MONITORING PUBLIC SERVICES · MONITORING PUBLIC SERVICES A practical guide to monitoring council...

MONITORINGPUBLICSERVICES

A practical guide to monitoring council servicesunder enforced competition

Researched by

CENTRE for PUBLIC SERVICESResearch. Strategy. Planning. Training

for

LGIU

MONITORING PUBLIC SERVICES

CONTENTS

Part 1: The practice and politics of monitoring

Part 2: The need for monitoring

Part 3: Lessons for improvement

Part 4: Differential Monitoring costs

Part 5: Monitoring and quality control plans

Part 6: User and trade union role in monitoring

Appendix 1: Example trade union questionnaire

Appendix 2: List of local authorities and trade unions who supplied information

Bibliography

Sources of Further Information

Researched a.ndwritten by:

CENTRE for PUBLIC SERVICESResearch • Strate~y • Plannin~ • Trainin~

1 Sidney Street Sheffield SI 4RG Tel: 0742 726683 Fax: 727066

(formerly SCAT)

for:

LGIUPublished September 1991

Price: £12.00Bulk and concessionary prices on request.

Service and Contract Monitoring

Part 1

THE PRACTICE & POLITICS OFMONITORING

IntroductionMonitoring of public services is essential to ensureservices are delivered effectively to the agreed standards.It is also an integral part of the strategy to minimise theadverse effects of compulsory competitive tendering inlocal government.

This report has been prepared to assist local authorities dealwith the practicalities of organising the monitoring ofcontracts let under the Local Government Act 1988. Itcovers the defined services - refuse collection, streetcleansing, catering, cleaning of buildings, vehiclemaintenance, sports and leisure management, and groundsmaintenance - and is applicable to other manual and whitecollar services which may be included in the Government'splanned extension of Compulsory Competitive Tendering(CCT).

There has been no substantive guidance on monitoringissued by the Department of the Environment and onlygeneral policy advice from a number of local governmentorganisations. Hence this report explains the need formonitoring, examines different local authority approachesto organising and staffing monitoring, provides advice onthe use of differential monitoring, and suggests how variousmonitoring systems and complaints procedures can bedrawn together in a monitoring and quality control plan.

Our evidence has come from many sources. Several localauthorities co-operated with the research for this report. Wealso obtained information from the local authorityassociations such as the AMA, ALA, LGIU, ADLO,COSLA, the Competition Advice Consultancy, the tradeunions Public Services Privatisation Research Unit,conferences and seminars, and our own research. We didnot carry out a national survey but instead concentrated onspecific case studies reflecting good and bad practice.

The positive role of monitoringMonitoring has a key role in ensuring that the DSO orprivate contractor delivers the specified service and is paidaccording to the amount and quality of the work completed,that defaults are corrected or liquidated damages incurred,and that health and safety and equal opportunitiesregulations are implemented on behalf of workers andservice users. But monitoring must not be constrained bythe narrow confines of what is defined in contracts or by theemerging 'contract culture'. The principles and practice ofmonitoring should apply to all services and should extendbeyond the legal requirements of particular contracts.Monitoring should not be determined solely by thecontractual obligations and constraints imposed on localauthorities by CCT. For example, monitoring can make animportant contribution to the Service Planning process andthe development of more effective performance indicators.

This wider role can encompass the following:

• Monitoring should contribute to the preparation andevaluation of Service/Business Plans for both clientand DSO. This should include the development ofperformance and quality indicators.

• Monitoring must play a key role in the process ofimproving the quality of public services. This mustencompass the production of services as well as thequality at the point of consumption by users. It can assistin the identification of problems in the organisation andmanagement of services.

• Monitoring should also be contributing to innovation.This will include identifying the need for new orexpanded services, improving specifications, identifyingthe need for new equipment and/or working methods,and helping to evaluate workers ideas for serviceimprovements.

• Monitoring should also be used to identify and exposethe shortcomings of competitive tendering. This couldinclude the limitations of tendering for the supply ofquality public services, identifying the full cost of thetendering process, and highlighting practicalalternatives.

However, the best and most comprehensive monitoringsystem cannot make up for or substitute fundamentallyflawed and/or inadequately financed bids. Local authoritiestempted to make 'savings' by either accepting very low bidswith some form of 'enhanced' monitoring or reducingmonitoring staff by shifting most of the responsibility formonitoring onto the DSO, need to consider the longer termimplications of such moves.

Achieving the desired performance is the primary objective.Whilst the DSO or contractor can be penalised financiallyfor not fulfilling the terms of the contract, the localauthority'S prime consideration should be the delivery ofthe specified service. The 'value' of full performance, forexample, clean schools and streets, good quality meals, isusually far greater than the relatively small financialliquidated damages imposed.

The relationship between the client and contractor is vital ifthe service objectives are to be achieved. Monitoring mustalways search for a degree of co-operation between clientand DSO or contractor. Monitoring must not be allowed tobecome a vehicle for settling old scores nor wielding powerfor its own sake. Local authorities should be seeking amanagement partnership between the client and DSOrather than a potentially conflictual complete separation ofclient and contractual responsibilities. No contractdocumentation is foolproof, it can always be improved. 'Ifyou are always pulling the contract out of the draw to examine thefine print this is bound to lead to problems' stated onemonitoring officer.

Local authorities have established a variety of workingrelationships between client and contractor. This dependsheavily on the extent of the client-contractor separation,internal working relationships, whether DSOs or privatecontractors won contracts, and corporate policies. Equallydifferent ways of organising monitoring have been set up.However, our research highlights the need to ensure,irrespective of the organisational arrangements andmonitoring systems, that the client has control over thenature of the service provided. Retaining political control of

2 Service and Contract Monitoring

service planning and delivery is essential. Monitoringshould be seen as a means of achieving politicalaccountability as well as an important part of contractmanagement.

Many DSOs and private contractors are seeking QualityAssurance registration for parts of their services. However,QA is not a substitute for monitoring, nor shouldmonitoring be restricted within the limitations of QA. Itwill reduce, not eliminate, the need for client sidemonitoring.

Role of monitoring inEnforced Tendering StrategyA comprehensive strategy for enforced tendering has beenpromoted by the National Coordinating Committee onCompetitive Tendering. It can be summarised briefly asfollows:

Service Profiles: Building up a clear picture of the existingservice including staffing, use of resources and equipment,service standards, financial systems, organisation andmanagement systems.

Joint Working: Establishment of local joint workingarrangements between councillors, officers and trade unionsfor the tendering process which includes the monitoring ofservices after the contract is awarded.

Investigation of companies and sector analysis:Improving understanding of trends and developments ineach sector and drawing up profiles of the track record andfinancial standing of companies seeking contracts.

Quality Specifications: Drawing up comprehensivespecifications detailing the required level, standard andwhere necessary, the method of service delivery.

Stringent Contract Conditions: Ensuring services aredelivered according to the specification and users' needs.

Comprehensive Tender Evaluation: Full technical andfinancial analysis of tenders. This should also help toidentify the intensity of monitoring which is likely to berequired.

Rigorous Monitoring: Ensuring users receive the specifiedservice, defaults reported and remedied and, if necessary,liquidated damages imposed. The full monitoring processshould be set out clearly in the tender documents so thatcontractors are aware of the proposed system.

Each one of these elements of the strategy is highlydependent on each other. For example, failure to implementa planned monitoring system could lead to the specificationnot being fully implemented nor the desired standardsachieved.

Political control of monitoringPolitical control of monitoring is very important. This mustmean more than simply reporting defaults to the relevantCommittee.

One authority has already had to bear the cost ofretendering and the DSO losing the contract partly as aresult of strident monitoring by ex-DSO supervisorsadopting high-handed tactics. Issues that were relevant inthis case were a poorly written specification, lack of training

of both monitoring officers and DSO supervisors, and aDSO reluctant to operate as a contractor. The DSOconsequently bore the brunt of what were clearly clientfailures. The client worked against the DSO instead ofworking with it to address problems as they arose.

The wider role of monitoring outlined above requires apolitical input from councillors. There is minimumreporting of contract performance in some authorities.Many stated that councillors had requested suchinformation. Improved reporting of performance must be aprerequisite for greater involvement of councillors inexamining the implications of performance and the use ofmonitoring to improve the quality of public services beyondcontractual considerations.

Councillors and officers need to avoid the fragmentation oflocal authorities as a result of taking the client-contractorsplit to the extreme. This can only hasten thecommercialisation of services and claims by DSOs that theyshould not have to implement corporate policies such asequal opportunities, conditions of service, and so on.Tameside MDC have run a series of client-contractorresidential courses aimed at 'emphasising the congruity ofobjectives and shared responsibilities'. They also aimed to'mitigate the destructive influence of a structure which sets uppotential conflicts'.

The threat of and actual Poll Tax Capping has forced manylocal authorities into difficult decisions about prioritisingbetween different services and allocating available resourcesinto service delivery but reducing certain client activitiessuch as monitoring. These pressures lie behind moves tosubstantially reduce client monitoring by transferringresponsibility to DSOs. This can at best be a short termstrategy because fully resourced client monitoring will haveto be budgeted for prior to retendering.

These financial pressures make it all the more important to.cost different levels of monitoring and to assess the risksassociated for each of these levels.

Monitoring is a trade union issueMonitoring of contracts held by DSOs (particularly thoseenthusiastically adopting commercial practices) and privatecontractors is vitally important for the following reasons:

• ensuring the effective implementation of the enforcedtendering strategy in full and that lessons learnt are fedback into the tendering process including tenderinvitation assessments, evaluation of tenders, referencesrequested by other local authorities and so on.

