Modifications in U.S. National Strategy [Re. Persian Gulf ...the Persian Gulf region, it has become...
9
uEbl1E I ..SECRET ._ .:__ _ --:..:..- • DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, C E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3) ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2011-064, document no. 43 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: December 19,2013 ent f State PD/NS - ,;,· .< - - -:c·Presidential ·,·w,, Directive . - ·- __ . ... ., ' ... ';; TO: The Vice · Presid The Secretary d The Secretary of The Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Energy The Director, Office of Management &Budget The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director"of Central Intelligence .· ... SUBJECT: Modificationi in U.S. National Strategy I set forth National Strategy in 1977 in Presidential Directive/NSC-18. It remains our strategy, but in light of increased projection of Soviet power which threatens U.S. vitil interests in the Persian Gulf region, it has become necessary to modify emphasis · and priority in the strategy and to elaborate and codify our pro- gress in building a security framework for the Persian Gulf. · k&t Greater Readiness Required Given ihe increased likelihood of major ldcal or regional con- . flict involving key US interests in the 1980s we must increase the priority given to reidiness in defense resource allocations. . . . Shifts in Priority for General Purpose Forces Presidential put the focus for our general forces on Europe but alsd called fot capabilities for con- · ....... ·' tingencies in Korea and the Persian Gulf region. Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan have, in the interim, : ·.
Transcript of Modifications in U.S. National Strategy [Re. Persian Gulf ...the Persian Gulf region, it has become...
uEbl1E I
SECRET
_ __ _--- bull
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL
C EO 13526 SECTION 53(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO 2011-064 document no 43 DECLASSIFICATION DATE December 192013
ent f State
PDNS-
middotlt- -
-cmiddotPresidential middotmiddotw
Directive - middot-__
middot ~
TO The Vice middot PresidThe Secretary dThe Secretary of The Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Energy The Director Office of Management ampBudget The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff The Directorof Central Intelligence
middot
SUBJECT Modificationi in US National Strategy
I set forth US~ National Strategy in 1977 in Presidential
DirectiveNSC-18 It remains our strategy but in light of increased
projection of Soviet power which threatens US vitil interests in
the Persian Gulf region it has become necessary to modify emphasis
middotand priority in the strategy and to elaborate and codify our proshy
gress in building a security framework for the Persian Gulf middotkampt
Greater Readiness Required
Given ihe increased likelihood of major ldcal or regional conshy
flict involving key US interests in the 1980s we must increase the
priority given to reidiness in defense resource allocations
Shifts in Priority for General Purpose Forces
Presidential Dir~ctiveNSC-18 put the focus for our general
~purpose forces on Europe but alsd called fot capabilities for conshymiddot middot
tingencies in Korea and the Persian Gulf region Soviet actions in
the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan have in the interim increa~e~
middot
- SBCRET
2
substantially the threat to our vital interests in the Persi~n middot
middot Gulf region f~o~e~_yer- _the chaotic - ~~uation following the Iranian
revolution the Iraq-Iran warand theintensifying intra-Arab
and middotIsraeli-Arabtensioris have incr(lse_d __ the_instability_ irimiddot ~h~
region__ Thjs has als~ increasedthe risk to middotUS and Allied intere~ts
_ ~~-~ --~ -~rectlmiddotmiddotmiddot ~~~- -middot~~ ~giving -~~-~ Soviet~--~~~ed op~~t~~i-fies---for
interference]~ -- At th~_ame time our success in normalizing -___
relations withtie Pebple s Repuplic of China has improve~ our - middot middot (o-- i) middotbull middot _middot middotbull- ltmiddot middot
strategic posi~ion ~-~ -E~st Asia Giveri~ the danger that Soviet middot-j_ middoti --
success in asserting )llfluence over the oil middot producing status of -- _middot middot --~---~r middot-middot middot middot ~
the Persian- Gul region could nndermine the viability of NATO and
Japan cause ~norm~~s- gt~ economic disruptions in Europe Japan and middot middot
the United States higher priority must be given to developing middotmiddot bull -~--- middot middot
0
adequate strategic lift general purpose forces and facilities _
acces~~ for Persi~~ Gul~ contingencies C-81 -_ middot- middot p middot -~ middot -
-~~hile N~TO --~ -
willretain8 call on force deploymEmts~in ~~ 7 - ~middot
p~acetimefor wartime middotoperations the Peisian Gulf shall have middot 7~ middot middot~ _
of strategic lift and ~eneral purpose middot-
forces middot in the__Five Y~middot~ Defense Program middot Ea~t Asia will have~
middot pri~rity for resour~es and wartime operatibns This priority [ calls for- middotmiddotmiddot middot
- -middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot- - middotmiddot middot----
maintaining improved __ 7elations with the Peoples Republic of China
_~-accelerated-_middot g~m-rth 6pound Japans defense capabilities as middot a contribution
to u~s ~Japanese secur~ ty ties and improved middotrelations -lith the
iSEAN states (81 Soviet projection of power in the Caribhean region with Cuba s
assistante over the past two years has c~eate~another area of
5ECltEf
~- middotmiddot middotmiddot -- --~~middot-- middotmiddot-~~ middot middot middot---middot -- - - -~-middotmiddot middot--- middot~- middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot-middot-middot middot ---middot ~~- middot -~ middot --middot----- middotmiddotmiddot--middot shy
middot
shy
_bull
middot
shy
_
middot- )1
SECRET 3
security concern In support of the objectives of Presidentia~ DirectiveNSC- 52 it is necessary to achieve quietly a strong)
military presence in the region This should be donmiddote not by an _
shiftmiddot ~
increase in
our-general purpose
force levels
but by gradtiai ~
~
in otir military exercise actiVities and basing
the Southeastern part of the United States and
in the middot region~hich w~ll be ~erceivei by Cuba and the Soviet Union -middot middot -
as evidence of our determination to limit Soviet and Cubanregional middot middot middotmiddot middot
influence middotmiddot ~ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot middot- __ middot
Sharing the s~middotcurity Burden with Our Allies
Because ~ he Soviet military buildup and the projection of Soviet
military powerhave our strategic must make bull
i~creased middot middotmiddot
requirements~ ~e more effort and devis~ better ~ays 6f sharing the economic and mili shy
- middotmiddot--= ~
tary burden ~ith our allies we muit - insist that our European middot
take up theregbn the NATQ front while e giVe
to forces and lift for the Persian Gulf At the same time our NATI)-middotmiddot J all~e~ - particularly _ ~he British and Frenc~ should contribute ~orces 4 middotmiddot
_middot
middotto the security ~poundramew~rk for th~ Persian Gulf
Germany~ other me~bers of NATO and Japan should contribute nonshy
military resources such as economic assistance ~0 the security frame- middotmiddotmiddot
wor_~_ Jrwo couht~ies l~h i ch flank Southwest Asia and would be most ~- middot middot middotmiddot bull middot middot
( ~mportant recipients ~f ~his economic aid ~ - - as well as of military _-middot
i
middot
aid from selected donors ~- would be Turkey and Pakistan ~
Our European and regional allies middotmiddotmiddot~middot overfli[Jt ~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotbull middot
middot
I transit and stag i ng for US forc es middot moving to Southwest Asia Procedures
-~~ould be established to facilitate overflight and refueling clearances
bullArms Control
Arms control n~got~at ions vhiltfih promise t~o middotc onmiddotsmiddott r a in S oviet
f orces strategic and general purpose -- and particularly t o
SECRET
middot- -- -middot-- middot--- - middot------ - - -------middot--~---- - ----- -- --- middot
shy
bull
middotI
gti i
middot
Vbull
SfCREfshy
limit resources that both sides must commit to the strategicmiddot middot
competitior~ will be middotpursued vigorously middot This latter element of
our strategy must be exploited to the extent possible for alleviating
both the ~conomic burdens of defense and for reducing the likelihood
of the use of nuclear weapons ---amp1-
Persian Gulf Security Framework
Presidential DirectiveNSC---__middot elaborates US strategy f or
the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia region fer middotmiddot _ ~-middot
bull
middot ~
bull middotmiddot
middot sECRET
bull
middot SECRET
Presidential DirectiveNSC
