Mongolia DPRK Relations

7/26/2019 Mongolia DPRK Relations

1/24Asian Survey, Vol. 46, Issue 2, pp. 275297, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. 2006 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requestsfor permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California

Migeddorj Batchimeg is former Senior Researcher at the Institute for

Strategic Studies of Mongolia. Currently, she is Ulaanbaatars Trade and Economic Representative

in Taipei. She wishes to thank Dr. Stephen E. Noerper and an anonymous reviewer for their help

in preparing this article.

MONGOLIAS DPRK POLICY

Engaging North Korea

Migeddorj Batchimeg

Abstract

Since the end of the 1990s, in order to improve relations, Mongolia has intensified

its engagement policy with North Korea. This article analyzes the overall develop-

ment and future prospects of bilateral relations and various aspects of this policy.

Keywords: Mongolia, North Korea, DPRK, Northeast Asia, engagement

During the Cold War era and Sino-Soviet confrontation,Mongolia was an ally and satellite state of the former Soviet Union, providingMoscow with a buffer against China. Major decisions in Mongolias foreign

policy were made in the Kremlin, and its foreign relations were developed mostlywith former socialist countries. The end of the Sino-Soviet confrontation greatlydiminished Soviet dominance over Mongolian foreign policy, and the countrybegan to enjoy greater freedom in strengthening its relations with the rest ofthe world, particularly China and Western countries such as the United States(diplomatic relations were established in 1987) and Japan (in 1972). In theearly 1990s, the Mongolian Parliament adopted two key policy ideas, respec-tively, the Concept on National Security and the Concept on Foreign Policy,that were consistent with the principles of its new Constitution guaranteeing a

democratic society and free-market economy. The foremost importance of thesenew policy documents lay in Mongolias declaration that its foreign policywould be based on its own national interests rather than ideological factors.

1

1. The Concept of Foreign Policy, at

http://www.mongolia-foreign-policy.net/

, accessed

April 25, 2004.


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According to the new concepts, Mongolia sees itself as an integral part ofNortheast Asia.

2

Integrating with regional economic cooperation efforts is adecisive factor in the development of this landlocked country, situated between

Russia and China. Mongolias geographical isolation and lack of regional inte-gration into Northeast Asia are the two major factors impeding the countrysdevelopment.

Since the early 1990s, the Northeast Asian countries have contributed to thedevelopment of the Tumen River Development Project, which aims to acceler-ate regional integration under the direct support of the U.N. Development Pro-gram (UNDP). However, because of a combination of factors, including theunpredictability of the Korean Peninsulas security situation and absence ofJapans participation, the project has not demonstrated much success to date.

In recent years, the Northeast Asia railway and energy network projects havebeen widely discussed among interested parties. If these projects can be real-ized in the coming years, Mongolia stands to gain two strategically importantbenefits. One is the possibility of obtaining sea access on the Korean Penin-sula via Chinas northeastern provinces; the second is an international railwayor highway link between the Korean Peninsula and Europe. Currently, Mon-golia is greatly dependent on Chinas major northeastern port of Tianjin.

In the current strategic environment, balancing the power of regimes andenabling collective defense arrangements represent the main components of

Northeast Asian regional security architecture. Although the possibility of es-tablishing a cooperative security mechanism among regional governments hasbeen discussed for years, limited progress has been made. As the smallestcountry in Northeast Asia in terms of economy, population (2.7 million), andmilitary power, Mongolia actively supports establishing multilateral securitycooperation and has made some proposals in that direction.

3

Therefore, devel-oping regional integration, promoting regional stability by strengthening co-operation, and making its own contribution to this dynamic processratherthan simply observing itare all important directions in Mongolias current

foreign policy.

4

Mongolia is a non-aligned country that does not possess enough strength tocontain or threaten other countries. It enjoys friendly relations with all countries

2. No clear-cut consensus exists among Mongolian and international scholars on the geograph-

ical or political definition of the Northeast Asian region. However, most researchers see Russia,

China, Mongolia, Japan, South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK), and North Korea (Democratic

Peoples Republic of Korea, DPRK) as the Northeast Asian countries.

3. On September 21, 2001, at a U.N. General Assembly general debate, the Mongolian foreign

minister suggested creating a dialogue mechanism to discuss regional security issues amongNortheast Asian governments.

4. Ministry of External Relations of Mongolia, Foreign Policy Blue Book (Ulaanbaatar: Admon


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in the region without the cloud of unresolved historical bilateral problems.Moreover, Mongolia has close relations and a special historical affinity withthe Korean people;

5

it is not directly involved in the divisive politics and con-

tinuing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

6

Because of this, Mongoliaspolicy has been to contribute toward strengthening peace and stability on thepeninsula and increasing mutual understanding and trust there. In 1999 and2003, Mongolian Prime Ministers Rinchinnyamyn Amarjargal and NambarynEnkhbayar visited both North and South Korea during the same trips, clearlydemonstrating Mongolias interest in finding solutions for the peninsula andmultilateral cooperation in this region.

Without North Koreas cooperation or at least purported willingness to co-operate, the agenda of facilitating a peaceful solution on the Korean issue

could become idle talk. After experiencing years of stagnation in bilateral rela-tions, Mongolia began to conduct an engagement policy toward North Koreain the late 1990s, recognizing that it had few trusted friends around the world.(While China seems to be the closest partner and patron of North Korea, anxi-ety and distrust still prevail between the two.) During Mongolian President N.Bagabandis 2004 visit to North Korea, both sides acknowledged their com-mon interests and agreed to strengthen bilateral relations.

This article has several objectives. It analyzes the overall development ofbilateral relations between Mongolia and North Korea. It also summarizes the

goals, means, outcomes, and limits of Mongolias engagement policy towardNorth Korea and forecasts prospects for enhanced bilateral relations. Althoughinterdependence is currently minimal, bilateral cooperation draws upon Mon-golias engagement policy, rather than from any immediate necessity or press-ing impetus from Pyongyang.