• implementation of health and safety and equalopportunities policies. Given the restrictions on equalopportunities monitoring imposed by the 1988 LocalGovernment Act, trade unions have a key role in keepingthis issue on the political agenda and pressurising localauthorities to maximise the use of their limited powers.

• employment practices including pay and conditions ofservice, working conditions, and grievance procedures.

• scope for recruitment of the contractors workforce.

• ensure contract defaults and failures are fully reported tocouncillors, trade unions, and other organisationsmonitoring privatisation.

Service and Contract Monitoring 3

• development of more effective DSO bids in subsequentrounds of tendering.

• overall progress of the contract, as an 'early warningsystem' to identify overspending and/or mismanagementwhich could lead to closure of the DSO.

Trade union concern is often focused on the start ofcontracts, particularly where private contractors have woncontracts. Many contract failures have been exposed by thetrade unions. However, although a contract may incurserious problems during the start-up period, this does notnecessarily justify its classification as a 'contract failure' ifthe remainder of the contract period is relatively free ofmajor defaults. Problems on some contracts are fullydocumented but there is usually a substantial informationgap on the vast bulk of contracts.

Information on contract performance is often difficult toobtain and this places additional responsibility on tradeunionists. Some authorities seek maximum publicity whenthey contract-out/privatise the service but then effectivelyalso privatise contract monitoring by failing to produce orrefusing to release details of contract performance. ThePublic Services Privatisation Unit, the Centre for PublicServices (formerly SCAT), and other organisations aremonitoring the performance of contractors nationally. Inthe absence of this information branch officials, shopstewards, and full-time officers must be regularlyencouraged to pass on information which they oftenconsider 'unimportant' or which they believe is alreadyknown by others. It is often not given sufficient priority dueto competing demands and limited resources.

Part 6 examines user and trade union monitoring in moredetail.


Part 2

THE NEED FOR MONITORING

The importance of effective monitoringMonitoring of services and contracts performs a numberof functions. Its importance should not be under-estimated.

• It should ensure that comprehensive specifications andcontract conditions are implemented to achieve therequired level and quality of service. Monitoring isequally as important as the content of the specificationand contract conditions. It plays a key role in helping toensure the implementation of the local authoritiescorporate policies and its statutory responsibilities.

• It should ensure that contractors are paid only for thework they complete to the required standard.

• It should ensure that the method of delivering theservice complies with the contract conditionsparticularly with regard to health and safety, equalopportunities, and the use of subcontractors.

• Disputes over standards, frequencies, and timing of workare inevitable and the monitoring system shouldcontribute to achieving a consistent level of service.

• It should help to identify the causes of any problems andthe need for changes in the specification once thecontract has started. The evaluation of monitoringshould be an important part of developing Service Plans.

• It can reduce opportunities for contractors to submit lossleader bids with the intent of recouping initial losses bycutting corners and reducing standards later in thecontract.

• It is a vital part of the financial control system and helpsto limit the use of variation orders, and hence costincreases, to those which are essential to service delivery.

• It is an important means of safeguarding the localauthority's own staff who may be working alongside orin the same building/area as the private contractor's staff.

• It is a mechanism to help safeguard users and the publicgenerally as well as the local authority's own staff whomay be working alongside or in the same building as thecontractor's staff.

• It enables the local authority to respond quickly andeffectively to DOE complaints regarding whether theDSO is performing to specification.

• Monitoring is essential to safeguard the interests of thelocal authority should legal action be taken by thecontractor over contractual disputes or by users for non-performance or injuries.

Finally, rigorous but fair monitoring systems, fullyresourced, will act as a disincentive to those privatecontractors unable or unwilling to meet specifications infull.

Why failures arise'Monitoring standards requires constant attention: the contractorsare not angels. '(Using Private Enterprise in Government, HM Treasury,HMSO 1986)

Contractors failures to meet the required standards and/orto complete all the specified work is usually the result ofone or more of the following:

• employing insufficient staff to complete all the tasks

• paying poor wages with inferior conditions of service,poor working conditions, and demands for highproductivity levels which lead to a high turnover of staffor employment of untrained staff.

• poor contract management and supervision.

• hire and fire management practices reducing the numberof experienced staff.

• the contractor's working methods proving inadequate forthe task in hand.

• the contractor having insufficient resources to respondto complaints and to liaise with the local authority'smonitoring staff making it more difficult to get workrectified and the causes of poor performance identified.

• cutting corners attempting to recover 'losses' due to lossleader bids and/or lower than expected profit margins.

• problems during contract start-up are usually due to newworking methods, untrained staff, or new staffunfamiliar with the locality.

• contractors in financial difficulties may seek towithdraw, demand higher payments, or' have thecontract terminated, all of which are likely to result inreduced standards.

Failures may also arise because of shortcomings on theclient side. These may include:

• a poorly written specification.

• poor tender evaluation.

• changes or cuts in standards in the specification whichare different to those operating before the contractstarted. These are sometimes imposed followingdecisions by councillors but are frequently a result ofdecisions solely by officers because they lack a detailedunderstanding of service delivery and/or under pressureto cut spending.

• a hostile client-contractor relationship.

• inadequate monitoring system and/or insufficientmonitoring staff.

• poor information and lack of communication betweenclient and contractor.

Company strategiesMonitoring systems and staffing levels should be devisedfrom experience, not on the basis of corporate marketingabout a firms commitment to 'quality' and itsimplementation of 'quality assurance'. Transnationalcompanies have a number of key characteristics. Firstly,there is often a large gap between corporate marketing and


the extent to which policies are implemented on particularcontracts. The glossy images of staff training, uniforms,high-tech equipment and so on are often far removed fromreality on some contracts.

Secondly, transnational companies are adept at adoptingoperational and managerial strategies to suit local markets.Experience has shown that it does not follow thatcompanies which adopt particular operating techniques andlabour relations policies such as union recognition in otherparts of Europe will use them on contracts in Britain.

Thirdly, transnational companies are more likely to obtainBS 5750 and meet European standards for particular partsof their operations on certain contracts or specific servicesand then claim their application for all contracts.

Company strategies may also change over the life of acontract, particularly those running four to five years.Economic conditions cannot be predicted and are unlikelyto remain constant. Firms may change their corporatepriorities in response to prevailing economic conditions.Recessionary conditions will inevitably increase pressure onthose contracts operating with low profit margins or alreadyloss-making. This may result in some contractors reducingtheir own monitoring, adopting a more aggressivemanagerial and operational attitude to the contract, and/orincreasing claims for variations in order to improve theirfinancial position.

Private contractors are quick to identify weak monitoringsystems. They will often:

• quickly identify the highly visible areas and locationsand concentrate effort in these areas at the expense of'backroom' areas.

• assess the strengths and weaknesses of monitoring,particularly its timing, so that they can amend schedulesto show their work in the most favourable light.

• claim that uncompleted work was caused by interferenceor non-co-operation from council employees or by tradeunion action. Misuse by users, the weather, and 'vandals'are often cited.

• claim that certain aspects of the work are not included inthe contract and not their responsibility

• engage in lengthy disputes over the interpretation ofstandards.

Larger contractors have wide experience of different typesof monitoring to draw on. Equally they can take greaterrisks in allocating resources to a given contract knowingthat if forced to increase these at a later date they can, atleast in theory, do so.

Contractors are not enthusiastic about comprehensive,rigorous monitoring of a contract. They will assess thelikelihood of monitoring policies written into contractdocuments being implemented in full once the contract isoperationaL Contractors will also assess the financialimplications of different levels of defaults and liquidateddamages. There are several examples where it has clearlybeen in the company's financial interest to bear a certainlevel of defaults because the liquidated damages incurredwere lower than the cost of employing sufficient staff tocomplete the work fully in the first place.

Some contractors will rely on local authority monitoring

staff as a substitute for their own inadequate managerial andsupervisory resources. Where this occurs the localauthority's monitoring operation is in effect subsidising thecontractor.

An example of this occurred in a London borough whichundertook considerable pre-contract work with a privatecontractor identifying sites and the requirements of thecontract. The firm's contract manager then left soon afterthe contract started and was not immediately replaced. Theclient reported that 'the contractor is operating on a crisismanagement basis, awaiting warnings of default before carryingout some work. The client is thereforeeffectively both supervisingthe contract for the authority and managing the contract for thecontractor.' The contractor responded to warnings in time toavoid defaults.

In these situations the authority should demand that thecontractor allocate additional supervisory resources to thecontract or contribute towards the council's costs, and/orensure monitoring is carried out as rigorously as possiblewithin the terms of the contract.


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Part 3

LESSONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Monitoring of services has traditionally been carried outas an integral part of the management and delivery ofservices. Supervisors, area managers, and other linemanagers combined monitoring of the completion andquality of work with other managerial duties. Client andcontractor were one and the same. Authorities also hadestablished channels for dealing with complaints fromusers. It is only with the advent of contracting that theneed for separate and distinct monitoring systems hasarisen.

Enforced tendering has imposed a new set ofresponsibilities on councillors and officers as well as newdemands on trade unions. It has forced furtherreorganisation of local authorities at a time when a period ofstability was a pressing requirement. Coming after a decadeof substantial policy changes and financial constraints onlocal government it is, understandable that many localauthorities concentrated almost solely on winning contractswhilst monitoring was pushed on to the back burner to bedealt with later. It is not surprising that contractmonitoring has been uneven and fragmented. Examples ofgood practice have to be contrasted with examples wheremonitoring clearly needs to be given a higher political andtechnical priority.

