Modernizing the Iraq Oil Industry: The Iraq Oil Law and Future Possibilities

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Modernizing the Iraq Oil Industry: The Iraq Oil Law and Future Possibilities

Gregory S. Wang

U85-502 Directed Research Project

Graduate Program in International Affairs

Washington University in St. Louis

Summer 2008


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Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Brief History of Iraqi Oil Development 2

Iraq National Oil Company 2

The Iraqi Hydrocarbon Law 4

The Oil Council 5Regional Authority 6The INOC and Contracting 7Revenues 9

Distribution of Oil Revenue 10

Four Models of Allocation 11Centralized Public 11

Decentralized Public 12Centralized Private 12Decentralized Private 12

Oil Development in Other Nations 14

Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) 14Libya

Buyback Model 15Kuwait 15

Project Kuwait 16Development and Production Contract 17

Other Considerations in Iraq 17

Conclusions 18

References Cited 20


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Modernizing the Iraqi Oil Industry: The Iraqi Oil Law and the Future of Iraq

Gregory S. Wang

Introduction

Global prices of crude oil reached a new high of over $138 per barrel in the springof 2008, an incredible jump from the crude oil prices in 2003 of around $35 per barrel(Mufson and Irwin 2008; EIA-MonthlyEnergy 2004). The average American driver hasexperienced increases in gasoline prices rising from around $1.50 per gallon 5 years agoto near $4.00 per gallon today (EIA-Historical Prices 2008). This has given pressure to

new debate regarding alternate energy sources and new oil development.

According to the Energy Information Administration, a branch of the U.S.Department of Energy, the country of Iraq is currently listed as having the third largestproven reserves of oil in the world with reserves of 115 million barrels and the potentialfor even more in undiscovered fields (EIA-Iraq 2007). Similar to many other MiddleEastern countries, oil is the main export and an integral source of revenue for the Iraqieconomy. Therefore, with the United States greatly involved in the redevelopment ofIraq and its oil industry, the country is undergoing numerous changes to decades-old oilpolicy to get ready to become a major supplier of oil to the energy-hungry world.

The pumping of crude oil is rarely easy, and many potential issues are involved.Some of the oil-related dilemmas in Iraq on obtaining oil centers on the control of oil andthe handling of potential wealth. This brings issues such as how to separate the control ofoil between the central and the regional governments and how to balance between theprivate and the public sector. This control of oil is most important because it will predicthow oil revenue will be distributed and how much ownership and revenue will actuallygo to the people of the country.

There is much pressure from the United States and from many policy-makers inIraq for the country to quickly come to some consensus on overriding issues that havedelayed new oil production. Pre-war levels of oil production in Iraq were around 2.5million bbl/d and are currently about 1.5 million bbl/d post-invasion (EIA-Iraq Exports2007). This indicates there is much potential for development of Iraqs oil industry,especially compared with other regional countries like Iran at about 4 million bbl/d andSaudi Arabia at 7 million bbl/d (EIA-Iran Oil 2007; EIA-Saudi Exports 2007).

The Iraqi Parliament has been debating the Iraqi Oil Law (Hydrocarbon Law)since 2007. This will be critically important legislation in determining the rules to whichcontracting international oil companies must adhere for future oil development. The law

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will define the distribution of wealth among Iraq's three principal groups, the Kurds,Shiites, and Sunnis, which has been an issue of debate because of the current instabilitybetween these factions. The law also anticipates that foreign oil companies will play alarge role in the development and production of future oil fields in Iraq. This is contestedby opposition that believes international companies will take advantage of the current

weakness of the Iraqi government by establishing exploitative production sharingagreements (PSAs). The distribution of oil revenues are an important consideration forIraqs oil policy where allocations to the regions and the people will need to bedetermined as well as putting money toward the long-term development of Iraq.

In order to evaluate the alternatives available for organizing the new Iraq oileconomy, it is important to first understand the environment and history of the Iraqs oilindustry. Iraqs past gives indication of Iraqs nationalism and how it would bebeneficial to maintain the Iraq National Oil Company in the future. Additionally, thehistory of Iraq provides much information about the current state of oil production in Iraqand how it might benefit from international oil company investment and technology.

Following a brief look at Iraqs past, a close examination of the last proposedIraqi oil law in 2007 will be performed to see the issues that are currently under debate.After this, the issue of revenue distribution will be looked at as well as structures of theoil production regulations in other countries. To conclude this paper, the currenthappenings in Iraq regarding oil will be observed as well as predictions and suggestionsfor the possible oil economy.