TO The Vice president The Secretary of State
The Secretary of The Treasury middot The Secretary of middot Defense middotThe Secretary of Commerce The Secretaryof Energy The Director Office of Management ampBudget The Chairman Joint Chiefs 6f Staff The Director of Central Intelligence
~ -
SUBJECT Persian Gulf -Security Framework (U)
In my State of the Union Address to the Congress in January middotshy
1980 I called special middot attention to our interests in the South~~st - middot middotmiddot
Asia and Persian Gulfregion Furthermore in light of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistanmiddot I declared that
An attempt middot -middot
by any outside force to gain control of
the middotPersian Gulf region ~ill be regPrded as -an
aisault on the vital interests of th~ United
States ~ - - ---bull middotrt will be repelled by the use of any middot
nieans ne-cessary including mlli tary force II (U) _ middot ~ middot
Subsequently ~ - have directed action to protect the Strait of
Hormuz and s~e~g~hen o~r kei friends in the
region
in the face of
risks stemming fro~ the IranIraq ~ar middot It-is middotus strat~gy to
meet these commitments and to defend our vital interests in the
Jegiori as a whole by
building up our own capabilities to project force into
the region -Hhile maintaining a credible presenc~f
SICHEl -----~ -middot middot-middotmiddot-- - - - middot - ~ - middot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-- -middot bull middot- -- ~-- ----- ---middot --middot _ _____________
bullmiddot SECREf SECRET 2
middot
developing a broad range of militaryand ~-related)
response- ~~
options in and outside the region against the Soviet
Union including Us~ force projection into the region
1-~ to~pensaty for the current Soviet regional advantage
in conventional forces middot
--middot making the Soviet Union aware that it will also -~ - - 1 v- ~--(IV_- _middot middot u
a~ide range ~f economicand diplomatic sanctions
a worldwide b~sis if it inter~enes in the regio~ bull
aisisti~g coh~tries in the region to deter and diminish
internal and ~xternal threats to middotstability and to
middot con_tribut~ tomiddotmiddot ~eterring and resisting Soviet
penetratiori _ -~ political economic or military
dimin~shing ~adi~al influence~ in the region hi ~orking for progress toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace
settlement middot middot
_improving access to facilities in the region while
bull remaining ~ensitive to the special historical experience
of the iegi()I1 and not placing in j eop~rdy our
relationshi~~ - or the - internal stability of the -middot - middot-middotmiddotmiddot-
countri~s~~nce~ned by insisting on- formal lt ~
-
- middot _arrangemen~s - where ~hey are not desired
taking ~~reiional approach to secu~ing our economic
and poll~ical interests middotratmiddother than basing their
defense wholly on drawing a line to protect specific
countries in the middot regionmiddot (S--f
There has been co-nsiderable progress in improving our security
posture in the region and in shaping an effective security frame shy
vork In order to ensure that this tr~nd continues I direct that
the Persian Gulf Seturity Framewofk be pursued 1n terms as fotlows ~
SECREf
bull middot bull r- shy 3SECRET
I The Military Component
The Department of Defense has principal responsibility for
initiatives in this area ccin~istent with the respon~ibility of th~
Department of State This component will include greater effort in
the following areas
A US Force Capabilities including forces lift facili shy 7
ties access~foverbuilding and prepositioning of supplies _
exercies and presenc~ in the region
B Local Defense Cap~bilities i~proved through securitymiddot
assistancemiddot advisory programs and enhancement of local
faciiitiei ~nd military capabiliti~s in order t6 supp~rt middot
u~s force ~ projection and local defense d~veloped by
jointplan~ing com~ined exercies consultations~ and
other Jppro~riate meansmiddot __In particular we must strengthen Q bull
Turkeys capabilities to serve as a Jtthreat-in-being
on
_
~he flank of any Soviet intevention iri the
C Getting 6ur Allies to Carry more of the Burden
middot deterrenc~defe~s~ in Euiope and Northeast Asia as part middot
of a r~ tional division of labor in order to permit middot
greater al Ioc~~ion of USmiddot resources to the security of
the ~~r~ian Gulf in the event of a simultaneous
there f-amp1 _
I I The Foreign Polity Component
The Department of State has princip~l responsibility for th i s
com~onent which willmiddotbmiddote carried out in terms of
A The Peace Process in which progress must be achieved as
rapidly as feasible
SECRET
dEbfE I Imiddot
SECRET
B The Northern Tier including Turkey Pakistan and ~ran in
which improved securityrelation are the objective
C middot The A~abian Peninsula in vhich we will assist the countries
concerned ~o enhance their internal stability and counter middot
Soviet influertce -- -
D The Allies in Europe and Asia from who~ we seek diplomatic
military economic and political assistance in meeting our
middot middot
_ middot middot middotmiddot middot mutuaL security objectives in the Persian Gulf region 7An
- shyearly( focus of effort with these allies and with regional
poiers will be establishing procedures to middotassure quick process
ing_ ofmiddot overflight refueling and staging clearances required
middot for the US to project and sustain forces in Southwest Asia kBJ
III Economic Issues
-~- The Department o~ the Treasury State and Energy will share
respOJSibility in this area Economic subcomponents are
A bull Oil Policy to ensure availability of oil at reasonable
middotmiddot __ _ middot prices middot and to reduce Western _dependence on Gulf oil
Bbullbull Western Economic Assistance in lvhich our goal will be to -middot
help address economic problems in the region through
multila~eral and unilateral efforts middotmiddotmiddot__ middot__ middot
C Saudi and Other Gulf State Financing of Regional Security
Needs~ in which we seek a more compr~hensive region-wide
use of Saudi and other pmiddoteninsular -eal th to meet regional security needs
D Economic Stability ~hich is crucial middot to bbth the internal
and external security and to the political stability of
states in the region It should be an integral component
of the security review process ancmiddott~k~~ - i~~-a middot~ acco~nt middot in
any US decisions concerning military andor econo~ic
assistance ~
SECRET
middot middot dLUIiL I
5
IV Intelligence Issues
The Director qf ~entral Intelligence has the priricipal
responsibility for deTeloping an effective regionally integrated middot
inte~ligence program which is fully supportive of the tasks and middotmiddotbull
objectives in the military diplomatic and economic components
Resources Considerations
middot~ Each agencywili~ be responsible for and will identify the middotmiddot bull
programs iri its area which are required foi implementing this
dire~tiv~ middotIri additi~n each agen~y will propose appropriate middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot prioities for thes~ pr(Jgrams fer middot- middot middot middot middot middot- (_
lt TheOffice of Management and Budget will monitor middotagency proshy- bull bull
grams in support ()f tlisdirectivewill insure that such programs middot ~- shy
are identifiab~e ~~d will insure that they are re~eiving an
appropriately high priority in all agencies feuro7 middot
Coordination
Interagency c6ordination for the security framework shall
middot conti~ue to be ~c~omplished by middotthe sec middot-
- middot
middot --~ middot -_ -_
middotmiddot - middot
-- shy
middot
- -shy
SECRET
famp1
- middot _-_ middot
- SBCRET
2
substantially the threat to our vital interests in the Persi~n middot
middot Gulf region f~o~e~_yer- _the chaotic - ~~uation following the Iranian
revolution the Iraq-Iran warand theintensifying intra-Arab
and middotIsraeli-Arabtensioris have incr(lse_d __ the_instability_ irimiddot ~h~
region__ Thjs has als~ increasedthe risk to middotUS and Allied intere~ts
_ ~~-~ --~ -~rectlmiddotmiddotmiddot ~~~- -middot~~ ~giving -~~-~ Soviet~--~~~ed op~~t~~i-fies---for
interference]~ -- At th~_ame time our success in normalizing -___
relations withtie Pebple s Repuplic of China has improve~ our - middot middot (o-- i) middotbull middot _middot middotbull- ltmiddot middot
strategic posi~ion ~-~ -E~st Asia Giveri~ the danger that Soviet middot-j_ middoti --
success in asserting )llfluence over the oil middot producing status of -- _middot middot --~---~r middot-middot middot middot ~
the Persian- Gul region could nndermine the viability of NATO and
Japan cause ~norm~~s- gt~ economic disruptions in Europe Japan and middot middot
the United States higher priority must be given to developing middotmiddot bull -~--- middot middot
0
adequate strategic lift general purpose forces and facilities _
