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Moore on goodness and thenaturalistic fallacyHasna Begum aa University of DaccaPublished online: 15 Sep 2006.

To cite this article: Hasna Begum (1979) Moore on goodness and thenaturalistic fallacy, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 57:3, 251-265, DOI:10.1080/00048407912341261

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Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 57, No. 3; September 1979

MOORE ON GOODNESS AND THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY*

Hasna Begum

1. Introduction

The Naturalistic Fallacy has been a central issue in Ethics since G. E. Moore published Principia Ethica in 1903. Our understanding of Moore's position depends on our understanding of the term 'non-natural' which he coined in this work. Philosophers attempting to interpret Moore have raised several serious problems about his views. In particular:

(i) What does Moore mean by 'non-natural'; i.e., What is the distinctive feature of goodness as a non-natural quality?

(ii) How are we to understand what Moore says about the Naturalistic Fallacy?

(iii) Is the notion of 'non-natural' compatible with the Naturalistic Fallacy?

(iv) Does Moore himself commit the Naturalistic Fallacy? Philosophers have tried to understand Moore's notion of 'goodness' as a non- natural quality in order to get satisfactory answers to these problems. But unfortunately their attempts, in most cases, have led to misleading and arbitrary interpretations. In this article I shall attempt to clarify Moore's notion of goodness, and thereby to answer these questions.

Moore introduces the trichotomy of terms: 'natural', 'non-natural' and 'supersensible' in Principia. The distinctions between the three kinds of quality to which these terms refer are very important for the correct interpretation of Moore's ethics.

2. The Trichotomy of Qualities

To clarify the distinctions between the three qualities perhaps the best approach would'be-to discover Moore's own examples of such qualities. According to two passages in Principia taken together, a natural quality is a quality of a natural object which is an object of experience and which exists in time; and a supersen:sible quality is a quality of a supersensible entity which is 'only inferred

* 1 acknowledge Professor Peter Singer's and Professor D. H. Monro's help while writing this paper.

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252 Moore on Goodness and the Naturalistic Fallacy

to exist' in a supersensible world.~ So it seems reasonable to suppose that as a natural object is an object of experience, a natural quality itself too must be a quality which does exist in time and is 'an object of experience' (and experience here may be taken as sensory experience as the distinction then becomes clearer); and again, as a supersensible being is an object, which is 'only inferred to exist', a supersensible quality, which inheres in supersensible beings in the supersensible world, must be a quality, which is also 'only inferred to exist'.

In Principia Moore attempts to make a distinction between natural and non- natural qualities. For Moore, though goodness is not a natural property it must belong to a natural object. 2 He writes about metaphysical terms

. . . when I spoke of 'metaphysical' terms, I meant terms which refer to qualities of such a supersensible reality, which do not belong to anything natural.3

This sentence contains a categorical assertion that metaphysical terms refer to qualities which do not belong to natural objects. So the most important distinction between the two kinds of quality, non-natural and supersensible, is that whereas one belongs to natural objects, the other belongs to supersensible objects, though both kinds are not natural, i.e., other than natural. This is the crucial point which has been commonly ignored by the commentators on Moore's Ethics.

Moore clearly regards non-natural qualities as different from both the other two. How are they different? A natural quality is one that is 'an object of experience' and 'exists in time', a supersensible quality is one that is only inferred to exist in a supersensible world. It follows that a third kind of quality, different from either of these, must be: (1) not an object of sensory experience, existing in time; (2) not a quality of supersensible objects existing in a supersensible world. If we combine these, we get this definition: A non-natural quality is a quality o f a natural object and yet is not an object o f sensory experience and does not exist in time.

A number of examples of natural qualities have been given by Moore in Principia.4 Moore says categorically that such terms as 'yellow', 'green', 'blue', 'productive of life', 'willed', 'desired', etc., denote properties which are all properties of natural objects and can be experienced; and any theory which defines goodness as any of these properties is a naturalistic theory.

