Mondale the good_fight_ch_7
Transcript of Mondale the good_fight_ch_7
The
Good
FightA
LIF
EIN
LIB
ER
AL
PO
LIT
ICS
WA
LT
ER
MO
ND
AL
EW
ithD
avidH
age
SC
RIB
NE
R
New
York
LondonToronto
Sydney
TH
EG
OO
DF
IGH
T
7cia1
issuessuch
asV
ietnamor
abusesof
theG
enevaC
onvention?T
hebest
buLwark
we
haveis
astrong,
independentSenate.N
evertheless,therules
mustbe
shapedto
strikea
balancebetw
eencarefuldeliberation
andabuse
bythe
minority. Senator Tom
Harkin
ofIowa
hasproposed
areform
whereby
thenum
berof
votesrequired
forcloture
would
declineslow
lyover,say,a
month
ofdebate,untilonlya
mere
majority
isrequired.Iworry
aboutsuchan
approach:I think
senatorsw
ouldsim
plyw
aitouttheclock
andthe
Senatew
ouldbecom
em
orelike
theH
ouse,where
theleadership
;can
forceanything
throughand
thebody
becomes
atoolfordeliverance,
notdeliberation.
Maybe
them
agicnum
bershould
declineslow
lyover
am
onth, butnofurther
thanfifty-eightor fifty-seven
votes.I
would
alsoprohibit
the“hold”
strategythat
allows
onesenator
toblock
ajudicial
nomination
ora
bill.I
thinkthat
much
power,
placedin
thehands
ofonesenator,
humiliates
theSenate
andm
akesa
farceof
thenom
inatingprocess.
Perhapsthe
Senateneeds
arule
allowing
theleadership
tocall up
issuesby
majority
voteundercertain
circumstances.
Despite
whatthe
rulesnow
say,it’sim
portanttorem
ember
thatthe
Sen
atecan,
with
theclear
mandate
ofthe
Constitution,
adoptnew
rulesby
majority
vote,at
leastat
theoutsetof a
newC
ongress.We
made
historyand
establishedthatprecedent during
that pivotalweek
in1975.
Ialso
wish
thatA
merican
votersw
ouldask
whether
thecandidates
seekingtheir
supportw
illcontribute
tothis
impasse
inW
ashington,this
divisivenessthat
gripsour
nation,orw
hetherthey
canbe
aforce
forreform
andpublic
comprom
ise.I spent
many
yearsofm
ylife
inthe
Sen.ate,and
Ideeplybelieve
inits
capacityfor
progressand
comprom
ise.I’vebeen
inthe
Senatew
henitreally
worked,and
I believeitcan
work
again.B
ut we
haveto
takecare
thatwe
make
itwork.
Spies,
Security,
andthe
Rule
ofL
aw
DU
RIN
GM
YS
EN
AT
Eyears
1liked
toset
asideseveral
hoursevery
Sundayfor
reading—books
onpublic
affairs,journalsof
opinion,andthree
orfour
Sundaynew
spapers.Ialways
foundsom
ethingthat
boreon
my
work
inthe
Senateor
deservedattention
fromC
ongress,andIw
ouldusually
gointo
theoffice
onM
ondaym
orning
with
abriefcase
IuIIofclippings,notes,
andideas
forthe
staff.B
utone
Sundayin
late1974
stoodout
fromthe
others.O
nD
ecember
22the
New
YorkThnes
publisheda
front-pagestory
bySeym
ourH
ershdetailing
am
assiveand
long-standinggovernm
entcampaign
ofillegal
spyingon
Am
ericancitizens.
Hersh
wrote
thatthe
CIA
hadconducted
illegalsurveillance,surreptitiously
openedthousands
ofpiecesofm
ail,conducted
illegalbreak-ins,andinfiltrated
dozensofdom
esticdissident
organizations—all
inviolation
ofitscharter.
Inthe
Senatew
ehad
beenhearing
rumors
ofthis
sortof
thingfor
months,
huteven
so,the
storycam
eas
ashock.
Within
afew
daysm
ycolleagues
startedm
akingtheir
way
down
tothe
Senatefloor
totalk
aboutit.
My
friendJohn
Pastoreof
Rhode
Islandgave
anelegant
speechasking,
Flowcould
thesethings
occurw
ithoutanyone
inC
on
gressknow
ingabout
them?
Who’s
watching
theseagencies?
What’s
happenedto
ourcountry?T
hatdayhe
andM
ikeM
ansfieldbegan
draft-
134
35
TH
EG
OO
DF
IGH
TSpies,
Security,and
theRule
ofLaw
inga
resolutionto
establisha
specialSenatecom
mittee
toinvestigate
thebehavior
ofthe
intelligenceagencies—
acom
mittee
whose
work
would
dominate
my
lifefor
much
of thenextyear.
When
Hersh’s
storybroke,
most
mem
bersof
Congress
were
feelingnum
bon
theissue
oftrustanddeceit
ingovernm
ent.W
ehad
spentmost
of1971
readingthe
PentagonPapers
andabsorbing
theirlessons—
howgenerals
andpresidents
hadlied
tothe
publicabout
Vietnam
.T
henw
ehad
goneright
intothe
morass
ofW
atergateand
thetraum
aof
Nixon’s
resignation.E
venso,the
CIA
revelationsstunned
us.We
hadcom
eofage
assuming
thatw
ew
erea
nationof
laws,
andthat
theintelligence
agenciesto
protectedthe
Am
ericanpeople.It w
illseemnaive
today,perhapsincredi
ble,butwhen
Ifirstcame
intogovernm
ent,Am
ericansstillpresum
edthat
government
expertsw
eregenerally
rightand
publicleaders
were
generally
honest. Mostofm
ycolleagues,and
most ofthe
votersw
erepresented.
believedour
countryhad
enemies
overseasw
how
eredangerous,
andcrim
inalsat
home,
andthat
we
neededstrong,
aggressivesecurity
agencies
toprotect
us.W
ealso
generallyagreed
thatif
theseagencies
were
goingto
dotheir
work
properly,it had
tobe
secret.Iknew
fewpeople
inC
ongressw
how
ouldhave
arguedotherw
ise.T
hisattitude
was
reflectedin
congressionaloversight
ofthe
intelligence
comm
unity.N
ocongressionalcom
mittees
hadfull,form
alauthority
overthose
agencies,nor didany
comm
itteeshave
unambiguous
power
tocom
peltestim
onyfrom
them.
If theheads
oftheagencies
didcom
eup
tothe
Hillto
report,theirsw
asjust anodyne
testimony.T
heem
barrassingactivities—
therisky
operations,the
secretpro;ects—
would
bedisclosed
toonly
two
orthree
peopleon
Capitol
Hill,
maybe
thehead
ofA
ppropriations
becausehe
controlledtheir
money,
orthe
headof
Judiciary,w
hoknew
howto
keepa
secret.M
oreover,these
generallyw
erem
embers
whom
theagencies
themselves
choseto
brief.T
hisw
asfine
with
most
mem
bersof
Congress.
Am
ericanshad
alot
offear
inthe
mid-1960s
andearly
1970s,and
most
people,1
would
say,believed
thatthe
Com
munists
were
bentondestroying
us.We
hadlived
throughW
orldW
arIIandthen
Korea.T
heSoviets
andthe
Chinese
were
regardedas
frighteningforces,
andpatriotic
Am
ericansnever
doubtedthat
we
hadto
protectourselves
athom
eand
abroad.John
Stennisof
Mississippi,
known
inthe
Senateas
JudgeStennis,
chairedthe
Arm
edServices
Com
mittee, and
Ionceheard
himsay
thathehad
toldthe
directorof the
CIA
,You
justgodo
yourwork,and
youdon’thave
tocom
ehack
tom
ew
ithallthis
information.
