient to make a much wider range of missiles, and in much higher numbers. This deficit rather reflects “the physical wear and tear of the old machinery and the need to equip the plant for new technological processes”.

The announcement of the contract outlines the current condition of the Votkinsky plant in great detail. It mentions that 2,665 pieces of various equipment are currently in use on the floors manufacturing “special products”. The age of all that equipment is nothing short of alarming (see Table 1). Almost 80 per cent of it has been in use for more than a decade (see the chart). Some 1,537 units (58 per cent of the total) are past their service life and need to be replaced for

reasons of obsolescence, degraded precision parameters and plain old wear and tear. To illustrate, the programming modules of 169 machine tools still in use at the Votkinsky plant rely on ancient paper tape input. These modules have long been discontinued by the manufacturer, so repairing them takes ages and costs an arm and a leg.

Under the technical specifications outlined in the announcement of the contract, a total of 10 production buildings are to be refurbished. Some of them are situated at the main site of the plant, which straddles the river Votka, while others are some distance away at the assembly and fitting base, where the missiles are put together and tested. In addition to that base, which is 11 km away from the main site, the upgrade program will involve eight production floors and three technological departments (including the central laboratory and the main metrology department). Essentially, the entire production chain will be retooled, from the manufacture of individual parts, components and materials (such as plastics and thermal insulators) to the hull workshop, bonding, assembly, fitting, quality control, painting and packaging floors.

The documents also contain the list of new equipment to be procured. It has to be said that much of it is Russian-made, including machining centers, some machine tools, furnaces and overhead cranes, fault detectors and X-ray machines. But a lot of the new machinery is to be sourced from foreign suppliers. The Soviet machine-tool and instrument-making industry lagged far behind the Western competition. The state of that industry in present-day Russia is probably as sad as the state of the Votkinsky plant itself. It simply cannot deliver the standards required in modern manufacturing. No wonder then that some hardware crucial for the success of the entire upgrade program will have to be brought from places such as the United States, Britain, Germany, Denmark, Austria and the Czech Republic. That includes new machining centers, computerized turning lathes, cutting equipment and various instruments, such as calibrators and spectrometers (see Table 2). Ten of the 33 articles on the list of new equipment will be foreign-made. Imports will account for 145.64m roubles of the 314.34 million cost of the project (46.3 per cent).

It should also be mentioned that the sole bidder for the initial project design contract was OAO “Prikampromprpoekt”

Years in service

5 or less 5 to 10 10 to 15 15 to 20 over 20 Total

Number of units 199 391 538 687 850 2665

Share (%) 7% 15% 20% 26% 32% 100

Source: technical task description in the announcement of the design documentation contract under the “Upgrade and Retooling of FGUP Votkinsky plant for Mass Production of the Iskander-M Product” project.

Table 1. Age of the Votkinsky plant equipment

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 15Iskander-M Missile Triggers Industry Upgrade Program

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(Prikamskiy Institute of Industrial Design, based in Izhevsk). Under the Russian legislation, the state contract must now be awarded to that bidder. Meanwhile, on March 30, 2010 the government announced the next contract under the Votkinsky Plant program - this one for engineering documentation. The contract is worth 7m roubles; the winner should be

announced in June. Shortly before that, the government made a separate announcement on the purchase of another batch of new equipment for the plant, worth 105m roubles. That means that the Votkinsky refurbishment project is not stuck at the initial stage, and certainly not dead. Things finally seem to be moving forward.

Equipment Company Country Requirement (units)

Cost (RUR)

Vertical Machining Center MC 80 / 5ax SIMPLE STROJTOS Czechia 2 36 mln

Horizontal Machining Center TOStec OPTIMA TOS VARNSDORF Czechia 1 30 mln

Machining Center C 20 HERMLE Germany 2 30 mln

CNC Lathe Emcoturn E25 EMCO Austria 2 9 mln

Cut-Off Machine Exotom-150 Struers Denmark 1 3.5 mln

Guillotine Shears TruShear TRUMPF Germany 1 6 mln

Welding System MagicWave Type Fronius Austria 3 3 mln

Dry Ice Blaster Triblast-2 TRIVENTEK Denmark 1 6.14 mln

Portable XRF Analyzer Alpha-2000 Innov-X Systems United States 4 20 mln

Calibrator Transmille 3010 (3041) Transmille Great Britain 1 2 mln

TOTAL 10 companies 6 countries 18 145.64 mln

Source: technical task description in the announcement of the design documentation contract under the “Upgrade and Retooling of FGUP Votkinsky plant for Mass Production of the Iskander-M Product” project.

Table 2. List of foreign-made equipment to be purchased for the Votkinsky plant


Defense Industries

Russian Defense Procurement in 2009

Russian Defense Procurement in 2009Andrey Frolov

Russia’s defense procurement budget includes the Defense Ministry’s spending on the repair and maintenance of its

existing hardware, contracts for new equipment and military R&D programs.

OverviewIn a departure from the previous years’ practice,

Russia has not officially announced the exact figures of its defense procurement spending in 2009. There is no official explanation for this – but the general understanding is that the figures simply kept changing throughout the whole year, reflecting the government’s latest anti-crisis measures. We estimate Russia’s total spending on defense procurement in 2009 at 500bn roubles, which is roughly the average of all the publically announced figures and very close to the latest available official statistics. With the country’s total defense spending estimated at 1,080bn roubles1, defense procurement accounted for about 46 per cent of that figure. In 2008, that share was only 32 per cent – meaning that the overall cuts in Russia’s defense spending last year (the pre-crisis spending target was 1,376bn roubles) affected mostly the upkeep of the army, with procurement escaping relatively unscathed2.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov has provided a rough breakdown of total procurement spending. Of the 592bn roubles that went into procurement programs, 332bn (56 per cent) would be spent on buying new hardware,

he said. Another 160bn (27 per cent) would be channeled into R&D3. That leaves 100bn roubles (17 per cent) for the repair and upgrade programs. The figure of 592bn seems too high (that must have been the pre-crisis spending target), but the relative shares of its components have remained more or less unchanged over the past few years, so they seem to be an accurate reflection of the real situation. That means that of the estimated 500bn roubles of actual spending on defense procurement programs, about 280bn (56 per cent) was spent on new hardware, up to 135bn (27 per cent) on R&D and another 85bn (17 per cent) on repair and upgrade programs (See Figure 1).

The Defense Ministry has also released approximate figures on the relative share of each service in the total defense spending (not just procurement). Maj Gen Aleksandr Shevchenko said that “right now”, the share of the strategic nuclear and space forces is over 20 per cent, the Army and Airborne Troops account for over 40 per cent, the Navy for 15 per cent and the Air Force for 20 per cent of the military budget4. The naval component of the nuclear deterrent seems to account for the bulk of the spending on the nuclear forces. Sergey Ivanov said that about 40 per cent of the military budget would be spent on the Navy5 in 2009, mainly on building Project 955 nuclear-armed submarine cruisers – and also, in all likelihood, on sorting out teething problems with the Bulava SLBM, which those subs are supposed to carry.

The defense procurement program continues to suffer from irregular disbursement of funds. In the first quarter of 2009, Russian defense contractors received from the

Defense procurement spending, bn roubles

Announced by Details

428 Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin

Popovkin said that 300bn roubles made up 70 per cent of the defense procurement budget.

497 Deputy Premier Sergey Ivanov Ivanov said that 332bn roubles made up 66.8 per cent of the defense procurement budget.

592 Deputy Premier Sergey Ivanov

489 Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov Serdyukov said that 378bn roubles made up 77.3 per cent of the defense procurement budget.

508 Deputy chairman of the Russia Duma budget and taxes committee Sergey Shtorgin

Shtorgin said 47 per cent of the total defense spending (1,080bn) went into armament programs

Source: CAST.

Table 1. Official statements on Russia’s defense procurement spending in 2009 (in chronological order)

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government only 63 per cent of the moneys due to them6 (73.6bn roubles). By September, that figure fell to 60 per cent7. And although a system of three-year contracts was formally introduced in 2008, one-year contracts still accounted for the bulk of Russia’s 2009 defense procurement program.