5. Mongolians and Koreans have acknowledged their ethnic and cultural ties for centuries.

There was considerable intermarriage among Mongolian and Korean elites in the 13th century. Ko-

reans believe their ancestors came from Mongolia; they see the blue spot or Mongol spot seen

on the back of every newborn Korean child as a symbol of this ethnic heritage. Ch. Dalai,Mongol-Solongosyn ertnii tuuhen hariltsaa [Historical relations between Mongols and Koreans] (Ulaan-

baatar: Academy of Science of Mongolia, 1998), p. 9. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Dae Jung

specifically emphasized the historical relationship between Mongolians and Koreans during their

visits to Mongolia in 1986 and 1999, respectively. K. Demberel, Kim Ir Sen ba Mongol [Kim Il

Sung and Mongolia], paper presented at the Mongolia and the Cold War International Work-

shop, Ulaanbaatar, March 2004, p. 5; and Ministry of External Relations of Mongolia,Information

Bulletin of Foreign Relations

, no. 13, 1999, p. 10.

6. The North Korean nuclear crisis reemerged after the U.S. stated publicly that Pyongyang had

acknowledged having a nuclear weapons program to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly

in October 2002. In December the DPRK announced that it was unfreezing its nuclear facilities:

official seals were cut, and surveillance cameras installed by the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) were removed. Increasingly provocative actions by the U.S. and North Korea have

escalated the crisis; Pyongyangs expulsion of IAEA inspectors and withdrawal from the nuclear


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Overview of the Bilateral Relationship,19482005

Since the establishment of diplomatic ties between the Mongolian Peoples Re-public (MPR) and the DPRK, bilateral relations have gone through three stages:a period of ideology-driven friendship, a period of stagnation, and a period ofreengagement.

Period of Ideology-driven Friendship,

19481990

On October 15, 1948, the MPR established diplomatic relationship with thenewly born DPRK, becoming the second country to offer recognition after

the Soviet Union. Although Mongolia did not directly participate in the Ko-rean War, it nevertheless expressed ideological support for North Korea andprovided livestock as material assistance, including more than 200,000 headof horses, cows, and sheep. After the war, Mongolia received and brought upmore than 200 war-orphaned children. In 1956, North Korean leader Kim IlSung visited Mongolia and expressed his appreciation of Mongolias sup-port during wartime; Mongolian leader Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal paid a recipro-cal visit to Pyongyang later that year. At that time, the two countries signed theAgreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation and in the following year

began to conduct bilateral trade. During the Cold War, while not officiallyallies Mongolia and North Korea maintained friendly relations as socialistcountries.

In 1986, Mongolian leader Jambyn Batmunkh visited North Korea. Twoyears later, during the intensifying Sino-American rapprochement and as theSoviet Union and China were developing economic ties with South Korea,Kim Il Sung paid a visit to Ulaanbaatar. He told Batmunkh the following:

Among the socialist states in Northeast Asia, with the exception of our two coun-

tries, the rest are all large countries. The Soviet Union is a superpower; China is abig power too. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are Southeast Asian countries. There-fore, we (North Korea and Mongolia) should keep a close relationship.

7

The main purpose of Kim Il Sungs visit was to assess Mongolias policy mo-tivations. Kim discussed broadly developing bilateral economic ties, express-ing a willingness to help Mongolia develop its heavy industry.

8

After the visit,the two countries established the Intergovernmental Commission for Eco-nomic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation.

7. Archive documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Mongolia, as cited in

Demberel, Kim Ir Sen ba Mongol, p. 5.


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Period of Stagnation, 19901996

Shortly after Kims visit, the pro-democracy movement emerged in Mongo-lia, riding the new global democratic wave. According to a Mongolian scholarof international relations, the first priority of young democrats in Mongo-lia was to end Soviet dominance, in other words, to set the condition forMongolia to conduct independent domestic and foreign policy, rather thanto introduce new democratic institutions.

9

In March 1990, the Politburo of theMongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party (MPRP) Central Committee resigned,and shortly thereafter the new government, consisting of democratic and formercommunist politicians, came to power. After only a few days in office, Mon-golias new government established diplomatic relations with South Korea,becoming the first Asian former socialist country to offer such diplomaticrecognition.

The economic incentive was the foremost factor that led Ulaanbaatar to es-tablish ties with Seoul. Disintegration of the Soviet-led Council for MutualEconomic Cooperation (COMECON)and the abrupt termination of Sovietaidcaused quasi-bankruptcy in the Mongolian economy at the beginning ofthe 1990s. Mongolia faced the immediate task of finding new partners capableof filling the vacuum. Moreover, Mongolia considered South Korea, one of thefour newly industrialized Asian economies, to be a model for its free-market

economy. Contrary to the challenge facing Soviet and Chinese leaders, recog-nizing South Korea appeared easier for the new generation of leaders of Mon-golia. In October 1991, President Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat visited Seoul, andsubsequently the South Korean government provided grant aid of $1.5 mil-lion. South Korea was one of the largest donor countries to Mongolia until themid-1990s, the most difficult period for the latters structural reform.

Understandably, Soviet and Chinese recognition of South Korea, coupledwith the loss of many ideological partners in the socialist family, left the NorthKorean leadershipdetermined to maintain itsjuche

(self-reliance) ideology

and authoritarian regimein a difficult situation. By the end of 1990, Mongo-lias domestic policy of radical political and economic reforms and its warm-ing relations with South Korea had had a direct impact on ties with the DPRK,and bilateral relations entered a period of stagnation.

In Mongolias Foreign Policy Concept, adopted in 1994, South Korea wasmentioned as one of the few countries having specific importance to Mongo-lias foreign relations after nations such as Russia, China, the U.S., Japan, andGermany. Countries formerly belonging to the socialist family were givenpenultimate place in the priority list. North Korea was totally ignored. The

9. Tsedendamba Batbayar, Mongolian-Russian Relations in the Past Decade, Asian Survey


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same year, the annual meeting of the bilateral Intergovernmental Commissionfor Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation was terminated. WhileMongolian-South Korean bilateral trade was gradually increasing, Mongolian-North Korean trade volume was continuously dropping (see Figures 1 and 2).

The stagnation of bilateral relations was not caused by Mongolian factorsalone; North Koreas further isolation from the rest of the world contributed to

figure 1 Bilateral Trade between Mongolia and the ROK(US$million)

SOURCE: Ministry of Industry and Trade of Mongolia, 19912003.

figure 2 Bilateral Trade between Mongolia and the DPRK

SOURCE: Ibid. to Figure 1.


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Period of Engagement-Produced Relations,

19972005

By the mid-1990s, the Mongolian economy had begun to recover from its sharpdecline. Following this positive change, the main objective of Mongolias for-eign policy gradually shifted focus toward providing necessary support for thegovernment policy of deepening domestic reforms, laying solid foundationsfor further economic growth, and promoting the national interest within the in-ternational arena rather than seeking emergency funding to stabilize the fiscalcrisis at home. Some politicians and scholars began to emphasize the impor-tance of Mongolias participation inand possible contribution tothe pro-cess of peaceful resolution of the Korean Peninsulas security issues. Theyalso urged the strengthening Mongolian-North Korean bilateral ties within theframework of promoting multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia.