acces~~ for Persi~~ Gul~ contingencies C-81 -_ middot- middot p middot -~ middot -
-~~hile N~TO --~ -
willretain8 call on force deploymEmts~in ~~ 7 - ~middot
p~acetimefor wartime middotoperations the Peisian Gulf shall have middot 7~ middot middot~ _
of strategic lift and ~eneral purpose middot-
forces middot in the__Five Y~middot~ Defense Program middot Ea~t Asia will have~
middot pri~rity for resour~es and wartime operatibns This priority [ calls for- middotmiddotmiddot middot
- -middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot- - middotmiddot middot----
maintaining improved __ 7elations with the Peoples Republic of China
_~-accelerated-_middot g~m-rth 6pound Japans defense capabilities as middot a contribution
to u~s ~Japanese secur~ ty ties and improved middotrelations -lith the
iSEAN states (81 Soviet projection of power in the Caribhean region with Cuba s
assistante over the past two years has c~eate~another area of
5ECltEf
~- middotmiddot middotmiddot -- --~~middot-- middotmiddot-~~ middot middot middot---middot -- - - -~-middotmiddot middot--- middot~- middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot-middot-middot middot ---middot ~~- middot -~ middot --middot----- middotmiddotmiddot--middot shy
middot
shy
_bull
middot
shy
_
middot- )1
SECRET 3
security concern In support of the objectives of Presidentia~ DirectiveNSC- 52 it is necessary to achieve quietly a strong)
military presence in the region This should be donmiddote not by an _
shiftmiddot ~
increase in
our-general purpose
force levels
but by gradtiai ~
~
in otir military exercise actiVities and basing
the Southeastern part of the United States and
in the middot region~hich w~ll be ~erceivei by Cuba and the Soviet Union -middot middot -
as evidence of our determination to limit Soviet and Cubanregional middot middot middotmiddot middot
influence middotmiddot ~ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot middot- __ middot
Sharing the s~middotcurity Burden with Our Allies
Because ~ he Soviet military buildup and the projection of Soviet
military powerhave our strategic must make bull
i~creased middot middotmiddot
requirements~ ~e more effort and devis~ better ~ays 6f sharing the economic and mili shy
- middotmiddot--= ~
tary burden ~ith our allies we muit - insist that our European middot
take up theregbn the NATQ front while e giVe
to forces and lift for the Persian Gulf At the same time our NATI)-middotmiddot J all~e~ - particularly _ ~he British and Frenc~ should contribute ~orces 4 middotmiddot
_middot
middotto the security ~poundramew~rk for th~ Persian Gulf
Germany~ other me~bers of NATO and Japan should contribute nonshy
military resources such as economic assistance ~0 the security frame- middotmiddotmiddot
wor_~_ Jrwo couht~ies l~h i ch flank Southwest Asia and would be most ~- middot middot middotmiddot bull middot middot
( ~mportant recipients ~f ~his economic aid ~ - - as well as of military _-middot
i
middot
aid from selected donors ~- would be Turkey and Pakistan ~
Our European and regional allies middotmiddotmiddot~middot overfli[Jt ~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotbull middot
middot
I transit and stag i ng for US forc es middot moving to Southwest Asia Procedures
-~~ould be established to facilitate overflight and refueling clearances
bullArms Control
Arms control n~got~at ions vhiltfih promise t~o middotc onmiddotsmiddott r a in S oviet
f orces strategic and general purpose -- and particularly t o
SECRET
middot- -- -middot-- middot--- - middot------ - - -------middot--~---- - ----- -- --- middot
shy
bull
middotI
gti i
middot
Vbull
SfCREfshy
limit resources that both sides must commit to the strategicmiddot middot
competitior~ will be middotpursued vigorously middot This latter element of
our strategy must be exploited to the extent possible for alleviating
both the ~conomic burdens of defense and for reducing the likelihood
of the use of nuclear weapons ---amp1-
Persian Gulf Security Framework
Presidential DirectiveNSC---__middot elaborates US strategy f or
the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia region fer middotmiddot _ ~-middot
bull
middot ~
bull middotmiddot
middot sECRET
bull
middot SECRET
Presidential DirectiveNSC
TO The Vice president The Secretary of State
The Secretary of The Treasury middot The Secretary of middot Defense middotThe Secretary of Commerce The Secretaryof Energy The Director Office of Management ampBudget The Chairman Joint Chiefs 6f Staff The Director of Central Intelligence
~ -
SUBJECT Persian Gulf -Security Framework (U)
In my State of the Union Address to the Congress in January middotshy
1980 I called special middot attention to our interests in the South~~st - middot middotmiddot
Asia and Persian Gulfregion Furthermore in light of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistanmiddot I declared that
An attempt middot -middot
by any outside force to gain control of
the middotPersian Gulf region ~ill be regPrded as -an
aisault on the vital interests of th~ United
States ~ - - ---bull middotrt will be repelled by the use of any middot
nieans ne-cessary including mlli tary force II (U) _ middot ~ middot
Subsequently ~ - have directed action to protect the Strait of
Hormuz and s~e~g~hen o~r kei friends in the
region
in the face of
risks stemming fro~ the IranIraq ~ar middot It-is middotus strat~gy to
meet these commitments and to defend our vital interests in the
Jegiori as a whole by
building up our own capabilities to project force into
the region -Hhile maintaining a credible presenc~f
SICHEl -----~ -middot middot-middotmiddot-- - - - middot - ~ - middot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-- -middot bull middot- -- ~-- ----- ---middot --middot _ _____________
bullmiddot SECREf SECRET 2
middot
developing a broad range of militaryand ~-related)
response- ~~
options in and outside the region against the Soviet
Union including Us~ force projection into the region
1-~ to~pensaty for the current Soviet regional advantage
in conventional forces middot
--middot making the Soviet Union aware that it will also -~ - - 1 v- ~--(IV_- _middot middot u
a~ide range ~f economicand diplomatic sanctions
a worldwide b~sis if it inter~enes in the regio~ bull
aisisti~g coh~tries in the region to deter and diminish
internal and ~xternal threats to middotstability and to
middot con_tribut~ tomiddotmiddot ~eterring and resisting Soviet
penetratiori _ -~ political economic or military
dimin~shing ~adi~al influence~ in the region hi ~orking for progress toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace
settlement middot middot
_improving access to facilities in the region while
bull remaining ~ensitive to the special historical experience
of the iegi()I1 and not placing in j eop~rdy our
relationshi~~ - or the - internal stability of the -middot - middot-middotmiddotmiddot-
countri~s~~nce~ned by insisting on- formal lt ~
-
- middot _arrangemen~s - where ~hey are not desired
taking ~~reiional approach to secu~ing our economic
and poll~ical interests middotratmiddother than basing their
defense wholly on drawing a line to protect specific
countries in the middot regionmiddot (S--f
There has been co-nsiderable progress in improving our security
posture in the region and in shaping an effective security frame shy
vork In order to ensure that this tr~nd continues I direct that
the Persian Gulf Seturity Framewofk be pursued 1n terms as fotlows ~
SECREf
bull middot bull r- shy 3SECRET
I The Military Component
The Department of Defense has principal responsibility for
initiatives in this area ccin~istent with the respon~ibility of th~
Department of State This component will include greater effort in
the following areas
A US Force Capabilities including forces lift facili shy 7
ties access~foverbuilding and prepositioning of supplies _
exercies and presenc~ in the region
B Local Defense Cap~bilities i~proved through securitymiddot
assistancemiddot advisory programs and enhancement of local
faciiitiei ~nd military capabiliti~s in order t6 supp~rt middot
u~s force ~ projection and local defense d~veloped by
jointplan~ing com~ined exercies consultations~ and
other Jppro~riate meansmiddot __In particular we must strengthen Q bull
Turkeys capabilities to serve as a Jtthreat-in-being
on
_
~he flank of any Soviet intevention iri the
C Getting 6ur Allies to Carry more of the Burden
middot deterrenc~defe~s~ in Euiope and Northeast Asia as part middot
of a r~ tional division of labor in order to permit middot
greater al Ioc~~ion of USmiddot resources to the security of
the ~~r~ian Gulf in the event of a simultaneous
there f-amp1 _
I I The Foreign Polity Component
The Department of State has princip~l responsibility for th i s
com~onent which willmiddotbmiddote carried out in terms of
A The Peace Process in which progress must be achieved as
rapidly as feasible