It has been difficult for DSO workers to get accustomed todual monitoring ie being supervised by their ownmanagement but also being monitored by the client. Thishas been difficult where monitoring has been inconsistent,for example, monitoring officers operating individuallyusing different standards, or where client/contractorreorganisation has afforded the opportunity to settle 'oldscores'.

The research carried out for this r~port concluded thatexperience in the first two years of CCT can be summarisedas follows:

Too little monitoringAlthough monitoring systems were drawn up for andincluded in the tender documents, many local authoritieswere not ready to start effective monitoring on the first dayof the contract. This includes contracts operated by bothprivate contractors and DSOs. Whilst the situation hasimproved since August 1989 there is evidence thatmonitoring remains a weak link in the CCT strategy.Monitoring staff have been reduced or the planned staffinglevel never achieved because of spending constraints inmany authorities - some have been 50% below the plannedlevel. One authority decided on cost grounds not to employa monitoring officer on a £350,000 four year groundsmaintenance contract awarded to Community LeisureManagement (now part of SERCO). Within weeks,. somecouncillors were encouraging residents to cut grass vergesnear their homes.

One client officer reported:'If there is a lesson to be learnt, it is that the private contractorsare

always ready to dispute matters which appear to be to theirdetriment, and officers responsiblefor monitoring need to be verymuch aware of contract terms and conditions and the reasoningbehind them. '

Inconsistent monitoringThere have been examples where local authorities havestarted off monitoring quite strictly only to relax after thefirst few weeks. At least one authority started offmonitoring a private refuse contractor fairly rigorously onlyto let up after eight weeks. There has also been inconsistentmonitoring of contracts within the same authority. Therehave also been examples where the local authority did notdetail the method of monitoring at the time of tenderingwhich has led to misunderstandings between client andcontractor at the start of the contract.

Over monitoringThis was not very widespread and where it has occurred ithas mainly been due to monitoring being used to settleother matters rather than a systematic application ofrigorous monitoring. It has sometimes been due to the fall-out resulting from job opportunities missed or gainedduring the client-contractor split. In other cases it is due topersonality conflicts and the absence of corporatemonitoring policies. Some contracts, particularly cateringand street cleansing, enable monitoring staff to interpretstandards in minute detaiL The temperature, weight,nutritional value, and presentation of meals is vitallytmportant but can be monitored with such rigour whichleaves the client little room to manoeuvre. Over monitoringcan also arise from political interests keen to put pressureon the DSO.

Placing too much responsibility formonitoring on the contractorSome local authorities, where DSOs have won most or all ofthe contracts, are shifting the responsibility for monitoringonto the DSO with the client merely checking work, ineffect, checking the DSO's monitoring system. The successof this depends heavily on the internal relationshipsbetween client and contractor and corporate policies. It isessential that the DSO or contractor has a clear system andresources to supervise and control the quality of their workirrespective of client side monitoring responsibilities.

Too much emphasis on complaintsWhilst monitoring the quality of services at the point ofdelivery is crucial there is some evidence that some localauthorities rely too heavily on monitoring the consumptionof services. Having a proper complaints procedure isessential and the level of complaints is one indicator of theperformance leveL But there are numerous reasons whysome people will not complain irrespective of the resourcesput into the complaints procedure. Complaints are rarelyindicative of the performance of other aspects of thespecification.

This can lead to the extremes of complacency or overzealous reaction depending on 'consumer' reaction. Only bymonitoring the production process as well user complaints


can the real causes of problems be identified andimprovements made in the organisation, management, anddelivery of servIces.

Lack of planning and management of monitoringMany local authorities clearly downgraded the importanceof monitoring after DSOs had won the bulk of contracts.With the threat of Poll Tax Capping and other financialcontrols many local authorities have sought to minimisecosts absorbed by monitoring. But monitoring cannot behurriedly organised immediately prior to or once a contractcommences. Monitoring staff must be trained and themonitoring system ideally tested before the contract starts.Very few local authorities had fully tested monitoringprocedures and techniques before the start of the contract.

Lack of training of monitoring staffMany local authorities did carry out some training ofmonitoring staff but this was usually limited to 'on the job'training. The lack of training contributed to many of thepoints raised in this report. It also reinforced the view thatmonitoring lacks a clear career structure and is too oftenseen as a 'dead end job'.

Lack of corporate monitoring policyVery few authorities could claim that they had developed acomprehensive strategy for monitoring which had actuallybeen implemented and which included training, adequatemonitoring teams, tested systems, agreed performancetargets, and evaluation and review of monitoring fed backinto service plans and future tendering.

Lack of integration of health and safetymonitoringLiaison between monitoring service provision and healthand safety monitoring has sometimes been uncoordinated.Preparation of comprehensive health and safety policies andtheir technical assessment during tender evaluation must befollowed up by systematic monitoring. There is evidencethat the importance attached to health and safety in thetendering process is not always matched once the contractis operationaL

Inadequate equal opportunities monitoringWe have few examples where monitoring of equalopportunities has been carried out. More often than not it isthe responsibility of Personnel and separated from clientmonitoring of service standards. Whilst the 1988 LocalGovernment Act severely restricts equal opportunitiesmonitoring of a contractor's staff there is still scope tomonitor equal opportunities in service delivery.

Disputes over standardsThese inevitably arose when there were changes in the leveland standard of service under the contract which differedfrom those which operated beforehand.

Varied reporting to committeesMany authorities have only recently compiled reportscovering the progress of contracts for council committees.The overall impression is that councillors were notsufficiently informed about the progress of contracts.

Client-contractor split:varying treatment of DSOsIn some cases DSOs have been virtually regarded as privatecontractors by the client, or in some cases by both clientand DSO management. This has led to conflicts overmonitoring, standards, and financial matters which areoften not in the interests of the local authority or serviceusers.

The need for method statementsDetailed quality and method statements have proved to bean essential and legitimate requirement of contractors.Circular 1/91 suggests that a prescription of existingpractices and procedures can be 'counter-productive' and thatit denies contractors the opportunity to put forward theirown ideas for improving services. It asks local authorities to'consider carefully how far it is necessary - or defensible - torequire contractors to provide information in minute detail abouttheir proposals for the operation of the service'. This suggeststhat only those requiring 'minute' detail may be consideredunreasonable. Detailed quality and method statements areneeded to fully and properly evaluate tenders and to assessthe required level of monitoring prior to the start of thecontract.

Inadequate financial monitoringThis is both a client and contractor responsibility. Somecouncils have been forced to retender contracts because oflosses incurred by DSOs. This is due primarily toinadequate tender pricing rather than any lack of financialmonitoring. However, some local authorities were initiallynot fully prepared to carry out the detailed financialmonitoring required by the contracting system.

District Auditors review contract supervisionDistrict Auditors have been examining local authoritiesmonitoring arrangements as part of a wider review ofmanaging CCT. An audit review of one authority in April1990 which had private contractors in groundsmaintenance, street cleansing, and office cleaning,concluded 'that the Council's arrangements had the followingweaknesses:

a) the contracted Bills of Quantities did not always reflect thelevel of service that had been provided previously, although thathad been the Council's intention.

b) inspectors were poorly trained for the work that was expectedof them, and failed to identify poor performance on at least onecontract.

c) procedures for certifying payments due on contracts were notproperly established and resulted in an inappropriate degree ofreliance being placed on a very junior officer.

d) the system for issuing default notices and deducting liquidated


Table 2:1 Contract Terminations and Defaults

Service Terminations Liquidated damagesNo of contracts No of contracts

DSO Private firms DSO Private firmsNo % No % No % No %

Building 3 1.4 6 4.3 17 7.9 18 12.8CleaningRefuse major 8 4.0 12 16.7Collection minor 16 7.9 5 6.9

Street major 15 8.7 3 5.2Cleansing minor 12 7.0 3 5.2

Vehicle 1 3.4 2 1.8Maintenance

Catering:Education

Other catering major 1 1.0 3 10.0minor 2 2.0 1 3.3

Grounds 1 0.2 4 3.5 major 16 3.7 5 4.4Maintenance minor 24 5.6 5 4.4

Total 4 0.3 11 2.8 113 8.5 55 12.4

Source: LAeSAB

Table 2:2 Contracts with Problems

Service Terminations Problems with standards of serviceDSO Private Firms DSO Private firms

No % No % No % No %

BuildingCleaning 5 3.3 10 10.3 31 20.6 29 29.9

Refuse Call. 7 2.6 1 1.3 23 8.7 30 40.5Street Cleansing 1 0.5 1 1.6 5 2.6 12 19.7Vehicle Maint - - 1 3.3 - - 2 6.7Catering 2 1.3 4 15.4 6 3.9 8 30.8Grounds Maint. - - 6 6.4 3 1.0 13 13.8Sports & Leisure - - 5 17.2 - - 4 13.8

Total 15 1.2 28 6.8 68 5.7 98 23.8

Source: Privatisation News No 13, Public Services Privatisation Unit.

damages from contract payments had not been properlyestablished.

Department of the Environment research findings'There is little evidence that authorities treat external contractorsdifferently from DSOs' stated the report Competition forLocal Government Services carried out by the Institute ofLocal Government Studies for the Department of theEnvironment. Default notices and financial deductions'have been commonly used by authorities following competition indealing with both DSOs and contractors'. It reported the very

Since April 1990 effective action has been taken to remedy theseweaknesses. Contracts have been re-negotiated, contractorperformance has greatly improved, and liquidated damages havebeen applied where performance is still less than satisfactory. '

\0 Service and Contract Monitoring

limited role of Members in monitoring contracts notingthat 'the formalisation of the contract management process is thatit has become an officer responsibility'.