10

In 1996, after a victory in the general election that brought it to power forthe first time, the Mongolian Democratic Coalition government began to con-duct an active policy designed to improve its relationship with Pyongyang. In1998, Mongolias foreign minister visited North Korea, resurrecting high-ranking contacts that had been absent for a decade. The deputy foreign min-ister of North Korea paid a reciprocal visit to Ulaanbaatar the same year. TheMongolian Parliament Group for Mongolia-DPRK Cooperation was establishedsoon afterward. Despite its own economic constraints, Mongolia providedfood relief to North Korea in 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2003, aiding it inovercoming difficulties caused by a wave of natural disasters and internal fac-tors. This assistance clearly demonstrated Mongolias willingness to warm itsrelations with the DPRK and play a modest role in Korean Peninsular affairs.

Although the Mongolian government was making progress in restoring itsrelationship with the DPRK, in the meantime it also managed to develop closerelations with South Korea. Thus began the policy of taking a balanced ap-proach toward the two Koreas. During the 1999 and 2001 summits in Ulaan-baatar and Seoul, respectively, both the Mongolian and South Korean sidesagreed to develop mutually complementary relations in the new century. Bothsides perceived mutual complementarities arising from the following factors:Mongolias geographic endowment of natural resources and vast territory andits strategic location between the two large markets of China and Russia; andSouth Koreas development experience, sophisticated technology, and capitaladvantage.

11

South Korea is the fourth-largest partner of Mongolia in both trade

10. S. Bayar, Solongosyn Hoig: Shine Nuhtsul Baidal [Newly emerging situation on the Ko-

rean Peninsula], Strategi Sudlal [Strategic Studies], no. 1 (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for StrategicStudies, 1997), p. 26.

11. D. Ulambayar, Mongol uls-BNSU-yn hariltsan nuhsun hamtyn ajillagaa, hugjliin tun-


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and investment. Approximately one-fifth of Mongolians living abroad residein South Korea.

In May 1999 Mongolia expressed its support for Seouls Sunshine policy

in a joint statement issued during South Korean President Kim Dae Jungsvisit to Ulaanbaatar.

12

Pyongyang condemned the Mongolian government fortaking this position and promptly canceled its participation in an Ulaanbaa-tar meeting of government representatives of the Tumen River DevelopmentProject.

13

Immediately following this condemnation, North Korea closed itsembassy in Ulaanbaatar.

14

Despite North Koreas negative reactions, the Mongolian government con-tinued its effort to cultivate friendly relations between Ulaanbaatar and Pyong-yang. In November 1999, Prime Minister Rinchinnyamyn Amarjargal visitedPyongyang and declared that Mongolia attached great importance to strength-ening traditional friendly relations and did not support any policy designed toisolate the DPRK in the international arena.

15

In essence, this was Mongoliasdeclaration of its official support forand embracing ofits engagement policytoward North Korea.

During his visit, J. Amarjargal made clear to North Korean leaders Mongo-lias interest in developing cooperation with the DPRK within the frameworkof the Tumen River Development Project and obtaining sea access through the

port of Rajin-Songbon. The Mongolian side suggested reviving the Intergov-ernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation todiscuss bilateral economic cooperation in construction, agriculture, and infra-structure. The two sides expressed interest in concluding agreements on doubletaxation and investment protection to help revive bilateral economic relations.A Mongolian diplomat said, following the visit, that the North Koreans hadshown increased interest in bilateral economic contacts, citing their prime min-isters statement that developing economic cooperation is nowadays a majortrend in international relations.

16

and ROK],Zuun Hoid Aziin Tuluv baidal ba Mongol Uls [The current situation and perspectives

of Northeast Asia and Mongolia] (Ulaanbaatar: Asia Research Center, National University of

Mongolia, 2003), p. 180.

12. See Joint Statement of Mongolia and Republic of Korea, Gadaad Hariltsaa Medeellin

Tovhimol [Information Bulletin of the Ministry of External Relations of Mongolia], no. 13 (1999),

pp. 56.

13. Tsedendamba Batbayar,Mongolias Foreign Policy in the 1990s: New Identity and New

Challenges (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 209.

14. However, during the Mongolian prime ministers visit to Pyongyang, the North Korean

side explained that the primary reason for closing the embassy was related to financial constraints.

Gadaad Hariltsaa Medeellin Tovhimol

, no. 24 (1999), p. 2.

15.

Unuudur [Today], November 6, 1999.


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The June 2000 general election brought back to power the MPRP, the formerruling party that had been in opposition since 1996. Despite the turnover,Mongolias engagement policy toward North Korea has remained unchanged.

It is notable that, as far as foreign policy is concerned, Mongolias major polit-ical parties share common ground. In August 2002, North Korean ForeignMinister Kim Young-il visited Ulaanbaatar, the first such visit in 14 years,marking a significant revival of bilateral ties. The two sides concluded a newTreaty of Friendly Relations and Cooperation. One month later, the meeting ofthe Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and TechnicalCooperation between Mongolia and North Korea resumed in Pyongyang.

At this time, Mongolia voiced a willingness to contribute to the multilateralefforts aimed at maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In

November 2003, then-Prime Minister Nambaryn Enkhbayar paid an officialvisit to Pyongyang, telling his counterparts that he hoped to facilitate dialogueon the Korean Peninsula security issue. The two sides agreed to strengtheneconomic ties and increase the volume of bilateral trade via goods exchange;they also concluded agreements on avoiding double taxation and promotingbilateral investment. North Korea agreed to offer Mongolia use of its Rajin-Songbon port as means of facilitating sea access for foreign trade. Pyongyangalso announced its decision to reopen its embassy in Ulaanbaatar.

17

In August2004, North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Yong-il visited Ulaanbaatar

and attended the reopening ceremony. Kim expressed his hope of further deep-ening traditional friendly cooperation and broadening the bilateral relation-ship. He suggested building a joint cooperative farm for which North Koreanswould provide manpower.

18

In December, President Natsagiin Bagabandi visited Pyongyang and metwith Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme PeoplesAssembly; their talks focused on economic cooperation. A bilateral trade agree-ment and an accord setting up the Inter-governmental Economic, Trade andScientific and Technological Consultative Committee

19

were signed.