SECRET
dEbfE I Imiddot
SECRET
B The Northern Tier including Turkey Pakistan and ~ran in
which improved securityrelation are the objective
C middot The A~abian Peninsula in vhich we will assist the countries
concerned ~o enhance their internal stability and counter middot
Soviet influertce -- -
D The Allies in Europe and Asia from who~ we seek diplomatic
military economic and political assistance in meeting our
middot middot
_ middot middot middotmiddot middot mutuaL security objectives in the Persian Gulf region 7An
- shyearly( focus of effort with these allies and with regional
poiers will be establishing procedures to middotassure quick process
ing_ ofmiddot overflight refueling and staging clearances required
middot for the US to project and sustain forces in Southwest Asia kBJ
III Economic Issues
-~- The Department o~ the Treasury State and Energy will share
respOJSibility in this area Economic subcomponents are
A bull Oil Policy to ensure availability of oil at reasonable
middotmiddot __ _ middot prices middot and to reduce Western _dependence on Gulf oil
Bbullbull Western Economic Assistance in lvhich our goal will be to -middot
help address economic problems in the region through
multila~eral and unilateral efforts middotmiddotmiddot__ middot__ middot
C Saudi and Other Gulf State Financing of Regional Security
Needs~ in which we seek a more compr~hensive region-wide
use of Saudi and other pmiddoteninsular -eal th to meet regional security needs
D Economic Stability ~hich is crucial middot to bbth the internal
and external security and to the political stability of
states in the region It should be an integral component
of the security review process ancmiddott~k~~ - i~~-a middot~ acco~nt middot in
any US decisions concerning military andor econo~ic
assistance ~
SECRET
middot middot dLUIiL I
5
IV Intelligence Issues
The Director qf ~entral Intelligence has the priricipal
responsibility for deTeloping an effective regionally integrated middot
inte~ligence program which is fully supportive of the tasks and middotmiddotbull
objectives in the military diplomatic and economic components
Resources Considerations
middot~ Each agencywili~ be responsible for and will identify the middotmiddot bull
programs iri its area which are required foi implementing this
dire~tiv~ middotIri additi~n each agen~y will propose appropriate middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot prioities for thes~ pr(Jgrams fer middot- middot middot middot middot middot- (_
lt TheOffice of Management and Budget will monitor middotagency proshy- bull bull
grams in support ()f tlisdirectivewill insure that such programs middot ~- shy
are identifiab~e ~~d will insure that they are re~eiving an
appropriately high priority in all agencies feuro7 middot
Coordination
Interagency c6ordination for the security framework shall
middot conti~ue to be ~c~omplished by middotthe sec middot-
- middot
middot --~ middot -_ -_
middotmiddot - middot
-- shy
middot
- -shy
SECRET
famp1
- middot _-_ middot
middot- )1
SECRET 3
security concern In support of the objectives of Presidentia~ DirectiveNSC- 52 it is necessary to achieve quietly a strong)
military presence in the region This should be donmiddote not by an _
shiftmiddot ~
increase in
our-general purpose
force levels
but by gradtiai ~
~
in otir military exercise actiVities and basing
the Southeastern part of the United States and
in the middot region~hich w~ll be ~erceivei by Cuba and the Soviet Union -middot middot -
as evidence of our determination to limit Soviet and Cubanregional middot middot middotmiddot middot
influence middotmiddot ~ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot middot- __ middot
Sharing the s~middotcurity Burden with Our Allies
Because ~ he Soviet military buildup and the projection of Soviet
military powerhave our strategic must make bull
i~creased middot middotmiddot
requirements~ ~e more effort and devis~ better ~ays 6f sharing the economic and mili shy
- middotmiddot--= ~
tary burden ~ith our allies we muit - insist that our European middot
take up theregbn the NATQ front while e giVe
to forces and lift for the Persian Gulf At the same time our NATI)-middotmiddot J all~e~ - particularly _ ~he British and Frenc~ should contribute ~orces 4 middotmiddot
_middot
middotto the security ~poundramew~rk for th~ Persian Gulf
Germany~ other me~bers of NATO and Japan should contribute nonshy
military resources such as economic assistance ~0 the security frame- middotmiddotmiddot
wor_~_ Jrwo couht~ies l~h i ch flank Southwest Asia and would be most ~- middot middot middotmiddot bull middot middot
( ~mportant recipients ~f ~his economic aid ~ - - as well as of military _-middot
i
middot
aid from selected donors ~- would be Turkey and Pakistan ~
Our European and regional allies middotmiddotmiddot~middot overfli[Jt ~ bullmiddotmiddotmiddotbull middot
middot
I transit and stag i ng for US forc es middot moving to Southwest Asia Procedures
-~~ould be established to facilitate overflight and refueling clearances
bullArms Control
Arms control n~got~at ions vhiltfih promise t~o middotc onmiddotsmiddott r a in S oviet
f orces strategic and general purpose -- and particularly t o
SECRET
middot- -- -middot-- middot--- - middot------ - - -------middot--~---- - ----- -- --- middot
shy
bull
middotI
gti i
middot
Vbull
SfCREfshy
limit resources that both sides must commit to the strategicmiddot middot
competitior~ will be middotpursued vigorously middot This latter element of
our strategy must be exploited to the extent possible for alleviating
both the ~conomic burdens of defense and for reducing the likelihood
of the use of nuclear weapons ---amp1-
Persian Gulf Security Framework
Presidential DirectiveNSC---__middot elaborates US strategy f or
the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia region fer middotmiddot _ ~-middot
bull
middot ~
bull middotmiddot
middot sECRET
bull
middot SECRET
Presidential DirectiveNSC
TO The Vice president The Secretary of State
The Secretary of The Treasury middot The Secretary of middot Defense middotThe Secretary of Commerce The Secretaryof Energy The Director Office of Management ampBudget The Chairman Joint Chiefs 6f Staff The Director of Central Intelligence
~ -
SUBJECT Persian Gulf -Security Framework (U)
In my State of the Union Address to the Congress in January middotshy
1980 I called special middot attention to our interests in the South~~st - middot middotmiddot
Asia and Persian Gulfregion Furthermore in light of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistanmiddot I declared that
An attempt middot -middot
by any outside force to gain control of
the middotPersian Gulf region ~ill be regPrded as -an
aisault on the vital interests of th~ United
States ~ - - ---bull middotrt will be repelled by the use of any middot
nieans ne-cessary including mlli tary force II (U) _ middot ~ middot
Subsequently ~ - have directed action to protect the Strait of
Hormuz and s~e~g~hen o~r kei friends in the
region
in the face of
risks stemming fro~ the IranIraq ~ar middot It-is middotus strat~gy to
meet these commitments and to defend our vital interests in the
Jegiori as a whole by
building up our own capabilities to project force into
the region -Hhile maintaining a credible presenc~f
SICHEl -----~ -middot middot-middotmiddot-- - - - middot - ~ - middot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-- -middot bull middot- -- ~-- ----- ---middot --middot _ _____________
bullmiddot SECREf SECRET 2
middot
developing a broad range of militaryand ~-related)
response- ~~
options in and outside the region against the Soviet
Union including Us~ force projection into the region
1-~ to~pensaty for the current Soviet regional advantage
in conventional forces middot
--middot making the Soviet Union aware that it will also -~ - - 1 v- ~--(IV_- _middot middot u
a~ide range ~f economicand diplomatic sanctions
a worldwide b~sis if it inter~enes in the regio~ bull
aisisti~g coh~tries in the region to deter and diminish
internal and ~xternal threats to middotstability and to
middot con_tribut~ tomiddotmiddot ~eterring and resisting Soviet
penetratiori _ -~ political economic or military
dimin~shing ~adi~al influence~ in the region hi ~orking for progress toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace
settlement middot middot
_improving access to facilities in the region while
bull remaining ~ensitive to the special historical experience
of the iegi()I1 and not placing in j eop~rdy our
relationshi~~ - or the - internal stability of the -middot - middot-middotmiddotmiddot-
countri~s~~nce~ned by insisting on- formal lt ~
-
- middot _arrangemen~s - where ~hey are not desired
taking ~~reiional approach to secu~ing our economic
and poll~ical interests middotratmiddother than basing their
defense wholly on drawing a line to protect specific