Key developments in 20091. One of the key developments in 2009 was the signing

of large new arms contracts, mainly for weapons systems that had not previously been supplied to the Russian armed forces. Some of the largest of those contracts include the purchase of 64 Sukhoi fighters by the Russian Air Force (48 Su-35S, 12 Su-27SM and four Su-30M2 aircraft), followed by the purchase of new aircraft engines and airborne weapons for those jets.

2. In addition to signing new contracts, the Russian Air Force set a new post-Soviet record for new aircraft deliveries

in 2009. But the bulk of those deliveries was made of the MiG-29SMT fighters turned down by Algeria - meaning that the record was a blip, unlikely to be repeated or broken any time soon. The fall in the numbers of new weapons platforms delivered to the Russian Air Force will come as early as 2010.

3. Spending on Navy procurement contracts has also gone up. Orders have been placed not just for auxiliary vessels but big warships as well. For the first time since 1993, the Russian shipbuilders have laid down a new Project 885 (Severodvinsk class) nuclear-powered attack submarine, and a second Project 22350 (Admiral Gorshkov class) frigate. At the same time, spending on the repair and maintenance of the Russian Navy’s warships has gone down.

4. Army procurement programs have continued at about the same pace as in the previous years. There has been no sharp rise in deliveries, and no large new contracts have been announced. But there has been a marked increase in the numbers of upgraded hardware.

Date Satellite Launch Vehicles Number and type of satellites put into orbitFebruary 28 Proton-K One 17F15 Raduga-1 relay satellite

April 29 Soyuz-U One Kobalt-M photo reconnaissance satellite

May 22 Soyuz-2.1a One 14F112 Meridian telecommunications satellite

July 6 Rokot Three telecommunication satellites of the Rodnik communications system

July 21 Kosmos-3M One 11F627 Parus navigation satellite

November 20 Soyuz-U One 14F138 Lotos-S radio reconnaissance satellite of the Liana system

December 14 Proton-M Three 14F113 Uragan-M navigation satellites of the GLONASS-M system

Source: Russian media, www.russianforces.org.

Table 2. Space launches for the Defense Ministry in 2009

Figure 1. Russian defense procurement spending in 2005-2009

Source: media reports, author’s estimates.

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Figure 2007 2008 2009Nominal spending (real terms figure in 2007 prices), billion roubles

302.7 365 (322.2)* 500 (405.6)*

Strategic missile forces and space forces

Topol-M and Yars ICBMs 7 11 9

Sineva SLBMs 10** 6** 6**

Space SLV launched 7 7 7

Space vehicles put into orbit 4 13 11

Air Force and Air Defense hardware

Strategic and Long-range bombers

1 Tu-22M3 (u) 1 Tu-160 (n), 6 Tu-95MS (r) 2 Tu-160 (r; u), approximately 6 Tu-95MS (r)**

Front line bombers 2 Su-34 (n), 6 Cu-24M2 (u)

1 Su-34 (n), 12 Su-24M2 (u) 2 Su-34 (n), 2 Su-24M2 (u)

Attack aircraft 6 Su-25SM (u) 8 Su-25SM (u) 12 Su-25SM (u)

Fighters 8 Su-27SM (u) 8 Su-27SM (u), 2 MiG-31BM (u) 31 MiG-29SMT/UBT (n), 8 Su-27SM (u) n/a MiG-31BM (u)

Anti-submarine aircraft 1 Tu-142MZ (u) n/a n/a Tu-142M/MZ

Jet trainers n/a n/a 1-3 Yak-130 (n)

Helicopters 4 Mi-28N (n), 1 Ka-50 (n), n/a Mi-8MTV-5 (n)

10 Mi-28N (n), 3 Ka-52A (n), 2 Ka-50 (n), approximately 10 Mi-8 (n)**, 1 Ka-252RLD (n), 6 Ansat-U (n) 1 Mi-26T (r), 14 Mi-24 (r), 20 Mi-8 (r)

Special-purpose aircraft 1 Il-20 (u), 1 Il-22 (u) 1 Il-20 (u), 1 Il-22 (u) n/a

Passenger aircraft n/a 1 Tu-154M (n) 1 Tu-154B2 (r)

UAVs n/a 1 Tipchak, 10 ZALA 421-08, 10 Strekoza

10 Pchela-1K

Air defense systems 1 battalion of S-400 (n) 1 Pantsir-S1 system (prototype), 170 radars, 75 automated control systems

1 battalion of S-400 (n), 4 Pantsir-S1 systems (n)

Navy

Strategic ballistic-missile nuclear-powered submarines

1 Project 667BDR (r) 1 Project 667BDRM (r) -

Non-strategic nuclear-powered submarines

- 1 Project 949A (r), 1 Project 971 (r), 1 Project 945A (r), 1 Project 671RTMK (r)

-

Heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers - 1 Project 11435 (r) -

Guide-missile cruisers - 1 Project 11641 (r) 1 Project 11442 (r)

Diesel-electric submarines - 1 Project 20120 (n) 1 Project 877 (r)

Destroyers and escorts - - 1 Project 956 (r), 1 Project 11540 (n)

Corvettes - 1 Project 20380 (n) -

Table 3. Comparison of some defense procurement figures for 2007-2009


Defense Industries

Russian Defense Procurement in 2009

1 Defense procurement budget to rise to 1,175bn roubles in 2010 – Putin // RIA Novosti, November 21, 2009.2 In January 2009, the head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (OSK), Anatoliy Shlemov, said that funding of the priority programs

would remain unchanged. See: Funding of United Shipbuilding Corporation defense procurement contracts to remain unchanged // Prime-TASS, January 16, 2010.

3 Defense procurement funding to remain unchanged at 1,300bn roubles in 2010-2011 – Sergey Ivanov // ARMS-TASS, June 2, 20094 Ivanov: Most of the Defense Ministry spending to be channeled into the Navy // Vzglyad, June 3, 2009.5 Treasury disburses 73.6bn roubles under defense procurement program // ARMS-TASS, April 8, 2009.6 Some 60 per cent of defense procurement funding has reached contractors, rest to follow by year’s end – Putin // ITAR-TASS,

September 15, 2009.7 Nikolskiy A. Gref turns down profits // Vedomosti, February 17, 2009.

Figure 2007 2008 2009Assault landing ships and boats - 1 Project 1176 (n), 2 Project

11770 (n)1 Project 1176 (n), 1 Project 775 (r)

Minesweepers 2 Project 1265 (r) - 1 Project 02668 (n)

Transport ships - - 1 Project 20180 (n)

Auxiliary ships and boats - 1 Project 19910 (n), 1 Project 19920 (n)

1 Project 12150 (n), 1 Project 21980 (n), 1 Project 21270 (n), 1 Project 19920 (n), 1 Project 304 (r)

Deep-sea submersibles 1 Project 16180 (n) 1 (n), 1 Project 1855 (r) 1 Project 16811 (n)

Land-based missile systems - - 1 Bastion (n)

Armored vehicles, artillery and transport vehicles

Main battle tanks 31 T-90A (n), 31 T-72BA (u)

62 T-90A (n), 31 T-72BA (u) 63 T-90A (n), approximately 40 T-72BA (u)

Armored combat vehicles 31 BMP-3 (n), 90 BTR-80 (n), 60 BTR-70 (u), 10 BMD-4 (n)

41 BMP-3 (n), 155 BTR-80 (n), 55 BTR-70 (u) 30 BMD-4 (n), approximately 6 Sprut-SD (n)

306 or 357 armored combat vehicles (BMP-3, BTR-80, Dozor and others) (n), 10 Nona-SVK (n), 150 BMD-2/BMD-4 (u), 2 BMO-T (n), approximately 6 Sprut-SD (n)

Artillery and mortars 300 (n; u; r) 152 (n; u; r) 20 (n), 85 (u), 36 (r)

Automobiles 4,000 (n), about 3,000 (r)**

4,500(n), including 3,000 trucks About 4,000 (n)

Tactical missile systems 1 Iskander-M battalion (n)

4 Iskander-M launchers (n) 3 launchers and 13 Iskander-M missiles (n)

* – adjusted for the 2008 inflation of 13.3 % and the 2009 inflation of 8.8 %. See: Russian Federal Statistics Service web site (www.gks.ru).** – author’s estimate.Notes: (n) – new, (u) – upgraded, (r) – repaired.Source: Russian media, www.russianforces.org.