Soalthough
some
ofm
ycolleagues,
includingG
eneM
cCarthy,
hadstarted
raisingquestions
aboutthe
CIA
,even
if we
hadw
antedgreater
scrutinyofthese
agenciesw
ew
ouldhave
facedinstitutional
harriers.W
ew
ouldhave
hadto
changethe
way
Congress
was
structuredand
thew
ayit com
pelledinform
ationfrom
theseagencies,
andw
eprobably
couldn’thave
passedsuch
changesin
thosedays.
As
forthe
FBI,no
onecould
touchit
aslong
asJ.Edgar
Hoover
was
incharge.
Evenw
henhe
was
senescentand
behavingerratically,he
stillintim
idatedpeople.T
hisstem
med
inpartfrom
hisreputation
asa
crime
hghter, aguy
who
knewhow
tokeep
criminals
offthestreet.
But
Hoover
was
alsorum
oredto
keepsecretfiles
inhis
personaloffice—em
barrassingm
aterial,w
hichhis
agentsaround
thecountry
were
supposedlyencour
Led
tocall
into
himpersonally.
Later,w
henw
ew
ereinvestigating
thereig
nassassination
plots,for
example,
ourcom
mittee
uncoveredcv
idence
thatJohn
Kennedy
was
havinga
liaisonw
ithJudith
Cam
pbell,w
how
asthe
girlfriendof
SamG
iancana,a
mafioso
who
was
alsow
orking
with
theC
IAto
assassinateC
astro.O
urevidence
showed
thaton
[the
veryday
Hoover
heardabout
thisaffair,he
wrote
aletter
aboutit
toBobby
Kennedy,
thenlater
went
tosee
PresidentK
ennedyafter
gettingFBI
mem
odescribing
theaffair.N
oone
knows
whatthey
talkedabout,
bit
Hoover’s
approach, when
hefound
something
ugly, was
togo
tothat
someone
andsay,“D
on’tworry
aboutit.Trust
me.
lt’shere
andit’s
underw
rapsand
nothingis
goingto
happento
it.”M
aybethat’s
why
LyndonJohnson
refusedto
fireH
oover.Johnson,who
hadan
earthyTexas
way
of[saying
things,used
tosay,“It’s
betterto
haveH
ooverinside
thetent
pissm
goutthan
outsidethe
tent pissingin.”
For allthesereasons—
patriotism, the
fearofgenuinesecurity
threats,iitim
idationby
thepeople
who
ranthese
agencies—C
ongress’sattitude
.137.
136
TH
EG
OO
DF
IGH
TSpies,
Security,and
theR
uleofLaw
hadforyears
beenhands-off,
leavethem
aloneand
letthemdo
theirjobs.
That
attitudebegan
tochange
duringV
ietnamand
afterthe
release
ofthe
PentagonPapers.
That
hadbeen
acold
shower,
astory
ofdecep
tionand
manipulation
thatran
fromthe
Pentagonrightup
tothe
White
House.T
hegenerals
andthe
intelligenceexperts
hadlied
tous,had
kept
vitalinform
ationfrom
thepublic
andeven
leadingm
embe.s
ofC
on
gress—and
inaddition
hadm
adesom
eextrem
elypoor
military
calcula
tions.Vietnam
hadfailed
andthe
countryw
asnow
more
skeptical.
Bythe
mid-l970s,
many
Am
ericanspresum
edthat
thegovernm
ent
was
wrong
much
ofthetim
e.Nixon
hadleft office
indisgrace,and
people
understoodthat
apresidentofthe
United
Stateshad
comm
andeeredand
politicizedagencies
thatw
eresupposed
toprotect
therestof us.A
public
opinionsurvey
at thetim
easked,“D
oyou
thinkgovernm
entofficialstell
thetruth
mostof the
time
ordothey
liem
ostofthetim
e?”Shocking
per
centagessaid
theylie
mostofthe
time.So
when
Seymour
Hersh’s
exposé
came
along,it stirred
thecesspoolofpublic
cynicism.
Tom
akem
attersw
orse,shady
behaviorw
ithinthese
agenciesw
as
startingto
undermine
thebroader
justicesystem
.Frank
Johnson,a
dis
tinguishedfederaljudge
fromA
labama,later
toldm
ethat,over
theyears,
henoticed
thatjuries
grantedless
andless
credenceto
thetestim
onyof
FBIagents.
The
word
was
outthat
theyw
ereplaying
games.H
esaid
thi
5
troubledhim
becausethe
agenciesthatw
ereso
importantto
thecrim
inal
justiceprocess
hadbegun
tolose
thepublic’s
confidence.
The
Seymour
Hersh
storiesand
alot
offine
subsequentreport
ingbrought
allthis
toa
crescendo.T
heold
guard,the
hands-offcrowd,
startedgiving
way
tothe
youngersenators,
andto
anew
ideathat
while
theseagencies
areessential
toour
securityand
must
operatein
secret,
theym
ustalso
operateunder
thelaw
andm
akethem
selvesaccountable
tothe
legislativebranch
andthe
courts.The
generalfeelingw
asthat
the
Congress
hadto
takeresponsibility
forthese
agencies,tofind
out what
it
didn’t know—
andhadn’t w
antedto
know.A
sM
ikeM
ansfield,them
ajor
ityleader,observed,“Itused
tobe
fashionable..
. formem
bersofC
ongress
tosay
thatinsofar
asthe
intelligenceagencies
were
concerned,the
less
theyknew
aboutsuch
questions,the
better.W
ell,in
my
judgment,
itis
138
abouttim
ethat
attitudew
entout
offashion.It
istim
efor
theSenate
to
takethe
trouble,and,yes,therisks,ofknow
ingm
orerather
thanless.”
Inthe
firstweek
of January1975
Washington
wason
fireover the
CIA
allegations,and
PresidentFord
appointeda
comm
issionto
investigate,
with
Vice
PresidentRockefeller
aschairm
an.Ford
probablythought
that
would
calmthings
down
andpacify
theskeptics
inC
ongress,hut
hew
as
wrong.Pastore
hadraised
alotof serious
questions,anda
numberof sena
torsfelt w
ehad
simply
not beendoing
our job.In
addition,some
feLt that
theR
ockefellerCom
mission
wouldn’tget
tothe
bottomofthe
matter
for
fearof embarrassing
Nixon
andpeople
who
hadw
orkedin
hisadm
inistra
tion.Three
weeks
later,actingon
aresolution
byPastore,the
Senatevoted
82to
4to
establisha
selectcomm
itteeto
conductits
own
investigation.
FrankC
hurch,w
how
ason
theForeign
Relations
Com
mittee
andhad
beenin
theSenate
almost
twenty
yearsw
ithoutchairing
am
ajorcom
mittee, w
asM
ansfield’schoice
aschairm
an.W
illiamM
iller,aform
erF
or
eignService
officerand
atalented
Senatestaff
mem
ber,w
asappointed
staff director.T
heother
Dem
ocraticm
embers
were
PhilH
artof
Michi
gan, oneof the
deansof our delegation,and
threerelatively
newsenators:
Robert
Morgan
ofNorth
Carolina,
Walter
Huddleston
ofKentucky,
and
Gary
HartolC
olorado. The
Republican
mem
bersw
ereallrespected
sen
atorsofgreatintegrity:John
Towerof Texas,
Barry
Goldw
aterof A
rizona,
Charles
“Mac”
Mathias
ofMaryland,R
ichardSchw
eikerof Pennsylvania
andH
oward
Bakerof Tennessee.
Ialsoasked
tobe
onthe
comm
ittee.Ihad
beenshaken
bythe
lossof
publictrust
afterV
ietnam,
andI
was
stilloffended
byN
ixon’sabuse
of
publicoffice.
Ihad
written
abook,
The
Accountability
ofPow
er,w
hich
made
thecase
forgreater
accountabilityof
thepresidency
tothe
other
branchesofgovernm
entandto
thepublic.
I stillbelieved
ingovernm
ent
asa
forcefor good,hut
I wasn’tsure
howlong
we
were
goingto
beable
to
hangon
tothe
public’sconfidence.T
hisw
asn’tjustam
atterof afew
little
spycapers.T
hisw
asa
questionofw
hetherlarge, pow
erfulagenciesof the
executivebranch
andeven
theW
hiteH
ousew
eregoing
toobey
thelaw
andm
akethem
selvesaccountable.