countries in the middot regionmiddot (S--f
There has been co-nsiderable progress in improving our security
posture in the region and in shaping an effective security frame shy
vork In order to ensure that this tr~nd continues I direct that
the Persian Gulf Seturity Framewofk be pursued 1n terms as fotlows ~
SECREf
bull middot bull r- shy 3SECRET
I The Military Component
The Department of Defense has principal responsibility for
initiatives in this area ccin~istent with the respon~ibility of th~
Department of State This component will include greater effort in
the following areas
A US Force Capabilities including forces lift facili shy 7
ties access~foverbuilding and prepositioning of supplies _
exercies and presenc~ in the region
B Local Defense Cap~bilities i~proved through securitymiddot
assistancemiddot advisory programs and enhancement of local
faciiitiei ~nd military capabiliti~s in order t6 supp~rt middot
u~s force ~ projection and local defense d~veloped by
jointplan~ing com~ined exercies consultations~ and
other Jppro~riate meansmiddot __In particular we must strengthen Q bull
Turkeys capabilities to serve as a Jtthreat-in-being
on
_
~he flank of any Soviet intevention iri the
C Getting 6ur Allies to Carry more of the Burden
middot deterrenc~defe~s~ in Euiope and Northeast Asia as part middot
of a r~ tional division of labor in order to permit middot
greater al Ioc~~ion of USmiddot resources to the security of
the ~~r~ian Gulf in the event of a simultaneous
there f-amp1 _
I I The Foreign Polity Component
The Department of State has princip~l responsibility for th i s
com~onent which willmiddotbmiddote carried out in terms of
A The Peace Process in which progress must be achieved as
rapidly as feasible
SECRET
dEbfE I Imiddot
SECRET
B The Northern Tier including Turkey Pakistan and ~ran in
which improved securityrelation are the objective
C middot The A~abian Peninsula in vhich we will assist the countries
concerned ~o enhance their internal stability and counter middot
Soviet influertce -- -
D The Allies in Europe and Asia from who~ we seek diplomatic
military economic and political assistance in meeting our
middot middot
_ middot middot middotmiddot middot mutuaL security objectives in the Persian Gulf region 7An
- shyearly( focus of effort with these allies and with regional
poiers will be establishing procedures to middotassure quick process
ing_ ofmiddot overflight refueling and staging clearances required
middot for the US to project and sustain forces in Southwest Asia kBJ
III Economic Issues
-~- The Department o~ the Treasury State and Energy will share
respOJSibility in this area Economic subcomponents are
A bull Oil Policy to ensure availability of oil at reasonable
middotmiddot __ _ middot prices middot and to reduce Western _dependence on Gulf oil
Bbullbull Western Economic Assistance in lvhich our goal will be to -middot
help address economic problems in the region through
multila~eral and unilateral efforts middotmiddotmiddot__ middot__ middot
C Saudi and Other Gulf State Financing of Regional Security
Needs~ in which we seek a more compr~hensive region-wide
use of Saudi and other pmiddoteninsular -eal th to meet regional security needs
D Economic Stability ~hich is crucial middot to bbth the internal
and external security and to the political stability of
states in the region It should be an integral component
of the security review process ancmiddott~k~~ - i~~-a middot~ acco~nt middot in
any US decisions concerning military andor econo~ic
assistance ~
SECRET
middot middot dLUIiL I
5
IV Intelligence Issues
The Director qf ~entral Intelligence has the priricipal
responsibility for deTeloping an effective regionally integrated middot
inte~ligence program which is fully supportive of the tasks and middotmiddotbull
objectives in the military diplomatic and economic components
Resources Considerations
middot~ Each agencywili~ be responsible for and will identify the middotmiddot bull
programs iri its area which are required foi implementing this
dire~tiv~ middotIri additi~n each agen~y will propose appropriate middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot prioities for thes~ pr(Jgrams fer middot- middot middot middot middot middot- (_
lt TheOffice of Management and Budget will monitor middotagency proshy- bull bull
grams in support ()f tlisdirectivewill insure that such programs middot ~- shy
are identifiab~e ~~d will insure that they are re~eiving an
appropriately high priority in all agencies feuro7 middot
Coordination
Interagency c6ordination for the security framework shall
middot conti~ue to be ~c~omplished by middotthe sec middot-
- middot
middot --~ middot -_ -_
middotmiddot - middot
-- shy
middot
- -shy
SECRET
famp1
- middot _-_ middot
Vbull
SfCREfshy
limit resources that both sides must commit to the strategicmiddot middot
competitior~ will be middotpursued vigorously middot This latter element of
our strategy must be exploited to the extent possible for alleviating
both the ~conomic burdens of defense and for reducing the likelihood
of the use of nuclear weapons ---amp1-
Persian Gulf Security Framework
Presidential DirectiveNSC---__middot elaborates US strategy f or
the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia region fer middotmiddot _ ~-middot
bull
middot ~
bull middotmiddot
middot sECRET
bull
middot SECRET
Presidential DirectiveNSC
TO The Vice president The Secretary of State
The Secretary of The Treasury middot The Secretary of middot Defense middotThe Secretary of Commerce The Secretaryof Energy The Director Office of Management ampBudget The Chairman Joint Chiefs 6f Staff The Director of Central Intelligence
~ -
SUBJECT Persian Gulf -Security Framework (U)
In my State of the Union Address to the Congress in January middotshy
1980 I called special middot attention to our interests in the South~~st - middot middotmiddot
Asia and Persian Gulfregion Furthermore in light of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistanmiddot I declared that
An attempt middot -middot
by any outside force to gain control of
the middotPersian Gulf region ~ill be regPrded as -an
aisault on the vital interests of th~ United
States ~ - - ---bull middotrt will be repelled by the use of any middot
nieans ne-cessary including mlli tary force II (U) _ middot ~ middot
Subsequently ~ - have directed action to protect the Strait of
Hormuz and s~e~g~hen o~r kei friends in the
region
in the face of
risks stemming fro~ the IranIraq ~ar middot It-is middotus strat~gy to
meet these commitments and to defend our vital interests in the
Jegiori as a whole by
building up our own capabilities to project force into
the region -Hhile maintaining a credible presenc~f
SICHEl -----~ -middot middot-middotmiddot-- - - - middot - ~ - middot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-- -middot bull middot- -- ~-- ----- ---middot --middot _ _____________
bullmiddot SECREf SECRET 2
middot
developing a broad range of militaryand ~-related)
response- ~~
options in and outside the region against the Soviet
Union including Us~ force projection into the region
1-~ to~pensaty for the current Soviet regional advantage
in conventional forces middot
--middot making the Soviet Union aware that it will also -~ - - 1 v- ~--(IV_- _middot middot u
a~ide range ~f economicand diplomatic sanctions
a worldwide b~sis if it inter~enes in the regio~ bull
aisisti~g coh~tries in the region to deter and diminish
internal and ~xternal threats to middotstability and to
middot con_tribut~ tomiddotmiddot ~eterring and resisting Soviet
penetratiori _ -~ political economic or military
dimin~shing ~adi~al influence~ in the region hi ~orking for progress toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace
settlement middot middot
_improving access to facilities in the region while
bull remaining ~ensitive to the special historical experience
of the iegi()I1 and not placing in j eop~rdy our
relationshi~~ - or the - internal stability of the -middot - middot-middotmiddotmiddot-
countri~s~~nce~ned by insisting on- formal lt ~
-
- middot _arrangemen~s - where ~hey are not desired
taking ~~reiional approach to secu~ing our economic
and poll~ical interests middotratmiddother than basing their
defense wholly on drawing a line to protect specific
countries in the middot regionmiddot (S--f
There has been co-nsiderable progress in improving our security
posture in the region and in shaping an effective security frame shy
vork In order to ensure that this tr~nd continues I direct that
the Persian Gulf Seturity Framewofk be pursued 1n terms as fotlows ~
SECREf
bull middot bull r- shy 3SECRET
I The Military Component
The Department of Defense has principal responsibility for
initiatives in this area ccin~istent with the respon~ibility of th~
Department of State This component will include greater effort in
the following areas
A US Force Capabilities including forces lift facili shy 7
