A Gulf State Analytics report

Monthly Monitor ReportJune 2015

Gulf State Analytics Monthly MonitorGulf State Analytics 2015. All Rights ReservedNo duplication or transmissionof this document is permitted without the written consent of Gulf State AnalyticsContact us: contact@gulfstateanalytics.com Visit our website: www.gulfstateanalytics.com

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THE UAE AND CHINA’S THRIVING PARTNERSHIP 3

SAUDI ARABIA AND ISRAEL’S FERTILE COMMON GROUND 6

BAHRAIN MONITOR 8

KUWAIT MONITOR 11

OMAN MONITOR 14

QATAR MONITOR 16

SAUDI ARABIA MONITOR 17

UAE MONITOR 20

ENDNOTES 21

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THE UAE AND CHINA’S THRIVING PARTNERSHIP

By Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat

Throughout the 21st century, China’s ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have strengthened in var-ious domains. China and the UAE’s growing relation-ship is a case in point. Since Beijing and Abu Dhabi established a diplomatic partnership in 1984, China and the UAE have become major economic partners and the bilateral relationship is well poised to flourish in the future.

China Daily recently reported that China-UAE trade is expected to reach USD 16 billion in 2015, making Chi-na the UAE’s second biggest import partner behind In-dia.1 At the same time, the UAE is responsible for one-third of China-GCC trade and one-fifth of Sino-Arab trade.2 China exports primarily electronic appliances, mechanical tools, and devices; the UAE exports main-ly copper, plastic, and iron.3

A Financial and Commercial Hub

Eyeing promising potential in the UAE, several Chi-nese banks have made their way into the emirates. In-dustrial and Commercial Bank of China, China’s largest lender, established an office in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) in 2008. DIFC is also home to branches of Bank of China Middle East, the Agricultur-al Bank of China, and China Construction Bank. Other banks, including China Development Bank, also plan to open branches in the UAE.

At the same time, the UAE has been very active in Chi-na’s banking sector, establishing branches and repre-sentative offices on the Chinese mainland. Union Na-tional Bank was the first Emirati lender to enter China in 2007, setting up an office in Shanghai, followed in 2012 by National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD) and Emirates NBD. Optimistic about the emerging pow-er’s growth, the Commercial Bank of Dubai launched a Chinese banking platform called TianLong in late 2012 to support the business and personal banking

requirements of China’s small and medium business-es. Services include a Chinese speaking staff, Chinese language documentation, and renminbi accounts.

Several major Chinese companies outside the banking sector have also begun to see encouraging opportu-nities in the UAE. The Emiratis’ state-of-the-art port, customs services, free zone facility, and logistics park have made the UAE a strategic point from which to conduct business throughout the greater Middle East. Over 2,400 Chinese enterprises are members of Dubai Chamber. Most of these companies sell electronics, machinery, building materials, gifts, garments, and novelty items.4 Over 1,400 Chinese firms are reported to be located elsewhere in the country.5 These compa-nies view the UAE as an important hub, facilitating ex-pansion across the wider Middle East. Many Chinese companies have started to use the Dubai International Financial Centre as a bridge to access wider markets in the region.6 China’s largest petroleum firm Petro Chi-na and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China have also established footholds in the emirates.7,8

Dragon Mart, China’s largest trading hub outside the mainland, was built in Dubai during 2004.9 The com-plex is expected to undergo a massive expansion (and name change) to include retail, residential and leisure developments. The new Dragon City will eventually cover 11 million square feet.10

These growing economic ties have facilitated more than China’s access to untapped consumer markets and lucrative investment opportunities. The UAE, with its ‘Look East’ policy, has been interested in lur-ing Asian investment. Attracting Chinese investors and promoting the UAE to China has been an increasingly important priority of officials in Abu Dhabi.11

The Dubai Week, for example, was an event held in Beijing by DIFC to showcase Dubai as a competitive global business destination for investment opportu-nities.12 Another recent initiative was the agreement signed by China’s New Silk Road Investment Associa-tion in May of this year to promote the Emirati-host-ed event Global Trade Development Week to Chinese businesses and investors.13

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The UAE has also been making inroads in China. It is reported that the UAE’s investments in China stood at USD 1.5 billion in 2013.14 Emirati enterprises and busi-nesses have around 650 projects in China. Several in-stitutions, such as UAE stock exchanges and the Dubai Pearl Project, have exerted efforts to increase their profiles in China and to attract potential investors.15,16

Petroleum

Although not to such an extent as the Qataris and Saudi Arabians have done so, the Emiratis have made energy cooperation an increasingly important aspect of their relationship with China. China imports around 15 percent of the Emirates’ petroleum compared to 12 percent by South Korea. In recent years, this en-ergy partnership has gone beyond buying and selling. In mid-2015, China Petroleum Engineering and Con-struction Cooperation (CPEEC) signed a USD 330 mil-lion agreement with Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO) for a development project at the UAE’s southern Mender oilfield.17

Under the contract, the CPEEC will be responsible for the building of pipelines, oil gathering stations, sew-age systems, and power transmission lines. The deal is expected to increase ADCO’s daily production from 1.4 million barrels to 1.8 million within two years. Since early 2015, CPECC, which is affiliated with Chi-na’s largest petroleum and liquefied natural gas com-pany, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), has been involved in several other projects in the UAE, including the development of the country’s crude pipeline and Asab oilfield.18

The company has a history of partnering with its Emi-rati counterparts. In 2008, for instance, the company secured a USD 3.29 billion deal with the Emirates In-ternational Investment Company on the Habshan-Fu-jairah pipeline project. To complement this, Abu Dha-bi National Oil Company (ADNOC) has established an office in Beijing. As China’s energy needs grow, so will its interests in the UAE’s natural resource wealth.

Infrastructure, Trade, Currency, and Travel

Reciprocity in the infrastructure sector is also on the rise. In recent years, China and the UAE have signed agreements for construction projects worth billions of dollars. Dubai’s DP World, for instance, has invested in several Chinese ports and logistics centres in Hong Kong, Tianjin, Qingdao, and Yantai.19 In the meantime, it was reported in 2013 by Chinese Ministry of Com-merce that between 2011 and 2013, Beijing firms have won more than USD 4.8 billion worth of con-struction projects in the emirates.20 This has led many Chinese infrastructure companies to make their way to the UAE.

Chinese companies have done well in the UAE’s au-tomobile sector, previously dominated by European, Japanese, Korean, and American brands. Chinese firms, including Foton, Cherry, Dongfeng and GAC Motors, have now entered the Emirati market. 21 As UAE consumers seek more affordable cars, Chinese manufacturers eye the lower end of the market. Eight Chinese car manufacturers took part in the last Du-bai International Motor Show.22 Chinese car sales are predicted to increase 100 percent each year in the country and their market share is expected to reach double-digits by 2020.23

In further efforts to facilitate the economic part-nership, China and the UAE signed a currency swap agreement worth 35 billion yuan in 2012.24 Expect-ed to be activated soon, this agreement will not only ease trade between China and the UAE, it will also help China globalise its currency.25 The agreement aims to boost trade and investment between the two countries by using the Yuan in the trade of petroleum. By taking part in the currency swap, at a period when the Chinese currency enjoys increasing global use, the UAE is asserting its commitment to strengthen eco-nomic ties with the world’s second largest economy. Travel between the two countries is burgeoning. Pres-ently, there are 21 daily flights from Dubai to China (Beijing, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and Shanghai), in-cluding eight operated by Emirates.26 Chinese nation-

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als reportedly constitute around four percent of pas-sengers at Dubai International Airport and they are responsible for 12 percent of sales at Dubai Duty Free outlets.27 To improve the experience for Chinese con-sumers, the retailer has hired more than 500 Chinese employees at its Dubai Airport outlets. Many stores and hotels in the UAE now have Cantonese and Man-darin-speaking staff.28 Remarkably, some also accept renminbi as a form of payment.29

Another important initiative was the agreement be-tween the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates with UnionPay International of China for connecting with UAE-Switch, a service that links ATMs across the GCC. The deal aims to allow the use of UnionPay at all ATMs connected to the service, which would ease Chinese investors’ ability to conduct transactions in the country. The most recent measure came when the Dubai Gold & Commodities Exchange (DGCX) and the Bank of China signed a Memorandum of Under-standing, which aims for both countries to exchange market information and industry practices between both institutions.30

Beyond Energy and Trade

Perhaps the strongest area of China-UAE cooperation is education. The first Chinese international school in Dubai will open in about two years’ time.31 Breaking down linguistic and cultural barriers will contribute to even deeper political and economic relations in the future. Importance has been placed on cultural events as well. In 2015, the annual Chinese Spring Festival in Dubai attracted an unprecedented number of Chinese tourists and locals.32

The Emiratis have also concerned themselves with humanitarian aid, having offered USD 50 million in assistance to finance reconstruction after the Sichuan earthquake in 2008.33

The Road Ahead

The ties between China and the UAE are expected to grow in the coming years. On an official visit in Feb-ruary, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Sheikh

Abdullah Bin Zayed al Nahyan pledged to expand the China-UAE partnership.34

Beijing sees great potential in the emirates. In addition to its natural resources and strategic position, the UAE is viewed as a gateway to access untapped consumer markets and lucrative investment opportunities. Chi-na’s growing interests in the UAE and the other Gulf Arab monarchies must also be analysed within a geo-political context.