For Moore supersensible qualities are qualities the existence of which is known only by inference and this inference follows from the propositions about the supersensible world which are assumed to be true by metaphysicians. Moore thinks that supersensible qualities are the qualities of such assumed supersensible entities which 'are not at all'. By this he seems to mean that they have neither temporal existence nor the kind of being that, for example,

t Principia, pp. 38fandpp . 40f. 2 lbid. ,p . 41. 3 0 p . cit.,p. 112. 4 ibid., p. 40

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Hasna Begum 253

numbers have. In one passage5 he seems to suggest that the Stoic conception of Nature, Spinoza's Absolute Substance, the Kantian Kingdom of Ends, are examples of supersensible objects. In this passage Moore also says that according to Metaphysical Ethics, that which is 'perfectly good' is something which (i) exists, but is not natural; and which (ii) has some characteristic possessed by a supersensible object. He also gives two examples in Principia of a supersensible quality: 'Divine Omnipotence' and Pure Will.6

1 give a diagram below which, I believe, represents Moore's classification of qualities into three distinct kinds:

I Natural

(known through sensory experience)

I ln~trinsic I Extrinsic

I I I

Natural Derivative or caused

Qualities

I I

Not Natural (cannot be known through

sensory experience)

| I Non-Natural Supersensible

(Consequential, must (So-called qualities, inhere in natural non-existent and

objects, may have or non-being; just even constitute intrinsic product of imagin-

values) ation of meta- physicians; have no

connection with objective natural

world.)

The above diagram shows that 'Not Natural' is a genus and 'Non-Natural' and 'Supersensible' are two different species under this genus. Taking 'Not Natural' and 'non-natural' as synonymous, many philosophers have wrongly interpreted Moore as holding goodness to be a supersensible quality. But Moore often refers to supersensible qualities as 'so-called' qualities and he also shows his disbelief in the existence and the being of any supersensible entity in many passages in his writings. Moore seems to deny any possibility of existence which

5 Ibid.,p. 113. 6 Ibid., pp. 103 and 128 respectively.

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254 Moore on Goodness and the Naturalistic Fallacy

is not natural and thus disagrees with the metaphysicians about their concept of 'goodness'. He so characterises 'Metaphysical Ethics' as to show that the metaphysicians' concept of goodness as a so-called supersensible quality is necessarily a null class.

3. Goodness as a Consequential Quality

In the diagram I have shown that a non-natural quality is a consequential quality which inheres in natural objects, and which may have (or indeed constitute) intrinsic value. This needs explaining. In Principia Moore argues that goodness is a simple unanalysable non-natural quality and is irreducible to any other quality. But what he says in Principia seems to imply that for him goodness is a simple quality like yellow, which is both a physical and constituent quality. His repeated analogy between goodness and yellow gives this impression. Moore, however, later in his essay, 'The Conception of Intrinsic Value', published in Philosophical Studies, 1922, attempts to show that goodness is simple and unanalysable and therefore indefinable like yellow, but is not a physical quality, nor is it a constituent quality though it is a quality of an object which is physical. Goodness is an emergent new quality and whenever certain qualities (there can be any number of varieties of combination of such qualities) are combined together, the quality of goodness emerges as a result of such combinations. This is the reason, according to Moore, why goodness is irreducible to any of the constituent qualities of an object and, again, is not identical with any of the particular sets of such combinations. Moore says that goodness is not to be identified with any of the constituent qualities of an object which is good and that whenever naturalists or metaphysicians identify goodness with any constituent quality or with any set of constituent qualities they commit the Naturalistic Fallacy.

The consequential quality of goodness is thus a distinct quality in a thing which emerges from the presence and combination of constituent qualities in the object itself. The combination of constituent qualities in an object can be as numerous as the number of things which are good; when an object has the constituent qualities x, y and z, there emerges a new quality, goodness, in the object. But from this it does not follow that whenever we find a good object the object in question must always have the same qualities x, y and z. Even if goodness always did result from the same set of qualities it would still be indefinable. The point is that it is a new quality not reducible to these others.

4. Goodness as Intrinsic Value

In 'The Conception of Intrinsic Value' Moore explains the nature of goodness and beauty as intrinsic value which, he admits, he failed to explain in Principia. In the process of clarifying his own view he opposes all subjective theories, the objective theories which do not hold values to be intrinsic, and also the so-called objective theories which hold values to be both objective and intrinsic but only to inhere in a supersensible world with supersensible entities. He defines intrinsic value:

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Hasna Begum 255

To say that a kind o f value is 'intrinsic' means merely that the question whether a thing possesses i t . . . depends solely on the intrinsic nature o f the thing in question.7

Moore goes on to explain what he means by 'intrinsic value'. He says that two things x and y being exactly alike intrinsically, in spite of their being two things, must possess intrinsic value in the same degree. The most important thing to notice is that, while two things, x and y, which are exactly alike must have the same degree of intrinsic value, it does not follow that, if they do possess the same degree of intrinsic value, they must be exactly alike. For Moore, p implies q but q need not imply p (where p stands for a particular set of value-making qualities and q for value). A different set of value-making qualities might give rise to the same degree of value. Moreover, the value of a thing depends solely on its intrinsic nature, that is to say, its intrinsic qualities. Moore contends that extrinsic (relational) qualities, e.g. numerical, temporal, spatial and circumstantial ones, have nothing to do in the determination of intrinsic value.8 Hence x and y, though alike in value, might be very different in many other respects.