The year 2005 was marked by a significant number of exchanges. A Januaryintergovernmental meeting on economic, trade, and scientific and technologi-cal cooperation in Ulaanbaatar produced an accord to boost cooperation in thetrade, agriculture, and construction sectors. As a result, vice-ministers of agri-culture subsequently exchanged visits, agreeing to establish joint farm opera-tions in Dornod, Tuv, and Hentii Provinces of Mongolia. The first such farm

17.

Zuuny Medee [Century News], November 22, 2003.

18.

Montsame News

, August 10, 2004; also UB Post

, December 23, 2004,

http://ubpost.mongolnews.mn/northkorea.php

, accessed February 15, 2006.

19. Successor of the former Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and


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will be set up in Dornod Province in the first half of 2006, with North Koreaplanning to send up to 30 agricultural experts and workers. Mongolian Minis-ter of Nature and Environment Ulambayaryn Barsbold visited Pyongyang in

May 2005 and discussed improving cooperation on land and environmentalpreservation. He met with the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

20

North Ko-reas Minister of Finance Mun Il Bung, who is also chairman of the DPRK-Mongolia Friendship Association, visited Mongolia in September to discusscooperation. Mongolias Vice Minister of Trade and Commerce Ts. Enkhtuv-shin visited Pyongyang the same month and reviewed detailed measures tointensify bilateral trade relations.

The two countries are reportedly ready to sign an agreement on sea trans-portation that guarantees Mongolia sea access through North Koreas Rajin-

Songbon port. Mongolian officials and business people who have visited NorthKorea recently report that gradual economic liberalization is underway in thatisolated country, which is eager to develop economic cooperation with Mon-golia in order to diversify its trade relations and pool of investment partners.It is notable that with the growth of inter-Korean relations, Mongolia-SouthKorea relations are now becoming more positive but not impeding Mongolia-North Korea relations.

Mongolia also has been attaching importance to developing bilateral culturalties with North Korea. Interestingly, as some scholars have noted, cultural con-

tacts have remained intact between friendship societies in the two countries,largely because of the active dedication of individuals.

21

Mongolian artistsparticipate annually in the Spring Festival in Pyongyang, held on Kim IlSungs birthday. In 2002, a group of more than 100 delegates headed by theMongolian vice minister of education, culture, and science attended this event.The two governments biannually adopt cultural exchange plans that include anexchange of performance groups, art exhibitions, movie festivals, etc. In Sep-tember 2003, North Korea opened a cultural center in Ulaanbaatar.

Military-to-military exchanges are also under consideration. General Tseveg-

surengiin Togoo, chief of the general staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces,had planned to visit Pyongyang in October 2005. However, the visit was post-poned andalthough there were rumors that this was somehow related toPresident Bushs November visit to Mongoliathe Mongolian side made nopublic comment on the matter.

In recent years, the most sensitive issue between Ulaanbaatar and Pyong-yang has been the so-called North Korean refugee problem. The Mongoliangovernment is trying to handle this issue in a careful and delicate manner; for

20. North Korea Interested in Green Wall Program of Mongolia, UB Post

, May 19, 2005,

http://www.ubpost.mongolnews.mn/

, accessed May 25, 2005.


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that reason, government agencies are reluctant to make public the number ofrefugees and other relevant information because of two-fold concern for thesecurity of refugees and relations with North Korea.

According to Ravdangiin Bold, Mongolias ambassador to the U.S. between1999 and 2003, more than 600 North Koreans who arrived in Mongolia acrossits border with China have been resettled in South Korea.

22

Some foreign mediasources have reported that there were attempts by locals and foreigners to es-tablish a North Korean refugee camp in the Dornod (Eastern) Province. How-ever, the Mongolian government denied this on the grounds that Mongolia wasnot a signatory to the International Refugee Convention.

However, North Koreas interest in sending more workers to Mongoliahas been welcomed by officials in Ulaanbaatar. During the intergovernmental

meeting held in January 2005, Mongolias government has pledged to offerthe workers special favorable conditions including a waiver of the monthlyforeign-worker tax. Bat-Erdeniin Batbayar, chairman of the Northeast AsianAssociation (a non-governmental organization [NGO] actively involved in NorthKorean relations) and former chairman of the Mongolian Parliament Group onMongolia-DPRK Relations, has emphasized that accepting a large labor forcefrom North Korea would be a wiser choice for Mongolia than establishingrefugee camps for North Koreans.

Interpreting MongoliasEngagement Policy

Because of its ambiguity in Mongolian, the term engagement (

tatan oroltsu-

ulalt

) is not commonly used. During the Cold War era, the Mongolian politicalconcept was based on Marxist and Leninist ideology. But in the early 1990s,Mongolia began to embrace Western political concepts; the important policydocuments mentioned previously, i.e., the National Security Concept and For-eign Policy Concept, were basically compatible with corresponding international

concepts. In particular, the Foreign Policy Concept, adopted by Parliament in1994, denounces ideological motivation in foreign policymaking and advo-cates equal, balanced relations with due consideration given to Mongoliasgeographical location and vital national interests. The National Security Con-cept, adopted the same year, formulates areas of national interest and thecountrys vulnerabilities in accordance with the neoliberal notion of compre-hensive security. However, because Western political science is still in an earlystage of development in Mongolia, many conceptsand the translations forthemhave not yet been developed as systematic knowledge. Therefore, some

terms are either not commonly used or their translations are rather confusing.


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Although the Mongolian government does not often use the word engage-ment when describing its North Korea policy, all aspects of this policy clearlydemonstrate its engaging nature, in contrast to policies of containment or

isolation. One often hears Mongolian diplomats and politicians suggestingthat [t]he more isolated North Korea is, the more dangerous it is. SurengiinBadral, former counselor of the MFA, wrote the following:

North Korea, for its part, naturally needs allies and friends to ease the hardship shefaces due to, among other things, isolation and distrust. Therefore, in order to allowher to slip further into the hands of uncooperative, hatred-minded, hostile leadershipand a group of such countries, every step should be taken to engage her in all possible

bilateral and regional dialogues.

23

Mongolias Interest in the Korean Peninsula

Mongolias policy on the Korean Peninsula is an important component of itspolicy toward Northeast Asia. Mongolia shares the same interests with the restof the region in ensuring peace and prosperity.

24

As Robert A. Scalapino hasnoted, . . . long associated ethnically as well as geographically with the KoreanPeninsula, Mongolia cannot escape the impact of the current Korean division.