As China gains leverage on the international stage, particularly with its recent Silk Road Initiatives and the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), Bei-jing cannot afford to ignore the strategically located and resource-rich Persian Gulf nations. As a vibrant trading and commerce center, the UAE is viewed as an important member of the AIIB. At the same time, the UAE serves as a strategic hub for the realisation of Silk Road initiatives. It is important to note that approx-imately sixty percent of Beijing’s total trade passes through the UAE, where it is then delivered to Europe and Africa.35

This is probably why the UAE has already asserted its willingness to support and participate in China’s Silk Road Initiatives and has become the AIIB’s founding member.36,37 Engaging in a new partnership with Chi-na, an economic power that has no aggressive histo-ry in the region since the Mao era, offers the UAE a bargaining chip with Washington. From an economic viewpoint, China, the world’s most populous nation with the second largest economy, offers much to the UAE. In spite of the world’s financial turmoil, the Chi-nese economy is still expanding at an impressive rate and is expected to surpass the U.S. by the end of the next decade to become the world’s largest economy. Given China’s rise as an economic power, it is difficult to imagine the UAE and China’s relationship not deep-ening in the coming years.

Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is a Middle East an-alyst based in Qatar. His areas of expertise include China-Middle East relations, Indonesia-Gulf ties, and Muslim affairs.

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SAUDI ARABIA AND ISRAEL’S FERTILE COMMON GROUND

By Gary Grappo

The Arab Peace Initiative, presented in 2002 by then-Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, promised Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel once the Jewish state accepted a just and comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian con-flict, including recognition of the 1967 borders for an independent and sovereign Palestinian state.38

With prospects for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the traditional way (i.e., direct talks be-tween the two sides) currently negligible, a new ap-proach toward fulfilling King Abdullah’s ambitious in-itiative is necessary. The Arab states, most especially Saudi Arabia, can jump start the normalization pro-cess by taking one enormously significant step – secu-rity cooperation with Israel. Such cooperation would not only address the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Israel’s shared security concerns in the increas-ingly unstable Middle East, but also begin creating a climate of mutual trust necessary for an eventual res-olution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Since the creation of Israel in 1948, there has been no more opportune time for Arab-Israeli security cooper-ation. Across the region, Israel and so-called “moder-ate” Arab states – the GCC, Egypt, Morocco, and Jor-dan – face the same multiple threats. All cry out for a collective approach.

A Common Foe in Tehran

First among them is Iran’s growing presence and al-leged hegemonic ambitions in the Arab world. In addition, the recently concluded P5+1 agreement to curb Tehran’s nuclear program is unlikely to mollify their fears of the Islamic Republic’s agenda vis-à-vis Israel and the GCC, not only with respect to Iran’s nu-clear program but also its support for various groups throughout the region, e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah, and others. Indeed, these were no doubt subjects of con-

versation when a prominent Israeli and Saudi recently met in Washington.39

The Gulf Arab monarchies and Israel, both of whom work closely with the U.S. on anti-missile defenses, can themselves collaborate to neutralize a potential threat that Iran would pose if Tehran ever were to de-velop a nuclear weapon, regardless of the July 14 deal signed in Vienna.40

GCC-Israeli security cooperation would also send a powerful message to Iran’s governing mullahs. Im-agine Tehran’s reaction once it learns that, after al-most seven decades of Arab-Israeli antagonism, the perceived Iranian threat to the region has broken the estrangement. Even if waived off by Iran’s blinkered theocratic leaders, the significance would not be lost on Iran’s increasingly frustrated populace yearning for re-integration into the region and the world, starting with the economically prosperous GCC countries.

Countering Militant Islamism

Many of the moderate Arabs and the Israelis harbor similar views of and antipathy toward the same hard-line jihadist factions, most notably Daesh (“Islamic State”). A collaborative approach drawing on the GCC and Israel’s experience and resources would demon-stratively increase their collective ability to counter the agendas of militant Islamist extremists.

Teaming up to defeat Daesh should rank especially high on the list of the GCC and Israel’s security prior-ities. In view of Daesh’s recent victory in Ramadi (the capital of Iraq’s Sunni-majority Anbar province) and its continued advances in eastern Syria, Palmyra being the most recent, only a comprehensive “all-in” strate-gy on the part of all Middle Eastern governments has any chance of checking the so-called “caliphate,” es-pecially given Washington’s unwillingness to commit anything more than air support and training of Ira-qis and small numbers of Syrian opposition fighters. While it may not be realistic to expect Israel to join any military coalition against Daesh (although that is a possibility in the future) Tel Aviv could either overtly or covertly cooperate with such a pan-Arab force.

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The Stakes in Syria

While Israel might once have been willing to accept the ‘devil it knew’ in Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, the in-creasing uncertainty of his position now requires Is-rael to reach out to Arab states in an effort to counter the gains that Sunni Islamist extremists could achieve in a post-Assad Syria.41 However, if Assad fell to a rel-atively moderate political order, Hezbollah’s weapons and logistics lifeline from Tehran would suffer a severe blow, which would potentially cripple Israel’s long-time enemy to the north, and ultimately break the Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah axis, loathed by leaders of the Gulf Arab kingdoms and the Jewish state.

Security and intelligence cooperation would provide tangible benefits to both sides in their counter-terror-ism efforts. It would ensure a comprehensive, genu-inely region-wide approach to combating Daesh and other armed jihadist factions, allowing for important sharing of valuable lessons learned. Each of these steps could provide an enormous opportunity for both se-curity and especially intelligence cooperation. In par-ticular, Israeli-Arab intelligence cooperation – further boosted by help from Washington – would provide all sides with invaluable opportunities for circumscribing Iranian ambitions, reining in the region’s most violent extremists and toppling the Iranian-backed regime in Damascus.

Entering into such landmark cooperation would dra-matically improve the political climate between Arabs and Israelis. It would make clear that the Arab world is no longer Israel’s enemy and that their security and that of Israel’s are inextricably linked. For Arabs, it would show that the two sides can pursue mutual in-terests.

Palestinian Statehood

Greater cooperation between the GCC and Israel would set the stage for the first-ever meaningful and constructive dialogue about the Palestinian question. Israel, having chosen to cooperate and to enter into a security dialogue, could consider taking steps neces-sary for the eventual establishment of a Palestinian

state, e.g., giving the Palestinian Authority greater au-tonomy in the West Bank, relieving the siege of Gaza, facilitating the long overdue elections in the West Bank and Gaza, and ultimately initiating negotiations over other critically important matters such as refu-gees and Jerusalem.42

This is an especially relevant concern for Saudi Arabia. Having taken the courageous initiative of planting the Arab Peace Initiative, Riyadh can now deliver the first genuine fruits of the tree King Abdullah planted 13 years ago. Were King Salman to take the equally cou-rageous initiative, i.e., reaching out to Israel – either directly or indirectly – he would not only secure his own country’s interests, but also set the stage for the long-awaited resolution of the region’s most enduring conflict.

Unquestionably, King Salman and the ruling family would face a significant element of political risk by making overtures to Israel. Anti-Israel sentiment is strong among Gulf Arabs, which is a reason why Ri-yadh makes efforts to hide the kingdom’s tacit alli-ance with Israel.43 However, Saudi Arabia’s long-term security interests are at stake, the same interests that drove then-Crown Prince Abdullah to reach out to Is-rael in 2002.

To successfully broker a just and lasting resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states must address Israel’s security concerns. Tel Aviv, especially today, maintains that the steps required for negotiating Palestinian statehood would jeopardize its security. Surprisingly, within the context of Iran’s potential rise as a regional power, the common threat of extremism and the ongoing Syrian crisis, the GCC and Israel have an opportunity to open the door to solving the Palestinian issue while also improving col-lective security interests.

Gary Grappo is a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer from the U.S. Department of State, with extensive ser-vice in the Middle East, including as U.S. Ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman and Charge d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

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BAHRAIN MONITOR

• Daesh (“Islamic State”) sets its sights on Bahrain• Al-Ashtar Brigades cell is busted; ten members

arrested on “terrorism” charges• Bahrain summons Iraq’s ambassador• Opposition leader receives four-year prison sen-

tence• U.S. lifts holds on security assistance to Bahrain

June 1

Government tells women to avoid mosques In the aftermath of the two terrorist attacks that tar-geted Shi’ite mosques in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Prov-ince on May 22 and 29, Jaffari Waqf (Endowment) Directorate chairman Sheikh Mohsen al-Asfoor in-formed Bahraini women that they would be stopped from entering mosques. The Saudi Arabian suicide bomber who blew himself up outside Al Anoud mosque was dressed as a woman, which has raised concerns in Manama that Daesh (“Islamic State”) could wage similarly orchestrated attacks in Bahrain. Asfoor announced, “We urge women not to pray in mosques because of the recent developments espe-cially after the mosque attacks in Saudi Arabia… Such security measures are taken for the safety of every-one because it is difficult to place checks on women who come to pray in mosques.”44

June 2

Authorities bust a 14-member “terrorist” cell operating in Bahrain Police arrested ten members of a suspect cell affiliated with al-Ashtar Brigades. In 2014 Manama designated the faction a terrorist organization following several bombings in Bahrain that al-Ashtar Brigades allegedly orchestrated. The prosecution accused the cell mem-bers of “forming and joining a terrorist group and at-tempting to kill policemen, possessing and using ex-plosives, and weapons training,” having two members

based in Iran, and sending five recruits to Iraq for train-ing. With the exception of one member, all confessed to being affiliated with al-Ashtar Brigades. Bahrain’s state-run news agency reported that the prosecution decided to hold the suspects for two weeks.45, 46,47

Analysis: Al-Ashtar came onto the scene in late 2014 as a militant Shi’ite group determined to attack Bah-rain’s Sunni monarchy. According to GCC interlocutors, al-Ashtar belongs to a wider network of Shi’ite bri-gades formed in Iraq. The brigades have two strategic and tactical objectives.