Arms Trade

Russian Loans for Arms Contracts

Russian Loans for Arms ContractsDmitry Vasiliev

Russia began offering credit as an inducement for foreign buyers of its weapons shortly after the collapse of the

former Soviet Union. In 1992 India was given an USD 830m loan to buy a whole range of Russian arms, including fighter jets, tanks and armored vehicles, anti-tank weapons, missiles, etc.1 In particular, the money was used to finance the purchase of 10 Su-30K fighters in 1998, worth USD 300m.2 The contract was part of the largest Russia-Indian defense cooperation program to date - to develop a new modification of the Su-30 fighter, the Su-30MKI, and launch licensed assembly of 140 such planes in India. The Su-30K’s were bought pending the completion of the program, so that they could later be upgraded to the Su-30MKI specification.

But that first Russian “loans for arms” deal was not really part of a deliberate strategy. It was largely a continuation of the old Soviet tradition of military largesse towards its allies. The truly calculated use of financial instruments to promote Russian weapons abroad did not begin until the turn of the century, when oil prices shot up, buoying the Russian economy. That turnaround in economic fortunes coincided with the presidency of Vladimir Putin; the national defense industry (including defense exports) was a far greater priority to him than to his predecessor. Defense contracts now figured large during the foreign visits by the Russian president and senior officials. That period saw the signing of some of the largest Russian weapons deals to date, including the high-profile contracts with Algeria and Venezuela. Those contracts were largely made possible by Russia’s willingness to offer various offsets , including attractive financing schemes. It is clear, however, that offsets became a significant factor in the Russian arms trade only after the year 2000. One indirect piece of evidence to support that claim can be found in the US CRS reports on conventional arms transfers to developing nations. The first time those reports mentioned Russia’s growing use of flexible financial instruments was in 2003.

There are several known examples of Russia’s use of the “loans for arms contracts” scheme. The Indian contract aside, the first such loan, of USD 350m , was given to Jordan in 2006 so that it could place an order for two Il-76MF military transport aircraft (worth USD 100m, with a now delivery date in 2011), 200 Kornet-E (AT-14) anti-tank guided-missile systems, 182 Igla (SA-18) man-portable SAM systems with the Dzhigit pedestal twin-launcher mounts, and a batch of the new RPG-32 Hashim hand-held anti-tank rocket launchers (all delivered in 2008)3. Moreover, the loan has not been used up yet, so Russia has still more of its military wares on offer to Jordan – and is even ready to give Amman a new loan, if

need be. The deals on the table now include the upgrade of Jordan’s air defense systems sold to it by the former Soviet Union (Strela-10/SA-13 and Osa/SA-8 mobile SAM systems, ZSU-23-4 Shilka SPAAG), joint production of the RPG-32, the purchase of the TOS-1M heavy tank-chassis-mounted flamethrowers, etc.4

In September 2007, Russia offered a USD 1bn financing scheme to Indonesia, which has since bought six Mi-17 utility helicopters (delivered in 2008) and placed an order for another six Mi-35M attack helicopters (worth an estimated USD 100m, with a delivery date in 2010). It has also signed a contract for 18 BMP-3F naval infantry fighting vehicles (USD 40m, for delivery in 2010).5 It was expected that Indonesia would also contract Russia to build two new Project 636 (Kilo class) diesel-electric submarines and design a corvette based on the Russian Project 20380 (Steregutschi class). But so far those deals have not been signed, partly because of the world economic crisis.

In September 2009, Russia and Venezuela signed an agreement involving a USD 2.2bn loan.6 It is not clear what exactly Venezuela has bought. The only known contract is for 92 upgraded T-72M1M main battle tanks from the Russian army stock. As for the rest of the second Venezuelan package (the first was signed in 2006), it is known to include large numbers of SAM and artillery systems (some of it from the Russian army stock), as well as small arms. The overall worth of the new Venezuelan deal is far more than the USD 2.2bn of Russian credit: some estimates put the figure as high as USD 5bn.7

In February 2010, Sri Lanka received a USD 300m Russian loan, to be spent on Russian military and dual-purpose produce, primarily helicopters.8 Finally, in April 2010 a deal was agreed with Bolivia on a USD 100m loan to finance the purchase of 10 Mi-171 utility helicopters for the government’s campaign against the drugs.9

Overall, the number of the “loans for arms contracts” deals Russia has signed so far isn’t that great, and for two reasons. First, Moscow only offers these loans in exceptional circumstances - such as when it is trying to enter a new market (Sri Lanka after the end of the civil war, Bolivia following the arrival of Evo Morales, the traditionally pro-Western Jordan and Indonesia), or to flog second-hand equipment, which is not very competitive anyway (such as the hardware from the Russian army stock sold to Venezuela). Notably, a financing deal was offered to Greece, a NATO member, when Russia was bidding for a contract to supply several hundred BMP-3M infantry fighting vehicles. (Alas, Greece is now facing an

Adve

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t


Arms Trade

Russian Loans for Arms Contracts

economic meltdown, so new APCs are probably the last thing on its mind.) Meanwhile, the financing of the Indonesian contract for six Su-27 and Su-30 fighters signed in 2007 (the year the Russian loan was issued) does not in fact come from that loan. The money was borrowed from foreign banks, and the deal itself is worth USD 335m.10 The explanation is simple: these fighters are in great demand on the world market, and Indonesia had already bought four Su-27 and Su-30 fighters (delivered in 2003), so a contract for another batch of them in order to have just enough for a squadron was more or less a done deal. In other words, when a contract looks certain, no incentives are offered.

On the other hand, the economic crisis means than not every country can afford to take out a loan to buy new weapons. Our figures indicate that the amount of Russian

“weapons credits” issued after 2008 has fallen, and the only new financing deals are for dual-purpose hardware, such as helicopters. Customers have also slowed down the rate at which they are using up the previously extended Russian loans.

Finally, with the ongoing economic crisis, financing new weapons deals is a burden for the Russian treasury. But the loans really are an effective mechanism of bolstering arms exports and keeping the national defense contractors in business. For Russia, these exports are not so much a political instrument (with the possible exception of arms sales to the Middle East) as an economic strategy. Without foreign contracts, the Russian defense industry will sink - so government financing of arms exports can be viewed as one of the mechanisms of state support for the sector.

1 Kalashnikova N. Russia launches new foreign policy – this time in the East // Kommersant, January 28, 1993; SIPRI ARMS Transfer Database.

2 Makiyenko K. Sukhoi design bureau in India – the Su-30MKI project // Arms Exports, special edition, 2006.3 Zygar M. Weapons of Mutual Understanding // Kommersant, February 11, 2008; Novichkov N. Jordan’s Special Forces Acquire Vehicle-

Mounted Kornet-E // Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, May 2008.4 Rosoboroneksport offers Jordan air defense upgrade solutions // ITAR-TASS, May 11, 2010; Russia to arm Jordan with flame-throwers

// Marker, May 11, 2010.5 Six Russian Mi-35 jets to be sold to Indonesia // Oborona.ru, June 18, 2008.6 Russia to sell 5bn dollars worth of arms to Venezuela // RIA Novosti, February 5, 2010.7 Ibid.8 Bezeka E. Russia to give Sri Lanka a 300m dollar loan to buy weapons // RIA Novosti, February 5, 2010.9 Bolivia to receive 100m dollar Russian loan to buy helicopters // RIA Novosti, April 3, 2010.10 Indonesia to use French loan to buy Russian Sukhoi fighters // Interfax-AVN, September 22, 2008.


Armed Forces

Russia’s Army Reform Enters New Stage

Russia’s Army Reform Enters New StageRuslan Pukhov

In October 2008, Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov announced a new stage of military reform,

and the most radical transformation of the Russian military machine since the Red Army was born in 1918. The MoD set about implementing the new strategy with gusto – most of the structural changes had been implemented by December 1, 2009. The reform has affected the army’s numbers, structure, command system and officer training.