25

Ensuring the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is considered to be avital interest for Mongolia. North Koreas possession of a nuclear weapons ca-

pability would seriously destabilize the region by challenging the existing bal-ance of power and would provoke nuclear competition among neighboringcountries. In 1992, Mongolia declared itself to be a Nuclear Weapons-FreeZone (NWFZ). Mongolia supports creating NWFZs in various parts of theregion, including Central Asia and the Korean Peninsula.

Mongolia does not support any abrupt or forceful change in the status quoon the Korean Peninsula, because this would create grave instability in the re-gion and lead to greater distrust among countries there. Moreover, uncertain-ties caused by this kind of change might intensify an arms build-up, further

damaging regional cooperation and delaying the prospects for integration. Inthis scenario, Mongolias external environment for economic developmentwould deteriorate and its room for international maneuvering would shrinkbecause of ambiguities in relations among major powers.

23. Suren Badral, Prospects for Political and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia,Fifth

Symposium on Northeast Asian Security

, Occasional Paper, no. 15 (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Stra-

tegic Studies, 2002), p. 19.

24. Priorities of these interests may be defined in different orders by different agencies or

people.25. Robert A. Scalapino, The Political Process in Northeast Asia and Mongolias Challenge,

paper presented at the U.S.-Mongolian bilateral conference, February 28-March 1, 2005, Washing-


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A sudden collapse of the existing North Korean regime is not in Ulaanbaa-tars interest either. Mongolia is still tackling internal development challenges,many of which were caused by transitional reform from a centrally planned

economy to a free market system. Regional economic development condu-cive to the countrys reform and international sponsorship aimed at intensify-ing its political and economic reform are crucial for the sustainable growthof Mongolias economy. A sudden loss of control by the DPRK regime overNorth Korea could create many undesirable circumstances in Mongoliasexternal environment and likely impede its development. In the long term,Mongolia wishes to see North Korea evolve into a more open, predictable, co-operative nation. It is assumed that a unified, prosperous Korea will best serveMongolias further interests and positively influence Northeast Asian peace

and prosperity.

External Factors

Indeed, the Mongolian national interest is not the only force driving the Ulaan-baatar government to actively engage Pyongyang: external factors are also atwork. First, growing interdependence and interactions among the NortheastAsia countries are both important factors. Interdependence and further regionalintegration are making Mongolias internal and external policies inseparable,

while frequent interactions are making the country a self-conscious participantin the regional process.Second, other countries expectations about Mongolias role vis--vis North

Korea have influenced Mongolia to reconsider and energize its policy towardthe DPRK. American, South Korean, and Japanese officials and scholars fre-quently mention Mongolia as a possible model for North Korea and point toits potential for influencing DPRK behavior.

26

Considering that those coun-tries are regarded as Mongolias important third neighbors,

27

it is reasonableto expect some degree of policy coordination with them by Mongolia. The Mon-

golian governments position in dealing with the North Korean refugee issue isone example: the speaker of the South Korean National Assembly specifically

26. Then-Asia Foundation head Professor Stephen Noerper authored a lengthy essay on Mon-

golias potential contribution on DPRK issues that sparked extensive discussion in Mongolias

policy making sphere. Stephen E. Noerper, Of Horsemen and Hermits,Mongol Messenger

, June

5, 2002, p. 5, later re-printed as Of Horsemen and Hermits: Mongolia, North Korea, and the New

Security Architecture in Northeast Asia, inNew Northeast Asia Security Initiatives: Cooperation

for Regional Development and Security

, ed. Ikegami (Stockholm: Center for Pacific Asia Studies,

Stockholm University, 2003).

27. Third Neighbor(s) is a collective community of democracies supporting Mongoliastransformation, the leading position of which increasingly belongs to the USA. Munkh-Ochir Dorj-

jugder, Mongolia in 2003, in Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2004

, ed. Charles E. Morrison, Asia


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thanked the Mongolian government for its careful handling of the issue.

28

Toward Mongolian diplomats, U.S. and Japanese officials express similarpositions.

After the North Korean nuclear crisis reemerged in 2002, the question ofMongolias possible contribution to peaceful resolution of the problem wasraised frequently during bilateral dialogues between Mongolia and the UnitedStates. In a joint statement issued during President Bagabandis 2004 visit tothe United States, the two sides noted their common support for the perma-nent, thorough, and transparent dismantlement of nuclear programs on theKorean Peninsula.29 However, while Mongolia supported American efforts atpermanent dismantlement, it remained relatively neutral on the details.

The degree of common concern over the North Korean issue appears to be

lower in the dialogue between Mongolia and its two immediate neighbors(viz., China and Russia) than in discussions with third-neighbor countries.One rarely hears of broader discussions between Mongolia and China or Mon-golia and Russia. However, during President Bagabandis July 2004 visit toBeijing, a communique was signed committing both sides toward a peaceful,non-nuclear solution on the Korean Peninsula. Some Chinese officials andscholars express understanding of Mongolias engagement policy. Some evennote that Mongoliaas a small state benefiting from the post-Cold War strate-gic environmenthas a certain amount of potential to foster North Korean

acceptance of the existing international order, based on previous experience.Seemingly, all these countriesthe U.S., Japan, South Korea, China, and

Russiasomehow recognize that Mongolia can make a contribution to thepeaceful solution of the North Korean issue in neutral ways. These may in-clude a possible modeling and mediating role, rather than Mongolias simplyfollowing the policies of other countries. This is an important factor thatwould allow Mongolia to maintain its neutrality and independence in dealingwith North Korea.

Goals of Engaging North Korea

As Victor D. Cha has written, engagement generally aims to ameliorate thedissatisfied or revisionist inclinations of the problem state in a manner consis-tent with peaceful change of the existing order.30

The first goal of Mongolias engagement strategy toward North Korea is in-creasing the quality of bilateral cooperation. Mongolia is striving to build mu-tual trust, even modestly, through reaching a higher level of understanding on

28. Udriin sonin [Daily News], November 15, 2003.29. http://www.extmin.mn/statement_Mongol_US_20040715eng.html.

30. Victor D. Cha, Engaging China: The View from Korea, in Engaging China, eds. Alastair


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MIGEDDORJ BATCHIMEG 289

bilateral and international issues and also through increasing economic inter-dependence with North Korea. Mongolias efforts toward engagement may beseen as a way of sending reassuring signals that the country poses no threat to

North Korea. For Pyongyang, engagement may serve as an instrument for re-ducing uncertainty through dialogues and exchanges, so that some tensionscaused by its security dilemma may be reduced. Moreover, there is reason forMongolians to believe that the experience they have gained through the so-cial, economic, and political reform of their country may be useful to NorthKoreans. Mongolias success in overcoming transitional difficulties by accom-modating donor country efforts and promoting international cooperation couldbecome a reference for North Korea in developing related strategies to over-come current difficulties. The development of trade, economic, and other co-

operation and the consequent increase of mutual interdependence will showNorth Korea that Mongolia is serious about bilateral cooperation.