First, the Shi’ite brigades are determined to wage vio-lent acts in Bahrain on behalf of the island kingdom’s Shi’ites. Second, the Shi’ite militias seek revenge against Daesh (“Islamic State”) for its terrorist attacks that targeted Shi’ite mosques in eastern Saudi Arabia on May 22 and May 29, and in Kuwait City on June 26.

In October 2014, a Saudi Arabian court issued a death sentence to the revered Shi’ite cleric Nimr al-Nimr. Ac-cording to one GCC observer, following al-Nimr’s sen-tence, the Shi’ite brigades began to muster in Iraq in order to enter Saudi Arabia should the death sentence be carried out. Even prior to al-Nimr’s sentence, sourc-es in Basra claimed that Iran’s al-Quds force had prep-ositioned large caches of weapons near the Iraqi city for “use in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.”

In sum, the growing influence of militant Shi’ite groups in Iraq and the GCC factors into a larger picture in which the region’s sectarian problems are exacer-bating. A key question that has yet to be answered is to what extent is the Islamic Republic of Iran backing such extremist factions.

June 10

Manama summons Iraq’s ambassador

According to a message that Bahrain’s Foreign Min-istry posted on Twitter, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa summoned Iraqi ambassador Ahmed Rasheed al-Dalimi to discuss the banned Shi’ite faction, Saraya al-Ashtar, and its train-

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ing in Iraq. Manama called on officials in Baghdad to cease permitting “terrorist groups” that threaten Bah-rain’s security to use Iraq.48

Aluminium Bahrain (Alba) wins a USD 3.5 billion expansion

Alba, which is one of the largest smelters of the light-weight metal in the world, secured approval for a USD 3.5 billion expansion, which is expected to increase output by at least 50 percent. This expansion project, expected to start in 2016, will likely boost the compa-ny’s output by 514,000 tons. The originally proposed plan was for USD 2.5 billion. The project’s financial advisors are JP Morgan, Gulf International Bank, and National Bank of Bahrain.49

June 12

Manama convicts 57 Shi’ites for their alleged role in a “bombing plot”

Bahrain’s authorities jailed 57 Shi’ite subjects, and stripped 56 of them of their nationality, for an al-leged plot to carry out bomb attacks against “police-men,” “vital sites,” and “security locations, including an embassy.” The Gulf Daily News reported that the 57 sought to bomb Riyadh’s embassy in Manama, in addition to the King Fahd Causeway, which connects Bahrain with Saudi Arabia. The court accused the out-lawed association al-Wafa, in addition to the domi-nant Shi’ite opposition faction, al-Wefaq, of financing the 57. According to two advocacy groups in Bahrain, nine of the 57 on trial were below the age of 18.50

June 16

Opposition leader receives a four-year sentence

Sheikh Ali Salman, leader of Bahrain’s dominant Shi’ite opposition faction (al-Wefaq), received a four-year jail sentence on charges of “inciting unrest”. Ad-vocate general Haroon al-Zayani told Bahrain’s state-run news agency, BNA, that Salman was convicted on charges of “publicly inciting hatred, an act which disturbed public peace, inciting non-compliance with

the law and insulting public institutions.” Salman was arrested in December and his trial received considera-ble attention in the international press.

Al-Wefaq issued a statement condemning the ruling and vowing to maintain pressure on Bahrain’s Sunni rulers to implement reforms in the island kingdom. “The sentence gives a new lease on life to the crisis and gives greater legitimacy to mobilize. The people have no choice but to continue in their peaceful popu-lar movement… People will not return to their homes and will not relent in their demands.”

Salman denied any wrongdoing and dismissed the trial as an effort to quell political dissent. Amnesty International called on officials in Manama to release Salman, whom the group identifies as a “prisoner of conscience” who received an unfair trial. The hu-man rights group stated, “Today’s verdict is shocking. It is yet another clear example of Bahrain’s flagrant disregard for its international obligations. Sheikh Ali Salman has been sentenced solely for peacefully ex-pressing his opinion.” Bahrain’s government defended the sentence on the grounds that Salman was guilty of “incitement of hatred, as well as inciting violence” and that the trial was “wholly unrelated to any politi-cal views he may hold.”51, 52

June 18

Authorities seize explosives near Manama and point their finger at Iran

In what they stated was an Iranian attempt to uti-lize Bahrain as a base for terrorist attacks in the Middle East, Bahraini officials seized explosives and bomb-making devices to be used in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Police chief Major-General Tariq al-Hasan stat-ed that the seized explosives had “clear similarities” to those used by Iranian-financed groups in Afghani-stan and Iraq and “represent[ed] a significant escala-tion in attempts to smuggle explosives material into Bahrain.” Tehran did not respond to Hasan’s state-ment. According to Bahrain’s state-run news agency, BNA, authorities found the explosives in Dar Kulaib, a village near Manama.53

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June 20

Bahrain releases leader of secular movement following his four-year jail sentence

Ibrahim Sharif, leader of the secular movement Na-tional Democratic Action Society (aka Waed), was released after completing a four year sentence. Sha-rif was detained for his role in the anti-government demonstrations that occurred during the “Arab Spring” revolt of 2011. The political activist delivered a speech shortly after his release in which he thanked the Bahraini people for their staunch opposition to the ruling monarchy.54

June 27

Imam of Daesh (“Islamic State”) takes to social media to directly threaten Bahrain

One day after a Saudi Arabian unit of Daesh waged a deadly terrorist attack in Kuwait (see Kuwait Monitor July 26) Turki al-Binali posted a message on Twitter promising that “the next attack after Kuwait” would target Bahrain.55 Binali is a Salafist cleric from Bahrain who left the island kingdom in 2013 before traveling to the Maghreb. Since his departure from Bahrain, Binali has relocated to Iraq and Syria to become the “Imam” of Daesh.

June 29 Obama Administration lifts holds on security assistance to Manama

Washington decided to lift the holds it had imposed on assistance to the Bahrain Defense Force and Na-tional Guard, following Manama’s crackdown on “Arab Spring” activists in 2011. The State Department released a statement acknowledging Bahrain’s ongo-ing human rights problems (with Sheikh Ali Salman’s sentence referenced as an example), yet asserting that Manama “has made some meaningful progress on human rights reforms and reconciliation.”56

Bloomberg reported on June 15 that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had spoken in May with Bahrain’s Foreign Minister at a meeting in France. Kerry prom-ised that Washington would work to end its ban on weapons sales to Manama.57

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KUWAIT MONITOR

• Daesh (“Islamic State”) unit wages terrorist attack in Shi’ite mosque in Kuwait City

June 4

Government revokes licenses for three television channels

Kuwait’s Ministry of Information has cancelled the licenses of three television channels – al-Watan, al-Watan Plus, and al-Watan Ghanawi. The operator of the three channels – Kuwait Media Group – addition-ally controls a newspaper, also called al-Watan, reput-edly a voice of dissent. In January, Kuwait’s Trade Min-ister cancelled al-Watan newspaper’s license.58

Kuwait and Italy discuss sale of up to 28 Eurofighters Defense News reported that discussion began on May 31 between Kuwaiti officials and their counterparts in the Italian Defense Ministry and Air Force, as well as at Alenia Aermacchi (an Italian aerospace company owned by Finmeccanica). The talks, held in Kuwait, focused on the possible acquisition of 24 to 28 Euro-fighters, in addition to related training and logistics.59

Oil Minister declares plans to increase hydrocarbon production nearly 40 percent by 2029

Kuwait’s Oil Minister Ali al-Omair announced at an OPEC seminar, “We have discovered new reserves... that contain both oil and gas. This will support Ku-wait’s plans to increase its production to a stable level of 4 million barrels per day by 2020.”60

June 6

Kuwait opens its first consulate in Erbil, Iraq The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud Barzani was present at the opening of the Kuwait consulate in Erbil and met with Kuwait Con-

sul Omar Ahmed al-Kandari. Barzani, who expressed hope for the strengthening of KRG and Kuwait ties in the Middle East. In terms of regional issues, Barzani raised the issue of terrorism and the threat it poses to global security. He also affirmed that the Kurds would never take sides in any Sunni-Shi’ite conflict.61

June 11

France and Kuwait near a USD 1.1 billion helicopter deal Al Arabiya reported that France and Kuwait were near finalizing a USD 1.1 billion contract for the sale of 24 military helicopters to Kuwait. The helicopters are built by Airbus. Following a conversation between French President Francois Hollande and Kuwait’s Emir Sheikh Sabah al Ahmad al Jaber Al Sabah, Hollande’s office stated that the contract would be signed soon. According to the French Defense Ministry, Paris and Kuwait City agreed to the contract after France’s De-fense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian visited Kuwait on June 6. Hollande and the Emir of Kuwait first discussed this contract at a summit held in Riyadh in May.62 Analysis: Of all the P5+1 members, France is under-stood to maintain the toughest stance vis-à-vis the Ira-nian nuclear program. At a time when Washington’s traditional Sunni Arab allies are growing disillusioned with U.S. foreign policy (especially with respect to the Islamic Republic), the GCC states seek to nurture ties with other outside actors, including France, England, China, and Russia. In doing so, such states seek to gain greater leverage over Washington by demonstrating that they have other options and can pursue a rela-tively more independent foreign policy. The Obama Administration’s diplomatic overtures to Tehran are, naturally, unsettling for Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states.

