Monarchy Democracy 21st C

Monarchy & Democracy in the21st

Century

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transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,

2009 Seminar on Emerging Democracies in the 21st Century and for the printing

1 Monarchy and Democracy Mark Mancall 1

2 The Relevance of Hegelian Monarchy: Modern Dynasties, Political Crises and the ‘Perfect Prince’ Mark R. Thompson 19 3. The Limits of Constitutional Monarchy in Scandinavia Jørgen Elklitt and Birgitta Wistrand 40 4. Democracy and Monarchy in Thailand Dr Suchit Bunbongkarn 57

5. The Future of Thai Monarchy Kavi Chongkittavorn 65 6. Lessons from Japan’s Symbolic Monarchy Kenneth J. Ruoff 75 7. The Story of the Demise of the Monarchy in Nepal Sudhindra Sharma 84

8. Once Upon a Time: The Rise and Fall of the Nepal Monarchy Kunda M. Dixit 109 9. Media, Monarchy and the Management

Hugh O’Donnell 122

Contents

Monarchy & Democracy in the 21st Century

10. Self-Censorship: A Means to An End Kinley Dorji 137

11. The Bhutanese Media and a Democratic Constitutional Monarchy Siok Sian Pek-Dorji 150 12. Bhutan’s ‘Democratic Constutional Monarchy’: Revisiting Kingship and Democratic Transition Theories Sonam Kinga 169 13. Bhutan’s Democratic Journey Renata Dessallien 191

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Monarchy and Democracy

Mark Mancall

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The origins of the conference which gave rise to these papers derive from several different directions. First, a one-day conference was held at Stanford University in California in the spring of 2008, which took as its focus the supposed opposition between “monarchy” and “democracy”. As was pointed out by some members of the conference, this opposition made no sense either in contemporary political theory or in practice. Indeed, many monarchies are democracies (for example, Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and even Japan). While the conference passed almost as an unmarked moment in time, the supposed opposition between monarchy and democracy often appears in armchair commentary on political affairs or in ill-informed, semi-scholarly work. In light of this there was, and remains, a pressing intellectual and practical need to explore the relationship, rather than the opposition, between monarchy and democracy. This was one of the objectives of the conference held Paro, Bhutan, on May 17-20, 2009. We hope that the conference and the resulting papers will reignite a discussion in political theory about monarchy, particularly as it may evolve in the 21st century.

Second, the Kingdom of Bhutan adopted a democratic Constitution in 2008. This Constitution has been consistently described as, and in reality is, a gift from the Monarch to his people, in particular a gift from His Majesty the fourth Druk Gyalpo, the fourth King of the Wangchuck Dynasty, which has ruled in Bhutan

was signed by all members of Parliament in the presence of His Majesty the King,

March 24, 2008, under the new Constitution. From the very beginning, among the many topics discussed among the intellectuals and bureaucrats in Bhutan,

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particularly in the capital (to the extent that serious conversation about these

monarch in the new “democratic monarchical” system and, second, the degree to which the new system is truly democratic. The Constitution has not been clearly interpreted in both these areas, either institutionally by the Constitutional bodies or conversationally by those participating in the discourse. Indeed it may be argued that, within Bhutan, the discourse will persist in the future. The lack of conclusions

and of the description of the democratic institutions it established sharpened the feeling that such a conference would be useful.

We hoped that by bringing together a small group of scholars and journalists who

them new ways of thinking about the issues that face us nationally. At the same time we hoped that our experience combined with theirs would, as mentioned above, reopen the discourse about monarchy in 21st century political theory.

The conference was structured in such a way as to encourage discourse itself. The participants were asked not to write papers but only to prepare discussion notes, and the conference was conducted throughout as a conversation among the participants, gently (we hope) guided by a set of questions that we posed to each other. Only after the end of the conference were the participants asked

conference required very little guidance and moved ahead on its own momentum, each moment of participation building on what had been said previously. It was an exhilarating experience which still continues, months later, to raise issues of no little importance. At the same time we must admit honestly that the conference came to no conclusions that could be applied universally; rather, we seemed to conclude that the issue was worth further and deeper discussion as the present century wears on. From the point of view of the Bhutanese participants, all of whom shared in these opinions, we still have a long road to travel before we achieve any clarity

future will see the development of a discourse in political theory within Bhutan

contribute further to the growth of democracy and to greater clarity concerning the monarchical institution, which is so central to our very national existence.

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The conference took place, and indeed was organised, around a set of intellectual, theoretical, and historical issues which, in fact, were examined and re-examined by the participants.

It seems that there are a series of concept confusions that appear across the board in many areas of political theory, political thought, and even political action. These concept confusions may arise from different sources: for example,

institutional considerations, and, we may argue, a certain confusion develops when Western political theory confronts non-Western societies. Conversely confusion may also appear in the thought and practice of non-Western political thinkers and practitioners when they attempt to apply concepts and intellectual attitudes learned in Western institutions to their own other-than-Western societies. For instance the application of Western legal theory or Constitutional institutions to societies that already have developed their own legal procedures and institutions for resolving

no less obviously, of the mentalité of the theorists and practitioners themselves. There would seem to be a confusion between the concept of “democracy” or “democratisation”, particularly in contemporary American political thought and action, and the concept of “republicanism” or, at least, a republican form of government. (It may well be that this concept confusion is what led the Stanford conference to pose an opposition between monarchy and democracy, a fallacy that was pointed out by a member of Stanford’s own political science department who participated in the conference.) It must be pointed out that this concept confusion

many republican forms of government, such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, were patently undemocratic or even anti-democratic; similarly some undemocratic governments, such as the Spanish regime under Francisco Franco, were titularly monarchical. The institution of republican forms of government does not imply democratisation, nor does democratisation imply a republican form of government.

Another area of concept confusion seems to arise with the use of terms such as “representative democracy” in the context of elections to parliamentary institutions. The simple holding of elections is no guarantee of democracy if we judge from Soviet, Chinese, and other examples around the world. Nor does the holding of elections that lead to populating parliamentary institutions with representatives


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elected by voters participating in “legal” or “Constitutional” elections necessarily guarantee democracy. This can be seen in the frequency with which certain powers have insisted that elections be held in one or another country on the supposition that elections themselves will lead to the process of democratisation. Indeed there is no evidence to support such a conclusion when we analyse political reality. A further conceptual confusion arises between the concept “representative democracy” and something that might be called “functional democracy”. Democratic institutions may run the gamut from congregations that include the entire community of citizens (ancient Athens, for example) to those that use a variety of techniques to arrive at popular consensus in traditional villages. This kind of confusion has been recognised in recent years by some scholars who are looking at the potential for the development of democratic ways of assessing opinion that do not rest

political theory needs to take greater account of the research produced in certain areas of anthropology.

Many theorists, scholars, and policymakers, though not all by any means, share

theory qua political theory is applicable to all instances without regard to certain variables that seem to be left out of their considerations.

One variable that does not appear to be taken into consideration in contemporary discussions is that of the size of the state or polity that is the focus of attention for the theorist or the researcher. Within a European context polities such as the Dutch, the Belgian, or the Danish, to mention just a few examples, were considered “small” and some scholarship about them paid attention to that idea. However, in more modern times, the number of states that are not just small but are in many ways “tiny” – but which are still full and equal members of the international community, at least legally – has increased. In these states, where “small” or “tiny”

call into question a great deal of theory and research on political institutions based on larger societies, to the extent that the theoretical formulations and research results based on the largest societies are applied to small or tiny ones. To give but one example: how do the institutions of “representative democracy” function in a polity in which almost all the members of the politically active community know each other and are actually or putatively related to each other across class and geography? In fact what does “representation” mean in such a small but highly integrated community?

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Democratic theory also appears to have ignored the variable that may be characterised as the stage of development, economic or political, of a given polity. Some theorists of democracy appear to think that representative democratic institutions can be introduced to, or imposed on, a society regardless of its stage of development, much as certain tendencies in Communist theory thought that the stage of capitalism could be skipped and a particular society could jump immediately from feudalism to socialism. This argument frequently takes a propagandistic form for immediate political purposes, but the question needs to be raised on both theoretical and practical levels. Certainly this is easily observable in foreign policy.

Political theory, and often political practice as proposed by certain governments

states or polities to which advice is being offered. The problem becomes even more acute when the elites of other-than-Western societies adopt Western concepts and institutions without profoundly adapting them to their own polities. This situation is exacerbated by the frequent tendency to rely on outsourcing decisions to consultants who by virtue of coming from “more advanced” societies or political systems are given an authority of opinion that overwhelms local considerations. Indeed, it may not be too far-fetched to speak here of a kind of “developmentalist imperialism”, supported by the education of many members of non-Western elites in Western institutions.

In the republic of academic institutions, political theorists and, at certain levels,

that are so much the daily bread of historians and anthropologists; they have come to believe that there is something called “democracy” that is (1) an object of universal desire, and (2) a conceptual benchmark from which particular political circumstances can move a society away or toward which they can move a society. At a theoretical level, discussions of the political situation in Thailand in recent times appear to have rested upon these assumptions about the universal desirability of democracy and the measurement of progress toward or away from democracy

On both the theoretical and practical levels positions taken on the issues mentioned so far may be divided into two camps, roughly denominated “right” and “left” (in the European, not the North American, sense), for shorthand


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purposes. Take, for example, the question of the “inclusiveness” of “democracy”. The “right”, it may be argued, privileges the political institutionalisation of some form of representative or elective democracy. This theoretical position leaves open questions such as the characteristics that voters or individuals eligible for election

of these characteristics may always be negotiable, but without the existence of a set of characteristics, however they may be agreed upon, it is almost impossible to conceptualise a representative elected democracy.

The “left”, on the other hand, appears to argue from very different assumptions about the necessary prerequisites for a democracy. While the “right” may address

an approach very much in line with the “individualism” to which the right lays claim – the “left” tends to understand “democracy” in a much broader context, so theoreticians of the “left” may raise questions concerning the very possibility of political democracy in the absence of social and economic democracy. Another issue that may concern the “left” is the possibility of democracy in a society in which income differentials are so great that the possession of, or access to, money is the overwhelming characteristic of eligibility for election or for participation in decision-making. In this perspective, “representative democracy” may serve narrow class or other-group interests or even function as an empty shell serving non-democratic purposes.

To put the matter another way there is a theoretical distinction between procedural democracy, which focuses primarily on representative institutions both nationally and locally, and “substantive democracy”, which subsumes not only a genuine public accountability of representative institutions but also the democratisation of the economic, social, and other domains of collective human life.

These observations, while certainly not novel, provided the theoretical context for the Paro conference. But the conference was also contextualised by modern history, particularly since the so-called “Reagan/Thatcher revolution”. The particular chronological framework for this historical context arises from the fact that it is

consensus”, which, broadly speaking, consisted of the application of neoliberal economic theory and its domination not only of economic policymaking but

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such as Bhutan could not help but consider the future of its internal political arrangements within the context of the Washington consensus, whether Bhutan’s policymakers were completely aware of that fact or not. This is reinforced by two

without the possession of an educated elite trained in the political and economic thought and reality of the pre-Washington consensus world. The generation of leaders who eventually brought Bhutan to the point at which “democratic” institutions were introduced through the adoption of the Constitution largely experienced an external environment dominated to a remarkably great extent by the theories and practices of the Washington consensus. This, furthermore, was reinforced by the fact that the leadership generation in question was largely trained in Western institutions that were themselves both the source of and the vehicle for the propagation of the Washington consensus. (It is interesting to note here

taken place in French academic institutions at the beginning of the 1990’s, but France was not on the academic or the intellectual horizon of Bhutan.)

The basic assumptions of the Washington consensus that concern us here revolve around the idea that a free market economy is a natural phenomenon, a “force of nature”, and that it and “democracy” or “democratisation” are linked by some kind of transcendent umbilical cord, each reinforcing, feeding, the other. The acceptance of these assumptions in much of North American academia and in some British political circles resulted in an inability to hear, much less to take seriously, other

perspectives, such as Scandinavian social democracy, Japanese or Singaporean “capitalism” or, for that matter, Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness, as variants of its own perspective rather than alternatives. This tendency was strengthened by the triumphalism attendant upon the collapse of Communism in 1989 and after. In the non-Francophone West, the dominance of the Washington consensus was rooted in the marketing of its ideas through the education of students from the “developing world” and by the power of the productive economic forces and the military forces of the Anglophone West. The period from 1980 to the collapse of

therefore, the aggressive marketing of “democracy” and “democratisation” internationally, particularly its republican forms, by at least one Great Power, using all means possible.


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This, then, is the broad context within which the Paro conference took place, but no less important is the fact that it is in this same period that political thought and practice in Bhutan began to move in the direction of the adoption of a political system based upon the immediate intellectual and institutional assumptions of the Anglo-Saxon West or of its Indian derivative (remember that most Bhutanese bureaucrats possessing political views in this area were educated abroad, primarily in Anglo-Saxon or Indian academic institutions of one sort or another).

The Bhutanese ContextThe issues discussed above, often unrecognised by the Bhutanese political players themselves, also provided the context for developments in Bhutan over the last 35

of the fourth King took place on June 2, 1974, and his reign witnessed profound institutional, social and economic changes in the country. Indeed to say that it “witnessed” these changes may be something of a misnomer, since the truth of the matter is that he himself provided the vision and leadership for these changes. This was possible in part, but only in part, due to the fact that during his reign Bhutan came as close to being an absolute monarchy as possible (due to the development of means of communications and control), it being understood that when all is said and done no such thing as an “absolute” polity of any kind may ever have existed. To no small extent, it must be carefully noted, the power of the Monarch to inspire, direct, and guide the changes that Bhutan experienced in this era derived very much from the extraordinary personality of the fourth King himself.

Several developments during this period provided the immediate contextual environment for the Paro conference. First, from the fourth Druk Gyalpo’s ideas, and under his leadership, Bhutan developed, however gradually, a Bhutanese “idea” of development in all domains, an idea that has come to be known internationally as well as domestically as Gross National Happiness. The discussion of Gross National Happiness, and of its reception at home and abroad, will have to be the

image, perhaps somewhat vague to be sure, of a polity – in political, social, and

to recognise, however, that the idea and its acceptance, publically almost without question, were, and continue to be, intimately associated with the mind and personality of the fourth King within a polity that was widely considered to be an absolute monarchy.

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Under His Majesty the fourth Druk Gyalpo’s leadership Bhutan underwent a transformation (I am consciously attempting to avoid teleological terms such as “development” or “modernisation” which have become very much a part of contemporary Bhutanese political discourse). This transformation included, most profoundly, a transformation in the relationships of the means of production, a process which began during the reigns of the earlier Kings of the Wangchuck dynasty, and involved, for example, the abolition of certain pre-modern relationships between labour and land, the introduction of money, etc.

The reign of the fourth King also saw a rapid increase in urbanisation in the country and the appearance of new social classes clustered around the increasingly

from the growth of domestic educational opportunities and opportunities to study abroad as well as from the growth of international travel. Education and travel, overwhelmingly to the Anglo-Saxon West as well as to India, were the primary vehicles for the intrusion of, and eventually domination by, Western, particularly

These developments, and others too, reached a crescendo with the beginning of the

transforming a kingdom ruled by an “absolute monarch” into a polity over which a “Constitutional monarch” reigned as “head of state” in a parliamentary democracy. It needs to be clearly stated that there was no evident popular demand for such a transformation, and that, moreover, very little cultural, social, educational, or political preparation was made for the transformation. Even more to the point it is

the relationships of the means of production had reached a level where changes in political structures were required. This transformation was accomplished through

the Paro conference, radically transformed the political nature of the Bhutanese monarchy and raised the question, in both practical and intellectual terms, of the sources of legitimacy on which the throne’s authority rested.

From the perspective of the foreign observer as well as of the internal participant, the rapid and very remarkable political transformation which took

st century introduced into


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Bhutanese history and into the nation’s political, social and economic practice, a sharp discontinuity with which all concerned are still grappling in an effort to

of contradiction that throughout the 20th century the monarchy was the one truly “national” institution in the kingdom. Bhutanese thinkers are still wrestling with the implications of such a profound discontinuity, introduced by the order of an “absolute monarch” to create a “constitutional monarchy”. This is why the issue of the relationship between monarchy and democracy takes on such importance within Bhutan against the background of the experience of other transformations in different political, social, economic and cultural environments.

The Paro ConferenceThe objective of the Paro conference was to explore the theoretical bases and concepts for the study of monarchy in the various societies represented at the conference. The conversation was conducted in such a way as to encourage an in-depth exchange of ideas and experiences. Among the questions raised at the beginning were these: what are the trajectories of change that monarchy has followed in democratizing societies? What kinds of monarchies were they before they started on the trajectory of change, and how did their point of departure

social, economic, political and international forces? What are the problems they have encountered along these trajectories? How have scholars and journalists formulated these problems? What are the foundations upon which we can reignite

reintroduction of the conceptual study of monarchy into the political discourse and theory of the 21st century? What kinds or categories of monarchy are there at the present time? Are there lessons from the past that make monarchies relevant for the future?

Moving closer to the core of our issues we wanted to explore the varieties of institutional and Constitutional structures that characterise contemporary monarchies in “democratising” polities. How are contemporary monarchies in such polities constituted? The Constitution of monarchies and of monarchical legitimacy through the writing and creation of history, the use of ceremonial and public festivals, special social arrangements, and the theoretical formulations used

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to undergird the monarchical institution, the mechanisms for the construction of monarchical “charisma” in the era prior to democratisation and in the era of democratisation: these were some of the phenomenological questions raised in the discussion. These lists can only hint at the range of questions raised by the participants throughout the conference.

Given the nature and breadth of the conference it is impossible for the papers

discussion, and the excitement of the exchanges among the participants. We offer

but, rather, as spurs that we hope will lead to the return of monarchy to political discourse.

In looking for participants in this conference we were struck by the relative paucity of scholars whose main concern is monarchy. At the same time as the conference progressed, and even more so after the conference, we became aware of scholars

The existing literature on monarchy, particularly literature in the second half of the 20th century in English, is overwhelmingly a literature of nostalgia. This itself was an interesting datum.

At the same time we were not unaware of the fact that those of us who were addicted watchers of the television series “Star Trek” or continue to read science

depicted in these tales of a world not yet born, and, no less interesting, there is relatively little capitalism. We also became more aware of the fact that many “presidential” democratic systems tend toward, or often display characteristics of, monarchical systems. For example a semiological analysis of the way recent American presidents have presented themselves to the public, particularly in press conferences, suggests that a slogan “the monarchy is dead; long live the King” may not be an inapt description of the contemporary state of presidential polities.

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The papers in this volume are not intended to provide a coherent and integrated discussion of the issues surrounding monarchy and democracy in the 21st century. Rather they have two quite distinct but closely related purposes. First, the conference


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and the papers that issued from it were and are intended to provide a perspective on questions concerning the development of monarchical ideas and institutions in the environment of experimentation with democratic institutions and ideas that seem to characterize the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In this perspective the rediscovery of the “state” in contemporary political discourse and research necessarily raises the question of the varieties of states and Constitutional arrangements that are or may be appropriate to state formation and change in the particular historical conjuncture of the present and in the general, long-range process of change that characterises the economic, social, political, and environmental domains of our contemporary world. To frame the question as directly as possible, are the forms of leadership and the institutions for the public expression of opinion and the making of public decisions that seemed to be developing in many parts of the world after the end of the Second World War and even earlier, adequate to our contemporary condition? This volume, therefore, wants to not only encourage

of monarchy as a particular form of the contemporary state in future discussions.

development of approaches to the creation of a “democratic” polity, for historical

in terms of the new political system appears not to have been integrated into the broader political discourse concerning the state. As time passes it becomes evident that the Bhutanese experience may itself contribute something to the development of political thought in this area. Moreover as globalisation increasingly facilitates

discourse enriched by the kinds of changes that took place at the Paro conference.

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philosopher Hegel. This is particularly striking because rarely are the reasoning and insights of a Western philosopher applied to the analysis of a non-Western

examples drawn from different societies, is to distinguish between the Monarch

variable. Beginning his contribution with an expression of the doubts, and often

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the dismissiveness, of much of the contemporary discussion of monarchies,

for a positive role for monarchy in the present and future. Of course, the broadly accepted generalisation that progress moves from monarchy to republicanism may be questioned from the Hegelian perspective that Mark Thompson provides. The paper thus points in a potentially very productive direction for future theoretical discourse on monarchy.

The paper by Jørgen Elklit and Birgitta Wistrand goes right to the heart of the matter of monarchical political theory by revealing Scandinavian experience in this area and raising the idea that monarchies may exercise “soft power” and not just because it is constrained by democratic Constitutions but even, perhaps, because of that. They suggest that the monarchy may have a stronger role than suspected precisely because its role as manifest in the formal institutions of a monarchical state may be left, perhaps even purposely, amorphous.

Dr. Suchit Bunbongkarn discusses monarchy, the Thai monarchy in particular, as an instrument to “maintain peace, stability, and unity amidst political turmoil

monarchy, for reasons of history and experience, can play a role that mediates between demands for the growth of democracy and the forces or conditions that may hinder or oppose such a growth; moreover he argues that, again for historical reasons, the monarchy can contribute to , but not ensure that, democratic development will be “peaceful and sustainable”. To some extent, this view redesigns in democratic terms the traditional role of the Thai monarch, at least as it has been constituted since the middle of the 19th century. Monarchy, thus understood as playing a mediating role, serves, as it were, as a midwife in the birth of a new democratic system if, of course, the other powers that are at play permit it to do so. This argument resonates strongly with arguments in other papers in this volume. It is suggestive of the role of the media discussed in Siok Sian Pek-Dorji’s paper and of the role of the monarchy discussed in Kenneth Ruoff ’s contribution, among others. On another level, Dr. Suchit’s paper may lead in the direction of a different analytical perspective: can we, or should we, consider the existence of monarchy as an independent variable in understanding violence in democratic transitions?

Kavi Chongkittavorn points very clearly to the fact that consideration of the monarchy must take into account the other political institutions and social classes


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in the midst of which the monarchy performs its functions and against the background of which the monarchy has to take into account and be accountable for the welfare of the people and the nation as a whole. This essay appears at a particularly sensitive moment in the history of the Thai polity, but its application makes a point valid for monarchy in general, when it suggests that the King (by extension not only the Thai king) has a role to “continue to serve as the head of state and symbol of unity…”. Kenneth J. Ruoff brings our attention to at least two important facets of the conversation. First, he makes it clear that the symbolic function of the monarchy may well be no less important, indeed in some cases may be even more important, than its political function. Second, he clearly sees the potential of monarchy as an agent for positive political and social change in a society. It may be precisely because the Monarch is above politics that he or she has the ability to serve as a positive agent of change in the face of, or despite, the political interests that lodge in the “democratic” institutions of the state.

Sudhindra Sharma’s article, “The Story of the Demise of Nepal’s Monarchy”, provides us with a very analytical overview of the history of the Nepalese monarchy. In several ways it stands in contrast to the story told by Sonam Kinga and is, therefore, very instructive. Several elements require noting: the role of the monarchs’ personalities; the inability of either the monarchy or the political leadership to develop a coherent position about democratisation and to sketch, agree upon, and follow a single path from their present to the future; the importance historically of violence in an extremely segmented society, leading eventually to radical demands and to armed struggle for change (if not necessarily

particular event. More broadly, the Nepalese story includes three elements that were absent in the transition that Bhutan has undergone: (1) The international

was the relatively more obvious than in other situations. (2) Domestic politics took place at a certain distance from the people themselves, doubtless due to the fact that caste combined with class produced in Nepal a society so segmented that those above do not think it necessary to take into consideration those below. (3)

apparently leaderless process of political change. Sharma’s paper demonstrates,

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such historical complexity. The contrast with Bhutan’s carefully guided process of change could not be more marked and suggests the role that intelligent leadership from above may play in 21st century democratisation processes.

Monarchical failure, the subject of Kunda Dixit’s contribution, provides much material for speculation and theorising. It is obvious that the personality of the Monarch and the Monarch’s relatives is a political factor that must always be taken into account. (Of course, the same may be said of non-monarchical polities as well, and a certain surprise must be expressed at fact that the role of personality is taken into theoretical account far less than history suggests it should be.) This is by no means a consideration that has been unremarked, but its importance may be of

different systems may need to take “incidental variables” such as personality into greater account than they do. The second observation that Dixit makes, and which

with which the “Nepalis have forgotten that the country was ever a monarchy…”. To put it perhaps more abstractly than the author intended, memory and the monarchy exist in a dialectical relationship characterised by some tension, and the Monarch and other powers that exist in any given monarchical polity must pay attention to the dynamics of this relationship if monarchy is going to be able to provide future focus and stability.

Hugh O’Donnell, discussing the experience of the Spanish monarchy, warns against the emergence of what he calls “celebrity monarchy”, that is to say, monarchy as entertainment (and, we may add, of both the highest and the lowest kind) and, at

history carried on into the present and future and a channel for emotion that may contribute positively to the national stability in the midst of crisis.

Kinley Dorji’s essay on self-censorship brings into the discussion of monarchy, and even more important, into the discussion of democracy broadly conceived, the issue of censorship not as a means of oppression to retain a system that would otherwise falter but, perhaps less noticed and remarked upon, self-censorship as a means for maintaining and strengthening a particular monarchical system. He also points to the ways in which certain forms of verbal expression lodged deeply in a particular culture may have political and institutional implications that go beyond


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the observations of anthropologists. Restraint in expression as a positive political phenomenon may be simply contrasted with the forced restraint of expression in most democratic societies, which is considered a very negative value.

Siok Sian Pek-Dorji’s contribution is instructive about the role of the media in coherent change, in Bhutan’s case from a monarchy to democracy. What is

upon to play in such a transition. On the one hand the media must exercise their democratic responsibility to develop healthy critical and analytical attitudes, and, on the other hand, the media must also exercise their historical and political responsibility to sustain the determined steadiness of the transition. In Bhutan, this is further complicated by the fact that to all intents and purposes the media themselves have come into existence and developed alongside, and in conjunction with, the new political system. While this complicates matters in the particular case, more broadly it suggests that the media cannot be considered a separate “system” over and against the political system but, quite the contrary, must be considered an integral part of systemic change without becoming the automatic instrument of the agents of change. If we consider the media themselves to be agents of change, then perhaps the support of the media by the monarchy can be understood in terms of cooperation toward a shared goal. If this is the case, it may be useful as

also as potential critical allies of the other agents of change, functioning more as a gyroscope than as an instrument of ideology or an attack animal.

Sonam Kinga suggests the possibility, indeed perhaps the importance, of questioning many theoretical propositions about the transition to democracy that are essential to Western thought given the Bhutanese experience. This raises a

reformulation simply by assigning Bhutan the status of singularity. He himself suggests this possibility in his conclusion. On the other hand, he also suggests that it may be the accepted theories themselves that require reformulation in light of Bhutan’s experience. It is not too extreme to suggest that political theory in the modern and contemporary world has been primarily Western political theory; international applicability may derive from forces other than the explanatory power of Western thought. This leaves us with one of several very limited possibilities. We may continue the present practice of exceptionalising experience that does not

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into account experiences other than those from which Western theory has been derived. We may abandon the attempt to arrive at a universal theory, at least at the present time. Sonam Kinga’s paper provides theoretical challenges as well as historical information.

The paper by Renata Dessallien provides an instructive contrast to the story told in arguments made by Sudhindra Sharma. In fact, the story of Bhutan’s political transition would seem to be almost precisely the opposite of Nepal’s. Dessallien

well-placed leader (in contrast, perhaps, to a politician) as the crucially distinctive variable. Almost inevitably, or at least in some way logically, the discussion must lead to another question: what kind of “democracy” can be expected to develop from the kind of leadership that Dessallien describes, absent any real popular demand or any decisive eventual conjuncture, such as a rising against an oppressive ruler. It is already very clear that uprising and social violence against tyranny and repression are no guarantees of democratisation. What both Sonam Kinga and Renata Dessallien seem to insist upon is a theoretical account of the appearance and strategies of carefully guided leadership at the beginning of, and in the process of, conscious political evolution of a polity.

It is a commonplace in western democratic theory to suggest the important role of the bourgeois class in the demand for, and the process of, democratisation. Neither the Bhutanese nor the Nepalese examples discussed in some of these papers suggest that the bourgeois class played any role. The papers on Thailand, as well as other commentary do not suggest that the Thai monarchy’s role in that society rose from or even attended closely to the interests of the bourgeoisie. The same seems to be true in Japan. If this is the case, then the experience of political “democratic” change outside of the West may call into question the universality of the claims made, both theoretically and politically, for the central role of the bourgeoisie in the process of democratisation. And, if that is the case, this may also have implications for the claims made for the social and political consequences of one, as opposed to another, theory and politics of economic development.

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The remarks provided above on each of the papers included in this volume are, it goes without saying, very subjective. I can only hope that the authors will forgive me


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if I have misrepresented their arguments or have neglected what they themselves think is important in them. However, they all seem to point to an exciting and important conclusion: the question of monarchy must move into the domain a of political and social theory and of political science, transcending anecdote and the kind of history writing that have characterised much of the discussion of monarchy in the last century. This book will have achieved its purpose if it both focuses the attention of scholars and theorists on Bhutan and, at the same time, serves as a

Mark Mancall is Professor Emeritus of History at Stanford University, California, USA.

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The Relevance of Hegelian Monarchy:Modern Dynasties, Political Crises, and the “Perfect Prince”

Mark R. Thompson

2

When thinking about monarchy in the early 21st century one might be struck by how irrelevant or anachronistic it is often considered - the former when it is constitutional and institutionalised, the latter when it is absolute and arbitrary.

Scandanavian monarchies come to mind - see the contribution by Jorgen Ploen Elklit in this volume) or it makes the wrong kind of difference (e.g., the autocratic monarchies of the Middle East - see Michael Herbs book All in the Family: Absolutism and Democratic Prospects in the Middle Eastern Monarchies). Based on the dynastic principle monarchy might seem out of step with the meritocratic ideology that supposedly dominates the modern age. Although monarchy is clearly compatible with democracy if it is “constitutionalised” (e.g., the United Kingkom or Sweden), a philosophical tension remains (most simply illustrated by the difference between the words “citizen” and “subject”). So if monarchy is to be appropriately modern, it must become irrelevant, not interfering with democratic legitimation by popular rule. If it is more than that, it becomes a nuisance if not a positive danger to

sociologist Weber famously foresaw replacing traditional legitimacy in the process of modernisation. On the other hand, both in the papers in this volume and elsewhere, Bhutanese commentators and observers of Bhutan mostly argue that without the strong leadership and continued guidance of the monarchy neither modernisation nor democratisation would have taken the relatively peaceful path they have there.

It is not easy to seek counsel on this issue from the realm of political theory as most

One of the few exceptions in this regard is Hegel who embraced constitutional

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monarchy.1 His defense of monarchy against the enlightenment onslaught (and its seeming political expression in the French Revolution) was robust: in the Philosophy of Right (1820/2001) he not only argued that a constitutional monarchy could be considered a “rational” form of government, it was actually the most rational form imaginable. He did not mean this just for Prussia (while making clear he opposed the restoration of absolute monarchy which conservative thinkers of his time proposed) but as a form of government generally. Hegel’s advocacy of monarchy (as this principle was embodied in his philosophy of history) has been an embarrassment to his often otherwise admiring commentators - Marx excepted, of course, who was not stinting in his scorn of Hegel on this issue (Marx, 1970/1843-44). Most interpreters found it best to ignore these residues of the past that clung to Hegel’s shoes while he peered so presciently into the future.

But it is useful for our purposes here to take Hegel as a guide when looking into the relevance of the monarchy in the modern age, which I will do in the next section of this paper. He may well be a bit overenthusiastic at times (going so far as to advocate a monarch’s divine right to rule), but his views are a useful counterpoint to the skepticism that dominates most contemporary considerations of monarchy. In particular he argues that hereditary succession is a crucial aspect of monarchy and that the role of the monarch should be strictly limited. I will

is suddenly abolished. To understand how important something was it is helpful to consider what happens when it is gone. The next part examines the dynamics of monarchy’s underlining principle—hereditary succession. Here my approach is to ask how this precept has survived in politics in modern societies in the form of political dynasties and what importance it has. This, in turn, will lead me back

I will ask how monarchies have reacted in critical situations. Despite the large variation between the various crises monarchies have faced in Asia and Africa, a fundamental distinction emerges: situations in which the monarch’s intervention is seen as politically neutral and those in which the monarchy is perceived to have acted in a partisan fashion. This will bring me back to Hegel’s key argument about monarchy: that the prince must stay above the political fray and, in fact, who the prince is should not actually matter at all (a very counterintuitive claim as the credibility, and even survival of many modern monarchies seems to rest on the personality and political skill of the current king).

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Hegel’s Defense of Constitutional MonarchyHegel’s position on monarchy has been subject to much misunderstanding. Many commentators have reacted with incredulity that monarchy can be rationally

interpreters have faced:

Is the institution of hereditary monarchy a merely given and natural foundation to government that betrays the Cartesian-Kantian revolution through a return to medieval forms grounded upon what lies beyond human reason? Is Hegel betraying his own fundamental philosophical insights in order to conform his argument to the historical reality given in his time?... In the interest of defending Hegel, certain commentators have, against Hegel’s own expressed intentions, radically historicized his claim to the rationality of these institutions, without clarifying why constitutional monarchy appears unacceptable in our own times. Should this contemporary shift away from monarchy be understood as an historical refutation of the rationality Hegel sees in this form of government? Or, conversely, are our contemporary attitudes towards monarchy merely irrational prejudices from a Hegelian perspective? (2004)

Hegel’s argument in favor of retaining a constitutional monarchy, formulated in the wake of the French revolution, was reformist, not reactionary. He warned that the excesses of the French revolution threatened the very freedoms that it had initiated. But Hegel also distanced himself from conservative Prussian thinkers such as K.L. von Haller who wanted to free the crown from constitutional constraints and make it the sole source of law. (Hegel, in turn, was subject to harsh criticism by Prussian reactionaries.) Hegel had close connections with several Prussian reformers – Stein, Hardenberg, and Altenstein. In fact it was Altenstein who was instrumental in offering Hegel a professorship in Berlin because he found his reformist views attractive (Beiser 2005). Hegel rejected an absolute monarchy freed from legislative and executive restraints, envisioning instead a sovereign whose role was primarily

of freedom he derived from the French Revolution, but saw in constitutional monarchy the best way in which it could be upheld and preserved (Ritter 1965).For Hegel, a political state is rational to the extent that it undergoes inner differentiation in accordance with the nature of concept (Begriff) of the state itself

The Relevance of Hegelian Monarchy: Modern Dynasties, Political Crises, and the “Perfect Prince"

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(Diamond 2004). Monarchy represents the most rational form of the modern state because it, more than any other form of government, realises the ideal of freedom that underlies the concept, or idea, of the state (Beiser 2005). This claim

disappeared; but this does not necessarily prove that monarchy is not adequately rational, only that this rationality is no longer as readily apparent as it was in an earlier age in which such state forms were more common (Yack).

A constitutional monarchy is a mixed form of government in the sense that Montesquieu understood it as a “guarantee of public freedom” (1820/2001). It is composed of the legislative, the executive, and the sovereign. The legislature makes general laws and thus represents the principle of universality. The executive

laws applied particularly and thus embodies both the legislative and executive components as an individual (Beiser 2005). This leads Hegel to the metaphysical or systematic claim that as sovereign only the monarch can represent the concept/idea of the state. Marx denounced Hegel on this point for “twisting” the “empirical fact” of the monarch representing national sovereignty “into a metaphysical axiom” (Marx 1943-44/1970). Frederick Beiser offers a more positive interpretation of Hegel’s position on the monarchy and the idea of the state:

While Hegel gives more weight to his systematic argument that any prudential consideration about the best form of government…, the fact remains that his systematic argument is best understood in the light of his claim that constitutional monarchy provides the best institutional safeguards for freedom. Since the idea of the state is based on freedom, and since constitutional monarchy realizes freedom more than any other form of government, it follows that constitutional monarchy is the highest realisation of the idea of the state. (2005)

Hegel argued that constitutional monarchy evolved through two historical steps and was based on the hereditary principle. He believed human history to be a series of stepping-stones that led to the gradual realishistorical stage of constitutional monarchy involved citizens transferring their individual natural wills to the monarch to escape the hazards and uncertainties of the divided sovereignty characteristic of the Middle Ages and the early Renaissance

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period. As one person, the monarch is an indivisible power that better represents sovereignty than a legislature that can be divided against itself (Diamond 2004).

by contract, who can hold him responsible for his actions. Hegel even adds to the monarchy’s exalted status by suggesting it possesses a divine right to rule (Beiser 2005). Yet such transcendental speculation does not lead Hegel to claim that the monarch has, or deserves, absolute power.

For after sovereignty had been gathered into the hands of an absolute monarch, the next stage in Hegel’s account of the evolution of the state was the self-differentiation of the political system. The granting of rights to the particular spheres of civil society, on the one hand, and the division of powers between the executive and legislative, on the other, led to an enormous increase in individual freedom. This dual process of increasing personal security and granting civil rights created a strong sense of obligation by the citizenry towards their enlightened sovereign. This, in turn, helped stabilise human liberty through a longstanding institution, something which the French Revolution with its radical republicanism failed to accomplish.2

Hegel had a holistic view of the state. In the state, each part exists for the whole and the whole exists for the part. Thus, the individual is both means and ends for the state. This is how Hegel is able to derive both individualist and collectivist conclusions about the state: while the individual’s rights must be upheld by the state, the individual must devote himself to affairs of the state.3 Hegel argued that the Greeks and the Romans did not know the Christian principle of subjectivity, the idea of the freedom of the individual. They propagated only collective, political freedom involving the proper action of citizens acting according to laws they had themselves created. Only the advent of Christianity led to a higher understanding of the importance of individual freedom. (But Hegel also criticised those Christian

the case that he upheld some fundamental liberal values…True to his respect for such rights, Hegel


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theologians who placed the highest good in other-worldly salvation, not in the realization of human freedom in the world.)

The monarchy protects individual interest from clashing with the public good in the ideal constitutional state or, as it were, Christian-inspired liberty with the Greek idea of the polis. For the monarch symbolises the universal will of the sovereign state against the particular wills of individuals operating within civil society. A well functioning state must not allow particular wills to become ends in themselves. State power must be predominant, precluding the potential chaos of civil society. The monarch proclaims the decisions of the state, showing that their necessarily arbitrary character has its logic in the universal claims of the state. As Diamond writes, “the ‘majesty of the monarch’ lies in the free asserting of ‘I will’ as an

This linear historical process which Hegel describes may seem paradoxical because, like Montesquieu, Hegel believed that the best constitution for a nation derived

He writes that “every nation has a constitution appropriate to it and suitable to it” (Hegel 1830/2001).4 Hegel argues that monarchy is particularly well equipped to embody national character and constitutional continuity as it has often been linked to a country’s history over generations. Hegel’s position also allows the conclusion that because it well represents the nation and its culture, the monarchy is best able to steer a nation through crisis (Diamond 2004). Beiser summarises Hegel’s position this way:

Ultimately, the monarch plays essentially a formal role in the Hegelian state, serving as the “highest instance of formal decision.” Yet this symbolic

unity, sovereignty, and culture of the people. (2005)

But this culturalist perspective does not lead Hegel to depart from his claim about the universal rationality of monarchy. Hegel presumes an inner unity of world

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history in which there are countries/cultural regions lower down in the civilisation hierarchy as opposed to those which have achieved a higher stage.5 For Hegel, not just Prussia alone has reached this point of historical development (Beiser 2005). It had become widespread in Western Europe and was part of a necessary historical transformation because it best guaranteed freedom - Hegel’s teleological endpoint of the development of the state. 6

Monarchy must be based on hereditary succession, Hegel argues.7 This means, of course, that who succeeds as king is arbitrary, a kind of genetic lottery. The new monarch may or may not be virtuous, enlightened or not. But given the legislative and executive constraints on the monarchy, it does not really matter who the monarch is. Diamond writes:

The natural immediacy of succession through primogeniture precludes

as monarch, dictating that the monarch will come from this certain position in this particular family. From the perspective of the “‘understanding,” this seems to root irrationality in the very apex of the state…[Hegel] argues that in a fully evolved constitutional state, the particularity of the monarch, which admittedly is wholly contingent, should play no role in determining the general will, since the legislative and executive powers together will propose laws and decisions which require nothing but the formal approval of the monarch to enact them. The monarch in this state acts only in concord with the other two powers, and the laws and their application are brought into existence not through the monarch’s uninformed and arbitrary whim, but only after having passed through the entire political process. (2004)


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The hereditary succession places the monarch above an elite faction. The principle of primogenitor insures for Hegel that who becomes king will be depoliticised, or, in his words, that “all fractious disputes are avoided” (a highly dubious interpretation of the history of monarchies!). Hegel concludes with the simple claim that the “principle of state must be such that the private character of its occupant [i.e., the

sole function of monarchy is to provide the state with agency, making the personal traits of the monarch irrelevant (Diamond 2005). The personality of the monarch

monarchy. Monarchs must follow the advice of his ministers, and thus cannot be held accountable for their actions. Hegel thus writes of the monarchy in a crucial passage in the Philosophy of Right:

In a completely organised state, it is only a question of the culminating point of formal decision…he has only to say “yes” and dot the “i”…In a well organised monarchy, the objective aspect belongs to the law alone, and the monarch’s part is merely to set to the law the subjective “I will.” (1820/2001)

When Monarchy is AbolishedIn his famous study of interwar democracies in Political Man the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset pointed to the “absurd fact” that those countries which had retained constitutional monarchies had more stable democratic orders than those which had become republics (1959). He argued that the deep-seated social and political changes linked to industrialisation had made the institution of the monarchy largely irrelevant. But preserving the monarchy did help retain the loyalty of those groups that felt they were losers in modernisation: the old aristocracy, traditionalists, clerics, and peasants. The continued existence of the monarchy showed that the world they once knew was not entirely lost and that the new world could gradually be adapted to. He cited the examples of Britain, Scandanavia, the Lowland countries, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. On the other hand, France, Germany, and Austria had been plagued by social instability and political unrest since the abolition of the monarchy.