The key elements of the reform are as follows:Accelerate the downsizing of the armed forces to 1 •million people by 2012;Reduce the number of officers (from 335,000 to 150,000 •vacancies) and restructure the officer corps;Centralize the officer training system by reorganizing •65 military schools into 10 “systemic” military training centers;Reorganize and downsize central command, including •the MoD and the General Staff;Bring in more civilian staff into the army’s logistics and •auxiliary services;Eliminate cadre-strength (skeleton) formations and •bring all units up to permanent readiness status;Reorganize the reserves and their training system; •Reduce the number of units, formations, and military •bases;Reorganize the Army into a brigade system, abolishing •the division, corps and army echelons; andReorganize the Air Force and Air Defense, abolishing •armies, corps, divisions and air regiments to replace them with a new structure of airbases and aerospace defense brigades.There has been much media hype over the cuts of the

central military command, reorganization of the military training centers, redundancies in the officer corps and the abolition, to all intents and purposes, of warrant officers.

Meanwhile, the sweeping structural transformation of the Russian Armed Forces in 2009 – especially the Army, the Air Force and Air Defense – has largely remained below the media radar, both at home and abroad. This lack of attention is entirely undeserved: in the space of just 11 months the Russian Armed Forces have been rapidly reshaped in the “new look” (“novyi oblik”) mold, which is radically different in many ways from the traditional model of the Red, then Soviet, then finally Russian Army. Strangely enough this revolutionary transformation spearheaded by Minister Serdyukov has attracted very little attention.

Army transformationThe main thrust of the reform has been to abandon the

traditional Soviet and Russian model of a mass mobilization army. The idea is that in peace time the new Russian Army should be made of fully-manned formations which are always ready for combat duty – the so-called permanent readiness forces. All skeleton-strength units are to be disbanded. All Army formations should be fully manned, i.e. become permanent readiness forces. To that end, Russia is moving away from conscription and towards professional military service. The increase in the numbers of permanent readiness forces will compensate for the overall downsizing of the Army. The skeleton-strength units, manned in peace time by officers without any private soldiers, are to be disbanded. That means than many officer vacancies – most of them senior – will be axed.

Another important change as part of the new brigade structure is the transition towards a three-tier command system comprising district command, operational command and the actual brigades. The existing divisions, combined services armies and army corps are being replaced with brigades, all taking their orders from their respective operational commands. Eight such commands were to be set up on the basis of the existing combined-services armies, but those plans remained on paper throughout 2009 and, so far, the old armies structure is still in place. Six strategic commands are being set up on the basis of the six existing military districts. The commanders of the districts have been put in charge of the respective new strategic commands.

Prior to the launch of the reform in 2008, the Russian Army (not including Airborne Troops) had 24 divisions (3 tank divisions, 16 motorized-rifle divisions and 5 machine-gun-and-artillery divisions); 12 independent motorized-rifle and rifle brigades; plus two division-strength military bases in Armenia and Tajikistan. In practice, out of those 24 divisions and two military bases, only five motorized-rifle divisions and one base were fully manned in 2008. Three of them were in the North Caucasus military district (the 19th, 20th and 42nd divisions), one in the Moscow district (the 3rd division) and one in the Volga-Urals district (the 27th division), plus the 201st military base in Tajikistan. The rest of the division-strength formations had just one or two regiments fully manned. Only about 13 per cent of the Army’s formations could be deemed permanently combat-ready.

Over the course of 2009, 23 divisions were disbanded and their elements used to form 40 new brigades and


Armed Forces


brigade-strength military bases. That number, correct as of 1 December, includes four tank brigades, 35 motorized rifle brigades and one “cover” (fortifications) brigade. Only two division-strength formations still remain: the 18th machine-gun-and-artillery division stationed on the South Kuril Islands, and the 201st base in Tajikistan. All four of the new tank brigades were assembled from elements of the old tank divisions. Of the 35 motorized rifle brigades, 10 had been in place before 2008, 21 have been formed from pre-existing motorized rifle divisions, and another four have been newly created using equipment stored in the reserve depots. Most of the new brigades had been formed by June 1, 2009. They have been taking part in various exercises starting from last spring, and the lessons learnt during those exercises are being used to make certain adjustments to the structure of the new formations.

All the new brigades are permanent-readiness forces, which means that the proportion of the Army formations that have permanent combat-ready status is now 100 per cent, up from the pre-reform figure of 13 per cent. At least 95 per cent of the vacancies in the new brigades have been filled; some brigades are already fully manned, and all of them are fully supplied with equipment and provisions.

As of late 2009, a total of 85 new brigades have been formed in the Russian armed forces as part of the reform. Apart from the 40 combined arms brigades, that number includes nine missile brigades, nine artillery, four rocket-artillery, nine air-defense and one engineers brigade, plus a communications brigade, a electronic warfare brigade, and some others. The seven existing special task force (“spetsnaz”) brigades have retained their special status, and a new experimental reconnaissance brigade has been created in Mozdok, in the North Caucasus. Many support formations have had their status downgraded to regiment or battalion.

The existing army storage and repairs depots have now become the main reserve component of the Army. Those depots are essentially big warehouses holding enough arms and equipment to field a military formation of a certain size. More than 60 such depots have now been formed; most hold enough equipment to field a brigade, including 15 combined-arms brigades (one tank brigade and 14 motorized-rifle brigades). In the “new-look” Russian army, the function of serving as mobilization centers now resides with military schools and regional training centers.

There have been some vacillations over whether to make the same structural changes in the Airborne Troops - but after Gen Vladimir Shamanov was appointed their commander, it was decided to leave the divisional structure intact. The service has retained all its divisions (two Airborne and two Air-Assault). The divisions themselves have been beefed up. The number of independent airborne and air-assault brigades has gone up from three to four, and plans are afoot to create another two (so that each of the six military districts

could have one). By 2015 the Army will also have 18 new army aviation brigades, following the decision to reverse the transfer of army aviation service to the Air Force command.

Air Force, Air Defense and the NavyThe newly merged Air Force and Air Defense has also

undergone radical structural transformations and cuts.The old Soviet regimental structure of Air Force

formations, which dated all the way back to 1938, has been abandoned. The new basic formation in this type of service will be the airbase rather than the old air regiment. Each airbase will include the command, one to seven air squadrons, an airfield service battalion and communication units. The idea is to bring all airborne and ground support units under a single airbase command. Many believe this structure has been borrowed from Belarus, where it was introduced quite a while ago.

A total of 52 airbases had been formed by the end of 2009, replacing 72 Air Force and Air Defense regiments, 14 previously existing airbases and 12 independent air squadrons. The total number of Air Force and Air Defense formations has been slashed from 340 to 180.

All air division HQs have been disbanded, and the airbases take their orders directly from the new Aviation commands. Seven such commands have been set up to replace the old aviation armies, as well as Air Force and Air Defense armies. The 37th Air Army of the Supreme Command (strategic aviation) has been reformed into the Long-Range Aviation Command. Similarly, the 61st Air Army of the Supreme Command (military transport aviation) has been restructured into the Transport Aviation Command. The old Special Task Force Command (and its 16th Air Army) now forms the core of the new Operative-Strategic Aerospace Defense Command, which has special status and is responsible for air defense of Moscow and almost the entire Moscow Military District. Another four territorial commands have been set up to replace the six former Air Force and Air Defense armies, which were subordinated to their corresponding Military District commands.

The Air Force training system has also been reformed. The Gagarin Air Force Academy and the Zhukovskiy Air Force Engineering Academy have been merged to become the Zhukovskiy-Gagarin Air Force Academy with an HQ in Monino. All pilot training has been centralized under the single Krasnodar Aviation Institute.

The Air Defense Forces, which are now part of the Russian Air Force, have undergone serious restructuring. All the former air defense divisions and corps have been disbanded and replaced with 13 aerospace defense brigades, which combine fighter aviation air bases, SAM regiments and radar regiments. These 13 brigades have been distributed between


Armed Forces


the Operative-Strategic Aerospace Defense Command and the four Air Force and Air Defense commands.