Moore explains the nature of intrinsic value by contrasting it with intrinsic properties. He writes

Indeed it seems to me to be one of the most important truths about predicates of value, that though many of them are intrinsic kinds of value, in the sense I have defined, yet none of them are intrinsic properties, in the sense in which such properties as 'yellow' or the property of 'being a state of pleasure' or 'being a state of things which contain a balance of pleasure' are intrinsic properties. 9

For Moore, predicates of value though depending solely on intrinsic properties are not themselves intrinsic properties. He admits that there must be some characteristic belonging only to predicates of value which intrinsic properties never possess. I think what Moore has in mind, though he does not clearly express it, is that the characteristic belonging only to predicates of value is the characteristic of being consequential. This distinctive characteristic of intrinsic value has been taken into account later by both W. D. Ross and C. D. Broad.

It is unfortunate that Moore does not discuss this characteristic here any further and instead points to another difference between intrinsic value and intrinsic property. He says

I can only vaguely express the kind of difference I feel there to be by saying that intrinsic properties seem to describe the intrinsic nature of what possessed them in a sense in which predicates of value never do.10

Here Moore perhaps means that by mentioning the intrinsic properties we do describe the contents of the intrinsic nature of the thing which possesses it. But

7 PhilosophicalStudies, p. 260. 8 Ibid., pp. 260ff. 9 Ibid., p. 272. to Ibid., p. 274.

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256 Moore on Goodness and the Naturalistic Fallacy

this is not the case with intrinsic value. It is a consequential property of the whole intrinsic nature. We cannot describe the intrinsic nature of the thing which possesses it by mentioning its intrinsic value. What we say is just that 'the thing possesses certain intrinsic value' because it possesses certain intrinsic properties which constitute the intrinsic nature of the thing in question. It seems, however, that when we say that a thing is 'beautiful' we describe the thing which possesses a certain intrinsic nature, but we do not describe the intrinsic nature i t se l f of the thing which possesses 'beauty'. Different and innumerable sets of combinations of intrinsic properties can constitute intrinsic natures which can give rise to intrinsic value. So, no definite description of the intrinsic nature is entialed from any attribution of intrinsic value to a thing. That is why Moore says p---" q, but q--k p.H I think this is the most plausible explanation of the difference between 'intrinsic properties' and 'intrinsic value' which Moore has in mind. This distinction may be made clearer by the help of the following diagram:

i Intrinsic Characteristic

T (A thing.)

I I

Extrinsic Characteristic

(e.g. temporality, spatiality, etc.)

Intrinsic Property (Does not depend on the intrinsic

nature of T but is a constituent part of the intrinsic nature,

e.g. yellowness.) Intrinsic Value (Is not a constituent part

of the intrinsic nature of T yet solely depends on the intrinsic

nature of T for its existence, e.g. goodness, beauty.)

Broad observes that the difference between intrinsic properties and intrinsic value which Moore tries to explain in 'The Conception of Intrinsic Value' is misleading. According to Moore's view in the essay, Broad thinks, goodness as intrinsic value is determined solely by the intrinsic nature of the thing which possesses it and yet is not intrinsic.~2 That is, from what Moore says about the

I 1 " p ' stands for value-making intrinsic qualities and' q' for intrinsic value. 12 'Certain Features in Moore's Ethical Doctrines', The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (ed.) Schilpp,

p. 60.