The future of Iraq lies with rebuilding the country and developing its economy.The decision of how and by whom the oil will be developed and how the fruits of thiseffort will be distributed to the people will likely determine the new Iraq.

Brief History of Iraqi Oil Development

The production of oil has long been the staple export for the Iraqi economy. Thehistory of Iraqs oil development has been difficult due to a number of internal politicalconflicts, wars with Iran, and economic sanctions. With estimated proven reserves of 115billion barrels of oil and possibly over 100 billion barrels undiscovered, Iraq has muchpotential for growth in supplying the international demand for energy (EIA-Iraq 2007;Muttitt 2005, 19). To understand some of the factors influencing the decisions beingmade today, an understanding of the past events of Iraq will be beneficial. The path tothe present day oil development began with the push for production under SaddamHusseins regime in the 1970s, the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iraqs invasion of Kuwaitfollowed by economic sanctions in the 1990s, to finally the occupation period of presentday Iraq.

The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), formerly known as the Turkish PetroleumCompany has been the main producer of oil in Iraq since 1925. The IPC at itsestablishment was a conglomerate of several foreign shareholders. In 1958, Abdul KarimQassem, belonging to the Iraqi military, helped lead a military coup to overthrow the

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monarchy of Iraq. On becoming the Prime Minister, Qassem pushed forwardnegotiations that would force the involvement of the government in the production of oil.He would demand the government possess a 20% ownership of the company and have aseat on the board directing the IPC (Stork 1975). Failing negotiations, Qassem thenissued Public Law 80 which, against much protest and dispute from the oil company,

assumed government control of 99.5% of concession areas from the IPC leaving themwith only the land on which they were currently producing oil.

In 1971, the remaining assets of the IPC in Iraq were nationalized to then createthe Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) which would then control all of the oil productionin Iraq. Kamil Mahdi, Senior Lecturer in Middle East Economics at the University ofExeter, when commenting on the development of the oil industry while in control byforeign companies said:

In 50 years of sole control of Iraqs crude oil production, foreign companiesfailed to establish any commercial refining capacity within the country.

Virtually all gas was flared and there was no local downstream oil-basedindustry. Reservoir and environmental management was poor and the foreignconsortium refused to share essential technical information with localpolicymakers (Mahdi 2007, 12).

Mahdi indicates with the above passage the mismanagement by foreign companies ofIraqs oil resources in the past. This would then lead to nationalization that can today beused for promoting government control of the Iraqi oil industry.

Nationalization of the industry brought increases in production. During Saddamsrule of Iraq, he pushed for aggressive oil production from 1976-1980 bringing productioncapacity to about 3.7mbd in 1979 with plans for 5.5mbd by 1983 (Khadduri 2004).Saddam viewed oil as the principal income of his regime and pushed production toincrease government wealth and security. However, in 1980, oil development wasstunted when Iraq attacked its neighbor Iran. During this war, Iran focused bombingefforts on many economic targets, destroying many oil facilities, and severely putting adent in Iraqs oil development.

Another five-year plan was introduced following the war in 1989 and capacitywas brought up to 3.5mbd, with an optimistic target of 6mbd by 1995 (Khadduri 2004).Still, Iraqs greatly weakened economy from the past eight years at war with Iranprevented any quick growth, and relations were beginning to sour with their neighbors inKuwait. The Iraqi government accused Kuwait of enacting a form of economic warfareby increasing production of oil past OPEC limits during the downturn of prices and ofstealing Iraqi oil from the Rumailah fields. Iraq then decided to take over prosperousKuwait claiming that Kuwait was a part of Iraq in August of 1990.

Following the war, Iraq was faced with 13 years of economic sanctions and wasbarred from selling its oil on the international markets. A United Nations report in 2000described Iraqs oil industry as being in a terrible condition and the industry was known

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for having to improvise their engineering and cannibalize from other plants (Mahdi 2007,12; Khadduri 2004). Iraqs oil industry was in a poor state maintaining around 2.8 mbdbefore the US war with Iraq. Presently, Iraq is oil production capacity is about 2.4 mbdand they are striving to rebuild and develop to the previous level and beyond (Lando2008b). Iraqs long tenure of government possession of oil resources provides the

background from which the drafters of Iraqs new oil policies work from and influencesdecisions made today.