139
.
TH
EG
OO
DF
IGH
TSpies,
Securicy,and
theR
uleofLaw
Everyoneon
thecom
mittee
understoodthatw
ehad
avolatile
assignm
ent,but
when
we
firstconvened
we
weren’tsure
howto
proceed.T
hem
andatew
asim
mense.W
ew
eresupposed
toexam
ineevery
federalintel
ligenceagency,
includingthe
CIA
,the
FBI,the
Defense
IntelligenceA
gency,and
theN
ationalSecurity
Agency,
allovera
spanofforty
yearsof
activity.W
ehad
astaffof
135,including
53investigators.
We
hadto
developdocum
entrequests,
drawup
witness
lists,w
ritechronologies
ofthe
abusesw
eknew
about,andinvestigate
whetherthere
were
others.Pas
torehad
toldreporters
heassum
edthe
comm
itteew
ouldm
eetexcLusivelyin
“executivesession,”
thatis,behind
closeddoors.C
hurch,onthe
otherhand,said
hehoped
tohold
anum
berof hearingsin
public.There
was
noprecedentfor
ourw
ork.W
ehad
aprofound
investigation,perhaps
neverto
berepeated.W
ew
eregoing
tobe
lookingatthe
filesandclassified
docum
entsofourm
ostsecretagencies,andthathad
neverhappenedbefore.
The
comm
itteeitselfhad
differenttheorieson
howto
proceed.Some
Republican
mem
bers,John
Tower
andB
arryG
oldwater
among
them,
didn’tw
antto
doan
awful
lotat
first.M
anyclung
tothe
ideathat
we
shouldn’tbe
diggingaround
inthe
operationsofsecret
intelligenceagen
cies.I’m
suresom
ealso
worried
thatthis
would
justbe
aN
ixonw
itchhunt.
BillM
iller,for
whom
Idevelopedgreat
respect,thought
we
couldconduct
ourinvestigation
mainly
throughinterview
sw
ithagents
andagency
officials,then
putthe
storytogether
without
diggingaround
inthe
sewer
forfacts.
That
vieww
asnot
sharedby
thecom
mittee’s
chiefcounsel,F.A
.0.
Schwarz
Jr.,who
came
down
fromN
ewY
orkto
jointhe
comm
ittee’sstaff. Fritz,as
hew
asknow
n,was
anheir
tothe
toy-retailingem
pirebut
was
asuccessful
triallaw
yerand
laterhead
ofthe
Brennan
Center
forJustice
atthe
New
York
University
Schoolof
Law.
He
was
aH
arvardLaw
graduateand
apartner
atC
ravath,Sw
aine&
Moore,
who
hadadvised
theN
ewY
orkPolice
Departm
entondifficult
issuessuch
asuse
ofdeadlyforce
andhandling
ofpublicprotests.Schw
arzw
asalitigator
atheart,
aninvestigator,
andhe
feltwe
hadto
seethe
files,getthe
docum
ents,startdigging,andthen
draftthequestions
andcallw
itnesses.Fritz
arguedthat
without
exposingspecifics
we
couldn’tdocum
enta
casefor
genuinereform
.
140
Mostofus
endorsedSchw
arz’sstrategy,
hutPresident
Fordw
asreluc
tantto
letus
gettoo
close.In
February,w
ehad
privatesessions
with
Edward
Levi,Ford’sattorney
general,andW
illiamC
olby,the
CIA
director,
toset
groundrules
forthe
investigation.In
earlyM
arch,C
hurch,Tow
er,MiH
er,andSchw
arzw
entto
theW
hiteH
ousefor
am
eetingw
ithFord
andhis
secretariesofdefense
andstate,Jim
Schlesingerand
Henry
Kissinger,
tospecify
theso
rtof
documents
theyplanned
torequest.
In1973
theC
IAhad
beenim
plicatedin
Watergate,
andSchlesinger,
thenC
IAdirector,
askedhis
staffto
compile
alist
ofall
activitiesconducted
outsidethe
agency’scharter,a
listthatbecam
eknow
nas
“thefam
ilyjew
els.”W
ew
antedthat.
We
alsow
anteda
copyof
areport
thatC
olbyhad
preparedfor
Fordon
allegedC
IAinvolvem
entin
overseasassassination
plots.In
addition,C
hurchasked
fora
seriesof
classifiedW
hiteH
ousedocum
entsand
mem
orandafrom
theN
ationalSecurityC
ouncil.For
severalw
eeksw
esent
document
requestsof
thisnature
overto
theW
hiteH
ouseand
gotthe
stalltreatm
ent—”W
ecan’t
findthat”
or“It
will
takeus
some
time
toproduce
thosedocum
ents.”Fritz
Schwarz
andFrank
Church
evenm
et with
Rockefeller
topry
loosethe
documents
beingdelivered
tohis
comm
ission.Schwarz
toldm
elaterthatR
ockefellercharm
edhim
,m
entioningthe
family
toystore,
huthe
didn’tgiveup
thedocum
ents.Som
em
embers
ofour
comm
itteew
erefine
with
this.T
heydidn’t
wantto
embarrass
Fordand
theyw
eren’tsureaboutthe
scopeofour
man
date.B
utafter
thisw
entonfor
afew
more
weeks,
we
kneww
ew
ereget
tingstonew
alledby
theexecutive
branch.Ifthiscontinued,w
ew
ouldjust
bew
astingourtim
eand
perpetuatingthe
original problem—
anexecutive
branchunaccountable
toC
ongress.M
eanwhile,
thestory
continuedto
unfoldin
thepress.
Inlate
Feb
ruary,D
anielSchorr
ofC
BS
New
sreported,
forthe
firsttim
e,that
theC
IAw
asalleged
tohave
developedplots
toassassinate
foreignleaders.
Over
thenextm
onth,additionaldetailson
allegedassassination
attempts
continuedto
trickleout.
At
thesam
etim
ethe
CIA
,oragents
actingon
theirown,had
beguna
coun
tero
ffen
siv
e.T
hey
saidour
investigation,anda
parallelinvestigation
inthe
House,
threatenedto
exposecovert
work
TH
EG
OO
DF
IGH
T
andcripple
thenation’s
intelligencegathering.
One
eventold
acolum
nistthat
hew
asprepared
tolie
underoathbefore
ourcom
mittee
ifthat’sw
hatit took
toprotect nationalsecrets. T
hatwas
thestartofa
conservative
drumbeat
againstour
work
thatw
ouldcontinue
forthe
restof
our-
investigation.O
riginallyw
eplanned
tocom
pleteour w
orkin
eightm
onths.Gener
allyw
hensenators
establisha
select comm
itteeon
atopic,they
areanx
iousthat
itnot
turninto
aperm
anentcom
mittee.
Isoon
sawthat
ourdeadline
was
unrealistic,andthat
ifwe
setourselvesan
artificialtimeline,
theFord
administration
would
haveno
troublew
aitingus
out.Finally,
ata
comm
itteem
eetingon
April
23,w
eargued
itout.
Gary
Hart
saidw
eneeded
abackup
strategyin
casethe
White
House
continuedto
stall.
Goldw
aterthought
we
shouldscale
backthe
document
requests;he
was
afraidw
ew
ouldget
something
sensitiveand
thensom
eoneon
thecom
mittee
orthe
staffw
ouldleak
itto
thepress
andem
barrassus.
But
PhilH
art seemed
tospeak
formost ofus
when
hesaid,“T
heW
hiteH
ousehas
justgiven
ustw
o‘go
tohells.’
What
isour
responsegoing
tobe?”
Iw
asnotas
seniorasPhilH
art orB
arryG
oldwater, butIdid
havesom
eexperi
enceconducting
investigationsand
working
with
reluctantsources.I
lit
acigar—
oftensm
okein
comm
itteem
eetingsin
thosedays—
pushedm
ychair
back,and
said,“W
ew
illhave
tow
aitthem
out.”W
ehad
toget
in
aposition
where
theW
hiteH
ouseknew
we
were
goingto
bearound
aslong
asnecessary.