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Hasna Begum 257

difference, it seems that goodness as intrinsic value is a non-intrinsic characteristic. But Broad, of course, could see the distinction in Moore's mind

the distinction being the derivative nature of goodness as intrinsic value.~3 In 'A Reply to My Critics'14 Moore most politely blames himself for making

use of an 'awkward piece of terminology' which made Broad take Moore to have said that there are non-natural qualities which are non-intrinsic. He asserts that he was never willing to say this. He admits that it would certainly be a contradiction to say that a property is determined solely by the intrinsic character of what possessed it, and yet is not 'intrinsic', became by being solely dependent on the intrinsic nature of the thing, it cannot be extrinsic to the thing itself. Nevertheless, he had said that goodness and beauty, though properties and intrinsic, were not intrinsic properties. The distinction he meant to make, he tells us, was between two kinds of property which depend only on the intrinsic nature of a thing. A property of one kind is also a constituent part of that intrinsic nature - - a natural intrinsic property. A property of the second kind is non-natural: it depends on the intrinsic nature of a thing but is not a constituent part of that thing. It is thus not an intrinsic property, though it is a property, and, since it is solely dependent on the thing's intrinsic nature, is also in a sense intrinsic. However, Moore does not make as clear as he should have made the distinction between the intrinsic natural and the intrinsic non-natural properties of a thing. Even in 'The Reply to My Critics' Moore does not give a clearer account of the distinction which is in his mind. The distinction, that non- natural intrinsic properties which depend solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing which possesses them are consequential, whereas natural intrinsic properties are the constituent properties of the things in question, could be traced in his writings; but he never explicitly expresses or explains this point. The closest he reaches to explaining this point is when he writes

It is true, indeed, that I should never have thought of suggesting that goodness was 'non-natural' unless I had supposed that it was 'derivative' in the sense that, whenever a thing is good (in the sense in question) its goodness (in Mr Broad's words) 'depends on the presence of certain' non- ethical characteristics' possessed by the thing in question: I have always supposed that it does so 'depend', in the sense that, if a thing is good (in my sense), then that it is so follows from the fact that it possesses certain natural intrinsic properties, which are such that from the fact that it is good it does not follow conversely that it has those properties.15

This passage shows clearly that Moore admits that there is a necessary connection between being non-natural and being derivative; i.e., non-natural properties are and must be derivative or consequential in nature.

In his reply Moore refers to another distinction between intrinsic value and intrinsic properties which he has made in 'The Conception of Intrinsic Value'.

13 Op. cit.,p. 60. 14 Ibid., pp. 583f. 15 Ibid., p, 588.

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2 5 8 Moore on Croodness and the Naturalistic Fallacy

In one passage ~6 he says that a non-natural intrinsic property or intrinsic value does not describe the thing which possesses it to any extent at all, whereas a natural intrinsic property always describes it to some extent. It is true that we cannot describe fully and completely the intrinsic nature of an object without mentioning all of its natural intrinsic properties. Unlike natural intrinsic properties, natural extrinsic properties do not describe the intrinsic nature of the thing which may happen to possess them as accidents. Again, though intrinsic value as a non-natural intrinsic property does depend solely on the intrinsic nature of the object that possesses it, it does not describe the thing. Because of itspeculiarnature (p-- , q, but q-/-*p) it is not possible to know from its presence among many possible combinations of natural intrinsic qualities from which particular one it has been derived, So this is how a non-natural intrinsic property does not describe to any extent at all. It is noticeable that this is so not because the property is not descriptive but because it does not and cannot offer any definite description.

5. The Relation between Value and Value-making Characteristics: A Logical Necessity ?

Now, the important question is: What is the nature of the relation between intrinsic value and value-making characteristics? Moore says that the relation between value and value-making characteristics is a necessary one. But, he says, it is not a causal necessity, nor is it a logical necessity (i) based on the definition of (e.g.) 'beauty', or (ii) based on the meaning of 'either-or', or any other kind of necessity. In this paper I shall only examine whether Moore is right in holding that it is not a logical necessity. I shall first spell out the difference between a purely synthetic proposition and a proposition of the kind 'If A and B are exactly alike in intrinsic nature and A is beautiful then B is beautiful too'. Compare that proposition with this one: 'If A is desired and B is exactly like A in intrinsic nature B must be desired too'. This will be analytically true only if 'exactly like' includes 'like in respect of being desired'. But being desired is a relational characteristic and is not part of A's intrinsic nature. The proposition is therefore synthetic.17

At first sight this may seem odd. We are inclined to say that it is irrational to desire A but not B, which is exactly like A, and we suspect that some kind of self-contradiction is involved. But remember that we are considering only the intrinsic characteristics of A and B. A collector may be prepared to pay large sums for Napoleon's toilet articles and nothing at all for some exactly like them which had no connection with Napoleon. A man who loves his wife is not thereby committed (legally, morally or logically) to loving her identical twin. You may badly want the steak set before you in a restaurant; if, after you have eaten it, the waiter produces another steak exactly like the first, there is nothing

16 ltbid., p. 590f. 17 Suppose 'exactly like' means like in its intrinsic and its extrinsic qualities (I mean its extrinsic

qualities other than the quality of being desired). In this case also the statement will probably be true, but, of course, not analytically true.