The report also refers to changes in monitoringarrangements with wider involvement of users (see Part 6).It concluded that 'there was no variation in the pattern ofmonitoring in relation to political control or type of authority. Thedetermining factor was the nature of the service involved. '

Performance recordTables 2:1 and 2:2 indicate the relative performance ofDSOs and private contractors using information supplied tothe LACSAB and Public Services Privatisation Unitdatabases based on 1,772 and 1,609 recorded contractsrespectively.

The evidence from these two databases highlights twoimportant points:

1. that private contractors are between 5.7 and 9.3 timesmore likely to have a contract terminated than a DSO;

2. that contracts awarded to private contractors arebetween 1.5 and 4.2 times more likely to have problemsand/or incur liquidated damages than those let to a DSO.

lessons from the NHSA review of monitoring NHS domestic services and cateringcontracts identified several difficulties which are alsoapplicable to local government.

• the general absence of a clearly defined physical productwhich can be measured objectively and quantitatively.

• the reliance which has to be placed on qualitativemeasures and subjective judgment.

• the importance of time in the service and particularly ofthe time at which monitoring takes place.

• the participation of a number of different departments inthe provision of service with difficulty in defining who isresponsible for problems.

(Management and Monitoring of Contracts for Domestic,Catering and Laundry Services, Nuffield ProvincialHospitals Trust, 1987)

The National Audit Office report on competitive tenderingin the NHS found 'some weaknesses in monitoring and qualitycontrol arrangements'. Eleven out of 29 case studies werecriticised on monitoring and inspection. One of the healthauthorities which experienced difficulties with privatecontractors decided to include quality control requirementsas an essential part of the tender. But the NAO found that'this change is not popular with contractors and has led towithdrawals from tender exercises'.(National Audit Office, HC 318, HMSO, 1987)


Part 4

DIFFERENTIAL MONITORING

Differential monitoring, that is, the monitoring of privatecontractors in a different way to that of the Council'sown DSO, has been undertaken by a number ofauthorities. This is a sensitive area and councils willneed to justify why such arrangements are needed. Itshould be carried out where it can be justified andquantified based on technical evidence and professionalopinion. This section examines the need for differentialmonitoring in certain circumstances.

Differential monitoring or supervision is based on thetechnical assessment of contractors staffing, management,experience, and operational proposals set against the clientsplanned monitoring system. If the local authority believesthat a contractor(s) will require additional supervision andmonitoring over and above that already planned by theauthority then the additional cost of monitoring should bequantified and included in the financial assessment oftenders during tender evaluation. .

The assessment of the need for differential monitoring isgood public service practice. It clearly falls within the thefiduciary duty of a public body. Several local authoritieswhich contracted out services before the Local GovernmentAct 1988 found that they had to increase monitoring staffonce the contract had started. It is clearly good 'businesspractice' to asses the need for and the cost of monitoringbefore awarding the contract. It is therefore a valid and vitaltest for a local authority to undertake.

However, the application of differential supervision hassometimes been categorised as 'anti-competitive' by theGovernment. It has, wrongly, been viewed more as a meansof of contributing additional costs to contracting out thus'penalising' private contractors. This has encouraged theview that it is primarily a financial matter when in fact itequally concerns the quality of service delivery. It isfundamentally about client control to ensure delivery of thespecified service.

Information was obtained from fourteen local authoritieswhere differential monitoring has been used. To date, inonly one case has the Secretary of State issued a Section l3notice around differential monitoring.

Differential monitoring must be one of the criteria which isassessed in the evaluation of all tenders. It should be anintegral part of tender evaluation checklists. It would bewrong to assume that differential monitoring will benecessary in all services or for all tenders but it is clearlycommon sense that it is a factor which is considered in eachevaluation. A two stage process is recommended.

Firstly, local authorities should assess the NEED fordifferential monitoring for all tenders including the DSO.This may result in different monitoring requirements foreach tender depending on the relative strengths andweaknesses of each bid. It could therefore vary betweencontractors. Simply adding increased monitoring costs toall bids from private contractors would clearly be deemedunacceptable.

Secondly, the COST of differential monitoring should becalculated and a decision taken on whether this should beincluded in the financial assessment of tenders. In somecases it may involve only marginal additional costs but inothers, where a contractor's management and supervision ofa large contract is deemed deficient, the costs may besubstantial.

Justification for differential monitoringThe Government remains to be convinced that differentialmonitoring should be automatically applied.

'The Secretary of State sees no reason why the cost to theauthority of supervising work carried out by outside contractorsshould be any higher than for the supervision of work carried outby the DSo. He does not thereforebelieve that it is consistent withthe requirements of Section 7(7) for authorities to apply highersupervision costs when assessing bids received from outsidecontractors, unless these costs are based on specific quantifiedevidence.'(para 14, DOE Circular 1/91)

However, the CIPF A Code of Practice maintains thatcircumstances exist where differential monitoring shouldbe justified.

'We remain convinced that, if an authority believes that anytenderer would for any reason need more supervision than others,it would be imprudent not to provide for such supervision, andunbusinesslike not to take its cost into account. '(CIPF A Circular on revised Code of Practice, February1991)

In theory, differential monitoring is not only applicable toprivate contractors but also to DSOs. The performance ofsome DSOs since 1989 has reinforced the need to assess therequired level of client monitoring during tenderevaluation. In practice, private contractors incur defaultsand liquidated damages far more frequently and it istherefore reasonable to expect differential monitoring to beapplied more frequently to their bids than to DSOs.

At the tender evaluation stage some question marks may beraised which on their own are not sufficient to rule out atenderer but could be used for choosing to opt fordifferential monitoring:

1. If the tender evaluation team believes that a contractorhas too few operatives/vehicles to deliver the requiredstandard of service which will result in additional vigilanceby the client.

2. If a contractor submits a very low bid in comparison toother bids which is likely to result in 'abnormal pressure onthem to restrict the resources put into the work' (CIPFACode of Practice). A contractor putting in a very low bid isclearly more likely to cut corners, reduce standards, and/oremploy insufficient staff to fully complete all the tasks thusrequiring a higher level of monitoring.

3. If the contractor has a proven record of defaults on othersimilar contracts.

4. If there are doubts about the contractor's ability tomanage and supervise the contract adequately, isinexperienced, and/or its quality control system isconsidered weak. The CIPF A Code states additionalmonitoring may be necessary where 'tenderers make


different arrangements for quality assurance'.

One local authority concluded that a private contractor,which was already operating the first tranche of groundmaintenance, had under-estimated managerial andsupervisory staff in its tender for the second tranche. Thetender evaluation panel concluded that the contractor'sproposal for only one contract manager, without a deputy,and one supervisor for five mobile teams was insufficientfor the proper performance of the contract. In thesecircumstances the council would be compelled to provide asenior supervisor. This was costed, together with carallowance and on-costs, at £25,000 per annum. Althoughthe private contractor's tender remained the lowest thecontract was awarded to the DSO. This was an example ofthe local authority having to substitute for the contractor'slack of management resources.

There is evidence that some local authorities are veryreluctant to refer to differential monitoring as such but willplan and cost additional supervision where they believe thecontractor's management and supervision arrangements aredeemed inadequate.

5. If the contractor has little or no experience of the rangeof work and/or has not undertaken contracts of a similarsize.

6. Where contractors 'use methods for paying theirworkforce which make payment wholly dependent onclearance of the work by clerk of works' (CIPFA Code).

7. If a contractor's administrative system is poorlyresourced and cannot have access to local authoritycomputer networks because of Data Protection Actprovisions. For example, a local authority has to restrict aprivate contractor's access to computerised housing recordswhich could result in substantial additional administrativework in contrast to the DSO which would have directaccess. At least one local authority calculated the additionalworkload and included the cost of one administrativeworker plus on-costs in the financial analysis.

Another example of the need for differential monitoringconcerns security of buildings and equipment. At least twoauthorities have calculated the cost of additional securityfor a six month period for building cleaning contracts onthe grounds that the contractor's staff would be unfamiliarwith the locking up and security procedures.

The revised CIPF A Code of Practice refers to points 2, 4,and 6 above. It also suggests that differential monitoringmay be necessary where groups of small tenders arecompared with large tenders. Some of these points aresufficient grounds for not awarding a contract to aparticular firm but in the current political climate contractsare being awarded in these circumstances.

If a contractor has Quality Assurance certification this intheory should reduce the need for differential monitoring.However, it will be important to check precisely which partof a service has been certified. QA is being exploitedcommercially by some contractors making exaggeratedclaims. QA is no guarantee - it may not cover the type,scale, complexity of specification, in question nor thesubsidiary which has tendered.

Evidence of the need for differential monitoringOther studies have highlighted the need for additionalsupervision for private contractors.

The Audit Commission's Quality Exchange was set up toreport on quality standards and performance providingcomparative information and a 'contact' service forauthorities sharing information, and initially covered 198local authorities. Its first report shows clearly that localauthorities 'inspect more of the work carried out by privatecontractors compared to the inspection of work carried out byDSOs'. It also reported 'some local authorities canying out ahigh level of inspection at the start of the contract, but hope toreduce the level once the contract is running smoothly'. The levelof inspection in vehicle maintenance was 50% for privatecontractors compared to 20% for DSOs, in street cleansingit was 30% for private contractors compared to 10% forDSOs, and about 10% for both private contractors andDSOs in refuse collection.