ties access~foverbuilding and prepositioning of supplies _
exercies and presenc~ in the region
B Local Defense Cap~bilities i~proved through securitymiddot
assistancemiddot advisory programs and enhancement of local
faciiitiei ~nd military capabiliti~s in order t6 supp~rt middot
u~s force ~ projection and local defense d~veloped by
jointplan~ing com~ined exercies consultations~ and
other Jppro~riate meansmiddot __In particular we must strengthen Q bull
Turkeys capabilities to serve as a Jtthreat-in-being
on
_
~he flank of any Soviet intevention iri the
C Getting 6ur Allies to Carry more of the Burden
middot deterrenc~defe~s~ in Euiope and Northeast Asia as part middot
of a r~ tional division of labor in order to permit middot
greater al Ioc~~ion of USmiddot resources to the security of
the ~~r~ian Gulf in the event of a simultaneous
there f-amp1 _
I I The Foreign Polity Component
The Department of State has princip~l responsibility for th i s
com~onent which willmiddotbmiddote carried out in terms of
A The Peace Process in which progress must be achieved as
rapidly as feasible
SECRET
dEbfE I Imiddot
SECRET
B The Northern Tier including Turkey Pakistan and ~ran in
which improved securityrelation are the objective
C middot The A~abian Peninsula in vhich we will assist the countries
concerned ~o enhance their internal stability and counter middot
Soviet influertce -- -
D The Allies in Europe and Asia from who~ we seek diplomatic
military economic and political assistance in meeting our
middot middot
_ middot middot middotmiddot middot mutuaL security objectives in the Persian Gulf region 7An
- shyearly( focus of effort with these allies and with regional
poiers will be establishing procedures to middotassure quick process
ing_ ofmiddot overflight refueling and staging clearances required
middot for the US to project and sustain forces in Southwest Asia kBJ
III Economic Issues
-~- The Department o~ the Treasury State and Energy will share
respOJSibility in this area Economic subcomponents are
A bull Oil Policy to ensure availability of oil at reasonable
middotmiddot __ _ middot prices middot and to reduce Western _dependence on Gulf oil
Bbullbull Western Economic Assistance in lvhich our goal will be to -middot
help address economic problems in the region through
multila~eral and unilateral efforts middotmiddotmiddot__ middot__ middot
C Saudi and Other Gulf State Financing of Regional Security
Needs~ in which we seek a more compr~hensive region-wide
use of Saudi and other pmiddoteninsular -eal th to meet regional security needs
D Economic Stability ~hich is crucial middot to bbth the internal
and external security and to the political stability of
states in the region It should be an integral component
of the security review process ancmiddott~k~~ - i~~-a middot~ acco~nt middot in
any US decisions concerning military andor econo~ic
assistance ~
SECRET
middot middot dLUIiL I
5
IV Intelligence Issues
The Director qf ~entral Intelligence has the priricipal
responsibility for deTeloping an effective regionally integrated middot
inte~ligence program which is fully supportive of the tasks and middotmiddotbull
objectives in the military diplomatic and economic components
Resources Considerations
middot~ Each agencywili~ be responsible for and will identify the middotmiddot bull
programs iri its area which are required foi implementing this
dire~tiv~ middotIri additi~n each agen~y will propose appropriate middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot prioities for thes~ pr(Jgrams fer middot- middot middot middot middot middot- (_
lt TheOffice of Management and Budget will monitor middotagency proshy- bull bull
grams in support ()f tlisdirectivewill insure that such programs middot ~- shy
are identifiab~e ~~d will insure that they are re~eiving an
appropriately high priority in all agencies feuro7 middot
Coordination
Interagency c6ordination for the security framework shall
middot conti~ue to be ~c~omplished by middotthe sec middot-
- middot
middot --~ middot -_ -_
middotmiddot - middot
-- shy
middot
- -shy
SECRET
famp1
- middot _-_ middot
middot SECRET
Presidential DirectiveNSC
TO The Vice president The Secretary of State
The Secretary of The Treasury middot The Secretary of middot Defense middotThe Secretary of Commerce The Secretaryof Energy The Director Office of Management ampBudget The Chairman Joint Chiefs 6f Staff The Director of Central Intelligence
~ -
SUBJECT Persian Gulf -Security Framework (U)
In my State of the Union Address to the Congress in January middotshy
1980 I called special middot attention to our interests in the South~~st - middot middotmiddot
Asia and Persian Gulfregion Furthermore in light of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistanmiddot I declared that
An attempt middot -middot
by any outside force to gain control of
the middotPersian Gulf region ~ill be regPrded as -an
aisault on the vital interests of th~ United
States ~ - - ---bull middotrt will be repelled by the use of any middot
nieans ne-cessary including mlli tary force II (U) _ middot ~ middot
Subsequently ~ - have directed action to protect the Strait of
Hormuz and s~e~g~hen o~r kei friends in the
region
in the face of
risks stemming fro~ the IranIraq ~ar middot It-is middotus strat~gy to
meet these commitments and to defend our vital interests in the
Jegiori as a whole by
building up our own capabilities to project force into
the region -Hhile maintaining a credible presenc~f
SICHEl -----~ -middot middot-middotmiddot-- - - - middot - ~ - middot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-- -middot bull middot- -- ~-- ----- ---middot --middot _ _____________
bullmiddot SECREf SECRET 2
middot
developing a broad range of militaryand ~-related)
response- ~~
options in and outside the region against the Soviet
Union including Us~ force projection into the region
1-~ to~pensaty for the current Soviet regional advantage
in conventional forces middot
--middot making the Soviet Union aware that it will also -~ - - 1 v- ~--(IV_- _middot middot u
a~ide range ~f economicand diplomatic sanctions
a worldwide b~sis if it inter~enes in the regio~ bull
aisisti~g coh~tries in the region to deter and diminish
internal and ~xternal threats to middotstability and to
middot con_tribut~ tomiddotmiddot ~eterring and resisting Soviet
penetratiori _ -~ political economic or military
dimin~shing ~adi~al influence~ in the region hi ~orking for progress toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace
settlement middot middot
_improving access to facilities in the region while
bull remaining ~ensitive to the special historical experience
of the iegi()I1 and not placing in j eop~rdy our
relationshi~~ - or the - internal stability of the -middot - middot-middotmiddotmiddot-
countri~s~~nce~ned by insisting on- formal lt ~
-
- middot _arrangemen~s - where ~hey are not desired
taking ~~reiional approach to secu~ing our economic
and poll~ical interests middotratmiddother than basing their
defense wholly on drawing a line to protect specific
countries in the middot regionmiddot (S--f
There has been co-nsiderable progress in improving our security
posture in the region and in shaping an effective security frame shy
vork In order to ensure that this tr~nd continues I direct that
the Persian Gulf Seturity Framewofk be pursued 1n terms as fotlows ~
SECREf
bull middot bull r- shy 3SECRET
I The Military Component
The Department of Defense has principal responsibility for
initiatives in this area ccin~istent with the respon~ibility of th~
Department of State This component will include greater effort in
the following areas
A US Force Capabilities including forces lift facili shy 7
ties access~foverbuilding and prepositioning of supplies _
exercies and presenc~ in the region
B Local Defense Cap~bilities i~proved through securitymiddot
assistancemiddot advisory programs and enhancement of local
faciiitiei ~nd military capabiliti~s in order t6 supp~rt middot
u~s force ~ projection and local defense d~veloped by
jointplan~ing com~ined exercies consultations~ and
other Jppro~riate meansmiddot __In particular we must strengthen Q bull
Turkeys capabilities to serve as a Jtthreat-in-being
on
_
~he flank of any Soviet intevention iri the
C Getting 6ur Allies to Carry more of the Burden
middot deterrenc~defe~s~ in Euiope and Northeast Asia as part middot
of a r~ tional division of labor in order to permit middot
greater al Ioc~~ion of USmiddot resources to the security of
the ~~r~ian Gulf in the event of a simultaneous
there f-amp1 _
I I The Foreign Polity Component
The Department of State has princip~l responsibility for th i s
com~onent which willmiddotbmiddote carried out in terms of
A The Peace Process in which progress must be achieved as
rapidly as feasible
SECRET
dEbfE I Imiddot
SECRET
B The Northern Tier including Turkey Pakistan and ~ran in