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Hasna Begum 259

irrational in not wanting that too. Desirings, likings and dislikings may depend on the extrinsic characteristics of their objects; or they may depend on some characteristic (such as not being hungry) of the desiring person.

Beauty is not like this. Extrinsic qualities (like 'having been worn by Napoleon' or 'being married to me') are quite irrelevant to beauty. We have seen that 'If A is desired, and B is exactly like A, B must be desired too' is not only not self-contradictory, but may be actually false. But ' If A is beautiful, and B is exactly like A, B must be beautiful too' seems to be indubitably true. Nevertheless, Moore thinks that this proposition is also a synthetic one, because beauty is not part of the intrinsic nature of the beautiful object. 'Exactly like A in intrinsic nature' does not include, as part of its meaning, 'like A in being beautiful'.

Is Moore right about this? I would think that it is doubtful whether the denial of the proposition about beauty does not involve self-contradiction. It follows that it is doubtful too whether this proposition is a synthetic one. When two things are intrinsically and objectively alike there can never be any justification for thinking one to be beautiful and the other not. If, like the steak eater, we are surfeited with beauty for the moment (having just emerged from the Louvre) we may perhaps say: ' Bdoes not seem beautiful to me at the moment, though A did, and B is exactly like A ', but no t ' A is beautiful and B is not'. It seems that when one says that a thing A is beautiful one commits oneself to saying about any other thing whatsoever that is exactly like A in intrinsic nature that it is also beautiful. This commitment does make the denial of the proposition quite unintelligible and perhaps logically false.

Moore acknowledges this to the extent of saying that the relation between value and value-making qualities is a necessary one, though not logically necessary. Apparently the relation between a derivative quality and the other qualities from which it derives is necessary if those qualities are intrinsic ones, but not if they are extrinsic. Why should the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic qualities make so much difference? Moore's point would seem to be that, if the goodness or beauty of a thing depends solely on its intrinsic qualities, then that thing will be good or beautiful in all possible worlds. So long as its intrinsic qualities remain the same, it must be good or beautiful. If they change, then it is no longer that thing. It cannot (in any universe) be the thing it is without being good or beautiful; which does seem to be at least very close to logical necessity. None of this applies to relational qualities, which may very well change, in other universes or even in this one, without the thing to which they belong thereby becoming a different thing.

When Moore says that the necessity is not a logical necessity he is probably wrong. He says that the proposition 'If A and B are exactly alike in intrinsic nature and if A is beautiful then B must be beautiful too' does not need any a posteriori consideration - - it can be known a priori. He writes

What is meant is just that if A is beautiful and B is not, you could know a priori that A and B are not exactly alike; whereas, with any such subjective predicate, as that of exciting a particular feeling in me, or that of being a thing

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260 Moore on Goodness and the Naturalistic Fallacy

which would excite such a feeling in any spectator, you cannot tell a priori that a thing A which did possess such a predicate and a thing B which did not, could not be exactly alike.~ 8

Though Moore says that the knowledge of this necessity is a priori he denies that this necessity is 'the kind of necessity, which we assert to hold for instance, when we say that whatever is a right-angled triangle must be a triangle, or that whatever is yellow must be either yellow or blue'.~ 9 He says, ' . . . I must say I cannot see that all unconditional necessity is of this nature'.20 But, I would think that the knowledge of this necessity is a priori because this necessity involves logical necessity of some kind.

Firstly, the proposition 'If A is beautiful and B is exactly like A in its intrinsic nature then B is beautiful too' seems to involve the relation of indentity. The relation of identity which seems to be involved here is generic identity; and it is based on Moore's assumption that things which are identical in intrinsic nature must be identical in intrinsic value. The relation of identity does hold in the cases where x is a constituent quality of both A and B: If A is exactly like B in its constituent qualities, and x is a constituent quality of A, then x is a constituent quality of B too. This does not apply to the proposition in question because beauty is not a constituent quality of A and B. The relation of identity does also hold in the cases where x is a relational quality: If A is exactly like B in its relational qualities, and x is a relational quality of A, then x is also a relational quality of B. But this also does not apply to the proposition in question, because beauty is not a relational quality.