Without North Koreas participation, at least at a minimal level, any effort atdeveloping successful regional cooperation in Northeast Asia might ultimatelyprove futile. Based on this assumption, Mongolia is seeking to engage NorthKorea at the regional multilateral level.31A second aspect of Mongolias en-gagement policy seeks to draw North Korea into Northeast Asian regional se-curity and economic cooperation. In the political and security fields, Mongoliatook the initiative to establish dialogue mechanisms for regional foreign mini-

sters, including North Koreas.32In October 2003, Enkhbayar, then prime min-ister, noted the possibility of founding broader multilateral security mechanismsbased on the Six Party Talksbut including Mongolia.33In the economic field,North Koreas involvementgiven the countrys geostrategic importanceisessential for successful implementation of the Tumen River Development Project,as well as other regional energy and infrastructure network development projectsin which Mongolia seeks a share.

Another purpose of engagement is related to Mongolias self-image in theregion. As noted above, in terms of population, economy, and military capabil-

ity, Mongolia is the smallest country in Northeast Asia. Making contributionsto peaceful resolution of the Korean Peninsula situationthe foremost chal-lenge to regional securityby influencing North Koreas behavior through co-operation or serving as an honest broker would help Mongolia strengthen itsinternational image. Having a certain role to play, Mongolia ultimately can

31. Foreign Policy Blue Book (2000), p. 28.

32. In May 2001, the Mongolian foreign minister sent letters to the regional foreign ministers,

emphasizing the need for multilateral dialogue among them. Later, in July that year, he expressed

this position at the 8th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting in Hanoi.33. N. Enkhbayar, Stability and Prosperity of the Northeast Asia, speech at the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), October 2003, Strategi Sudlal [Strategic Studies],


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290 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2006

obtain a stable place of its own at the table. Developing close relations withNorth Korea could provide important leverage in this regard.

Methods of Engagement

At the current stage, maintaining a high-level political dialogue with NorthKorea serves as the primary method of engagement (see Figure 3). In order tobuild trust, it is very important for Mongolia to show the independent nature ofits policy and position in political relations with North Korea. As a small coun-try with big neighbors, including the third neighbors, Mongolia definitelytakes the positions of those major powers into account in its policymakingprocess. However, since the beginning of the 1990s the history of Mongoliasforeign relations has been enriched by facts that demonstrate the comparativelyindependent stance of its foreign policy. National interest is the core of Ulaan-baatars foreign policy. There are two arguments that demonstrate Mongoliasindependent position on Korean issues. First, Mongolia is trying to be as neu-

tral as possible on Korean Peninsula security-related issues. Although Mongo-lia has expressed concern about the recent nuclear crisis, it has not taken any

Period Head of the Delegation

1997 O. Ochirjav, state secretary of the MFA1998 Sh. Altangerel, foreign minister1999 B. Batbayar, chairman, Mongolian Parliament Group on Mongolia-

DPRK Relations O. Ochirjav, state secretary of the MFA R. Amarjargal, prime minister

2001 B. Ganbold, state secretary of the MFA2002 D. Idevhten, secretary-general, MPRP

B. Erdenesuren, vice minister, Ministry of Education, Culture, andScience

Ts. Munkh-Orgil, vice minister, Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs;chairman of the Mongolian Side of the Intergovernmental Commis-sion between Mongolia and DPRK

2003 Sh. Gungaadorj, chairman, Parliament Standing Committee on Envi-ronmental Protection and Rural Development

L. Erdenechuluun, foreign minister N. Enkhbayar, prime minister

figure 3 Visits by the Mongolian Side(since 1997)

SOURCE: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia, 19972003.


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or even for its withdrawal from the NPT. Instead, Mongolia called on all par-ties to respect each other and increase mutual trust.34Second, Mongolia hastried to avoid any offense to North Koreas self-respect and national honor,

welcoming the DPRKs proposal for peaceful reunification of Korea.35Somesensitive issues such as political reform and regime change are not on the agendaof bilateral dialogue.

Growing cultural exchange is an important tool in Mongolias engagementof North Korea. Although political dialogue serves as an instrument to main-tain and strengthen high-level contacts, cultural exchange has been useful forenhancing public diplomacy. Developing trade and economic relations is an-other important method of engagement. Because of the very limited scope oftrade and economic cooperation, this method does not play a big role in the

current stage of bilateral relations. However, North Korea, in line with its grad-ual economic reform, has shown increasing interest in developing bilateraleconomic relations with Mongolia. Expanded trade and labor cooperation in ag-riculture, construction, and infrastructure may enhance this level of cooperation.

Outcomes of Engagement

Success of a given policy should be measured by the level of implementationof its objectives. It is too early for success in Mongolias engagement policytoward North Korea to be taken for granted. However, the policy has producedsome positive outcomes. First, at the bilateral level Mongolia has seenprogress. Compared to the Cold War period and the period of stagnation in theearly and mid-1990s, bilateral exchanges and contacts between Mongolia andNorth Korea have grown steadily. During recent visits by Mongolian primeministers and the president, the North Koreans have demonstrated active inter-est in developing bilateral cooperation, specifically in promoting economiccontacts. Within the past two years, several high-ranking North Korean offi-cials have visited Mongolia to promote cooperation. Signing the new Treaty ofFriendly Relations and Cooperation and other agreements that provide the legalbasis for bilateral economic cooperation, as well as North Koreas reopeningof its embassy in Ulaanbaatar, have demonstrated both sides willingness todevelop mutual relations.