which improved securityrelation are the objective
C middot The A~abian Peninsula in vhich we will assist the countries
concerned ~o enhance their internal stability and counter middot
Soviet influertce -- -
D The Allies in Europe and Asia from who~ we seek diplomatic
military economic and political assistance in meeting our
middot middot
_ middot middot middotmiddot middot mutuaL security objectives in the Persian Gulf region 7An
- shyearly( focus of effort with these allies and with regional
poiers will be establishing procedures to middotassure quick process
ing_ ofmiddot overflight refueling and staging clearances required
middot for the US to project and sustain forces in Southwest Asia kBJ
III Economic Issues
-~- The Department o~ the Treasury State and Energy will share
respOJSibility in this area Economic subcomponents are
A bull Oil Policy to ensure availability of oil at reasonable
middotmiddot __ _ middot prices middot and to reduce Western _dependence on Gulf oil
Bbullbull Western Economic Assistance in lvhich our goal will be to -middot
help address economic problems in the region through
multila~eral and unilateral efforts middotmiddotmiddot__ middot__ middot
C Saudi and Other Gulf State Financing of Regional Security
Needs~ in which we seek a more compr~hensive region-wide
use of Saudi and other pmiddoteninsular -eal th to meet regional security needs
D Economic Stability ~hich is crucial middot to bbth the internal
and external security and to the political stability of
states in the region It should be an integral component
of the security review process ancmiddott~k~~ - i~~-a middot~ acco~nt middot in
any US decisions concerning military andor econo~ic
assistance ~
SECRET
middot middot dLUIiL I
5
IV Intelligence Issues
The Director qf ~entral Intelligence has the priricipal
responsibility for deTeloping an effective regionally integrated middot
inte~ligence program which is fully supportive of the tasks and middotmiddotbull
objectives in the military diplomatic and economic components
Resources Considerations
middot~ Each agencywili~ be responsible for and will identify the middotmiddot bull
programs iri its area which are required foi implementing this
dire~tiv~ middotIri additi~n each agen~y will propose appropriate middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot prioities for thes~ pr(Jgrams fer middot- middot middot middot middot middot- (_
lt TheOffice of Management and Budget will monitor middotagency proshy- bull bull
grams in support ()f tlisdirectivewill insure that such programs middot ~- shy
are identifiab~e ~~d will insure that they are re~eiving an
appropriately high priority in all agencies feuro7 middot
Coordination
Interagency c6ordination for the security framework shall
middot conti~ue to be ~c~omplished by middotthe sec middot-
- middot
middot --~ middot -_ -_
middotmiddot - middot
-- shy
middot
- -shy
SECRET
famp1
- middot _-_ middot
bullmiddot SECREf SECRET 2
middot
developing a broad range of militaryand ~-related)
response- ~~
options in and outside the region against the Soviet
Union including Us~ force projection into the region
1-~ to~pensaty for the current Soviet regional advantage
in conventional forces middot
--middot making the Soviet Union aware that it will also -~ - - 1 v- ~--(IV_- _middot middot u
a~ide range ~f economicand diplomatic sanctions
a worldwide b~sis if it inter~enes in the regio~ bull
aisisti~g coh~tries in the region to deter and diminish
internal and ~xternal threats to middotstability and to
middot con_tribut~ tomiddotmiddot ~eterring and resisting Soviet
penetratiori _ -~ political economic or military
dimin~shing ~adi~al influence~ in the region hi ~orking for progress toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace
settlement middot middot
_improving access to facilities in the region while
bull remaining ~ensitive to the special historical experience
of the iegi()I1 and not placing in j eop~rdy our
relationshi~~ - or the - internal stability of the -middot - middot-middotmiddotmiddot-
countri~s~~nce~ned by insisting on- formal lt ~
-
- middot _arrangemen~s - where ~hey are not desired
taking ~~reiional approach to secu~ing our economic
and poll~ical interests middotratmiddother than basing their
defense wholly on drawing a line to protect specific
countries in the middot regionmiddot (S--f
There has been co-nsiderable progress in improving our security
posture in the region and in shaping an effective security frame shy
vork In order to ensure that this tr~nd continues I direct that
the Persian Gulf Seturity Framewofk be pursued 1n terms as fotlows ~
SECREf
bull middot bull r- shy 3SECRET
I The Military Component
The Department of Defense has principal responsibility for
initiatives in this area ccin~istent with the respon~ibility of th~
Department of State This component will include greater effort in
the following areas
A US Force Capabilities including forces lift facili shy 7
ties access~foverbuilding and prepositioning of supplies _
exercies and presenc~ in the region
B Local Defense Cap~bilities i~proved through securitymiddot
assistancemiddot advisory programs and enhancement of local
faciiitiei ~nd military capabiliti~s in order t6 supp~rt middot
u~s force ~ projection and local defense d~veloped by
jointplan~ing com~ined exercies consultations~ and
other Jppro~riate meansmiddot __In particular we must strengthen Q bull
Turkeys capabilities to serve as a Jtthreat-in-being
on
_
~he flank of any Soviet intevention iri the
C Getting 6ur Allies to Carry more of the Burden
middot deterrenc~defe~s~ in Euiope and Northeast Asia as part middot
of a r~ tional division of labor in order to permit middot
greater al Ioc~~ion of USmiddot resources to the security of
the ~~r~ian Gulf in the event of a simultaneous
there f-amp1 _
I I The Foreign Polity Component
The Department of State has princip~l responsibility for th i s
com~onent which willmiddotbmiddote carried out in terms of
A The Peace Process in which progress must be achieved as
rapidly as feasible
SECRET
dEbfE I Imiddot
SECRET
B The Northern Tier including Turkey Pakistan and ~ran in
which improved securityrelation are the objective
C middot The A~abian Peninsula in vhich we will assist the countries
concerned ~o enhance their internal stability and counter middot
Soviet influertce -- -
D The Allies in Europe and Asia from who~ we seek diplomatic
military economic and political assistance in meeting our
middot middot
_ middot middot middotmiddot middot mutuaL security objectives in the Persian Gulf region 7An
- shyearly( focus of effort with these allies and with regional
poiers will be establishing procedures to middotassure quick process
ing_ ofmiddot overflight refueling and staging clearances required
middot for the US to project and sustain forces in Southwest Asia kBJ
III Economic Issues
-~- The Department o~ the Treasury State and Energy will share
respOJSibility in this area Economic subcomponents are
A bull Oil Policy to ensure availability of oil at reasonable
middotmiddot __ _ middot prices middot and to reduce Western _dependence on Gulf oil
Bbullbull Western Economic Assistance in lvhich our goal will be to -middot
help address economic problems in the region through
multila~eral and unilateral efforts middotmiddotmiddot__ middot__ middot
C Saudi and Other Gulf State Financing of Regional Security
Needs~ in which we seek a more compr~hensive region-wide
use of Saudi and other pmiddoteninsular -eal th to meet regional security needs
D Economic Stability ~hich is crucial middot to bbth the internal
and external security and to the political stability of
states in the region It should be an integral component
of the security review process ancmiddott~k~~ - i~~-a middot~ acco~nt middot in
any US decisions concerning military andor econo~ic
assistance ~
SECRET
middot middot dLUIiL I
5
IV Intelligence Issues
The Director qf ~entral Intelligence has the priricipal
responsibility for deTeloping an effective regionally integrated middot
inte~ligence program which is fully supportive of the tasks and middotmiddotbull
objectives in the military diplomatic and economic components
Resources Considerations
middot~ Each agencywili~ be responsible for and will identify the middotmiddot bull
programs iri its area which are required foi implementing this
dire~tiv~ middotIri additi~n each agen~y will propose appropriate middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot prioities for thes~ pr(Jgrams fer middot- middot middot middot middot middot- (_
lt TheOffice of Management and Budget will monitor middotagency proshy- bull bull
grams in support ()f tlisdirectivewill insure that such programs middot ~- shy
are identifiab~e ~~d will insure that they are re~eiving an
appropriately high priority in all agencies feuro7 middot
Coordination