June 12

Kuwait donates USD 121 million to help UN deal with the Syrian humanitarian crisis

UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres expressed his gratitude after Kuwait contributed USD

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121 million to the UN refugee agency to address the ongoing crisis in Syria. While in Geneva, Gutteres told UN Humanitarian Envoy for Kuwait Abdullah al-Ma-touq that “it is fitting that as the Holy month of Ram-adan approaches, this gesture illustrates the humani-tarian and caring spirit of the true tradition of Islam.” Matouq stated that Kuwait’s contribution was meant to end “the pains and tears shed thus far, giving hope to every child, drawing a smile on the face of every orphan and responding to the call for relief of the el-derly, widows and women who lost their children and loved ones.”63

June 13

Police arrest prominent opposition figure According to Iran’s state-run news agency, Press TV, Kuwait’s security forces detained former parliamen-tarian Musallam al-Barrak, on the run in the Kabed area (southwest of Kuwait City.) Barrak had been ar-rested in February on charges of insulting the emir, a verdict upheld by Kuwait’s Cassation Court on May 18, and had received a two-year prison sentence. Accord-ing to his lawyer, nine of Barrak’s relatives were also detained. He disclosed that the former politician had been placed in solitary confinement in Kuwait City’s Central Prison.64

June 14 President of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) visits Kuwait to discuss range of issues

KRG President Masoud Barzani arrived in Kuwait and discussed with the emir the threat of terrorism and the state of KRG-Kuwait relations. Kuwait’s Prime Min-ister Sheikh Jaber Al-Mubarak Al-Hamad Al Sabah also held talks with Barzani, focusing on political and eco-nomic relations, as well as opportunities for Kuwaiti investment in Iraq’s Kurdish region. The prospects for initiating passenger flights from Kuwait City to Erbil were also discussed. The meeting was held eight days after Kuwait had opened its consulate in the KRG.65

June 21

Female human rights activist receives a three-year jail sentence for criticizing the Emir of Kuwait

A criminal court in Kuwait convicted Rana Jassem al-Sadoun in absentia of publicly “insulting” the monarch of Kuwait. A Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Qabas, reported that her sentence will entail hard labor. According to online activists, Sadoun was in Lebanon when the court reached its verdict. She is a founding member of the human rights group, National Committee for Monitoring Violations, which defends freedom of speech.66

June 26

Daesh (“Islamic State”) wages its first terrorist attack in Kuwait

A Saudi Arabia-based unit of Daesh, Najr Province, claimed credit for a suicide blast that killed 27 and injured several hundred Shi’ites taking part in Friday prayers in Kuwait City’s historic Imam Sadiq Mosque. Najr Province, which also carried out the two May at-tacks against Shi’ite mosques in eastern Saudi Arabia, took to social media to state that one of its members had blown himself up in a “temple of the apostates” (a derogatory reference to Shi’ite Mulims, to whom Daesh refers as “heretics”). The attack occurred on the same day that Daesh claimed credit for attacks in Tunisia and France.

On June 28, Kuwaiti authorities identified a young Saudi named Suliman Abdul-Muhsen al-Qabaa as the suicide bomber. Qabaa had transited Bahrain en route to Kuwait. He flew into Kuwait International Airport several hours before detonating his explosives-laden vest in the Imam Sadiq Mosque. Five suspects face legal action, including a 26-year-old illegal resident named Abdul-Rahman Sabah Aidan, who drove the car that carried the suicide bomber to the mosque, the owner of the car, the owner of the house where Aidan was captured while hiding, and the brother of the house owner. All five were allegedly involved in the terrorist attack.67

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Analysis: It makes sense that Daesh (“Islamic State”) chose to strike the Emirate of Kuwait. Kuwaiti support-ers of Daesh have been involved in sending money and other support mechanisms to the group through char-ities and other vehicles. Reportedly, 800 Kuwaitis have joined Daesh’s ranks on Iraq and Syria’s battlefields.

As a relatively wealthy and stable Gulf nation, Kuwait has been spared the levels of sectarian violence that neighboring Iraq and Saudi Arabia have experienced since the beginning of the 21st century. The monar-chy’s protection of Shi’ites from tribal and Islamist sectarian elements in the parliament and the wide range of social services and public sector jobs avail-able to the Shi’ites (nearly one third of Kuwait’s over-all population) have served to ease tensions between the emirate’s Sunni majority and its Shi’ite minority. By targeting a Shi’ite mosque in Kuwait City, however, Daesh is unquestionably determined to incite sectari-an strife in Kuwait.

While the GCC states are known for maintaining air-tight security, this terrorist attack serves as a wake-up call to authorities in Kuwait City and other Gulf capi-tals. That a Saudi Arabian national was able to change planes in Bahrain and land in Kuwait to launch his suicide attack exposes the GCC states’ failure to flag

possible assailants and their vulnerability to attacks by disaffected Gulf Arab youth. Daesh has outlined its clear plans for incorporating Kuwait into the “Islam-ic State” by 2019. The attack on a Shi’ite mosque in Kuwait’s capital city signals the beginning of Daesh’s design for seizing control of Kuwait and toppling the ruling Al Sabah family.

June 27 Thousands attend funerals for victims of mosque attack

One day after 27 people were killed by the suicide attack on an historic Shi’ite mosque in Kuwait City, thousands of Kuwaitis attended the victims’ funerals. Marzouq al-Ghanin, speaker of Kuwait’s parliament, declared, “The huge turnout of mourners shows to-day, this society rejects all divisions and sectarian rifts… The objective of the criminal terrorist act failed miserably since it sought to sow the seeds of division and sectarian strife”.68

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OMAN MONITOR

• Muscat secures safe release of American journalist detained in Yemen

• Oman receives six Yemeni detainees from Guanta-namo Bay

June 1

Houthi spokesperson discusses Yemen peace talks in Oman

Gulf News reported that a spokesperson for the Houthi rebels, Mohammed al-Butkiti, stated that, while in Oman, the Houthi delegation had demanded an end to Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen, as well as a lifting of the naval blockade, before they would enter into negotiations with Riyadh. Bukhiti an-nounced, “What I can reveal about the talks in Oman is that we demanded the halt to Saudi aggression on Yemen before talking about any deal with the Saudis.”

One day earlier, a Saudi Arabian official told Gulf News that Yemen’s exiled government had not been involved in the Muscat talks, which did include rep-resentatives from the Obama Administration. Bukhiti denied this statement and accused the Hadi govern-ment officials of telling “lies” to disrupt efforts at re-solving the crisis. He stated, “There are neither direct nor indirect talks with the Americans in Oman. There are serious efforts by regional and international forces to stop the war. The talks are shrouded with secrecy to ensure their success.”69

Oman secures safe release of American journalist detained in Sana’a by Houthi rebels

The BBC reported that American freelance journalist Casey Coombs had been released after being held by Houthi rebels in Yemen’s capital for two weeks. Coombs was flown to Oman and met with the U.S. ambassador. At the time of Coombs’ release, three other Americans remained under Houthi control. U.S. State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf thanked

Oman’s authorities, especially Sultan Qaboos, for helping to secure Coombs’ safe passage to Muscat.70

June 13

Oman receives six Yemeni detainees from Guantanamo Bay Oman’s ministry of foreign affairs stated on Twit-ter that Muscat had received six detainees from the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. The tweet read, “Considering the circumstances, Oman has re-ceived six Yemeni detainees.” The U.S. Department of Defence issued a statement expressing gratitude for Muscat’s “humanitarian gesture and willingness to support ongoing U.S. efforts to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.”71

June 16 Trade union official calls for a minimum wage law for expatriates

The Times of Oman reported that Mohammed al-Khal-di, board member of General Federation of Oman Trade Union (GFOTU), stated, “At present, there is no mention of minimum wages in the labour law either for nationals or migrant workers. However, in 2013, a ministerial decree ensured that nationals were guar-anteed a minimum wage, even though it was not mentioned in the labour law… But the migrant worker was left in the lurch. Bringing in a system can improve the entire labour system in Oman”. Shaji Sebastin, a social worker in Oman’s capital, also backed this stance. “If the new labour law guarantees minimum wage system for migrant workers too, it would be a great move. This can solve a lot of Omani labour market issues. Of course, in the job contract, the salary is mentioned. But as minimum wage is not a rule for migrant workers in Oman even when they are doing the same job, migrant workers get employed for different salaries… Minimum wage can also help mi-grant workers’ home country governments to prepare their citizens while they are getting ready to take up