My
colleaguesagreed,
andin
May
we
votedto
extend
ourtim
etable.In
today’senvironm
entI
don’tbelieve
thatw
ouldw
ork.T
heparti
sandivide
is sodeep
that, unfortunately,apresident can
usuallycounton
mem
bersof
hisow
nparty
inC
ongressto
protecthim
.T
hisis
precisely
what
we
sawin
2007and
2008,w
henC
ongresstried
toinvestigate
the
intelligencefailures
thatled
tothe
war
inIraq.
Bush
andC
heneyknew
theyw
ouldbe
out of officeby
January2009
andfigured
theycould
string
outtheinvestigators
untilthen.B
utit w
asdifferentforus.BillM
iller,our
comm
itteestaff director, had
beena
staffaidefor
SenatorJohnSherm
an
Cooper, a
Republican. W
ehad
Republicans
suchas
Dick
Schweiker,M
ac
Mathias, and
How
ardB
aker, who
haddem
onstrateda
gooddealof
inde
Spies,Security,
andthe
RuleofLaw
pendencefrom
theW
hiteH
ouseon
Vietnam
andW
atergate.W
ehad
JohnTow
er,the
comm
itteecochair,
who
ultimately
earnedconsiderable
prestigeby
making
thiscom
mittee
work.
These
peoplew
erem
oderates,senators
forwhom
theseissues
were
reallynotpartisan
matters.T
heintel
ligenceabuses
hadoccurred
underboth
parties—w
edocum
entedabuses
undereveryadm
inistrationfrom
FranklinR
ooseveltto
Richard
Nixon—
andpeople
who
believedin
thelaw
andaccountability,
Republican
andD
emocrat,w
eretroubled
byw
hattheyw
erehearing.T
heyallw
ereserio
us
aboutthe
Senate’sconstitutional
responsibilityto
overseethe
executivebranch,and
theyinsisted
thatthe
White
House
producew
hatwe
needed.In
addition,the
Republicans
hadjust
come
throughthe
embarrass
ment
ofWatergate.
They
hadsupported
apresident
who
letthem
down
andhum
iliatedthem
.Irem
emberG
oldwater
tellingm
ethat
hehad
oncetold
Nixon,“T
heonly
time
youever
hadm
eup
tothe
White
House
was
when
yougot
yourass
ina
crack.”So
theR
epublicanside
hada
mood
ofself-preservation,a
sensethat
theyw
ouldhe
loyaltothe
White
House
intheirfashion.
Then,
too,our
Republican
friendsbegan
torealize
thatthe
investigation
was
playingw
ellw
iththe
pressand
thepublic.
As
ourcom
mit
teebegan
uncoveringa
seriesof
far-fetchedC
IAespionage
plans,B
arryG
oldwater
calleda
news
conferenceone
dayto
discussa
bizarregadget
developedby
theagency,a
“hio-innoculator”that
was
supposedto
injectpoisons
intotargeted
victims
fromlong
distances.He
drewa
bigcrow
dof,
andthe
nextday
hispicture
ranon
thefront
pageofnew
spapersaround
thew
orld.I
teasedhim
,saying
thathe
hadstaged
apublicity
stunt.“O
fcourse
Idid,”he
saidw
itha
bigsm
ile.“1learned
itfromH
ubert.”E
ventuallyFord
came
around.H
ew
asa
loyalRepublican,
huthew
asnot
anideologue.
His
attorneygeneral,
Edward
Levi,the
distinguishedform
erdean
ofthe
University
ofC
hicagoLaw
School,understood
thegravity
oftheabuses.A
ndthe
politicsw
erew
ithus. People
were
confusedand
angryaboutw
hattheyread
inthe
newspapers.
Mem
bersofC
ongressw
ereunder
alot
ofpressure
todo
something
onthis.
They
couldn’tjust
walk
away
fromtheir
responsibilities,as
theytried
todo
laterw
iththe
intelligencefailures
onIraq.
A1
42
14
3
TH
EG
OO
DF
IGH
TSpies,
Security,and
theR
uleofL
aw
But
we
made
accomm
odationson
ourside,
too.W
edidn’t
want
theinvestigation
toseem
partisan,or
something
designedto
embar
rassem
ployeesof
theseagencies.
Iinsisted
thatw
eget
keydocum
ents,
butI
alsoargued
thatw
eshould
limit
thedegree
ofdetailw
easked
for.
We
wanted
onlyto
learnabout
what
happenedand
howit
happened.
We
were
notout
toget
individuals.I knew
thatif
itlookedlike
we
were
undermining
Am
erica’ssecurity,
we
were
goingto
getshut
down—
and
probablydeservedly.
Inaddition,
we
knewthat
ourinquiry
hadlittle
precedentfor
inthe
Senate’slong
history.D
uringthe
Civil W
ar,a
Conduct ofW
ar Com
mit.
teehad
made
Lincoln’slife
miserable. T
henin
the1920s
theresom
ehear
ingsw
ereheld
onthe
Palmer
Raids
onsuspected
anarchists.B
utbefore,
duringand
afterW
orldW
arII,
nobodyw
antedto
interferew
ithintelli
genceoperations. T
hisw
asthe
first time—
andm
aybeit w
ouldbe
thelast
time—
thata
congressionalcom
mittee
would
beable
tooperate
thew
ay
we
did,conducting
adeep,
broad,and
unrestrictedinvestigation
ofour
nation’ssecret
agencies.Fritz
Schwarz
andBill
Miller
spenta
lotof time
figuringout how
toslice
thisw
atermelon
sow
ecould
get what w
eneeded
without hurting
theagencies
or riskingour country.
These
questionsgenerated
nolittle
frictionin
theSenate,
with
someI
ofour
colleaguescharging
thatthe
probew
ouldhelp
theenem
yand
exposeagents
torisk.
InD
ecember
1975,the
CIA
bureauchief
inA
th-1
ens,R
ichardW
elch,w
asgunned
down
onhis
way
home
froma
partyi
anincident
thatshocked
usall.
Afew
months
afterthat,
my
colleague
Milton
Young
of North
Dakota
gavea
speechon
theSenate
floorim
ply-.
ingthat
we
were
responsiblefor
revealingW
elch’sidentity
and,thus,foi
hisdeath. Fortunately, the
factsw
ereon
our side. Iwent right dow
nto
the
floor myself and
pointedout that the
comm
itteehad
never beengiven
his
name.
We
insistedon
thatrule—
we
neverreceived
names
andcouldn’t
haveleaked
any. Ialsopointed
out thataG
reeknew
spaper hadpublished
theaddress
ofthe
CIA
officein
Athens.
Nevertheless,
we
hadto
step
carefullybecause
thoseaccusations
circulatedfrequently.
Eventually
Ford’sstalling
tacticsfailed
andthe
administration
beg
making
witnesses
available.O
nM
ay15,
behindclosed
doorsin
aw
in-
dowless, bunkerlike
roomhigh
upin
theC
apitol,w
econducted
ourfirst
formal
hearing,and
William
Colby
presenteda
historyof
CiA
covert
actions.A
week
laterhe
confirmed
toour
comm
itteethat
theC
IAhad
sponsoredseveral foreign
assassinationplots, including
aplan
tokill Fidel
Castro
anda
bungledattem
pt onthe
lifeof Patrice
Lamum
ba, prime
min
isteroftheC
ongo.W
henm
embers
oftheR
ockefeller Com
mission
sawthe
assassination
files,they
realizedthat
theycouldn’t
handleit
ontheir
own.
The
topic
wasso
fullof
explosiveallegations
that,I
think,they
decidedthey
had
tohave
some
sortof
understandingw
iththe
Congress,
particularlyw
ith
theSenate.A
t theend
ofthat month, they
concludedtheir
investigation
ratherabruptlyand
beganturning
theirfilesover
tous.