Despite its minuscule net volume, bilateral trade has begun to grow. The NorthKorean Ministry of Light Industry opened a representative office in the capitalin 2003, and ministry delegates have been regularly attending the Ulaanbaatartrade fair. That year the North Korean Study Group visited Ulaanbaatar andconducted research on the potential for bilateral economic cooperation. As NorthKorean Ambassador Pak Jong Do told the UB Post, an English-language weekly,

34. N. Enkhbayar, speech at the SIPRI.


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. . . work has begun in most areas of cooperation that we agreed to develop.36

Recent estimates suggest that about 300 North Korean workers are working indifferent construction fields in Mongolia. Cultural exchanges are increasing

under the active support of the two governments.Compared to bilateral engagement, achieving multilateral engagement, es-

pecially in security, seems to be more problematic, mostly because Pyongyangis unwilling to internationalize the North Korean nuclear issue. However,whether the major regional players have the firm political will needed to de-velop a multilateral mechanism is the core issue. On the other hand, economiccooperation in multilateral frameworks is probably a less sensitive topic.Nonetheless, the overall political and strategic situation of the region will havea direct impact on future developments.

Limits of Mongolias Engagement

There are limits to Mongolias effort at engaging North Korea. A lack of pub-lic understanding and support of Mongolias engagement policy is a majorfactor that diminishes the effectiveness of its effort. Although the governmentregards its relations with North Korea as a crucial part of its policy towardNortheast Asia, the public is not aware of this importance or the reasons for it.Logically, this situation reflects the immaturity of Mongolias policymaking

capacity related to North Korea. Therefore, in order to attain its policy objec-tives, the Mongolian government needs to take certain measures to promotethe involvement of NGOs, academic institutions, and the private sector in bi-lateral relations, rather than relying only on a limited number of officials anddiplomats.

From a theoretical perspective, [E]ngagement is most likely to succeed whenthe countries are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, touse sticks as well as carrots, in their attempts to accommodate the dissatisfiedpower.37Mongolia is not powerful enough to use its own carrot-and-stick ap-

proach to North Korea. Without regional countries supporting Mongolias en-gagement and willingness to play the role of honest broker, the lone activismof Mongolia is less likely to succeed.

Minimal political and economic interdependence between Mongolia andNorth Korea is another constraint on Mongolias efforts. Realistically, Ulaan-baatar has little material leverage related to vital interests or immediate strate-gic goals, especially when it comes to North Korea. Because of its strategiclocation, Mongolia holds special importance for Russia, China, and some other

36. Interview with North Korean Ambassador Pak Jong Do, UB Post (Ulaanbaatar), June 29,2005.

37. Randall L. Schweller, Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory, in Engaging China,


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developed nations. As mentioned earlier, Mongolia and South Korea have acertain mutual complementarity that provides grounds for bilateral coopera-tion. However, as far as the current North Korean regimewhose main goal is

regime survivalis concerned Mongolia cannot be an ideal partner in pro-viding material support for resolving challenging developmental problems.The current revival of bilateral cooperation should be considered to be an out-come produced by engagement policy but not as a realist strategic arrange-ment; this kind of produced cooperation may be quite sensitive to externalfactors, including any major change in the surrounding environment.

Finally, as a typical have-not power, North Korea sees engagement poli-cies toward it as being, in effect, foreign tools designed to change its regimepeacefully. Even China, its closest and most influential neighbor, is distrusted.Many Chinese scholars admit that Beijings influence over the North Koreanregime is limited. There is a possibility that Mongolias efforts may also beseen by the North Koreans as an attempt to affect regime stability. In that case,Mongolias policy of engaging North Korea might not bring the productiveoutcome sought.

Prospects for Regional Development andMongolia-North Korean Relations

The geopolitical situation appears very complex in Northeast Asia. China isemerging as an active player that is more confident and sophisticated in pro-moting its national interests, both at the regional and global level. Although itseconomic and defense capabilities have been increasing rapidly, maintainingdomestic stability is becoming more problematic for Chinese leaders. Russiais pursuing a strong Russia policy under Putins leadership and seeking tostrengthen its military capability to fit major-power status. Gradual economicrecovery will give Russia more opportunity to regain its status in the AsiaPacific. Amid internal and external pressures and growing distrust from its

neighbors, Japan is gradually shifting its defense policy toward establishing anormal military and made a significant breakthrough in dispatching troopsto the Middle East. Rapid changes are taking place in South Korean attitudestoward relations with North Korea while South Korean public opinion on tieswith the U.S. has been changing in a way not supportive to the bilateral alli-ance relationship. Despite some signs of economic reform, internal politics inNorth Korea remain unchanged and unpredictable.

In this environment the region has been experiencing a process of powerrestructuring. Although the U.S.-Japanese alliance remains intact, mostly be-

cause of South Koreas generational shift and the continued American hard-line policy toward North Korea, the future of the U.S.-South Korean alliance


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trading partner, it is also emerging as a close political and security partner. Al-though North Korea seeks relative independence, Chinas political and eco-nomic leverage over it has been growing. Mongolia, while giving priority to

its relations with its immediate neighbors, is also strengthening its relationshipwith the U.S. The two countries agreed to develop a comprehensive partner-ship; the biggest stakes of bilateral relations lie in the political and securityareas.38Although the U.S. has remained in close coordination with Taiwan,with Chinas rise Taiwans international space has been continually shrinking.What makes the situation more complex is that growing nationalism is one ofthe dominant factors in the new power distribution process in the region.

Triggered by the new complexities of the regional security environmentespecially in the post-9/11 eraand growing recognition of common valuesand interests, regional security cooperation, particularly among the major powers,has aroused greater attention. Most countries now recognize that the balanceof power or an alliance regime alone is not sufficient for sustaining peace inthe region. Both the U.S. and North Korea have recognized the multilateral na-ture of the Korean Peninsular nuclear crisis and chosen to handle the issue inthe framework of the Six Party Talks. Until recently, the U.S. has shown verylittle interest in developing a formal multilateral mechanism in the sub-region.Now there appears to be a shift toward Northeast Asian multilateralism, nota-bly by seeking an active Chinese role and Russian influence in the talks. TheSix Party Talks thus should be considered an important opportunity for devel-oping a more formal multilateral mechanism. Nevertheless, with the failuresof the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and FourParty Talks,39 ad hoc multilateralism seems to be insufficient for resolvingyears of distrust and confrontation in Northeast Asia. Besides, the NorthKorean issue requires broader solutions that include political, economic, andhumanitarian aspects.

38. The term comprehensive partnership, coined during the 2005 summit of the heads ofstates, connotes the vision that the two nations should engage in all-rounded cooperation by devel-

oping closer ties in political, security, economic, and social spheres of relations, and not merely

succumb to strategic collaboration ala treaty alliances. However, as the geographical and economic

gap between Mongolia and the U.S. remains, political and security fields will, in the foreseeable

future, retain the say in such a partnership.