Now, what is peculiar to goodness and beauty, according to Moore, is that they are neither constituent qualities nor relational qualities, but consequential qualities which emerge only from intrinsic constituent qualities (intrinsic nature) of a thing. From this it follows that: If A is exactly like B in its constituent qualities, and if the combination of the constituent qualities of A gives rise to beauty, then the combination of the constituent qualities of B must give rise to beauty too. Therefore, it is true that if A is exactly like B in its constituent qualities, and A is beautiful then B is necessarily beautiful too. This might follow from the law of identity in so far as it fol lows from the constituent qualities of A that it has the consequential quality of beauty. So, it seems that this kind of proposition involves the logical relation of identity.

This kind of proposition also seems to involve the logical relation which Moore mentions in 'External Relations', Proceedings o f Aris. Soc., Vol. 20, 1919-20, that 'from the proposition, with regard to any term, that it is red it follows that it is coloured'. Moore obviously has in mind propositions of the form' x is good' when he says that the relation between value and value-making qualities is not a logical one. But, no doubt a proposition of the form ' I fx is A, it is good' is also a proposition about goodness and this seems to involve the kind of relation above. This can be shown as follows:

18 Philosophical Studies, p. 271. 19 Ibid., p. 271. 20 Ibid., pp. 271-272.

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Hasna Begum

If A is red, A is coloured. Anything like A in respect of being red must also be coloured. B is like A in respect of being red. .'. B is coloured. So with ~beauty' or 'good': If A is x y z it is good. What is like in respect of being x y z is good. B is like A in respect of x y z. .'. B is good.

261

From the above it seems that the relation in question is one of logical necessity of this type; it is a case of entailment.

It is, however, important to note that the proposition 'the beauty of anything follows from its intrinsic nature' is not analytically true in the sense that the meaning of 'beauty' is not that 'it follows from the intrinsic nature of the thing that possesses it'. I would think that the necessity follows from the fact that when we utter value propositions about something we commit ourselves to saying the same about some other thing which is exactly like (in intrinsic nature) the thing of which we have already uttered a value proposition. The logic of value terms, unlike that of subjective terms is such that assertions of anything having any value imply commitments to make similar assertions about any other thing which in intrinsically like the former. This distinctive feature of value terms shows that there is a close logical connection between value and value-making characteristics.2~

6. 'Goodness' As a Non-Relational Universal and the Naturalistic Fallacy

Moore's non-natural quality of goodness is what he calls 'the third kind of universal', i.e., a non-relational property; it is a pure conceptual entity. 'Goodness'as a conceptual entity is different from any natural quality and from any so-called supersensible quality. It is different from natural qualities because though it is a quality of a natural object it is not a part of the object that is good but a consequential property consequent upon the other natural qualities which the object in question has, whereas a natural quality is a constituent part of a natural object. It is different from supersensible qualities because supersensible qualities are qualities of super-natural beings and not of natural objects, whereas goodness is always a quality of a natural object. As a non-relational property, 'goodness' is a property in its own right, i.e., it is a conceptual entity of no empirical quality which is a part of the objects that are good. Thus 'goodness' is a pure conceptual entity without having any corresponding empirical quality of which it is a concept. In this sense 'goodness' can only compare with numbers (and also with 'truth' for Moore) which are also non-natural qualities and are included in the third kind of universals. Thus, in short, Moore's notion of

21 R. M. Hare also observes this. Vide, The Language of Morals, p. 11 I.

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262 Moore on Goodness and the Naturalistic Fallacy

'goodness' as a non-natural quality is a consequential property which is a pure concept or a non-relational universal.22

Now it is important to see the impact of the interpretation of'goodness' as a non-natural quality and a pure conceptual entity on the interpretation of the Naturalistic Fallacy. The fallacy is committed by most moral philosophers before Moore because they fail to see the unique nature of 'goodness' as a conceptual entity. They take 'goodness' either to be some natural constituent quality (e.g. pleasure) or some supersensible quality (e.g. Pure Reason) which has neither existence nor being (which Moore distinguishes from existence). I would think that when Moore quotes Butler on the title-page of Principia: 'Everything is what it is, and not another thing' he refers to this important mistake of previous moral philosophers. They think 'goodness' to be what it is not, to be some other thing - - the real nature of 'goodness' is not revealed to them: the nature of being a pure concept without being a concept of any natural or supersensible quality of a natural or supernatural object respectively. It is a concept in its own right, and o f itself and o f nothing else other than itself. Whenever the philosophers confuse 'goodness' with another thing they commit the Naturalistic Fallacy.