InSeptem
berw
ebegan
ourpublic
hearings,and
peoplebegan
to
graspthe
gravityof
theinvestigation.
We
producedevidence
ofa
series
of embarrassing
CIA
activities, includingoutlandish
programs
todevelop
shellfishtoxins
andother
poisons.W
ealso
examined
theH
ustonPlan,
astrategy
developedby
aN
ixonaide
named
TomC
harlesH
ustonto
use
theFBI
andthe
CIA
toconduct
illegalburglaries
andopen
them
ailof
thousandsofA
merican
citizens.A
tthis
point,a
seconddynam
icbegan
working
inour
favor.M
any
of theCIA
’scareer
professionalsw
ereoffended
bythe
illegaloperations
andw
erew
illingto
sayso.For the
goodagents,the
professionals, thatw
as
LooneyTunes
time.
One
agentin
particularstood
out—he
hadan
Irish
surname,
althoughin
ourreports
we
usedpseudonym
sto
protectagents’
safety.W
easked
himto
testifyabout
theeffort
toassassinate
Patrice
Lumum
ba.H
ethought
theproject
was
shameful.
He
said,“W
henthe
agencyw
antedto
dosom
ethinglike
that,they
always
pickedan
ethnic
likem
e.That’s
thekind
ofw
orkw
edo.
The
niceguys
upin
thefront
.shop—
theW
aspyIvy
Leagueguys—
don’tdo
thatsort
ofthing.”
The
image
of classyprofessionalism
beganto
crumble
prettyquickly.
FC
learly,these
doubtsran
straightup
anddow
nC
IA,
tothe
point
where
intelligence-gatheringhad
become
dysfunctional.W
elearned
thatthe
headof
counterintelligence,Jam
esA
ngleton,w
homthe
other
ents
calledM
other, was
sow
aryof corrupted
intelligencethathe
simply
______
.14
5.
‘44
TH
EG
OO
DF
IGH
T
stopped
readin
gth
eag
ency
’sow
nintelligence
reports.Even
BillC
olby,w
hohad
beeninvolved
insom
epretty
brutalstuff
duringthe
Phoenixcounterintelligence
programin
Vietnam
,cam
eto
feelthat
thesecret
projectsw
eredestroying
theagency.
Peoplelike
Colby,
who
were
stillrational,
understoodthat
theagency
hadrun
offthe
railsand
couldnot
correctcourse
internally.C
olbylater
wrote
inthe
New
York
Times
thatcongressional oversight w
ould“strengthen
Am
ericanintelligence.”
InN
ovember
ourfocus
turnedto
theFBI, and
we
sawthe
same
pat
tern.By
noww
ehad
dividedour
work
between
two
subcomm
ittees,onefor
theforeign
intelligenceagencies
andone
forthe
domestic
agencies,and
I was
askedto
chairthe
domestic
taskforce.
Ithought we
hada
top
notchinvestigative
staff,and
Ihappily
duginto
thedocum
entsand
ranthe
hearings.W
eproduced
evidencethat
theIR
Shad
sharedconfiden
tialtaxpayer
filesw
iththe
intelligenceagencies,
andthat
theFBI
hadconducted
“blackbag”
jobs—that is, burglaries—
againstallegeddom
esticsubversives
allthew
ayback
tothe
1940s.A
llthis
was
deeplyem
barrassing—infuriating
topeople
onboth
sidesofthe
aisle—and
itsuggestedthat
thiscancer
hadspread
beyondthe
foreign
intelligenceagencies
intodom
esticoperations.
William
Sullivan,the
number
threeofficiaL
inthe
FBI,testifiedthatJ.
EdgarHoover had,in
hislater years, com
pletelypoliticized
theagency. A
sa
result,allthethings
thatareim
portant toan
FBI agent—his
professionalismasan
investigatorand
asa
factfinder—
were
givensecond
placeto
thepolitical
activitiesH
ooverw
antedto
pursue.Sullivan
saidthey
hadspent
more
time
pursuing
Hoover’s
enemies
thanthey
didcatching
crooks.T
henw
em
adeone
of ourgreat
investigativebreakthroughs,
aset of
discoveriesthat
shockedus
andbroke
thedom
esticinquiry
wide-open.I
was
concernedabout
intelligenceabuses
directedagainst
Am
ericanciti
zens,andI w
aspushing
our staffhard. Iwanted
witnesses
anddocum
ents,not
vaguerum
ors.O
neday
oneof ourstaff investigators,M
ikeE
pstein—a
brilliantguy,
unbelievablytenacious—
came
intom
yoffice
andsaid,
“Senator,Ihave
some
thingyou’d
betterlook
at.They’re
calledC
OIN
TE
LPR
Ofiles, and
youw
on’t believew
hat’sin
here.”T
heacronym
CO
INT
EL
PRO
was
Bureau
slangfor
“counterintelli
Spies,Security,
andthe
Rule
ofLaw
genceprogram
,”T
heBureau’s
own
programfor
fightingsubversive
activity—
orw
hatitconsidered
subversiveactivity—
insidethe
United
States.W
hatw
eread
inthose
filesis
well-know
nnow
,hut
atthe
time
itw
asastonishing.
Inits
paranoia,the
FB1had
keptsecret
fileson
1m
illionA
merican
citizens.Hoover
haddesignated
twenty-six
thousandindividu
alsto
bearrested
andjailed
inany
nationalem
ergency,including
Martin
Luther
King
andN
orman
Mailer.
The
FBihad
conductedhundreds
ofburglaries
atoffices
ofpoliticalgroups.
Ithad
investigatedhalf
am
illion“subversives”
without
everobtaining
acourt
order.It
hadengaged
U.S.
army
intelligenceagents
toinfiltrate
meetings
ofvariousprogressive
organizations
hereat
home,
includingthe
NA
AC
P,environm
entalgroups,
andw
omen’s
rightsorganizations.T
heC
iA,
with
thecooperation
ofthe
U.S.
PostOffice,had
illegallyopened
them
ailofhundreds
ofAm
ericancitizens
form
orethan
twenty
years,including
thepersonal
ofJohnSteinbeck,
Hubert
Hum
phrey,A
rthurB
urns,and
evenN
ixonhim
self.T
herew
asutter
contempt
forthe
ideaof
accountability,and
itw
asall
there,in
officialagencydocum
entsthatcouldn’t
hedenied.
Worst
ofall
was
thepersecution
ofM
artinL
utherK
ing.FBI
mem
osshow
edthat
Hoover
consideredK
inga
“hateleader”
andbelieved
thatK
inghad
conspiredw
iththe
Com
munist
Party.H
ooverhoped
toreplace
himw
ithsom
eoneelse
ofHoover’s
choosing.The
Bureau
hadtried
topre
ventKing
fromm
eetingw
iththe
pope. Ittriedto
keephim
out ofthebet
terhotels
inM
emphis
byw
ritinganonym
ousletters
thatasked,“W
hatis
aN
egrodoing
ina
high-classhotel
likethis?”
Iteventried
topreventhim
fromattending
thecerem
onyatw
hichhe
receivedthe
NobelPeace
Prize.Itbugged
hishotel
rooms—
hehad
girlfriends, andthe
FBIm
adesure
thatM
rs.K
ingknew
aboutthat.
And
o1course
agentsw
rotethe
notoriousanonym
ousletter, m
ailedw
itha
setof tapes,suggestingthat K
ingcom
mit
suicide:“King,there
isonlyone
thingleft foryou
todo.Y
ouknow
what
it
is.Y
OU
aredone.T
hereishutone
way
outforyou.You
bettertake
itbeforeyourfilthy,fraudulent self isbared
tothe
nation.”A
ftergoing
throughthese
documents
we
calledA
ndrewY
oung,w
hohad
beensecond-in-com
mand
atthe
SouthernC
hristianL
eadershipC
onferenceand
King’s
lieutenantin
theearlyl960
s.K
ingand
Young
14647
TH
EG
OO
DF
IGH
T
knewall
alongthat
theB
ureauw
asw
atchingthem
.Y
oungtestified
that
theyfelt
saferw
henFBi
agentsw
erearound
because,in
some
ofthose
mean
countiesin
theD
eepSouth, the
Ku
Klux
Klan
behaveditself w
hen
federal agentsw
erein
thevicinity. Y
oungtold
usthey
learnedto
identify
FBIagents.