The Iraqi Hydrocarbon Law

The Iraq Hydrocarbon Law was drafted by a three-person team of experts in theinternational oil industry. The drafters of the law were a committee designated in May2006 by Iraqi Oil Minister Husain al-Shahristani (Khadduri 2007):

Thamir al-Ghadhban, the former Iraqi Oil Minister and an advisor to PrimeMinister of Iraq Nouri al-Maliki

Faruq al-Kassim, a Norwegian oil expert with previous experience drafting oillaws in developing countries

Tariq Shafiq, one of the founding members of the Iraq National Oil Companywho is now employed by the consulting firm Petrolog & Associates

After drafting the law, it was submitted to the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salehthat assigned a committee made of federal representatives and Kurdistan RegionalGovernment officials. This committee then reviewed and revised the document for eightmonths when it was then unanimously approved (Khadduri 2007). The draft was sent bythe Iraqi cabinet in February of 2007 and then submitted to the Iraqi Council ofRepresentatives for approval where it has been in discussion and revision to the current

day (Shafiq 2007b). A main criticism of the drafting process of the law is that it waswritten behind closed doors with no public discussion of the oil law before it wasreleased. This gave little opportunity for other industry experts or non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) to review and provide feedback (Al-Shamma 2007; Mahdi 2007,13).

It is important to note that the basis of the draft oil law is grounded by the 2005Iraqi Constitution. It is particularly influenced by Articles 110-115 which address theboundaries and sharing of different areas, the ownership of oil and related resources, andthe structuring between the different parts of the government. These are the areas of mostcontention on the draft law, superseded by the Iraqi Constitution (Mahdi 2007, 16).

This draft law is one of a series of four proposed laws that would restructureIraqs oil industry. The drafts stated purpose is to establish the regime for themanagement of Petroleum Operations in the Republic of Iraq and to build uponexisting co-operation between the relevant Ministries in the Federal Governmentadministration (Draft Iraq Oil and Gas Law 2007, 5). This draft law would be used toresolve the constitutional conflicts arising from the mentioned articles, the practicaloperational requirements of the oil industry, and the need to protect Iraqs oil wealth

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establish a strong central Iraqi government and the Iraqi Oil Law. Conflicting statementsexist between the State Department, that says they discouraged the contracts, and HuntOil, that says they have documentation showing State Department encouragement orneutrality on the issue (Glanz and Oppel 2007). This type of controversy brings to lightconfusion in American policy and shows evidence of a push for US company

involvement in Iraq oil.

The central government has already qualified 35 companies to be able to bid onoil service contracts and has held on their threat of blacklisting any of the companies thathad signed with the Kurds from obtaining federal contracts (Lando 2008b). Theoccurrence of the Kurds pursuing to establish their own contracts with foreign companiesdespite the central Iraqi government reflects the lack of cohesion within the country andthe difficulties in passing a comprehensive oil law. However, recent news indicates acompromise may have been garnered between the central government and the Kurdishregional government. Iraqi news-outlets reported on April 15 that an agreement has beenestablished between Iraqs central government and the Kurdish regional government

regarding the validity of the Kurds previously established oil deals (Lando 2008c). Withan agreement made on Kurdish contracts, the Iraqi government can then progress indeveloping their oil policies.

The INOC and Contracting. The Iraq National Oil Company is to be stronglytied to the government and will be able to produce and sell oil on its behalf. The INOC isto be legally owned by the Iraqi government yet will be financially and administrativelyindependent. The INOC will be given flexibility in being able to operate throughout thecountry as well as participate in other outside ventures per approval by the Council (DraftIraq Oil and Gas Law 2007, 12).

Articles 12 and 15 of the draft law outline the scope of the INOC which allow itto manage and operate existing fields and also allow the participation in the explorationof future field development. It is important then to note that the draft oil law has annexesthat include descriptions of oil fields that are either presently producing, discovered, orexploration areas. These annexes specify which fields are allocated to the INOC andwhich will be open to foreign companies; however, the draft law still leaves open thepossibility for the INOC to work in all stages of the production and exploration of oil inall fields. At the same time, the law also says the INOC must diligently seek anddevelop associations, affiliations, joint ventures and other forms of partnership and or co-operation in order to promote the rapid growth of an Iraqi private sector showing a goodfaith invitation for foreign participation (Draft Iraq Oil and Gas Law 2007, 21). Article 6of the draft law covers the creation of the INOC, and here it specifies that for any newfields, the INOC is to compete with foreign oil companies for an exploration andproduction contract (Draft Iraq Oil and Gas Law 2007, 13).