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jobs in Oman. When the guarantee comes from the labour law, the migrant can feel more secure. It can protect migrant workers from being denied decent salaries.” Ahmed al-Busaidi, a member of the Majlis al-Shura, opposed the proposal, citing concerns about com-plications in the Gulf Arab nation’s labor market. He stated that “wages should be decided between the employers and employees.”72

June 29 Oman Trading International Ltd. eyes opportunities in Africa and North America

Talal al-Awfi, the CEO of Oman Trading International, announced that the company aims to purchase, lease, or build fuel-storage tanks in either Mozambique, Tan-

zania, or Kenya, and to open an office in the U.S. Oman Trading International is a Dubai-based joint-venture of the state-run Oman Oil Company SAOC (OOC) and the Vitol Group, the largest private energy trader in the world. Awfi stated that such expansion into East Africa and the U.S. would enable Oman to extend to mar-kets beyond Asia, where Oman (and the other GCC members) sells the majority of its oil. The office in the U.S. is intended to serve as a base for trade with Latin America.73

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QATAR MONITOR

• Qatari officials extend restrictions on five Afghan detainees in Doha

June 2 Doha agrees to extend restrictions on five senior Taliban officials

Qatari authorities agreed to a temporary extension of travel and monitoring restrictions imposed on the five Taliban figures (all Afghan citizens) that the U.S. released from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 2014. They were released in exchange for U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, the last U.S. soldier detained by the Afghan Taliban. According to Washington, the extend-ed restrictions will remain in place until a diplomatic solution is reached. The restrictions had been set to expire on June 1. On May 31, John Brennan, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated that he had communicated with officials in Doha and had asserted that the extension of their restrictions serves U.S. na-tional security interests.

Ahmad Shaikeb Mustaghani, a spokesman for Qatar’s Foreign Ministry, declared that the extension of the restrictions was aimed at ensuring that the five Af-ghans will never constitute a threat to Afghanistan. On June 1, U.S. State Department spokesperson Marie Harf stated, “All five remain in Qatar, where they re-main subject to extensive monitoring as well as travel restrictions. We are in close contact with our Qatari counterparts on this issue. We continue to work to make sure that these individuals do not pose a threat to the United States, and there are ongoing discus-sions about what will happen next. But as those dis-cussions happen, Qatar has agreed to maintain those restrictions.”74

Qatar responds to reports on construction worker deaths in the emirate

In response to a graphic published by The Washington Post, which maintains that 1,200 foreign workers have

died in Qatar during construction, Qatar’s state news agency issued a rebuttal calling the article “complete-ly untrue…In preparing its report, it appears that the Post simply took the total annual mortality figures for Indian and Nepalese migrants working in Qatar and multiplied those numbers by the years remaining be-tween now and the 2022 World Cup – a calculation which assumes that the death of every migrant worker in Qatar is work-related.” The statement also claimed that the article had caused “enormous damage” to the emirate’s “image and reputation”, and demanded a retraction from The Washington Post.75

June 5

Qatar attributes criticism of 2022 FIFA World Cup bid to “racism” and “economic or political rivalry”

Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Khalid bin Mohamed al-Atti-yah, responded to allegations that Doha had secured the 2022 FIFA World Cup through corrupt measures. While in Tunisia he stated, “We are confident we have entered the competition in accordance with the conditions set and this Arab file (Qatar) won. Unfor-tunately, some parties can’t see a Muslim Arab state succeed in attracting such championships. For the first time in the history of world football, this tournament will be held in an Arab state and will be for all Arabs.”76

Analysis: Without question, Qatari officials are on the defensive regarding the FIFA World Cup fiasco. Alle-gations concerning corruption have been swirling for several years. Doha clearly knew that it was in trouble (as was FIFA) when, in 2014, the construction rate for the multiple complexes related to the 2022 World Cup began to slow. One GCC interlocutor noted that within this context, “Qatar is using the race and bigotry card to defend itself which will not work well with public opinion.”

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SAUDI ARABIA MONITOR

• Deadly violence erupts along the Saudi Arabi-an-Yemeni border as Houthis fire Scud missiles into southern Saudi Arabia

• UN-sponsored talks in Geneva fail to bring an end to hostilities in Yemen

• At OPEC meeting in Austria Saudi Arabia signals no indication of changes in oil production

• Despite international pressure, court upholds Raif Badawi’s verdict

• Kingdom threatens to explore option of building nuclear weapons in response to Iran talks

June 3

Riyadh offers reward for information about May attacks in Eastern Province

Saudi Arabia’s Interior Ministry offered a cash reward of USD 1.3 million for information leading to the arrest of 16 individuals allegedly involved in the two terrorist attacks that targeted Saudi Arabia Shi’ites in late May. Additionally, the ministry offered rewards for any infor-mation about future attacks in the kingdom sponsored by Daesh (Islamic State). The ministry warned that “anyone dealing with the wanted men will be held ac-countable.” This warning followed the ministry’s pub-lication of the names of sixteen individuals allegedly involved in the terrorist attacks.77

June 5 OPEC gathering in Vienna yields no sign of changes in oil-production

The OPEC meeting in Vienna ended without any indi-cation that the cartel will change its oil-output target. While Riyadh did not comment before the meeting on an output target, al-Hayat (a UK-based Saudi Arabian newspaper) reported that Ali al-Naimi, the kingdom’s oil minister, stated that he is “100 percent satisfied” with the market for crude oil.78

Analysis: The Saudis continue to pursue the pricing agenda as a political weapon. Questions have emerged, however, regarding the sustainability of Riyadh’s posi-tion. Three important factors are in play. First, OPEC and non-OPEC countries dependent on oil exports are in need of income from higher prices. This pressure on Saudi Arabia was most apparent when Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited Moscow. Ac-cording to a Russian source, President Vladimir Putin told the Saudi leader that the Kremlin-Kingdom rela-tionship can grow only if the price of oil rises. Neigh-boring Oman (a non-OPEC member) has also issued criticisms of Riyadh’s pricing agenda. Low prices have had a devastating impact on Oman’s economy. Second, the ongoing costs of the military campaign in Yemen (and other proxy wars in the region) are draining Saudi Arabia’s coffers. Many analysts argue that the price of oil must increase soon to offset the rising costs of the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen. Lastly, the re-entry of Iranian oil into the global market will pressure Riyadh to reset its oil price policy.

June 6

Houthis fire a scud missile at the kingdom

Ansar Allah, the dominant Houthi militia, fired a scud missile at Saudi Arabia, which the kingdom shot down with two Patriot missiles. The ballistic missile was fired at Khamees Mushait along the Yemeni border, home to King Khaled, Saudi Arabia’s largest air force base. A Houthi spokesman vowed that the next attack “will be stronger” and that Ansar Allah has “just begun” the militia’s amped up attacks against the kingdom.79,80 The UK Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond immediate-ly condemned the Houthi-orchestrated attack. He de-clared, “This attack must not be allowed to derail the political process, which remains the only way to bring long-term stability to Yemen.”81

Analysis: The Saudi Arabian-Yemeni border is growing increasingly dangerous. GCC interlocutors maintain that Ansar Allah has fired more Scud missiles into the kingdom than reported. Some of these missiles have slipped through Saudi Arabia’s air defence systems and have hit strategic targets in the kingdom’s south-

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ern provinces. It is rumoured that a Scud missile killed Ahmed al-Shaalan, the commander of the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF); yet Shaalan is said to have died from a heart attack while in London. Given that Shaalan was in charge of the kingdom’s air operations against the Houthis, it is unclear why he would have been in Lon-don. Although the story is not confirmed, it is important to note that Riyadh is likely hiding much information about Ansar Allah’s scud missile attacks against targets in southern Saudi Arabia. While Saudi Arabian author-ities maintained that the early stages of Operation De-cisive Storm had destroyed the Houthis’ most powerful weapons, such an attack underscores how, in reality, the Saudi Arabian-led campaign has thus far failed to achieve this objective.