The experience of the Chinese (1911), Russian (1917), and German (1918-19) Revolutions suggest that the abolition of the monarchy leads to a common outcome: a massive legitimation crisis and a radical decline in human freedom.

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What Peter Berger has termed the “sacred canopy” is torn away (1967). A metaphysical vacuum emerges. After all, the monarchy had been the focal point of cultural continuity involving a sacral system connecting heaven and earth. In his famous study of Nazism, Eric Voegelin argued secularisation led to the rise of “political religions” (1938/2000). With the transcendence of traditional religion destroyed, revolutionaries, left and right, attempted to create heaven on earth by deifying a concept such as “class” or “race”. The terror of the French revolution, the rise of Maoism in China, Stalinism in Russia/the Soviet Union, and Nazism in Germany make Voegelin’s argument seem plausible in these three post-revolutionary, republican contexts.

This is not, of course, to suggest, that the abolition of monarchy is a monocausal explanation for the rise of totalitarian political religions, nor are they necessarily linked. Rather, the suggestion here is that the abrupt abolition of monarchy

meaning can lead to rapid radicalisation, particularly if other aggravating factors (economic crises, lost wars, political turmoil, etc.) intervene. It is interesting to

(but ultimately unsuccessfully, despite several attempts in France) restored. Even

of monarchy, as Napoleon’s coronation as emperor demonstrates. In Germany the presidency of Paul von Hindenburg, the famous World War I general and

Ersatzmonarchie ("monarchical substitute"). Mao has been compared with traditional Chinese emperors (Salisbury 1992). More generally the modern institution of the presidency has been viewed as a substitute for the monarchy. The strong French presidency under de Gaulle and more recently the revived Russian presidency under Putin became political spearheads for resurgent states. In both the French and the Russian cases, the rise of a powerful presidency seemed to put an end to a long period of turbulence (in France a period of about 150 years!) that began with the abolition of the monarchy.

All of this seems to provide support for Hegel’s position. Monarchy represents political continuity; its abolition discontinuity. The political disruption that Hegel had seen in the French revolution was repeated in the Chinese, Russian, and German revolutions, for example. Jacobian excesses plagued all “totalitarian democratic” revolutions proclaimed in the name of freedom but ultimately undermined it by


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destroying the institutions that could protect it (Talmon 1952/1970). Constitutional monarchies in Europe proved one of the most effective guarantees of individual freedoms and an effectively functioning polity as Hegel would have expected and Lipset’s observation suggests. Thus constitutional monarchies do indeed seem to help realise the “idea of the state” in terms of the preservation of human freedom in Hegel’s terms.

The Continued Relevance of Dynasticism in the Modern WorldIn the Weberian tradition, dynastic rule is seen as the mark of traditional rule par excellence. One rules not because one has,capable but because one happens, by chance, to be born in the right family. In the discussion of regime types, neo-Weberian scholars have developed the notion of (neo-) “sultanism” - an extreme form of personalistic rule based on dynasticism (Chehabi and Linz 1998). Drawing on Weber’s (historically misleading) analogy between extremely arbitrary traditional rule and “sultanism” in the Ottoman empire, the argument is that in modern times political rule can degenerate from institutionalised government to arbitrary rule based largely on the will of one person. Lacking a strong party or support in the military, this “neo-Sultan” turns to his family and, in particular, his son or wife, to preserve his grip on power. The Somozas in Nicaragua (Anastasio Somoza Garcia, Luis Somoza Debayle, and Anastasio Somoza Debayle), “Papa” and “Baby Doc” (Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier) in Haiti, the Castros (Fidel and Raul), the Kims in North Korea (Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and his supposedly annointed son-successor, Kim Jong-un), the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran (Reza Shah Pahlavi and his son Mohammad), the Ceausescu clan in Romania (Nicolae, his wife Elena and his son Nicu) in Romania, and the “conjugal dictatorship” in the Philippines (Ferdinand E. Marcos with his wife Imelda) are examples of this phenomenon.8 Sultanistic rule is despotic rule. Regime institutionalisation is undermined by the personality cult of the ruler which does not serve an ideology but only family interests. Even the traditionalist-style legitimacy some of these rulers seek (such as the Shahs in Iran) turns out to be little more than a cover for personal rulership, neither constraining their rule in any meaningful way nor raising their standing in the eyes of the public (who mostly come to see them as usurpers).

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This view is close to Hegel’s criticism of absolute monarchy. Having gathered state power in the monarchy, the next historical “stage” is “missed” because instead of dividing power with the executive and legislative and granting rights to the people, the ruler consolidates all power in his own person to be exercised entirely at his own discretion. “Neo-sultanism” shows the dangers of absolute dynasticism.

Neo-sultanistic rule tends to arise in the midst of a crisis of sovereignty (Chehabi and Linz 1998), roughly parallel to Hegel’s argument about divided sovereignty in the Middle Ages. Kim Il-sung took power in a divided Korea; Nicolae Ceasusescu came to predominance in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, making a sharp break with the Soviets with his condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; Fidel Castro seized power as Cuba was still under the sway of U.S. (neo-) imperialism. These leaders often quite successfully strengthened their countries’ sovereignty and national pride, building their cults of personality around nationalism. But lacking constitutional constraint, the behavior of these dynasts became increasingly arbitrary. What begins to matter most in the state is the character of the ruler. Among sultanistic rulers, the personality of the prince is all important, which makes it, in the Hegelian framework, a degenerate state form.

More benign forms of hereditary rule also exist in the modern world. An under-reported and analysed issue in U.S. politics is the role of dynasties in politics there. While the Bush and Kennedy (and the would-be Clinton) presidential dynasties are well known, these tend to be treated as uninteresting exceptions (Phillips 2004). In fact, dynasticism is widespread in U.S. politics. Almost every U.S. state has powerful local dynasties (one famous example is the dynasty established by Huey Long in Louisana). The U.S. Senate has a long tradition of dynasties. It is not uncommon for wives to follow their deceased husbands into senate positions, congressional seats, or governorships (Kincaid 1978). One key to understanding dynasties in the U.S. is the absence of strongly institutionalised political parties. Without them, political families have the advantage both of a “brand name” and extensive political networks which prove decisive in “weak” parties that rely largely upon

of dynasties with certain social-cultural traditions (the social liberalism of the Kennedys, for example, which was strongly emphasised in eulogies for Ted Kennedy in August 2009).

As is well known, dynasties are also widespread in Japanese politics (Curtis 2000 and Itoh 2003). The most recent elections in Japan in August 2009 pitted two scions of


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political dynasties against one another. The grandfathers of Yukio Hatoyama, who led his opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to victory, and of Taro Aso, the defeated prime minister and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), had fought over the founding of the LDP in 1955, switching off in that year as prime ministers. In Japanese politics, sons often succeed their fathers as MPs in the National Diet in order to keep the political faction that had backed the father together. Even the reformist former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi broke with

the Diet. He won despite massive LDP losses (“Railing Against” 2009). Without a

groups, giving other major factions a competitive advantage. This corresponds to Hegel’s point that hereditary succession helps to avoid factionalism.

But the modern example of dynasticism that I think most clearly illustrates Hegel’s argument about the importance of the hereditary principle is that of dynastic female leaders in Asia (Thompson 2004). In eight Asian countries female leaders have followed their fathers or husbands as national leaders or as heads of the opposition (Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka). But the most relevant cases of dynastic female leadership for our purposes here are those in which female leaders represent the national identity in succession to their state founding fathers (Aung San Suu Kyi and her father Aung San, the Gandhi women and Nehru, Megawati and Sukarno). This is close to Hegel’s point about hereditary monarchy symbolising national culture. These independence leaders in Asia embodied the nation-state, a quality which they passed on to their daughters. As the daughters (or wives) of nation founders, female leaders’ acquired what can be termed “inherited charisma”. Weber understood charisma as a form of authority that rests on leaders’ exceptional (außeralltäglich) qualities, extraordinary insights, heroic character, and profound sanctity, giving them superhuman or even supernatural powers. Weber adds that

will seek a mechanism that enables charismatic rule to be extended to the next

search (e.g., the choice of the new Dalai Lama) or an institutional election (e.g., the choice of a Pope) (Weber 1948/1922). But the claim that charisma is inheritable is also common. Because they are viewed from a gendered perspective, it is not expected that female leaders compete in terms of personal qualities with their male predecessor. Although some female leaders are/were undoubtedly outgoing

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and capable (Indira Gandhi and Aung San Suu Kyi come to mind), others are noteworthy for their retiring, even shy public natures. In Indonesia Megawati Sukarnoputri’s reticence is legendary – she often refuses to say anything at all about key issues (Ricarda Gerlach in Derichs and Thompson, forthcoming, argues that for Megawati “silence is golden”). The personality of the “princess” in this case is not crucial, rather it is her dynastic role that is central.

What matters is less their personal qualities, than the fathers or husbands they represent, who in turn symbolise (one version of) national identity. When voting for one of the Gandhi women (or men, including the martyred Rajiv), Indians pay tribute to Nehru’s vision of a secular India. A similar argument can be made about popular support in Burma/Myanmar for Aung San Suu Kyi as a continuation of the respect shown toward her father Aung San’s vision for a civilian run and a multicultural Burma, opposing the current military and Burman-centric rule of the generals. Interestingly in this regard, the divisiveness in recent Bangladesh politics can largely contributed to the “duelling ladies”, Sheikh Hasina Wajed and Khaleda Zia, who have alternated as prime minister since 1991 (excepting the brief military coup of 2007 largely provoked by their feuding). These two women not only represent men who were political rivals (Sheikh Hasina accuses Khaleda Zia’s husband, Ziaur Rahman, of masterminding the assassination of her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in order to seize power for himself) but also competing notions of what kind of nation Bangladesh should be. For Sheik Hasina, upholding her father’s legacy as the country’s “founding father”, it is a Bengali-based nationalism. Khaleda Zia, on the other hand, follows her assassinated husband’s call for the Islamisation of Bangladesh as the basis of a stronger national identity (Ricarda Gerlach, “Female Leadership and Dueling Dynasties in Bangladesh” in Derichs and Thompson, forthcoming).

Except Indira Gandhi all recent dynastic female leaders in Asia have been the widows, wives, or daughters of “martyred” male leaders who were assassinated, executed, or imprisoned by non-democratic regimes or their political opponents. After their assassination (Mujib and Zia of Bangladesh, Aung San of Burma,

of Pakistan) or arrest (Sukarno of Indonesia, who died under house arrest and Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia, who has since been released and has now returned to politics) became heroes, their jail cells or graves ritual pilgrimage sites. This “martyrdom” of male politicians in these Asian countries became the chief moral resource with which the opposition could mobilise support against a dictatorship,


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leading in some cases to immediate opposition mobilisation (in the Philippines after the Aquino assassination and in Malaysia after Anwar Ibrahim’s arrest) or to later protests in which their legacy was invoked.

Despite the political advantages of martyrdom, the death or imprisonment of an opposition leader posed grave dangers to his or her family’s political interests. Like sons succeeding their fathers as MPs in Japan, hereditary succession held

personalistic parties/factions once held together by the martyred leader’s charisma and authority faced damaging internal splits during subsequent power struggles. Moreover there were fears that other parties or factions might aspire to opposition leadership, taking advantage of protests for their own ends. A successor was sought from within the martyr’s family to preserve unity and restore the group’s strength.

successors instead? In part leadership was thrust upon them because males were unable, unwilling or unsuited to assume leadership of the family-based faction.

However women were chosen to lead simply for want of male relatives. For one thing, they seemed less threatening to other would-be faction leaders, making it easier for potential rivals to unite behind them. Also, it was thought that, despite assuming the dynastic mantle, women would leave real control to male party leaders. Arriving in London exile in 1984, Benazir Bhutto was chosen as the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) leader by the party “uncles” because “they assumed she would serve primarily as a symbol.”9 In the Philippines, a divided opposition ultimately agreed on Cory Aquino as its presidential candidate. Her chief rival, Salvador Laurel,

him. In Malaysia, Wan Azizah’s gender and political inexperience seemed to be the

along religious and ethnic lines. Female relations of martyred male politicians were best able to unite political factions because their leadership was seen as largely symbolic.

Still we must ask why women were considered for leadership succession at all given the highly patriarchal character of these societies. Several female leaders faced openly paternalist/religious objections to their rule. For example key Muslim politicians in both Indonesia and Pakistan protested strongly against Megawati and

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Benazir Bhutto becoming president or prime minister, respectively, claiming this to be incompatible with Islam. Bhutto died at the hands of Islamist terrorists. Many male rivals (and sometimes even the female leaders’ husbands!10) could not come to terms with a woman running the country which, as the ideology of patriarchy claimed, was a man’s job.

One reason women could be chosen as leaders despite such paternalism is their high social standing. Kinship trumped gender. In the case of Bangladesh, Najma Chowdhury has suggested that “the emergence of Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia in political leadership roles represents a paradox in a patriarchal culture that is best explained by their kinship linkages to male authority” (Chowdhury 1994). The exceptional political situation created by martyrdom made it more tolerable to break with traditional female roles. As Benazir Bhutto wrote about her anti-Zia campaigns: “There was no resistance to me ... as a woman, even in these where

of my family, of all of us, had risen above the barrier of gender” (Bhutto 1989).

But more important still, in the context of political crisis following the martyrdom of an opposition politician, the gendered female role suddenly became a distinct political advantage. In societies where women were traditionally seen as apolitical, dynastic female leaders were perceived as standing above the political fray. They were accidental politicians, reluctantly joining the political arena for a great cause, not male machiavellis engaged in pursuing their own interests. Chosen because of their blood or marriage ties to martyred leaders, they were less likely to be thought of as representing a particular political faction or group. Often portraying themselves as “simple housewives” to emphasize their reluctance to take up the heavy duty of political responsibility, they were cast as (female) “saints” against (male) “sinners”, as was the case between Corazon C. Aquino and Ferdinand E. Marcos in the Philippines (Derichs and Thompson, forthcoming).

Monarchy in the Midst of Crisis: Nepal, Lesotho, and ThailandGiven Hegel’s historicist argument about monarchy embodying the state and sanctifying national culture, it is not surprising that monarchal institutions appear to help their countryies cope with political crises centered around national identity.

10


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Flemings and Walloons have long ago resulted in the break-up of that state had not the monarchy provided the symbolic glue that somehow manages to keep this political entity together?11 As sketched above, Hegel believed the monarchy could stabilise the constitutional system as long as it remained above the fray of political

fashion.

Clearly the abolition of the Nepalese monarchy is the consequence of a lost political battle (see the chapters in this volume by Kunda Mani Dixit and Sudhindra Sharma). In 2005 King Gyanendra assumed authoritarian powers in the name of

had been shaken by the assassination of King Birendra and eight other members of the royal family in 2001 by Crown Prince Dipendra who then killed himself). Maoist gains and anti-monarchy protests led to free elections and a government coalition which abolished its chief enemy, the monarchy. In Nepal the inverse of “Hegel’s law” seems to have been in force: a monarch who does not stay above the fray can fall victim to it.

A similar narrative can be found in the little known experience of the Kingdom of Lesotho. One observer writes:

Thanks to Lesotho’s founding father, King Moshoeshoe, the kingdom can look back on almost 200 years of being a nation. Unlike most African countries, the nation building process was achieved a long time ago as the southern Basotho people rallied [to] the kings for protection from Boer and Zulu aggressions from the surrounding lowlands. Moshoeshoe and his successors maintained independence from white-ruled South Africa through military power and diplomatic

wisdom, forming a protectorate under direct protection from London. Until independence in 1965, the King - or the paramount chief as he was called during British rule - was pretty much the uniting symbol of Lesotho.

11

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With the 1966 constitution, that made the paramount chief a king, power was given to elected politicians and Lesotho was made a constitutional monarchy…After independence came…political turbulence, with military rule in the 1970s and ‘80s. In the mid-1980s, the military even installed King Moshoeshoe II, King Letsie’s father, as the head of the executive in a popular move. Popularity did not last long, however, and calls for democracy led to another coup in 1990, deposing the King. (Hennig 2003)

In 1994 the so-called “King’s Coup” overthrew the democratically elected government of Ntsu Mokhehle, bringing Moshoeshoe back to power. This occurred after he had been dethroned twice in the past (1970 and 1990) because

openly intervened. Subsequent political manoeuverings led to his reinstatement, the last time by his son Letsie III. Only after Moshoeshoe died in a car crash in 1995 did Letsie managed to return the monarchy more or less back to its envisioned constitutional form. He did not intervene during a renewed outbreak of political stability and outside intervention in 1998, even refusing widespread demands to mediate (the unrest subsided, but there was renewed violence against the government in 2008 and 2009). Having suffered nearly fatal damage through politicisation, the monarchy appears to have morphed to an extremely apolitical form. Lesotho’s monarchy appears to have returned to its “Hegelian” role as a form of self-protection.

The most striking example of a monarchy in the midst of a political crisis at the time of this writing is in Thailand (see the contributions of Kavi Chongkittavorn and Suchit Bunbongkarn in this volume). The current Thai monarchy has long presented itself (and is praised by its “network” supporters) as a politically neutral institution that has only intervened as a last resort during national crises (McCargo 2005 and 2007). King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s interventions in 1973 and 1992 that put a halt to the shooting of largely peaceful protestors by the military and paved the way for democratisation were seen as great successes in this regard. More recent accounts, however, have painted a much darker picture (most controversially, Paul Handley’s unauthorised biography of 2006). Critics like Handley argue that the Thai monarch’s interventions have been much more extensive than is commonly acknowledged in polite company in Thailand. Such interventions, it has been suggested, have not just been against military bloodshed but also on the side of military coups (in 1976 and most recently in 2006 which


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overthrow the Thaksin government) (Hewison 2008). Defenders of the monarchy dismiss such charges. They have increasingly resorted to charges of lèse-majesté to silence critics.12 Surveillance of “malicious” comments about the monarchy, particularly on the internet, has risen sharply recently.13 My aim here is not to judge of the relative merits of these positions. It is only to point out that the perception

Thailand claiming to act in its name and defense) undermines its Hegelian “crisis management capabilities.”

Importantly in this regard, the issue of succession is one of the most widely gossiped about (because it cannot be openly discussed) issues in Thai politics

the limits of the undoubted respect and admiration that the vast majority of Thais show toward the current (ailing) King. His “success” as a monarch is very much tied up with his own personality. The “twilight problem” of succession arises because the personality of the monarchy seems to matter so much in Thailand.

Conclusion Hegel’s defense of monarchy, found quirky by many a critic, sheds much light on the nature of constitutional monarchy today. It represents institutional continuity, symbolises national culture, and embodies the unity of the state, enabling it to help guarantee human freedom, which for Hegel is the ultimate idea of a state. Lipset’s

contrast to the instability of their revolutionary, republican counterparts - adds empirical credence to Hegel’s philosophical claim. The French, Chinese, Russian, and German Revolutions show how disastrous an abrupt shift away from monarchy can be for preserving freedom.

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the monarchy from criticism, given that in a constitutional system the monarch is only carrying

any criticism of it based on the premise that it is apolitical! For a thoughtful discussion see both

lèse majesté cases

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The example of other modern dynasties supports the Hegelian argument about

succession is genetically preordained and not open to political competition, the new leader can better avoid partisanship. Dynastic female leaders, like the sons of many Japanese MPs, were chosen as successors because family or marriage ties maintained consensus among in their political faction. Dynastic ties (as well as their perceived traditional gender roles) also seemed to elevate them above normal “dirty politics.” In addition, their “inherited charisma” enabled them to symbolise their father or husband’s national project.

Monarchies are best able to stand “above the fray”, of course, when they are not themselves actively involved in it. Where a monarch does intervene (unsuccessfully), such as recently occurred in Nepal, he or she can be deposed. In Lesotho a legacy of courtly intervention (and dethronement) has led the monarchy to take a radically apolitical stance. In Thailand perceptions of growing royal intervention have weakened the institution, with the timing being particularly problematic (but surely not unrelated to) the fragility of the ageing king.

Hegel considers it not at all paradoxical to argue that the “perfect prince” must not be perfect at all. Perfection is not a matter of the person who happens to be

established – with its constitutional powers clearly delimited – then it can perform its function as the sacred embodiment of the state, symbol of the nation, and

Mark R. Thompson is Professor of Political Science at Erlangen Nuremberg University, Germany.

References

Avineri, Shlomo. Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State. London: Cambridge UP, 1972. Print.

Beiser, Frederick C. Hegel. New York: Routledge, 2005. Print. Berger, Peter L. The Sacred Canopy; Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. Garden

City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967. Print. Bhutto, Benazir. Daughter of Destiny: an Autobiography. New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1989. Print. Chehabi, H. E., and Juan J. Linz. Sultanistic Regimes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP,

1998. Print.


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Chowdhury, Najma. “Bangladesh: Gender Issues and Politics in a Patriarchy.” Ed. Barbara J. Nelson and Najma Chowdhury. Women and Politics Worldwide. New Haven: Yale UP, 1994. Print.

Curtis, Gerald L. The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change. New York: Columbia UP, 1999. Print.

Datta-Ray, S.K. “For Some in Asia, It’s Hard to Stand by Their Women.” International Herald Tribune [New York City] 3 Aug. 2001: 7. Print.

Derichs, Claudia, and Mark R. Thompson, eds. Martyrs’ Widows and Dynasties’ Daughters: Dynastic Female Leaders in Asia. (Forthcoming). Print.

Diamond, Eli. “Hegel’s Defence of Constitutional Monarchy and Its Relevance within the Post-National State.” Animus 9 (2004). Web.

Handley, Paul M. The King Never Smiles: a Biography of Thailand’s Bhumibol Adulyadej. New Haven: Yale UP, 2006. Print.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, and S. W. Dyde. Philosophy of Right. Kitchener, Ont.: Batoche, 2001. Print.

Hennig, Rainer Chr. “Lesotho’s Royal House - A World Apart.” Afrol News. 2 Apr. 2009. Web.

Herb, Michael. All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies. Albany: State University of New York, 1999. Print.

Hewison, Kevin. “Book Review: The Book, the King, and the Coup.” Rev. of The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand’s Bhumibol Adulyadej. Journal of Contemporary Asia Feb. 2006: 190-211. Print.

Itoh, Mayumi. The Hatoyama Dynasty: Japanese Political Leadership through the Generations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Print.

Kincaid, Diane D. “Over His Dead Body: A Postive Perspective on Widows in the U.S. Congress.” Western Political Quarterly 31 (1978): 96-104. Print.

Lee, Eun-Jeung. “Anti-Europte: Paradigm Changes in the Reception of Confucianism in Germany Since the Early Enlightenment.” 2009. MS. (Forthcoming).

Lee, Eun-Jeung. “Anti-Europte: Paradigm Changes in the Reception of Confucianism in Germany Since the Early Enlightenment.” MS. (Forthcoming).

Levin, Michael, and Howard Williams. “Inherited Power and Popular Representation: A Tension in Hegel’s Political Theory.” Political Studies XXXV (1987): 105-15. Print.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man; the Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960. Print.

LM Watch. Web. 03 June 2010. <http://lmwatch.blogspot.com>. Marx, Karl, and Annette Jolin. Critique of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right” / Transl. from

the German by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley ; Ed. with an Introduction Andnotes by Joseph O’Malley. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., 1977. Marxists

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Internet Archive. Web. 7 Sept. 2009. McCargo, Duncan. “A Hollow Crown.” New Left Review Jan/Feb (2007): 135-44.

Print. McCargo, Duncan. “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand.”

Review 18.4 (2005): 499-519. Print. Mijares, Primitivo. The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos I. San

Francisco: Union Square Publications, 1976. Print. Montesano, Michael. “Contextualizing the Pattaya Summit Debacle: Four April

Days, Four Thai Pathologies.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 31.2 (2009): 217-48. Print.

Phillips, Kevin. American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politics of Deceit in the House of Bush. New York: Viking, 2004. Print.

“Railing Against the Wrong Enemy.” The Economist 22 Aug. 2009: 23. Print. Ritter, Joachim. Hegel Und Die Französische Revolution. [Frankfurt Am Main]:

Suhrkamp, 1965. Print. Salisbury, Harrison E. The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng. Boston:

Little, Brown, 1992. Print. Streckfuss, David. Defamation and Social Memory in Thailand. London: Routledge,

2007. Print. Talmon, J. L. The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. New York: Norton, 1970. Print. Thai Netizen Network. On the Cases Related to Computer-Related Crime Act. Thai

Netizen Network. 26 May 2009. Web. Thompson, Mark R. Democratic Revolutions: Asia and Eastern Europe. London:

Routledge, 2004. Print. Voegelin, Eric, and Manfred Henningsen. The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin.

Columbia (Mo.): University of Missouri, 2000. Print. Weber, Max, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills. From Max Weber: Essays in

Sociology. New York: Oxford UP, 1958. Print. Yack, Bernard. “The Rationality of Hegel’s Concept of Monarchy.” American

Political Science Review 74 (1980): 709-20. Print.


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The Limits of Constitutional Monarchy in Scandinavia: The Road to Survival of Monarchies?

Jørgen Elklit & Birgitta Wistrand

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In the three Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), where the monarchies still thrive, all three Heads of State have reached – or will soon reach – their seventies. But there are no signs of shifts on the thrones, which would have been the case if it were in Bhutan where the King has to resign at the age of 65. In the Nordic countries, however, it will continue to be business as usual, as there is no age limit for monarchs – and no discussion about that particular issue.

Presently Sweden’s Crown Princess, Victoria, is taking steps – even if slowly – towards her future role as Head of State, but currently all focus is on her long-awaited marriage next June to a work-out instructor, Daniel Westling, a man of common background. In Norway, Haakon, King Harald´s son, has already married a woman from a common background which one only rarely sees in Crown Princesses; and his colleague, Crown Prince Frederik of Denmark, married a woman of foreign origin and also a commoner. These marriages all had to be approved by the Head of State, i.e., the mother or the father. As so often is the case, conditions for males are less restricted than for females. But the situation changes once you are in power, a topic to which we shall return below.

The heirs and heiresses are all in their late thirties/early forties and authority obviously lies with their parents, at least in regards to the Monarchs’ decision on when to step down from the throne, i.e., to entrust the Crown Prince or princess with the responsibility of carrying the torch forward – if stepping down is being seriously considered at all. Evidently the current Monarchs consider the position worth the price – or is it purely because of their sense of responsibility – that they apparently want to continue to endure their restricted and controlled lives?

Can one now foresee any obstacles for the heirs to the thrones, legally or politically, when they eventually take on their duties in their respective “bicycle monarchies”

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using Mark R. Thompson’s term. Are citizens of the three Scandinavian countries actually prepared to accept these increasingly ordinary and normal couples as important symbols in and representatives for their countries?

We have found little or no discussion on the subject. In fact, the question of the monarchy’s raison d´être is not really a salient topic in public discourse in

and the criticism never seriously touches the present dynasties or their functions. Instead, it dwells mostly on a theoretical level, with no substantial demands for change.

Nor are the functions or status of monarchy a vital research topic in political

The interrelations between media and monarchy have recently evoked some interest, especially when it is understood that both institutions see themselves as – and are – intertwined and interdependent.

The Stabilising Effects of MonarchiesIf one wants to understand this peculiar state of affairs, one possibility is to start by looking at what political science has to say about countries with a Monarch as head of state. The Dutch-American political scientist Arend Lijphart reminds us that it is surprising that so many democracies are or have been monarchies, as it is a constitutional form that appears to be less democratic than a republican government with an elected president (140).

Lijphart explains this state of affairs by the fact that they are constitutional monarchies, i.e., the power of the Monarch is severely limited (by the constitution). He then goes on to quote Rose and Kavanagh: “Monarchs have remained in power where the reigning family has been willing to withdraw from a politically active role. Reciprocally, monarchies have fallen when the monarch has sought to continue to assert political power” (568). Nepal here becomes an interesting case to think of, as the Royal House in Nepal never really appreciated the 1991-constitution and the thinking behind it; the consequences were grave. It appears, however, that the above formulation by Rose and Kavanagh could be further elaborated. It is not only the withdrawal from a politically active role, which has allowed some Monarchs to remain in power, but also their genuine (or perceived) acceptance and support of democratic development, in some cases probably amounting to a sense of having a very real responsibility for the country and its future development.


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To this emphasis on the time perspective one can add differences in personal

work with – and were complicated personalities – while others have been just the right person at the right place at the right point in time, which has therefore contributed substantially to the position (and chances of survival) of the monarchy in the country in question. This observation obviously has validity also outside Scandinavian countries, and outside Europe.

In his study of inter-war democracies Lipset also argues that countries that have retained constitutional monarchies have had a more stable democratic order and development than those that became republics (78-79). Preserving the monarchies, according to his view, helped those who were losers during the transition to a new social structure and therefore felt alienated in the entire modernisation project. These, often conservative, groups could then more gradually adapt to the new situation, while countries with newly founded republics saw unrest and instability and lack of legitimacy among the conservative orders. Where Lipset writes about the inter-war period we are inclined to extend his argument to the very special period of WWII and the German occupation of Norway and Denmark, where the royal families in both cases provided an example of stability and the social and national values of the times before the great upheaval of the occupation (and WWII in general), thereby helping all those who were losers, i.e. opposed to the German occupation. The symbolic importance of the two royal families can probably not be over-estimated even though they themselves chose different ways in their opposition to the German occupation. The Swedish royal family also functioned as the “national” family in times of severe turbulence and concern.

is in no way comparable to times of major social upheavals or foreign occupation during a war as comprehensive as WWII. But one can still ask if the monarchical institution still provides an element of stability in today’s uncertain situation. The next question then is, are today´s monarchies able and

for the Nordic monarchies, constitutionally, and in political and social practice?

Constitutions and Political Practice

constitution if political practice over time has changed the meaning of formal

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formulations in some of the articles of the constitution. A good example of this is the Danish Constitution, where the term “The King” does not in any way mean “the King (Queen) of the day”, but refers to “the government”, which has in reality – and because they are the ones who can be held to account by Parliament – now assumed the powers which according to the words of the constitution rest with the Monarch. This obviously can confuse those – in particular (but not only) foreigners – reading the constitution verbally, but it does not create practical, political problems in Denmark.

The same situation applies for Norway but the information on the Norwegian royal household’s homepage clearly informs readers that when the Constitution refers to the King, it nowadays means “the government” not the King. This is not the case with the Danish royal homepage, where one really has to search for precise information on the constitution and an authoritative interpretation thereof. It is not available on the monarchy page, but on Her Majesty The Queen´s homepage and then far down under the heading “Tasks and Duties” and after headings like “Language”, “Relations to Defence”, and “Politics”. Nor is it anywhere explained why the Queen is still seen to act as if she has real political-legal power, e.g., as she still countersigns bills and appoints ministers, including the prime minister. So it

their Queen has at least some formal power vis-à-vis the politicians, which is not the case.

The presentations of the members of the Danish royal family are designed as ordinary CV’s. The Queen’s personal interests and accomplishments as an artist are described at length.

The homepage on the royal family in Norway stresses the importance of history and heredity, where the religious blessing of the Head of State is an interesting special phenomenon. The presentation gives a general picture of a quite laidback royal family, taking their responsibilities seriously, but not wishing to be high

All three Nordic countries now have succession laws based on the principle of cognatic (equal) primogeniture. In spite of this principle, it is worth mentioning that there are still differences between the sexes. A Queen’s husband is not entitled to kingship, and his title is “Prince Consort”, while a woman marrying a King


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becomes a Queen, in her own capacity and with special duties. However, the Danish Prince Consort, Henrik – like other prince consorts – has no special duties. The Queens in Norway and Sweden lead their own households.

As mentioned earlier, discussions on the status of monarchies are rare, even though the situation of preparation for the current Swedish constitution was one of 20

sharp and intense discussions and considerations. Much of this debate took place inside the Social Democratic Party (which was then in power and had taken the initiative to revise the constitution), as there was an urge among several groups in the party to turn Sweden into a republic. Books and pamphlets were published, and discussions and endless debates were conducted. The King, Gustaf VI Adolf, was getting older and the heir, Carl Gustaf, was only a child when the revision was initiated. Anyhow, at age 27, Carl X Gustaf succeeded his grandfather on the throne in 1973 and a year later the new constitution was adopted by Parliament. Probably due to the popularity of the royal family, the Social Democratic Party did not dare to challenge the general public on the issue of abolishing the monarchy. After 1974 discussions on the monarchy and its raison d´être have faded away. But

talks about the situation when it is possible to force the Head of State to resign: "After six months of non-governing the government can report this fact to the parliament and the King has to step down." The reasons for introducing this article in the constitution are not known to us.

Two years later, in 1976, 500 million people viewed the wedding between King

disagreements regarding the present and future role of the monarchy, this occasion provided an excellent opportunity to re-establish the role of the monarchy in the hearts and minds of the Swedish people. Not only did the ceremony (arranged as a fairy-tale wedding/coronation with no costs spared) attract an almost incredible TV audience, but the Swedes went to the streets in masses, showing their genuine support for the newlyweds. The royal family had again displayed its social powers, thereby regaining centre stage, although it had now no constitutional power whatsoever.

The homepage of the Swedish dynasty consequently only presents the King´s ceremonial and symbolic role. But the King has at the same time maintained the

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our assessment of the role of the monarchies. One now sees that the King in all situations – apart from the opening of parliament in the Parliament House, where

sending a strong symbolic signal to Swedish citizens on the country’s leadership.

As we have noticed earlier the situation in the three countries is quite similar in rhetoric and practice, even if constitutions differ. The Heads of State want to see – and present – themselves as the foremost representative of their countries. The same approach is also implicit in their homepages where succession rules, heritage and history is presented as something natural and valuable; this contributes to

no serious discussion about the introduction of a republic in any of the three countries (apart from the discussion in Sweden in the years before 1974).

Differences between Formal and Informal Structures and Patterns of BehaviourThe brief descriptions of the development in the Scandinavian monarchies as well as the observations by Lijphart, Lipset, and Rose and Kavanagh all point to the importance of the time dimension as there has been a clear development over time in how Monarchs (and other royalty) have perceived their roles and responded to it. A hundred years ago the Monarchs in Denmark and Sweden saw themselves as having a political role to play – because they disagreed with this or that in the political sphere, but they and – in particular – their successors gradually realised that they had to make a very hard choice if they wanted to retain their position. In real terms they had no other choice than to accept that the sovereign people had now moved to a situation with chosen representatives to lead the affairs of state. If they wanted their dynasties to continue, they therefore had to accept the symbolic, unifying role as Head of State – and only that. However the key question is still what role the Monarchs of today want (or need?) to play – and how they see the future for their dynasties.

Only few opinion polls on attitudes towards the monarchies have been conducted in Scandinavia. The picture is very clear as solid majorities in all three countries (at least about two thirds) support the institution, even though the support in all three countries has been slowly declining over recent years. But opinion


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polls can only – at best – provide us with a partial answer to the question about monarchies’ actual role and support. It is intriguing that there has not in any of the Scandinavian countries been a serious, in-depth discussion about the future position of monarchy and why the institution should be retained even when all its important functions have been removed. One would expect that this kind of public debate would be important to all who want to uphold the monarchy (either because they are genuine monarchists or because they for one or another reason are not sympathetic to the introduction of a republican form of government). This kind of constructive debate is more necessary for monarchists now more than ever as the position of the monarchies is probably weaker than ever because

the increasing medialisation which, in this context, refers to the interplay between the media and the monarchical institutions.

John Plunkett argues in Queen Victoria: First Media Monarch, with considerable strength, that the rise of modern mass media reinvented the position of the monarchy in national life. When Queen Victoria was criticised for having retired from her formal duties in 1870’s, the economist Walter Bageholt concluded: "To be invisible is to be forgotten [...] to be a symbol, and an effective symbol you must vividly and often be seen." The situation is arguably the same today, as it is obviously believed (and followed) by royal families who work professionally on their images and on media strategies, engaging specialists to position them on the public arena in order to make them popular and visible and – therefore –

success in all monarchies.

Today, as earlier, opinions on the obsolete royalty, incommensurable with the ideas of a democratic and egalitarian political culture, are not infrequent, although not spoken out loudly. Still stronger, however, is a trend of a growing attraction to the royal institutions as argued by Jönsson & Lundell (2009). This appears to have a certain validity also in the Scandinavian countries where the revival of royalty is extremely noticeable in the media and, therefore, also by the public at large. Television programmes, magazines, and periodicals are incessantly trying to meet a rising demand from curious readers/royalists.

one example, even though it probably is the best known and most obvious ever.

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Media have played a determining role in shaping this new trend by not only giving royal families a public platform where they function as the most prominent and symbolically important personalities, but also at the same time acting as prime time media stars. The christening of a little new prince in Denmark in July 2009 is another example where this ordinary and private event resulted in an enormous media exposure even though the baby is only seventh in line for the throne.

Constant exposure in the media contributes to developing a feeling in the audience (i.e., among the citizens) of presence and control. Even if the Head of State is only seen as acting on behalf of the government, corporations, organisations, or individuals he (she) takes on the role of an initiator, giving himself (herself) a quality of taking charge and being in power. This image played in the media brings forth an interest in these omnipotent, beautiful, and well-behaved personalities. A typical royalist of today appears to be characterised by an affective and personal

person. Today’s media, therefore, try to make these well-known but obviously distant personalities in the royal families more familiar and closer to the ordinary

interest.

As we argued earlier, the traditional conservative groups (as nobility and upper classes) were the royal proponents and supporters in the early twentieth century. The actual situation is said to be different in that today’s ordinary citizens have also become strong supporters of the royalty. This is partly because of the opening of the homes and parts of the private life to the media in Denmark, e.g., partly by portraying the royal family of the 1940’s and 1950’s as a rather normal family with three little girls, and partly because the royal families have now accepted intermarriages between royalty and individuals of common background. On the other hand, the entourage of the royal families is still very clearly almost exclusively drawn from the upper classes so real interaction with ordinary citizens is still a rare phenomenon.

The media focus is clearly aiming more at the private aspects of royal family life – which all citizens to some degree can understand and identify with – than at

to them. The media focus and interest on personal and intimate matters is not


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exclusively aiming at the royal families as the same is the case for politicians – also giving the politicians new problems as well as new possibilities, depending on their ability to interact constructively with the media.

The constitutional Monarch in a democracy can be (i.e., should be) the

opportunities to work on the creation of this kind of unity and cohesiveness, such as all kinds of ceremonies, inaugurations of institutions, buildings and monuments, celebrations, tours of the country, etc. Simultaneously the King serves as a main attraction, as part of the culture, giving him a distinct role as the natural centre at such occasions. To choose the right events to attend and contribute to – from the hundreds suggested to the royal families every month – is therefore a crucial and strategic task.

At such occasions the Head of State may choose to deliver a speech which displays his views/ feelings even more directly. The Swedish King recently inaugurated a national reserve in the archipelago on the West coast of Sweden. This project has been highly politicised; the King – having a strong image as protector of nature – nevertheless accepted to inaugurate the reserve and in his speech he took a strong political stand for the creation of the reserve. The media even hinted that he had been instrumental in the process, giving him credence in some groups, criticism in others.