In discussing the involvement of foreign oil companies in the draft law, awardof contracts for oil production are to be under an Exploration and Production contract.These contracts are to be awarded on a competitive basis so that the resources remainunder national control, produce optimum economic return to the country, and such

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There are some methods that the Iraqi Government could implement to limit theprofits of foreign oil companies and bring in additional income for domestic use anddevelopment. One method would be a progressive tax rate that would increase in timesof higher oil prices. This type of tax is being implemented in Alaska where the tax ratewill increase by 0.4% per dollar when the Alaskan crude oil price is higher than $52

(Office of Governor Sarah Palin 2007). With the high oil prices, Alaska is currentlydiscussing new tax rebates to Alaskan citizens with the estimated $7 billion excess instate revenues (Marois 2008). The progressive royalty system would be helpful in thatoil companies will want to carefully monitor their production volumes and supply inorder to maximize their profits.

Instead of using royalties, Iraq could use an auction system in which companieswould bid on the initial lease of producing oil on lands. The auction system will revealthe oil industrys real valuation of each site of production as they submit bids to thegovernment for rights to produce on a particular section of land. Then the profits are splitbetween the government and the company on pre-negotiated conditions (Firey 2006).

The auction system or some variant tends to be a more preferred method as indicated bythe preference of the Iraq government through current acceptance of bids for servicecontracts for assisting in developing current oil fields. Until the drafting of the fourthsection of the oil law is completed outlining how the regulations for profits and howrevenues will be distributed, speculation can only be based on the published releases tothe media.

Summary of the Draft Oil Law. The draft Iraq Oil Law suggests manystructural changes for the Ministry of Oil and provides some insights on how the future ofoil production will be carried out. Much in the draft law, however, is left very unclearleaving room for debate and discussion on the actual intentions and the practicalimplementation of the articles. From the previously mentioned section on the INOC andContracting, the Ministry of Oils attitude on working with foreign nations gives someindication of a liberal attitude toward foreign involvement. In the Oil Council sectionof this paper, it was shown that the draft law states that the Ministry of Oil will overseethe award and management of exploration and production contracts, but whether thesecontracts will be production sharing agreements (PSAs), service contracts, or othervariant, it will not be known until the awards of these contracts have been made or isexplicitly addressed in an approved revision of the oil law.

There is also much leeway in the interaction between the federal and regionalarms of government and how oil revenues will ultimately be distributed. For reasonssuch as these, the draft law is still in discussion and yet to be passed by the Iraqi Councilof Representatives.

Distribution of Oil Revenue

In planning the future of the oil industry, an essential question will be how oilrevenues will be distributed in Iraq. How revenues accrued will be allocated to the state,the regions, and to the people of Iraq sets the framework for control from the most

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influential industry in the country. While considering different methods for revenueallocation, Iraq will also need to keep in mind to avoid the risks of Dutch disease as wellas falling back into an authoritarian state.

The issue of making maximum use of the derived oil income is important or

Iraq may fall into Dutch disease, defined as the result of an inflow of oil money(creating) inflationary pressure, which tends to foster particular patterns of consumptionand investment, and finally affects other industries, eventually weakening thediversification of the economy (Kalyuzhnova 2002, 60). The Iraqi example of thiswould be an overdependence on their oil economy, neglecting other development.

Countries based on an economy of oil also often fall victim to authoritarianism.This is because when these countries are able to build revenue from this single source ofincome, they no longer must be dependent and responsible to the people of the state,allowing for the authority to do as they please (Springborg 2007, 33-34). As previousmentioned in the essay, the draft oil law does specify the creation of an Oil and Revenue

Fund for distribution to the federal and regional governments and for a Future Fundfor economic development which indicates the drafters are planning for some oversightof revenue and its allocation.

Robert Springborg of the London Middle East Institute was the lead author ofthe book Oil and Democracy in Iraq that is one of the first publications on the topic ofthe different alternatives for the future Iraq oil industry. The book explores the differentpossibilities of the management of revenues in Iraq based on four types of models(Springborg 2007, 39):

1. Public Centralized2. Public Decentralized3. Private Centralized4. Private Decentralized

These models provide a useful groundwork in looking at different alternatives for Iraq,and a basis for evaluating the current method Iraq is pursuing.