June 7

Saudi Arabia targets Sana’a in response to the Houthis’ firing of a Scud missile

Riyadh waged strikes against the Tahrir district of Yem-en’s capital, Sana’a, in retaliation for Ansar Allah’s firing of a Scud missile the previous day. According to Houthi rebels, Saudi Arabia’s strikes killed at least 44 people and injured over 100. Saba news agency reported that the majority of those killed by Riyadh’s air strikes were militants.82

Authorities uphold controversial sentence against blogger

A Saudi Arabian court upheld Raif Badawi’s verdict, despite the international community’s condemnation. Badawi, a liberal blogger charged with “insulting” Is-lam, faces ten years in prison and 1,000 lashes for his activism.83

June 8

Saudi diplomat says “all options are on the table” in terms of Iran’s nuclear program

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s long-serving ambas-sador to the United Kingdom stated in an interview that “all options are on the table” if Tehran does not

resolve its nuclear standoff. Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf bin Abdul Aziz asserted that Riyadh has pur-sued a policy, since the reign of King Fahd, that Saudi Arabia would not pursue nuclear weapons. The Saudi ambassador continued, “Then it became known that Iran was pursuing a policy that could be shifted to a weapons-of-mass-destruction programme… This has changed the whole outlook in the region. Iran’s nucle-ar programme poses a direct threat to the entire re-gion and constitutes a major source and incentive for nuclear proliferation across the Middle East, including Israel.”84

Saudi Arabian stock market slips after oil prices fall

As a consequence of China’s fuel imports declining sharply and the global economy adjusting to OPEC’s decision to maintain production levels, oil prices fell and caused the main Saudi index to decrease by .4 per-cent. Saudi Basic Industries (the kingdom’s petrochem-icals giant) edged down .7 percent.85

June 9

British Guardian calls on London to sever ties with Riyadh

The UK news outlet published a letter signed by several leaders of prominent human rights organizations, call-ing on British officials to cut ties with Saudi Arabia. The letter declared that “Saudi Arabia ought to be treated as a global pariah” for Riyadh’s miserable human rights record. The letter cited the upholding by the Saudi Arabian supreme court of Raif Badawi’s 10-year jail sentence and punishment of 1,000 lashes, which it de-scribed as “sadistic cruelty.” The statement demanded that London recall its ambassador from Saudi Arabia, cancel all arms sales to Riyadh, and impose interna-tional sanctions on officials in the ruling monarchy.86

Riyadh summons Iran’s ambassador after four Saudis are poisoned in Iran

On June 7, 33 Saudi Arabian Shi’ite pilgrims were poi-soned at a hotel in Mashhadh, a city in northeastern Iran. Mashhadh is home to the shrine of revered Shi’ite

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figure Imam Reza, and each year the city attracts mil-lions of Shi’ite pilgrims from around the world. The poisoning resulted in the deaths of four children and the hospitalization of 28 others. According to an Irani-an news agency, the tragedy was accidental, caused by the hotel’s poor sanitation standards. Iranian officials reported the arrest of five hotel employees.

Two days later, Saudi Arabia’s foreign ministry de-manded that Tehran “swiftly take the necessary inves-tigations required and to discover the circumstances surrounding the event, and allow them to follow up on the medical conditions of the patients, and to provide necessary protection for them.”87

Swedish Foreign Minister: Punishment in Saudi Arabia is “medieval”

Foreign Minister Margot Wallstron accused Riyadh of imposing a “medieval” punishment on Raif Badawi. The Swedish official declared, “My opinion is that it’s a medieval sentence. It’s a medieval method that does not have its place in a society that allows a free media and allows people to express their point of view.”88

June 19 Yemen’s Saudi-backed exiled government blames Houthis for the failure of peace talks in Geneva

Yemen’s exiled foreign minister, Riad Yassin, blamed the Houthi militants for the failure of talks to produce a ceasefire. Yassin accused the Houthis of stalling the talks and maintained that his exiled government would continue efforts to broker a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Yemen. However, no date has been estab-lished for a second round of peace talks. Yassin told reporters, “We really came here with a big hope and still we are optimistic that we will go into a peaceful solution for Yemen under the umbrella of the Unit-ed Nations. But unfortunately the Houthi delega-

tion did not allow us to really reach all progress as we expected. This is not getting as much success as we hoped but it doesn’t mean that we have failed.”89

June 20

Saudi Arabia resumes bombardment of Aden

After peace talks in Geneva concluded without an agreement, warplanes from the Riyadh-led coalition launched 15 strikes against Houthi targets in Aden. Ac-cording to a military source with ties to the Saudi au-thorities, the objective of the bombing was “to noose around the Houthi rebels in Aden and assist the Popu-lar Resistance Committees” (which are anti-Houthi mi-litias comprised of southern separatists, Sunni tribes, and pro-Hadi fighters).90

June 24 Four soldiers are killed along the Saudi Arabian-Yemeni border

Ansar Allah (the dominant Houthi militia) shelled targets in southern Saudi Arabia. Four soldiers (two from the Royal Saudi Land Forces, one from the Bor-der Guards, and a UAE officer) were killed in a series of clashes along the dangerous mountainous border.91

June 30 Forces in Yemen launch Scud missile at a missile base in Riyadh province

According to Brigadier General Sharaf Luqman, spokes-man for Yemen’s army, the firing of a Scud missile at the Sulayyil missile base was “a response to the crimes of the brutal Saudi aggression.”92

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UAE MONITOR

• Emirati Islamist-inspired murderer of 2014 is sen-tenced to death under new counter-terrorism legislation

June 29 The Federal Supreme Court in Abu Dhabi sentences Emirati woman to death for an Islamist-inspired killing last year

The UAE’s state-run news agency, WAM, reported that a court sentenced Ala’a Badr Abdullah al-Hashemi (a 30 year-old Emirati woman) to death for fatally stab-bing Ibolya Ryan (a Romanian-American teacher) in an Abu Dhabi shopping mall in December 2014. The court stated that the murder constituted “a direct threat to the security and stability of society.” Hashemi had pre-viously sought to kill an Egyptian-American doctor in the UAE with a makeshift bomb, which she placed out-side his apartment; however, authorities dismantled the device and prevented the explosion.93

On July 13, the UAE executed Hashemi. She received the death penalty under UAE counter-terrorism laws put into effect last year.94

Analysis: The case of Hashemi—known in the UAE as the “Reem Island Ghost”—remains problematic. Ques-tions regarding her ability to assemble a makeshift bomb are still unanswered. Given that Hashemi was illiterate, certain GCC interlocutors are puzzled. Others are convinced that her husband provided her adequate information to construct such primitive bombs herself. Overall, the case of the “Reem Island Ghost” heightens concerns about sub-tribes in Abu Dhabi becoming sus-ceptible to extremist recruitment as well as lone-wolf activity against the UAE and non-Muslim Western ex-patriates in the emirates.

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ENDNOTES

1 Xinhua. “China-UAE trade to hit $100b in 2015: association.” China Daily. China Daily Information, 11 May 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-05/11/content_20678715.htm>.

2 “The UAE and China: A Strategic Partnership.” The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. ECSSR, 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.ecssr.ac.ae/ECSSR/print/ft.jsp?lang=en&ftId=/FeatureTop-ic/ECSSR/FeatureTopic_1500.xml>.

3 Bedirian, Razmig. “First Chinese International School to Open in Dubai.” Gulf News. GN Media, 2 Mar. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/education/first-chinese-international-school-to-open-in-dubai-1.1465126>.

4 Trenwith, Courtney. “China-UAE trade: Enter the dragon.” Arabian Business. Arabian Business, 10 Mar. 2013. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.arabianbusiness.com/china-uae-trade-enter-dragon-492242.html>.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 “Petrochina International (Middle East) Company Limited.” Dubai International Financial Center. DIFC, 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.difc.ae/petrochina-international-middle-east-company-limited>.

8 Hunter, Gregor Stuart. “Chinese bank ICBC heads to UAE.” The National. Abu Dhabi Media, 24 Aug. 2011. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.thenational.ae/business/banking/chinese-bank-icbc-heads-to-uae>.

9 Armijo, Jacqueline. “DragonMart, the Mega-Souk of Today’s Silk Road.” Middle East Research and Infor-mation Project. Middle East Research and Information Project, 2014. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer270/dragonmart-mega-souk-todays-silk-road>.

10 “Dragon City under the spotlight as Chinese Ambassador to the UAE visits Nakheel.” Nakheel. Nakhell PJSC, 9 Apr. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.nakheel.com/en/media/news/dragon-city-under-the-spotlight-as-chinese-ambassador-to-the-uae-visits-nakheel>.

11 Scott, Emma. “China’s “One Belt, One Road” Strategy Meets the UAE’s Look East Policy.” The Jamestown Foundation. Jamestown Foundation, 29 May 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.jamestown.org/regions/chinaasiapacific/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43961&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=52&-cHash=b986ae55ab212c510151c721f6731c20#.VXMX4OfDHFQ>.

12 “UAE, China well poised to take relations to new level.” Khaleej Times. Khaleej Times, 16 May 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.khaleejtimes.com/biz/inside.asp?xfile=/data/uaebusiness/2015/May/uaebusi-ness_May171.xml&section=uaebusiness>.

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13 “China New Silk Road Investment Association announces partnership with UAE mega-trade event.” UAEBusiness.com. UAE Business Magazine, 23 May 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://uaebusiness.com/2015/05/23/china-new-silk-road-investment-association-announces-partnership-with-uae-me-ga-trade-event/>.

14 “UAE, China Discuss Stronger Economic Cooperation, Strategic Partnership.” UAEinteract. UAEinteract, 8 Feb. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/UAE-China-discuss-stronger-econom-ic-cooperation-strategic-partnership/66471.htm>.

15 “China Fair opens in Sharjah.” Trade Arabia. Trade Arabia, 6 Dec. 2011. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.tradearabia.com/news/RET_209094.html>.