This interpretation of the fallacy is quite compatible with many other important interpretations of it: That the fallacy involves the mistake of defining the indefinable is quite compatible with this interpretation. 'Goodness' as a unique non-relational universal cannot be defined or analysed according to Moore. It cannot be defined because it is a quality by its own right and has no reference other than itself; it cannot be analysed because it is simple, it has no parts. That the fallacy involves the mistake of identifying goodness with that with which it is not identical is also compatible with this interpretation because 'goodness' as a pure concept is not identical to any other concept but to itself alone. Another interpretation is that the fallacy is mainly involved in treating a synthetic proposition as an analytic one. Any assertion that something is good (e.g. 'aesthetic enjoyment is good', 'personal affection is good') is, according to Moore, synthetic. Even when we are quite certain that it is true, there is nothing self-contradictory about denying it. Even if it were the case that (e.g.) all pleasant things and only pleasant things are good, this would still be a synthetic proposition. It would still make sense to ask 'are pleasant things good?' in the way that it does not make sense to ask whether fathers are male parents. Naturalists, however, take some assertion of this kind and treat it as an explication of the meaning of 'good'; that is, as an analytic statement and not a synthetic one. To do this is to commit the Naturalistic Fallacy.

There are also some interpretations of the Naturalistic Fallacy which can now be seen to be false. Examples are Hare's interpretation that the fallacy involves ignoring that evaluative words are prescriptive; and the assimilation of is-ought and the Naturalistic Fallacy by (e.g.) G. J. Warnock.

Hare writes in The Language o f Morals:

22 Vide Moore, G.E., Some Main Problems of Philosophy, Chapters X-XIX for Moore's notion of universals.

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Hasna Begum 263

Moore thought that he could prove that there were no such defining characteristics for the word 'good' as used in morals. His argument has been assailed since he propounded it; and it is certainly true that the formulation of it was at fault. But, it seems to me that Moore's argument was not merely plausible; it rests, albeit insecurely, upon a secure foundation; there is indeed something about the way in which we use the word 'good' which makes it impossible to hold the sort of position which Moore was attacking, although Moore did not see clearly what this something was. Let us, therefore, try to restate Moore's argument in a way which makes it clear why 'naturalism' is untenable, not only for the moral use of 'good' as he thought, but also for many other uses. [My italics.] 23

Then Hare goes on to his restatement of ~Moore's argument' in a way which leads to his own prescriptivism.

We have seen that for Moore goodness is a non-natural quality which is consequential and depends solely on the natural constituent qualities of the object that is good. Although 'good' does not directly describe the intrinsic nature of the good thing as the specification of its natural qualities would, it does describe the good thing indirectly. Moore says goodness is indefinable not because it does not describe, but because there are many ways in which goodness may describe the intrinsic nature of things that are good. And thus no single definite description can always follow from a thing's goodness. "Goodness' as a conceptual entity is indefinable in the sense that there is no one definite meaning attached to it (and it is unanalysable because it is simple). So, when Hare claims that his prescriptivism is the restatement of Moore's argument he seems to claim too much. Hare may be right in detecting in Moore's view his recognition that value words in their primary use do not describe at all. But he is surely making a large claim in saying ffiat his prescriptivism is the restatement of 'Moore 's argument'. Hare is certainly wrong here as Moore never has said or even implied that value words are prescriptive. The nearest he comes to mentioning the descriptive element in the term "goodness' is in 'The Conception of Intrinsic Value' where he says that 'goodness' does not describe the intrinsic nature of what possesses it as natural qualities do. 24 'Goodness' does not describe the intrinsic nature of a thing that possesses it, as we have seen above, not because it is not a descriptive term, but because it involves so many descriptions as there can be any number of sets of natural constituent qualities which can and do give rise to goodness. With so many possible descriptions it is impossible to understand which among them is involved in the particular thing which is said to be good on a particular occasion. And, until we mention the natural constituent qualities (which make the thing good) of the thing in question, it is hardly understandable what 'goodness' is describing in the particular instance. This is why the question 'Why is it (any thing) good'? is always meaningful. Thus Moore's contention that 'goodness'

23 The Language of Morals, p. 83f. 24 PhilosophicaIStudies, p. 274.

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264 Moore on Goodness and the Naturalistic Fallacy

does not describe does not imply that he holds 'goodness' to be prescriptive, as Hare seems to have claimed•

G. J. Warnock25 makes two accusations against Moore: The first is that Moore does not satisfactorily explain the terms 'natural' and 'non-natural', or seek to show 'why qualities of the one kind are not definable in terms of the other kind'• And, Warnock says, for this reason 'there is really nothing here for critical discussion to take hold of'. Warnock is clearly wrong as is shown by our discussion of the distinction between the two terms and how goodness as a non- natural quality cannot be defined in terms of natural qualities, according to Moore.