Informal or “Soft” PowerThe right to formally appoint the prime minister is seen as a key issue by many, at least theoretically and in complicated situations. But the political reality is that there is no such right and this interpretation of the actual constitutional law has not for many years been challenged in the three Scandinavian countries. In Denmark, e.g., the last serious confrontation over this topic was back in 1920 – 90 years ago – when the then King was taught a lesson by the majority of the politicians. And since 1974 Sweden has transferred all functions related to the appointment of prime ministers from the King to the Speaker of Parliament to completely avoid any future problems in this area, i.e., of monarchical interference in the purely

The Monarch should, obviously, accept that he/she is Head of State, not Head of Government. The temptation to forget that is, however, probably more often seen with presidents because of the fact that they have also been elected – and

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therefore also have a popular mandate. This popular mandate confers a special legitimacy on them which they may use to challenge the Head of the Government of the day as we have mentioned earlier. But one should not forget that political legitimacy does not only come from having been elected. It also to some degree depends on personal charisma and other personality characteristics, which are also instrumental for media penetration and acceptance.

The existence of dual channels of political legitimacy in many presidential systems (i.e., where the president is elected separately from parliament) is a special problem, which one does not see in monarchies. The other way to avoid this problem is to have a president who is elected by members of parliament (functioning as an electoral college). This is what one sees in a country like South Africa.

To this can be added that there is an important difference in the way preparation

age, be educated so that he/she might eventually (at an unknown point in time) be ready to shoulder the responsibility of being the nation’s unifying element. This is a tough challenge but it appears that even more could be done – i.e. is the preparation as we see it now good enough? And who is to decide if the person in question has the necessary gifts for the job? Can his/her talents develop enough? As far as we know there are no legal safety nets or resources to help out if a situation should arise where it becomes obvious that the heir does not match a

and gradually changed, to a considerable degree because of the increasing media exposure and demands from the public who demand someone who can play a distinctive, representative role both in the country and abroad.

It is also remarkable that the second-in-line to the throne is not given the same kind of continuous educational and other training for that person’s future role as

in line to the throne in almost the same way, in order to avoid problems, should something happens to the immediate heir to the throne.

are trained by specialists in communication, style, protocol etc.), but are selected by their parties to stand for election if the party expects that they can win the ultimate


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political prize to the party. One then has to hope that they – based on their general

The Monarch in a constitutional monarchy must act – and be seen to act – in a way which is politically completely neutral. A formal expression of this is that the Danish Monarch (and the heir to the throne, when he/she has turned 18) are not

The Monarch must be non-partisan and be seen to be non-partisan. But how far does this requirement go? Can the Monarch indicate publicly his political preferences in relation to issues, which are important, but where some of the political parties have positioned themselves differently, e.g., on a taxation issue?

how at least some voters perceive the issue and the reasonableness of the various policy positions taken by the political parties.

The consequence is that the Monarch does not express – at least – party political opinions which might have a bearing on the political development in the country. But as we have suggested earlier, the Head of State has at least some channels

Outside Scandinavia, Prince Charles’ interest in architecture in the UK is well-known – and controversial – but supports our point. Another example is the collaboration between the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the royal family during World War II, when the royal family was heavily involved in obtaining a

contribute more than they did through the taxes).

A special event was arranged and activities were orchestrated with participation from the royal family, prominent politicians, military personnel, and various cultural personalities, thus giving the event credence as well as legitimacy and visibility. The event was called ”The Big Propaganda and Citizen Party for the Defence Loan”. Not less than 60,000 people gathered at Skansen, where the King gave a long speech that was broadcasted. The King and other members of the royal family contributed to the loan from their own pockets. This kind of collaboration between the King, the government, and media still takes place in Sweden as in the other Nordic countries. The Norwegian royal family has been both instrumental

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and successful in their contribution by winning the bid to host two Winter Olympic Games in Norway during recent decades, which is a real political and public achievement. In spite of industrious efforts Sweden has not been able to obtain even one game, one partial reason probably being royal reluctance in promoting Sweden in this particular respect. The initiatives and events might differ but all those involved know that co-operation makes things easier – and it provides the royal family with an opportunity to express its position on issues from the political

government policy positions.

This is also the case in relation to foreign policy issues. As Head of State the Monarch must in his/her dealings with other states only express opinions that

heavily criticised some years ago when he expressed an opinion that could be

a country on the other side of the globe. The episode clearly weakened the King’s position in Sweden, not only because of what he said, but also because the episode

he could and what he could not do.

It obviously presents a considerable challenge to embody the nation and act as the Head of State – and simultaneously have to accept that the democratic expression and representation of the people should always only be through parliamentary and governmental channels. One would think that a competent and intelligent person should be able to learn to deal with this continuous challenge, but this hypothesis is not always supported by evidence.

“Democracy” and “monarchy” only go well together if monarchy at all times understands that its very special – and certainly not unimportant – role can only be

channel. But co-operation through informal channels – and on non-controversial issues – are still an option if there is a willingness to reach for a positive outcome.

speeches at New Year’s Eve, which, in Denmark are heard and watched by most Danes as they are both televised and broadcasted. The Head of State, i.e., the Queen, can then present directly to the citizens what by many is perceived as her views on various issues. The speeches obviously vary in depth, but it is interesting


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that they are analysed by many – and commented on by even more – who want

time. In the Queen’s latest speech, in 2008, she expressed clear support for Danish troops on mission in Afghanistan, which of course is a very political issue, even though popular support in Denmark is still clearly in favour thereof. What should be understood, however, is that the Queen – and her staff – do not prepare the speech completely on their own. Drafts are exchanged between the Castle and

will occur when the speech is actually delivered. So the conclusion is that the

the government’s positions on these issues – nothing more and nothing less. It is interesting that the 2008 remarks by the Queen on Afghanistan only resulted in a few lifted eyebrows here and there, while in Sweden, the King’s support for the same issue has been highly controversial and considered political as several parties strongly oppose either sending soldiers abroad – or at least the participation in the Afghan mission.

Representatives of the royal houses are also very keen not to get involved with civil society on issues which may be socially and politically divisive. When royalty agrees to be patrons of civil society organisations, it is always – at least in Scandinavia

all – such as the Red Cross – while others (like Amnesty International) are seen as being too political and they are, therefore, better avoided. The list of organisations with royal patrons is long and impressive, but also mainly non-offensive as it is dominated by humanitarian and cultural organisations that are fully acceptable to most citizens. This is another way for the royal family to be – and remain – an

so-called soft power. We here refer to Joseph Nye’s discussion of media’s ability to

ideals. Nye even argues that the media content is as important as how a country’s domestic and foreign politics are being run (2004). We are convinced that this concept and this understanding of media’s ability to provide soft power is a useful key to actually understanding how media interest in all aspects of royalty and royal life contributes to the survival of monarchies – at least in the short-run.

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Media and Monarchy A central point here is, however, that this forecast is based on media’s positive presentation of the monarchical institution as such and of the individual members of the royal family (and especially those close to the throne). The decline in popular support for the monarchies (seen in all three countries) is noteworthy, even if there is still majority support for monarchy in all three countries. We are convinced that this might change if the strong media interest (also in trivialities) wanes and/or members of the royal houses would suddenly start to behave in a way that challenges the accepted picture of them as modernising (up to a point) – while still behaving according to tradition and generally accepted norms.

But even the issue of which causes and organisations to accept as worthy of royal support and patronage can be a thin line to walk. That has recently been demonstrated in Denmark, where Crown Prince Frederik has been nominated for Denmark’s vacant position as member of the International Olympic Committee

so that is not the issue. And he is using his position to argue in favour of Danes

The issue is, instead, if it is a good idea to have the future King placed in a position where he one day might have to vote on issues that are basically political in nature as demonstrated by the discussions about the saliency of human rights issues in relation to the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. The government has accepted the Crown Prince’s candidature but the discussion about it in the public demonstrates how thin the line is. And that the Government was asked about its position on the issue also shows that it is seen as something the young man cannot do on his own, precisely because it is not a non-political, almost uncontroversial point . And what about the future, when he one day inherits the throne and becomes King of

the very fact that he will then have to step down from his IOC seat shows that it is foreseen that there might be political and controversial issues to be dealt with. If this is so, should he have the seat now?

Another almost unproblematic project royalty can – and do – engage in is the promotion of the country’s business and cultural activities abroad, as that is clearly advantageous to the entire country. Again, the point is that such activities


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segments. But there are some vital political decisions in this area also. They concern which countries to visit, who to take on as members of the entourage,

royal family often holds more knowledge and connections than corporations and organisations and they are therefore in a good position to take on a leading role.

ConclusionIt follows from the above that a constitutional monarch can have no role – and should have no role – as an arbiter or arbitrator of political or other controversies because that might easily put him in situations where he would have to speak in support of positions taken by a political party, civil society organisation, or an individual – and that would be seen as taking sides. This has been clearly understood by Scandinavian Monarchs, at least for now.

they can be held accountable during the next round of elections, and if they survive politically they can claim that they have now obtained the legitimising support of the people.

The Monarch cannot in the same way have his interference in political matters approved or disapproved by the people (apart from them taking to the streets), so his interference in the politics of the day will be seen by many (but not necessarily all) as illegitimate. The politicians have their mandate to act and take decisions from the electoral support of the voters, which is not the case of the monarch. This is also the case when the people in a referendum support the monarchy as an institution and/or chosen a particular individual as the next King (as was the case in Norway in 1905).

The acceptance of the role for the King as a symbolic, nationally unifying element also has another consequence, which is that the Monarch can continue as such (if that pleases him or her) until he or she passes away, maybe as a very old person. One can still be a symbol of the nation as an old, fragile person, even though there obviously is also a limit to that.

One might even argue that one needs to be seen as active, strong, and healthy if one wants positive attention from the media and broad support from the people. Nobody would probably deny that the beautiful young daughters and wives in the royal families are an important asset for today’s monarchies. They are linked to

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national pride, something for the nation to enjoy and be proud of. Furthermore they can appear in national projects as marrying, giving birth, and being displayed. These events are looked upon by media and by the public as symbols and embodiment of the nation. Therefore, a royal child does not – in this respect – belong only to his family, but also to the whole nation – to the national “we”. The royal glamour seems to fascinate the media and the general public (not least its female part) as a never-ending story. It, therefore, appears to us that an important – maybe even the most important key to success – that is monarchical survival in the long run – is to be accepted as being active, visible, and modern (to a point).

The requirement of the current Constitution of Bhutan that the King has to step down at 65 actually sends the same kind of signal, namely that the Monarch must be a person who is not beyond retirement age and who is in reality active and able to be more than a mere symbol. This constitutional requirement is not found in Scandinavian constitutions, but the role of the media and the provision of at least a certain element of soft power might – as we have argued – change this and also help us understand why it is that an institution as archaic as monarchy survive in modern democracies. And one should not forget that Article 5 of the Swedish constitution now says that after six months of his or her non-governing, the government can force the Head of State to step down. This statement also requests that the country has a vital Head of State – even though that person has been deprived of all formal tasks.

If the point is that there is a positive, active political role that the Monarch must be able to shoulder, then one is moving away from constitutional monarchy, where the King should not – under any circumstances – have a politically active role. What we have argued is that the concept of “soft power” might be an important

– not only in Scandinavia, but probably elsewhere as well. Formal constitutional

pursuing because the meaning of the concept “constitutional monarchy” is still that the monarch has his powers constrained by the constitution and that there are the politicians who have been elected by the voters to be the representatives of the sovereign people.

Jørgen Elklit is Professor of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark; Birgitta Wistrand is attached to Gender Studies at Uppsala University, Sweden.


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References

Appleby, Joyce Oldham. Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1992. Print.

Aris, Michael. The Raven Crown: the Origins of Buddhist Monarchy in Bhutan. London: Serindia Publications, 1994. Print.

Åse, Cecilia. Makten Att Se: Om Kropp Och Kvinnlighet I Lagens Namn. Malmö: Liber, 2000. Print.

Blain, Neil, and Hugh O’Donnell. Media, Monarchy and Power. Bristol: Intellect, 2003. Print.

Duchhardt, Heinz, Richard A. Jackson, and D. J. Sturdy. European Monarchy: Its Evolution and Practice from Roman Antiquity to Modern times. Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1992. Print.

Hedengren, Sven-Olof, Elisabeth Tarras-Wahlberg, Cecilia Wilmhardt, and Clas Göran Carlsson. Den Svenska Monarkin. Stockholm: Kungl. Hovstaternas Informations- Ochavd., 1996. Print.

Jönsson, Mats, and Patrik Lundell. Media and Monarchy in Sweden. Göteborg: Nordicom, 2009. Print.

Knopp, Guido. Majestät!: Die Letzten Großen Monarchien. München: Bertelsmann, 2006. Print.

Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries. New Haven: Yale UP, 1999. Print.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man. London: Heinemann, 1969. Print. Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public

Affairs, 2004. Print. Plunkett, John. Queen Victoria: First Media Monarch. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003.

Print. Rodell, Magnus. Att Gjuta En Nation: Statyinvigningar Och Nationsformering I Sverige

Vid 1800-talets Mitt. Stockholm: Natur Og Kultur, 2002. Print. Rose, Richard, and Dennis Kavanagh. “The Monarchy in Contemporary Political

Culture.” Comparative Politics 8.4 (1976): 548-76. Print. Stenius, Stefan. . Ekerö: L.

Wallinder, 1982. Print. Thompson, Mark R. Democratic Revolutions Asia and Eastern Europe. London:

Routledge, 2004. Print.

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Democracy and Monarchy in Thailand

Professor Emeritus Dr. Suchit Bunbongkarn

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IntroductionAbsolute monarchy, which had prevailed in Thailand for seven centuries, was replaced by constitutional monarchy through a coup by middle ranking military

instability, frequent changes of government, coups and counter-coups and shifts back and forth between representative government and authoritarian rule. Only the monarchy has remained stable as it continues to win respect from the populace. Changes of government under the constitutional monarchy have mostly been brought about through coups and mass uprisings rather than elections. However, there has never been prolonged, nor large-scale political violence and, as a consequence, the country has survived. This can be attributed to the unifying role of the monarchy, which is the country’s most revered institution as well as a symbol of the traditions and moral core of the nation. This paper attempts to explain the role of the monarchy in helping to maintain peace, stability and unity

The King as Head of StateUnder the present Constitution, like all the previous ones, the King is the Head of State who is enthroned in a position of reverence and cannot be violated. No one can expose the King to any sort of accusation.

As Head of State the Monarch performs several state functions. All legislative, executive, and judicial functions are conducted under the King’s name. He signs bills passed by the legislature, appoints the prime minister on the advice of the legislature, and appoints cabinet ministers and high-ranking government and

the Buddhist Supreme Patriarch and high-ranking Buddhist monks, confers

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of crimes. The Monarch does not bear any decision-making responsibility in performing these functions. The Prime Minister is responsible for most of the symbolic functions the King performs.

In addition several ceremonial functions are performed by the Monarch. For instance, he receives foreign ambassadors and other foreign government representatives. As the patron of Buddhism he presides over important Buddhist religious ceremonies. The King is also the patron of other religions that have followers in the country.

Another important function as Head of State is that His Majesty is the honorary supreme commander of the armed forces. During the period of absolute monarchy, the King was the real leader of the military and was responsible for all military affairs, including conducting warfare. Since 1932 the Monarch’s power and authority has been constitutionally limited. The King has ceased to command the armed forces, but he is still given the position of ‘honorary’ supreme commander.

bond between the Monarch and the armed forces.

Political Neutrality and the Constitutional MonarchThe King’s functions mentioned above are not different from those of the Monarchs in Western constitutional monarchies. They are the functions of the sovereigns who are required by their respective constitutions and tradition to be either politically neutral or above politics. These functions are, by and large, ceremonial in nature. Nonetheless the socio-political situation in Thailand is quite different from those in the Western democracies and, as a result, the role played by the Thai Monarch has not been limited to performing only ceremonial functions. The exercise of his moral authority has sometimes been necessary to help assure the stability and security of the nation.

In Western constitutional monarchies, the governments are relatively stable,

demonstrations, but the governments are able to handle them effectively and hence the sovereigns are not under pressure to intervene. However, in Thailand, there have been military coups, political violence, riots, uprisings and demonstrations, which have often led to political instability. This creates a situation wherein the

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Monarch must determine whether or not he should remain politically neutral. Nevertheless the King, since ascending to the throne in 1946, has been mostly effective in maintaining perceived political neutrality while, at the same time, making it known that he was very concerned with any political instability that might lead to violence and bloodshed.

The role of the King in political crises is not stipulated in the Constitution. When the public expects the King to do something to bring the country out of a crisis, what should the King do? In fact, when a crisis breaks out, it is the government’s responsibility to resolve it – but the King may give advice if things get out of hand.

Being above politics does not mean that the King cannot be concerned with political problems threatening the country’s stability. The King may exercise his moral authority and give advice to the government and political adversaries as to how to solve the nation’s problems, but he is always careful not to overstep his duties as stipulated in the Constitution.

In April 2006 when the protests against Thaksin’s government became stronger and the government mobilised its supporters to counter the protests, there were calls by several groups for a royally-appointed Prime Minister, but the King did not respond. It was understood that the Constitution did not give him power to do so. In his address to newly appointed judges in April 2006, the King insisted that political problems must be resolved through constitutional means. Even when he intervened in 1973 and once again in 1992 to end bloodshed in Bangkok after clashes broke out between soldiers and anti-government protesters, what he did was not unconstitutional. He gave advice to the parties concerned as to how to end

acquired through his political neutrality, charisma and integrity.

Foreign media sometimes criticised the military coups, arguing that they are not legitimate, including the one on September 19, 2006. These critics pointed out that when the palace accepted the coups, it was going against the principle of political neutrality and, in doing so, it gave the coups legitimacy. Let us look at the concept of political legitimacy. Every political system must have legitimacy to ensure political stability and to maintain its political integrity. The political legitimacy of a political system is related to the political culture of the people in that system. According to Lucian Pye, political culture “is a set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that

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gives order and meaning to a political process and that provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the political system” (Pye 104-5).

political legitimacy. If the people’s political beliefs or ideology are consistent with the political processes and the scope of power and authority of the rulers, then the political leaders and process would have political legitimacy.

Regarding the question of the legitimacy of a military coup, in the case of Thailand, one has to look at the acceptance of the public. As long as there is not a large-scale public protest, one can say that the military takeover is accepted and thus legitimate. Since 1932, there have been a number of successful coups and they were acceptable to the public if the coup leaders made sure that they would not be in power for long. Therefore, whether a military coup can be legitimate or not depends on the public acceptance, not the King’s. In fact, the King, being above politics, cannot express his views on any coup. At any rate, there is now a sign of growing discontent on the part of the public against a military coup, which would

Political Polarisation and the MonarchyAt the moment we are witnessing an increase of political awareness among Thais

Thaksin movements that has divided Thai society is an indication of the increase

in terms of class struggle between the old elites or the urban rich against the rural poor. They have argued that old elites are against Thaksin because he had worked against their class interests by helping the poor. They have further argued that the poor have been Thaksin’s supporters because the former Prime Minister was the only leader who really helped them to get out of poverty.

uprising. In addition those who are in anti- and pro-Thaksin movements have come from various social and economic strata. Although the urban middle class people are in the anti-Thaksin group, there are also a number of rural people in it. Regarding the pro-Thaksin movement, despite the fact that a large number of

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supporters came from rural areas in the North and Northeast, the movement is able to draw support from some urban middle class people too. The issue involved in

Those who are anti-Thaksin believe that Thaksin is corrupt, anti-monarchy, and likely to become an authoritarian ruler if he is able to come back. The objective of the pro-Thaksin group is to bring the former prime minister back to power. The attack on General Prem Tinasulanond, the President of Privy Council, and the present political system, which the pro-Thaksin movement’s leaders have labelled as a ‘bureaucratic polity’, may be ideologically inclined, but most of the rural supporters joined the movement because they simply want Thaksin to come back so as to respond favourably to their “mouth and stomach” concerns.

not to do anything unconstitutional. At the peak of the crisis from October to November 2008 when there was a violent suppression of the anti-Thaksin protesters in front of the parliament and their occupation of Suvarnaphumi airport (where there was no government suppression), some wanted the King to intervene. The King did not indulge their wish, but let the constitutional processes run its course.

The Thai Concept of the MonarchyDespite the introduction of the constitutional monarchy system in 1932, Thais continue to respect the King much as they did in the absolute monarchy period. This demonstrates that the institution of monarchy is deeply-rooted in Thai society, and the concept of kingship prevailing in that period was not greatly affected by the 1932 revolution. Although the legal authority of the Monarch has been substantially curtailed to that of a Head of State, the people’s reverence of the monarchy as an indispensable traditional institution is still prevalent.

The system of absolute monarchy in Thailand can be traced back to the Sukhothai period when King Sri-Intradhit established a kingdom at Sukhothai in 1238, freeing itself from the control of the Khmer Empire. The patriarchal kingship was founded in that year based on the original Thai concept of the father-child relationship. It was believed that the Sukhothai people referred to their king as Pho-khun or "revered father". As Prince Dhani put it, “The Monarch was of course the people’s leader in battle; but he was also in peace-time their father whose advice was sought…”

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conception of the kingship become more prevalent thereafter when the kings were referred to as Dharmaraja or the righteous ruler. In fact King Ramkhamhaeng himself had set a model of the righteous ruler abiding by the dictates of Buddhist morality.

The concepts of kingship and the government authority during the Ayudhya period were a mixture of Hinduism and Buddhism. The absolutism of the kingship during this period was based on Hindu theory which considered the King as god, or Devaraja. But this absolutism was constrained by Buddhism, which provided the concept of Dharmaraja, or the righteous King. Therefore, as David Wyatt pointed out, “the Brahmanical concept of the Devaraja,make the King the embodiment of the law, while the reign of Buddhist moral principle ensured that he should be measured against the law” (Samudavanija 8). The late Prince Dhani in his article on “The Old Siamese Conception of the

Thai concept of kingship. He pointed out that the rule and duties of the King was based on the Thammasat, or Dharmsatra, which “describes its ideal of a Monarch as a King of Righteousness, elected by the people”. The ideal Monarch, as the prince noted, abides ‘‘steadfast in the ten kingly virtues’’ (Prince Dhani 163).

The Ten Royal Virtues, or Tosapitrajadharma, were drawn from both Hindu and Buddhist thought. King Asoka of ancient India who, in Somdej Phra

establish a Buddhist welfare state. He was known to be the one who observed

gentleness, simplicity, freedom from anger, non-violent behavior, tolerance and inoffensive nature (Buddhajinavamsa 92)

in the concept of Dharmaraja mentioned above, but in the belief that the King is a Bodhisattva or incipient Buddha (Wales 31). According to Hinayana Buddhism, since the accumulation of merit is rewarded by rebirth to a better life, the King must be the one who had accumulated an abundance of merit in his former lives. In other words, he must be the one who has barami. The word barami can be translated loosely as "charisma". But, in fact, it means more than "charisma". Barami often refers to personal character or a disposition of benevolence and

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compassionate use of power. As William Klausner, a well known expert on Thai culture and society stated, “for barami one should also possess a certain gravitas which connotes a weighted dignity and seriousness of purpose. Barami is earned by

wisdom and vision” (Klausner 6). Not every king in the Ayudhya period observed the Ten Royal Virtues or used his barami to wisely maintain his political legitimacy.

faith in him.

Under the present system of constitutional monarchy, the theory of the Devaraja is no longer accepted, but the people continue to respect the present King as their ‘revered’ father. This is because of the barami that he has accumulated throughout more than sixty years of his reign. He is considered the Dharmaraja who has strictly observed the ten royal virtues, and this is where his moral authority comes from. His charisma, or barami, as a Dharmaraja, as William Klausner rightly notes, ‘‘is personal and not transferable’’ (Klausner 3). The extent of one’s barami depends on the possession of the Ten Kingly Virtues and the ruler’s righteous behavior. These attributes are personal and are not related to one having the title of Devaraja or Dharmaraja.

The King’s Rural Development ProjectsThe King’s barami has been strengthened through his concern for his people’s well-being. He has been working tirelessly for the welfare of the Thais, particularly those in rural areas.

Political problems and crises have not distracted the King from his commitment to promote the wellbeing of the Thai people. He saw the need for rural development

project to build the Huai Mong-Kol road in Hua Hin district, Prachuab Province. Then he initiated rural development projects that have been spread out all over the country. These included land allotments for farmers, rice and buffalo banks, and agricultural cooperatives. The King established several experimental programs on padi-growing, animal husbandry, the production of new rice seeds, and a dairy

deforestation, and to substitute other crops for the opium poppy. Several irrigation projects were suggested by him to help farmers in barren areas and to prevent

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to sustain the country’s economic development.. Together with the prestige and traditional continuity of the monarchy, the King’s contribution to the welfare and wellbeing of the people has strengthened the bond between the Monarch and his subjects, and reinforced his role of Head of State and Dharmaraja.

ConclusionThailand’s democracy has been very fragile and whenever the country was in crisis, the people hoped the Monarch would intervene. But the King, although very concerned with political fragility, always resolved crises through democratic and constitutional means. In the past, the military often intervened when there were political crises, but they failed to launch political reforms to consolidate Thailand’s democracy. A military coup is now becoming less and less acceptable, and the military knows very well that a military coup is not a solution to the country’s political problems. Therefore, democratic development in Thailand will depend on the people themselves. The monarchical institution, which has been a force

through the process of democratic development that, as a result, will make such development more peaceful and sustainable.

Suchit Bunbongkarn is Professor Emeritus of Political Science, at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand.

References

Buddhajinavamsa, Somdej Phra, and Wat Makutkasatri Yaram. Buddhist Philosophy and Its Social and Educational Relevance in Modern Thailand. MS. Mahamakut Buddhist University, Bangkok.

Klausner, William J. Thai Culture in Transition. Bangkok: Siam Society, 2002. Print. Prince Dhani. “The Old Siamese Conception of the Monarchy.” The Siam Society

Fiftieth Anniversary Commemorative Publication II (1954): 162. Print. Pye, Lucian W. Aspects of Political Development: an Analytic Study. Boston: Little

Brown, 1966. Print. Samudavanija, Chai-Anan. “Political History.” Government and Politics of Thailand.

Ed. Xuto Somsak. Singapore: Oxford UP, 1987. Print. Wales, H.G. Quaritch. Siamese State Ceremonies: Their History and Function. London: B. Quaritch, 1931. Print.

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The Future of Thai Monarchy Kavi Chongkittavorn

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Introduction At Suvarnabhumi Airport’s Terminal C and D, international passengers can see a huge golden-framed picture showing a gathering of 28 Kings, Queens and royal members from around the world who came to Bangkok ("City of Angels") to congratulate the world’s longest reigning King in June 2006. It was an exceptional occasion to make all the royal families of the world sit together, according to seniority, under one roof. The group photo is a testimony to the popularity and aura of Thailand’s King Bhumibol Adulyadej who has been on the throne since

today, it is common to see His Majesty’s face on posters, billboards and on the walls. For centuries the Thai monarchy warded off foreign invaders and most importantly survived repeated attempts by Western colonial powers to usurp them. In Southeast Asia only the Thai monarchy survived colonialisation while its neighbouring countries (Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Malaysia) succumbed when these powerful forces began their conquest in Malacca from 1511 onwards. This rare institution, particularly during the reign of King Bhumibol, has been consolidating itself ever since. Only recently in Cambodia, the monarchy was reintroduced after a reign of horror under the Khmer Rouge (1975-78) when the royal institution was abolished.

The Thai monarchy is currently confronting new challenges emanating from rapid transformation inside the country in the past three decades. Increased levels of education and awareness, overall economic development, and new technologies are all bringing demanding new voices into politics and the social scene. They are coming from the younger people both in urban and rural areas. Their knowledge and appreciation of traditional Thailand, in whatever form or structure, is marginal, especially those that are framed under the ideas of constitutional monarchy. These

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values and norms are becoming increasingly less attractive with the repeated political turmoil in Thailand in recent times. In more ways than one they have challenged established elite and traditional power-sharing arrangements that used to be the foundation of the current Thai political system. Of late they have also attacked the “Thai bureaucratic polity”, or amarnyathipatai, as being dictatorial and elitist in nature.

In the past four years Thai society has become polarised between various contending social groups, known locally as the yellow-shirt and red-shirt groups. While these groups profess loyalty to the monarchy, they differ greatly in their political preferences. The divide widened after the conviction of former prime minister

supporter of the red-shirt group – in October 2008 on corruption charges and abuse of power. In late March and early April 2009 Thaksin openly challenged the legitimacy of the Privy Council and its supervisory roles and indirectly criticised

of April 2009, Thaksin increased his attacks through the foreign media, accusing the King of interfering in Thai politics and explicitly linked him to the September 2006 coup that ousted Thaksin from power (FT, 20/4/09). During the protest in 2007 by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) or the yellow-shirt group, their leaders constantly urged the King to step in to end the political impasse. It was customary for Thai opinion leaders to seek the King’s political intervention in time of crisis. But this time it was to no avail. Previously, both politicians and demonstrators had also used the royal institution for their own self-interests; attempts were made from time to time to drag the King into the political quagmire. At a time when large-scale bloodshed seemed possible in Bangkok over Songkran1 (April 12-13, 2009), Thaksin immediately beseeched “His Majesty” to intervene again to end the showdown. It was an unwarranted provocation from Thaksin who wanted to implicate the King as the real king-maker of Thai politics. Fortunately the latest riots ended without the kind of violence everyone anticipated, thanks to Prime Minister Abhist Vejjajiva’s rejuvenated leadership and his stringent rule to engage security forces and protesters. It was good that the King did not intervene as everybody expected, despite repeated calls by Thaksin and his red-shirt group during the riots. On April 21st

through front page photos published in most Bangkok-based daily newspapers the

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The Future of Thai Monarchy

following day, showing him accepting an invitation of the governor of Confrerie du Guillon ("Brotherhood of Guillon") to become a member of the Geneva-based wine-drinking society. The message was succinct: the King was alive and well. He was also drinking wine. Obviously the King is trying to do away with the much-stated stereotype of him meddling with Thai politics. After all elected politicians and Parliament have to settle their own political problems in democratic ways. Never before in Thailand have debates on the role of the Thai Monarch and its future been so intense and direct. Of course the Thai people are still discreet whenever they talk about the royal family. But they do talk about them. During coronation day on May 5, 2009, half a million Thais, wearing white T-shirts (not yellow, red, or blue), showed up at the Royal Plaza to celebrate the anniversary of the King’s 63-year-old reign. It was the largest gathering for such an occasion. Whenever the King was admitted to Siriraj Hospital for health reasons thousands of common folks lined up to offer their best wishes.

Can the Thai monarchy survive the current turmoil with a divided nation? This paper attempts to answer this question by examining the relations between the Thai monarchy and key institutions, including military, bureaucracy, media and rural masses.

The King and his “Reserve Powers” in Thai Politics King Bhumibhol became the monarch at a very young age. In his early years, the King travelled widely throughout the country to get to know his people and allowed them to get close to him and to know him. During his reign Thailand has seen at least 18 Constitutions, 19 coups, 27 prime ministers and 56 governments. So the King knows his constitutional role and duties well and that he must not be involved in politics but that he must play a non-partisan role in the country’s political process and development. But the public often thinks that the King is behind all political manoeuvres. Obviously, these hearsays have further increased the King’s political aura.

As a constitutional Monarch, according to former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, the King possesses three discretionary powers: “the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, and the right to warn”. The King exercises these prerogatives through private audiences he grants to the prime minister of the day.

Prime Minister Thaksin Shinwatra often divulged parts of his consultations with

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the King. Six months before the September coup of 2006, Thaksin had an audience with the King at Klai Kangwon Palace in Hua Hin. He came out saying the King was not on the same page with the Privy Council, which at the time was criticising Thaksin and his behaviour. Thaksin had broken a century-old taboo. Sometimes the prime minister of the day would highlight one or two issues that the King addressed and share it with the public so that they would be aware that the King was concerned about certain issues. But there would not be any personal matter.

Under the Thai Constitution the King does have formal powers and responsibilities. In exercising this function he is conscious of his non-political role. All legislations vetted and approved by the National Assembly must be signed by the King. Sometimes, the King delays his signature—considered a rubber stamp, which could be interpreted in various ways. This discreet but powerful signal is strictly advisory. Whenever the King speaks, either on his birthday or with the Cabinet members or court judges, it is scrutinised and listened to with great attention. Of course there is no guarantee that the King’s thinking is being heard and properly understood.

Contrary to conventional belief, the King has not come out so often to intervene in Thai politics. He has only intervened in a few cases. But when he did, it was always important. Whenever Thai politics is caught in a quagmire, Thais automatically

embedded in the Thai psyche, but the most famous scene occurred in May 1992 when the political protagonists – General Suchinda Kraprayoon and Chamlong Srimuang – who were previously at each other’s throats, kneeled before the King. The dramatic event was broadcast live on TV. Within a second, peace was restored. That memorable image represented the high point of the Thai King and his barami,

whenever politicians quarrel, or military leaders become restless, Thais bank on the King and his magic power to heal all rifts. This strong sentiment derives from the public belief that Thai political leaders often lack the kind of moral authority to end a political crisis, as they are focused on their own vested interests and constituencies. In this case the King has always been perceived as an impartial person. It is a catch-22 situation. The King is needed when politicians are unable to solve differences among themselves; but whatever measures were taken would be viewed as intervention. The fact that the King is there to help out in times of trouble enhanced his political maturity.

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Thai Monarchy and the Military Every year, 48 hours before the King’s birthday on 5 December, all the leaders of the Thai armed forces dress in full military regalia to perform the trooping of colours at the Royal Plaza to honour the King and pledge allegiance to him and the throne. This colourful annual ritual symbolises the submission of the military to the King’s sovereign authority and political will. The Thai military culture has been built on the foundation of respect for the monarchy. In fact, it has been deeply embedded in the Thai psyche. The most important duty of the Thai military, besides defending the country from external threats, is to protect the throne – everything else is secondary. To outsiders it is hard to understand that all Thai military actions must be carried out in the name of the King and must be honourable and just as His Majesty is honourable and just. The King is the symbol of national unity.

Since most of the coups occurred during his reign, criticisms are naturally aplenty about His Majesty’s role in politics. In fact he does not have any executive power, but he has high symbolic power over the military and society as a whole. The military is clearly subordinated to the King. However, that does not prevent the military from playing an active political role. The rise and fall of a government could directly affect the morale of the armed forces and their budgets. In the past

could do so easily by ordering their junior commanders to stage a coup. Quite often, in responding to a political crisis in the past three years, pressure groups, as well as the public at large, have requested the military to intervene. The military has also realised that managing the country under a coup is a tough job, especially to gain diplomatic acceptance. The 2006 coup tarnished the Thai military and democratic development greatly because it showed that the military had not really returned to the barracks. Indeed when Thailand changed from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy in 1932, about 95 per cent of all prime ministers and

In the coming years the traditional role of the Thai military in protecting the throne would become even more important due to the issue related to succession. The King’s health has been the subject of intense speculation in the past four years, which has caused great concern among Thai people. At present the relations between the monarchy and the military are very solid. Army Chief General Anupong Paochinda has built his career protecting the royal family as part of

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the elite Royal Queen’s Guards. He has proved beyond any doubt, despite being a classmate of fugitive Thaksin at a military cadet school, that he is a professional soldier who has successfully resisted the calls to stage a coup since he assumed the position in October 2007. The First Region’s Army Chief, General Prayuth Chan O-cha, who expects to succeed him next year, has also been a staunch supporter of the monarchy.

Monarchy and the Rural Mass In June 2006 during a week-long demonstration by the rural poor who had gathered at Chatuchak Park, I met a group of rural farmers from Udon Thani, who held a number of placards with the portrait of Thaksin in full military regalia.

something like this had occurred. I wondered what had happened to all the smiling faces that were a common sight whenever people waited to see the King and all the kindness he has bestowed on his people for over six decades. Normally, during such demonstrations, portraits of the King were the preferred choices. Since then I sensed that there was a sea change in the perception of rural Thais who used to

their life-cycle.

After Thaksin became the prime minister in early 2001, he initiated a series of

debt-relief, and education. With his business background and acumen he was able to

populist schemes. As part of the so-called “political marketing”, he constantly came up with new social schemes for the rural areas such as one tambon ("district") one product, one village one free scholarship, one village one million baht fund, among others. Some of these programmes used to be within the purview of the

and sustainable development all along. He has done it without political overtones. Throughout his reign, but not in recent years, the King – often accompanied by the Queen and his son and daughters – traveled to remote villages to get to know his subjects. Their Majesties’ entourage would comprise doctors, educators and agricultural experts to provide advice and expertise to villagers directly. More than 3,000 royal-sponsored projects are currently in operation throughout the country.

These rural masses, especially those living in the North and Northeast regions, are considered the country’s poorest. They feel that they have been left out of the

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development process that has been concentrated in urban areas and major cities. In the past, they saw the King as the only person who could deliver services and

His populist policies woke them up especially as voters who could pick a prime minister. Aided by former progressive students Thaksin has created networks among villages in the provinces to support his political ambition. Some of them have become elected members of Parliament and have been active in helping the rural masses to organise them – using experience they gained during the armed struggle with the government. At the recent protest by the red-shirt groups, several rural leaders spoke on stage and attacked the King, which had never happened before within a Thai cultural setting. But somehow, Thaksin, the self-styled champion of the poor, has quickly transformed these rural leaders and red-shirt groups into republican aspirants.

Obviously the populist approach has been well received especially in times of the global economic crisis. Every country has come up with its own economic stimulus package to help domestic economies. Recent political outrage showed

programs would be undermined. The government under Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva understands this concern very well and since January has adopted bigger populist programmes, but with a better monitoring mechanism, for the rural poor to widen social safety nets such as the 500-baht monthly allowance for senior citizens, free education with free uniforms. In early May Abhisit injected an additional 800 billion baht for the long-term stimulus package.

The Monarchy and Media His Majesty has never given any interviews to members of the Thai media. Journalists are used to reporting what he says verbatim during ceremonies such as the opening of Parliament or to welcome new batches of senior judges. Each year all media outlets faithfully report his speeches on his birthday and New Year Eve. Through these speeches, the media interprets what is on His Majesty’s mind. The palace-media relations are best described as distant but correct. However, the King has granted several interviews to foreign correspondents and writers who were interested in Thailand. The most famous interview was conducted in 1979 with BBC Television, when he discussed the death of his elder brother, King Mahidol, as well as his duty and responsibility as the King of Thailand.

The Thai media regularly prints news from press releases from the Royal Household. Almost all photos related to royal activities are done by pooled media

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teams, comprising state-run media organisations. In the printed media, royal-related news often appears. Each day all TV channels will broadcast royal-related news at 8.00 pm provided by the Royal Household, focusing on the activities of members of the royal families. There are no independent royal correspondents as in other constitutional monarchies.

The King, an avid newspaper reader and veteran ham radio operator, has stressed

his birthday speech in December 2004 he spoke about the role of the media for the

mirror for the government in power and the society as a whole. In the same message he also talked about himself that as a King; he did not see himself as infallible, a King who could do no wrong in the ordinary sense of the word. The King was saying clearly that he was not above criticism. He added that he welcomed critical comments based on facts and objectivity. For the Thai media the King’s comments

They immediately associated his comment to earlier complaints on the media made by former PM Thaksin, criticising the media’s role. In a recent interview with Die Spiegel (15-4-09), M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, the King’s cousin and currently the governor of Bangkok, talked about his perception of the King. He said that the Thai monarchy has been successful: “The King has never failed, so his success has built up a myth around him that he could never do anything wrong”. As such, the belief that the King can do no wrong and is untouchable has become a template for the media as well as the rest of the society.

So far no Thai journalist has been charged with lèse majesté, as they simply abstain from reporting or writing about the monarchy. I have been often asked if I have ever written about the Thai monarchy. The answer is in the negative. The only time I did was on 21 January 2001 when I rewrote a short report from London. The Nation on that day published news taken from an English daily, The Independent, about Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn’s fondness for Thai minced pork and shrimp balls made by a Thai restaurant in Stratford-on-Avon in Britain. To celebrate his

Royal Household later made an inquiry asking why The Nation had published such an article. I was on duty that day. My response at the time was “to promote Thai food in England”.