An
agentalw
aysdrove
agreen
Plymouth
sedanand
always
wore
ablack
suitw
itha
blacktie,
white
shirtand
ahat—
evenin
hun
dred-degreew
eatherin
Alabam
a.“We
kneww
hothey
were
becausethey
always
hada
whip
aerial ontheir car,”
Young
toldus.
Testimony
of thiskind
was
almost com
ical,butalso
sadand
infuriat
ing. After
Young
testified, we
startedcalling
FBIagents,and
theirstories
revealedthat
theagency
hadgone
haywire.
Hoover
orderedthe
agency
tocelebrate
several occasionsever
year—the
thirtiethanniversary
ofthe
FBI, for example, or
thethirtieth
anniversaryofthe
dayhe
became
direc
tor—and
onthese
daysthe
agentsw
ereexpected
tobring
himpresents.
One
daya
storyappeared
inthe
Washington
Postrevealing
thatH
oover
was
manipulating
theagency
toget
presents.H
oovercalled
inhis
key
peopleand
said, “Thisis offensive
tom
e. How
many
times
haveI told
yoi
thatI do
not wantany
gifts?”T
henthe
next dayhe
sentw
ordaround
he
would
likean
ice-making
machine.
Much
more
serious,it
became
clearthat
thepeople
runningthese
agenciesw
ereincapable
of resistingpolitical
pressureand
drawing
aline
between
thelegal and
theillegal. W
etraveled
toN
ewH
ampshire
tointer
viewSullivan,
andunder
cross-examination
headm
itted,“N
everonce
didI
hearanybody,
includingm
yself,raise
thequestion,
‘Isthis
course
of action,w
hichw
ehave
agreedupon,
lawful?
isit
legal?is
it ethical
moral?’
We
nevergave
anythought
tothis
lineof reasoning
because
were
just naturallypragm
atic.”
We
gota
similar
responselater
when
1 questionedB
ensonB
uftham,
deputydirector ofthe
National Security
Agency, about one
of itssurve4.
lanceprogram
s:
Mondale: W
ereyou
concernedabout
itslegality?
Buffham
: Legality?
Mondale: W
hetherit w
aslegal.
Spies,Security,
andthe
Rule
ofLaw
Buffham
:In
what
sense?W
hetherthat
would
havebeen
alegal
thingto
do?M
ondale:Yes.B
uffham:T
hatparticularaspectdidn’tenterinto
thediscussion.
Mondale:
Iwas
askingyou
ifyouw
ereconcerned
aboutw
hetherthatw
ouldbe
legalandproper.
Buftham
:W
edidn’tconsider
itatthetim
e,no.
My
approachto
thedom
esticsubcom
mittee
hearings,as
inall
my
work,
was
toprepare
intensively_readingdocum
ents,interview
ingexperts,debriefing
ourstaff.Inthese
hearingsthatw
ascrucial
becausethe
issuesw
entlayers
deepand
thew
itnesses’testim
onyw
asoften
baffling.W
easked
FBIdirector
Clarence
Kelley
totestify
onthe
CO
INT
EL
pRO
activities.I
askedhim
which
activitiesw
ereinside
thelaw
andw
hichw
ereoutside.
He
answered
bysaying
thatsom
etimes
you
haveto
giveup
some
rightsto
protectothers.Isaid,“That’sfine.W
ouldyou
tellme
which
rightsyou
aregiving
tip?”“W
ell,”he
said,“1didn’tm
eanitthatw
ay.”T
hissloppy
thinkingprevailed
inthe
agencies_theidea
thatahigherpurpose
allowed
theseagencies,
with
theencouragem
entofthe
White
House,
todisregard
thelaw
.Ifound
asecond
patternequally
troubling.W
ew
ouldask
some
lowlevelagent,W
hogave
approvalfortheseactivities?
He
would
say,Well,I
don’tknow—
you’llhaveto
asksom
eonehigher
up.We
would
gostraight
upthe
chainofcom
mand,and
theyallsaid
thesam
ething,
noneofthem
[kiieww
hohad
authorizedanything.T
heprocess
was
clearlydesigned
forkg—
tohide
responsibilityand
preventanyone
fromever
beingcalled
toco
unt.
InD
ecember
our
work
came
toa
headin
afinalpublic
hearing.K
eHey
Wasstilltrying
tostonew
allus,insistingthat
theillegalactivities
hadlong
iice
come
toan
end.B
utwe
hadbeen
toldthat
ElliotRichardson,
when
was
Nixon’s
attorneygeneral,
hadordered
theFBI
tocom
pilea
listofillegalactivities
overthe
years.Iknew
thatifw
egot
Richardson’s
list,co
uld
verifyw
henthis
activ
itystarted
andw
henitended.So
we
caJiedtom
eyG
eneralLevito
testify,andIasked
himto
producethat
list.
.4
j49
TH
EG
OO
DF
iGH
TSpies,
Security,and
theR
uleof Law
When
thehearing
got under way, how
ever, Levi headedoff in
adiffer
entdirection.
He
wanted
toargue
thatthe
JusticeD
epartment
deserved
akind
oflegal
escapehatch
todo
preventiveinvestigations,
akind
of
penumbral area
where
thelaw
didn’t apply. I askedhim
thelegal basis
for
suchan
argument, and
toexplain
why
hisagencies
couldn’t simply
obey
thelaw
. He
went off into
what I thought w
asa
filibuster, along
answer to
avoidaddressing
thequestion.
You
couldsee
hew
asslipping
all over. He
didn’thave
anansw
er.H
ew
asone
ofthe
most
respectedlegal
scholars
inA
merica,
buthe
hadan
impossible
positionto
defend,so
Ibrought
himback
tothe
issueof
thedocum
entw
ehad
requested.T
hisw
asour
exchange:
Mondale:
I amasking
you, asthe
headof the
JusticeD
epartment,
if we
couldget those
reports.
Levi:W
ell,1 do
notknow
if youcan
ornot,
butw
ew
illcertainly
considerit.
Mondale: W
hynot
1
Levi:B
ecauseI
thinkthat
itis
onething
togive
reportsof
that
kindin
confidenceto
acom
mittee
ofthis
kindand
another
thingto
make
thempublic.
Mondale: T
heC
IAgave
theirsto
us. Why
can’t you?
Levi: Well, I am
notin
theC
IA.
I donot care
tobe.
I donot w
ish
tobe.
Mondale:
Do
youconsider thata
goodansw
er?
Levi:I—
yes, I consider theansw
er as goodas
thequestion.
Mondale, to
Senator Church: W
ell, I thinkthat kind
of arrogance
is why
we
havetrouble
between
theexecutive
andthe
legisla
tivebranch. T
hankyou, M
r. Chairm
an.
I later regrettedit testy
exchange. I soundedlike
a smart aleck
when
allI
1 was
tryingto
dow
asto
underscorethe
importance
of therule
of law. B
et.
I don’t want that colloquy
tom
isrepresent what I think
of Levi. Hew
a
first-ratescholar
anda
goodperson.
1 thinkhe
realizedthat
theage
hesupervised
hadgone
off ina
directionthat could
not bedefended, an
J.
hew
entback
tothe
JusticeD
epartment
andbegan
lookingfor
ways
to
get themback
oncourse.Levi becam
eindispensable
toour
reformefforts:
He
wrote
agood
setof
operatingguidelines
forthe
FBI,w
hichbanned
“preventiveaction”
andother
civilliberties
abuses,and
hehelped
con
vinceFord
toacceptproper C
ongressionaloversight.
He
dida
great deal
tobring
integrityback
tothose
agenciesbecause
he,too,
believedthat
theyshould
obeythe
law.