Centralized - Public. Public centralized allocation of revenues refers to thedistribution of revenues in a Natural Resource Fund (NRF) where the money can beinvested and distributed to promote economic growth and security. The Kuwaiti Fund forthe Future is an example of a NRF where revenue is to be set aside for futuredevelopment of other industries as Kuwaiti oil is depleted (Springborg 2007, 40-41, 44).Distributions could be performed through the use of government loans targeting smallbusinesses or redistribution of money to alleviate poverty. It is noted that this type ofsystem is more appropriate when there are rifts in the states political system becausemoney would be safely deposited with the NRF and to restrict the power of the centralgovernment (Springborg 2007, 43). Hence, this may be very useful in that Iraq isparticularly fragmented and politically unstable with its current conflicts. Differentfactions within Iraq may also find this system appealing as it puts all revenues in one spot

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Heritage Foundation also advocates the creation of this type of fund where researchfellow Ariel Cohen wrote that such a fund would protect oil revenues from the longhands of the Iraqi politicians. As in the Alaska model, part of the revenue should bedistributed directly to the bank accounts of every Iraqi (Cohen 2004).

There are many implications for Iraq if this type of system were to beimplemented. Alaska in 2003 issued $1000 to each citizen from the fund whichrepresented about 5% of each citizens total income; whereas, if that amount were givento each Iraqi citizen, it would represent about 80% of their total income (Springborg2007, 65). Sums of money of this magnitude to the Iraqi people may create anoverdependence on government support.

In addition to the problem of finding the correct balance of income to distribute,other structural and social differences exist in Iraq that would need to be worked out.One such problem would be how to distribute the money to the people in Iraq due to lessbanking participation, how to define eligibility to receive money, possible social conflicts

such as women empowerment by having money in a patriarchal society, and economicconcerns (Springborg 2007, 66). Springborg emphasizes the banking issue in Iraq sayingthat direct distributions of revenues would extensive financial information onindividuals and families, [and] might well be insurmountable [in present Iraq](Springborg 2007, 66). The public decentralized system would require many details to beaddressed, as would any such plan being implemented, but would be revolutionary andvery different from other previous ideas.

When deciding how the revenues will be distributed, Iraqs system will reflectone of the four models in some form. From the information provided by the Draft OilLaw and on the current discussions, Article 11 of the Draft Law indicates a large role forthe central government and the Ministry of Oil in awarding contracts and distributinggovernment revenues (Draft Iraq Oil and Gas Law 2007, 18). This type of arrangementis similar to the public centralized version of revenue distribution where Iraqs oilrevenues will be put into a central fund, the Oil Revenue Fund, and another smallportion set aside in a development fund, The Future Fund (Springborg 2007, 40-41;Draft Iraq Oil and Gas Law 2007, 18). The actual proportions for allocation to thesefunds and their subsequent distribution is yet to come with the fourth section of the DraftLaw; however, there is the chance that this may not reflect at all how revenues will bedistributed in Iraq without the passage of the Draft Oil Law.

While this section discusses many different models for organizing revenuedistribution, the actual decisions will need to be made according to the actual situation inIraq. Springborg believes that Iraqis are less heterogeneous in regard to oil than theirmix of religions, ethnicities and political commitments might suggest. Therefore, hesays that Iraqis, in general, would support revenue distributions of a centralized ordecentralized public model that would reserve funds for social welfare or distributerevenues to the people (Springborg 2007, 98).

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bbl/d1but found that they would need foreign assistance in order to achieve this goal(Kuwait Project 2008).

The bringing in of foreign companies to a predominantly nationally-controlled oilindustry was recognized and changes were made. Per Kuwaits Foreign Direct

Investment Act of March 2001, restrictions on foreign entities were lessened; however,the Kuwaiti Constitution strictly forbids allowing foreign entities to own any of Kuwaitsnatural resources. In this situation, one may think that PSAs would be the alternativesolution to obtain foreign aid and yet still retain the national ownership of the land, butKuwait instead is opting for an incentivized buy-back contract2 (EIA-Kuwait 2006).