It is interesting to note that since 2001 there has been an increase in court cases related to lèse majesté

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foreign media have paid much attention to the draconian set of laws for any person who insults the King and his family. The King actually has never taken recourse to legal actions to silence critics; nor is he, by royal convention, in a position to answer or respond to these critics. He remains unperturbed and proceeds to give royal pardon to those who are convicted. The latest case was that of an Australian writer, Harry Nicolaide, who was jailed for three years in January 2009 for lèse majesté against the King’s son in an unpublished book. He was given amnesty in late March 2009. Another case that made headlines was the pardon of a drunken Swiss tourist who tore off a portrait of the King in Chiang Mai two years ago. However, the real test would soon come. Recently the Thai court passed a 10-year jail term on Suvicha Thakor, a 34-year-old engineer, who used computer software to doctor the image of Thai Queen Sirikit before putting the pictures on YouTube. At present, his case has become the rallying point for a dozen international human rights and freedom of expression groups. They have jointly called for amendments to the draconian lèse majesté laws. A royal pardon is expected for Suvicha but nobody knows when it will happen. The Abhisit-led government could have arrested more online users who committed similar offences if it wanted to. All 37 Internet service providers have recorded all the identities of Internet users, including the time they logged in and out and the sites they clicked on for up to 90 days as mandated by the

Two books on the life and role of the Thai King were written in the past decade. William Stevenson wrote The Revolutionary King in 1999 after spending a year in Thailand. He had access to private meetings and was able to interview the King and his aides. Another book, The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand’s Bhumibol Adulyadej, by Paul Hanley (2005), has further prompted the curiosity of foreign and Thai readers alike about the true nature of the Thai King. This book has caused uneasiness among Thai authorities due to its unusual details and assumptions.

websites and bloggers. At least 4,000 websites were shut down since January 2009 due to the anti-monarchy content. Such online censorship has already tarnished Thailand’s media freedom, which used to be one of the best in Asia. This trend is likely to increase as Thai authorities continue to react in knee-jerk fashion to any

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Future of Thai Monarchy Like any other human institution, the Thai Monarchy has to evolve with time. Major royal-related institutes such as the Privy Council and Crown Property Bureau are no exception. In general the Thai public respect the royal institutes with positive views. Albeit this trend, it is imperative to improve the public perception of the royal institutions by making them transparent and accessible by ordinary people. As the Thai society becomes more open and democratic, the ever-changing Thai psyche will become a major variable. Amendments to lèse majesté laws including rule of procedures concerning royal-related activities should be encouraged as they do not mean the erosion of loyalty or diminishing roles of the

new perception of younger generations. Whoever succeeds King Bhumibol will

His Majesty’s replacement will have an impact on the relevance of the monarchy, democratisation and Thai lives. As long as the Thai monarchy continues to provide social and political stability under the current democratic framework, its existence

the symbol of unity, and a revered icon in Thailand. His Majesty will represent the continuity of history and the expression of the totality of Thai people.

Kavi Chongkittavorn is the senior editor of The Nation media group in Bangkok, Thailand.

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Lessons from Japan’s Symbolic Monarchy

Kenneth J. Ruoff

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Introduction and BackgroundThe world’s youngest democracy, Bhutan, is also its newest constitutional monarchy. Famous for the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH), Bhutan recently transformed itself from an absolutist monarchy to a democratic constitutional monarchy with the King as head of state. The Monarch’s role in practice under the new constitution will take shape in the coming years, with the King continuing to intersect with politics but in a more ceremonial fashion than previously.

In May 2009, the Bhutan Centre for Media and Democracy hosted a small group of scholars and journalists versed in issues of democracy and monarchy at a conference in Paro, Bhutan. As the author of the book The People’s Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995 as well as of various essays about Japan’s monarchy, I was one of the invitees. My role was to introduce suggestions from Japan’s model that might prove useful to Bhutan, examples of which I shall share below along with lessons in other areas that Bhutan offers Japan, the United States, and other industrialised, advanced democracies. Japan’s symbolic monarchy is more than six decades old, and Japan’s experience in this area suggests some lessons for Bhutan.

First, however, some background on Bhutan is necessary. The Wangchuck Dynasty

with keeping their country (population 675,000) safe in a tricky part of the world. Bhutan shares borders with the two “elephants” in the area, India and China. Nonetheless, Bhutan has guarded not only its independence but also a strong sense of national identity. Bhutan maintains close ties with India, but does not have diplomatic relations with China.

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When the fourth King, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, ascended the throne in 1972, Bhutan suffered from high rates of poverty, illiteracy, and infant mortality. King Jigme Singye Wangchuck committed himself to developing Bhutan to improve the lives of his people, but on terms that seem prescient from today’s perspective.

In order to provide a blueprint for his country’s development King Jigme Singye Wangchuck, in the late 1970s, devised the concept of GNH. GNH has four pillars in the present government’s interpretation: equitable and sustainable socio-economic development; preservation and promotion of cultural and spiritual heritage; conservation of the environment; and good governance, which complements the above principles. The King wanted Bhutan to develop, but not at the cost of destroying its environment or by losing its cultural heritage.

In the succeeding decades Bhutan made considerable strides in areas such as literacy (now at 55% and rising quickly) and poverty reduction, but under the leadership of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck the country did not waver from the policy of GNH. The fourth King was revered as a benevolent Monarch whose priority was the welfare of his people.

Thus it came as a shock to most people in Bhutan when, in 2005, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck voluntarily announced that he would be abdicating in favour of his son as part of a process to transform Bhutan into a democracy. The King was not under pressure to share power from, for example, a rising bourgeoisie, making his decision to relinquish power all the more remarkable. However, many people in Bhutan, far from being happy about this rare instance of a Monarch voluntarily ceding his power in favour of democratic rule, were opposed to such a move by their beloved King.

But King Jigme Singye Wangchuck insisted that what his country needed was not simply an individual ruler but rather a system of rule. In rapid succession, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck followed through on his promise to abdicate (2006), Bhutan’s leaders authored the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan

the symbol of unity of the Kingdom and of the people of Bhutan,” Bhutan held

2008), and then Bhutan celebrated a grand coronation (November 2008) in order

1980), on the throne.

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In a country that was not only accustomed to, but also in fact welcomed the King’s playing the leading role in the political process, how are Bhutan’s newly elected leaders to steer the country’s nascent democracy in a way that keeps the King above politics? At the same time, how can King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck, who maintains immense moral authority, continue to play an important societal role in improving his country?

The Importance of Keeping the Monarch Outside PoliticsThe “imperial will” was central to Japan’s political system under the Meiji Constitution of 1889. The postwar Constitution, in contrast, rendered it constitutionally insupportable to invoke the imperial will to justify policies. Nonetheless Emperor

decades after the war, and many people were accustomed to the imperial will. Fortunately most Japanese politicians came to understand that policies had to be devised and instituted in the name of the people, and that it simply was no longer acceptable to employ the Emperor in order to curry favour for policies.

While in Bhutan I watched footage of King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck’s 2008 coronation, and the displays of reverence that some of his countrymen displayed toward him remind me of scenes from Emperor Showa’s tours to rural

show peasants prostrating themselves in deference to Emperor Showa. King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck is by all accounts humble and also mixes easily with his countrymen, but it was clear from those scenes during the coronation ceremony as well as from talking to Bhutan’s political leaders that the young King enjoys tremendous authority.

Thus, there may come moments when it will be extremely tempting for Bhutan’s elected leaders, frustrated with the messy process involved with making policy in a democracy, to invoke the authority of the King in order to push through such and such bill. They must resist this temptation at all costs if the new system of constitutional monarchy is to mature. This means that not only must the elected leaders avoid invoking the King in parliamentary debates, but those ministers who

among Japanese at large, government ministers (especially the Prime Minister) and

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a custom is not out of line with the practices of other symbolic monarchies such as Britain and Spain.

According to many accounts Japan’s present Emperor, Akihito (1933-), depending

the Emperor’s views on various issues. The same was true of Emperor Showa. Japan’s national symbol is a human being, after all, and the Emperor has opinions on various matters. No doubt the same is true of Bhutan’s young King.

are absolutely forbidden from making public the content of their conversations with the Emperor during his lifetime (prime ministers who brief the Queen in Britain observe the same rule). To make the emperor’s comments public would be to involve him in politics, which is not acceptable.

Japanese politicians have made only a few mistakes in this area in the past six decades, the most famous of which occurred in 1973 and resulted in swift and severe consequences for the individual who leaked the Emperor’s remarks. After Masuhara Keikichi, Chief of the Defence Agency, shared with reporters comments

supported a defence build-up, Masuhara was forced to resign within days as a result of a general uproar over his apparent use of the Emperor for political ends.

Along the same lines the political views of King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck

servants continue to brief the King on political matters. It may seem strange to be recommending secrecy to a new democracy that is struggling to establish transparency in governmental matters, but, ironically enough, in the case of the

In most other areas, including in reference to issues such as the amount of public money used to support the monarchy, transparency would be best in Bhutan, but

Prime Minister Lyonchhoen Jigmi Y. Thinley recognises the need for discretion. During a meeting on 20 May, he stressed that in light of the King’s authority there

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that might compromise the country’s young democracy.

National Unity and IdentityBuddhism is central to Bhutan’s national identity. Article 3.1 of the new constitution reads: “Buddhism is the spiritual heritage of Bhutan, which promotes the principles and values of peace, non-violence, compassion and tolerance.” In fact the new constitution requires that the King be Buddhist (in this sense, Bhutan’s system is

religions. Buddhist symbolism was central to the coronation even if the state itself is now secular.

The extent to which Buddhism continues to be woven into the daily lives of people in Bhutan is evidenced by the fact that many of the items constituting “The Dragon’s Gift: Sacred Art of Bhutan,” an exhibition now touring internationally, were borrowed from private homes where they continue to serve profoundly religious purposes. There is little question that Buddhism will continue in part to

security.

But Bhutan is also changing fast now that it has opened itself to the world. Approximately half of the people now own cell phones, and television, especially programmes from India, is presently the rage. Although a majority of individuals still make their living through agriculture, the country is rapidly urbanising. Certain traditions no longer appeal to the young, much to the concern of some of their elders.

The young Oxford-educated King thus faces the question of which aspects of global culture to embrace (democracy being one important example), and which to keep at bay. At the same time he is faced with the same question regarding domestic traditions. Which traditions are worth preserving, and which should be discarded?

Japan’s Monarchs have also faced these questions during the modern period, most

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similar choices. For example it was Emperor Taisho (born to a concubine in 1879; d. 1926) who established the system of monogamous marriage in the royal house, something that his son, Emperor Showa, subsequently observed. The system of

In the same way that Japan’s imperial family members lend their prestige to their country’s traditional arts (e.g., waka), King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck has

These traditions include hand-woven textiles that tourists snap up with delight not to mention dazzling Buddhist art ranging from bronze statues to silk paintings.

Monarchies are often thought of as bastions of tradition, but they also are often at the forefront of modernisation as well. One only has to think of Emperor Meiji and his family being inoculated for smallpox during an epidemic in 1875, a time when many people feared vaccinations.

In a country with a population of 675,000 it is literally possible for the young King, during the course of his reign, to reach out individually to each and every one of his countrymen, an advantageous situation that cannot be duplicated in Japan. During a recent 25-day domestic tour that included visits to remote villages, King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck demonstrated his belief that certain superstitions are in fact harmful and should be discarded.

Walking between two remote villages in March of this year, the King met Tashi Wangmo, a woman ostracised in her community as a “poison giver”. In certain rural villages, there are families who have been ostracised for generations because they are seen as being cursed, and thus fellow villagers refuse to receive food or drink from them. Someone from the King’s entourage who had scouted ahead

Instead the King reached out to Tashi Wangmo by presenting her a rosary and asking her to pour some ara (locally brewed alcohol) into his cup, which he then drank. The King asked the woman to tell her fellow villagers that the King had drunk from the so-called poison-giver, which proved to be a life-changing event for her. By this simple act, the King had broken the curse that had plagued this woman’s family for generations. It was the sort of benevolent act with tremendous symbolic resonance from the young King to which people in Bhutan are quickly becoming accustomed.

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The 29 year-old King has not yet married. The case of Japan, especially in the post-

the royal house’s connection with the people. The 1959 marriage of the present Emperor and Empress dramatically linked the monarchy to what at the time was a burgeoning new middle class that held dear such post-war values as equality (the present empress, Michiko, came from outside the former nobility) and liberty (the marriage was interpreted as a love match).

Much about Bhutan young King’s reign, including the selection of a bride, is still taking shape, but unless the constitution is amended his time on the throne will end in 2045. The constitution requires the Monarch to abdicate upon reaching 65 years of age.

Lessons from BhutanIt is no secret that Bhutan is not a major international player in terms of economic or military might, but in the realm of ideas it has made a name for itself that is disproportionate to its size as a result of the concept of GNH. GNH was a guiding principle in the writing of the new constitution, which includes some intriguing articles.

Consider, for example, the following two articles:

5.2. The Royal Government shall:

(a) Protect, conserve and improve the pristine environment and safeguard the biodiversity of the country;

(b) Prevent pollution and ecological degradation;

(c) Secure ecologically balanced sustainable development while promoting

(d) Ensure a safe and healthy environment.

5.3. The Government shall ensure that, in order to conserve the country’s natural resources and to prevent degradation of the ecosystem, a minimum of sixty percent of Bhutan’s total land shall be maintained under forest cover for all time.

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Is there another country in the world that constitutionally requires that sixty percent of the national territory be maintained as forest? Most of the developed countries

protect what nature was left. Unfortunately, many of the countries developing today are making the same mistake.

place. Approximately one-third of the country is already under special protection as part of the national park system. Of course, Bhutan is not a utopia. For example, litter has recently become a problem in Paro, where the country’s one airport is located and where, frankly, perhaps too many resorts have already been built. Nonetheless, Bhutan’s long-standing, tenacious commitment to environmental protection is undeniable and admirable.

Obviously Japan has also adopted many worthwhile environmental policies. However, it is also true that huge amounts of concrete continues to be poured throughout the archipelago in projects that sustained the alliance between the construction industry and the recently dethroned Liberal Democratic Party, but which are not only of dubious practical value but are also environmentally destructive.

Although I think that the next lesson from Bhutan is particularly relevant to my own country, the United States, where the wealth gap has grown to disgraceful

between rich and poor. Although those individuals in Bhutan who practice subsistence agriculture (even as urbanites roar past in their automobiles) may view the matter differently, it is nonetheless the case that Bhutan does not have the sort of sickening discrepancies between rich and poor that characterise so many other countries, both developed and developing ones.

Bhutan would do well to keep the wealth gap as minimal as possible, and the King should (and from what we know of him, likely will) employ his immense moral authority in support of this goal. In any case, Article 9.7 mandates the government of Bhutan to minimise gaps in wealth: “The State shall endeavour to develop and execute policies to minimise inequalities of income, concentration of wealth, and promote equitable distribution of public facilities among individuals and people living in different parts of the Kingdom.”

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Article 25 of the Constitution of Japan: “All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living. In all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavours for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public health.”

Many Americans would probably denounce Article 9.7 of Bhutan’s Constitution as “socialistic”. This is ironic because scholars who have looked carefully at the United States often interpret the country as practicing socialism for the rich through special tax breaks and other government programmes even while the poor are required to live according to the market. Bhutan should avoid this aspect of the American model.

Kenneth J. Ruoff is Professor of History at Portland State University, Oregon, USA.

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The Story of the Demise of Nepal’s Monarchy

Sudhindra Sharma

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On June 19, 2008, monarchy ended in Nepal when the elected constituent assembly endorsed the country as a Federal Democratic Republic.1 The main political force calling for an end to monarchy in Nepal was the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), which had launched an insurgency in the Himalayan Kingdom from 1996 onwards, among others, to oust what it regarded to be the “feudal” monarchical institution. King Gyanendra had become increasingly isolated when the parliamentarian parties, the Nepali Congress (NC) and United Marxist- Leninist (UML), in particular, joined hands with the Maoists through a 12-point Memorandum of Understanding signed in November 2005 in New Delhi, to bring an end to the King’s absolute rule.

King Gyanendra Bikram Shah Dev eventually had to step down in April 2006 following 19 days of relentless mass demonstrations throughout the country. He handed over the executive authority to the reinstated parliament, which expanded to include the Maoist rebels. The Maoist members of the parliament along with MPs from other political parties passed a resolution calling for an end to the institution of monarchy and changed the status of the state from a Hindu Monarchical Kingdom to a secular, democratic, and federal republic. Thus ended the over two millennium-old monarchical institution of Nepal, and with it, the Shah dynasty, which had helped form the modern Nepali state in 1769. Aside from

student activists of various political parties, there was no mass jubilation at the ousting of the centuries-old institution, nor was sorrow openly expressed - at least

grateful to all the participants of the conference for sharing their ideas and commenting upon mine

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not on the streets. Neither exuberance nor anguish marked the termination of the centuries-old institution of monarchy in Nepal.

This paper examines monarchy in Nepal. It begins with the circumstances leading to the emergence of the state of Nepal in the late eighteenth century and the role of Prithvi Narayan Shah, in this process. The paper then focuses on the milieu, personalities and contributions of four Monarchs: Tribhuvan, Mahendra, Birendra and Gyanendra. Political events leading to the ouster of the monarchy following the royal massacre in June 2001 are then analysed along with a discussion of the factors that made King Gyanendra increasingly unpopular. Lastly, the contribution of monarchy to Nepal is assessed.

King Prithvi Narayan Shah and the Emergence of Modern Nepal

Gorkha’s victory over the Malla dynasty ruled kingdoms of the valley. The subjugation of the valley was an important turning point in the expansion of the Gorkhali Empire in the central and eastern Himalayas. King Prithvi Narayan Shah, who led the Gorkhalis in their conquest, was able to expand the dominion of the House of Gorkha, a small principality in central Nepal, not only through military conquest but also through marriage alliances and diplomacy (Blakie). Before the nomenclature ‘Nepal’ gained ascendancy from early nineteenth century onwards, the land used to be known as the “Gorkha ra bhar muluk” underscoring the territory as the dominion of the House of Gorkha. While Prithvi Narayan Shah deposed the erstwhile rulers of the valley (either through banishment or death sentence), he nevertheless sought the blessings of Taleju Bhavani, the titular deity of the Malla Kings.2 Likewise, while the new king took over the land and property belonging to the Malla kings and their military commanders, he recognised all the land that had been gifted by the previous dynasty to ascetics, temples, and Brahmins. These gestures indicated a degree of religio-cultural continuity: when Prithvi Narayan Shah deposed the Malla kings of the valley, his intention was not to loot and plunder but to govern the new possessions by integrating these into his ancestral possessions.

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Though Nepal, in the perceptions of its rulers, was a Hindu state, the monarchs did not see themselves as dev-raja. The ideas articulated by the rulers of this peripheral land, were those of cultural uniqueness and a claim to the continuation of a civilisation that had been displaced at the centre of Indian-Hindu civilisation.

From the thirteenth century onwards, with the consolidation of Muslim rule over much of north India, kingship in Nepal evolved along a different path from that of India. As Max Weber notes, Muslim conquest of India not only deposed Hindu kings, but also made redundant the services of the Brahmins as interpreters of the shastras and as advisers in the administration and the judiciary (Weber). This is because the various Islamic dynasties that ruled the Indo-Gangetic plains derived their legitimacy from a different tradition. The Islamic clergy or ulema, versed in the Koran, Hadith and the Shariat, played the role in Islamic sultanates that Brahmins played in Hindu kingdoms.

The persistence in the symbiotic relationship between Brahmin priesthood and Kshatriya kingship in Nepal and its severance in India led Hinduism to evolve along different lines in Nepal (Sharma, “Hindu State” and “Hindu Adhirajya”). It was thus that right up to the early part of the twentieth century, Brahmins played

chaturvarnashram dharma - the four stages of life and four varnas.3

By the seventeenth century the rulers of the petty kingdoms of the Himalaya saw themselves in some sense as being Hindu,4 meaning by this primarily that they were not Muslims. Conversely, the Ganges basin was referred to not as Hindustan, but

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From Monarchical Shahs to Rana ShogunsThe campaign begun by the Shah King during the late eighteenth century was to be consolidated by the regents of the incipient state during the early nineteenth century. During the same period, once the young state’s interests collided with that of the British East India Company and its ambitions were curtailed and territorial

century or so.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the relation of incorporated principalities to the Gorkhali State was predominantly a tributary one. The state was maintained by the appropriation of agricultural surpluses from the peasants. In contrast to thriving trade during the Malla times with the takeover of the valley by Prithvi Narayan in 1769, the contribution of trade to state coffers drastically diminished. The new Gorkhali rulers, suspicious that traders, particularly foreign ones, were informants of foreign powers, discouraged foreign traders from trading in the kingdom. For instance, soon after taking over he expelled the gosain ("Indian ascetic") merchants, while British attempts to establish trading relations and access to Tibet were similarly rebuffed (Whelpton, John 2005).

King’s power waned and state reign went effectively into the hands of military families. During the same period, the young state’s interests collided with that of the British East India Company regarding the ownership of the recently acquired territory in the central Tarai, which resulted in the 1814-1816 war. The expansion of the young Nepali state was halted by the defeat to the forces of the British East India Company that reduced its size by one third. One of the conditions of the treaty was to accept a permanent British representative (resident) in Kathmandu.5

Competition for the control of the state led to bloody struggles between different military families. From 1846 state machinery went effectively into the hands of one family - the Ranas. The power of this family was consolidated through the institution of hereditary prime ministership. During this period, the King was the

subcontinent, to appoint mukhiyars or dewans

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While the Shah Monarchs were referred to as Maharajadhiraj, the Rana prime minister was referred to as Maharaja.

The person who ushered in the rule of Ranas as the de facto rulers in Nepal from 1846 to 1951 was Jang Bahadur. The man had humble beginnings, having come from a military family that had assisted King Prithvi Narayan Shah in his campaigns. The contacts he had with the Crown Prince helped him gain access to the court. After consolidating his rule in the country by annihilating his rivals, he sought to establish amicable relations with the British. This was important in that from 1816 onwards, with the establishment of the residency in the valley, the British were closely monitoring events in Nepal. In 1850, Jang Bahadur visited England and

the taboo on crossing the kala-pani (or the "black ocean"). After having gained a

that it would be prudent to ally with the British rather than go against them - a policy that was to be followed by his clan and which was to yield it dividends for another century.6

The Ranas, as Nepal’s hereditary prime ministers and maharajas, were able to maintain the country’s independence, so to speak, by being faithful allies of the British. Unwavering support to the British - even in times of duress such as during mutinies, wars, and independence movement - meant that the British, in turn, reciprocated. This was also the main reason that their rule was to last as long as it did.

King Tribhuvan, Nepal’s 1951 Revolution, and Monarchy as the Locus of the State Independent India, in particular the government at that time headed by the Indian National Congress, was sympathetic towards the Nepali Congress. The Congress was formed in the then-British India during the 1940's, and the leaders had participated in India’s independence movement. Post-colonial India’s role in Nepal’s transition of 1950-51 was to bring two rival institutions into the centre-stage of Nepali politics: assertive monarchy and political parties.

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The end to the century-old Rana Shogun came rather abruptly. In 1947, India gained independence and the new democratic rulers of India, especially the Indian National Congress that soon formed the government, were not as sympathetic towards the Ranas, as had been the Imperial British. From within India there was a campaign by the Nepali Congress against the regime. Various Congresses formed in India, including the one started by “C” class Ranas, were amalgamated in 1950 and the new political party was simply called the Nepali Congress. The Nepali Congress launched an armed revolt against the Ranas the same year. They formed an alliance with King Tribhuvan in their attempt to topple the Ranas.

After King Tribhuvan was implicated in conspiracy against the Ranas, he sought asylum at the Indian embassy in November 1950. Soon the rebel forces under the leadership of the Nepali Congress began attacking Nepal’s bordering towns in the Tarai. In the face of deteriorating military strength and desertion of government troops to the rebel side, the Rana regime began to buckle under pressure. With anti-Rana initiatives of the Nepali Congress receiving covert support from

In short, the withdrawal of the British from India and the insurrectionary activities of the Nepali Congress were causes for the collapse of the Ranas. In addition, the very legitimacy on which Rana rule was based rapidly eroded when King

those opposed to the Rana regime. In 1951, after being eclipsed for a century and a half, monarchy, i.e. the Shah dynasty, was reinstated as the supreme authority in Nepal.

The event of 1951 is a story of a legitimate, though powerless, King risking his throne for the sake of his common people. Underlying the event is the story of

rather than with the nobility who belonged to his own class. It is this narrative that helped boost the image of monarchy as a caring institution and this image eventually helped it come to the centre-stage of Nepali politics. It was primarily this narrative that bestowed legitimacy and sanctity to the institution of monarchy.

The reinstatement of Shah Kings as the centre of power in Nepal was accompanied

the King’s empathy and association with the common-folk: out went the Anglicised

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dress worn by the Rana aristocracy, and in came the simple Nepali daura-surwal; out went the courtly language (the “hazuur” culture), and in came the simple Nepali language (the “tapai” culture); out went the gestures associated with courtly culture such as “swasti” and in came the simple “namaste” form of greeting. The enlightened rulers of princely states had probably undertaken this transition during the 1930's when the independence movement led by the Indian National Congress gained momentum: their transition and transformation probably became the template for fashioning a democratic and pro-India-oriented monarchy in the region.

The 1951 revolution had, in one stroke, changed the peasantry from subjects to citizens. It helped transform those whom had been the subjects of feudal lords of an autocratic regime into citizens of a democratic country. The 1951 event brought abrupt change to a society that had been accustomed to tradition. The seclusion of Nepal that the Rana rulers had painstakingly enforced ended, and

eventually led to new movements that were to have wide-ranging repercussions on

at engagement with modernity (Khanal).

In the new narration of the monarchy, the contribution of the Ranas, especially in ensuring Nepal’s independence and sovereignty, were generally glossed over. In history textbooks, the Ranas have generally been portrayed as the ruling class that deliberately kept Nepal backward.7

Nepal in the 1950’s and 1960’s

forces of tradition in the 1950’s were still quite strong. The traditional elements of society, including much of the Rana family itself, were to later regroup and make a comeback: they were to regroup around King Mahendra, who did not share his father’s democratic convictions.

was far from stable. The decade of the 1950’s has been characterised as a period of experimentation with democracy where Cabinets were formed and dissolved, Advisory Assemblies established and re-established, and parties created and

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fragmented. The unstable nature of the polity, in the aftermath of the overthrow of the Rana rule, was to help strengthen the hands of the monarchy since it was more often than not, the King who would call upon the leaders of political parties to form the government.

Things were changing on the international front during the 1950’s. The Chinese takeover of Tibet in 1949 created worries for both the United States and India. The United State’s diplomatic relations with Nepal had begun from 1947 and after 1950, the Americans saw Nepal as a frontline state against communism and began providing aid.

1951, four months after the overthrow of Rana rule. Later in the same year, an Indian military mission arrived in Kathmandu to modernise the Gauchar airport and build a road from the Indian border to Kathmandu.

Nepal became a member of the United Nations in 1955 and the Colombo Plan in 1956; this assured it of durable foreign assistance. It was at around the same period

With the removal of the Ranas from the centre-stage of Nepal’s statecraft, the army saw the King as their chief and from 1952 began regarding the King as the supreme commander-in-chief. This further bolstered the position of the monarchy at the cost of the political parties. However, monarchy in Nepal did not make itself assertive from 1951 onwards; its assertiveness was a gradual process and one that spanned several years.

In February 1959 a parliamentary election under a constitution promulgated by King Mahendra was held. Nepali Congress won a two third majority in the

formed with BP Koirala as the Prime Minister. Despite the progress made by the Koirala government, King Mahendra was not happy with it. Likewise, an assertive monarchy’s ambition to maintain control over government was hindered by the determined, popularly elected, and internationally recognised prime minister. As a result, King Mahendra, using the emergency powers vested in him by the then-

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constitution, arrested BP Koirala, dissolved the parliament, and assumed executive authority of the country on the 15th of December 1960.

King Mahendra, Assertive Monarchy, and Modernisation Some have tended to characterise Mahendra’s action in 1960 as a ‘coup’; however, the event cannot be called a coup since the monarchy had been granted residual powers by the 1959 Constitution and Mahendra had used these very provisions when he took action against the B.P. Koirala government. Though his action was constitutional, it was, however, not warranted; the situation within the country was normal and did not call for the declaration of emergency. Though King Mahendra was eventually able to sideline and marginalise his opponents, this action by the King was a breach of trust with the political leaders and tarnished the image of the monarchy. The symbolic capital and goodwill that the institution had earned through King Tribhuvan’s gesture in 1950/51, was undermined by the actions of King Mahendra in the event of 1960. (While Tribhuvan’s gesture had highlighted monarchy’s alliance with people and with democracy, Mahendra’s gesture underscored the Monarch’s parting of ways with people, its leaders and democracy.)

King Mahendra was able to do what he did because the traditional forces in society were quite strong at the time. The army, whose upper echelons comprised of the old Rana nobility, was behind him. For the new educated classes, there were few employment opportunities aside from the bureaucracy and the threat of their being expelled soon cowered many into accepting King Mahendra’s actions.

The Nepali Congress seriously challenged the King’s move, and an insurrection soon got underway in parts of the Tarai through India’s tacit support. Soon the geo-politics of the region changed dramatically with repercussions in the insurrection. There had been long-standing disputes between India and China in the Himalayas, which had been simmering for some time. In 1962 China launched a massive attack in Indian territories in the Himalayas; as a consequence, India’s security of the entire Himalayan region became vulnerable. The Indian government stopped providing aid to the Nepali Congress; it had been doing so tacitly in the interest of India’s security in the Himalayan region. This dramatic shift in geo-politics worked in the King’s favour.

King Mahendra was able to shore up his legitimacy by various other means. He soon promulgated a new civil code that ended the state patronage to the caste system. He enacted a land reform - something that had been discussed in the

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upper ceiling of land a family could own and was generally perceived to favour the lower classes. Besides these, he continued with the modernising thrust initiated by the Koirala government. Moves such as these, to a certain extent, redeemed the Monarch in the eyes of the common people.

Despite the monarchy monopolising state privileges, King Mahendra initiated various other changes such as the abolishment of vassal states and vassal kings and decentralisation of the administration. Though the popularly elected B.P. Koirala government and the nominated governments that had preceded it had begun many of these initiatives (such as planned economic development), the King gave continuity to these. The bureaucracy manned by the newly educated elites, many of whom had received their education in India, continued the modernisation thrust even after the mantle was taken over by King Mahendra from B.P. Koirala (Dixit).

King Birendra: Transition from Absolute to Constitutional Monarchy The Constitution promulgated in 1962 introduced a form of ‘guided’ democracy, known as the Panchayat system, which was a system of government with the King at the apex of the political body. The Constitution banned political parties. It vested sovereignty and powers of the state in the person of the King and underscored the role of the King as the creator and custodian of the Constitution, while simultaneously making him an active political agent. The Constitution of 1962

three decades, until a popular peoples movement known as Jana-andolan forced King Birendra, Mahendra’s elder son, to abrogate it.

It would not be wrong to characterise the period of assertive monarchy in Nepal as a period that ushered in modernisation in the country. Modernisation of Nepal under an active Monarch was possible because of a combination of both internal and external factors. Internally, a new set of political leaders and bureaucrats at the helms of the state aspired to modernise Nepal; externally, the international aid era had begun.

King Birendra, unlike his father Mahendra, was more positively-disposed towards democracy. Moreover, he had an acute political sense: knowing when to persist and when to diffuse an impending crisis, and when to step down altogether. When the agitation led by students, joined later by school and college teachers and other

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professionals, gained momentum in 1979-80, King Birendra called for a plebiscite asking the people to choose between a multi-party democracy or a reformed Panchayat system. The latter won and the Panchayat(for example direct election to the national assembly in place of indirect elections), continued for another decade and, as in earlier decades, the Monarch continued to reign as well as to rule (Dixit).

Things came to a boil once again in 1989. The economic embargo, imposed by India as well as the increased involvement of various professional groups to oppose the Panchayat, were factors that helped build up the momentum of the movement. The willingness of Nepali Congress and the Communist Parties of Nepal to join hands in a united struggle was decisive in that the movement was able to create enough pressure for King Birendra to open the door for a multi-party democracy, an interim government, and a new constitution.

The 1990 Constitution envisioned a Westminster-type of democracy with parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy. For a King who had been an active political leader for two decades, Birendra took easily to his new role in which he was expected to reign and not to rule.8 Over the next decade or so, the country’s governance was in the hands of the political parties. The role of the Monarch centred on cultural and religious activities and that of the ceremonial head of the state (Dixit). With the politically un-involved King, the image of monarchy

however, was to end on the fateful night of June 1, 2001.

On the night of June 1, 2001, a gruesome massacre took place within the Narayanhiti Palace premises that resulted in the death of King Birendra, Queen Aishwarya and 11 other members of the royal family when (according to a report by the government-formed commission) Crown Prince Dipendra pulled the trigger on his family and ultimately on himself. The remaining younger brother of late King Birendra, Prince Gyanendra, who was out of Kathmandu when the incident occurred, was crowned the new King.

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Since 1996 the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), referred to subsequently as the Maoists, had launched a ‘People’s War’ aimed at ending the Westminster-type democracy, including the monarchy, and instituting in their place, a People’s Republic. Multi-party democracy, reinstated from 1990 onwards, may not have delivered on political stability and governance - but none of the political parties that functioned under the 1990 Constitution espoused violence as a means of political change. This was no longer the case with the rise of the Maoists, who believed in and unhesitatingly deployed brute force to bring about political changes. This in turn led to the introduction of a coercive element in Nepali politics, and eventually was to cause upheavals in Nepali society and societal relationships.

Gyanendra was enthroned as the new monarch in June 2001. As Supreme Commander-in-chief of the Royal Nepalese Army, he gave his acquiescence to the deployment of the army to quell the Maoist insurgency. Unlike King Birendra, who had restricted the elected government from using the RNA against the Maoists, King Gyanendra showed no such hesitation and allowed government to undertake operations against the Maoists. More extensive operations of the army done by

The 12 years of experiments with multi-party democracy ended in May 2002 when

minister took pre-emptive action by dissolving the House when his own party members challenged the government. This time, however, the actions of the prime minister resulted in a constitutional crisis when after six months he was unable to hold an election, citing security reasons for his inability to do so. He was summarily sacked by the Head of State, King Gyanendra, for being unable to hold elections as mandated by the Constitution. This action by the Monarch, unfortunately, not only heralded a constitutional crisis (in that the 1990 Constitution did not have any provision as to what should be done in such circumstances) but precipitated a re-alignment of political actors: in particular, it led to the parliamentarian political parties aligning themselves with the Maoists.

Deuba’s dismissal was followed by King Gyanendra nominating prime ministers using Article 127 of the constitution. Each of the nominated prime ministers’ tenure was short-lived. Although the King-nominated governments attempted to build rapport - however fragile - between the various political actors including the Maoists, they were largely unsuccessful in committing political parties for

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fresh elections. As a consequence, on February 1st, 2005, the King declared a state of emergency, took back executive powers, formed a cabinet under his own chairmanship and promised to hold a general election within three years, after which he would handover executive power to the elected parliament.

With the King’s dramatic actions on February 1st, 2005, the country witnessed a major re-alignment of political forces with the seven party alliance and the Maoists moving closer to one another. Whether it was on the question of constituent assembly or the monarchy, the stance taken by the political parties had, in the months following February 1st, increasingly gravitated towards the Maoist agenda, whose bottom line was constituent assembly elections that would draft and then ratify a new constitution. Nepali Congress, a political party that had professed constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy since its inception, decided to remove any mention of constitutional monarchy from its statute during the party convention in September 2005. UML was more equivocal in deciding whether to adopt democratic republicanism through elections to a constituent assembly.

In November 2005, the leaders of the seven party alliance and the Maoists reached an understanding whereby both political actors agreed to establish peace

outlet, stating that the long struggle between autocratic monarchy and democracy in Nepal had reached a very grave and decisive turn in Nepali history.9

The course of action proposed by the Monarch to overcome the constitutional crisis was to hold local elections for municipality followed by election for the lower house of parliament and then eventually to hand over executive authority to this elected parliament. King Gyanendra seemed to be pursuing this line of action seriously. The date for municipal elections was announced for 8 February 2006. This was viewed as a prelude to the national election. But the Maoists, in spite of commitments made in the memorandum of understanding, went on a blitz by attacking the state security forces, candidates for municipal elections, and even

bandh, in order to deter people from participating in the municipal elections. This paid off when the turnout to the municipal election was 22 percent - lower than had been anticipated.

Added to the estrangement of the royal government was the precarious economic

9 The Kathmandu Post

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years 2000 to 2004, there was a decline in expenditure in the economic sector while security spending increased dramatically. Foreign aid, an important source of funding for the aid-dependant state, was not forthcoming when most of Nepal’s bilateral and multilateral donors, objecting to the King’s action on February 1st, 2005, were unwilling to sign new agreements with the government. This trend, coupled with increasing budgetary allocations to the Royal Palace when the overall economy was deteriorating, had begun to make the monarchy unpopular among the masses. These events exacerbated the people's mistrust of the King.

As the King increasingly began to become alienated from the people, the Maoists rendered themselves closer to the common folk by transforming their public persona. As early as late 2005, the Maoists were keen to shed their image as an extremist group that espoused violence to achieve political goals, and had begun projecting themselves as a moderate political party championing the cause of republicanism.

In April 2006, mass street protests known as People’s Movement II, organised by the erstwhile parliamentarian parties and supported by the rebel Maoists, took place. It forced King Gyanendra to step down and to hand over executive authority to the reinstated parliament.

Longitudinal Public Opinion Poll on Orientation towards the Monarchy People’s orientation to the monarchy underwent dramatic changes between 2004 and 2008 – the period when Nepal was going through tumultuous political changes. Among others, the People’s Movement II of April 2006 seems to have led to a dramatic shift in public opinion. Data generated by a longitudinal opinion survey, “Nepal Contemporary Political Situation” (or NCPS survey), conducted in December 2004, showed that 81 percent supported monarchy in some form or another.10

2006, a few months subsequent to the People’s Movement II. The support for monarchy further dwindled in 2007 to 45 percen,t after which it then stabilised. By January 2008 when the question was last asked in the NCPS V, some 49 percent

10

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favoured retaining the institution, 43 percent favoured abolishing it while another 10 percent were undecided.

Those who preferred to retain the institution wanted to do so because monarchy was seen as “part of tradition” and because “the forefather of the present king formed Nepal”. Those who preferred to abolish the institution wanted to do so because monarchy was perceived as “a feudal and exploitative institution” and because the monarchy “didn’t develop the country”. What the survey data reveals is that just a few months prior to its termination, a majority still preferred retaining the institution.11

To Retain or to Terminate: Debates on Monarchy in NepalArguments against King Gyanendra came primarily from two camps: those who wanted to retain the monarchical institution but were unhappy with what the King was doing, and those who wanted to abrogate the institution itself. The writings of two individuals - Kanak Mani Dixit and Baburam Bhattarai - exemplify these two camps.12

The writings of Kanak Mani Dixit, a journalist, exemplify a position that advocatesconstitutional-ceremonial monarchy while simultaneously chiding King Gyanendra for taking wrong political decisions. In various writings in Himal South Asia and Himal Khabarpatrika between 2002 and 2006, Dixit argues that King Gyanendra’s ambitious political decisions from October 2002 onwards, and particularly from February 2005 onwards, have been very wrong. In strong words, Dixit writes how

Monarch and how these could ultimately be a liability for the institution itself.

11

12

chat-satsana-phramahakasat

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The position that disagrees in principle with the institution of monarchy and

Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists). Bhattarai’s writings on the Nepali monarchy have been put forth in the book Monarchy vs. Democracy: The Epic Fight in Nepal (2005). In the chapter on the relevance of monarchy in Nepal, the author attempts to “demystify” some of the “prevalent misconceptions” about the Nepalese monarchy. Bhattarai lists four points that are made in support of the monarchical institution in Nepal: (1) It is the principle factor of stability in the country; (2) It is the symbol of unity; (3) It needs to be preserved since Nepal is the only Hindu kingdom in the world; (4) It has led to rapid economic development. He attempts to debunk each of these points.

Baburam Bhattarai’s arguments against the monarchy are replete with stereotypes and clichés. This is evident in his portrayal of various Monarchs. For instance, Prithvi Narayan Shah is extolled for his supposed stand against colonialism; Mahendra for his ‘nationalism’; and Birendra for his ‘liberalism’. Although the author claims to demolish the arguments in support of monarchy, he does not actually engage with the arguments at a theoretical or substantive level. Rather, he simply exonerates some Monarchs and admonishes others. Contrary to his claims, Bhattarai makes no substantive arguments against monarchy as an institution.

The Reasons for the Demise of Monarchy in NepalIn broad terms, four reasons could be singled out for leading to the demise of monarchy in Nepal: (1) the palace massacre; (2) the King aspiring to become a “constructive” constitutional Monarch; (3) the Monarch being unable to become a King of the Nepali people(s); and (4) the India equation. Each of these and how they played a role in ending the monarchy in Nepal are summarised.

1. Palace Massacre The palace massacre led to the erosion of the sanctity of the monarchical institution. As a consequence of the massacre, the monarchical institution itself became increasingly de-legitimised in the eyes of the public.

It became de-legitimised for two sets of people - those who believed in the conspiracy theory and those who didn’t - for quite different reasons. For those who saw the incident as a conspiracy hatched by Gyanendra, which, one might add, had a plot very similar to the story of the Lion King, the Walt Disney cartoon blockbuster, the new King was an illegitimate monarch. For this set of people,

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the monarchical institution became de-legitimised because the incumbent was an impostor.