As part of the reform in 2009, the Russian Air Force and Air Defense wrote off large numbers of old and obsolete hardware, including aircraft, and shed a lot of personnel. Some 50,000 officer vacancies were expected to be cut in this service as part of the reform.

Meanwhile, the Russian Navy was spared any radical reorganization in 2009. Important steps have been made, however, to simplify its structure and reduce the number of Navy formations, which should eventually fall from 240 to 123. The brunt of the cuts so far has been borne by the Navy Marines: the only Marine division (the 55th, of the Pacific Fleet) has been downgraded to a brigade. The Caspian brigade has been disbanded altogether, and the remaining four brigades have been reformed into regiments.

What next?The overarching idea behind Minister Serdyukov’s

reform is that the shape of the Russian Armed Forces should be dictated by the new nature of the conflicts Russia may have to face. These are primarily local conflicts, mostly on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Such conflicts require a strong rapid-reaction armed force that can be permanently maintained in a combat-ready state. For its defense against other great powers (primarily USA and NATO) Russia will now rely on its nuclear deterrent. It is perfectly obvious that neither the present, nor the foreseeable future holds the threat of a sudden large-scale land invasion of Russia. Any adversary even theoretically capable of such an invasion (the USA, NATO or China) would require a long time to mobilize, deploy and concentrate a large land force on our borders. That gives Russia a long enough period of threat before any possible war, so the requirements to the reserve strength of its armed forces need not be as stringent as before. The

country will have long enough to mobilize, which means that there is no longer a need to maintain the skeleton-strength formations in peace time. In the event of mobilization there will be plenty of time to assemble and deploy additional military formations.

To the adherents of the old dogmas, and those who still discern the need to prepare for a large-scale conventional military conflict with the West in the best traditions of World War II, the Serdyukov reform is a demolition of the country’s core defense infrastructure. But the main reason why the reform is unpopular among the military is, of course, the redundancies. No wonder then that its proponents have been taking so much flak. Minister Serdyukov and the top brass therefore well deserve credit for steering the course of the reform so firmly throughout 2009, despite all the criticism and resistance, as well as the difficult economic situation following the world financial crisis.

Nevertheless, all the changes implemented in 2009 are only the first and relatively easy stage of the coming radical transformation. So far, the reform has been limited mostly to administrative reorganization. Each new military formation (the commands, brigades and airbases) is essentially just a structural shell with a new table of organization. Each will now have to be filled with the actual content and then brought fully to life to become an effective and well-coordinated fighting force. That task is compounded by the need to start training the personnel in the use of the new hardware, now that it has finally begun to arrive. Add to that the overall goal of having military units and formations always prepared for action, ready to deploy within a few hours of receiving their marching orders, and the whole undertaking becomes rather daunting. Essentially Minister Serdyukov and his team now have to prove over the course of 2010 that the massive reorganization of the army in 2009 was the right thing to do, and that the “new-look” armed forces have really become more capable and effective than the “old-style” army. The year 2010 will truly make or break the Serdyukov reform.

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 25Russian Combat Aviation Losses

in Armed Conflict Zones in 1999-2010

The table below lists air crashes, serious accidents (in which the aircraft was lost or seriously damaged) and accidents with fatalities. The period from August 1, 1999 covers the beginning of the second campaign in Chechnya.

The list includes only the aircraft that belonged to the law-enforcement agencies: the Defense Ministry, the Interior

Russian Combat Aviation Losses in Armed Conflict Zones in 1999-2010Mikhail Lukin, Aleksandr Stukalin, Kommersant Publishing HouseAnton Lavrov

Ministry, the FSB and the Federal Border Service.The table includes planes and helicopters lost or

damaged on the territory of Chechnya and Ingushetia in 1999-2010, as well as in Georgia in August 2008. It also lists the aircraft that were flying into or out of the conflict zones.

No Date Aircraft Side number

Location Regiment Ca-sual-ties

Cause Details Crew

1 August 9, 1999

Mi-8MT 41 Botlikh (Dagestan)

487th independent helicopter combat and command regiment

3 Hostile fire Hit by an anti-tank guided missile at an airfield, destroyed by fire

Lt Col Yuriy Naumov, First Lt Alik Gayazov

2 August 9, 1999

Mi-24P 06 Botlikh (Dagestan)


0 Hostile fire Hit by an anti-tank guided missile at an airfield, destroyed by fire

3 August 11, 1999

Mi-8MTV2

114 Botlikh (Dagestan)

685th independent mixed air regiment of the Interior Ministry’s Internal Troops

3 Hostile fire Hit by an anti-tank guided missile immediately after landing, caught fire

Maj Andrey Orlov, Maj Andrey Anoshenkov, First Lt M.Yurin

4 August 25, 1999

Mi-8 Makok (Dagestan)

31st independent air squadron of the Federal Border Service

0 Unknown Fell shortly after take-off, main rotor and tail boom damaged during the fall, cockpit glass broken

Lt Col Anatoliy Ermolov

5 September 9, 1999

Su-25 Karamakhi (Dagestan)

960th assault air regiment 0 Hostile fire Fuel line damaged by hostile fire from the ground (possibly by a man-portable SAM), the pilot ejected to safety. Another version: technical problems

6 September 11, 1999

Mi-8MT Akhar (Dagestan)

326th independent helicopter squadron

3 Hostile fire Caught fire after being hit from a ZU-23-2 air defense system, the pilot ejected but was killed by small arms fire while still in the air

Lt Col Vasiliy Pershikov, Capt Vladimir Burmistrov, Capt Aleksandr Antipenko


Mi-26 Botlikh (Dagestan)


0 Pilot error The helicopter mushed during landing in heavy turbulence and hit the ground. The tail boom broke off, the helicopter turned over and caught fire

Maj Ivan Rudakov


Mi-24P Shalkhi (Ingushetia)


0 Pilot error Collision with trees Capt I.Kozlov

9 October 1, 1999

Mi-8MT 24 Terekli-Mekteb (Dagestan)


0 Unknown The helicopter lost steering after being fired at from the ground, fell to the ground and disintegrated on impact. Another version: damaged during landing due to pilot error

Maj A.Samartsev

10 October 3, 1999

Su-25 Tolstoy-Yurt (Chechnya)

899th guard assault air regiment

1 Unknown Flew into a mountain side while flying at low altitude. Another version: hostile fire from the ground, presumably hit by a portable SAM

Lt Col Andrey Khmelevskiy

11 October 4, 1999

Su-24MP Urus-Martan (Chechnya)

11th independent reconnaissance air regiment

1 Hostile fire Hit by a portable SAM, the commander did not survive the ejection

Maj Konstantin Stukalo, First Lt Sergey Smyslov

Facts & Figures

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief26Russian Combat Aviation Losses




Cause Details Crew

12 October 5, 1999

Mi-8MT 23 Buynaksk (Dagestan)


0 Unknown Lost steering after being hit by hostile fire from the ground, fell down and disintegrated on impact. Another version: damage during landing due to pilot error

Maj Vladimir Bakota

13 October 14, 1999

Mi-24P ShelkovskaYa (Chechnya)


0 Pilot error Hit the trees, sustained some damage but then landed successfully

Capt V.Plotnikov

14 November 29, 1999

Mi-8 Alkhan-Yurt (Chechnya)


1 Hostile fire Hostile fire from the ground Maj Igor Plutalov, Capt Evgeniy Sizonenko, Capt Damashevskiy

15 December 2, 1999

Mi-24V 08 Mozdok (SevernaYa OsetiYa)


0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, the systems failed, fell to the ground and disintegrated on impact

Maj Yuriy Suchkov

16 December 9, 1999

Mi-8MTV

Kharami pass (Dagestan)


0 Unknown Autorotation during landing, fell and disintegrated on impact

Lt Col Vladimir Shlyakhturov

17 December 13, 1999

Su-25 Chishki (Chechnya)

368th assault air regiment 0 Technical problems

Self-ignition of an unguided rocket in one of the wing pylons, the rest of the plane caught fire. The rocket may have been ignited by hostile fire from the ground

Col Sergey Borisyuk


Mi-8MT Yarysh-Mardy (Chechnya)

325th independent transport and combat helicopter regiment

0 Hostile fire Hit from the ground during an S&R operation, attempted emergency landing after the hydraulics failed, disintegrated on impact and burst into flames