39. KEDO is an international organization established to advance the implementation of the

October 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the DPRK. KEDO has served as

a unique vehicle for implementing energy-related projects in the DPRK and, more broadly, for sup-

porting international nuclear non-proliferation efforts and peace and stability on the Korean Pen-

insula. The Four Party Talks was proposed by the South Korean government in 1996, bringing

together the two Koreas and the United States and China. Following the number of preparatorytalks, one high-level session among the four took place in 1997. North Koreas dogged insistence

on regarding the Four Party Talks as negotiations between it and the U.S., with South Korea and


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In recent years, voices supporting a multilateral security mechanism to sup-plement the existing balance-of-power regime have grown in Northeast Asia.The initiative of Presidents George Bush and Roh Moo-hyun during their sum-

mit meeting in Gyeongju in November 2005 to begin discussions on a peaceregime in a forum separate from the Six Party Talks appears as a new highlight.

As a party not directly involved in the Korean nuclear crisis, Mongolia has avery limited role in tackling this problem. Nevertheless, as a neutral countrywith an active interest in developing multilateralism, Mongolia could playa useful part among the ambitious, distrustful powers in efforts to establish apermanent dialogue and thereby help reduce misunderstanding and build co-operation and confidence. As Kim Il Sung once emphasized, North Korea andMongolia are the smallest nations in Northeast Asia. North Korea has shown

interest in developing relations with small and medium countries such as Mon-golia, Canada, and Australia. These countries efforts in influencing North Koreasattitudes toward the international community may indeed be more effective thanthose of the more powerful countries.

The potential for economic integration is most promising for future multi-lateralism in Northeast Asia, which is one of the most powerful economic regionsin the world. The area accounts for about 30% of world gross domestic prod-uct and boasts some of the most powerful economiesJapan, China, SouthKorea, and Taiwan. Approximately half of world foreign exchange is held by

the Northeast Asia countries. Most importantly, regional countries possess sub-stantial natural resources and complementarities that can help generate furtherdevelopment.

Russia, Mongolia, and China abound in natural resources. Russia has one ofthe richest reserves of gas and oil in the world and wishes to be a strategic en-ergy partner for the major energy importers in the region, Japan, South Korea,and China. Chinas entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is accelerat-ing its economic cooperation with neighboring countries. China, Japan, andSouth Korea are becoming increasingly interdependent in the framework of

East Asian economic integration. Projects developing regional energy and in-frastructure networks are moving beyond the stage of assessment to the realmof reality. Importantly, because of North Koreas strategic location, certain partsof the road and energy networks will cross the country, helping to incorporateit into regional cooperation. Therefore, growing economic interdependencewill be an important factor shaping regional political stability and securitymechanisms in the coming years.

Chinas increasing activism to promote broader political and economic co-operation in Northeast Asiaunder its peaceful rise conceptshould be a

constructive means to advance regional integration. China has good political,security, and economic reasons to support cooperation in this sub-region. It


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and stability are a prerequisite to development. Among others nations, Mon-golia is frequently mentioned as being a country of crucial geopolitical inter-est. Maintaining good China-Mongolian relations is regarded as a significant

matter for the security and stability of northern and western China, includingXinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and the northeastern provinces.40To accelerate thedevelopment of the northeast, increasing economic cooperation will be neededto a degree compatible with Beijings development strategy for Chinas west.Many Chinese scholars suggest that it is now time for Northeast Asian countriesto think about concrete steps to establish a regional cooperation framework.Some argue that establishing a political and security cooperation mechanismwill be more complicated than establishing a vehicle for economic cooperation.They believe the achievement of economic cooperation will bring political re-

sults.41Therefore, Chinese policy toward Northeast Asia will provide an impor-tant positive impetus not only for regional ties but also to bilateral cooperationbetween Mongolia and North Korea.

Mongolia, North Korea, and the Russian Far East constitute the less devel-oped and less integrated region in Northeast Asia. The three share commonground in development needs. Mongolia has an interest in facilitating eco-nomic cooperation between the two Koreas. South Korea perceives Mongo-lias strategic location between Russia and China, its natural resources, and itslow-cost labor to be attractive factors for investment. Based on North Koreas

interest in exporting labor to Mongolia, some Mongolian companies are work-ing to develop proposals for initiating trilateral cooperation in Mongolian ter-ritory combining Mongolias resources, South Koreas technology and capitalinvestment, and North Korean laborers. Considering the continually growingeconomic relations between Mongolia and the two Koreas, as well as an in-crease in inter-Korean economic cooperation and cultural affinity between theMongolian and Korean people, it is reasonable to expect that increasing inter-dependence among the three countries will emerge in the coming years.

Conclusion

In the post-Cold War and post-Sino-Soviet conflict era, Mongolia has formu-lated an independent foreign policy free from socialist ideology and based onits own national interest. Defending national security by political and diplo-matic means and making full use of the opportunities in the external environ-ment for accelerating the countrys economic and social development are the

40. Li Dongyan, The Interaction between Northeast Asian Cooperation and Chinese Develop-

ment Strategy,Political, Security, Economic, and Infrastructure Factors of Economic Coopera-tion in the Northeast Asia, ed. Lhamsurengiin Nyamtseren (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian Development

Research Center, 2002), p. 30.


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main objectives of this foreign policy. Mongolia has chosen the Asia Pacificregion, Northeast Asia in particular, as the top-priority direction for its foreignrelations, keeping in mind issues of geographical and cultural proximity; moral

support for economic, social, and political reform; and accessibility of foreigncapital.

For the sake of its own security and development and peaceful co-prosperityof the region, Mongolia seeks to contribute to multilateral efforts aimed atstrengthening peace and accelerating economic cooperation in the region. Itsees engaging North Korea as a potential means to achieve its goals. ThroughMongolias engagement policy, bilateral relations have been transforming fromthe ideology-driven bonds of the Cold War period into engagement-producedstate-to-state relations. Although Mongolias policy has achieved little, if any,

appreciable success so far, it has produced certain positive outcomes. Pyongyang,by reopening its embassy in Ulaanbaatar and actively promoting exchangesand cooperation, has demonstrated a clear interest in strengthening ties withMongolia. Despite inherent limits, the prospects for future Mongolian-NorthKorean relations are encouraging, based on existing common interests, cul-tural and historical affinities, and similar ideological and economic experiences.


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