For those who did not see the incident as a conspiracy and who had no reason to

entirely different reason. What Prince Dipendra - having access to sophisticated weapons, taking to drugs, and killing his parents because they stood in the way of marrying the lady of his choice - underscored is how little the institution resonated with people’s expectations of virtue and tradition from the country’s premier institution. After all, the royalty was massacred not by republicans or

Besides exposing the vices of a decadent institution, the incident led people who did not believe in the conspiracy theory to conclude that the institution was not trustworthy: how could they trust an institution that was inept at handing its own members? Thus, for quite different reasons for both sets of people, the sanctity of the monarchical institution was severely undermined. The circumstance in which Gyanendra became King was like an albatross hanging around its neck.

2. King Visualising His Role as a “Constructive” Constitutional MonarchyKing Gyanendra, soon after he was crowned the Monarch, began articulating his views on what he thought the role of Monarch should be in Nepal. He expressed his dissatisfaction over the role played by his late brother King Birendra; while he saw his late brother’s role as a “passive” constitutional Monarch, he saw his role as a “constructive” constitutional Monarch. As one constitutional stalemate led to another, he seized the opportunity to expand the scope and role of monarchy, in line with his desire to become a “constructive” Monarch, when eventually he became a full blown, active-assertive King. In the process, the type of monarchy envisaged by the 1990 Constitution was thoroughly desecrated.

There were several landmarks in the transformation of the constitutional monarchy, as envisaged by the 1990 Constitution, to the assumption of active-

when he dismissed Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba for being unable to hold national elections. At that time, the Nepali Congress headed by G.P. Koirala had asked for reinstatement of the House of Representatives (which Deuba had dissolved six months earlier with the intentions of holding the election). King Gyanendra believed that the constitutional stalemate could only be overcome

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through a new election to the House of Representatives and not by reinstating the dissolved House. Without going into the legality of whether the King’s action and his reliance on Article 127 of the 1990 Constitution at that historical juncture was correct, what becomes apparent is his seizure of the constitutional stalemate, as an opportunity to expand the role and scope of monarchy.

When King Gyanendra took political action in October 2002, basing his actions on Article 127, he envisaged his role as a custodian of the Constitution. However, from being a custodian, he soon became a central political player - something not envisaged by the 1990 Constitution.

This came about in February 2005 when he dismissed the Sher Bahadur Deuba government nominated by himself and assumed executive and state authority. By assuming the responsibility and the authority of a chairman of the government, he became simultaneously the head of the state and the head of the government. With this, the transformation from a constitutional Monarch to active-assertive Monarch was complete, notwithstanding his claims to trusteeship.

The political forces intent on ending monarchy in the country and defeating Gyanendra politically, not surprisingly, portrayed him as a despot and as a tyrant. His persona and circumstances in which he became king did not help much and Gyanendra inadvertently played into this stereotype.

where its sanctity had been severely eroded not only decreased the popularity of King Gyanendra further, his decisions ultimately took its toll in ending the monarchical institution itself.

3. Unable to Become a King of the Nepali Peoples(s)Establishment of formal democracy in 1990 created an environment wherein cultural, ethnic, and religious identities could be expressed, and consequently Nepal began witnessing the assertion of such identities.

When Nepal was being forged as a modern nation in the 1950s, three institutions were involved in constructing the national identity - monarchy (with the recently reinstated Shah Kings as Monarchs), Hinduism, and the Nepali language. Nepal was seen as a single nation tied together by allegiance to monarchy, adherence to Hinduism and bound together by a common lingua franca - Nepali. When the

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modern nation was being fashioned during the 1950s, it was not that a plurality of ethnic communities, language groups, and cultures was not recognised - the country was seen to be plural; however, plurality was not conceived as an asset.

cultural, linguistic and ethnicity-based identities. Identity-assertions were not limited to Nepal: it was a global phenomenon. In fact, globalisation on the one hand and assertion of cultural, linguistic and ethnic identities, on the other, were to severely undermine nation-states in different fronts - economic, political, and cultural.

From the 1990s onwards, Nepal was seen as a plural country. Not only was plurality acknowledged - the mutual differences among the various ethnic groups, languages, and religions - were highlighted. And not only was it acknowledged, it was seen to be an asset. Indeed, the ethnic communities were now uplifted into the status of nations. According to political discourse on the rise in Nepal during the time, the country is not a nation but a multi-national state.

At a time when Nepal was seen to be a country of different peoples and nations, King Gyanendra, through his gestures, including the dress he wore and the language he spoke, embodied and epitomised only the Hindu-Parbatiya culture. That the Shah dynasty is Hindu by religion and Parbatiya by ethnicity is a fact of history; at a time of growing cultural, linguistic, and ethnic assertions, he could symbolically have embodied the various peoples that make up Nepal. Through state rituals and symbolisms, he could have been a King not just of the Hindus and the Parbatiyas, but of the Buddhists, the Muslims, the Christians and the indigenous religions. He could have aspired to be a King of Gurungs, Magars, Tamangs, Rais, Limbus, Newars, Dalits, Sherpas, Tharus, Yadavs, and all the various communities living in the Himalayas, the hills and the Tarai of Nepal. The politically-oriented King, however, by projecting himself to be an icon of orthodox Hinduism, increasingly became an anomaly in a milieu that acknowledged and celebrated pluralism. Not only could the active Monarch not strike chords with identity-based movements, but public gestures aimed at shoring his Hindu credentials alienated him further from the masses and the intelligencia. Unable to become a king of the Nepali people(s) estranged him further politically.

4. The India EquationKing Gyanendra’s inability to forge an understanding with Indian Congress leadership along with the interests of the then coalition partners in India proved to

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be fatal for monarchy in Nepal. Among the various political forces in India, Kings of Nepal have been most comfortable with Bharatiya Janata Party, the Hindu nationalist party of India. Relations between Nepali kings and the Indian Congress leadership have been warm at times and chilly during others.

At the particular time when Gyanendra had taken over executive authority in Nepal and was marginalising the parliamentarian parties while targeting the Maoists, Indian government was made up of a coalition between the Indian Congress and Leftist parties. The BJP, the party sympathetic to monarchy in Nepal, was in the opposition. The Leftist parties in India were especially sympathetic towards the Maoists. The nature of the coalition in India meant that they were more willing to bring in the parliamentarian parties and the Maoists together than to work with (what they considered to be) an undemocratic monarch.

Though the Indian government had played a crucial role in forging the 12-point Memorandum of Understanding between the Maoists and the parliamentarian

line has been that they would accept whatever decisions were made by the Nepali people including, as time revealed, the abolition of the monarchy itself.

During the heydays of colonialism, wherein racist discourses constituted the

enlightened native rulers, such as those of Baroda, Mysore, Cochin and Travancore, contested the dominant narrative by undertaking progressive social reforms and showing that Indians could govern themselves: this generated empathy and pride among the Indian National Congress leadership. This also generated disdain in that most of the Princely States did not allow political participation of the citizenry and that civil liberties were less protected than in British India (Ramusack 216-221).

Gandhi, who led the Indian National Congress during the 1910’s and 1920’s, wanted these constituencies to conform to his political and social programs. He was generally sympathetic to the Princes and used intermediaries who were personally loyal to him and who were likely to be non-confrontational with durbar

Indian National Congress and the Princely States in the early part of the twentieth

Congress leadership could trust in person and who was also related to the King

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of Nepal, was sent as an emissary to negotiate both with the King and heads of political parties in Nepal.

That the Indian Congress was, in principle, not opposed to the monarchy in the region is also attested by the fact that it had brought about the reinstatement of the Shah Kings as Monarchs of Nepal in 1951 by helping bring an end to the century-old Rana rule. It would not be incorrect to say that Indian Congress played a role in fashioning a particular variant of monarchy in Nepal, one that was close to the hearts of the Nepali people and one that underscored cooperation with the people’s representatives.

But this was to change with King Mahendra’s actions in 1960 that led to a cooling in the relationship between the Nepali Monarchs and Indian Congress. This trend continued until 1989 when King Birendra continued to remain as the active Monarch. The decision by King Gyanendra to become a “constructive” constitutional Monarch, which either intentionally or unintentionally led him to become an active-assertive Monarch, constricted the choices for the Indian Congress to the

whatever decisions on the fate of the monarchy made by the Nepali people.

Conclusion: Assessment of the Contribution of Monarchy in NepalThe contribution of monarchy in Nepal has been in building the state of Nepal, in modernising the Nepali state and society, in delineating a distinctive version of nationhood, and in fostering democracy. Each of these has been associated with different reigns or rules.

It may have been Prithvi Narayan Shah’s intention to expand the dominion of the House of Gorkha, but the expansion process that he initiated and that continued even after his demise, led to the formation of the present state of Nepal. The very existence of Nepal owes its existence to the dream, dexterity, and dedication of Prithvi Narayan. The hereditary Rana prime ministers who ruled from 1846 to 1950, as faithful allies of the British, ensured that Nepal became an independent, sovereign state but the country had to pay dearly in that it was isolated from the rest of the world. Nepal’s century-old political isolation ended with King Tribhuvan’s bold act in 1950-51. The reinstatement of Shah Kings as the centre of power

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in Nepal is enmeshed and interwoven with the tale of a King willing to risk his throne for the sake of the common people. Tribhuvan began expanding Nepal’s relationship with countries around the world, an initiative that was continued when his son, Mahendra, ascended to the throne in 1955. The persona of Mahendra generates two opposing narratives: one, of an ambitious Monarch who trampled democracy; the other, a moderniser. The story of Mahendra is a tale of how an otherwise traditionally-educated Prince undertook modernisation in order build a modern nation-state. The tale of King Birendra is that of a democratising Monarch. The jovial, happy-looking and pleasant Monarch facilitated the transition from assertive to constitutional monarchy, in the process helping consolidate parliamentary democracy in the country. The story of King Gyanendra is a tale of

the process: his failure resulted in the abrogation of the institution itself. The tale of the last of the Monarchs, Gyanendra, is also the story of a King who gracefully exited the palace and led the life of an ordinary citizen.

King Gyanendra may have sullied the institution, but he was not a party to its abrogation: the decision to abolish the monarchy was a decision made by the Maoists, UML, NC, MJF and other political parties. It was the elected constituent assembly that on June 19, 2009, endorsed Nepal as a republic, something that the reinstated and expanded House of Representatives had, a year earlier, declared. Neither of these two bodies, however, stated why they were abolishing the centuries-old institution; they did not furnish any explanation as to what the monarchy had done wrong for which the representatives of the people were punishing it by terminating its existence. Nor did these bodies provide an opportunity for the King to speak.

articulated by Gyanendra Shah (after he was no longer the Monarch) in his farewell speech before leaving the Narayanhiti Palace premises.

World history is replete with instances of monarchies having generally ended either through execution or exile. Nepal is unique in that the last of the Monarchs continues to live in the country as an ordinary citizen.

That the end of monarchy will herald a new ‘golden’ age in Nepal, as has been propagated by communist parties, simply has not borne fruit. One and a half years since the abolition of monarchy, the country continues to remain politically

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unstable, the economy has not picked up, Maoists have not renounced violence, public safety and security continue to deteriorate, agitations by various identity-based movements harping on politics of differences continue unabated, armed-separatist groups proliferate, and a new constitution that was supposed to be formed by an elected constituent assembly has not been drafted, let alone been

Sudhindra Sharma is the Executive Director at Interdisciplinary Analysts, Kathmandu, Nepal.

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If one were to try to pinpoint the exact moment that Nepal’s monarchy began its downfall, it would probably be 8:45 on Friday night on June 1, 2001.

It was a hot and sultry evening, thunderstorms were brewing on the valley rim of Kathmandu. Filaments of pink lightning illuminated clouds towering over the mountains, and there was the deep, dull boom of distant thunder. As the editor and publisher of the Nepali Times, I used to take Friday easy because that is the day the paper came out. That morning’s edition of the paper had a story on page one titled "Fight to the Finish". The political parties were continuing their endless bickering in Kathmandu, while the Maoist insurgents were gaining ground in the hinterland.

But few in Kathmandu were taking the Maoists seriously in those days, and no one would have predicted that in six short years Nepal would become a republic. The underground Maoists had been warning schools not to sing the national anthem

that morning was eerily titled ‘God save the King’.

Inside, on page 13 was a translated report about Crown Prince Dipendra titled “A Suitable Prince” which delved into how he was now 31 and needed to get married. Royal matters were not discussed so openly those days, and an article like that was fairly rare in the Nepali media. It was the disagreement within the royal family about the Crown Prince’s choice of wife that the story reported that was a factor in the tragedy that was soon about to unfold. Here is an excerpt of that news item:

Once Upon a Time: the Rise and Fall of the Nepal Monarchy

Kunda Dixit

8

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A Suitable PrincePreparations are underway to celebrate the 31st birthday of the heir to Nepal’s throne, Crown Prince Dipendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev. With this royal birthday around the corner, people’s attention is focused on the Crown Prince. People are asking why the Crown Prince is unmarried at this age, and whether his future

member of the Nepali royalty to break tradition and not be married even at 31. The Royal Palace is also concerned about the Crown Prince’s marriage. But many do not know where the Crown Prince’s heart lies. People close to the Crown Prince speak of two women he has an emotional relationship with. One is a childhood sweetheart while his relationship with the other began when he was older. “It

jokes a palace employee, adding, “but he does not support bigamy.” Crown Prince Dipendra is romantic by nature and he loves to joke and be open. His professors say he is uninhibited and has the poetic talents of his grandfather, the late King Mahendra, although his poems have not been published yet. Some people say the Crown Prince is against parliamentary democracy, but in reality he supports it wholeheartedly. He wants the Nepali people to have social discipline and responsibility. The Crown Prince is also very studious, his favourite subject being

also painstakingly reads all the major newspapers and engages in discussions about how to boost the nation’s economy.

Crown Prince Dipendra turns 31 on 27 June. It is high time His Royal Highness got married. The Nepali people wish to celebrate his marriage soon and in the grandest manner. Everyone is worrying about when this will happen. (Nepali Times, 1 June 2001, #45)

king had a heart attack and was in hospital. This was plausible since King Birendra was a cardiac patient. Then came rumours that the royal palace had been attacked. “This is it,” I remember thinking, “the Maoists have attacked the palace.” My reporters’ instincts took over and I called people who lived in the neighbourhood of the palace. They had heard gunshots.

An eye-witness said he had seen cars and army jeeps careening through the narrow streets towards the military hospital on the outskirts of the city. Cell phones were

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introduced in Nepal just two years earlier and they started going off all over town. Hospital personnel started calling friends and relatives who, in turn, called others.

Like Chinese whispers a lot of the information got distorted as it spread. But the broad outlines of the ghastly events began to take shape as the night wore on. What emerged was so shocking and unbelievable that many rejected it as gossip and went to sleep.

But the phones didn’t stop ringing. ‘King Birendra dead, Queen Aiswarya dead, Princess Shruti wounded, Prince Nirajan dead, Crown Prince Dipendra in coma’ the SMSs read. At 11 pm, three hours after the shooting, we had to decide whether to put the news up on our website. But we hesitated, we hadn’t cross-checked with any other source. What if all the sources we heard from had all got it from the same rumour?

The pre-monsoon clouds were closing in, and there was the sound of a helicopter

later it returned, obviously the weather was too bad for it to continue. This was the

the King’s brother.

we knew so far: that at least six members of the royal family were dead, there were rumours the Crown Prince had shot everyone and then shot himself. It was

decided to put it up.

The nation woke up the next morning, stunned by the news. People gathered at street corners reading the only two newspapers that had the news of the massacre. Editors were so shocked by the news that their confusion could be seen in the coverage, some papers played it safe and just ignored the story. The government immediately clamped down on news in the state media, radio and TV were allowed to broadcast only mourning music.

At the hospital eight members of the royal family were dead, King Birendra’s brother Dhirendra was struggling for life and Dipendra was in a coma. The


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Even though he was in a coma, and even though royal family members knew he had killed his family, rules of royal succession meant that Dipendra had to be declared king by the Privy Council. No country can make rules for something as unimaginable as this, and there was no precedence on which to base decisions.

Not the First TimeNepal until then had been known as a Himalayan kingdom of stupendous natural beauty, gentle people, and as the birthplace of the Buddha. What wasn’t so well known in the outside world was the violent history of its royal families.

expansionist Himalayan power that stretched from the Teesta in the east to the Sutlej in the west and half-way down to the Ganges to the south.

The belligerent Kingdom of Gorkha came into head-on collision with the East India Company. The supply lines were overstretched, and the citizenry was pauperised by taxation to fund the war effort. Palace intrigues and massacres of the nobility ensured that the territorial gains could not be sustained. The treaty signed at the end of the Anglo-Nepal Wars of 1814-16 allowed Nepal to retain her independence but the Gorkha empire was cut down to its present size. The British made sure that Kathmandu retained only a small strip of the plains to the south because it was the agricultural surplus there that was the main source of revenue for its military expansion.

In 1854 a little known general massacred more than 40 members of the nobility in the palace and took over power, marking the beginning of 104 years of a dynasty of Nepal’s hereditary and Anglophile Rana prime ministers. The British residency in Kathmandu (part of the 1816 treaty) found it easy to divide and rule because members of the two royal families were at each other’s throats. The Shah kings

independent India.

India’s independence in 1947 brought a democratic wave, but it wasn’t until

dissolved parliament and imprisoned Prime Minister B.P. Koirala, saying “Nepal

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isn’t big enough for the both of us.” He banned political parties and ruled with an iron hand, instituting the Panchayat System, a sort of homegrown authoritarianism.

Mahendra married his three sons (Birendra, Gyanendra and Dhirendra) to three sisters from the Rana clan. After his death in 1972, Birendra ascended to the throne. He had been educated in Europe and was a soft-spoken liberal and started well, trying to institute reforms in education and the civil service.

Under the absolute monarchy the press was severely curtailed. Criticism of the government was punishable and there was zero tolerance of any negative coverage of the King and royal family. Editors and reporters found out the hard way what the limits were, and most journalists practiced self-censorship. Even innocent mistakes, like a typo that turned “the auspicious birthday of His Majesty” to “the suspicious birthday of His Majesty” brought down the wrath of the state. The

of the state, and television, when it arrived in 1985, soon became a station to broadcast the home movies of the royal family.

The royal palace was the real source of control and power was exercised by the King’s feared advisers who had more say than the government of the day. The rules were laid out and everyone knew where the boundaries were. After Mahendra, there was an expectation that things might change. However liberal Birendra may have been he was too weak to change the system and the press secretary at the palace was the defacto minister of information.

cat-and-mouse game with the government. Usually the leftist papers were tolerated more because they were critical of the democratic Nepali Congress.

In the 30 years of Panchayat the Nepali polity became like a pressure cooker. There were no political parties and no free media to vent off steam. It all burst in April 1989 when a people power uprising swept Kathmandu. Birendra vacillated

constitutional Monarch.

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Hardliners in the royal palace never reconciled themselves to the loss of power

plotting to stage a comeback. Birendra’s brother Gyanendra was not a great fan of democracy and was putting his brother under pressure to roll back on freedoms.

When the country turned from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy after the 1990 Constitution, the media erupted with its new-found freedom. It was as if the lid had been blown off and, as is usual during times of transition like these, the media didn’t know where the boundaries were. Criticism of the government was suddenly allowed, and the papers competed with each other to give sensational headlines and party papers ran each other down with defamatory content. True, there was so much corruption, mismanagement and partisanship in the governance process in Nepal’s new democracy that they deserved to be written about. But the free-for-all media’s coverage ended up making the people so disillusioned that they started blaming the system, and not the politicians who had given democracy a bad name. “We are not mature enough for democracy,” became a favourite refrain.

In all this the monarchy was still a taboo subject. King Birendra, despite the dent on his reputation during the 1989 uprising, was still treated with respect, and Queen Aishwarya, who was the target of some of the most vitriolic street slogans during the protests, was left largely alone. There was some occasional dark hints about royal involvement in business deals, but no one really took the risk of spelling it out. Part of the reason was that the lèse majesté laws were left intact in the 1990 Constitution, and the King and army were still powerful behind-the-scenes players.

With the media now distracted by negative coverage of politicians the monarchy was left alone. This and the fact that King Birendra was comfortable in his role as a constitutional monarch and played it by the book meant that the monarchy started to regain its reputation. King Birendra, especially, gained new respect and even affection from Nepalis. Unlike during the Panchayat years there would be genuine and spontaneous show of support for him when he toured the country. Sometimes he’d just walk out of the palace with his Queen along the sidewalk to go to the nearby home of his daughter, Shruti’s. Many were reminded of Nordic royalty who had no airs.

Things started to change with the antics of young royal family members. When Prince Paras, the son of Gyanendra, allegedly ran over singer Prakash Gurung in

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2000, the media reported openly on the incident and the attempts of cover-up. News of other drunken brawls in Kathmandu’s bars in which royals were involved also started appearing in the papers, but the coverage was still circumspect and no names were named.

Disillusioned with what they felt was the slow pace of change and impatient to gain total power, Maoist rebels launched an armed struggle in 1996 to overthrow the monarchy. The insurgency spread rapidly across Nepal, feeding on the inequality, discrimination and social injustice in the country. Taking advantage of the political

There was increasing disenchantment against the political parties because of their corruption and mismanagement.

King Birendra took his constitutional role seriously and refused to intervene.

by the people. Compared with his parents Crown Prince Dipendra was an

had studied in a government school in Kathmandu and had many friends among ordinary Nepalis. He was close to his cousin, Paras, Gyanendra’s son, who was

Nepalis were used to hearing about the excesses of their pampered royals, they gossiped about their greed, wealth, and business interests. There was concern in the public about Dipendra and there were strong rumours that his parents were against his plans to marry Devyani Rana, the half-Indian daughter of a Nepali politician.

Queen Aiswarya was said to be vehemently against the match because she had a personal dislike for Devyani’s Indian mother who was glamorous, suave, and spoke good English. Birendra did not assert himself too much, but even he was said to be concerned that the next Queen of Nepal should not be of half-Indian descent—even hinting that his royal succession may be affected if he decided to go ahead with the marriage. Dipendra was adamant. Although he had many girlfriends, it seems he was smitten by Devyani. The girl, for her part, was probably getting impatient with the waiting and was putting pressure on Dipendra to decide.

Much of this was not common knowledge and came to light only after the massacre. In hindsight we now know that there was strong tension within the royal family

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over the question of Dipendra’s marriage. And although the Crown Prince had a good public image, what we didn’t know was that he had problems with substance abuse and had a gun fetish—a lethal combination as it turned out.

Journalists speculated about his marriage plans but stopped short of reporting what they knew: that Dipendra’s choice of bride was unacceptable to many members of the family especially his mother. But one Kathmandu news magazine reported on Dipendra’s interest and involvement in the Royal Nepal Army’s procurement of

the American Colt M-16.

So it was that on June 1, 2001, that Dipendra donned combat fatigues and black gloves, slung a 9mm MP-5K, an M-16, and a French shotgun around his shoulders and came downstairs. He advanced on his father, and Birendra seemed to think his son wanted to show him his guns and started to walk towards him. But Dipendra shot off a short burst into the ceiling and then at the direction of his father. The King was hit, and eyewitnesses say he had a look of utter disbelief in his eyes as he slowly slumped over to his side. As family members rushed to catch him as he

four others were injured. Most of the wounded were declared dead on arrival at the hospital. Princess Sruti died one hour later, Dhirendra and Dipendra two days later on 3 June.

The government was in disarray, no one knew who was giving the orders: the

Queen Aiswarya were dead, it didn’t say how they died. It proclaimed Dipendra CNN that the royal family

was killed by the “accidental discharge of an automatic weapon”. An information blackout and statements like these meant rumours ran rife and conspiracy theories were everywhere. After Dipendra’s funeral, Gyanendra was named King and he addressed the nation on television promising the people a “thorough investigation”. Nepal had three kings in four days. Gyanendra’s enthronement happened as protests raged throughout the capital.

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saying Dipendra was responsible. But the people, lied to and denied information, didn’t believe the government when it told the truth. Most people were convinced the unpopular Gyanendra was somehow responsible.

The media’s role became one of a detective in a murder mystery. Gathering evidence, piecing together the exact sequence of events, trying to crosscheck with

secretiveness of the royal family and the shock of the event. What the journalists uncovered and the conclusions of the inquiry commission tallied on almost all major points and the reason was that many of the eye-witnesses interviewed were

conclusions also became suspect.

It got to a point where journalists who stuck to what they knew were immediately labelled “royalists” or “biased”. The best test that the media was on the right track was the fact that by sticking to journalistic professionalism the conclusion we

a lot more interviews and facts. Like the Kennedy assassination and the Princess Diana accident, the conspiracy theories will never go away.

Some of these questions about the prelude and the events of that terrible night will perhaps never be known because most of the protagonists are dead. But what is true is that the massacre left an indelible mark on Nepali politics, eroding the traditional respect for the monarchy. The murders were so shocking that Nepalis never really came to terms with it, and the republican wave we see today is a delayed reaction to that event.

King Gyanendra, soon after his enthronement, told his people he was not like his

He staged a coup and took over the government on 1 February 2005, imprisoned politicians and civil society activists and muzzled the media. Nepal was an absolute monarchy again.

The King sent soldiers into the newsrooms. There were three of them in our

out our editorial cartoon, hacked off a paragraph from our editorial, even took out

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a letter to the editor and an op-ed column. This made censorship in the Panchayat

to the Nepali Times because he spoke English. He seemed almost apologetic about what he had to do and it was clear his heart was not in it.

Our papers and magazines came out with large white holes where material had been censored. And when the army said we couldn’t do that we replaced them with gibberish and absurd editorials. We wrote allegorical opinion pieces about democracy. FM stations were singled out for the strictest controls and our colleagues in the district radio stations were bravest in standing up to the censors. They were told not to broadcast news, only music. So they started singing the news, or they’d take the news studio to the street and read the latest news to passers-by.

him by defying his crackdown on the free press. It took only 14 months for a people’s uprising to force him to restore parliament and bring back democracy.

That was made possible by an alliance between the Maoists and the seven parliamentary parties in a pro-democracy movement brokered by India. By February 2006, Nepal’s second people power uprising in 16 years forced King Gyanendra to backtrack. What the Maoists could not achieve with a 10 year war and 15,000 dead was done in 19 days of non-violent street protests. This was a model for violent revolutions all over the world: that there is an alternative to

For two years after that Nepal was in a limbo between monarchy and republic, the King was still in his palace but the word “royal” had been expunged from the national airline, the national army and Nepal’s embassies abroad. Nepal was a lingering “royal republic”. In those two years Nepal went from a Hindu kingdom to secular republic, armed guerrillas faced elections, won and formed a government

tourism and other critical ministries in a coalition with other parties.

The monarchy which with the royal army was responsible for the formation of what is now Nepal were de-linked without bloodshed. The King wasn’t beheaded, his palace wasn’t sacked. In fact King Gyanendra was allowed to perform all his

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ceremonial duties for a full year after he had been sidelined, but when parliament declared Nepal a republic, called a press conference and willingly vacated the palace to become an ordinary citizen.

Lessons LearntThe beginning of the end of Nepal’s monarchy was the royal massacre of June 1,

from King Gyanendra himself, a deeply unpopular king who had a visceral distrust of politicians and the democratic process, and he tried to turn the clock back to re-enact his father’s 1960 coup.

arms to abolish the monarchy and, after they entered the peace process in 2006, needed a revolutionary face to justify ten years of a wasteful war to their own cadre as well as to the public.

Most Nepali people would have been neutral if asked to choose between a monarchy and a republic. They disliked the King but that didn’t mean there was an overwhelming desire to abolish the monarchy. Nepalis knew the country would not disintegrate without the monarchy, and there was residual respect for the tradition of monarchy.

The People Power Uprising was predicated not on republicanism, but on the removal of an absolute monarchy and a dictatorial King. There were very few slogans for a republic when people marched on the streets in April 2006. The Maoists, however, needed a revolutionary slogan, a trophy, something to justify the

repeatedly threatened to go back to war if the monarchy was not abolished. In essence they needed to prop up an enemy to bring down to prove that it was a victorious revolution, even if it was a defanged King.

Even after the monarchy was abolished and the King dethroned in July 2008, the Maoists kept citizen Gyanendra in their sights. They have needed to target him even if he is no longer King just to take the attention away from their own non-performance in government and to unite their fractious party against a common class enemy.

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This is not to say that Gyanendra is not capable of mischief and there are many in Kathmandu who think he is plotting a comeback. They say he is a vindictive man and would probably like nothing better than to exact revenge on those who overthrew him. However, even if the monarchy is somehow restored, Gyanendra probably knows that public opinion will not accept him, or his son, as King.

The moderate political parties realised that the monarchy probably needed to be

initially against abolishing the monarchy, party leaders relented because they themselves had been targeted by the King after his 2002 “creeping coup” and the

coup de grace in 2005.

The joke in Kathmandu in 2005 was that the most pro-republican person in Nepal was the king himself. He had no one to blame but himself, not just for his downfall, but for the end of his dynasty. He lied to the international community, he misled the parties multiple times even though they were essentially monarchists at heart, and he listened to no one. In the end history will see an arrogant King who was unable to understand the role of a modern Monarch in a developing country that

role, he hated the political leadership and the democratic process, and this brought down the King and the kingship.

When an inquiry commission was formed to look into the excesses in the crackdown on the 2006 pro-democracy movement King Gyanendra could have saved the monarchy by making a public apology. But he didn’t. He had another chance at his departure press conference before vacating the palace for good in 2008 but he could never get himself to say sorry.

King Gyanendra must have known that he had a public relations problem and that most Nepalis still blamed him for the murder of his popular brother. Yet he did nothing to remedy this. It was only in his last press conference where he devoted half the time denying his involvement in the massacre. But by then it was too late.

The restoration of the monarchy may not be possible now because Gyanendra and his son, Paras, are so deeply unpopular. The only convincing argument for restoration is if the country disintegrated into anarchy but both father and son would be more of a divisive factor than a unifying one at a time when the nation will need an institution to bind it together again.

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It’s too late also for the “baby King” proposal to make either Paras’ young son King or make the only surviving person in Birendra’s bloodline (his grand-daughter) the Queen. They will have a passive role in a ceremonial monarchy whereas, if Nepal is really in a crisis, it may need a more active Monarch enforcing constitutional provisions in the national interest. Today, across Nepal, the most surprising thing is how quickly Nepalis have forgotten that their country was ever a monarchy. It is as if they want to forget about this tragic part of our history and want to move on.

Kunda M. Dixit is the publisher of Nepali Times, Kathmandu, Nepal.

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Introduction“News,” British newspaper magnate Lord Northcliff is often (though almost certainly spuriously) quoted as saying, “is what someone somewhere wants to suppress. All the rest,” he added, “is advertising.” And indeed, this concept of the uncovering of awkward and embarrassing truths – for those in positions of power, that is – is a now long established element of the professional ideology of journalism, and lies behind such notions as its existence as a Fourth Estate, or as a public “watchdog”. Appealing though such an ideology may be, and excellent though it undoubtedly is as the stuff of literary and cinematic drama, it has been known for a long time1 that the professional practice of journalism is often far from this ideal. It is now widely recognised that “news” tends increasingly to come pre-packaged to the journalist rather than being actively sought out by him/her, coming “down the wire” in earlier days and now primarily distributed via the internet. Western societies have largely learned to “live” with this kind of news, though continuing anxieties regarding whose interests it ultimately serves surface repeatedly in debates over “spin”, “spin doctors”, “spin-meisters”, and so on.

What is generally not viewed as acceptable, however (except perhaps in cases where it is argued that “national security” is somehow at stake), is when journalists deliberately cover-up information that could be viewed as being in the public interest. In certain contexts, however, the curious phenomenon arises of the “disremembering” of facts that are already in the public domain, which enjoy an existence as elements of popular memory; but that are viewed by those in power

Splits of this kind, where popular discourse on the one hand and political culture

The Image

Media, Monarchy and the

Hugh O’Donnell

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(with the collusion of journalists) on the other maintain quite different versions of national history, occur most frequently when there is a transition of one kind of political regime to another. Whether from dictatorship to democracy or the other way round, the rationale most frequently advanced is the needs of national reconstruction. The second case deserves particular attention since dictatorships can and do demand the collaboration of the media – enforcing it by violent means if necessary. Alternatively, “freedom of the press” is widely viewed as a cornerstone of democratic process, and under these circumstances the willing collusion of journalists in strategies of forgetting cannot be straightforwardly ascribed to intimidation and oppression.

This paper looks at a particularly interesting case of “disremembering” – that surrounding the person of the current Spanish monarch, King Juan Carlos. A few words on the phenomenon of (European) monarchy in general, and on the Spanish monarchy in particular, focusing in both cases on their relationship with democracy, will help to set the scene.

Monarchy and DemocracyMonarchy – in the European case, at least, but no doubt more widely also – is a product of feudalism. Without necessarily wishing to subscribe either to the grand Enlightenment teleology of nineteenth-century French thinker (and “father of sociology”) August Comte, or those of his German near-contemporary Karl Marx, it would not seem unreasonable to expect that monarchies would be now little more than a historical memory in Europe. After all, capitalism and its concomitant bourgeois rationality are now almost totally dominant in the economies of Europe and the First World more generally. Even the remnants of the great feudal estates have been absorbed into that economic system – and bourgeois parliamentary democracy is itself one of the expressions of that bourgeois rationality. Yet this is clearly not the case. Not only have some of the old European monarchies survived, but others which were overthrown were subsequently reinstated (even if they have not all survived to the present day) and in addition two new ones have also emerged, in both cases – the Belgian and the Norwegian monarchies – in relation to the establishment of new nation-states.

Europe’s youngest monarchy – the Norwegian royal house – was in fact instated just over a century ago, in 1905, following the country’s split with Sweden in the same year. The decision to adopt a constitutional monarchy rather than a

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republic as the political form of the state was the result of a referendum rather

uniformly rude health) of a number of European monarchies (seven in all) shows us a number of things. Firstly, that parliamentary democracies have not universally viewed monarchy as a foreign secretion that must be extruded at all cost, but have on occasions willingly entered into a symbiotic relationship with it. Secondly, even

a valuable institution for the process of nation building. And thirdly – and the importance of this point can hardly be overstressed – continuing popular support for monarchies in Scandinavia and elsewhere, even if highly variable in both nature and intensity over time, shows that despite (or perhaps to some extent because of) the increasing commoditisation and bureaucratisation of daily life – what the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas calls "the colonisation of the Life World by the System World" – there remains more to popular culture and the experience of everyday life than political and economic rationality. Whatever our own personal opinions on monarchy might be (and I myself remain philosophically republican), we cannot hope to understand the societies we live in if we cannot, however imperfectly, attempt to grasp the enduring (complex, yes; variable, no

their lack of formal power and the intense media narratives focused on them as families they have somehow come, despite the pageantry and paraphernalia of state, to symbolise the continuing presence of the Life World in the very heart of that System World.

The Spanish CaseIn the twentieth century, Spain was without a monarchy – or at least a reigning monarch – for forty-four years. This was the period between the abdication of Alfonso XIII in 1931 and the ascension to the throne of Juan Carlos I in 1975 following the death of the dictator General Francisco Franco. After his victory in the Spanish Civil War (1936-9), Franco did not formally reinstate the monarchy: he neither recalled Alfonso XIII (who died in 1941), nor his son Juan, Count of Barcelona (who died in 1993). Despite this, he carefully groomed Alfonso’s

as such in 1969 (despite the fact that the legitimate heir to the throne, Juan, was

instatement as monarch – a ceremony of anointing rather than a coronation – Juan Carlos swore allegiance to the principles of the National Movement, the

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political arm of Franco’s single-party state. He also named Franco’s last Prime

would eventually dismiss Arias Navarro from his post in July 1976 as a result of the latter’s ultra-conservative views, many at the time viewed both these moves as a highly inauspicious start.

Franco’s death in 1975 was followed by Spain’s slow, and in some senses rather fearful, transition to parliamentary democracy. Political parties were legalised, and the last to be recognised, after considerable debate and much opposition from both the Church and the military, was the Communist Party on Easter Sunday 1977. Independent trade unions were also legalised, and Franco’s old corporatist

were held in July 1977 in an atmosphere of intense excitement and a 79% voter turn-out. A referendum on the new Constitution followed a year later in December 1978, this time with a voter turn out of 67% and just over 88% of those voting in favour. Juan Carlos introduced a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy and renounced all rights to executive, legislative and judicial power with a constitution that introduced wide-reaching reforms. In particular, it recognised

languages of the Spanish state.

This programme for reform was largely led by a group of politicians who had risen to the top of Franco’s political apparatus towards the end of his regime, but there can be no doubt that it would not have been possible without the agreement of Juan Carlos as the Head of State. Nonetheless, he remained a somewhat shadowy, and

anxieties, particularly though not only on the Left, regarding the fact that he was the

radically on the evening of 23 (and early morning of 24) February 1981, a date now so deeply consecrated in Spanish collective memory that it is simply referred to by the shorthand notation "23-F". While a new Prime Minister was being sworn

ceiling and taking all the Members of Parliament hostage – scenes captured live on television and later relayed around the world. The captors called for a military insurrection against the democratic process, a call answered in Valencia where the army came out onto the streets in tanks. The situation was extraordinarily tense.

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In the early hours of the morning of 24 February, Juan Carlos, having telephoned the military commanders of all the Spanish regions to stress his opposition to this attempted coup d’état, appeared on national television dressed in full military

all necessary measures to be taken to maintain constitutional order. His brief address – just over a minute in length – contained the following statement:

The Crown, symbol of the permanence and unity of the fatherland, cannot tolerate in any way actions or attitudes of persons aiming to interrupt by force the democratic process which the Constitution voted for by the Spanish people duly laid down via a referendum.

Subsequent events were to show that the attempted coup had in all probability relatively little chance of success, with none of the military units other than Valencia responding to the call, though this was not at all apparent at the time. Even so, Juan Carlos’s actions were and are clearly deserving of praise. He completely

the hero of the hour.

That, however, is a very different matter from what was to happen next. In the Spanish media Juan Carlos was instantly dubbed “the saviour of democracy”, a description that was quickly expanded to “the guarantor of democracy”, “the pilot of change”, “the driving-force of change” and other similar appellations. For

comments, however mild, of Juan Carlos in the mainstream Spanish media (the Catalan-language newspaper Avui has always been a somewhat different case). I am not in any sense suggesting a conspiracy of silence. There is no evidence (at least none that I am aware of) that any kind of conscious decision was taken by media outlets, either jointly or severally, to sanctify the king in any way. Nonetheless, for an extended period the king’s Francoist origins passed into the realm of the unsayable, despite the fact that they were known to all.

This description of Juan Carlos as the “saviour of democracy” remains with us

ever-present, but reaches peaks of great intensity at what are seen for one reason or another as key moments in time: anniversaries of Franco’s death, anniversaries of

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the Constitution, anniversaries of "23-F" itself and so on. We can be quite certain

of such vocabulary. But these moments do not have to be overtly political in nature. A particularly spectacular high-point was provided by the Barcelona Olympics in 1992, when viewers not only in Spain, but also throughout the world saw the King hug and embrace winning Spanish athletes, who would then be kissed by the princesses. This was also the moment of the consolidation of the discourse of the “citizen-King”, a Monarch who saw his role in society not as a divinely ordained function, but as a job, and who worked tirelessly for the good of the citizenry at large. He was frequently put forward as the new model for Monarchy

José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero, even referred to him on one recent occasion as a “rather republican king”.2

Modernity, Postmodernity and the End of Myth?Many commentators have proposed the failure of the attempted coup of 23

generally laconic about what the features of that modernity might be, and many alternative dates for the end (and indeed the beginning) of the “transition” have been proposed over time. The process of modernisation had been in train for some time, and it was its eventual incompatibility with the limitations of the Franco regime – despite a number of attempts on the latter’s part to adapt to the changing environment – that gradually engendered the widespread disillusionment and outright opposition, even among elite circles, to the regime necessary for

constructed, at least in the Spanish-speaking media, as a symbolic point of no return, a point beyond which further military interventions were completely out of the question. And one after which Spain became a mature, established parliamentary constitutional democracy – not one without its own problems and internal tensions, since that is impossible – but a mature and established one nonetheless. Part of this new political stability has been the phenomenon known in Spain as juancarlismo, or "Juancarlism", a term used to describe attachment to the person of Juan Carlos – this being associated intimately with his status as “saviour of democracy”, “pilot of change” and so on – rather than to the institution of monarchy itself.