Maj Vyacheslav Khristoforov


Mi-8MT Yarysh-Mardy (Chechnya)


0 Hostile fire Picked up the crew and soldiers from the trail helicopter during an S&R operation, then came under fire from the ground and sustained heavy damage, but managed to return to the airfield

Maj Vladimir Alimov, Vladimir Sterlyus


Mi-8MT Starye Atagi (Chechnya)


2 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground during an S&R operation

Maj Aleksandr Dzyuba


Mi-24P Starye Atagi (Chechnya)


2 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground during an S&R operation and exploded in mid-air

Maj Andrey Sovgirenko, Capt Aleksandr Ivanov


Mi-8MT Starye Atagi (Chechnya)

1 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground during an S&R operation


Mi-8T 84 Starye Atagi (Chechnya)


0 Pilot error The pilot lost orientation during a night-time landing, the helicopter hit the ground. The tail rotor and chassis were damaged, the tail boom broke off

Capt N.Denisov, Maj I.Yanushkevich


Mi-24P Botlikh (Dagestan)


0 Technical problems

The main rotor lost power during take-off, leading to hard landing and disintegration on impact

Maj Aleksandr Shabanov

25 January 21, 2000

Mi-8 65 Yalkhoroy (Chechnya)


0 Unknown Fell down and overturned shortly after take-off. One of the passengers on board was Maj Gen Vladimir Kazantsev, deputy chief of the Airborne Troops HQ. According to one of the versions, the cause of the incident was heavy icing of the main rotor

Col Nikolay Maydanov

26 January 22, 2000

Su-25 461st assault air regiment 0 Hostile fire Hit from a man-portable SAM, emergency landed after losing the left engine. The aircraft was written off

Maj A.Karmanov

27 January 24, 2000

Mi-8MT 47 Neftyanka (Chechnya)


0 Unknown Autorotation during landing, the helicopter hit the treetops, fell onto the left side, burst into flames and disintegrated. One of the versions suggests that the pilot lost control, possibly due to hostile fire from the ground

Capt Dmitriy Svetushkov

Facts & Figures

# 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 27Russian Combat Aviation Losses




Cause Details Crew

28 January 29, 2000

Mi-8 Konzhukhoy (Chechnya)


1 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground Col Nikolay Maydanov, Yuriy Derevyanko, Sergey Emets

29 January 30, 2000

Mi-24P 20 Botlikh (Dagestan)


0 Pilot error Pilot error during the crossing of a mountain range led to emergency landing on a mountain slope, during which the aircraft disintegrated

Maj Ruslan Obukhov

30 January 31, 2000

Mi-24P 08 Kharsenoy (Chechnya)


2 Hostile fire Hit from a ZU-23-2 air defense system Maj Andrey Zavitukhin, Capt Aleksey Kirillin

31 February 11, 2000

Mi-8MTV

78 Yalkhoroy (Chechnya)

153rd independent helicopter squadron of the 8th special task force air division

1 Pilot error The helicopter landed with one of the wheels in a trench, crushing a soldier on the ground and sustaining damage to the chassis

Maj Yu.Lopatin


Mi-8MT 48 Shatoy (Chechnya)


15 Hostile fire Hostile fire from the ground Maj IlYa Skripnikov, First Lt Dmitriy Brykaev, First Lt Dmitriy Rychkov


Mi-8MTV1

62 Itum-Kale (Chechnya)


0 Pilot error Crashed during landing Maj V.Makarov


Mi-8MTV1

61 Rokgort, Itum-Kale (Chechnya)


0 Pilot error Crashed during landing Maj Viktor Kapasinov


Mi-24V 03 Shatoy (Chechnya)


0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, fell down and exploded. The crew had ejected

Maj??? Yuriy KHarchenko

36 March 2, 2000

Mi-8MTV2

64 Shatoy (Chechnya)



The main rotor lost power, leading to hard landing. One of the rotor blades cut into the cockpit

Maj Viktor Kapasinov, Capt V.Vasilev

37 March 7, 2000

Mi-24P 33 Gizel (North Ossetia)


0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, fell not far from the home airfield and disintegrated on impact

Maj Dmitriy Shvetsov, Capt O.Oderov

38 May 7, 2000 Su-24MP Benoy-Vedeno (Chechnya)

11th independent reconnaissance air regiment

2 Pilot error Flew into a mountain side in adverse weather conditions

Maj Yuriy Kazakov, Capt Evgeniy Kurdyukov

39 May 14, 2000 Mi-8MT 41 Dyshne-Vedeno (Chechnya)

0 Pilot error Fell into the vortex ring mode and hard-landed

40 May 14, 2000 Mi-8MTV2

Nalchik-20 9th independent air squadron of the Interior Ministry’s Internal Troops


Engine failure shortly after take-off. Two unguided rocket projectiles ignited during the crash, hitting a residential building

Capt D.Lubov

41 May 29, 2000 Mi-8MTV2

57 Botlikh (Dagestan)

0 Unknown Details are unclear, the helicopter was damaged due to technical problems or hostile fire from the ground

42 June 12, 2000 Mi-8MTV2

83 Khankala (Chechnya)


4 Pilot error Shortly after take-off the main rotor blades caught the chassis of the helicopter flying ahead; the aircraft fell to the ground from an altitude of 150 meters

Capt Albert Zagidulin, First Lt Andrey Moshnyakov, Capt German Doroshenko, Sr Warrant Officer Vladimir Ryabov

43 June 19, 2000 Mi-24V 32 Novogroznen-skiy (Chechnya)



Right engine failure in mid-air leading to emergency landing

44 August 6, 2000

Mi-8 Arshty (Ingushetia)

1 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground and emergency landed

45 August 11, 2000

Mi-8MT (Chechnya) 487th independent helicopter combat and command regiment

0 Pilot error Hit the ground during landing in mountainous terrain and heavy wind, disintegrated on impact

Maj S.Korotkin

Facts & Figures


Facts & Figures

Russian Combat Aviation Losses in Armed Conflict Zones in 1999-2010



Cause Details Crew

46 April 26, 2001 Mi-8 (Chechnya) 0 Pilot error The aircraft got caught in air turbulence from the rotors of other helicopters while landing assault troops, lost steering and fell to the ground

47 May 21, 2001 Mi-8MTV

Shali (Chechnya)


- Pilot error Hard-landed in adverse weather conditions, overturned and caught fire

Maj I.Baranov

48 May 30, 2001 Mi-8 Tsentoroy (Chechnya)


0 Hostile fire Came under fire while evacuating a special task force unit, the bullets hit the fuel tank, leading to emergency landing

Lt Col Igor Rodobolskiy

49 May 31, 2001 Mi-8 Nesterovskaya (Ingushetia)

12th independent air regiment of the Federal Border Service

1 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground and emergency landed. The commander sustained fatal injuries. The helicopter was carrying a delegation of the Russian Duma

Lt Col Leonid Konstantinov, Capt Valeriy Norov, Capt Sergey Kurachenko, Warrant Officer Dmitriy Ignashkov

50 June 14, 2001 2 Su-25 05 Itum-Kale (Chechnya)

461st assault air regiment 2 Pilot error Hit the ground in mountainous terrain Lt Col Yuriy Yakimenko and Capt Oleg Podsitkov

51 June 25, 2001 Mi-8MTYa2

(Chechnya) 55th independent helicopter combat and command regiment


The main rotor lost power during take-off, the helicopter fell and disintegrated on impact

Maj V.Kuzmenko

52 June 26, 2001 Mi-8 Argun Gorge (Chechnya)

Federal Border Service 0 Hostile fire Oil pump damaged by hostile fire from the ground, the helicopter emergency landed

53 July 19, 2001 Mi-8MT Engenoy (Chechnya)


9 Unknown Fell while attempting to land and caught fire. One of the versions suggests that the helicopter was overloaded

Lt Col S.Korotkiy

54 July 20, 2001 Mi-8 Nozhay-Yurt (Chechnya)

1 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground

55 August 1, 2001

Mi-26 Severnyy airport, Grozny (Chechnya)