The case for differential monitoring for the implementationof health and safety policies has been clearly stated:

'In the HSE view the situation is comparable to that of localauthorities where experience has shown that the management of afunction carried out by a third party is far more onerous even in amonopoly situation. In addition, standards of Health and Safetyhave been seen to be reduced.

The introduction of competition in the view of the HSE not onlyincreases the proliferation of equipment, but also poses even moreonerous duties for the management of the Junction, and can belikened to the situation on a building site where there is amultiplicity of contractors. Very complex guidance procedures arenecessary in such circumstances as is a very active policing role.Moreover, there is a clear deterioration in standards of Healthand Safety practices according to the HSE.'(Review of Corporate Handling Policy, Chief Executive,Manchester Airport, July 1990)

Five out of eight local authorities who privatised refusecollection prior to the 1988 Local Government Act foundthat 'contractors needed greater pressure and higher levels ofinspection'. (Securing Further Improvements in RefuseCollection, Audit Commission, HMSO, 1984)

'Authorities have found that, initially, they require an increasedsupervisoryforce to monitor the level of performance of the privatecontractor.'(Managing Competition, SOLACE/LGTB, 1988)

Under-estimating monitoring resources can prove costlyonce the contract is under way. Here is one such example:

'Experience ... shows that a high level of supervision on theCouncil's part is essential in order to inspect thoroughly and on adaily basis.' (Report to Establishment Committee,Wandsworth Borough Council, 1985, concerning the TownHall cleaning contract with Executive Cleaning Services).The Council had to employ a temporary contractsupervisor. The report goes on to state:

'The high level of defaults being recorded requires a greateradministrative input into the Council's management of thecontract than was originally foreseen: the same applies to therecording of default points, the issue of rectification notices, andthe monitoring of the contractor's workforce. At the moment, theseadditional duties are being performed on the basis of overtimearrangements. '


Examples of the application of differential monitoring aredetailed in Table 4: 1. The highest known differential is theWestminster refuse/street cleansing contract in which thecouncil applied a 40.4% higher staffing level (41.2% in

financial terms) to the MRS bid. We have not found anyexamples where the cost of differential monitoring wassignificantly high to effect the financial evaluation althoughit obviously contributed to technical evaluation.

Table 4:1 Examples of Differential Monitoring

Authority Service Date DSO Contractor % %£ No £ No £ No

FTE FTE

Westminster Refuse/street 1988 177,100 10.33 250,000 14.5 41.2 40.4(MRS) cleansing

Kirklees Vehicle Maint 1989 52,000 4.0(BRS)

York Street 1989 12,577 1.0(Cory) cleansing

N. Tyneside Refuse/street 1989 81,300(Town & Country) cleansing

Easington Refuse 1989 26,702

Hackney Grounds 1989 45,000 10.0Maintenance (over 3 months)

Camden Grounds 1991 25,000 1.0(Brophy) Maintenance

Oldham Building repair 1990 12,000 1.0

Nuneaton & GroundsBedworth maintenance

Knowsley Refuse 1989(Sitaclean)

Delyn DC Accepted principle based on assessment of contractors quality control system

Chesterfield Street CI 1989 Evaluated additional monitoring costs but not decided not to apply them

Rochdale Street CI 1989 Evaluated but not used.(Charlesplant)


Part 5

MONITORING &QUALITY CONTROL PLANS

A ten point Monitoring and Quality Control Plan shouldbe drawn up to cover the following:

1. The organisation and management of monitoring

2. Monitoring techniques, methods and frequencies

3. Staffing requirements together with transport andother resource needs fully costed.

4. Training of monitoring staff and testing of themonitoring system

5. The recording, analysis, reporting and publicity ofperformance and standards

6. A complaints procedure to receive, record and processcomplaints from other local authority client departments,users, trade unions, council workers and the publicgenerally.

7. Contract start-up proposals

8. Criteria for evaluating the contractors own qualitycontrol, management, and supervisory arrangements toensure that they are not simply going to rely on the localauthority to identify defaults.

9. An appeals system for contractors disputingmonitoring findings

10. Periodic evaluation of the monitoring system andprocedures

The elements of this plan are described in more detaiL

1. The organisation and managementof monitoringLocal authorities have set up various organisationalarrangements to deal with monitoring. Different optionsare available and each authority needs to assess theseoptions and adopt the one most appropriate for itsparticular circumstances.

Central or departmental monitoring units: Monitoring iscarried out by client departments in most local authorities.Each department has their own monitoring staff as part ofthe client side operation.

However, some have set up central monitoring units. OneLondon Borough established a Contract Management Unit(CMU) in the Personnel Department which 'provides acentralised objective contract management andadministrative service to client departments in theoperation of building cleaning and catering contracts' -this role is separate from policy decisions and liaison withusers.

The CMU has a number offunctions:

• checking that the Council receives the specified servicefrom the contractor.

• as the 'holder' of the contracts it records changes to

buildings and translates the effects of client policydecisions to the contractor.

• coordinates Quality Assurance plans includingmonitoring, variations, and contract review

• compiles a database to assist future bids, client policies,and ensure the Equal Opportunity Policy on servicedelivery is being met.

There are clearly advantages and disadvantages to bothsystems. Many authorities will envisage departmentalmonitoring being more directly linked to client policies andfeedback into the development of the specification andcontract conditions, believing this can be diluted throughcentral units. There is clearly a case for each department tohaving the knowledge, expertise and resources to fullymonitor its own contracts. Others welcome the advantagesof a more corporate approach to monitoring and thedevelopment of service delivery.

Team approach: Building cleaning and groundmaintenance contracts are usually divided into geographicareas. In some cases local authorities allocate monitoringstaff on a similar basis. Each monitoring officer is allocatedone or two contract areas. However, one authority whichhad four separate building cleaning contracts stronglyadvised against a 'patch' system. In this authority themonitoring officers worked as a team covering all fourcontracts. A different officer would follow up defaultsidentified during an inspection. Operating as a team led togreater consistency in the application of standards.

Community Inspectors: Harlow DC has been carrying outa pilot scheme of four Community Inspectors monitoringthe refuse collection and. grounds maintenance contracts.They report findings directly to client officers. Eachinspector was allocated to a neighbourhood in which theywere responsible for monitoring both services.

They also act as a 'eyes and ears' resource identifyingabandoned vehicles, broken paving, damaged or missingstreet and road signs, and dumped rubbish reporting theseto the Neighbourhood/Area manager.

Community Inspectors were expected to build up arelationship with the public in their 'patch' in order toimprove the flow of information from and to the Counciland to 'lessen the detrimental effects of what had become acomplaints led service'. The initial phase was judged to be asuccess with regard to the two contracted services butliaison with other departments over the widerenvironmental role was more problematic.

Environmental Inspectors in Tameside operate on a similarbasis being responsible for monitoring highway, groundsmaintenance, and cleansing contracts on a patch basis andliaise with community organisations. They can alsoauthorise local one-off clean-ups and urgent highwayrepairs.

Site visits: Formal site inspections normally take place on amonthly or three monthly basis depending on the size ofthe contract. For example, every educational establishmentonce a term although those encountering problems arelikely to have additional follow-up visits. Site inspectionsshould be randomly selected and the contractor invited toaccompany monitoring officers. It is essential that theselection of sites to be visited is kept confidential so that the


contractor cannot amend staffing levels and so on in theknowledge that some sites will be inspected and others not.

Regular client-contractor meetings: Formal meetings areessential on a weekly, fortnightly or monthly basisdepending on the size and complexity of the service. Theynormally deal with contractual matters arising such asdefaults, variations, complaints, payments and otherproblems and should be minuted. The frequency ofmeetings may decline after the first 6-12 months of thecontract assuming the contract is running reasonablysmoothly. There are also likely to be more informalmeetings between monitoring officers and the contractor (0

deal with everyday matters.

Caretakers and other staff involved in monitoring: Therole of caretakers and other staff in monitoring varieswidely between authorities. In some cases caretakers have aresponsibility to assist in the monitoring of the contract attheir particular school as well as carrying out some cleaningduties themselves. This normally involves carrying out spotchecks, identifying defaults, checking complaints fromteaching staff, and ensuring these are logged in themonitoring book and referred to monitoring officers. Thissystem can work well particularly where the caretaker andHead have a good working relationship.

However, this system can begin to breakdown where localauthorities have imposed major cuts in cleaning hours, amore frequent occurrence. One local authority reported thatdefaults were not appearing on school monitoring sheetsbecause caretakers believed that the one third cut in hoursmeant that cleaners did not have sufficient time to do thejob properly. They were reported to have 'an in-builtresentment to the system'. The caretakers were also mindfulof the need to work as a team with the cleaners irrespectiveof whether they worked for a private contractor or the DSO(this particular contract was shared). In this situation theauthority had to place greater reliance on its monitoringofficers and subsequently had a higher monitoringstaffing/cost ratio than many other authorities.

2. Monitoring techniquesThe monitoring system must cover the following:

• what should be monitored, including the quality ofservice and method of delivery.

• the frequency of monitoring.

• how it is monitored.

• action to be taken on uncompleted and/or poor qualitywork.

• liquidated damages, warnings and contract termination.

What should be monitored• completion of specified tasks at the specified times andfrequencies.

• standard/quality of work achieved on the workcompleted.

• health and safety practices.

• working methods, for example, hygiene in cateringcontracts.

• staffing and equal opportunities in service delivery.

• standard of materials and supplies.

• social relations between staff and users.

• other conditions of the contract.

• financial monitoring.

Frequency of monitoringThis will vary from service to service and will include:

• daily, weekly or monthly inspections depending on theserVIce.