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primarily on Juan Carlos, but on his children, the new generation of Spanish royals, to whom the phenomenon of juancarlismoTheir three weddings – that of the infanta Elena in Seville in 1995, of the infanta

2004 – were large-scale media events attracting intense television and press coverage, and opening up a space that many different constituencies were eager to colonise. They were characterised by a concerted move to re-assert Spanish monarchy as a valuable institution, over and above the person of the king himself.

year old Seville cathedral; the second emphasised the oneness of Spain, playing on the fact that the princess was marrying a Basque, and that the wedding was taking place in the capital of Catalunya with some of its elements in the Catalan language. Cristina even arrived for the wedding in Barcelona in a Rolls Royce that had previously belonged to Franco, thereby symbolically re-inscribing at least one of the accoutrements of the Old Regime into the pomp and circumstance of the New. Media treatment was deeply respectful and openly celebratory.

The treatment of Crown Prince Felipe has been rather different. His choice of girlfriends – in particular Norwegian model Eva Sannum in 2000 – was the subject of intense media and political debate, with questions being raised regarding what

3 No-one had seemed to particularly mind when Elena married a young man with no professional

1992 and the 1996 Olympics). However the idea that the future queen of Spain might be an underwear model – whose photograph, it was claimed, was pinned to the interior of lorry-drivers’ cabins – seemed to be a step too far. She was

standing, suggesting an unappealing melange of both sexism and status snobbery at work. Felipe’s friendship with Eva Sannum did not prosper, and four years later he would marry Letizia Ortiz, a glamorous television journalist and newscaster.

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On the day of the wedding, contrary to all expectations, it rained torrentially in Madrid. The bride could not arrive in an open coach, had to transfer to a Rolls Royce, and arrived at the cathedral thirty minutes late as the prince waited awkwardly at the altar. The noise of the rain pounding on the roof of the television commentators’ box was at times so loud that it was impossible to hear what they were saying. A freak meteorological occurrence, of course, but somehow readable as a curious allegory of a changing and less propitious environment and of the dwindling ability of media narratives – central to the process of "Juancarlism" and the rewriting of history embedded within it – to reach their audience. While the central elements of the myth of juancarlismo were courageous defence of the constitution in the face of illegitimate use of power and a view of monarchy as work in the service of the citizenry, none of these appellations seemed remotely appropriate for someone considering marrying a lingerie model or actually marrying a highly telegenic media star.

underway in Spain. While Juan Carlos had in some sense straddled the move from a kind of pre-modernity to modernity – or perhaps better from a political apparatus that was holding back Spain’s gathering modernisation to one more suited to its needs – Felipe can be seen in some senses as negotiating the move

democracy, the defence of constitutional monarchy is no longer seen in Spain as the matter of political urgency it once was, and can no longer provide the stuff of political myth. Indeed, with the end of what French thinker Jean Lyotard in his book The Postmodern Condition called the “grand narratives” – systems of thought providing totalising explanations of a wide range of social processes – post-modernity may no longer be able to sustain myth, only gossip – at least in relation to those disconnected from, or in the process of becoming disconnected from, the real centres of power (other "grand narratives" sustained by those self-same centres of power appear to be holding up much better).

The Management of Memory

a construct, and a collective one at that. While it is, broadly speaking, acceptable to speak of the “rewriting of history”, particularly when it can be shown that things

narrative – it is important to bear in mind that history is always “(re)written”. All

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histories, including academic histories (albeit their greater methodological rigour), are narratives. All histories (including potted histories such as this one) create a subject position with a particular "Implied Reader" – to use Umberto Eco’s term – in mind, and invite the real reader to occupy that position thereby identifying with the perspective embedded within it (the invitation is not always successful,

winners and losers, or at least those who are more favoured by the perspective (who may indeed include, professionally, career-wise, or in some other capacity, the authors themselves) and those who are less so.

The political career of Juan Carlos has shown a number of such “rewritings”; some aimed at overcoming the limitations of juancarlismo, others having a broader political

Count of Barcelona. As a result of his claims to the throne being overlooked by Franco, the Spanish monarchy effectively skipped a generation, thereby making a mockery of the institution’s own rules of succession; on his death in 1993 Juan was widely referred to in the Spanish media as “the King who never reigned”. Despite the fact that his father never acceded to the status of King, Juan Carlos decided to bury him in the Panteón de los Reyes ("Pantheon of the Kings") at El Escorial,

Alfonso XIII’s remains transferred there in 1980 – thus symbolically restoring the

strong, again highlighting the operational symbiosis of politicians, media and monarchy (and also, in this case, the Church). The Government, meeting in an extraordinary session on the day of Don Juan’s death, issued a decree allowing the

the history of Spain”, while Pasqual Maragall, then mayor of Barcelona and later (Socialist) Prime Minister of Catalunya (2003-6), stressed the fact that Don Juan “made the historical continuity of the institution of the Monarchy possible, as well as contributing decisively to the restoration of democracy in Spain”. Press comment was also almost universally positive. Spain’s leading weekly magazine Tiempo spoke of his “leading role in the construction of modern Spain”, while

decades: General Franco... he was, in any case, the last victim of the Spanish Civil War”. And so, it was suggested, a great door had closed on history.

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There are several examples of the second case, where the effects of the rewriting are felt well beyond the monarchy itself. Though the myth – to a very large extent a

established ideological resource, it is not without its detractors who point out that

and of relegating to the unsayable their consequences for the present. Such detractors argue (correctly) that the change from dictatorship to democracy was not simply due to the actions of the King, or even of the politicians, but was a lengthy process that began decades before Franco’s death involving resistance organised by underground political parties and trade unions while the dictator was still alive. Individuals and groups undertook this resistance, which at times resulted in imprisonment and death, at great risk to both themselves and their families. Spanish history was thus being rewritten, they claimed – in ways discussed at length by contributors to Joan Ramon Resina’s edited volume Disremembering the Dictatorship – with the complicity of the media, with credit for the change to democracy being removed from the actions of ordinary people and transferred to the elites.

Further examples of the second relate more closely to the question of Juan Carlos’s Francoist past, its reduction to silence, and its replacement by the much celebrated myth of the “guarantor of democracy”. Opponents argue that this has worked not only to efface the Francoist origins of Juan Carlos’s kinghood itself, but also the likewise Francoist associations and even sympathies of many of the politicians

to have been “lifelong democrats”. Some of these self-same politicians are accused of using the myth to push through policies that might otherwise not have been guaranteed success.

Unease regarding the instrumentalising of the myth is most likely to be voiced in leftist or “nationalist” political and intellectual circles in the so-called “historical nationalities”, the term used in the Spanish Constitution to refer collectively to Catalunya, the Basque Country, and Galicia, all “regions” with their own language and their own long political and cultural history. Many Catalans in particular feel that abuse of the myth has contributed, directly or indirectly, to a diminution in the level of autonomy their country might have expected in the early nineteen-eighties as a result of the process of democratisation, and some take the view

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that the King himself is part of the process, at the very least by association4. This argument recurs insistently in parts of the Catalan intelligentsia and the Catalan media to this day, who claim that the need to stress the unity of the entire Spanish

"23-F" was the cause of the exclusion of Catalan nationalist politicians from

"Autonomous Communities", – the so-called “Organic Law on the Harmonisation of the Autonomous Process”, usually referred to in Spain by its acronym LOAPA – passed in June 1982. The lack of a Catalan voice, they claim, resulted in a dilution of their powers of self-determination (an argument forcefully rebutted, needless

the unity of the “kingdom of Spain”.

While these dissenting voices do have an audience in Catalunya – they surface

democracy” myth – they were for a long time more muted elsewhere in Spain (though this is now changing). This has resulted, in addition to the split between

Spanish against Catalan nationalists. The result is a damaging schism that a more courageous handling of the “nationalities” situation in 1982 would almost certainly have averted. Journalistic reverence for the “guarantor of democracy” myth in the early nineteen-eighties, and the resulting lack of investigation of some of its wider political implications, have, with or without the express consent of the journalists, as a result contributed to the defeat of a certain alternative understanding of Catalunya and its relationship with Madrid. Was truth spoken unto power? What seems clear is that not only did the provisions of the LOAPA fall some way short of what would have been possible within the framework of the 1978 Constitution, they were to some extent even in breach of it: a third of the text of the LOAPA was later ruled unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 1991. But if there was a lack of critical media engagement, this was almost certainly due less to journalistic malevolence or negligence than to the reassuring power of myth.

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ConclusionFor those who feel that a republic is a more rational political form, there is much about monarchy that is easy to criticise: the outlandish names – the full name of Don Juan, Count of Barcelona, was Juan Carlos Teresa Silvestre Alfonso de

shorter5; the at times bizarre pomp and circumstance; the outmoded ceremonial livery; the quaint idiolects (in more than one European country the royal “way of speaking” differs noticeably from that of the population at large); the inherent sexism of some of the laws of succession; the brazen abuse of position for commercial gain; the unedifying spectacle of the hangers-on; the lifestyles of minor royals living it up at public expense with no obvious social “return” on such an investment. Above all the vagaries of genealogical accident that can result in quite inappropriate individuals (from a “rational” point of view, that is) occupying important positions of symbolic and to some extent material power. Elections can, of course, also produce hideously incompetent or even murderous incumbents – we do not have to look far for examples in either the twentieth or twenty-

their mandate must eventually come to an end. There is, with few exceptions, no such procedural “escape” from an incompetent or embarrassing monarch: the Bhutanese Constitution, adopted in 2008 following the move to a constitutional democracy, is one of the few to contain such an “escape clause” and to include provisions for the removal of a monarch who is clearly not up to the task.

with us, variously ignored, opposed, satirised, tolerated, supported, celebrated and even held in affection. They are here, on the one hand, because they remain extremely useful, a highly valuable resource that can be exploited by other powerful groups, in most cases with the implicit agreement of the monarch, for a range of political projects, perhaps the most important being to provide a focus for national imagining and, thereby, symbolising national unity. But monarchies are not just the product of others’ manoeuvrings: they enjoy restricted, but nonetheless

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they support, their ambassadorial functions, the heading-up of trade missions, and so on. Examples of the second would include the role played by a number of European monarchies during the Second World War, the actions of Juan Carlos on the night of "23-F", or those of Jigme Singye Wangchuck of Bhutan in initiating his country’s move to a parliamentary democracy. And then, confusingly (and irrationally) for republicans, there is what appears to be the genuine affection that at least part of the population holds for its Monarchs – an affection rarely (if

apparatchiks rather than the enduring embodiment of the nation – an affection nourished and supported by a range of specialist and non-specialist magazines.

And yet nothing stands still. Though affection for the British monarchs6 can still

more measured criticisms of the broadsheets, it is a pale shadow of the popularity enjoyed by Victoria and her family in the nineteenth century, a popularity vividly illustrated by John Plunkett in his book Queen Victoria: First Media Monarch. Even in the Spanish case Juan Carlos no longer seems quite as “untouchable” as he once was: a careless remark picked up during a meeting with President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela – to whom the King directed a petulant “Why don’t you shut up?” during a recent Ibero-American Summit in Chile – was the subject of some (albeit carefully worded) press disapproval in 2007 and was widely circulated on the internet7. The King was not without his supporters as regards this incident – a number of right-wing commentators felt that the socialist Chávez badly needed cutting down to size, and that Juan Carlos was exactly the right person to do that. But even so, not everyone felt that this outburst was appropriate and there was a fairly mild-mannered debate in some sections of the press regarding the (constitutional) limits to legitimate interventions by the Monarch. All for the most part very gentlemanly – although Catalan politician Josep-Lluís Carod-Rovira went

had been the dominant tone up until then.

Speaking of the Royal Family also refers to

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In addition, even mainstream Spanish-language newspapers such as El País now carry articles on the “conspiracy of silence” surrounding Juan Carlos in various ways. A greater understanding of the widespread social upheaval preceding the Transition is also apparent. The highly popular television series Cuéntame cómo pasó ("Tell Me How it Happened"), launched in 2001 and now in its tenth season8, gave

before. On 31 October 2007 the Spanish parliament passed a Law of Historical Memory in relation to the victims of the Civil War.9 This has led to an upsurge in personal biographies from that period, including one-minute long mini-biographies aired on prime time television news. History is again being “rewritten”.

And yet if royalty is to survive as a functioning institution, some kind of “royal memory” – with, of course, its own “rewritings” and omissions – will be required, along with journalists (and politicians) willing to reproduce and disseminate it. Progress on this front is currently uneven: in the Spanish case, a working replacement for juancarlismo has yet to emerge, either in the form of a viable felipismo or of a commitment to monarchy more generally. As a result, the spectacle of celebrity monarchy, lacking either memory or stable (if contested) meaning, remains a real – for some ghastly, for others entertaining – possibility. Indeed, in view of the heavily romanticised media discourse that surrounded the wedding of Felipe and Letizia – such was its scale that its detractors referred to it as “Operation Letizia” – for some, it is already here.

Hugh O’Donnell is Professor of Language and Popular Culture at Glasgow Caledonian University, Scotland.

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References

Billig, Michael. Talking of the Royal Family. London: Routledge, 1992. Print. Boorstin, Daniel. The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-events in America. London: Penguin,

1961. Print. Eco, Umberto. The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts. London:

Hutchinson, 1981. Print. Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action. London: Heinemann, 1984.

Print. Lyotard, Jean-François, Geoff Bennington, Brian Massumi, and Fredric Jameson.

The Postmodern Condition: a Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1984. Print.

Plunkett, John. Queen Victoria: First Media Monarch. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003. Print. Resina, Joan Ramon. Disremembering the Dictatorship: the Politics of Memory in the Spanish Transition to Democracy. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000. Print.

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Introduction

degree I believed I was on the threshold of a career to seek the truth and nothing but the truth. It was not long before I realised how complex that mission was - and how complex the concept of truth was.

A few years into a journalism career I began to grapple with the notion of censorship. In my journalism classes any form of censorship was to be scorned and resisted. Outside, in the real world, censorship was a protracted reality. It was – and is - practiced in more forms than we understand and acknowledge, from subtle interactions to blatant violence. I realised, very quickly, that it was more than a curb on journalism and media. It was a culture that was a critical element in human behaviour and human relationships. In fact I eventually realised that society could not function without a form of censorship. It is prevalent - in fact ingrained - in all social and political systems.

This paper looks at one of the more subtle forms of censorship – self-censorship. I will discuss self-censorship in the media, self-censorship as a vital social norm, and self-censorship as a value in the Bhutanese context. I look at self-censorship as an important part of my own professional life and as a social skill that has been developed to an art form. In the context of this book I look at self-censorship as an element of the culture that has bound what we call the “Bhutanese system”, a polity that places the Monarch at its centre. I contemplate the underlying question, “is this culture prevalent in the modern Bhutanese media”?

applied as a skilful means to a noble end.

Self-Censorship: A Means to An EndKinley Dorji

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General MediaThroughout the 19th and 20th centuries writers, musicians, poets, journalists,

expression through the arts and what was seen as the boundaries of decency, of politics, sexual conduct, violence, racial, and religious tolerance. Sometimes they

human thinking, speech, and behaviour and played an important role in shaping human values.

controversy, usually on issues of religion and race, social and political sensitivities. City of Joy and The Party, China banned

Memoirs of a Geisha, Brokeback Mountain, Kundun and Seven Years in Tibet; Monty Python’s Life of Brian was banned in many liberal western countries, Thailand banned The King and I. Among famous banned books are Ulysses, Canterbury Tales, and The Arabian Nights. In recent years the fatwa imposed on Salman Rushdie by Ayatollah Khomeini for his book, The Satanic Verses, and the angry debate and threats that followed the publication of cartoons of Prophet Muhammad by the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, are among the most graphic examples of extreme censorship.

Generally, however, blatant and violent censorship of the media declined by the end of the 20th century with the wave of democracy that swept across the globe with about 180 countries adopting some form of democracy. The recognition of media as the fourth estate became widespread and uncontested. In a notable international initiative UNESCO promoted the concept of the Information Age that strengthened the understanding of the information society and its role. Even as the authority of the press, as housed in London’s Fleet Street, declined, the media gained prominence in the United States. The Washington Post’s revelation of

All the President’s Men, raised the

powerful medium with an almost irrepressible force that gave new meaning to freedom of expression and provided unprecedented access to the masses.

Yet the pressure on all media is pervasive today. A range of censorship mechanisms have been instituted by governments. Religious and ethnic groups intimidate

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Self-Censorship: A Means to An End

on media. Governments also spend substantive funds to control the electronic and digital media, including the Internet, both to protect vulnerable groups like children and to ward off political opposition.

But the most frequent form of censorship is manifested in self-censorship, the act of restraint in the media by media professionals themselves. Self-censorship is a response to pressures ranging from outright fear of retaliation from terrorists and

a collection of short stories and memoirs, Within the Realm of Happiness, in 2006 I found myself going through extensive introspection on practically every word,

community and the market, the real characters I might be portraying. Some of my favourite stories were left unwritten.

Before Bhutan opened up to the process of modernisation, art was performed as spiritual practice (traditional artists painted spiritual images to earn merit), literature was largely Buddhist scriptures, and the most powerful media was gossip and rumour.

including rumour, remained the most dominant form of communication. While there was no ban on any Bhutanese media society shied away from books that were critical of the country and, particularly, the royal family. In 2010, with four radio stations, six newspapers, and a number of entertainment magazines, the Bhutanese media are more open and critical but news is characterised by self-censorship.

News Media The discussion on censorship is more controversial and self-censorship more criticised when it comes to the news media and journalism. Governments, proprietors of media organisations, advertisers, and journalists themselves come

personal reasons. Self-censorship with such motives is viewed as a betrayal of the audience and thus a deprivation of people’s right to information.

ThreatsConventional critics would claim that censorship, in all forms, is normally practiced in non-democratic countries on the assumption that only democratic

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governments legally guarantee freedom of expression. It is also widely believed

government regulations cannot be disputed, particularly at a time when media are nearly completely commercialised, the control of media in the name of national security and state interests is largely seen as an excuse to muzzle them. Although violence in state censorship is something of the past journalists are still targeted for their criticism of political leaders. In authoritarian countries those who report and comment on politics are often in fear of sanctions by the authorities. Defamation,

to silence journalists in Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and China. Clashes between government and journalists occur every day in several African countries.

The global media community is not proud of its performance in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2001. Journalists actively sought censorship advice from military authorities supposedly to prevent the inadvertent revelation of military secrets and the war on terror after September 11, 2001, introduced the concept of the embedded journalist. In the US organisations like Media Matters for America, FAIR, Democracy Now!, and the ACLU have raised concerns about news broadcasting stations (notably FOX News) censoring their own content to be less controversial when reporting on the War on Terror. In fact the Iraq war, where the western press exercised blatant self-censorship, increased the credibility of the only “alternative”, the Qatar-owned television channel, Al Jazeera, which started an English broadcast in 1996.

Meanwhile, even as the Internet broke down the walls erected by censors, self-censorship has been globalised through the electronic media. Words like Tiananmen, Tibet, and Taiwan have been blocked in the Chinese language. Search companies including Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo, were reported to be censoring more information than even Chinese laws demanded.

In 2009 71 journalists were killed, according to the New York based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), nearly half of them while covering political beats and

for most violent attacks on journalists. Journalists and other media professionals have been threatened, kidnapped, or executed by political and religious militant

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groups and terrorists in all continents. Even governments have been intimidated into self-censorship in an era of unprecedented suicide bombers in war-torn Islamic countries. In more recent times, particularly, Islamic terrorists have placed de facto controls on American media companies, something that would have been

than it did in the past greed or fear is proving stronger than commitment to free speech.

Corporate PowerIn the west, today, large corporations are a more common source of censorship than governments. Self-censorship is pervasive in pluralistic capitalist countries, most often to conform to the pressures of the market. Media outlets kill numerous

clout to squelch negative reports. Powerful businesses use the threat of expensive lawsuits to discourage legitimate investigations. Journalists and editors consciously avoid topics that will anger a parent company or advertiser to protect their livelihood. With commercial interests dominating, the proprietor and the advertiser have more control over media than, say, the politician in industrialised societies.

In their seminal work, Manufacturing Consent, Chomsky and Herman argue that corporate ownership of news media very strongly encourages systematic self-censorship due to market forces. Even with supposedly liberal media bias and self-censorship is evident in the selection and omission of news stories, and the framing of acceptable discussion, in line with the interests of the corporation owners.

A 2000 study in the US by the Pew Research Centre and the Columbia Journalism Review notes that self-censorship is commonplace in the news media today. The survey of 206 reporters and 81 news executives in the US – 150 from local news outlets and 137 from national news organizations –found widespread concern over commercial and competitive pressures. As a result of these pressures journalists say that good stories all too frequently are not pursued. Apart from a handful of countries where journalists can seek some form of legal protection most media societies are at the mercy of proprietors.

In Bhutan the government, as the largest advertiser, is in a position to pressure media organisations but corporate pressure, as seen around the

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world, is already a reality. Even in the 1990s, when Kuensel was the only newspaper, companies were known to withdraw advertisements if they were unhappy with the coverage of their organisations. The tension between the advertising departments and the newsrooms are the best proof of this trend.

Social PressureBesides market pressure journalists quote various forms of peer and social pressures that force them to exercise self-censorship. According to the PEW survey journalists and news executives said, perhaps surprisingly, that fear of embarrassment or potential career damage is mentioned by about half of all journalists as a factor for avoiding newsworthy stories. The PEW survey also shows that about 20% of journalists steer clear of newsworthy stories because they might aggravate community problems.

News media are often accused of self-censorship because they can face serious backlash for controversial or hasty reporting. Sometimes they need to be “politically correct”. Important and newsworthy stories can be avoided because they are too boring or complicated. News media have been accused of “not taking any risks”. A study by the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2009 found that journalists’ perceptions of self-censorship are grounded partly in their professional norms, partly in their own personal political attitudes, and partly in the distance between their own political attitudes and the editorial stances of the news organizations that they work for.

With its small population, all these pressures are heightened in Bhutan. The media’s tensions with politicians, senior bureaucrats, and business houses are emerging although, in the context of a new democracy, it might be described as creative tensions. The Bhutanese Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, freedom of media, and right to information but the pressure on the media comes from the sensitivities of the small society. As one editor described it: “When you write a critical report about someone on Friday you are likely to bump into him at the vegetable market on Saturday, in the supermarket on Sunday, and probably at a dinner on Monday.”

Self-censorship under these circumstances questions the responsibility of journalists who have taken on, by their profession, the mandate to report of facts for the good of society. Otherwise it is a paradox. The owners of the media are a

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handful of people, a tiny group that does not take responsibility for their impact on society. A parliamentarian, president, prime minister, mayor, must be elected

any country, are there for the sole reason that they have the money.

Journalists and Society

imagine a world where everyone voiced his or her thoughts without considering the implications, like people suffering from the neuropsychiatric disorder known as Frontal Lobe Syndrome. As people shout involuntary obscenities, conversation would be a crude exchange at best. Under normal circumstances people grow up learning to edit their thoughts. As children we self-censor our conversations and language with or in the presence of adults and, as adults, we do the same with children. We censor ourselves for social, political, religious reasons. We censor ourselves in respect of other people’s rights, freedoms, and sensibilities, so that we do not insult their beliefs and emotions.

In Bhutan self-censorship, like all other social norms, has to be understood in the context of the small society and a culture that is largely drawn from Buddhism. Buddhist teachers explain that this is the teaching of self-regulation to discipline the mind, through practices like the 16 virtues, thereby reducing anger. The discipline of speech is based on respect for other persons and society at large. Not harming others results in a good reaction from them, and that is good for society. We avoid harsh speech to strive for delwa (bliss) of mind and body to ensure peace and harmony in the community.

As philosophers like Ruth Benedict analysed, and Buddhist teachers also point out,

a guilt-oriented society while eastern society is shame-oriented. Self-censorship is, therefore, necessary to avoid shaming people. Public criticism of people in the media is particularly painful and may aggravate rather than help solve a problem.The sensitivity of a small society can be – and often is - taken to extremes where people do not express their views and decision makers do not make decisions to avoid criticism. This sensitivity has a negative impact because the reluctance to criticize can result in a lack of healthy discourse. In Bhutan this has led to a more open and critical discussion on the Internet that is viewed with some relief although the comments are too often personalised and usually made under the cover of anonymity.

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Journalists, in most societies, are more vocal than the average citizen. In their attempts to portray extremities to make news stories more interesting they inevitably stretch the boundaries of speech and offer new horizons in social thinking. But, as members of society, they are conscious of the need to balance the pursuit of the truth with the inevitable need for self-censorship. On one hand they carry the responsibility of informing the people, sometimes risking their lives. On the other they know that the world would not function without some form of self-censorship. The answer is a right balance that, in Buddhism, includes the need to question authority. The Bhutanese ContextAccepting that the inviolability of free speech should not be challenged, particularly for the success of democratic systems, this paper argues that the values which held socio-political systems together over the centuries must also be respected in the broader context of social health. It is not a contradiction with freedom of expression. Media must play an important role in all political systems and freedom must be interpreted as responsibility.

Bhutanese society recognizes that there is a wealth of experiences, both good and bad, around the world. It has also recognized that, while respecting this diversity, Bhutan has to be proud of its uniqueness and maintain its distinctive approach to

identity that society has described as the Bhutanese system, meaning a polity that places the Monarch at its centre.

general election held in March 2008. The Monarch has stepped back from the political arena and governance is characterized by party politics. How does society, and members of society including the media, preserve the values of the Bhutanese system, particularly against the potentially divisive forces that can come with

families, and communities are pitted against each other?

Here lies the wisdom of Gross National Happiness which provides a perspective on the evolving political structure and, therefore, guidelines for change. GNH is an expression of the values that held Bhutanese society together over the centuries. Bhutan is not changing because it needs new values but is enabling the polity to

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the Monarch. The Monarch is the guardian of GNH and it is in the person of the Monarch that the values of GNH are preserved through change.

Of KingsBhutanese society has functioned like an extended family largely because of its size. Such a system has been held together by traditional values that are expressed by the cultural code called driglam namzha, loosely interpreted as “traditional etiquette”. At the heart of this system is the institution of monarchy. Driglam namzha prescribes a code of behaviour including mental and physical obeisance to the King. The emphasis on discipline and self-censorship stems from a culture that prescribes a deep reverence for the Monarch, so much so that people lower their voices for even a mention of the King.

In Bhutan the Monarch does not claim divine rights as did the European Kings of the past or the link to heaven that the Chinese Emperors claimed. The Bhutanese Monarch draws his power from the will of the people as symbolized by a unique

to sign a GenjaGongsar Ugyen Wangchuck.

The concept of kingship is drawn from the notion of a Buddhist King who is created because the people place their will in him, reposing in him the mandate of being a guardian over human society. He is the Dharma Raja, the protector and supporter of the dharma, ruling by the laws of dharma that he himself follows. In a culmination of these concepts the sacred enthronement ceremony of the Druk Gyalpo takes place in the Punakha Dzong where he receives the sacred empowerment in the presence of the relics of Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal. The crowning of the Druk Gyalpo in the capital city is a civil ceremony performed in the presence of Bhutanese and international dignitaries.

Modern Bhutanese society feels indebted to the monarchy for a century of

tradition and modernity. Drawing from this past Bhutanese society holds the view that the Monarch is the foundation for Bhutan’s political stability and that the credibility of this institution must be preserved for the survival of the country.

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Media and MonarchyThe papers in this book look at monarchy in the 21st century. The experiences and the impact of the institution of monarchy vary as much as the history and the social systems of each country but they provide a rich portrayal of an important aspect of governance of human society. There is surprisingly little written about this vital institution, as Professor Jørgen Elklit of Denmark points out in his paper. In the context of this book I look at the Bhutanese media’s coverage of the institution of monarchy, widely viewed by society as a sacrosanct institution. Here, too, the media draws its codes of ethics, conduct, and practice from society’s view of the monarchy. Still in their infancy, we see that the tone of the Bhutanese

cultural interpretation of the values imbedded in traditional Bhutanese etiquette. Bhutanese society’s relations with the Druk Gyalpo (Dragon King) could be compared with the awe that the Spanish population held for King Juan Carlos, or the love that the Thai people have for King Bhumibol, or the respect that the Danish people have for their Queen, and the unquestioning acceptance that Japanese had for the Emperors of the past. All the scholars who look at monarchy in different countries share the resounding agreement that the Monarch must remain above politics.

Thailand is an interesting example of society’s view of the Monarch and the media coverage. Both the Thai and international media have exercised self-censorship to an extreme degree in their coverage of King Bhumibol Adulyadej and the Thai royal family. It is also accepted that self censorship is “imposed” by the lèse majesté law which states: “anyone defaming, insulting or threatening the King, the Queen, the presumptive heir or the regent” is guilty of the crime of lèse majesté and can be sentenced to three to 15 years in prison. The lèse majesté law in Thailand is known to be the world’s harshest and, in 2009 alone, police were investigating 32 cases of the crime.

According to the Thai royal palace, censorship is imposed to preserve national security, maintain public order, preserve the rights of others, protect public morals, and prevent insults to Buddhism. But, in all fairness, going by the popularity that His Majesty King Bhumibol enjoys across Thai society, the Thai media carry a tone of reverence that is more than what a law could impose. Thai journalists voice the genuine reverence that a vast majority of the population have for King Bhumibol.

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a supernatural being and that if he did do anything wrong, he wanted to hear criticism so he could improve himself. This step was ostensibly taken to offset the charges of lèse majesté in Thailand, most of which have been intentionally directed at foreigners or Thai opponents of political, social, and commercial leaders.

Hugh O’Donnel points out in this book that, in Spain, it was nearly impossible

Spanish media for two decades. It was not a conspiracy of silence but, he suggests, the awe of the Monarch, Juan Carlos. The Japanese media maintained a stony silence even as society agonized over the “inability” of the Imperial couple to produce an heir to the Throne. In Nepal it was fear of reprisal that prevented the press from reporting the antics of a Crown Prince who even ran over and killed a popular singer.

Bhutanese journalists place the Monarch on an even higher pedestal and build the mystical aura around the institution. In the perception of the people, at this time

more important than ever. It is the institution of monarchy that must carry Bhutan through change.

ConclusionThe concept of self-censorship is complex. In a broader context society would not function if the behaviour of its members, including their speech, were not self-controlled. In politics it can also mean the manipulation of information in a system where, as John Ralston Saul writes in Voltaire’s Bastards, intelligence refers more to CIA than Einstein. Chinese philosopher, Sun Tzu, refers to this as the culture of secrecy. Decision makers may tend to judge their worth by the device of secrecy, that is, what they know and what they control.

The word censorship carries negative connotations with good reason, particularly when it refers to the media. It implies the deprivation of a right that is now indisputable in most societies – freedom of expression. Self-censorship also carries a negative connotation but to a smaller degree. In the media self-censorship could mean that professionals succumb to political and commercial pressures from governments, corporations, and media companies as well as threats from terrorists, militants, and gangsters. Author Judy Blume laments on her web page: “But it’s

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written; the books that will never be read and all due to the fear of censorship. As

be made, songs never sung, images that will never be painted.

Self-censorship in the news media, inevitable in a profession where the deluge of information must be distilled in the service of the people, must be based on a sense of responsibility. Sun Tzu said that secrecy is a narrow means and not an

self-censorship in journalism, it means that media professionals need to exercise self-censorship for the greater good of society. It means good journalism.

The Bhutanese media have a clear purpose. Gross National Happiness not only requires that people are informed but that society must preserve the good values of the past as Bhutan transforms into a modern nation. In a world where the media not only presents images of individuals and organisations but actually creates them, the Bhutanese media must be mindful of their long term impact on society. The Constitution of the kingdom of Bhutan does not include the lèse majesté law. In fact it was not even considered during the drafting of the Constitution. Yet the media are not even remotely critical of the King. On the contrary the Bhutanese media makes a conscious effort to promote the aura of the Druk Gyalpo with a tone of earnestness. In sharp contrast to the coverage of politicians, where the media have shown a tendency to be confrontational, the coverage of the King’s activities has been celebratory (with some of the writing even sounding like sloppy school essays).

The premise of media coverage of the Monarch is that Bhutanese monarchy is vital for the long-term peace and stability of the country. The King embodies the legitimacy of state. Apart from being the upholder of the Constitution he is also the guardian of the people, particularly the less fortunate. As the head of state

credibility.

At a time of historic political change the Monarchy provides the political space and the safety net for the process of democratisation which is a real life experiment

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symbol of unity for the small population. The transition of generations requires that the King is a role model and an inspiration for Bhutanese youth.

moving from a known era of stability into an unknown future. This means that

remain above politics. Strengthening the credibility of the King and the institution of monarchy does not mean just singing praises of the King as a personality –

coverage of the Throne to preserve the true sanctity of the institution. In this context self-censorship must represent right thought, right opinion, right action, for the greater and long term good of society.

After working as a journalist for 29 years, Kinley Dorji is now the Secretary of the Ministry of Information & Communications in Thimphu, Bhutan.

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The Bhutanese Media and a Democratic Constitutional Monarchy

11

The Year 20082008 was a bittersweet year for most Bhutanese. It was the year when Bhutan became the world’s youngest democracy and enthroned the world’s youngest king.

general election. The transition was all the more poignant for Bhutanese citizens who had lived through 100 years of progressive development and stability, led by a succession of far-sighted Kings. A century of stable progress was giving way to change.

made contact with the outside world; he had been an important mediator between the British and the leadership in Tibet. The second King, Jigme Wangchuck, strengthened Bhutan’s relations with British India and, during his reign, Bhutan and India signed the 1949 treaty of friendship that guided Bhutan’s foreign policy for many years. The rule of law was strengthened during the second King’s rule, and a traditional educational system as well as a district administration system was introduced. The third King of Bhutan, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, abolished serfdom, established the National Assembly, initiated Bhutan’s international foreign policy, and ushered in a period of development - from road infrastructure to health care and modern education.

The fourth King of Bhutan, His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck, accelerated the process of modernisation and took the nation from an era of basic infrastructure development to the age of information. His Majesty goes down in history as the King who decided that democracy would replace monarchy as the system of governance for Bhutan: “I have always made it clear that the people are more

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important than the King. We cannot leave the future of the country in the hands of one person who is chosen by birth and not by merit.” 1

To see a King give up his authority and hand the throne over to his son, and to see the dramatic political transformation introduced by the will of the King, was to see an act of wisdom and compassion that few people have seen, or will see, in

trust in the new generation of Bhutanese. That is why Bhutanese today describe democracy as a “gift from the throne”.

On August 18th, 2008, King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck signed Bhutan’s

people had reposed in him and his forefathers was now bestowed on the people of Bhutan. It was a moving moment for Bhutanese citizens as they watched their elected representatives sign the nation’s highest legislation, the Constitution of Bhutan, live on TV. As the dramatic and historic year drew to a close, images of

Himalayas.

The media are not just providers of information but also shapers of reality. Media

landscape. After becoming a democracy, Bhutan’s media have changed their tone of reporting on the new political system. What lessons can the media learn from other countries as Bhutan embarks on creating a new system of governance that strives to be a balance of tradition and modernity? How can media contribute to the construction of a democratic constitutional monarchy?

Media and the Restructuring of Society Bhutanese society is being restructured. A new generation of politicians is emerging, so too is a generation of young journalists. The concept of contemporary civil society is gradually taking root.2 The recently established constitutional agencies

constitute civil society in the traditional sense, the emergence of modern civil society through more


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– the Election Commission and Anti-Corruption Commission – are energetic and sincere in their efforts to make a difference in the new political landscape.

democratic constitutional monarchy. Amidst this major transformation of

democratic constitutional monarchy. It is the responsibility of the media in Bhutan

The media today are the key to laying the foundations of a public space that is essential in a democracy. The media help shape culture and people’s world view. As Bhutan’s democratic culture takes shape and the political worldview becomes more

help restructure society? How do they build a public space and provide greater transparency in the most important institutions? In the bid to ensure fair play and objectivity, both the Election Commission and the media regulator, the Bhutan Information, Communications and Media Authority (BICMA), drew up separate and often overlapping guidelines and regulations (some say too many) for media in the period leading up to the election campaign in March 2008.

The people of Bhutan have a new mandate, that of the voters. For many months, the Election Commission schooled the people on the need to vote and how to vote. This is a formal duty of every citizen. What is more complex, perhaps even more important, is the informal role of the citizen in political life, and in the development of their community and nation. This is the responsibility to maintain

the politicians perform. People, therefore, can use media to provide feedback and to keep watch on the performance of their elected leaders.

What then is the role of the media in an emerging democracy? Bhutan may now be labelled a democratic constitutional monarchy but the culture underlying this new democracy is yet to be developed. The media have a major role to play in creating this culture and contributing to the people’s understanding of the new Bhutanese political landscape. While the role of media in Bhutan is not necessarily different from other democracies, they need to focus on the education of a populace that is new to the concept of democracy.

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A New Political LandscapeThe Constitution provides all the fundamental rights for the people of Bhutan. The rights most relevant to the media are freedom of speech, opinion, and expression, the right to information, and the freedom of the media.

There has been a monumental shift in the people’s perception of the media and against the new political landscape. In the short span of three years Bhutan’s media have taken on the role of being the fourth estate and have been given the responsibility to strengthen the process of democracy. Bhutanese media have adopted a critical (some would say an initially confrontational) approach to elected leaders, much to the discomfort and dismay of new politicians, as this was a society that has hitherto been unused to direct public confrontation. Media have begun to openly question the authorities and the people in power.

New tensions have developed between media and the institutions they report on. This is a natural development when media have to play the role of a watchdog to

3 The print media, in particular, have become bolder and more openly critical.

responsibility is to be conscious of serving the King, the country and the people (known as the concept of the tsawa sum). There has been visible change with the introduction of democracy that has resulted in the emergence of winners and losers in such a united society. Bhutanese today are learning to disagree and to question even the authorities representing a real paradigm shift in public and social behaviour.4

Bhutanese contemporary society has been transformed from one in which allegations of corruption and misappropriations of power, which were previously shared through conversation, have now very quickly moved onto the print and broadcast media, albeit with some degree of anonymity that is characteristic of

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a small society. A Media Impact Study commissioned by the Royal Government of Bhutan in 2008 shows that people in general appreciate the media’s newfound courage and its watchdog role in Bhutan. Bhutanese society has very quickly come to recognise that media are a powerful and important institution in a democracy – but many in the bureaucracy and even among the elected leaders, for example, lack understanding of how media work. Meanwhile the accuracy and professional maturity of the media professionals are being questioned as a poorly trained media community takes on a major task.

The Media and Bhutanese SocietyBhutan has become a far more transparent and open society, partly due to the media’s growing openness in covering the opposing voices in parliament and society at large. The live coverage on TV of sessions of the parliament, particularly the National Assembly, have enabled Bhutanese everywhere to understand what their elected members are doing and how the new democracy is taking shape through the initial discussions in parliament.

increasingly critical along with the nation-building role that is characteristic of media in many developing societies. But the perspective of media coverage needs to expand. While the media hold institutions of democracy to account they also indulge in increasing celebrity and trivia coverage. Media do not question the dominance of global capitalism and the free enterprise market system, visible in private sector development, including the media themselves.5

Given Bhutan’s unique approach to change and development, the media need to uphold traditional national values against the background of political, economic, cultural, and social change. The philosophy of Gross National Happiness provides the broad perspective for national development. In the GNH perspective democracy is not a goal that can be reached one day but a path to good governance which means a source of good values. The new political system is, therefore, regarded as

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government. The other three are conservation of the environment, sustainable socio-economic development, and promotion of culture.

The Bhutanese media have been and must continue to be sensitive in their

qualities that Hegel propounds (see Mark Thompson’s paper) where kingship represents institutional continuity, national culture, and embodies the unity of the state. Bhutan’s kingship goes a step further as the guardian of GNH.

Media and MonarchyTales of dharma Kings abound in oral history and the scriptures found in the Indo-Tibetan region. Although Bhutanese kingship is not derived from divine authority, many Bhutanese believe the King is synonymous with enlightened beings, or Bodhisattavas, whose sole purpose is to serve the people after having attained wisdom and compassion.6

The Bhutanese believe that the fourth King of Bhutan is a reincarnation of a

guardian of the nation’s religious heritage. The media’s portrayal of monarchy supports the symbol of a wise and compassionate King in the service of his people. The royal family is often depicted in the media as supporting spiritual institutions and the well-being of the poor and needy.

It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that many people’s psyches mirror another

the Monarch and his subjects. The people offered the Monarch their reverence and loyalty and the Monarch was responsible for the well-being of the people and provided for all their basic needs. The fact that it was the throne that introduced democracy adds to this aura of an enlightened leadership; it was only the Monarch who could have even enforced such a policy.

So it is not surprising that Bhutanese media’s approach towards coverage of the Monarchy verges on being extremely reverential, to the point of being highly

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reverence and respect that society has nurtured.

The Bhutanese media mirrors the changing society the media appear to have intuitively adjusted their coverage of the roles of the two Kings, the fourth King of Bhutan and His Majesty the King, which changed almost overnight.