0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, sustained heavy damage, lost steering and emergency landed

56 August 14, 2001

Mi-8MT Tuskharoy (Chechnya)

Federal Border Service 3 Pilot error A rotor blade caught a mountain slope during landing; the aircraft fell and disintegrated on impact

Maj Andrey Kirienko, Maj Vladimir Turovtsev, Capt Vladimir Burakov

57 August 15, 2001

Mi-8MT Alleroy (Chechnya)


0 Pilot error A rotor blade caught a mountain slope during landing; the aircraft fell, sustaining damage to the tail boom and chassis

Maj N.N. Aksenov

58 August 15, 2001

Mi-24V Tsa-Vedeno (Chechnya)


2 Hostile fire Shot down by hostile fire from the ground (presumably a grenade launcher)

Capt Andrey Churbanov, First Lt Oleg Tumakov


Mi-8MTV

Khindoy (Chechnya)


4 Unknown Lost steering during landing and fell down. One of the versions blames technical problems (tail rotor failure), another - hostile fire from the ground

Maj Valeriy Gurin, Rafael Vasilev, Sergey Kalinin


Mi-24 Itum-Kale (Chechnya)

Federal Border Service 0 Pilot error Got caught in a downdraught and hard-landed, sustaining heavy damage

Capt R.Mikhaylov


Mi-8MT 33 Grozny (Chechnya)


13 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM shortly after take-off; a Defense Ministry commission was on board

Capt Vladimir Manaev, Capt Oleg Cherkasov, First Lt Aleksandr Aksakov

62 October 2001 Mi-24 Sharo-Argunsk Gorge (Chechnya)


0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, sustained heavy damage but managed to land at the home airfield

Maj Konstantin Kisten

63 December 1, 2001

Mi-26 Stoderevskaya (Stavropol Territory)



Emergency landed after both engines failed, one of the main rotor blades smashed into the cockpit

Maj Oleg Bondarenko


Facts & Figures




Cause Details Crew

64 January 27, 2002

Mi-8MTV2

45 Kobi (Chechnya) 70th independent mixed special task force air regiment of the Interior Ministry’s Internal Troops

14 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM while carrying a group of senior Interior Ministry officials

Maj Aleksandr Nepokrytykh, First Lt Kirill Lubyanov, Lt Aleksandr Pestov

65 January 28, 2002

Mi-8 Dyshne-Vedeno (Chechnya)

0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, emergency landed and burnt down

66 February 3, 2002

Mi-24P 72 Chechnya Independent aviation training center of the Federal Border Service

3 Unknown Disappeared in adverse weather conditions while returning from Tuskharoy to Khankala. Presumed cause: collision with the ground

Maj Anatoliy Kirpanev, Capt Vasiliy Tominets, Lt Dmitriy Zolin

67 February 7, 2002

Mi-8MT Grozny (Chechnya)


Lost steering due to technical problems (versions include tail rotor, gearbox or engine failure), started autorotating, fell from an altitude of 50 meters and burst into flames

Maj Yuriy Pukhnarevich, Capt Yuriy Plakhteev, First Lt Aleksey Lebedev

68 February 8, 2002

Mi-8 Irgakly (Stavropolskiy kray)



Emergency landed due to problems with the gearbox

Maj Sergey Palagin


Mi-8 Chechen-Aul (Chechnya)


0 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM. The warhead did not detonate, but damaged the left engine and ruptured an oil feed tube, leading to emergency landing

Lt Col Sergey Chernyavskiy

70 April 29, 2002 Su-25 Dyshne-Vedeno (Chechnya)

368th assault air regiment 1 Pilot error Hit the ground while exiting from a nosedive Maj Igor Bezryadin

71 July 20, 2002 Mi-8MTV2

Mt. Stolbovaya, Guli (Ingushetia)

independent aviation training center of the Federal Border Service

12 Pilot error Hit the ground in mountainous terrain Lt Col Sergey Nesterenko, Maj Aleksandr Zarubin, First Lt Sergey Balev, Warrant Officer Pavel Telegin

72 August 2002 Mi-8 Itum-Kalinskoe Gorge (Chechnya)


0 Hostile fire Emergency landed after coming under fire from the ground and taking heavy damage

Maj Sergey Palagin

73 August 19, 2002

Mi-26 89 Khankala (Chechnya)


127 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM (the missile hit the right engine), then emergency landed on a minefield

Maj Oleg Botanov, Capt Aleksey Amelshenko, Capt Vladimir Rytsar, First Lt Andrey Galoyko, Sr Warrant Officer Vladimir Melnik

74 August 31, 2002

Mi-24P Beshil-Irzu (Chechnya)


2 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM Capt Nikolay Volodin, Capt Aleksandr Blokhin


Mi-24V Galashki (Chechnya)


3 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM Maj Vladimir Vlasov, First Lt Dmitriy Dorofeev, First Lt Evgeniy Bulov


Mi-24V Severnyy airfield (Chechnya)



Autorotation during landing due to tail rotor failure. Fell and disintegrated on impact

Maj Yu.Noskov

77 October 12, 2002

Mi-8MT (Chechnya) 487th independent helicopter combat and command regiment


Engine problems during landing in mountainous terrain; the helicopter hit the ground, overturned and disintegrated

Maj S.Chekmizov

78 October 17, 2002

Mi-8MTV2

46 Yellow+D8

Komsomolskoe (Chechnya)

14th independent air squadron of the Interior Ministry’s Internal Troops

3 Pilot error Hit an electricity pylon while trying to avoid hostile fire from the ground, fell into the river Terek. The aircraft was then blown up on the spot as it could not be repaired or evacuated

Lt Col Vladimir Strekalovskiy, First Lt R.Gerasimenko, Capt Oleg Korovin

79 October 29, 2002

Mi-8MTV2

Khankala (Chechnya)

14th independent air squadron of the Interior Ministry’s Internal Troops

4 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM during landing. The missile hit the tail rotor; the helicopter started to autorotate, hit the ground, exploded and burnt down

Lt Col Aleksandr Volodin, Capt Pavel Borodin, First Lt Vladimir Tsaregorodtsev




Cause Details Crew

80 November 3, 2002

Mi-8MT Khankala (Chechnya)


9 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM during take-off Maj Vladimir Semakin, Maj Aleksandr Nesterov, First Lt Sergey Ryumin


Mi-24P Pravoberezhnoe (Chechnya)



Began to lose steering in mid-air, lurched to the left and fell into a nosedive. Crash landed onto its right side and burnt down

Capt Sergey Misyura


Mi-8 Tazen-Kala (Chechnya)


0 Hostile fire Came under fire during take-off, sustained heavy damage and emergency landed

Lt Col Aleksandr Markov

83 March 20, 2003

2 Mi-24 Mt. Daykhokh (Chechnya)


4 Pilot error The two helicopters hit the ground in adverse weather conditions and mountainous terrain

Lt Col Vitaliy Boyko, Maj Aleksandr Darvin, Capt Vladimir Skripochnikov, First Lt Rodion Sultanov

84 July 6, 2003 Mi-8MT Bachi-Yurt (Chechnya)

332nd independent guard helicopter combat and command regiment

5 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground shortly after take-off, sustained damage to the tail rotor and the tail boom, then fell to the ground

Maj Pavel Zheltukhin, Capt Ruslan Skorospekhov, Capt Sergey Muravev

85 August 2, 2003

Mi-24 Konzhukhoy (Chechnya)


Emergency landed due to engine failure and disintegrated. The helicopter was then blown up as it could not be repaired or evacuated

86 August 7, 2003

Mi-8MT Dyshne-Vedeno (Chechnya)

112th independent helicopter regiment

1 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, sustained damage to the main gearbox, which, combined with a fire on board, forced the pilot to attempt emergency landing. The helicopter was then hit several times from grenade launchers while trying to land and exploded

Lt Col Viktor Tyurikov, Maj Aleksandr Orlov, Capt Yuriy Patskevich


Mi-24 Khankala (Chechnya)



Hard-landed due to engine malfunction, turned over and disintegrated on impact

Maj Yuriy Borisikov

88 April 26, 2004 Mi-24 Ersenoy (Chechnya)


0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground, sustained heavy damage and emergency-landed