• random sample inspection on a weekly or monthly basis(this can only be effective if the contractor, who willoften accompany monitoring officers, has no priorknowledge of the sites to be visited).

• inspections in response to complaints from users

• specialist monitoring by health and safety officers orEnvironmental Health Officers.

• periodic reviews of overall performance

On larger contracts the normal procedure is for 10% of thecontract locations to be monitored every four weeks - thusmonitoring the whole contract once a year.

DefaultsIncomplete and/or poor quality work should be tackled in anumber of ways:

• the contractor should be required to complete the workor undertake it again at his/her own expense within aspecified time limit.

• payment delayed for uncompleted work.

• financial deductions from monthly payments.

• issue of warning notice if level of default noticescontinues to be high.

• termination of the contract.

• all or particular aspects of the contract is carried out bythe local authority or another contractor at the originalcontractor's expense.

The procedure for defaults is normally as follows:

1. A Rectification Notice is issued by the monitoringofficer as a result of their regular inspections or aninspection following a complaint from a user. This can onlycover work which can actually be rectified or has not beencarried out. The contractor is given a time limit of betweennormally 12-48 hours in which to rectify the work at theirown expense although this will obviously vary according tothe type of service.

2. Failure to rectify the work within the stated period andto the required standard will result in a Default Noticebeing issued stating the intention to deduct a sum from themonthly contract payment. If the work is substantial, theauthority could arrange for the work in question to becarried out by another contractor.

3. Defaults which cannot be rectified accumulate penaltypoints which also relate to financial deductions.


The DOE study reported: 'Deductions are normally made frompayments according to the number of notices issued. Someauthorities operated a grading system for work done, with say, anassessment of 90 percent satisfactory performance. Deduction frompayment would be made for performance below that level. Thenature of failure to perform was normally left open, though somedid detail typical failings, such as, for refuse collection, failure toreplace receptacle lids orfailure to clear spillages.

The difficulty of default notice system is ensuring that the amountof money deducted per notice can be clearly related to the "size" ofthe default. '(Competition for Local Government Services. ResearchReport to the DOE by Kieron Walsh, Institute of LocalGovernment Studies, Feb. 1991.)

Similar evidence has been highlighted by the trade unions.

'The deductions imposed on contractors must be geared to bothimmediately rectifying poor quality or uncompleted work and asan incentive to take steps to ensure failures do not recur. Thefinancial deductions have to be greater than the gains made by thecontractor in not paying sufficient staff to do the job properly inthefirst place. '(Taken to the Cleaners: The Lincolnshire Experience,Centre for Public Services, NUPE/NALGO, 1988)

'Many contractors complete an overall bid on the assumption thatcertain aspects of the work will be too cost-effective to deliver - itis cheaper to lose through "penalty" than tofulfil the standards.'(Cleaning Up in Ealing, Private Profiles No 2, LGIU, 1987)

One authority had awarded three out of four buildingcleaning contracts to a large private contractor. Thecontractor was receiving 99% of the monthly contractpayments yet the cleaning performance was only judged tobe about 90%. Financial deductions were based on thecontractor's prices in the bills of quantities which reflectedthe firm's costings but did not reflect the 'cost' to theauthority of work not being carried out. Under this systemthe lower the tender bid (or the more extensive the lossleader) the smaller the liquidated damages for non-performance.

Financial deductions should not only reflect the non-completion of the work but how it affects the usersenjoyment of the facilities.

One local authority developed a performance points systemfor a catering contract weighting the different elements. Forexample, health and safety performance was allocated 15%in contrast to 40% for service performance:

1. Financial controls2. Health and safety practices3. Hygiene/Catering practices4. General contract compliance5. Healthy eating, menu planning, foodspecification6. Staff and personne7. Service

% weighting1015155

51040

100

Another authority divides the monthly payments for itsbuilding cleaning contract:

• 80% payable for performing the cleaning serVIcesatisfactorily.

• 20% payable for achieving the related personnel andresource elements including meeting J.D. cards anduniform standards, health and safety requirements,material and equipment usage, supervisor attendance,employee induction training programme, meetingattendance by the contractor, and the contractors qualitycontrol adherence. The same authority applied a similarsystem for its catering contract.

Monitoring systems for sports and leisure management canvary between the defaults monitoring system and thepercentage performance system - for details see the ADLOpublication Sports and Leisure Management: EnsuringContractor Performance.

The current situation with regard to financial deductionsin relation to defaults has yet to be clarified. Some advicestates that local authorities must restrict financialdeductions strictly to the estimated financial cost of thedefault to the authority. Other advice states that a muchwider interpretation is legally justified with financialdeductions relating to all the elements which contribute tothe quality of service.

Different systems operate and there has to date been nolegal challenge from a contractor claiming that amonitoring system is unlawfuL

In the past the Courts have upheld a system of graduatedsums which increase in proportion to the seriousness of thebreach, for example delays in completion of buildingcontracts. A default payment which is tied to theseriousness of the breach and is payable on each occasion isclassified as liquidated damages and not penalties.However, a very punitive system of liquidated damages maybe judged by the Courts to be unreasonable and therefore apenalty system. The key is to ensure that liquidateddamages reflect a genuine pre-estimate of the loss to thelocal authority and the full procedures for issuing defaultand warning notices are adhered to.

Advice from the DOE and CIPFA is as follows:

DOE Circular 1/91 (para 37) states:

'Any default clauses or default points system introduced byauthorities should apply equally to contractors and the DSO andshould be related to a genuine pre-estimate of the additional coststhat will be incurred by the authority. It is unlawful to applydefault clauses or default points as if they were fines. '

The CIPF A Code of Practice states:

'Authorities should in addition ensure that they can show that theamounts of liquidated damages which contracts provide for non-performance, and deductions for partial performance, representrealisticpre-tender estimates of their likely costs and losses.'

Costs to the authority also include the administrative costof issuing a default notice as an additional administrativecost which would not otherwise have been borne. Evidencefrom local authorities shows that additional administrativecosts of default notices vary between £11.80 and £40.00 pernotice.

The quality of domestic refuse collection can be assessed byapplying the following defaults observed from'a percentagesample of premises visited as soon as practicable aftercollection


Aspect of ServiceMonitored

Collection not madeaccording to programme

Part collection onlyBins not replacedSpillage on streetSpillage on propertyExcess not collectedLids/closures replaced/closedGates left open

percentagedefault point

1.0

0.50.10.50.50.50.10.1

A maximum of 1.00 per property inspected. These are thenexpressed as a percentage of the properties inspected andapplied to the total contract.

Warning notices and contract terminationThese are issued when a certain level of defaults are reachedwhich enpowers the authority to terminate the contract. Itis essential that the contractor is made aware that theperformance level is either at or approaching the level atwhich contract termination could be considered and isgiven a clear statement of the local authority's intentions.These steps provide vital evidence should the contractorlater claim 'unfair or unreasonable' termination of thecontract.

Performance bonusesAt least one local authority has devised a PerformanceBonus on its Building Cleaning contract operated by theDSO. The bonus is paid if the contractor achieves a 95% ormore performance level for three consecutive paymentperiods. The bonus is 4% of the value of the routine andperiodic work done during those periods. The bonus is notpaid if any second or third stage rectification notices havebeen issued during any of the three payment periods. Nofurther bonus is payable until the contractor has achieved a95% or more performance level for a further threeconsecutive periods commencing at the end of the lastpayment period for which the last bonus was paid, ie, amaximum of 4 bonus payments annually if the contractorachieved a 95% performance level throughout a 12 monthperiod.

3. Staffing requirements and costingsIt is essential that monitoring systems and resources arematched. Detailed rigorous monitoring systems on paperare virtually useless in practice if they are badly resourced.Private contractors are adept at assessing the strengths andweaknesses of monitoring systems. It is more effective tohave a less comprehensive monitoring system withadequate staff than one which can only be implementedfragmentally and/or irregularly.

Staffing levels for contract monitoring vary widelydepending on the type of service and annual value of thecontract. Councils have found problems accepting ratios fortwo reasons. Firstly, there is at present insufficientinformation on which to develop meaningful ratios.Secondly, the ratios reflect proposed staffing levels and donot indicate whether such staffing levels are in factadequate.

Table 5:1 identifies monitoring staffing levels in severallocal authorities. It includes information from tenderevaluation reports and an Audit Commission study ongrounds maintenance. The Audit Commission's statementthat 'no more than one full time equivalent inspectorshould be needed for each £0.5m of annual contract value'(based on only five examples) should be treated warily.These are crude ratios. There is no evidence to suggest thatthe monitoring of these contracts is 'successful'. Much willdepend on the quality of service defined in thespecification: the range of services undertaken, and thegeographic distribution of parks and open spaces.

The table also excludes the role of caretakers and other staffwho carry out some monitoring duties in addition to theirmain duties.

Providing a career structure for monitoring staff is crucialto avoid it being categorised as somewhat of a 'dead-end'job. This can be achieved in two ways. Firstly, by placingmonitoring jobs within an overall management structurewhich permits promotion to other jobs in the clientstructure. Secondly, by developing monitoring jobdescriptions which include other duties such as promotionand marketing thus enhancing its attraction and status.

4. Training monitoring staffIt is essential that monitoring staff are trained in inspectiontechniques and procedures. In some authorities, monitoringofficers had previously worked as, or alongside, DSOpersonneL In the future councils may wish to ensure thatthe new monitoring officers are seconded into the DSO aspart of their training to familiarise themselves with servicedelivery issues. The need for monitoring officers to work asa team, along with other client officers, is criticaL Whilstmany local authorities reported that they carried out verylittle training of monitoring staff, citing 'hands-onexperience' and 'a learning curve' many stated theirintention of being better prepared for future contracts.Much can be gained from pre-contract training ofmonitoring staff. Whilst involving some client costs theadvantages are clearly substantiaL Training should coverthe following:

• basic understanding of the contract.