16 Bardsley, Daniel. “China looks to invest in UAE.” The National. Abu Dhabi Media, 18 Aug. 2011. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/china-looks-to-invest-in-uae>.

17 Xinhua. “Road and belt initiative win-win for UAE and China.” China Daily. China Daily, 10 Apr. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-04/10/content_20402451.htm>.

18 McAuly, Anthony. “China state oil company wins Abu Dhabi oilfield contract.” The National. Abu Dhabi Media, 18 May 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/china-state-oil-company-wins-abu-dhabi-oilfield-contract>.

19 WAM. “DP World to develop new container terminal in Qingdao, China.” WAM. Emirates News Agency, 14 Nov. 2005. Web. 16 July 2015. <https://wam.ae/en/news/international/1395227527619.html>.

20 Makahleh, Shehab A. “Chinese firms win over $4.8b in UAE contracts over two years.” Gulf News. GN Media, 24 Aug. 2011. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://m.gulfnews.com/business/chinese-firms-win-over-4-8b-in-uae-contracts-over-two-years-1.856301>.

21 Abbas, Waheed. “New Chinese cars launched in UAE: Will you buy one?” Emirates 24/7. Dubai Media, 10 Apr. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/new-chinese-cars-launched-in-uae-will-you-buy-one-2015-04-10-1.586944>.

22 Khaleej Times. “Chinese car makers ready to manoeuvre the UAE market.” Al Bawaba. N.p., 20 Apr. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.albawaba.com/business/chinese-car-makers-ready-manoeuvre-uae-mar-ket-684036>.

23 Basit, Abdul. “Chinese cars make inroads into UAE market.” Khaleej Times. Khaleej Times, 20 Apr. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=data/companies/2015/April/companies_April46.xml&section=companies>.

24 Buckley, Chris. “China, UAE sign 35 billion yuan currency swap: PBOC.” Ed. Stephen Nisbet. Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 17 Jan. 2012. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/17/us-chi-na-uae-currency-idUSTRE80G19020120117>.

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25 Poorsafar, Hamid. “The Renminbi Goes Abroad.” The Diplomat. Diplomat, 24 Apr. 2014. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-renminbi-goes-abroad/>.

26 “Cheap Flights From Abu Dhabi to China.” Fare Compare. FareCompare.com, n.d. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.farecompare.com/flights/Abu_Dhabi-AUH/China-CN/citycountry.html>.

27 Trenwith, Courtney. “China-UAE trade: Enter the dragon.” Arabian Business. Arabian Business, 10 Mar. 2013. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.arabianbusiness.com/china-uae-trade-enter-dragon-492242.html>.

28 Rakhmat, Muhammad Zulfikar. “China and the UAE: New Cultural Horizons.” Middle East Institute. Middle East Institute, 9 Mar. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.mei.edu/content/map/chi-na-and-uae-new-cultural-horizons>.

29 John, Isaac. “HSBC joins UAE RMB accounts race.” Khaleej Times. Khaleej Times, 22 July 2011. Web. 16 July 2015. <http://www.khaleejtimes.com/article/20110722/ARTICLE/307229898/1036>.

30 “DGCXs MOU with Bank of China Seeks to Increase Interaction Be-tween UAE and Chinese Financial Mar-kets.” DGCX. DGCX, 27 May 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.dgcx.ae/index.php/2014-02-11-04-03-48/item/591-dgcx-s-mou-with-bank-of-china-seeks-to-increase-interaction-be-tween-uae-and-chinese-fi-nancial-markets>.

31 Bedirian, Razmig. “First Chinese International School to open in Dubai.” Gulf News. GN Media, 2 Mar. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://m.gulfnews.com/news/uae/education/first-chinese-international-school-to-open-in-dubai-1.1465126>.

32 Achkhanian, Mary. “Chinese cultural show in Dubai.” Gulf News. GN Media, 11 Feb. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://m.gulfnews.com/news/uae/tourism/chinese-cultural-show-in-dubai-1.1455052>.

33 WAM. “UAE donates 50 million dollars to China quake victims.” Gulf News. GN Media, 4 June 2008. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/uae-donates-50-million-dollars-to-china-quake-victims-1.110276>.

34 Xinhua. “China, UAE agree to boost cooperation, ties.” China Daily. China Daily, 15 Feb. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-02/15/content_19596192.htm>.

35 Hawksworth, James, Linda Du, and Antoine Denry. “Leveling the M&A Playing Field.” Slideshare. LinkedIn, July 2013. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.slideshare.net/mslgroup/leveling-the-ma-playing-field-msl-group-china>.

36 Xinhua. “China-UAE trade to hit $100b in 2015: association.” China Daily. China Daily Information, 11 May 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-05/11/content_20678715.htm>.

37 Bouyamourn, Adam. “UAE signs up as founding member of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.” The National. Abu Dhabi Media, 5 Apr. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015. <http://www.thenational.ae/business/bank-ing/uae-signs-up-as-founding-member-of-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank>.

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38 “The Arab Peace Initiative, 2002.” Al-Bab. Al-Bab, 2002. Web. 28 June 2015. <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm>.

39 Lake, Eli. “Israelis and Saudis Reveal Secret Talks to Thwart Iran.” Bloomberg View. Bloomberg LP, 4 June 2014. Web. 16 July 2015. <http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-04/israelis-and-saudis-re-veal-secret-talks-to-thwart-iran>.

40 Slavin, Barbara. “Ex-Obama adviser: Missile defense may avert GCC proliferation.” Al Monitor. Al-Moni-tor, 9 June 2015. Web. 28 June 2015. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/missile-de-fense-gulf-gcc-nuclear-proliferation-iran.html>.

41 Moore, Evan. “FPI Bulletin: In Syria, Armed Opposition Advances but Assad Endures.” The Foreign Policy Initiative. Foreign Policy Initiative, 15 May 2015. Web. 28 June 2015. <http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/con-tent/fpi-bulletin-syria-armed-opposition-advances-assad-endures>.

42 Grappo, Gary A. “New leadership is sorely needed to make progress for the Palestinians.” GlobalPost. GlobalPost, 1 May 2015. Web. 28 June 2015. <http://www.globalpost.com/article/6534552/2015/04/30/new-leadership-sorely-needed-make-progress-palestinians>.

43 Zambelis, Chris. “Unspoken Israeli-Saudi alliance targets Iran.” Asia Times Online. Asia Times Online, 8 Sept. 2012. Web. 28 June 2015. <http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/NI08Ak01.html>.

44 Grewal, Sandeep Singh. “Women urged not to visit mosques.” Gulf Daily News. Gulf Daily News, 2 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=403128>.

45 AFP, and Reuters. “Bahrain says 14-man ‘terrorist’ group busted.” Khaleej Times. Khaleej Times, 4 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=data/mid-dleeast/2015/June/middleeast_June28.xml&section=middleeast>.

46 Toumi, Habib. “Bahrain smashes terror cell.” Gulf News. GN Media, 3 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-smashes-terror-cell-1.1529302>.

47 “14-member terror cell busted.” Bahrain News Agency. Information Affairs Authority, 2 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/671694>.

48 El Dahan, Maha. “Bahrain summons Iraqi ambassador over banned Shi’ite group.” Ed. Robert Birsel. Reu-ters. Thomson Reuters, 10 June 2015. Web. 6 July 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/11/us-bahrain-security-iraq-idUSKBN0OR05C20150611>.

49 Reuters. “Bahrain’s Alba gets approval for expansion project.” Arabian Business. Arabian Business, 10 June 2015. Web. 6 July 2015. <http://www.arabianbusiness.com/bahrain-s-alba-gets-approval-for-expan-sion-project-595683.html#.VYjac_lViko>.

50 “Bahrain convicts 57 over ‘bombing plot.’” BBC. BBC, 12 June 2015. Web. 6 July 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33106304>.

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51 Browning, Noah. “Bahrain sentences opposition leader to four years in jail.” Ed. Larry King. Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 16 June 2015. Web. 6 July 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/16/us-bah-rain-trial-idUSKBN0OW0MB20150616>.

52 Black, Ian. “UK adds to condemnation of Bahrain over jailing of Shia opposition leader.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 16 June 2015. Web. 6 July 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/16/bahrain-jails-shia-opposition-leader>.

53 Maclean, William. “Bahrain says seizes explosives meant for use in Saudi Arabia.” Ed. Mark Heinrich. Reuters. Thomson Reuters, n.d. Web. 6 July 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/18/us-bah-rain-saudi-explosives-idUSKBN0OY13220150618>.

54 MEE. “Bahrain releases activist jailed for 4 years over part in 2011 uprising.” Middle East Eye. Middle East Eye, 20 June 2015. Web. 6 July 2015. <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/bahrain-releases-activist-jailed-4-years-over-part-2011-uprising-457383393>.

55 Atassi, Basma. “Bahrain tightens security amid ISIL threats.” Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, 3 July 2015. Web. 14 July 2015. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/bahrain-tightens-securi-ty-isil-threats-150703062006728.html>.

56 Kirby, John. “Lifting Holds on Security Assistance to the Government of Bahrain.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. State Department, 29 June 2015. Web. 14 July 2015. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/06/244478.htm>.