89 May 26, 2004 Mi-8 Belgatoy (Chechnya)

0 Hostile fire Came under fire while landing assault troops, the fuel tank was ruptured

90 May 26, 2004 Mi-24 Belgatoy (Chechnya)

0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground while covering assault troops landing

Maj Viktor Butenko


Mi-8 Karabulak (Ingushetia)

675th independent mixed special task force air regiment of the Interior Ministry’s Internal Troops

2 Pilot error Flew into a mountain side in adverse weather conditions

Maj Anatoliy Galchin, Capt Andrey Andrenkov, Capt Aleksandr Mager


Mi-24V Alkhan-Kala (Chechnya)


2 Pilot error The tail boom caught an electricity pylon; the helicopter fell to the ground and burnt down

Capt Sergey Zaleznitskiy, First Lt Mikhail Korotya

93 March 10, 2005

Mi-8 Alkhan-Kala (Chechnya)

FSB 16 Pilot error Caught an electricity pylon and fell down. An FSB special task force group was on board

Maj Valeriy Kataev

94 March 22, 2005

Mi-8 Oktyabrskoe (Chechnya)

Interior Ministry’s Internal Troops


Autorotation due to tail rotor failure; the helicopter hard landed and fell onto its side

Yuriy Fomin

95 April 1, 2005 Mi-8 Alpatovo (Chechnya)


Emergency landing due to engine failure

96 July 16, 2005 Mi-8 Tesbichi (Chechnya)

FSB 9 Technical problems

Lost steering during descent and hit a mountain slope


Mi-8MT Yuzhnyy (North Ossetia)

4th Air Force and Air Defense Army

11 Pilot error Hit the trees in adverse weather conditions and mountainous terrain

Lt Col Aleksandr Sviridov,

Facts & Figures





Cause Details Crew

98 April 27, 2007 Mi-8 Shatoy (Chechnya)

825th independent helicopter regiment

20 Unknown Crashed during landing due to autorotation. The helicopter was carrying a GRU special task force group

Lt Col Sergey Korolev, Capt Vyacheslav KudryaShov, Nikolay Sidygalov

99 May 17, 2008 Mi-8 Tangi (Chechnya)


0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground while evacuating a special task force group, caught fire. Emergency landed after flying 8 km with the single left engine working

Maj Valeriy Chukhvantsev, First Lt Valeriy Evdokimov, First Lt Yuriy Golovnev

100 April 22, 2008 Mi-8 Chozhi-Chu (Chechnya)

FSB 0 Hostile fire Came under fire from the ground and emergency landed

101 August 8, 2008

Su-25BM Zarskaya road (South Ossetia)

368th assault air regiment 0 Friendly fire

Came under friendly fire from a portable SAM system

Lt Col Oleg Terebunskiy

102 August 8, 2008

Su-25SM 08 Red Tskhinval (South Ossetia)

368th assault air regiment 0 Hostile fire The aircraft was hit by a man-portable SAM but managed to return to the airfield

Lt Col Oleg Molostov

103 August 2008 Su-25SM (South Ossetia) 368th assault air regiment 0 Hostile fire The aircraft was hit by a man-portable SAM but managed to return to the airfield

104 August 9, 2008

Tu-22M3 36 Karbauli (Georgia)

52nd guard heavy bomber air regiment

3 Unknown Main version: shot down by Georgian air defense

Lt Col Aleksandr Koventsov, Maj Vyacheslav Malkov, Maj Viktor Pryadkin, Maj Igor Nesterov

105 August 9, 2008

Su-24M Dzeveri (Georgia)

929th state flight testing center

1 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM Col Igor Zinov, Col Igor Rzhavitin

106 August 9, 2008

Su-25SM Tskhinval (South Ossetia)


First hit by a Georgian man-portable SAM, then came under friendly man-portable SAM fire from South Ossetian guerrillas

Col Sergey Kobylash

107 August 9, 2008

Su-25BM Itrapis (South Ossetia)


Hit by mistake by Russian air defense Maj Vladimir Edamenko

108 August 11, 2008

Su-24M 42 Red Tskhinvali (South Ossetia)

968th research and training mixed air regiment of the 4th pilot training center

0 Friendly fire

Hit by mistake by Russian air defense

109 August 11, 2008

Su-25SM 09 Red (South Ossetia) 368th assault air regiment 0 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM, but managed to return to the airfield

Capt Ivan Nechaev

110 August 11, 2008

Su-25 46 Red (South Ossetia) 461st assault air regiment 0 Hostile fire Hit by a man-portable SAM but managed to return to an airfield, despite fire on board and right engine failure

Maj Ivan Konyukhov

111 August 16, 2008

Mi-8MTKO and Mi-24

205 Ugardanta (South Ossetia)

12th independent air regiment of FSB and the 487th independent helicopter combat and command regiment

1 Pilot error While attempting to land, the Mi-8MTKO collided with the stationary Mi-24 and turned over. Both helicopters then burnt down

Sr Warrant Officer Aleksandr Burlachko, Igor Pan

Facts & Figures



Our AuthorsMikhail Barabanov. Graduated from the Moscow National University of Culture, then worked for the Moscow City Government. Editor-in-Chief of MDB since 2008. An expert on naval history and armaments.

Andrey Frolov. Graduated with an honours degree from the Faculty of Foreign Affairs of Saint Petersburg State University and in 2003 from the French-Russian Masters’ School of Political Science and International Relations. In 2003–2004 – researcher at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR-Center), executive editor of Yaderny Kontrol magazine (in Russian). In 2004 – project manager of Export control system transformation in Russia.

Anton Lavrov. Graduated from the Tver State Technical University. An independent aviation analyst and one of the most prominent independent Russian researchers of the 2008 Russian-Georgian War.

Mikhail Lukin. Graduated in 1992 from Moscow State University with a degree in Journalism. In 1990 joined the Postfactum news agency as an editor. In 1993 became a staff member of the XX Century and the World think-tank, and in 1994–1997 worked as head of the information section in the National News Service. In 1997 became deputy director of the information center of the Kommersant Publishing House. Director of the information center of the Kommersant Publishing House since 2003.

Fyodor Lukyanov is Editor-in-Chief of the Russia in Global Affairs journal, published in Russian and English with participation of Foreign Affairs, and an international columnist with the Kommersant daily, Vedomosti, The Moscow Times and Gazeta.ru online source; leading national radio stations and TV channels. Fyodor Lykyanov graduated from Moscow State University 1991 as a Germanist. He worked as a correspondent, commentator and editor for many Russia media. Member of the Presidium of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, an influential independent organization providing foreign policy expertise.

Konstantin Makienko. Graduated from the Oriental Department of the Moscow National Institute for International Relations in 1995 and the French-Russian Masters’ School of Political Science and International Relations in 1996. He was head of a project on conventional armaments at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR-Center) in 1996–1997. Since September of 1997, he has been Deputy Director of CAST. He is the author of numerous articles on Russia’s military-technical cooperation with other countries.

Ruslan Pukhov is director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) since 1997. In 1996 he graduated from the School of International Information of MGIMO University under the Russian Foreign Ministry. In 1996-1997 - postgraduate student of the French-Russian Master d’Etudes Internationales Sciences Po - MGIMO. In 1996-1997 - researcher for the Conventional Arms Project of the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center). Since 2007 Member of the Public Advisory Board of the Russian Defense Ministry.

Aleksandr Stukalin is a graduate of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University. Joined Kommersant, Russia’s leading broadsheet, in 1992 and became the newspaper’s editor-in-chief in 2004. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Russian Newsweek in 2005–2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Vedomosti newspaper in March-September 2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of Kommersant from October 2008 to date.

Dmitry Vasiliev. Graduated in 2004 from the State University – Higher School of Economics with a Master’s Degree in Strategic Management. From 2003 to mid-2004 worked as a risk evaluation analyst at Absolut Bank . CAST researcher since July 2004 , editor-in-chief of Eksport Vooruzheniy journal since 2005.

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Moscow Defense Brief - WikiLeaks · # 2, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 3 The Arms Non-Reduction Treaty...

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