• the management and organisation of monitoringincluding the objectives, procedures, and reporting to befollowed.

• technical inspections: for example samples fornutritional testing, temperature testing, vehiclemaintenance assessment and so on.

• visual inspections: for street cleaning and cleaning ofbuildings which rely heavily on visual judgments andmay involve the use of photographs.

• health and safety inspection. Whilst the local authority'SSafety Officer is usually responsible for health and safetyinspections, it is also useful for monitoring staff to bewell versed in the broad safety requirements of thecontract.

• negotiating and communications skills and relationshipswith the contractor's staff: this should cover dealingwith conflictual situations, avoiding compromising or


Table 5:1 Monitoring Staffing levels

Authority AnnualValue Noof ins £m/ins Annualcost Cost of monitoringof contract FTE of monitoring as % of contract

Grounds MaintenanceHillingdon £4.0m 6.0 0.7mTowerHamlets £1.0-£1Am 1.5-2.0 0.6m-0.7mBath £1.2m 2.0 0.6mShepway £0.7m 1.2 0.6mRochford £0.7m 1.2 0.6mWestminster (1990) £1A5m 4.0 0.36 £81,780 5.64%A £0.7m 0.73 1.0B fOAm 0.55 0.7Refuse Collection & Street CleansingWestminster £12.1m 14.5 0.84 £250,000 2.0%A £0.8m 1.0 0.8B £0.6m 1.0 0.6C £0.8m 0.6 1.3Building CleaningSandwell (schools)(1991) £2.7m 204 1.12 £37,588 104%

Westminster £0.6m 2.0 0.30 £20,000 3.3%Lincolnshire(1988) £1.5m 5.0 0.30Rotherham £1.0m 5.5 0.18Birmingham £2.3m 9.0 0.25(exc education &housing)

School MealsSandwell1989 £3.8m 1.8 2.1 £31,363 0.85%Other cateringWestminster (1988) £0.66m 2.0 0.33 £20,000 3.0%Birmingham £0.65m 1.0 0.65(welfare)Public ToiletsWestminster £0.22m 1.0 0.22Social Services TransportWestminster £0.83m 3.0 0.27 £50,000 6.0%

Sources: Preparing for Compulsory Competition, Audit Commission, Occasional Paper No 7, 1989: Tender Evaluation reports from local authorities.

potentially corrupt practices, and ensuring that monitoringstaff deal with matters in a fair and reasonable manner.

The testing of monitoring systems prior to the start of thecontract should be negotiated with the trade unions. Thecontract start-up period can be used to refine the system.

If a contract is won by a private contractor, monitoring staffshould be made aware of the prevailing practices in theparticular sector.

Where a Management Buy-Out (MBOs) succeeds inwinning a contract, monitoring staff should be briefed onways of avoiding cosy relationships from developing.

Training should also be extended to caretakers and other

staff who have a monitoring role in addition to their mainduties. This should include at the very minimum, a briefingsession outlining their responsibilities and role inmonitoring, the techniques to be used, and so on, togetherwith clearly written advice. Some may have writingdifficulties and will need additional support.

5. Recording, analysing, and reporting systemSystematic recording of monitoring information is essentialin order to monitor standards and assess contractperformance over the length of the contract. Monitoringsheets and reports should be collated at one point for eachservice. The design of monitoring sheets and questionnaires


varies according to service and the monitoring system. Thedesign of any reporting system should include trial runsbefore the contract starts followed by an evaluation after afew months to make any necessary amendments tomonitoring sheets.

Graphs and charts should be prepared to report the level ofdefault notices/points. These should also indicate the levelat which the contract is considered to be operatingsatisfactorily and the level at which written warnings wouldbe issued and termination of the contract considered. Easyto read reports are an essential aid to assisting councillors,school governors, and others quickly assess the level of andchanges in performance. Detailed tables should be avoided.

Use of computersMany authorities are using computer based monitoringsystems - some developed in-house and others usingpurchased packages. Areas for inspection are usuallygenerated randomly on a regular basis to ensure at least 10%of the contract is monitored monthly. Whilst offering manyadvantages a number of authorities have reported problemswith use of computers in monitoring, in particular theability of the contractor to assess or dispute monthlyperformance levels and issuing default notices for trivialsums. Clearly the use of computers should be part of thelocal authority's Information Technology strategy. Furtherevaluation of the use of computers in monitoring is needed.

6. Complaints procedureEach service should have a system for receiving, logging,and forwarding complaints from:

• users of the service.

• user organisations which could range from tenantsassociations to local firms.

• governing bodies.

• ethnic and community groups.

• other council departments.

• council staff working alongside con tractors.

• trade unions.

Each site should have a complaints or monitoring recordbook in which all complaints at the site should be logged.This should include the nature of the complaint, date,name, address, and note of the action taken. These shouldbe available for inspection by monitoring officers.

All complaints should be received by the client. Thecontract conditions should include a clause which requiresthe contractor to pass a record of all complaints they receivedirectly to the client.

Broad categories of complaints should be developed foreach service and complaints from different sources, forexample, telephone calls and postcards, and from differentlocations, for example, town hall, neighbourhood offices,can be recorded centrally to indicate one aspect of overallperformance.

7. Contract start-upBetween 4-6 weeks is usually allowed for the 'settling-inperiod' to permit the contractor to sort out initial teethingproblems, become fully acquainted with buildings androunds, and to allocate staff accordingly. However, thelength of of the start-up period should vary according to thesize and complexity of the contract. Default notices areusually issued in this period but the financial deductionsare not implemented.

This is a crucial period for the local authority. It is vital thatthe local authority monitors the contract from day one, ineffect setting standards and procedures. The contractorshould be informed of defaults and liquidated damageswhich would be incurred under normal circumstances oncethe start-up period has ended.

The contract conditions should clearly state that the start-up period is not negotiable. There are examples of at leasttwo private contractors who have sought extensions to start-up periods even before they have begun the contract. Corydemanded a ten week start-up period on the Bromley refusecontract - the council eventually agreed a two weekextension to the original four week period. BFI Wastecarestarted the Kensington & Chelsea refuse and streetcleansing contract in April 1989 with a six week start-upperiod. By June the Council admitted 'serious problems'and extended the start-up period indefinitely. It continueduntil November 1989.

The settling-in period is likely to result in an increasedlevel of user complaints particularly if new rounds or rotasare introduced. The start-up arrangements shouldanticipate a certain level of complaints and set upprocedures for dealing with them.

The lead-up to the start of the contract is equally important.Disputes have arisen because contractors believed thatuncompleted work had been allowed to accumulate prior tothe start of the contract. This occurred in some groundsmaintenance contracts and led to immediate disputes anddemands for additional payments. One alternative is to askall tenderers to price for a certain level of additional work atthe start of the contract which can be drawn upondepending on the monitoring officers assessment ofconditions at the particular time. It is more likely to occurin the period between the time a decision is taken to awarda contract to a private firm and the start of the contract,particularly when large job losses are involved and/or thecontractor is offering much reduced terms and conditions.

Councils should ensure that the need to carry out a propersurvey of the work to be carried out is part of, and explicitin, the contract specification. Evidence has shown thatcontractors who fail to do this have difficulties in meetingthe terms of the contract in the start-up period. The firststage of tender evaluation should include assessment of thecontractor's knowledge and understanding of the scale andscope of the contract and that this is reflected in their price.

8. Evaluating a contractor'squality control systemThis must be carried out during the evaluation of tenders.It is vital in determining the contractors ability to deliverthe required service and the need for and cost of differentialmonitoring. Failure to fully assess a contractor's


2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Chart 5:1 Recording User Complaints by Area and Comparison with Standards

300

350 T---------;-----------------------------------------------------------.

250

200

150

100

o---------------------------------------------------------------------

Week Number

50

management and supervision arrangements and experiencecould lead to service failures and monitoring problems.Contractors must be capable and willing to implement theirown supervision and monitoring of the work. Theincreasing commercial use of QA claims by contractors andattempts to cross-subsidise management resources fromother areas make this assessment increasingly important.

The assessment should include:

• the proposed management of the contract- the management structure- number of managers and their responsibilities(including duties on other contracts)

- training and experience of similar work- location of staff.

• the supervision of the contract- number, hours, and qualification of supervisors.

• contractors quality control proposals and how they willbe implemented.

• details of support staff ie clerical/administrative staff.

• training arrangements.

• comparison of total management and supervisory costsincluding local/head office breakdown.

This should enable the tender evaluation team to reach adecision on the relative merits of tenders and the adequacyor not of management, supervisory, support and trainingarrangements. Tenders have been rejected on technicalgrounds for failing to propose satisfactory arrangementsafter having been given the opportunity to respond atinterview.

9. An appeals procedureProcedures should be established to enable disputesbetween monitoring staff and the contractor to be resolvedthrough an appeal to a senior officer. The procedure shouldbe set out in the contract conditions. It should be viewed as

a means of last resort. Regular weekly or monthly meetingsbetween monitoring staff and the contractor should be ableto iron out the vast majority of difficulties and disputes.