The other accusation is that Moore is wrong in saying that evaluation is not reducible to description• Warnock writes

• . . the expression 'the naturalistic fallacy' was introduced by G. E. Moore in his Principia Ethica, though the idea is certainly older than that, and has commonly been supposed to originate in Hume . . .

• . . Perhaps the real point at issue - - the point which, it might be suggested, was really at the back of Moore's mind - - is that evaluation is not reducible to description;. . .

Warnock here assimilates the 'is-ought' pioblem and the Naturalistic Fallacy and goes on to argue that the distinction between evaluation and description is not valid because 'most, perhaps all, evaluative expressions are also descriptive expressions'• Here I would like to point out that the distinction cannot be attributed to Moore• We have seen while discussing Hare's interpretation of the fallacy that Moore does not mean that the fallacy is involved in the attempt to describe evaluative terms. 'Good', for Moore, is fact-reporting, though the report is not direct• It needs the further step of asking 'What is good about it?' And the answer would involve mentioning some natural descriptive qualities of the thing in question• Thus, for Moore, the fact-value or is-ought distinction is not important at all, and is not involved in the Naturalistic Fallacy.

It is important to note that Moore is even accused of committing the Naturalistic Fallacy himself. In An Introduction to Western Philosophy A. Flew not only accuses Moore of committing the fallacy but also gives a complete misinterpretation of Moore's notion of'goodness' as a non-natural quality. Flew writes

Moore's position is a curiosity of the history of ideas• For, having taken goodness to be the primary concept in valuing, he insists that it is radically unsound to identify goodness with any of the ordinary characteristics of whatever might be said to be good. He then goes on later to distinguish these as 'natural' from goodness, which he calls 'non-natural'• Yet he still thinks of goodness as a quality which can be possessed by things in themselves, and his supposed non-natural qualities have by others understandably been construed as intimations of a supernatural. If Moore were right we could

25 For this discussion vide Contemporary MoraIPhilosophy (1967), pp. 62f.

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Hasna Begum 265

sensibly and without contradiction entertain the supposition that a good thing and a bad thing might be in all other respects identical; which surely is preposterous. And precisely by thus making goodness a characteristic of things in themselves he ensures that the alleged fact that something possesses it could not be sufficient to warrant conclusions about what ought to be. He thereby himself commits the Naturalistic Fallacy. For this expression, which Moore coined, has since come to be understood by reference to that Parthian paragraph of Hume - - a n author nowhere mentioned in Principia Ethica.26

Flew's contention that 'If Moore were right we could sensibly and without contradiction entertain the supposition that a good thing and a bad thing might be in all other respects identical' shows that he completely misses the point that for Moore goodness is a consequential quality. It is because goodness is a consequential quality which is consequent upon other, constituent qualities of an object that is good, that the object in qufstion cannot have the quality of badness - - the constituent qualities of the object can only give rise to goodness and cannot give rise to badness. This is an unfortunate but not isolated example of an introductory book containing a mistaken interpretation of Moore.27 Flew also assimilates the is-ought problem and the Naturalistic Fallacy and on that basis he further accuses Moore of committing the fallacy himself by ignoring the difference between 'is' and 'ought'. We have already seen above that Moore does not say that the Naturalistic Fallacy involves the 'is-ought' distinction. So his ignoring the distinction does not lead to the commitment of the Naturalistic Fallacy.

University of Dacca Received December 1978

26 Flew, A., An Introduction to Western Philosophy, London (1971), pp. 107f. 27 Vide also: Warnock, G. J., op. cit.. p. 14. Warnock writes:

• . . for all that he [Moore] says, the simple sui generis quality of goodness might quite well be detected as attaching to anything whatever - - alighting, so to speak, inexplicably and at random upon anything of whatever kind . . . . for Moore, there is no reason why what is good is good - - that it is good is not only a distinguishable, but a totally isolated, fact about it, not just different from, but unrelated to, anything else.

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