The Bhutanese media (at the time, the newspaper Kuensel and BBS) often portrayed the fourth Druk Gyalpo as an ‘executive’ King - discussing development plans and priorities and minute details of the national budget (a western journalist described him as a ‘master consultant’). The King was businesslike and yet mingled with

food and drinks in the lunch he traditionally hosted after each district meeting. The fourth Druk Gyalpo was frequently photographed with the people, most often with children and youth, because he spent long hours with students. Since the early 1990s, when the power of the media was recognised, the King’s speeches were broadcast live and reproduced regularly.7

militants illegally camped on Bhutanese soil, the fourth King visited the South and addressed the people, the armed forces, and the country. TV viewers watched, riveted, clinging onto every word of their King. In a series of meetings the King and the government had repeatedly asked the militants to leave Bhutan. Just before the military operation, the weekly Kuensel reported on the growing tension and the possibility of military operations. The operation itself was covered cautiously by the Bhutanese media but became a more sensational story once it hit the Indian press. The King was depicted as a Bodhisattva8 by the Bhutanese media and as a war hero by the Indian press. What was most remarkable was the fourth King’s command that there be no national celebrations even after a successful military operation. Thus, an occasion that many leaders would have used to build

Bodhisattva

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national pride or patriotism went by quietly, without major fanfare, and the troops and volunteers returned home without celebrations. The media reported on the outcome but without the usual hype and emotion that would usually surround such stories. For the people of Bhutan their King was truly a wise and compassionate

As BBS began live radio and television coverage of the fourth King’s addresses to his people during the last years of his reign, his words often moved the people to tears. Both the Kings of Bhutan are shy of the media, in particular of TV. They have never granted an interview to a TV programme, at least not in Bhutan. And, unlike Thailand, the media do not provide daily news on the monarchy unless there is a major event.

The media coverage of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck heightened the aura of the Monarch. When His Majesty was able to reach out live to the nation, the people watched and listened. The images of the King laughing and playing games with the people during the National Day celebrations were viewed with awe.

The transition of Monarchs was also broadcast live on December 17th, 2007, during the celebrations that signalled the start of the centenary celebrations of the monarchy in Bhutan and the countdown to the general election in March, 2008.

of Kings, arrived early to receive the chief guest. People who saw the fourth Druk Gyalpo walk down the path, avoiding the red carpet in reverence to his son, were overcome with emotion. On the arrival of His Majesty the King the two Kings lowered their scarves to each other in traditional greeting. It was a historic moment of transition that strengthened the Bhutanese monarchy and continuity of the institution in the minds of the people.

King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck carries the same aura but, by contrast, the media depict the young Monarch in more relaxed and social situations. The King has introduced a new closeness with the people and is often seen with his arms comfortably around the old and the young, often hugging and kissing little children. The live coverage of the coronation celebrations in 2008 captured this intimacy and, at the same time, conveyed the new informal role of the monarchy in the new democratic system. His Majesty’s charisma has also extended beyond

2007 to celebrate 60 years of the King of Thailand’s reign.

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The new King’s natural oratorical skill and his moving addresses have created powerful TV imagery. One of the most moving moments was His Majesty’s address to the Bhutanese people during the national day of 2008.

Throughout my reign I will never rule you as a King. I will protect you as a parent, care for you as a brother and serve you as a son. I shall give you everything and keep nothing; I shall live such a life as a good human

I shall always serve you, day and night, in the spirit of kindness, justice and equality.

The 2008 televised programmes on the coronation and centenary celebrations was a large-scale media event that attracted 146 foreign journalists, more than the 127

9 The live coverage, held over the four days of celebrations, replaced the normal TV programming and

It was in October 2007 that His Majesty shared his vision and mandate for Bhutan. His Majesty’s address to the graduates that year was broadcast live on TV. His Majesty’s mandate – Peace, Security, and Prosperity for Bhutan, achieving the goals of Gross National Happiness, and building a vibrant democracy – rang out clearly in a speech that inspired many of the younger generation.

the images of the new King are best recorded in remote parts of the country where he appears to be completely at home.

His Majesty spent several weeks travelling the country in 2008, and again in 2009 when he visited Eastern Bhutan. In a candid moment in Kurtoe district His Majesty requested a woman whose family was associated with the local belief in poison-givers to serve him a drink.10 This one moment, made public by the media, helped

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to eradicate the stigma associated with such families in the East and was a powerful reminder of how monarchy can be a positive force to break down negative views and beliefs.

The media continue to provide coverage of His Majesty’s treks in the wilderness, showing him going into homes and engaging with people of all ages. His Majesty’s coronation coverage showed him truly a King of the people at ease with his people. The three days of live coverage showed His Majesty’s fondness for socialising and his stamina in meeting every single person who lined the roads and footpaths to greet their Monarch. His Majesty showed a particular regard for the elderly and had a kind word for every person who came to offer him the ceremonial white scarf.

His Majesty has also reinforced his role as the provider of care and welfare. There

Majesty’s sisters, whose responsibilities are to study the needs of the people in the areas. This is an attempt to take welfare to the people; in keeping with the privacy accorded to the royal family the media has done little reporting on the progress of

Monarchy and National IdentityThe monarchy in Bhutan, described as the symbol of national unity, plays a strong

coverage emphasises his place among the people and his concern for their well-being (kidu).

The bureaucracy, the executive, judiciary, and legislature and indeed all other institutions are being critically watched and questioned, but when it comes to the monarchy the Bhutanese media, by and large, remain loyal subjects. Most Bhutanese today are royalists at heart. The population does not see a contradiction between loyalty to the monarchy and being a citizen in a constitutional democracy. The manner in which the Bhutanese media portray both the monarchy and democracy is understood to be critical for the success of Bhutanese democracy. Here there is much that Bhutan can learn from its neighbours, notably Thailand and Nepal.

The media must be objective and not just jump into a confrontational role. In an emerging democracy media also have the vital responsibility of educating people

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about democratic governance and about their own roles as citizens. They need to be conscious of the central role of the King and the credibility of the institution of the monarchy. As in many other countries recent events covered by TV in Bhutan have reinforced the role of Bhutan’s monarchy as the symbol of national identity. Bhutan’s strong traditional culture will probably not permit the media to intrude into the personal daily life of the Monarch in the immediate future. The world has learnt how this has destroyed not just the mystery of monarchy but also reduces it to mere celebrity status elsewhere.11

At the same time Bhutan’s media have been discreet about the monarchy and the royal family to the point of not providing adequate information. Many people, for example, do not recognise younger members of the royal family including His Majesty’s own siblings. News on the royal family is almost negligible.

Old Culture in a New SocietyWhen discussing the role and trends in the Bhutanese media we need to understand the culture of Bhutanese society and the sentiments of the people – the educated elite as well as the people in rural areas.

there is extreme sensitivity about their printed pictures. People, especially in rural areas, do not throw away a newspaper that had a picture of the King or a senior monk or deity printed in its pages. They would be upset if they found such pages “desecrated”. The practice is to burn these papers and pictures.

Media in 2008 released numerous supplements, publications, and programmes on the royal family, in particular tracing the contributions of the Kings to the development of Bhutan, to mark the centenary of monarchy. Many people across Bhutan suggested that media minimise the use of such pictures, particularly in the advertisements and supplements, as it hurt their sentiments to see others using the paper to wrap books and other things. Younger Bhutanese, however, felt that the media tended to become repetitious by using the same pictures of the royal family over and over (MIS 2008).

Coverage of His Majesty’s tour of Eastern Bhutan after an earthquake in September, 2009, show many touching moments of a King with his people in

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the aftermath of a natural calamity that damaged many homes and facilities. A newspaper editorial noted the important role of the King in Bhutan: “People may question the transition to democracy gifted by the fourth Druk Gyalpo but no Bhutanese will question the monarchy. Unwavering trust and respect will always reside in the monarchy.” 12

The open displays of affection for the King are genuine. This tone of love and respect for His Majesty, while a common sentiment in Bhutan, is so strong when expressed in the media that it could appear to lack credibility to people who are not Bhutanese.13

The values of Gross National Happiness are a legacy of the Bhutanese system. Bhutan’s media have to keep GNH alive at a time when Bhutanese are being bombarded by global images - Bollywood and Hollywood and all the commercials

is beginning to outweigh the information and education. The Media Impact Study 2008 shows that people today tend to go to media for entertainment compared with 2003 when they sought media for news and information.

The media today, particularly the use of the internet and mobile phones, are

is providing a tidal wave of raw information and users of the internet have yet to learn how to process and assess the reliability of such information. Internet forums have also become the most vibrant forums on issues concerning Bhutan. And, as they become more popular, a blog established by the opposition leader is one of the better known in Bhutan’s emerging blogo-sphere.

12 Bhutan Times

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There is an absence of a forum of credible and alternative voices - people tend to shy away from sharing opinions on blogs. On the other hand, many news stories are emerging to be more opinions than objective news, at a time when the audience has yet to learn to differentiate between opinion and news. The challenge today is that, in a generally traditional society where knowledge used to lie with seniors or the educated elite, it is hard for the community to accept strong and unsubstantiated opinion pieces from relatively young and inexperienced writers in the media, particularly when they replace news, which is meant to be objective, fair, and balanced. 14

Bhutanese TV is limited to one national channel compared with the aerial invasion of more than 190 global channels bringing in the world’s commercialism and entertainment to the remotest homes in Bhutan. Children, who had learnt values from their parents and families, are now tuning in to global values on TV without

Society is yet to understand the difference between news, opinion, advertising, and entertainment.

The traditional respect for the written word is still strong among those who have not gone to school. People have not learnt to question the reliability of news and information, and believe that anything in print must be right. “The reporters are all educated so who am I to question what they write?” is a familiar comment from people in farming communities outside the main towns.

The Media Impact Study 2008 also shows that people generally accept stories about the government to be true since “there is no reason for the government to misinform the people”. A political party worker in the valley of Phobjikha says: “This is our government, why should our government lie to us?” (MIS 2008).

There is a growing recognition of the need to scale up media literacy for all levels of

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vital need in a small and rapidly changing society faced with a deluge of information and media. There is an acute lack of Bhutanese content and programming that could give Bhutanese society a real sense of the new political developments and understanding of what citizens can do to be a part of this new democracy. At this juncture, Bhutanese media must do more to encourage questions and debate to ensure that people’s views are heard. Media must also provide more public space for discussion about the democratic constitutional monarchy that everyone is collectively responsible for shaping.

Monarchy Supports MediaThe advent of democracy has spurred the growth of media. In the months preceding the general elections, millions of Ngultrum were poured into the development of media messages, campaigns, and campaign speeches on TV, radio, and newspapers. At one stage, driven by a misguided sense of equity, the authorities ensured equal amounts of funding for all media regardless of their reach or content. The understanding of advertising and media content has grown in the past year and government policy is becoming more professional. Newspapers are becoming more competitive with more newspapers emerging in a free market situation hoping to capture a niche readership.

It is noteworthy that Bhutan’s monarchy has been a prime mover in supporting the independence of media in Bhutan. In 1992 the fourth King of Bhutan issued a decree that gave the national broadcaster (then the BBS radio) and the only newspaper, the weekly Kuensel, editorial independence, although they were funded by the government.

BBS has since become a public service broadcaster that introduced TV in 1999. Kuensel is now 51% government owned, with 49% sold to private shareholders, and has an independent editorial policy free of government control. Government policy supports the free and professional growth of the media and the government provides incentives to support media growth.

The media today have grown to six newspapers (the latest, a weekly newspaper

includes three FM stations and one university radio station), and one TV network (with potentially 190 international channels). All this developed within a span of three years spurred by the advent of democracy. More applicants are waiting to start media services for a population of 679,000 with a 59% literacy rate.

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In 2009 the third sitting of the parliament of the new democratic constitutional monarchy began with the parliament deciding that BBS TV should no longer provide live broadcast of the discussion of bills although all other sessions were

their conduct and the MPs end up pandering to TV rather than focusing on the debates.15 By the end of the parliament session three weeks later, His Majesty, in his closing address to parliament, stated that he would support the professional development of media in Bhutan:

Media - newspapers, television, radio and the Internet - must play a very important role. I appreciate that while some of the media agencies are young and lack adequate resources they have strived to perform their duties with complete commitment. Hereafter, media will be vital in keeping people well informed and in encouraging debate and participation – key to a vibrant democracy (Kuensel 31st July, 2009).

On February 21st, 2010, His Majesty signed a royal decree that launched a Bhutan Media Foundation to “support the growth of a strong, responsible media”. His Majesty’s decree stated:

In our small nation media can be even more effective in encouraging debate and participation, vital to building a vibrant democracy...As it is my sacred duty to ensure the success of our young democracy, I have decided, through the exercise of my Royal Prerogative of Kidu,16 to strengthen media agencies so that they may carry out their duties, without fear or favour, in the interest of democracy (Royal Kasho granted on the 21st of February, 2010).

The Bhutan Media Foundation, endowed with an initial grant of Nu. 15 million from His Majesty, will provide fellowships and grants to support media development.

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To Build a Democratic CultureMedia are young and at a critical juncture where they must discuss and understand the critical role they play in Bhutan’s political future. Today there is an urgent need for media, and Bhutanese society, to be involved in discussions on the responsibilities of the media and the need to build a democratic culture.

The Bhutanese people’s vision of Bhutan continues to place the institution of monarchy at the centre of the system. It symbolises peace and stability for the nation, and the Monarch has the unique role of being the guardian of the Constitution and guardian of Gross National Happiness. As head of state the

the high ideal that must become the strength of Bhutanese politics. The prime minister described the Monarch as the “moral force” of the Bhutanese system.

The Bhutanese media have the responsibility to help build a democratic culture at a time when the country is making the complex transition from an absolute monarchy to a democratic constitutional monarchy. In this new political landscape the media have the responsibility to provide a new way of seeing Bhutan as an “imagined community” (Anderson), and to create a new shared consciousness. In a fundamentally hierarchical society media have to continue to explore ways to be more democratic without losing the tradition of respect that characterise the society. The Media Impact Study 2008, for example, raises this point when focus group discussions show that viewers may like the new broadcast programmes that offer opportunities to question key institutions and persons, but remark that

and their tone of voice.

Bhutanese media are experiencing a contradiction in terms of the inherent traditional respect for elders in society, and the questioning of persons in position

to earn the respect of the people in this new democratic environment. In the case of the monarchy it is without doubt that people continue to uphold tremendous respect for both the institution and the King in person.

Reporters are pushing hard to report on the new political landscape but they are not doing enough to enable Bhutanese to understand this new transitioning society.

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While our media continue to expand they are not able to keep pace with covering the numerous rapid developments taking place in governance, and in society.

Bhutan’s politics have become far more complex than before. The introduction of democracy has brought about a whole new way of thinking that is being played out in the parliament, in the halls of government, among the business community and on the farms. Journalists today need to understand everything from the role of the King to the concept of the state and the government, from the concerns of the villager to the concerns of youth who make up 54% of the population. They need to dig deeper into the foundations of a democratic constitutional monarchy.

Media have to ask more probing questions about the way society is and the way it is changing. Bhutanese today need greater transparency in every aspect of life - we need to understand the new economy, the new society, the new politics and the changing culture. How will all this make a difference to our lives and move us closer to the goal of Gross National Happiness? Media must play the dual role of pointing out what is working well and being a public watchdog at the same time. And this is a challenge in a young democracy.

Bhutan is currently in the midst of building a democratic culture and nothing before this has prepared us for the roles we all play as citizens, as leaders, and as media.

shift, by royal command, from being the subjects of their King to being citizens in a democracy. This is part of the process of creating a democratic culture.

the discourse involving other sections of society. Like the higher ideals that have historically driven journalism, media must be motivated by a sense of wanting to make a positive change.

Bhutanese people call the socio-political system “the Bhutanese system” to emphasise this uniqueness and the media needs to continue to report on the institution of monarchy with sensitivity. The media should go beyond rhetorical political coverage and avoid the sensationalism or trivialisation seen in some countries where the royal family make celebrity news or are icons and souvenirs

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for tourists. The media do not just report on the institution but also strengthen the credibility and create the image of the institution of monarchy. Media should, therefore, be constantly conscious and enhance the awareness of the people of the importance of the royal institution, and a democratic constitutional monarchy.

For a small country that believes its strength lies in the uniqueness of its national identity, the media must play an important role in creating a shared national consciousness that must be translated into shared national values as the foundation on which Bhutan’s democratic constitutional monarchy will grow.

Media and Democracy.

References


Diamond, Larry Jay. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1999. Print.

Diamond, Larry Jay. The Spirit of Democracy: the Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World. New York: Times /Henry Holt and, 2008. Print.

Kovach, Bill, and Tom Rosenstiel. The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect. New York: Crown, 2001. Print.

Challenges.” Nordicom Journal. Print. "Media and Public Culture", Proceedings of the Second International Seminar on

Bhutan Studies. Publication. Centre for Bhutan Studies, 2007. Print. Pek-Dorji, Siok Sian. The Legacy of a King: the Fourth Druk Gyalpo Jigme

Singye Wangchuck. Thimphu: Dept. of Tourism, 2007. Print. Royal Government of Bhutan. Ministry of Information and Communications.

Deparment of Information and Media. Media Impact Study 2008. Thimphu, 2008. Print.

Royal Government of Bhutan. Ministry of Information and Communications. Mediadom, Media Impact Study 2003. By S. S. Pek. Thimphu, 2003. Print.

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Saul, John Ralston. Voltaire’s Bastards: the Dictatorship of Reason in the West. New York: Free, 1992. Print.

Wangchuk, Dorji. “Royal Gesture Dispels Stigma.” Kuensel [Thimphu] 21 Apr. 2009. Print.

Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York: W.W. Norton &, 2003. Print.

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Bhutan’s Democratic Constitutional Monarchy: Revisiting Kingship and Democratic Transition Theories

Sonam Kinga

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IntroductionOn 9th December 2006 King Jigme Singye Wangchuck, the fourth King of Bhutan, abdicated to make way for the enthronement of the Crown Prince and the introduction of parliamentary democracy. He had announced a year earlier that he would abdicate before 2008.1 Against everyone’s expectation that the abdication might happen in 2007, he did so a year earlier at the height of his power, fame, and success, after ruling for 34 years. He was only 51 years old, although the constitution, which was drafted under his command (issued in 2001), requires a King to abdicate only at the age of 65.

His abdication was not triggered by any crisis. It was neither a consequence of military coup, internal uprising, international pressure, nor usurpation by his

to empower the people by introducing parliamentary democracy. It was not uncommon among the people and media to draw a parallel between him and

lifelong concern. He gave up his Kingdom and even his family. The notion of the

transition with a strong moral dimension. By giving away the King’s right to rule, the monarchy’s ‘moral right to reign’ has been reinforced. The institution of monarchy has been strengthened.

When I say that the introduction of democracy has strengthened the institution of monarchy, I do not suggest that the King has retained powers of governance and

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the right to interfere in everyday politics. He had already stepped aside to be the head of state in historic political reforms in 1998 by handing over executive power to a cabinet elected by a legislature, two-third of whose members were directly elected by the people. By this, he has suggested the idea of state and government as separate entities. His abdication and introduction of democracy reinforced that idea of separation. The Constitution tries to draw this distinction by calling the state gyal kham2 and government as zhung. However, many people do not think along the lines of this conceptual distinction. In their understanding, the king has given away his powers to the people. Exercising that power by voting to elect a government was felt to be a responsibility, not so much a right. It was not unusual to hear around election time thus, “His Majesty has given his powers to us. Now it is our responsibility (gen khur) to decide on which button we should press our thumbs.”

The subsequent discourse on democracy came to centre on the idea of it as a ‘gift’ from the King. This is a very powerful discourse in the context of Bhutanese

parlance, he is referred to as drinchen gi pham ("benevolent parent") or kidu gi pham

public pronouncement. In his coronation speech on 1 November 2008 the new

protect you as a parent, care for you as a brother and serve you as a son.” This is suggestive of a national community conceived in the image of a larger family with the King at the centre.

The strengthening of monarchy through the introduction of democracy creates an interesting paradox that posits a challenge to academic discourse which sees the possibility of democratisation only in the context of monarchy receding as constitutional sovereign. Foremost among these proponents is Benedict Anderson who declared; “For in fundamental ways, ‘serious’ monarchy lies transverse to all modern conceptions of political life” (1983: 19). Anderson did not advance the idea that monarchy and democracy were conceptually binary opposites. What he did imply, however, was that they were tenable only with the Monarch as ceremonial sovereign head. According to him, monarchy is antique and sacral, and draws its

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legitimacy from divinity and not from populations (ibid). To survive in the twenty-

In a paper presented at Ryukoku University, Japan,3 he suggests that monarchies are relics of the past. The fact that they have survived thus far is strange. He believes that those strange monarchies that survived did so because they managed to be on the winning side of the world wars or remained neutral, adapted to nationalism in time, accommodated the principles of democratisation and aligned with new social groups especially the middle class people. For monarchies to survive, he argues that they must make the necessary transition to constitutional monarchy just as they did in Europe between 1809 and 1875.

I contend that his arguments are focussed on monarchies that pre-date the twentieth century and draw legitimacy from ‘divine rights’. To argue that monarchy is antique and can survive only by making the transition to constitutional monarchy is to argue against any idea of monarchies forming in a modern age dissociated from divinity and becoming a relevant political organisation. Bhutan’s monarchy problematises this argument precisely because it came into being by discarding an ecclesiocratic institution of succession that depended on multiple reincarnations to rule as sovereigns (Kinga 2009: 158-173).4 It does so because it was formed in the twentieth century and drew legitimacy from a ‘contract’ (see below) signed in

of different regions of the country. Moreover, it has been the source and agency of modern socio-economic development and political reforms for nearly half a century. Whereas European monarchies gave way to nationalism and the formation of modern nation-states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and accepted being mere ceremonial heads, the Bhutanese monarchy became central to the conception and formation of the modern Bhutanese state, and not marginal to it.

We must look at King Jigme Singye Wangchuck’s abdication not in isolation but in conjunction with the constitutional provision that a King must step down at

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the age of 65. The suggestion is that a King would still be healthy and able when he retires. This contrasts with an image of a King who retires or dies in old age from ill health or sickness. What the King’s abdication and constitutional provision suggest is the distinction between a mortal, corporeal body of the King and non-material, continuing body-politic of the King. I draw this from Kantorowicz’s two-

Frazer’s (1972) theory of kingship. He posits that a King or his surrogate must be

perfection. The King is also said to embody all the sins and evils of his subject and, therefore, he carries them away in the traditional ritual of scape-goating. The Hocartian theory (1969) sees kingship as a form of ritual rather than a political organisation. The kingdom is thought of as a realm of prosperity realised by

In the last one hundred years of its existence the Bhutanese monarchy did not

preserve. There are Buddhist rituals, such as sipa chidoe or jana chidoe, in which

made and disposed. They are intended to remove misfortunes and obstacles in life. These rituals require many resources and only wealthy patrons can sponsor them.

performed at regular intervals. The Bhutanese kingship is not founded on any such ritual. In contrast to Frazer’s argument that the King embodies all the sins and evils of his subjects, the Bhutanese King is seen as the fruition or realisation of the collective merit of all the people (saynam chithuen le drup pa). Similarly, the Hocartian conception of kingship as a form of ritual contrasts with the Bhutanese perception of kingship as a political organisation, holder of the diarchic spiritual and temporal polity (choe sid lugnyi kyi tenpa zin mi). For both Frazer and Hocart, kingship is associated with necessary rituals.

The abdication of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck and the constitutional provision suggest that kingship need not be associated with old age and sickness. Whereas Kings retire, kingship can continue. Thus, his abdication and the constitutional

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retirement age for future Kings imply strengthening of the institution of monarchy. Before the corporeal body gives way to old age, sickness, and death, kingship can be continued by a younger, healthier heir. The King’s "body-natural" recedes to give way to a continuing "body-politic". But rather than think of body-politic as a divine continuum that Kantorozowicz draws in relation to medieval European kingship, I think of it as the continuing institution of monarchy in the context of Bhutan. This is not to undermine the importance and agency of individual Kings,

Each reinforces the other. Through his act of abdication, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck has strengthened the institution of monarchy. In other words, by relinquishing the King’s legal right to rule, he has reinforced the monarchy’s moral

the body-politic of the King, not in place of it.

It is within this framework of the King’s body-politic or the monarchy as the site of democracy that the subsequent parliamentary elections took place in Bhutan. Bhutan’s democratic transition thus contests Anderson’s thesis that monarchy must give way to democracy, and that the nation-state is the site of democracy.

Democratic Transition TheoriesHow do we then explain Bhutan’s democratic transition? Can mainstream democratic transition theories that focus on institutions, elites, and formal

Bhutan’s democratic transition process. In order to show why this is so, I wish to

The two mainstream democratic transition theories are the structuralist and elite bargain theories. Drawing from the early modernisation theory, the structuralists argued that societies underwent progressive stages of development or

many pre-conditions before they can become a democracy. Since the publication of Seymour Martin Lipset’s The Social Requisites of Democracy, political scientists and scholars have built on the thesis of economic pre-conditions necessary for a country to democratise. Lipset theorised that the rise in income among citizens as well as the rise in GDP makes society move on the democratic path. Democracy is post-development. Unless constitutional reforms and economic liberalisation are well in place, democracy cannot be established. Although this thesis has been contested ever since Rustow published his article "Transition to Democracy" (1970),

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the idea has not been totally abandoned. Huntington (1984) went on to discuss economic, social, external and cultural preconditions of democratisation. Zakaria (2003: 69) argued that only "a country that attempts a transition to democracy

The primary argument of the structuralists is that economic development creates an alternative centre of power that is able to challenge state power. That is the basis of democratic transition. In discussing this argument, Chadda summarises her position as follows.

In their view, the development of a capitalist economy creates a rival focus of power to the state. This is an essential precondition for the development of individual freedom. Capitalism also creates a condition in which these individuals are able to band together to attain political or economic goals…Democracy emerges as the best method of achieving this goal. (2000: 5)

Not only was the structuralist theory very Euro-centric, its position began to lose ground as poor countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe, which did not meet the ‘pre-conditions’, began to democratise. Thus, a new group of scholars following Rustow sought an alternative explanation to democratisation that came to be known as the elite settlement or elite bargain theory (Linz 1997, Diamond 1990). Rather than socio-economic and cultural preconditions, these scholars emphasised elite bargains and negotiations as causes of democratisation. Whereas the structuralists see the struggle between established authorities and emergent centres of powers generated by way of capitalism as the cause of democratisation, the elite theorists see bargain or negotiation among existing centres of powers as the cause of democratisation. The elite theorists contend that the elite in any society are never homogenous. There are different groups of elites. Instead of grabbing all power for themselves, these elites enter a process of negotiation to make compromises on differences and bargain to share power. They agree on open rules of competition for sharing power so that there is no forcible seizure of power (Chadda 2000:6). Burton and Higley (1987) built on the elite settlement theory and concluded that “1) elite settlements are relatively autonomous elite choices and thus cannot be predicted or explained in terms of social, economic and cultural forces;

primary basis for subsequent political stability; which 3) is a necessary condition for the emergence and sustained practice of representative democratic politics” (1987: 304).

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Neither the structuralist nor the elite settlement theories can fully explain Bhutan’s democratic transition. The structuralist’s arguments do not hold for Bhutan as they did not for the poor countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe that democratised during the ‘third wave’5. When Bhutan embarked on the path of

identify. Firstly, Bhutan is still a least developed country. Its economy is largely rural with 68% of the people engaged in subsistence farming. Although hydro-electricity generation and tourism constitute the major economic activities in terms of their contribution to GDP, Bhutan is far from being an industrial society. The

the structuralists they set. Nearly 30% of the people live below the poverty line. Most of the poor live in rural areas.

Second, democracy was introduced in a social setting characterised by cultural diversity. With over eighteen different ethno-linguistic groups constituting the small Bhutanese population of only 634,000 people, there is neither the cultural homogeneity nor the sort of linguistic uniformity that is deemed indispensable for transparency in democratic dialogue and communications (Abizadeh 2002).

Third, the introduction of democracy was not a consequence of any elite bargain or settlement process. Most of the traditional elites were part of the state. They consisted of ministers and senior bureaucrats. But there were no other elite groups

government consists of the prime minister and ten ministers. The prime minister and four ministers were ministers in the previous government. Two former ministers formed the opposition party although both of them resigned after losing the elections. Two of the six new ministers of the present government were senior bureaucrats. One was a major in the army. The Speaker of the National Assembly was also a senior bureaucrat and a diplomat. Thus, many political actors in the new political system were part of the previous government. The leadership largely consists of former ministers and senior bureaucrats. It has been said that they are like ‘old wine in a new bottle’. But there are also new political entrants. Thus there has been no abrupt and total change in leadership. This provides enough space for continuity and change. Hence, the democratic process in Bhutan was not triggered by negotiations and compromises among different groups of existing elites to iron out their differences.

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Larry Diamond is a leading elite bargain theorist. In his latest work, The Spirit of Democracy (2008), he moves beyond discussion on the role of elites to look at various factors that trigger democratic transition. I wish to summarise his arguments to show how they cannot explain Bhutan’s democratic transition.

The Internal Factors1. Loss of LegitimacyOne of the most important internal factors that trigger the democratisation process is the regime’s loss of domestic legitimacy. The loss occurs when the regime fails to deliver economic development or political performances: “A crucial

self-proclaimed missions and become redundant - or when they completely fail to do so and clearly cannot deliver.” (Diamond 2008: 91) In his review of recent theory and research on democratisation process, Shin (1994) makes the same point. “The most prominent domestic factor is the steady decline in the legitimacy of authoritarian rule…Unable to meet new demands for political freedom and participation, these regimes could no longer justify their existence.” (Shin 1994: 152) The perception that the regime has lost legitimacy need not be that of the people of a particular country. It could be shared by powerful states and global public opinion.

2. Authoritarian DevelopmentJust as the failure of authoritarian regimes to deliver, Diamond argues that the successes of these regimes also trigger democratic transitions. This is to say that as long as the regime is authoritarian, democratisation is inevitable irrespective of the regime’s success or failure. Successes in delivering economic development, and therefore, raising income, education levels, access to information and particularly the growth of a middle class push democratisation forward. It is the middle-class intellectuals who become the agency for democratisation. But how?

3. Free ValuesEconomic development "alters a country’s social and economic structure, widely dispersing power and resources…it profoundly shifts attitudes and values in democratic direction" (Diamond 2008: 98). Structurally, the middle class enlarges.

patrons and sources of authority. Income disparities lessen which reduces ‘social distance, and political polarisation, between classes.’ The threat of excessive

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taxation to an otherwise wealthy few is diminished. As more people earn greater income and become politically more aware through education and access to information, they become more inclined to participate in the political process. Their democratic values change. These values include self-expression, tolerance, suspicion of authority, and valuing of freedom. As a result they come to demand institutions that protect their rights and freedom.

4. The Rise of Civil SocietyThe growth of middle class also translates to the formation of organisations and associations or the acquisition of membership to them. These organisations grow in numbers, resources, and sophistication enabling them to check and challenge the state. This alters the balance of power from state to society. For civil society to effect democratic transition, they must be able to mobilise themselves in order to unite different political parties and disparate social classes into a movement. Again Shin states: “The strengthening of civil society is the second domestic factor

and eroded the capacity of authoritarian rulers to dominate and control their societies” (1994).

The External Factors1. Peaceful PressureBy external factors, Diamond refers to peaceful external pressure on an authoritarian regime applied by way of diplomacy, economic assistance and sanctions. These pressures overlap or converge. The effectiveness of diplomatic persuasions to democratise depends on the regime’s willingness to initiate political reforms in exchange for economic aids. Aid is made conditional to political reforms. Where it does not work, economic sanctions are imposed. Diamond is cognizant that these factors have their limits and do not necessarily generate success all the time.

2. Democracy Assistance

assistance to strengthen democratic institutions, civil society, monitoring of elections, reforming governance, etc. Elections are the most important entry point for democratic assistance.

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[E]lections became the natural focal point for democracy assistance,

society groups to educate and mobilise voters and monitor the vote; and to international election observation teams to help scrutinize the conduct of elections and detect and deter fraud. No form of international aid has had a more dramatic and immediate effect, nor wider and more legitimate participation. (Diamond 2008: 122-123)

Diamond maintains that democracy assistance has not been limited to elections alone, but has been expanded to support elected parliament, local governments, judiciary, etc. But the main form of democracy assistance was largely during and after elections.

Making similar arguments, Shin again states that "democratic pressures from other countries and assistance from international organisations have weakened the physical basis of authoritarian rule by cutting off economic and military aid. The pressures have weakened its moral basis by encouraging people to realise that ‘democratisation is the necessary ticket for membership in the club of advanced nations" (1994).

3. Democratisation by Force

regime. The consequence is not always a democratised polity since a government formed through external force and coercion faces challenge of legitimacy both by the people at home and the international community.

The Regional FactorsFinally, Diamond attributes membership to regional organisations as a means to democratic transition. Citing the European Union, and the Organisation of American State and the Organisation of African Unity, he argues how the condition

countries. An important criterion for admission as members in such organisations is for the candidate country to initiate democratic reforms, institute democratic practices, respect fundamental rights of its people, and human rights. As part of accession to these bodies, the countries have to prove that they are democratic.

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The Bhutanese ExceptionTo support his arguments, Diamond draws most of his examples from Europe, Latin America and Africa. When they are tested against the recent democratic transition in Bhutan, they do not hold up.

The democratic transition in Bhutan was not triggered by any crisis of legitimacy. Rather than suffer any decline in legitimacy, the Bhutanese monarchy has been very successful in delivering socio-economic development as well as initiating political reforms especially in the last three-and-a-half decades. Political reforms that expanded decentralisation and popular participation in decision-making process particularly in village societies have been the hallmark of the fourth King’s reign. This period has been characterised by high increases in literacy rates, enhanced access to basic social services, modernisation of transport and communications, development of trade and industry, promotion of public education and mass media, and improvement in living conditions.

Second, in contrast to Diamond’s argument that the middle class push forward the democratisation process, Bhutan’s small middle class largely consisting of civil servants, corporate employees, and the business community have not been the agency of dissent and democratisation.

Third, there has not been a growth of civil society to pose a challenge to state power. This does not suggest the absence of civil society organisations. In contrast to western notions of civil society as organisations and associations that stand in opposition to the state, traditional civil society organisations in Bhutan existed as voluntary organisations to support community life and activities (Dorji and Choden 2005).

Fourth, the Bhutanese government was never under any international pressure to democratise its political system. As I indicated above, Bhutan has already been undergoing a steady process of decentralisation and democratisation for over three decades. Only when the King issued his command to begin the drafting of the constitution did some international agencies offer help in drafting it. That was, however, politely regretted. As a least developed country, Bhutan’s development partners provide important sources of investment capital and resources. The domestic revenues are only enough to meet recurrent expenditures. Development

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any socio-economic and political change within Bhutan. Instead, all of them

comparatively achieve far better results.

Fifth, there were offers of ‘democracy assistance’ after the elections. Before and during the elections, the King commanded that all expenses for elections must be met from internal resources. This was an important command to ensure that the democratisation process, particularly the elections, remained free of external pressure.6

Finally, Bhutan is a founding member of a regional organisation called the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The SAARC charter does not require its members to be democracies. Its primary objective is to promote regional social, economic, and technical co-operations. Although it does mention adherence to the UN charter, SAARC has never demanded that its members democratise their political systems.

For these reasons, it is problematic to locate Bhutan’s democratic transition in prevailing democratic theories. This is not to argue for a Bhutanese variant of Asian-style democracy. Those who have considered the possibility of such a

of South East Asian leaders like Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mahathir Mohammed of Malaysia. This view centres on the Confucian communitarian values such as respect for authority and placing priority of society over individuals. Because Asian society and culture is different from that of the west, they argued that western ideas of individual rights and democracy are not conducive for Asia. These views have been contested. Hood (1998: 854) thinks that these regimes are actually those which have failed to complete the transition to democracy. Lee (2002) argues that if there is an alternative Asian model of democratisation, it is the demonstrations and political protests that brought about democratisation in countries such as the Philippines in 1986, South Korea in 1987, Indonesia in 1998, Mongolia between 1989-1990, Nepal in 1990, and Thailand between 1991-1992. Lee draws a few common characteristics of these protests. First, they were sparked off by students. Second, the middle class became the backbone of the

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movement. Third, a pro-democracy organisation orchestrated the demonstrations and protests. And fourth, these demonstrations never stopped until their demands were met (2002: 833-835).

population of Chinese ethnicity or descent. But this is not true of Bhutan. In the early 1990’s, there were instances of demonstrations in southern parts of the country. But they were largely attributed to immigrants from Nepal, who had illegally settled in the country.7

illegal immigrants and required them to leave. The state’s attempt to enforce its citizenship and immigration laws were, however, contested as moves to enforce certain cultural ideas and practices. The complexity surrounding this issue is not the concern of this paper. However, to establish any causal link between these sporadic demonstrations and the King’s democratisation efforts is problematic. Foremost among them is the risk of being ahistorical. This would isolate the events of 1990s from all the other political reforms in the previous decades. Obviously, this is not tenable. In contrast to Lee’s arguments, these demonstrations were neither launched by students nor supported by the middle class or any pro-democracy organisation.

It would be, however, incorrect to think that political reforms in Bhutan which culminated in the introduction of democracy took place in isolation of regional and global events and processes. I suggest that developments within Bhutan took place at a time of profound changes in the world. When King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, the third King began a process of political and socio-economic development and modernisation of the country in 1953 and 1960-61, many Afro-Asian nations were undergoing a period of decolonisation from imperial rule. The rulers in these nations were confronted with the task of fashioning a state and the only immediate model available to them was the European nation-state: "After all, that was the only

Bhutan was never a colony of any European power and I do not suggest that the modernisation of the Kingdom took after a European model. Developments in the region were more visible. For example, India and Pakistan won independence in 1947. The Republic of China was proclaimed in 1949. The Rana regime came to an end in Nepal in 1951. And in 1959, Tibet was occupied by China. There is

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no doubt that the Bhutanese leadership was aware of these changes. But no causal link can be established between these changes and the King’s initiative for socio-economic and political reforms.

When King Jigme Singye Wangchuck ascended the throne in 1972, Bhutan had just become a member of the United Nations. His formal enthronement in 1974 also coincided with what Huntington calls the beginning of third wave of democratisation. One of his major political reforms was the establishment of local development committees known as Dzongkhag Yargay Tshogdu between 1976 and 1981. He took this further down to village communities with the establishment of Gewog Yargay Tshogchung in 1991. In India, a constitutional amendment in 1993 gave rise to the creation and growth of local governments or panchayats. In Nepal, local governments were also established in 1994 after the Jan Andolan movement gave birth to a written constitution and constitutional monarch. But I do not imply any causal link between developments in different countries. My suggestion is that the process of democratising local communities by establishing local governments was characteristic of South Asia in early 1990s.

developments both in the region and the world. Although there is no evidence of these developments affecting Bhutan, there is no doubt that the King was fully aware of events unfolding all around. The transition to democracy preceded by three decades of decentralisation and political reforms took place within such a regional and global context.

Trigger of Bhutan’s TransitionThus far, I have shown how conventional democratic transition theories do not explain Bhutan’s recent transition to parliamentary democracy. In my opinion the real trigger for Bhutan’s transition was a critical decision of leadership. I argue that this was a mark of "innovative leadership", as Juan J. Linz (1987) calls it. To deny leadership the agency of transition is to argue that democratic transition is dependent only on certain institutional or structural factors. It completely discounts the personality of leaders and decisions they take. Bernecker (1998), for example, demonstrates how the leadership of King Juan Carlos was crucial to introducing democracy in post-Franco Spain. Juan Linz has made a case for leadership as agency of change:

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No sociological, structural, or even political model is adequate to explain such a process without reference to particular political actors making decisions day by day, facing unexpected and disturbing crises which could have derailed the process, even if there had been a clearly conceived and premeditated political plan. In such a context, the question of leadership is central. (Quoted in Bernecker 1998: 65)

Linz refers to the leadership factor in crucial moments and crises. The decision of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck to abdicate and introduce democracy was, however, made in a time of peace. It needs to be mentioned here that the founding of monarchy in 1907 was also done in a time of peace. Critical political decisions in times of peace do not constrain or restrict decision-makers from the exigencies of crises. Decisions are more visionary.

King Jigme Singye Wangchuck had said that Bhutan’s political system must change with the times. The principal argument he made then was that Bhutan needs a dynamic political system to adapt to a changing society that aspires for new means and institutions of expressions. In Bhutan’s case, however, the needs of a changing society were foreseen by the King. According to him the inherent weakness of monarchy was its dependence on one person. The intentions of Kings may be good, he said, but they could change. The need, therefore, is for institutions and a political system that rests on the wisdom of all people rather than one person.8 That political system was to be parliamentary democracy established under a written constitution. In his view, democracy was a viable political institution that

elsewhere, it was not due to its inherent weakness but due to abuses of democracy by those in power. What we can glean from these arguments is the positioning of monarchy as an institution of stability and continuity amidst uncertainties and vicissitudes of politics and politicians in a democratic polity.