There are two aspects to settling disputes. The firstconcerns disagreements and matters which have not beenresolved between monitoring staff and the contractmanagers. These should be resolved between the seniormonitoring officer/client manager. This should preventissues being shifted from one level of management toanother. One authority which had contracted out most of itsbuilding cleaning to a large private contractor reported thatthe firm were not happy with decisions resting with theCleaning Services Manager. They wished to progressunresolved matters to a 'higher level' but this was firmlyresisted.

The second concerns the use of arbitration. This shouldonly be viewed as a option if all other means of settlingdisputes have been exhausted. Many authorities did nothave arbitration written into their contracts in the beliefthat this could be exploited by some private contractors.Others were concerned that it set up an adversarial situationand the image of two sided rather than one local authority.One authority was setting up an internal arbitrationprocedure to provide its DSO with some recourse should amajor dispute arise with the client.

10. Evaluation of monitoringThe monitoring system for each contract should besubjected to a thorough review and evaluation after 6 and 12months and subsequently on an annual basis. These reviewsshould also contrast and compare the experience ofmonitoring different types of services and to assist thedevelopment of a corporate monitoring policy.

These reviews will be important in order to:

• identify the need for new monitoring techniques.

• maximise the use of resources consistent with corporatetendering and monitoring policies.

Service and Contract Monitoring21

• ensure lessons learnt are fed back into the preparation oftenders for other services.

• provide feedback to assist the development of serviceplans.

• provide adequate and accurate information for referencesrequested by other local authorities seeking referenceson particular contractors.


Part 6

USER AND TRADE UNIONMONITORING

Trade unions and user organisations such as ParentTeacher Associations (PTAs) and Tenants Associationshave played a key role in exposing poor quality servicesand inadequate monitoring systems. It should beemphasised from the start that their involvement is notto strengthen 'complaints-led' monitoring but to beinvolved much more substantially in the development ofspecifications, service planning, generating ideas toimprove and expand services, and monitoring the qualityof service delivery. It is vital that local authoritiesrecognise the valuable contribution that trade union anduser organisations can make in addition to individualusers. Unfortunately, most 'customer care' schemesfocus on users as individuals, rather than collectivegroups.

User involvement in monitoringThe DOE research report on CCT Competition for LocalGovernment Services found an increasing use of userpanels, user surveys and user consultative committees.These are shown in Table 6: 1 below.

Parent Teacher Associations in various local authoritieshave carried out surveys and monitored school cleaning andschool meals. For example, PT As in one County Councilwere instrumental in forcing the Council to terminateschool cleaning contracts in 1985 with three contractorsbecause of consistent failure to clean the schools properly.

Trade unions can also playa vital role in investigating theperformance of contracts held by companies seekingcontracts in their own authority. For example, the TGWUand GMB senior shop stewards in one authority visitedthree contracts held by one firm. They talked to monitoringofficers, visited depots, observed the operation of thecontract, and compiled a report setting their findingsagainst quotes from the contractors quality control manuaLThe report was widely circulated and helped to expose thefirm's inadequately resourced bid.

Trade union surveysThere have been several examples of PT As, teaching unionssuch as the NUT, and local authority unions such asNALGO and NUPE carrying out separate and joint surveysof contracted out services. The East Midlands divisions ofNALGO and NUPE funded a detailed investigation of theISS school cleaning contract in Lincolnshire followingseparate surveys by the NUT and NUPE which revealedwidespread concern of cleaning standards (Taken to theCleaners: The Lincolnshire Experience, Centre for PublicServices, NALGO/NUPE, 1988).

Newcastle Tenants Federation and the Newcastle CityCouncil Joint Trade Unions carried out a survey of 25tenants associations and held discussions between tenantsand shop stewards in 1990 to recommend improvements tostreet cleansing (Clean Sweep, Newcastle TenantsFederationrrrade Union Anti-Privatisation WorkingGroup, 1990). The report also proposed regular contactbetween tenants groups and monitoring officers with formalcontact on a quarterly basis between councillors, tradeunions, the tenants federation, and CityWorks (the DSO)operational manager to discuss strategies and policy issuesrelating to the service. Whilst these proposals have yet to befully implemented, three pilot schemes are underway inwhich volunteers from community organisations monitorstreet cleansing, refuse and grounds maintenancefrequencies, overall quality, and priorities. Detailedmonitoring is still carried out by monitoring officers.

Sheffield Joint Works Group, composed of tenants andtrade union delegates, meets monthly with councillors andofficers to discuss housing repairs, improvement issues, andother matters concerning service delivery. Monitoring ofcontractors is a constant topic. A monitoring policy reportwas produced which informed tenants what to watch out fortogether with phone numbers to report defects, health andsafety risks, and so on.

Trade unions in a Scottish Regional Council have carriedout surveys of standards of school cleaning in 1990. Aprivate company won two cleaning contracts from theCouncil in 1989 after undercutting the DSO by over £1m ineach case. It did not bid for the other 10 contracts whichwere won by the in-house service. At the time the companyhad not bid for nor won any other local authority cleaningcontracts. The firm cut wages and from £2.60 to £2.25 andeliminated holiday and sick pay.

Table 6:1 Increased User Involvement in Monitoring

Method Number of authorities using methodBefore CCT post CCT No reply

User Panels 4 10 2

Public Surveys 7 12 2

User Consultative Committees 9 12 2

User complaints 29 30 2

Public complaints 28 30 2

Source: Competition for Local Government Services, Research Report by Kieran Walsh, INLOGOV for Department of the Environment, February 1991.


The region's Joint Trade Union Council decided to carryout their own monitoring of the contract after many schoolsreported problems. They carried out two surveys of Headsof Establishments in 1990. A copy ofthe survey is includedas Appendix 1. Both surveys reported poor standards. Forexample, the first survey revealed that two thirds ofrespondents reported a deterioration of cleaning standards,55% reported an increase in complaints about cleanlinessand hygiene, 75% reported a reduction in the number ofareas cleaned, and 69% stated that cleaning materials hadreduced in quantity and quality. These surveys providedfurther evidence to support their original case against theaward of the contract. Media coverage can also lead toimproved monitoring.

Trade union monitoring is also vitally important whereDSOs have won contracts with very low bids or where thespecification has been dramatically reduced. One authoritywas forced to return to 52 week cleaning after reducing thespecification requirements for holiday cleaning leading tostaff being employed for only 38 weeks. This led torecruitment problems, inadequately cleaned buildings,defaults and so on. The authority finally agreed to a £2mbudget increase to meet changes to the specification.


2. Since privatisation, have complaints from users or staffabout standards of cleanliness/hygiene:

(1) Decreased(2) Remained the same(3) Slightly increased(4) Significantly increased Please return this completed questionnaire to:

APPENDIX 1

Strathclyde Joint Trade Union CouncilQuestionnaireCleaning Standards in all EstablishmentsIn answering the following list of questions, will you pleaseenter into the appropriate box the number from the choiceof answers to each question that most closely reflects yourviews on the question asked.

1. Since privatisation, do you consider cleaning standardsto have:

(1) Improved(2) Remained the same(3) Slightly deteriorated(4) Significantly deteriorated

3. Since privatisation, have the cleaning hours in yourestablishment:

(1) Increased(2) Remained the same(3) Slightly decreased(4) Significantly decreased

4. Since privatisation, has the supply of cleaning materials(ie detergents, soaps, disinfectants etc)

(1) Improved(2) Remained the same(3) Slightly deteriorated(4) Significantly deteriorated

5. Since privatisation, has the supply of necessaryequipment to the cleaner (ie machines, mops, buckets,cloths etc)

(1) Increased(2) Remained the same(3) Slightly decreased(4) Significantly decreased

Please tick the appropriate box in answering the nextquestion.

6. Are the standards of cleanliness and hygiene beingmonitored?

YES DNO D

The following questions ask for your written comments.

7. Have you any specific complaint(s) which you wish todraw to our attention?

8. Are there any other comments that you would wish tomake concerning the privatised cleaning service which youare now experiencing?

25Service and Contract Monitoring

APPENDIX 2

Local authorities and trade unions who suppliedinformation and/or agreed to interviews with clients andcontractors:

BarnetBradfordBuryCamdenDarlingtonEdinburghGreenwichHarlowHounslowManchesterNorwichNuneaton and BedworthRedditchRotherhamSandwellSheffieldStoke on TrentStrathc1yde RCSwanseaTamesideWalsallWolverhamptonYork

NUPE (Wales Division)Public Services Privatisation Research UnitTGWU (Luton)


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Using Private Enterprise in Government, H.M. Treasury,HMSO 1986

Competition for Local Government Services, Research report tothe Department of Environment by Kieron Walsh, Instituteof Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham,February 1991.

Privatisation News No. 13, Public Services Privatisation Unit

Management and Monitoring of Contracts for Domestic, Cateringand Laundry Services, Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust,1987

Competitive Tendering for Support Services in the NHS,National Audit Office HC318, HMSO 1987

I' Competition in the Provision of Local Authority Services, DOECircular 1/91

Code of Practice for Compulsory Competition, CIPF A Circular,February 1991

Securing Further Improvements in Refuse Collection, AuditCommission, HMSO 1984

Managing Competition, SOLACE/LGTB 1988

Taken to the Cleaners: The Lincolnshire Experience, Centre forPublic Services NUPE/NALGO 1988

Cleaning up in Ealing, Public Profiles No.2, LGIU 1987

Sports and Leisure Management: Ensuring ContractorPerformance, Association of Direct Labour Organisations,1991

Preparing for Compulsory Competition, Audit CommissionOccupational Paper No. 7

Clean Sweep, Newcastle Tenants FederationfTrade UnionAnti-Privatisation Working Group, 1990


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