57 Rogin, Josh. “U.S. Moves to Lift Bahrain Arms Ban.” Bloomberg View. Bloomberg LP, 15 June 2015. Web. 14 July 2015. <http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-15/u-s-moves-to-lift-bahrain-arms-ban>.

58 Reuters. “Kuwait cancels licences of three TV channels.” Arabian Business. Arabian Business, 5 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://www.arabianbusiness.com/kuwait-cancels-licences-of-three-tv-chan-nels-595185.html>.

59 Kington, Tom. “Kuwait, Italy Discuss Eurofighter Buy.” Defense News. Sightline Media Group, 4 June 2015. Web. 14 July 2015. <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/air-force/2015/06/04/ku-wait-eurofighter-italy-talks-alenia-aermacchi-rafale-egypt-qatar/28494435/>.

60 “Kuwait wants 40% hike in oil and gas production by 2020 – minister.” Russia Today. Autonomous Non-profit Organization “TV-Novosti”, 5 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://rt.com/business/265141-ku-wait-oil-gas-production/>.

61 Rudaw. “Kuwait celebrates new consulate in Erbil.” Rudaw. Rudaw, 6 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/060620152>.

62 Irish, John. “France nears 1 bln euro Kuwait deal to sell Airbus helicopters.” Al Arabiya News. Al Arabiya Network, 11 June 2015. Web. 6 July 2015. <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/aviation-and-trans-port/2015/06/11/France-nears-1-bln-euro-Kuwait-deal-to-sell-Airbus-helicopters.html>.

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63 “Kuwait gives US$121 million to help fund UNHCR’s Syria crisis response.” UNHCR. UNHCR, 12 June 2015. Web. 6 July 2015. <http://www.unhcr.org/557ae8446.html>.

64 “Kuwait police arrest senior political dissident.” Press TV. Press TV, 13 June 2015. Web. 6 July 2015. <http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/06/13/415712/Kuwait-opposition-leader-Musallam-alBarrak>.

65 Rudaw. “President Barzani discusses investments and flights in Kuwait.” Rudaw. Rudaw, 14 June 2015. Web. 6 July 2015. <http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/140620151>.

66 “Kuwait activist sentenced for insulting emir.” Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, 22 June 2015. Web. 6 July 2015. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/kuwait-activist-sentenced-insulting-emir-150622074745029.html>.

67 Fitch, Asa, and Maria Abi-Habib. “Suicide Bomber Kills Dozens in Kuwait Mosque.” The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company, 27 June 2015. Web. 16 July 2015. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/deadly-blast-hits-kuwait-mosque-1435319403>.

68 Botelho, Greg, and Ian Lee. “Thousands attend funerals of Kuwait mosque attack victims.” CNN. Ca-ble News Network, 27 June 2015. Web. 14 July 2015. <http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/27/world/ku-wait-mosque-attack/>.

69 Batati, Saeed Al. “Yemen talks in Oman ‘shrouded in secrecy’.” Gulf News. GN Media, 1 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/yemen-talks-in-oman-shrouded-in-secre-cy-1.1528035>.

70 “US hostage Casey Coombs released in Yemen and flown to Oman.” BBC. BBC, 1 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32965489>.

71 “US hostage Casey Coombs released in Yemen and flown to Oman.” BBC. BBC, 1 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32965489>.

72 K, Rejimon. “’Expat workers should get minimum wage in Oman’.” Times of Oman. Muscat Media Group, 16 June 2015. Web. 6 July 2015. <http://timesofoman.com/article/58493/Oman/Call-for-expat-workers-in-Oman-to-get-a-guaranteed-minimum-wage-under-revised-labour-laws>.

73 Dipaola, Anthony. “Oman Oil Trader Seeks U.S., Africa Footholds in Growth Push.” Bloomberg Business. Bloomberg LP, 29 June 2015. Web. 14 July 2015. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-29/oman-oil-trader-seeks-u-s-africa-footholds-in-expansion-push>.

74 Beattie, Victor. “Qatar Extends Taliban Five’s Travel Restrictions.” Voice of America. VOANews.com, 2 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://www.voanews.com/content/qatar-said-to-agree-to-extend-monitor-ing-travel-restrictions-on-taliban-5/2802664.html>.

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75 Williams-Grut, Oscar. “Qatar claims NO workers have died while building its World Cup stadiums.” Busi-ness Insider. Business Insider, 3 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://www.businessinsider.com/qatar-world-cup-2022-government-claim-no-migrant-workers-have-died-constructing-football-stadiums-wash-ington-post-death-toll-1200-2015-6>.

76 “Qatar won 2022 bid solely on merit: FM.” The Peninsula. Peninsula Newspaper, 6 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/news/qatar/342206/qatar-won-2022-bid-solely-on-merit-fm>.

77 Al Sayegh, Hadeel. “Saudi names suspects in mosque bombings, offers $1 million bounty.” Ed. Noah Browning and Toby Chopra. Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 3 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/03/us-saudi-security-bounty-idUSKBN0OJ1R120150603>.

78 Smith, Grant, Golnar Motevalli, and Julian Lee. “OPEC Nations Signal Few Prospects for Oil-Production Change.” Bloomberg Business. Bloomberg LP, n.d. Web. 14 July 2015. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-05/opec-nations-signal-few-prospects-for-oil-output-shift-in-vienna>.

79 Almosawa, Shuaib, and Kareem Fahim. “Saudi Arabia Shoots Down Missile Fired From Yemen.” The New York Times. New York Times Company, 6 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-shoots-down-missile-fired-from-yemen.html>.

80 Browning, Noah, and Mohammed Ghobari. “Scud missile fired at Saudi Arabia as 38 Yemenis reported killed.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 6 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/arti-cle/2015/06/07/yemen-security-saudi-idUSKBN0OM06120150607>.

81 Saudi Gazette. “British foreign secretary condemns Houthi attack on Saudi Arabia.” Al Arabiya News. Al Arabiya Network, 7 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/mid-dle-east/2015/06/07/British-foreign-secretary-condemns-attack-on-Saudi-Arabia.html>.

82 “Yemen crisis: Saudi Arabia air strikes kill 44 in Sanaa.” BBC. BBC, 7 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33036136>.

83 Rath, Arun, and Deborah Amos. “Saudi Supreme Court Upholds Blogger’s Prison And Lashing Sentence.” NPR. NPR, 7 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://www.npr.org/2015/06/07/412719854/saudi-su-preme-court-upholds-blogger-s-prison-and-lashing-sentence>.

84 Coughlin, Con. “Saudi Arabia says Iran could trigger nuclear arms race.” Gulf News. GN Media, 10 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-says-iran-could-trigger-nuclear-arms-race-1.1532323>.

85 Auyezov, Olzhas. “MIDEAST STOCKS-Oil weighs on Saudi Arabia; Egypt inches up.” Reuters. Thomson Reu-ters, 8 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/08/markets-stocks-sau-di-egypt-idUSL5N0YU1M820150608>.

86 Tatchell, Peter, et al. “UK government must end its support for Saudi Arabia.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 9 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/09/uk-government-must-end-support-for-saudi-arabia>.

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87 Reuters. “Saudi Arabia summons Iran ambassador after poisoning of Saudis.” Yahoo! News. Yahoo - ABC News Network, 9 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <https://news.yahoo.com/saudi-arabia-sum-mons-iran-ambassador-poisoning-saudis-155352577.html>.

88 AFP. “Saudi lashing sentence for blogger ‘medieval’: Swedish FM.” The Daily Star. Daily Star, 9 June 2015. Web. 19 June 2015. <https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Jun-09/301271-saudi-lash-ing-sentence-for-blogger-medieval-swedish-fm.ashx>.

89 “Yemen crisis: Geneva talks fail to produce ceasefire.” BBC. BBC, 19 June 2015. Web. 14 July 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33205359>.

90 AFP. “Saudi Arabia resumes air strikes in Yemen as talks fail.” The Express Tribune. Express Tribune News Network, 20 June 2015. Web. 6 July 2015. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/907125/saudi-arabia-resumes-air-strikes-in-yemen-as-talks-fail/>.

91 McDowall, Angus, and Mohammed Ghobari. “Shelling by Yemeni group kills four soldiers on Saudi border.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 25 June 2015. Web. 14 July 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/arti-cle/2015/06/25/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0P50E120150625>.

92 Ghobari, Mohammed, and Noah Browning. “Yemeni forces launch Scud missile at Saudi Arabia - Yemen military spokesman.” Ed. Alan Crosby. Reuters. Thomson Reuters, n.d. Web. 14 July 2015. <http://uk.reu-ters.com/article/2015/06/29/uk-yemen-security-missile-idUKKCN0P92TC20150629>.

93 El Dahan, Maha. “UAE sentences Emirati woman to death for killing U.S. teacher.” Ed. Sami Aboudi and Mark Heinrich. Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 29 June 2015. Web. 14 July 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/29/us-emirates-usa-killing-idUSKCN0P90XV20150629>.

94 Pearson, Michael. “UAE executes woman who killed American teacher at shopping mall.” CNN. Cable News Network, 13 July 2015. Web. 16 July 2015. <http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/13/world/uae-us-mall-killing/>.