Abdication then was in a way what Giuseppe di Palma calls "forward legitimation" in contrast to a process of backward legitimation that would resort to reviving ancient rituals or invoking divine rights. I have argued that Bhutanese monarchy is not seeped in rituals and divinity. This is not to imply any lack of historical basis of monarchy’s legitimacy that compels invention of new ones. The historical basis of legitimacy exists (see below).

Kuensel,

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The fact that democracy was introduced in a time of peace calls for an explanation for the absence of violence, which underlies most democratisation process. In the Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Barrington Moore Jr. (1966) argues

revolutions either led by the bourgeois, traditional landed elite, or peasants which in turn lead to different kinds of regimes (Wiener 301). Violence has also characterised the democratic transition of many South Asian countries. But Bhutan has pre-empted any violence in timing its democratic transition. The stability of the state and absence of the breakdown of law and order did not create any room for military intervention. The military is very loyal to the monarchy. The King is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces that consist of the army, police, and the royal body guards. The only role for the military during this time was to provide security to polling stations around the country. The Maoist elements from Nepal made threats of violence on Election Day. However, no violence disrupted the elections.

Since the King introduced democracy in a time of peace, the question of how the people, who had not demanded it, came to accept and interpret it, posits an interesting area of enquiry. According to the Constitution, the King is above the law and he is not answerable for his actions in a court of law. It is logical that someone who grants the Constitution has to be outside the realm of law. The question that we need to pose is from where does the power and legitimacy to grant the Constitution as a gift and, hence, democracy arise? If not divinity, what is the other source of power?

Every year, on 17 December, the national day celebrations throughout the country

and ‘representatives’ of the people signed a ‘contract’ with the founding Monarch, King Ugyen Wangchuck. The document, which is well-known as the genja, bears the seals of forty eight signatories including the First King Ugyen Wangchuck. A genja commits both parties to uphold the undertaking or responsibilities enshrined in it. The undertaking of King Ugyen Wangchuck was to lay a secure future for the Bhutanese people and country. On their part, the other signatories were to serve him and his heirs as hereditary Monarchs with loyalty and dedication. The signing of the genja signalled the establishment of hereditary monarchy. It is this document that has endowed the monarchy with the legitimacy of its reign. At the

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Wangchuck said echoes this notion of legitimacy: “The highest achievement of one hundred years of monarchy has been the constant nurturing of Democracy.

democracy, whereby my father, the fourth Druk Gyalpo, and I, hereby return to our People the power that had been vested in our kings by our forefathers one hundred years ago (emphasis mine).” There is no doubt that legitimacy is derived from this genja.

Although the genja provides the historical basis of monarchical legitimacy, the Kings of Bhutan did not seclude themselves in its comfort. They also did not concern themselves with the invention of rituals and ceremonies to fabricate a more backward legitimated kingship. Instead, each King became the agent of social, economic, and political reforms, in contrast to former rulers whose primary concern was the support of monastic community to legitimise their rules. Monarchy has never been a conservative institution retarding social change. In fact it became the force of change in a traditional society.

Another important factor legitimising the King’s authority to grant the Constitution

The draft prepared by the drafting committee was circulated to every household in the kingdom. Then the King and the Crown Prince held public consultations with the people of all districts on every article of the draft Constitution. These provided both the moral and legal grounds for legitimacy.

The “Democratic Constitutional Monarchy”The democratisation of the Bhutanese state has created what the constitution

represents the continuity of the Bhutanese state. The Constitution states that the King is the "head of State and the symbol of unity of the Kingdom and of the people of Bhutan". Since the job of the head of state as opposed to head of government cannot be open to political competition, it ensures continuity of the state. Moreover, no politician can ever claim to represent the totality of the Kingdom or the whole of its people. The King is the only person and monarchy the institution that represents the entire people. Although Bhutan’s population is small, its ethno-linguistic composition is heterogeneous. Besides, new social groups are emerging. The King is the symbol of unity of these heterogeneous social and ethno-linguistic groups. His job is non-partisan, unlike that of an elected leader.

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How could this function of being the symbol of unity be actualised by a constitutional Monarch in everyday life of the nation? It encompasses a paradox which lies in the necessity for political distanciation and social engagement. By political distanciation, I mean the necessity to be above and beyond politics. Neutrality in politics ensures that the symbol of unity is upheld. While upholding

constitutionality since he is the guardian of the Constitution. Political engagement, on the other hand, is partisan. It divides rather than unites. Yet political distanciation and neutrality should not result in the monarchy being aloof and removed from the society in which it is located. It has to be politically neutral to function as a unifying force. By political neutrality, I strictly think of a non-partisan role in the kingdom’s political life. A non-partisan political agency for the monarchy, however, is an argument for the need for the King to act when the interests of the kingdom and the people are at stake.

Similarly the monarchy needs to be socially engaged. The engagement of Bhutan’s

on such activities of the British royal family, Vernon Bogdanor writes: “The philanthropic and charitable work undertaken by the royal family ‘may lack mystery, but…serves the country by propping up civil society, that commonwealth of citizenship outside the state’, and also ‘pinpoints social needs otherwise ignored by government and offers a voice to minorities and other deprived groups which are little represented politically” (1995: 308). The foundations and institutions that the Queen Mothers of Bhutan have established9

social roles by targeting the poor, youth, women and children. Rather than create an aura of mystery by distanciation, their philanthropic and voluntary activities have made them reachable, relevant and sensitive to the needs of more vulnerable sections of Bhutanese society.

One of the most important prerogatives of the King enshrined in the Constitution is to grant welfare or kidu. This includes citizenship, land, and other kidu. In order

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10 has been revamped

who need welfare the most would not be able to travel to the capital to seek it. Therefore, they must be sought out and given kidu. Democratic politics has begun to usher in new notions of contestation for resource allocation and entitlements. The institution of kidu system will ensure that imbalances in resource allocation that will necessarily arise is offset and the needs of vulnerable sections of society are addressed.

Among different kinds of kiduhas been land and relief-support for victims of natural disasters particularly those of the earthquake that hit eastern Bhutan in September, October, and December 2009. Land kidu has been especially relevant in the context of implicit threats of taking over the ‘excess land’ of rural people. As the modern state deployed different technologies of land surveys over different periods of time, rural people were found to own lands in excess of what was recorded in their land record registers. The state required people to pay for the excess lands or surrender them to the government. The debate on this issue has dominated the last few sessions of the previous National Assembly. In fear of losing land, some people paid money to the government to retain ownership of these ‘excess lands’. In a historic land reform initiative that the King launched after his coronation, the people were permitted to own all the excess lands. He also commanded that the money paid earlier by some people should now be returned.

I cite these as examples of how the symbolic authority of the King as the source of welfare and re-distributor of resource has been successfully deployed. But I do not suggest that these are the only prerogatives of the King. The Constitution

ConclusionI began this paper by arguing against the universalist idea of monarchy being ancient, sacral and, hence, irrelevant as a means of organising modern political life. I made this argument primarily by suggesting that such an idea assumes all monarchies to be formed in pre-modern age and draws legitimacy from divinity.

10

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They, therefore, obstruct progress and social change. In order to survive, they must make the necessary transition to being a constitutional monarchy of a modern nation-state. On the contrary I have shown that Bhutan’s monarchy was not only founded in the twentieth century drawing legitimacy from a signed ‘contract’, but has been the agency of socio-economic development and political reforms. The introduction of parliamentary democracy has, therefore, not been a mere survival

of social and political change. In other words, monarchy in Bhutan is not founded on any ritual or ceremony. It is not a cosmetic relic of a sacral past but a relevant and contemporary national institution.

I argued that the democratic transition in Bhutan has not been triggered by conventional causes that scholars of democratic transition theories identify. Scholars and students of political science particularly devoted to regime change and transition are interested in models and theories to explain such change and transition. I have illustrated how the Bhutanese case does not hold up to the logic of these models and theories. Instead, I have located the agency of democratic transition in Bhutan’s monarchy and its innovative leadership, which does not concern these theories. From these, I conclude that either the Bhutanese case is

further elaboration.

Sonam Kinga is a member of the National Council of Bhutan.

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191191

Bhutan’s Democratic JourneyRenata Dessallien*

13

Introduction Democracy’s lustre has dimmed in recent years, both in the south and the north.

th century evoked prospects for a democratic golden age. But too often elected governments deviated from the basic precepts of democratic rule, sometimes straying so far that democracy became unrecognisable. Recent books such as Wars, Guns, and Votes describe some of the brazen tactics employed in the name of democracy (Collier 2009). Although democratic transition was supposed to usher in an era of good governance and people’s emancipation, in many societies it delivered something very different:

What many (or most) citizens actually experienced was a mix of distressed governance: abusive police forces, domineering local oligarchies, incompetent and indifferent state bureaucracies, corrupt and inaccessible judiciaries, and venal, ruling elites contemptuous of the rule of law and accountable to no one but themselves. As a result, people – especially in the bottom strata of society, which in many new democracies comprised the majority – were citizens only in name. There were few meaningful channels of participation and voice open to them. There were elections, but they were contests between corrupt, clientelistic parties that served popular interests only in name. There were parliaments and local governments, but they did not represent or respond to broad constituencies. There was a constitution, but not constitutionalism – a commitment to the principles and restraints in that hallowed charter. There was democracy

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in a formal sense, but people were still not politically free…there is good reason to question whether such a shallow rendition of democracy can legitimately be termed anything more than a competitive authoritarian regime. (Diamond, 2008)

Democracy is clearly a complex, vulnerable and fragile system, susceptible to deformation. While undoubtedly the least worst form of governance, democracy

It must be steered by decision-makers who must place national interests above individual and group pursuits. And it must be carefully scrutinised by a society that actively engages with the system to keep it true to purpose. Otherwise, democracy tends to veer off course and malfunction. It becomes a front for other forms of governance; it becomes a Trojan horse. Bhutan started its democratic journey with several important advantages that most other developing country democracies lacked: peace and stability, good governance, great leadership, and a carefully crafted constitution. The fourth King had groomed the country carefully for the transition, starting several decades before the historic 2008 elections with the early decentralisation decisions of 1981 and 19911 and other measures. This gave the country time to prepare itself, to study the experiences of other nations, to design a system tailored to its own context, and to make the transition on its own terms.

Yet despite these favourable conditions and careful preparations, the transition to

The introduction of political parties in 2007 was a major change and has not come without stress and strain. Anxieties over how the new systems function are running high. While much of this can be attributed to growing pains, the Bhutanese must be careful because democratic growing pains have a habit of becoming chronic pains. Decisions taken now, during democracy’s formative stages, will determine the path dependency of the system for decades to come. Bhutan is therefore at an important conjuncture in its history. It has a unique opportunity to steer clear of the most costly mistakes made by other young

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Bhutan’s Democratic Journey

democracies that could save years of struggle, frustration and lost progress. It can establish, right from the start, a well-functioning, high-quality democracy that reaps good harvests for the Bhutanese people, maintaining the country’s peaceful and stable development path. Indeed, as a small nation in a sensitive geopolitical zone, Bhutan may not have the same space to repeat the mistakes of others.

well during their tenure for citizens’ current wellbeing and to establish healthy and constructive political conventions and standards that will shape the nation’s future political process.

This paper draws on previous work by the author to understand the causal

in the developing world. Areas such as the incentives structures and behaviour

architecture, and the impact of high levels of corruption on democratic polities and politics have emerged as areas of particular concern. This paper applies some

of a strong national vision and development strategy, grounded in country

importance of democratic framework conditions, both from the perspective of the Constitution and constitutionality, as well as from the perspective of democratic culture. It highlights the need to overcome public scepticism toward democracy, to establish healthy inter-party relations, and to encourage citizens and civil society to proactively engage with the democratic process. The paper concludes with that

the King in encouraging Bhutan’s democratic process to settle into an enduring positive trajectory. The Importance of Democratic “Ends”In a country that quietly took the wide-spread notion of economic growth as the principle object of human progress and turned it on its head,2 any discussion of democracy must be preceded by clearing the air with respect to means and ends.

simple turn of phrase has had a profound impact not only on Bhutan and its development paradigm,

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As Lyonchhen Jigmi Thinley has repeatedly emphasised, it is when we confuse means with ends that we end up pursuing the wrong goal. Should we think of democracy as a “means”, an “end”, or both? To answer this question, it may be helpful to break down democratic governance into component parts. What is known as procedural democracy – the casting of votes by citizens to elect leadership, the practice of public consultation, debate and deliberation, the function of representation, etc. – may be considered means toward certain desired governance outcomes or ends. In its procedural aspects, therefore, democracy may be viewed as a set of means to attain higher level aims. This aspect of democracy, especially elections, currently receives most of our attention. But is that all there is to democracy? What is it about democracy that inspires

to the point that many are willing to place themselves at great personal risk for its achievement? Why does democracy evoke such aspirational yearnings? What causes people to place such faith in democracy? Certainly it is not democracy’s procedural elements alone. Above and beyond its systems and processes, democracy seems to correspond to some intrinsic values that resonate deeply in the human spirit.

need for freedom from subjugation, the need to participate in decisions that effect oneself, one’s family and community, the need to be treated fairly and equally by the state. Viewed from this perspective, democracy may also be considered an “end” in itself. And there are some who contend that democracy, at least some parts of it, is at the same time both a means and an ends. People’s participation, for example, is concurrently a means and an end in itself, argues Amartya Sen (Sen 1999). We know quite a lot about democratic procedures or “means”, and indeed spend inordinate time and energy on some of them. We also know a lot about democratic “ends” – philosophers have thought deeply about human freedoms and the equality of man for centuries. But somehow the practice of democracy too often brushes aside the latter or accords it secondary status. How can systems of democratic practice be adjusted to take greater heed of the intrinsic “ends” that they are supposed to achieve? How can democratic “ends” be repositioned to their rightful place at the top of our hierarchy of preoccupations? How can they, rather than “means”, become the primary object of our democratic endeavour?

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Few countries are better placed to do this than Bhutan. Just as Bhutan trailblazed 3 so it can break

new ground for democratic governance, endowing it with deeper meaning. This could contribute immensely to a much-needed general shift in global perspective, creating incentives for better democratic performance. Such a democratic framework would require us to revisit our current crude taxonomy of countries that legitimises any government established through multi-party elections with the label “democratic regime”, no matter if the winning party or coalition is fundamentally authoritarian or even predatory in nature, operating above the law, using coercive and criminal tactics, etc. Does a democracy without the rule of law merit the name? When people are afraid to report crimes to the police for fear of their elected MPs’ retribution, is that democracy? Clearly we

surface of multi-party elections to describe the real forms of governance at work beneath the democratic façade. Only by putting the intrinsic values of democracy at the apex of our conceptual construct, can we hope to realise the deeper purpose of democracy to which we aspire. Bhutan owes it to itself and to the world to develop a deeper approach to democracy – one that inspires a new, normative democratic discourse. The seeds of such an approach are embedded in the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH), and in its index variables of social and institutional trust, freedoms, community vitality,

particularly with respect to policy implications, so that democracy develops depth and meaning for the average Bhutanese. Democracy’s real product is trust – trust in one’s neighbours, in public institutions, and in public representatives (Barber 2008). This dimension of the GNH Index is of paramount importance as it will

create positive incentives for preserving and enhancing trust, public opinion polls on people’s trust in various branches of government and political parties could be considered, as well as their general trust in their neighbours, community organisations, and civil society groups.

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In concluding this section, it may be important to remember that many promoters and practitioners of democracy do not have time for normative enquiry and conceptual niceties. Some believe that democracy’s higher purpose is mere rhetoric; democracy’s real merits lie in its ability to contain the coercive powers of the state and release pent up societal “steam”, enabling multiple, competing claims to work themselves out through a legitimized process. They are less bothered that democratic processes are driven by the narrow strategic calculus of competing political parties, rather than by principles of the public good. This paper argues that while democracy certainly possesses pragmatic merits, it is ultimately not sustainable unless it also delivers on people’s aspirations for better living conditions and social justice, and for this to occur it must be guided by normative principles. It is therefore in the interest of both the demos and the democratic system itself, to focus more on values and principles, on the moral underpinnings of governance, and on what democracies actually deliver to people at large – on democratic “ends”.

their words with their deeds. Western nations are strong in espousing the importance

share of their democracy building support to developing countries into “means”.4 All the more reason for a country like Bhutan to focus on what exactly it wants its democracy to achieve.

Democratic transition and consolidation cannot be understood in isolation from

basic characteristics include: its physical size and geopolitical location; its value systems including spiritual, cultural, and environmental heritages; the evolving system of governance, including the centrality of the monarchy and the emergence of political governance within a traditionally administrative, patriarchal state; the structure of the economy and employment; the population including its size, age pyramid, educational levels, degrees of civic awareness, ethnic composition and

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From these characteristics, Bhutan developed its own vision of development that gradually began orbiting around the concept of GNH. It emphasises balance between individual and collective wellbeing, between man and nature, between the temporal and the spiritual, and between rights and responsibilities. In this vision, for example, forest cover is valued not only for its economic utility, but also for nature’s own intrinsic value. It was within this context that Bhutan’s democratic framework conditions were

in 2004, and signed in July 2008. The Constitution evokes the basic elements of Bhutan’s national character and aspirations, and outlines its democratic system. The articles on spiritual heritage, culture, environment, human rights and responsibilities, and principles of state policy are both aspirational and normative, conveying the desired character of the country. They have direct bearing on the framework conditions for good governance. Vital elements of this national vision are at odds with dominant global currents and therefore vulnerable. As global forces entered the country, particularly since the 1980’s, tensions emerged that impacted the country’s development strategy and, hence, its governance. Today, there is a growing tension between GNH and the country’s susceptibility to (and in some quarters, preference for) individualistic and consumerist lifestyles advertised by free-market economies. There are those who wish to resist the pressures to conform to the global market-based ethos so as to preserve the country’s values and lifestyle, and there are those who want the country to embrace the global models of development. As the latter view is buttressed by international mass media and dominant global thinking, its proponents have an advantage. This tension is evident in Bhutan’s WTO accession process. While the forces behind GNH in Bhutan are strong and gaining international recognition,5 no national development strategy in the world offers a good model for balancing GNH values with the forces that drive 21st century modernity. How the GNH vision unfolds in Bhutan and what direction the country’s

country’s democracy. A more GNH-focused development trajectory, with its

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emphasis on socio-economic equity and concern for all sentient beings, would

market development path would undoubtedly lead to the pursuit of a Western-centric form of democracy. This would leave Bhutan wide open to the deceptions and struggles witnessed by other countries that abandoned their roots to tread this path. It would almost certainly destroy certain natural, indigenous traits within Bhutanese society that could otherwise reinforce meaningful democratisation. A GNH anchored development strategy would not only promote smoother, deeper democratisation by cultivating a conducive environment for civil liberties

procedures. For example, it would help inform whether political parties should be active during local elections and whether this would enhance or undermine community vitality (a variable of the GNH Index). It would also, for example, inform the choice of electoral systems. Bhutan selected the single constituency,

representational link it establishes between the elected and his or her electoral constituency. But FPTP also happens to be the most politically divisive electoral system. Already political party rifts have emerged in Bhutan. This should be of concern because these social cleavages tend to grow and fester in young democracies. And they concurrently detract from the goal of GNH and the consolidation of democracy. Clearly, one of the best strategies for deepening democracy in Bhutan is to further anchor GNH, enabling it to become the state’s social contract and inspiring and guiding the overall development and political processes. In this way, its attributes can infuse the character of Bhutan’s democratic governance. Some work toward this end has been done at the conceptual and policy levels, mainly through the work of the Centre for Bhutan Studies and the establishment of the GNH Commission, but much more is required. The GNH Survey of 2007 ascertained people’s perceptions of their happiness and informed the GNH Index. The GNH Commission is now charged with analysing state policies, plans and programmes

clear methodology for determining what policies are or are not GNH-enhancing. It is compounded by the fact that virtually all international development conceptual

process away from GNH. They lead toward excessive individualism, consumerism,

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often at virtually any cost – and most are socially and environmentally unsustainable. The fact that despite the interesting spatial considerations of the country’s GNH strategy, its central preoccupation is economic growth, illustrates just how hard it is for analysts to break away from global conventional wisdom. The GNH strategy is in fact a growth strategy. Its analysis and conclusions may all be perfectly valid from an economic growth perspective, and it may outline a sound, GNH-enhancing growth path. But then it should be labeled as such; it should not be accorded the overarching title of “GNH strategy”. Such mislabeling is misleading and dangerous for GNH. It underscores how much more work the Commission needs to do in order to develop a real GNH strategy. Building state capacity for GNH strategy and policy analysis is fundamental. But enhancing national capacity for GNH policy and programme analysis is not enough. The social contract is a two-way street. GNH policy-making work needs to be complemented by public understanding of, and engagement with, the GNH concept. Today, most Bhutanese have only a vague notion of GNH, and misunderstandings abound. Some people feel that GNH is a nice idea, but relegate it to the intellectuals. Some people think it is “pie in the sky”. Some fear it may become a means of state control and a threat to individual freedoms. A recent opinion piece in the Kuensel warned that GNH could become an instrument for state authoritarianism ("Dissecting GNH" 2009). These voices need to be heard and discussed. Bhutan’s current transition from administrative to political governance will take time and frictions between the two modus operandi will inevitably emerge in which GNH may become entangled. The more the Bhutanese public engages with the concept, making it their own, the less likely it is to be misused or to smack of paternalism. A bottom-up GNH track is therefore vitally important at this time. Fortunately, the Ministry of Education has begun a process to weave GNH into the school curriculum, which will help to raise general awareness. This needs to be complemented by a proliferation of public GNH discussions and exchanges among different groups, particularly among youth. At a moment in history when the limits of the “invisible hand” have become so painfully apparent and the crisis in global leadership so pervasive, it would be a great pity if Bhutan were to dilute its identity and erode its inherent strengths by

is invisible because it does not exist” (Ura 2009). GNH can help Bhutan remind

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itself of its inherent values and beliefs, the dilution of which have led so many other countries astray. It can help maintain Bhutan’s distinct identity and qualities that are essential for its continued strength as a nation, and which are inherently

Bhutan deepen its democratic experience. Constitutionalism and the Rule of LawIn addition to a strong national vision and strategic abilities to chart the country’s development pathway on its own terms, conducive democratic framework conditions also require robust legislative and institutional provisions of governance. While many of the institutions that underpin Bhutan’s democracy are already in place and have been for some time, the new political process has only recently been introduced and the whole system therefore merits careful monitoring. While there are many dimensions to this, I wish to highlight two areas of competing logic and possible tension. First, there is the balancing act between the need to test and adjust the new systems, and the need to infuse the Constitution and its supporting structures with trumping powers. Second, there is the need to keep a close eye on possible gaps between the provisions of the law, the spirit of the law, and the application of the law. Behind both these areas lies the paramount issue of the rule of law. Democracy without the rule of law is toothless. Had more attention been placed on building the institutions and conventions for upholding the rule of law in developing countries, alongside efforts to develop democratic procedures such as elections, the quality of these democracies would certainly have been better. The

At the heart of establishing the rule of law lies the process of developing the Constitution’s trumping powers. In Bhutan, the Constitution is young and as the nation tests its provisions, it is inevitable that areas will emerge where some

the Constitution at this early phase of its existence could undermine its ability to consolidate trumping powers. Furthermore, differentiating between the genuine

The challenge of knowing when and how much to amend the Constitution will confront the country in the not-too-distant future and clear principles and

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parameters will need to be set for this, with political and public consultation and endorsement forming an important element to ensure broad support. Consideration of India’s “basic structure” doctrine may be helpful in this regard (Noorani 2001). For the time being, however, it would be unwise to touch the Constitution, both in order to enable its gravitas to settle and because constitutional change under an overwhelmingly majoritarian National Assembly is potentially dangerous. When a constitution lacks trumping powers, those in power can easily circumvent the rule of law, and serious gaps can form between the law, its spirit, and its application. In some instances disrespect for the law is so rampant that all pretence is

law is deemed necessary for public consumption, but the law is routinely breached surreptitiously. The rule of law can only be established through institutions. In countries that began their democratic adventure with weak public institutions, building their capacities has been a focus of international assistance for many decades. But experience shows that such endeavours can take an exceedingly long time to reap meaningful results, and beyond a certain critical point where political

impossible. Countries that managed to develop reasonably strong institutions before the introduction of democracy, like Bhutan, are clearly at an advantage. But they are not risk-free. When political forces are driven by mal-intent, they can

To be on the safe side, Bhutan should anticipate that at some point its political forces may try to alter the country’s legal or institutional framework with ignoble purpose. A common method employed in other countries is to gradually politicise the organs of the state – the civil service, the judiciary, the police, the armed forces, etc. Excessive politicisation leads to progressive de-professionalisation and de-capacitation of institutions, making it easier to divert them from their fundamental purpose of public service. The main conduit for this is through the politicisation of appointments, promotions, and transfers. Bhutan would do well to ensure that it is well guarded against this risk. Appointments to key positions, such as constitutional bodies and independent institutions, should be carefully monitored for their political neutrality, their professional calibre, and their integrity. The appointment commissions prescribed in the Constitution were designed to do this; however, similarly designed commissions in other countries have not been able to hold up under political pressures. Bhutan should heed their experiences.

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Civil society watchdog groups could assist by keeping a close eye on these critical processes and advocating for the substance and spirit of the Constitution to be upheld – as long as these groups themselves are politically neutral and professionally

prerequisites for vitally important positions, such as judges, is advisable. Strengthening Democratic CultureDemocracy works best when it is supported by a democratic culture. This is a broad subject and can be interpreted in different ways. I wish to highlight three important elements for Bhutan – the interface between citizens and their government, the role of civil society, and the relationship between political parties. Interface between Citizens and Their GovernmentTime and again we see the spectacle of elected leaders invoking “the people” when, in fact, “the people” are the furthest thing from their mind. Apart from

governments that are supposed to be of them, by them, and for them? The practice of public consultation, public deliberation, public polling, public hearings, etc., are present in most democracies in one form or another. But it is possible to have all these in place and still have almost no responsiveness by the elected to the

government develop depth and meaning in Bhutan? One of the biggest constraints to building democratic culture in Bhutan is the dearth of people who truly believe that democracy is the best system of governance for them. People’s scepticism and apprehensions are understandable, given the exceptional quality of governance under Bhutan’s recent Monarchs to which they became accustomed. But they will need to embrace the new system wholeheartedly in order for it to function well. A major effort is thus needed to help the Bhutanese public appreciate the merits of democracy and to shape it to their aspirations – and the best people to do this are the politicians. Rhetoric alone, however, will

the merits of the new system. This will require not only delivering on electoral promises, but also ensuring that the democratic process is collegial, peaceful, inclusive, responsive, effective, transparent, and accountable. Practising intra-party democracy (e.g. regular and transparent elections at all tiers of the party apparatus) would also help convince the public that politicians practice what they preach. If

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successful democracy depends on people’s belief in it, then elected leaders should feel a vested interest in building people’s faith in the system. If they act accordingly with sincerity, people’s scepticism in democracy can be transformed from an obstacle into an active agent for deepening democracy. In the quest for healthy interface between the electors and the elected, Bhutan has an advantage that many other young democracies lack – its size. Despite the country’s rugged terrain, its small population makes direct democracy a feasible proposition. While some quarters may wish to delay this practice in Bhutan until the general public becomes more politically aware, this may be a mistake. What better way to help expand the public’s political awareness than by starting the practice of organised consultations with them, including referenda when necessary,

democracy. Importance of Civil SocietyCivil society organisations (CSOs) have a vital role to play in building people’s understanding of democracy, facilitating the exchange of ideas to enrich the public decision-making process, and keeping government in check. In Bhutan, a wealth of local and indigenous civil society groups exists to manage collective concerns – water sharing, community infrastructure, social assistance, etc. At the national level, CSOs are emerging very gradually around social, developmental or environmental concerns. Apart from the media, the Centre for Bhutan Studies, and the Bhutan Centre for Media and Democracy, there are no CSOs that engage directly on issues of democratic governance. This is partly because the topic is so new; perhaps partly because the CSO Authority is still being set up and people may not be clear about registration issues; and partly because the law stipulates that CSOs should remain politically neutral and there may be some confusion between this and the expression of personal opinions on the political process. For Bhutan’s democratic culture to develop, it would be important to encourage the development of CSOs that question and challenge decisions and directions taken by the government, as well as to monitor the overall workings of the democratic process. Media has a vital role to play here, as do think tanks and democracy watchdog organisations. This web of institutions is what John Keane refers to in his concept of “monitoring democracy” (Keane 2009). How to promote this type of CSO in a young democracy, while ensuring that it is not captured by political

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parties, will be a challenge. Keeping the ownership of CSOs out of the hands of

The independent media constitutes a special category of CSO. In some countries, where the main opposition party is unable or unwilling to play its role, the media actually ends up performing an opposition function – holding government to account. The independent media in Bhutan has started to do this. But to enhance its effectiveness it needs both greater access to public information and high

Act, similar India’s, where it has proven to be catalytic. The second could start with a media-generated code of conduct for reporting. Government should resist the urge to regulate the reporting standards of the media as this will be perceived as infringement on their freedom. Instead, media should be encouraged to self-regulate. Finally, one of the greatest modern threats to independent and quality media reporting is from the commercial pursuits and considerations of media owners. Unless and until the media of Bhutan can work out innovative funding mechanisms that allow it independence not only from government but also from big business and the business bottom-line, it will lose its ability to serve the pubic interest. This would have a very negative impact on the process of democratic consolidation. Several thoughtful papers on this topic have been discussed at GNH Conferences (Dorji 2007). Given Bhutan’s context, government assistance in setting up such funding is required. As it is this same media that often lashes out

mechanisms for independent public media is a good indicator of its commitment to that vital but messy democratic ingredient – freedom of speech. The Relationship between Political Parties

these relationships and the FPTP electoral system tends to produce two major political parties with high degrees of competitiveness. In some developing countries, this electoral system has degenerated into a “winner takes all”, zero-sum game that has made it almost impossible to develop any meaningful form of political dialogue between the opposing parties. In worst case scenarios, this has dragged the political process down into the realms of hatred and violence. This

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phenomenon is exacerbated in situations of landslide electoral victories, such as in Bhutan. Developing a democratic culture of constructive inter-party dialogue and

party relations. An interesting proposal to this effect – the Majority Judgement system – was made at the Asian Conference on Deepening Democracy, held in Paro in 2009 (Balinski 2009). In the meantime, if Bhutan’s majority and opposition parties do not consciously guard themselves against the risk of confrontational politics, their relationship will almost inevitably slide into acrimonious and

the majority party’s massive advantage in the National Assembly, it is behoven on it to be generous toward, and accommodating of, the opposition. Each big-hearted effort to constructively engage with the opposition will be another step toward consolidating a democratic culture. An instrument the government may wish to explore in this context is the use of political party codes of conduct. Such a code exists for election periods and there is a general code of conduct within the National Assembly Act.6 However, it may

of the opposition party. For example, the Speaker may be required to entertain motions of a certain gravitas submitted to him by the opposition for plenary discussion, or the PM’s question periods may be required to grant preference to the opposition’s queries, or a certain proportion of the chairs of National Assembly sub-committees may be reserved for opposition members, etc.

Codes of conduct, monitored by the appropriate oversight bodies and by civil society organisations, can help encourage constructive political party behaviour. But such codes cannot fundamentally change the nature of inter-party relations. Only statesman-like leadership from within the main parties can do that. Regular consultations between the leaders of the majority and opposition parties, initiated by either side but particularly by the former, on issues of national importance, are a good gauge of constructive engagement. Only when relations between the main political parties are collegial and constructive can the full dividends of democratic deliberation emerge. Democratic practice hinges on the ability of political parties to aggregate the diverse views and opinions

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of the electorate into coherent agendas. This requires both intra- and inter-party negotiations, deliberations, and give-and-take. In this way, the diversity of political views becomes an asset, as the deliberative process enriches and broadens the perspective of people, parties, and the government and informs public decisions. Without democratic deliberation, there can be no meaningful democracy. And without constructive inter-party dialogue, there is no real democratic deliberation where it matters most. Leadership – the Heart of the MatterHis Majesty the fourth King once said that shortly after acceding the throne, he realised the decisions he made for the good of the nation would usually not be good for himself personally, while decisions that might be good for himself personally would usually not be good for the nation. He had to make a choice. The record of his words and deeds during his 34-year reign makes it abundantly clear what choice he consistently made. He placed the greater good above his personal consideration. His only compulsion was his conscience. That is what we expect from public leaders. That is true public service. That is the calibre of leadership that most Bhutanese want and expect from democracy and that will determine

Democratic literature is thin on leadership because democracy is supposed to have looked after this preoccupation through the electoral process. What literature there is on the subject tends to focus either on the qualities of good public leaders or on the checks and balances required to keep public leaders on the straight and narrow. Almost no literature exists on how to get great leaders, endowed with the ethos of

no matter how perfect the democratic system may appear on paper, no matter how robust the legal and institutional framework, it can all be undermined, overtly or covertly, by ill-intentioned leaders. It is also curious because the types of leaders that the democratic system tends to produce around the world are those with charismatic qualities capable of pushing society’s populist buttons to trigger knee-jerk electoral responses – very different from the leadership qualities required to help democracy produce good governance, and enable people to realise their collective and individual freedoms, capabilities, and equalities. Bhutan has a big head start over other countries when it comes to leadership. The country has been blessed with great rulers under the Wangchuck dynasty, and His

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inherited some of that legacy, as virtually all its members were groomed under the fourth King. Because of this, there is an expectation that they deliver on more than the day-to-day running of government. In line with the far-sighted leadership of the monarchy, they must also anticipate the future. They must review their current decisions and actions not only with respect to their immediate impact, but also in light of the conventions, practices, and standards of political governance they will establish for the country, and in whose tracks future governments will follow. And they must pave the way for the next generation of leaders. While a few young leaders have emerged or seem to be emerging, they need assistance. It is behoven on the current leadership to groom the country’s future leaders in the same enlightened spirit that they themselves were. This is an important task for Members of Parliament, leaders of other constitutional bodies, government institutions, and political parties. Civil society groups can also help incubate future leaders. What about the King? What is his role in protecting the quality of Bhutan’s leadership

those who will pass through the electoral process? Apart from continuing to lead by example, his most powerful instrument, the King is constitutionally endowed with important functions as Head of State and is required to grant royal assent for various aspects of governance that have direct bearing on the country’s leadership. For example, he must endorse appointments like that of the Chief Justice and the Drangpons. For some posts, he makes the selection from the recommendations of

involvement imbibes the process with his moral authority. This is a great safeguard for the country. In addition, the King may award titles, decorations, and other recognitions through which he can choose to draw public attention to the desired calibre and quality of public leadership. He may direct some of these recognitions to outstanding contributions by youth and to inspire young people for public service. In his speaking engagements, the King may also highlight the qualities of great leadership,

spirit that guides him. In addition to promoting the emergence of great future leaders, the King also

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questions of law to the Supreme Court, return bills to Parliament, and he may command a National Referendum. Naturally, with the recent introduction of political party democracy and the need for the new system to take root, the King is reticent to intervene unless absolutely necessary.

The King may also need to compensate for the lack of familiarisation of the people with their new system of governance. As mentioned earlier, despite the

of democracy. When they are unable to provide the required oversight and

thing. So, until the Bhutanese general public develops strong, organised groups and outspoken eminent persons whose views hold sway over government, some

protector of the state and guardian of the people. Given this situation, the King may also wish to consider extending his activities to help develop people’s understanding of their roles and functions in the new system, and their capacities to perform them well. Clearly, the King has vital contributions in shaping the country’s current and future leadership and the quality of democracy. He is leading by example. He is introducing and shaping the new role of the monarchy under a constitutional democracy. He is working to infuse the new system with the ethos of public service that characterised past governments in Bhutan. And while it will remain his most fundamental responsibility to represent his people’s collective aspirations and needs, he is having to assume some of his people’s democratic responsibilities, until they develop these capacities themselves. All these are in addition to the other vital functions of the monarchy. The role of the King in Bhutan’s young democracy will perhaps never be as

extensive as he must support parts of the democratic system that have yet to

to avoid over reliance on the Monarch to develop its own strength, the King is treading very carefully. Those who advise the King must do so with equal care and, like their King, must remain totally and utterly above the political fray.

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Concluding ThoughtsBhutan has crossed a major threshold on its democratic journey. Before it lies a long road with many forks and hairpin turns that will require great presence of mind and navigational skill for the ride to be smooth. The need for stability and continuity must be balanced with the need for greater freedoms and inevitable change. The logic of democracy must be balanced with the logic of GNH. The introduction of political governance must be balanced with the legacy of hierarchical, administrative governance. Many other young democracies faced similar challenges in the past, and while each situation is unique, broad trends can be drawn from their experience. Bad decisions early in the transition phase often led to devastating and long-term impacts. The democratic system proved itself to be highly vulnerable to non-democratic power structures and predatory elite, as well as to global forces that were not always helpful. Democracy was thus frequently drained of its soul and paraded like the “Emperor’s New Clothes”, as in the well-known fairy tale. The building blocks for consolidating and deepening democracy inevitably require the ruling class to submit to the curtailment of its power and authority. As this relies on leadership of a calibre that most democracies are not wont to produce, young, struggling democracies often got caught in a catch-22 situation. Many have lingered in democratic limbo for decades – during which time people have been forced to swallow a sorry substitute for meaningful democracy, while their leaders played the system for personal gain. Bhutan has a precious opportunity to avoid this dismal experience. The country’s legacy of great leadership and good governance gives it a distinct advantage. But this window of opportunity is time-bound; it will not exist in a few years time, at least not to the same degree. By then the pattern of political behaviours and conventions of the new system will have been largely set into a path of dependency that will characterise the country’s future governments. Using the current opportunity well is, therefore, the single most important task of the current government and people of Bhutan. Many of Bhutan’s inherent characteristics and its legacy of good governance could help guide and shape the country’s democracy positively. As the quality of democracy is inextricably linked to the quality of a country’s values and vision, an obvious starting place is GNH. The GNH concept is inherently democracy-

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friendly – it could help Bhutan deepen its democratic experience right from the

home. The economic-centric forces that have blinded the international community to other essential elements of human wellbeing have entered Bhutan and are hard at work. The economic bias of the country’s mislabled "GNH strategy" is but one

right from the start, it needs to enable GNH to shape the country’s new system of

in the minds and hearts of the general public. The overriding lesson to be learned from other young democracies is that democratic “ends” must be valued on the same footing, if not higher, than democratic “means.” The sign of a good democracy is much more than a good election – it is what happens in between elections. Four main areas emerge from this observation. First, strong democratic framework conditions are required for democracy to deliver on people’s expectations. The rule of law, constitutionalism and the trumping powers of the Constitution are key to this, both in their aspect as rules and as morality. Second, keeping the appointments and promotions to high

professionalism and integrity, is vital. In this way, the process of state building can

to drive it in unhealthy directions. Third, developing the attributes of a conducive democratic culture is a priority. This includes maintaining constructive and collegial

engaging citizens and civil society with democratic processes, and strengthening the ability of the media to play its vital democratic oversight functions. Finally, although the literature on democracy has neglected the fundamental issue

leadership advantage over other countries, care must be taken to maintain the standard and groom the country’s next generation of public leaders. In addition to his many other vital functions, the King has an important role to play in inspiring and encouraging both Bhutan’s present and future leaders, political and non-political, to maintain the high standards of public service to which the people have become accustomed.

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References

Balinski, Michel. “The Majority Judgement: A New Mechanism for Electing and Ranking.” Proc. of Conference on Deepening Democracy in Asia, Paro. Print.

. 27 Oct. 2008. Web. 31 Jan. 2010.

Bradley, Andrew, Amor Boubakri, Sridhar K. Khatri, and Rizal Sukma. Democracy in Development: Global Consultations on the EU’s Role in Democracy Building. Publication. Stockholm: IDEA, 2009. Print.

Collier, Paul. Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. New York: Harper, 2009. Print.


“Dissecting GNH.” Kuensel [Thimphu] 20 Oct. 2009, Editorial sec. Print. Dorji, Kinley, and Siok Sian Pek. “The Bhutanese Media: In the Service of the

Public.” Proc. of Second International Conference on Gross National Happiness, Antigonish. Print.

Keane, John. The Life and Death of Democracy. New York: W.W. Norton &, 2009. Print.

Noorani, A. G. “Behind the “Basic Structure” Doctrine.” Frontline Apr.-May 2001. Print.

Sen, Amartya. “Democracy as a Universal Value.” Journal of Democracy 10.3 (1999): 10. Print.

Ura, Karma. Conference on Deepening Democracy in Asia. Paro. 12 Oct. 2009. Speech.

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