Byearly
1976w
ehad
calledeight
hundredw
itnesses, reviewed
more
than1 10,000
pagesof
classifieddocum
ents,and
documented
along
historyof
abuse.W
ehad
issuedone
publicreport,
onthe
CIA
foreign-
assassinationsprogram
,and
were
ak)utto
publisha
powerful
second
volume,
IntelligenceA
ctivitiesand
theRights
of Am
ericans,w
hichdetailed
thefindings
of ourdom
estictask
force.T
hestaff
was
finishingw
orkon
severalm
orecom
mittee
reports,w
hichw
ouldinclude
more
thaneighty
recomm
endationsto
reformthe
intelligencecom
munity—
some
of which
were
quitehard
onC
ongressitself.
LochJohnson,a
University
of Geor
giapolitical
scientistw
hoserved
onthe
comm
itteestaff,
latersurnina
rizedthat
aspectof our
work:
“lna
politicalsystem
basedon
checksand
balances,C
ongresshad
providedtoo
fewchecks
andperm
itteda
shift
inbalance
fromthe
overseersto
theoverzealous.
The
supervisorsin
the
executivebranch
hadfailed
toperform
anybetter.”
Now
ourchallengew
asto
write
alaw
that would
preventtheseabuses
fromhappening
again.A
tfirstw
etried
touse
thecom
mon-law
method.
We
tookactual
casesfrom
thefiles
andthe
testimony
andtried
todis
cernw
hichactivities
must
beoff-lim
its,w
hichw
eretruly
necessary,and
which
couldhave
beenconducted
legaLly.W
eforced
ourselves,through
thediscipline
of dealingw
ithfacts
andevents, to
come
upw
itha
seriesof
iideLines,w
hichw
ethought
might then
heenacted
intoa
law.W
espent
ys—tw
elve-hourdays
andm
ore—for
acouple
ofweeks.
But
theissues
were
simply
toocom
plex.A
nyguideline
we
wrote
was
toodetailed
and
olong,and
theagencies
feltit w
ouldjusttie
themin
knots.
[In
theend
we
keptrunning
intothe
same
two
conundrums:
We
Douldn’t w
riterules
broadenough
toanticipate
everycontingency
ina
tional
securitycrisis,
andw
ecouldn’t
seehow
toim
posepublic
over-
-‘v,
151
TH
EG
OO
DF
IGH
T
sighton
agenciesthat
must
operatein
secret.O
uransw
erw
asa
pieceof
legislationthat
became
theForeign
IntelligenceSurveillance
Act,
or
FISA.
Sincew
ecouldn’t
write
guidelinesto
coverevery
possibility,w
e
createda
new, separate
courtw
iththe
authorityto
examine
eachcase
as
itcame
up. We
wouldn’ttie
theagencies’hands
inadvance,but w
ew
ould
requirethat
theym
aketheir
casebefore
acourt
oflaw
.T
hatw
assom
e
creativew
ork, butI think
it was
agood
answer,and
bythe
springof
1976
we
haddraft
Legislation.
Bythe
time
theFISA
legislationstarted
advancingin
bothhouses
of
Congress,
I was
inthe
White
House
aspart ofthe
Carter
administration.
Thus
I was
onthe
otherside
of thetable,
inthe
administration
andseek
ingpragm
aticsolutions
with
thepeople
who
ranthe
FBIand
theC
IA.
But
thatw
asfortunate,
1 think,because
I couldrecom
mend
toPresident
Carter
andthe
attorneygeneraL
ways
tom
akeFISA
work;
I couldm
ake
theargum
entthat
theFISA
courtw
asgood
forus.
When
we
gotinto
a
quandary,I
was
ableto
bringin
FritzSchw
arz,then
inprivate
practice.
orcom
mittee
staff fromthe
Hill,
togive
ustheir
readingon
thelaw
and
congressionalintent.
Am
easureof
thedifficulty
ofthis
issueis
thateven
peoplew
orking
forthe
same
administration
oftenhad
differingpoints
ofview
.C
arter
hadestablished
aspecial
White
House
coordinationcom
mittee
consist
ingof representatives
fromthe
CIA
,theN
SA, the
Departm
entsofState,
Defense,
andJustice, and
theN
ational SecurityC
ouncil,andoften
I w
them
ainadvocate
fortough
courtoversight
ofthe
surveillance.O
na
fewpoints,
suchas
whether
thelaw
shouldprotect
Am
ericancitizem
when
theyw
ereoverseas, only
I andperhaps
Griffin
Bellw
ouldbe
arraycd
againstZbigniew
Brzezinski, Stansfield
Turner,theN
SA, and
others.(
afew
of thosetopics
Carter
himselfhad
tocall
thefinal com
promise.Y
,
onthe
whole, w
ehelped
Congress
write
agood
lawand
it provedtobel
exceptionalexam
pleof
sophisticated,legislative-executive
cooperari
tobring
about reform.
After
threeyears
of investigations, hearingsand
debate, theFISA
1
passedthe
Senatein
1978by
avote
of 95to
1.In
additionto
theR
S
law, C
ongressplaced
aten-year
termlim
iton
thedirector
ofthe
FBI
152
preventanotherJ.EdgarH
ooverfrom
emerging
andcreated
aperm
anentpanel,
theSenate
IntelligenceC
omm
ittee,w
ithauthority
overthe
federal
intelligenceagencies.
Ithinkitw
asa
historicachievem
ent,notjustfine
investigativew
orkby
ourstaff,
andnot
justresourceful
work
indrafting
the
legislation,hut
proofthatourpolitical
systemis
strongenough
andw
iseenough
toco
nfront
athreat
toour
constitutionalfram
ework,
make
corrections,and
leavethe
democracy
stronger.Am
ericansunderstood
thatleaders
oftheirgovernm
enthad
abusedthe
powers
ofoffice,and
thenthey
sawthat
we
hadtranscended
partisanshipto
investigatethose
abusesand
hadrallied
publicsupportfordram
aticand
far-reachingchanges
tothe
way
ourin
telligence
agenciesw
ork.LochJohnson
would
laterw
rite:
The
intelligenceinvestigation
of1975
must
surelyrank
asone
ofthe
most
significantinquiries
conductedby
theU
nitedStates
Senate.It
representedthe
firstseriousexam
inationof
the“dark
side”ofgovernm
entsincethe
establishmentofthe
modern
intelligencebureaucracy
in1947;
itunearthedm
oreinfi)rm
ation(m
uchof
ithighlyclassified)
fromthe
executivebranch
thanany
previouscongressional
inquiryhad
done;it
setin
mot ion
forcesthat
would
revolutionizethe
approachto
intelligencepolicy
onC
apitolH
illand,
consequently,w
ithinthe
intelligencecom
munity.
The
newsystem
changedbehavioratourintelligence
agencies.When
swore
inW
illiamW
ebsteras
FBIdirector
in1978,
Igave
hima
copyour
comm
itteereport
andtold
himto
readit
beforehe
didanything
‘else.I
thinkit
hadan
impact
onhis
tenure.Stansfield
Turner,the
CIA
directorunder
PresidentCarter,cam
eto
feelthe
same
way;
hew
rotethat
ong
congressionaloversight
“ensuresagainst
ourbecom
ingseparated
min
thelegal
andethical
standardsof
oursociety.”
George
Tenet
later-
me
thesam
ething.
When
heran
theC
IA,
hesaid,
hisagents
likedFISA
systembecause
theyknew
theauthority
ofthe
courtsstood
md
them.
Itprofessionalized
theagency
again.That
laww
orkedw
ell
Spies,Security,
andthe
Rule
ofLaw
I
153
TH
EG
OO
DF
IGH
TSpies,
Security,and
theR
uleofLaw
throughC
arter,through
Reagan, through
Bush
1,throughC
linton.They
all worked
with
it,andI began
tothink:
Now
,atleastforour generation,this
issueis settled.
Then
came
theB
ush-Cheney
administration
andthe
disasteroftheirw
aronterror.
They
tooka
horribleset ofevents—
theattacks
of9/11—and
usedthem
tocreate
aclim
ateof
fearthat
would
justifytheir
driveto
reinterpretthe
Constitution
andarrogate
greatpow
erto
themselves.