Interagency c6ordination for the security framework shall
middot conti~ue to be ~c~omplished by middotthe sec middot-
- middot
middot --~ middot -_ -_
middotmiddot - middot
-- shy
middot
- -shy
SECRET
famp1
- middot _-_ middot
bull middot bull r- shy 3SECRET
I The Military Component
The Department of Defense has principal responsibility for
initiatives in this area ccin~istent with the respon~ibility of th~
Department of State This component will include greater effort in
the following areas
A US Force Capabilities including forces lift facili shy 7
ties access~foverbuilding and prepositioning of supplies _
exercies and presenc~ in the region
B Local Defense Cap~bilities i~proved through securitymiddot
assistancemiddot advisory programs and enhancement of local
faciiitiei ~nd military capabiliti~s in order t6 supp~rt middot
u~s force ~ projection and local defense d~veloped by
jointplan~ing com~ined exercies consultations~ and
other Jppro~riate meansmiddot __In particular we must strengthen Q bull
Turkeys capabilities to serve as a Jtthreat-in-being
on
_
~he flank of any Soviet intevention iri the
C Getting 6ur Allies to Carry more of the Burden
middot deterrenc~defe~s~ in Euiope and Northeast Asia as part middot
of a r~ tional division of labor in order to permit middot
greater al Ioc~~ion of USmiddot resources to the security of
the ~~r~ian Gulf in the event of a simultaneous
there f-amp1 _
I I The Foreign Polity Component
The Department of State has princip~l responsibility for th i s
com~onent which willmiddotbmiddote carried out in terms of
A The Peace Process in which progress must be achieved as
rapidly as feasible
SECRET
dEbfE I Imiddot
SECRET
B The Northern Tier including Turkey Pakistan and ~ran in
which improved securityrelation are the objective
C middot The A~abian Peninsula in vhich we will assist the countries
concerned ~o enhance their internal stability and counter middot
Soviet influertce -- -
D The Allies in Europe and Asia from who~ we seek diplomatic
military economic and political assistance in meeting our
middot middot
_ middot middot middotmiddot middot mutuaL security objectives in the Persian Gulf region 7An
- shyearly( focus of effort with these allies and with regional
poiers will be establishing procedures to middotassure quick process
ing_ ofmiddot overflight refueling and staging clearances required
middot for the US to project and sustain forces in Southwest Asia kBJ
III Economic Issues
-~- The Department o~ the Treasury State and Energy will share
respOJSibility in this area Economic subcomponents are
A bull Oil Policy to ensure availability of oil at reasonable
middotmiddot __ _ middot prices middot and to reduce Western _dependence on Gulf oil
Bbullbull Western Economic Assistance in lvhich our goal will be to -middot
help address economic problems in the region through
multila~eral and unilateral efforts middotmiddotmiddot__ middot__ middot
C Saudi and Other Gulf State Financing of Regional Security
Needs~ in which we seek a more compr~hensive region-wide
use of Saudi and other pmiddoteninsular -eal th to meet regional security needs
D Economic Stability ~hich is crucial middot to bbth the internal
and external security and to the political stability of
states in the region It should be an integral component
of the security review process ancmiddott~k~~ - i~~-a middot~ acco~nt middot in
any US decisions concerning military andor econo~ic
assistance ~
SECRET
middot middot dLUIiL I
5
IV Intelligence Issues
The Director qf ~entral Intelligence has the priricipal
responsibility for deTeloping an effective regionally integrated middot
inte~ligence program which is fully supportive of the tasks and middotmiddotbull
objectives in the military diplomatic and economic components
Resources Considerations
middot~ Each agencywili~ be responsible for and will identify the middotmiddot bull
programs iri its area which are required foi implementing this
dire~tiv~ middotIri additi~n each agen~y will propose appropriate middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot prioities for thes~ pr(Jgrams fer middot- middot middot middot middot middot- (_
lt TheOffice of Management and Budget will monitor middotagency proshy- bull bull
grams in support ()f tlisdirectivewill insure that such programs middot ~- shy
are identifiab~e ~~d will insure that they are re~eiving an
appropriately high priority in all agencies feuro7 middot
Coordination
Interagency c6ordination for the security framework shall
middot conti~ue to be ~c~omplished by middotthe sec middot-
- middot
middot --~ middot -_ -_
middotmiddot - middot
-- shy
middot
- -shy
SECRET
famp1
- middot _-_ middot
dEbfE I Imiddot
SECRET
B The Northern Tier including Turkey Pakistan and ~ran in
which improved securityrelation are the objective
C middot The A~abian Peninsula in vhich we will assist the countries
concerned ~o enhance their internal stability and counter middot
Soviet influertce -- -
D The Allies in Europe and Asia from who~ we seek diplomatic
military economic and political assistance in meeting our
middot middot
_ middot middot middotmiddot middot mutuaL security objectives in the Persian Gulf region 7An
- shyearly( focus of effort with these allies and with regional
poiers will be establishing procedures to middotassure quick process
ing_ ofmiddot overflight refueling and staging clearances required
middot for the US to project and sustain forces in Southwest Asia kBJ
III Economic Issues
-~- The Department o~ the Treasury State and Energy will share
respOJSibility in this area Economic subcomponents are
A bull Oil Policy to ensure availability of oil at reasonable
middotmiddot __ _ middot prices middot and to reduce Western _dependence on Gulf oil
Bbullbull Western Economic Assistance in lvhich our goal will be to -middot
help address economic problems in the region through
multila~eral and unilateral efforts middotmiddotmiddot__ middot__ middot
C Saudi and Other Gulf State Financing of Regional Security
Needs~ in which we seek a more compr~hensive region-wide
use of Saudi and other pmiddoteninsular -eal th to meet regional security needs
D Economic Stability ~hich is crucial middot to bbth the internal
and external security and to the political stability of
states in the region It should be an integral component
of the security review process ancmiddott~k~~ - i~~-a middot~ acco~nt middot in
any US decisions concerning military andor econo~ic
assistance ~
SECRET
middot middot dLUIiL I
5
IV Intelligence Issues
The Director qf ~entral Intelligence has the priricipal
responsibility for deTeloping an effective regionally integrated middot
inte~ligence program which is fully supportive of the tasks and middotmiddotbull
objectives in the military diplomatic and economic components
Resources Considerations
middot~ Each agencywili~ be responsible for and will identify the middotmiddot bull
programs iri its area which are required foi implementing this
dire~tiv~ middotIri additi~n each agen~y will propose appropriate middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot prioities for thes~ pr(Jgrams fer middot- middot middot middot middot middot- (_
lt TheOffice of Management and Budget will monitor middotagency proshy- bull bull
grams in support ()f tlisdirectivewill insure that such programs middot ~- shy
are identifiab~e ~~d will insure that they are re~eiving an
appropriately high priority in all agencies feuro7 middot
Coordination
Interagency c6ordination for the security framework shall
middot conti~ue to be ~c~omplished by middotthe sec middot-
- middot
middot --~ middot -_ -_
middotmiddot - middot
-- shy
middot
- -shy
SECRET
famp1
- middot _-_ middot
middot middot dLUIiL I
5
IV Intelligence Issues
The Director qf ~entral Intelligence has the priricipal
responsibility for deTeloping an effective regionally integrated middot
inte~ligence program which is fully supportive of the tasks and middotmiddotbull
objectives in the military diplomatic and economic components
Resources Considerations
middot~ Each agencywili~ be responsible for and will identify the middotmiddot bull
programs iri its area which are required foi implementing this
dire~tiv~ middotIri additi~n each agen~y will propose appropriate middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot prioities for thes~ pr(Jgrams fer middot- middot middot middot middot middot- (_
lt TheOffice of Management and Budget will monitor middotagency proshy- bull bull
grams in support ()f tlisdirectivewill insure that such programs middot ~- shy
are identifiab~e ~~d will insure that they are re~eiving an
appropriately high priority in all agencies feuro7 middot
Coordination
Interagency c6ordination for the security framework shall
middot conti~ue to be ~c~omplished by middotthe sec middot-
- middot
middot --~ middot -_ -_
middotmiddot - middot
-- shy
middot
- -shy
SECRET
famp1
- middot _-_ middot