They
threwout
aconstitutional
andlegal
framew
orkthat
theyw
erepledged
toprotect
andthat
hadsurvived
throughfour
administrations
andm
orethan
two
decades.T
heydeliberately
defiedthe
FISAlaw
andundertook
illegal surveillancew
ithout seekingcourtapproval.T
heycom
missioned
legalm
emos
justifyingtorture,
thenkept
thosem
emos
secretfrom
thevery
authoritiesw
iththe
most
expertise.T
heydestroyed
tapesthat
documented
theirow
ntorture
practices—in
plaincontem
ptofthe
9/11C
omm
ission, which
hadlegal
authorityto
reviewevidence.
Atthe
coreof
allthese
activitiesw
asthe
same
dangerousprem
isew
einvesti
gatedin
theC
hurchC
omm
ittee:that the
presidentcan,unilaterallyand
insecret,do
as hechooses
despitethe
law.T
hedefenders
oftheseactivities
saidour
nationfaced
agreatthreat,
thatthey
hada
constitutional dutyto
protectthe
Am
ericanpeople.But
noone
deniesthis.W
eargued
that point,andsettled
it,duringourSenate
hearingsm
orethan
thirtyyears
ago.T
hequestion
we
consideredin
theC
hurchC
omm
itteeisnotw
hetherA
merica
needsstrong
intelligenceagencies
andsecretsurveillance
activities,
which
we
do,but
whether
thepresident,
andthe
presidentalo
r,gets
todecide
what
islegal
andw
hatis
not,w
hatviolatesthe
Constitu
tionand
what does
not.In
creatingthe
congressionalintelligence
comm
itteesand
enactizFISA
, Congress
voted,with
largebipartisan
majorities, thatthe
answ
er
no—the
president cannotarrogatethese
powers
tothe
executivebrand
or decide,in
isolation,toreinterpret standing
law.A
sFrank
Church
to_
theW
ashingtonPostin
1976, “The
lessonto
belearned
isnotjustthatilIe
gal actionsw
erejustified. R
atheritis
thatoncegovernm
entofficialsstag
believingthat
theyhave
thepow
erand
theright
toact
secretlyouts
-
thelaw
,we
havestarted
down
along,slippery
slopew
hichculm
inatesin
aW
atergate.”W
hatIfound
most
gallingafter
9/11is
thatthe
Bush
administration
couldhave
askedC
ongressto
updatethe
intelligencelaw
sand
make
themcurrent
with
developments
intechnology
andthe
terroristthreat.
But
theyhad
nointerest
inm
akingthe
laww
orkor
incooperating
with
Congress.
They
were
tryingto
buildtheir
theoryof
the“unitary
executive,”
acom
mander-in-chiefprivilege
thatwould
allowthem
tosetpolicy
withoutansw
eringto
anyonehutthem
selves.Itwas
different,intone
anddepth
andbreadth,from
anythingthis
countryhad
seenbefore.
Apresident
who
isaccountable
tono
one—not
theC
ongressor
thecourts—
isa
presidentwho
willhe
tempted
torew
ritethe
lawfor
hisow
nconvenience,
todecide
who
isan
enemy
ofthestate,
toviolate
constitutional
protectionsofour
liberties.A
systemofgovernm
entcannot
operate
thisw
ay.That
definesthe
imperialpresidency
thatgaveour
foundersnightm
ares.T
herew
illalw
aysbe
threatsto
ournational
security,and
therew
illalw
aysbesom
eonew
hoargues
thatshortcutsare
necessaryto
keepussafe.
Butthat
isno
argument
tosubvert
thelaw.
Ifyouw
antto
adaptto
newF
circumstances
ornew
threats,then
youam
endthe
law.There
isno
cvi
dencethat
Bush
andC
heneyaccom
plishedanything
bystepping
outside
[the
lawthat
theycouldn’t
haveaccom
plishedw
ithinits
boundaries.A
tofevidence
suggeststhat
what
they’vedone
hasw
eakenedA
merica.
When
youviolate
theG
enevaA
ccords,w
henyou
operateA
buG
hraih-d
Guantanam
o,when
youuse
extraordinaryrendition
totorture
peoplew
holater
turnout
tohe
innocent,youlose
respectin
thew
orld.You
crcangeragainstthe
United
Statesand
youspaw
nviolence
andem
power
rrorists.W
henyou
abusethe
toolsof
ourm
ilitaryand
intelligenceagencies,
usubvert
democracy
itself.A
mericans
wonder
why
theyshould
su
p
prt
aforeign
policyw
hoserationale
iskept
secretfrom
them,
orpar
ipatefully
intheirdem
ocracyifthe
toolsoftheirow
ngovernm
entcanturned
againstthem
when
theydissent.T
hequality
ofyourdecisionserio
ratesbecause
youare
afraidto
testthemin
openargum
ent.
1c4
TH
EG
OO
DF
IGH
T
Areassuring
cycleof
self-correctionruns
throughA
merican
history,of citizens
recognizinga
problemin
theirm
idst anddem
andingthat their
leadersaddress
it.B
utw
ecan’t
trustour
civilliberties
tosom
eabstract
theoryof history.
We
needto
takecare
of themevery
day. The
foundersleft us
agreat gift, an
elegant but durabledem
ocracythat gives
expressionto
thew
isheso
them
ajorityw
hile, byand
large, protectingthe
rightsA
them
inority.Events
will
testthat
structurefrom
time
totim
e—a
civilw
ar,aterrorist
attack—and
we
cannot simply
assume
thatit w
ill survivethe
challenge.T
helesson
of Am
ericanhistory
is that,in
threateningtim
es, fearcan-
overtakeour
betterjudgm
ent.It
happenedw
iththe
Alien
andSedition
Acts
atthe
endof
theeighteenth
century,w
iththe
Palmer
Raids
a’-’W
orldW
arI, w
iththe
internment
of JapaneseA
mericans
inthe
l94
with
J.Edgar Hoover’s
abuseof pow
erin
the1960s.W
ehave
strayedI
ourvalues
time
andagain
inour
history,alw
aysin
times
offear,and
ww
erealm
ost always
ashamed
of ourselvesw
henw
erecovered
oursenses..,
Meeting
aN
ewD
emocrat
JN
1973
AN
D1974, having
heardthe
callthatm
anysenators
hear,I took
atestrun
atacam
paignforthe
presidency.Bythattim
e1 had
worked
ona
numberofnational
issuesin
theSenate,and
Iwanted
tosee
ifIcouldhave
anational
impactw
ithvoters.
That
turnedoutto
bea
toughperiod.Iw
ason
theroad
everyw
eekendform
orethan
ayear,
raisingm
oneyand
puttingm
yselfbeforeaudiences
instates
where
I was
not well-know
n.It was
time
away
fromm
yfam
ily,fromM
innesota,andfrom
my
work
inthe
Senate.A
fterm
orethan
ayearof constant
travel,consta
nt
fund-raising,andconstant
speeches,Ihad
pulledabout
evenw
ith“N
oneofthe
Above”
innational
opinionsurveys,and
I droppedthatbid—
tow
idespreadapplause.
On
theday
IannouncedIw
asending
thatexperiment,
Ifeltahuge
ienseof
relief.A
fterthat
1had
nointention
ofgoing
backinto
thetio
nal
arena.1feltIhadfound
my
sweetspotin
theSenate.
Then
oneday
inM
ayof
1976,m
ychief
ofstaff,
Dick
Moe,
sugsted
thatwe
havecoffee
with
Hum
phrey,who
was
backin
theSenate
resentin
gM
innesota.Governor Jim
my
Carter
of Georgia
hadcom
eit
of nowhere
with
asuperb
campaign
fortheD
emocratic
presidentialm
tnination,and
thenew
spapersw
erestarting
tospeculate
aboutpos
lerunning
mates.
My
name
was
onall
thelists,
alongw
iththose
ofM
uskie,JohnG
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henpolitical
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