This buyback proposal for foreign assistance in oil development was namedProject Kuwait with the focus of developing Kuwaits northern fields through foreignassistance. Project Kuwait held four main tenets (Kuwait Project 2008):

1. Oil industry in Kuwaits Northern fields to increase oil production from

400,000 to 900,000 barrels daily.2. The employment, training, and development of Kuwaiti citizens.3. The transfer of modern technology for the production and development ofdifficult oil fields.4. Minimizing the risk on Capital, to develop certain projects in the KuwaitNorthern fields and to accomplish the most profitable income for the country.

The planned Kuwait Project will allow the Kuwaiti government to retain fullownership of oil reserves, control over oil production levels, and strategic management ofthe ventures (EIA-Kuwait 2006). International companies will receive payment throughoil in addition to additional bonuses and incentives for increasing production (EIA-Kuwait 2006). Project Kuwait was originally planned to begin in 2005 but has beendelayed and is currently being discussed in the Kuwaiti parliament. The main point ofthe opposition indicated that original estimates of investment by the Kuwaiti governmentfor Project Kuwait of $8.5 billion dollars were unrealistic which the current chiefexecutive of the Kuwait Petroleum Corp Saad Al-Shuwayib has acknowledged. Costswould be at least double the original. Still, as of 2007, efforts are underway as Kuwait isaccepting bids from foreign companies for Project Kuwait (Reuters 2007).

According to Greg Muttitt (2005, 33) a structure such as Project Kuwait could beanother alternative for Iraq. This is another archetype that would allow the governmentto retain control of the oil fields and limit the profits of oil companies, yet still be able toobtain the foreign assistance needed for development (Muttitt 2005, 33). Iraq couldestablish this type of contract for foreign assistance in developing and exploring newfields and keep the national oil company producing from current fields, in-line with theproposal in the Iraq Draft Oil Law (Draft Iraq Oil and Gas Law 2007, 21).

1 The EIA reports Kuwait is striving for 4 million bbl/d by 2010 and 5 million bbl/d by 2020 which may bemore updated since Kuwait is already producing at the 2.6 million mark (EIA-Kuwait 2006)2 Buyback contracts are similar to Risk Service Contracts where foreign companies provide capital andtechnical expertise in return for a portion of the oil sales or actual compensation in oil (Muttitt 2005, 25)

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Development and Production Contract (1990s Iraq). Another method for thenew government for Iraq to explore when considering the types of contracts that will besigned with foreign companies is the development and production contract. This type ofcontract was used in the 1990s by Saddam Hussein. Foreign companies would developand produce an oil field for a fixed period of time, around 12 years, after which they

would then turn over control to the national government. Following the return of thefield, the foreign company may continue on through a technical service agreement bywhich they would provide assistance to the national oil company as needed in return for aprivilege to buy oil at market or a discounted price (Muttitt 2005, 33). This type ofcontract, like others proposed, allows for national control of the oil fields and limits theprofits of foreign companies with the benefit of still obtaining foreign assistance indevelopment.

There are several examples of contract types in use that Iraq might implement tofulfill the requirement of national government ownership of the fields, yet also the needfor foreign oil company investment and expertise. Iraqi policymakers will need to review

the different options available, and compare Iraqs situation with that of other nations toassist in making the optimal decision.

Other Considerations in Iraq

In addition to deciding the contract type to be used and the actual distribution ofrevenues, other issues in Iraq will need to be resolved. Some of these include howcontrol will be split between the central government and the regions and how theregulation of oil will be administered, the instability of government within Iraq, andmanaging US interests for Iraqi oil with the best for Iraq.

The conflict between the central government and the Kurdish region may bemaking some progress towards resolution. There are reports that Iraqi officials havecome to an agreement with the Kurdish region in resolving the dispute stemming fromthe Kurds moving to sign their own oil development contracts and their own oil lawdespite the lack of a central Iraqi oil law (Lando 2008c). With the Kurds having alreadytheir own oil law, it is yet to be determined how regulations by the central governmentmight affect them or if they will have their own autonomy in this matter.

The Kurdish oil law actually has many similarities to the Draft Oil Law for theIraqi government submitted in February 2007. The Kurd Natural Resources MinisterAshti Hawrami said that the Draft Law for the federal government is in line with ourlaw (Lando 2007). The Kurd Oil Law indicates that all revenues from the oil productionwill go to the central government where after expenses and other distributions are takenout, 17% of net revenue will be returned to the Kurdistan Regional Government for theirown allocation (Kurdistan Regional Government 2007). While some of the numbers mayneed to be negotiated and analyzed for suitability and reasonableness, the law may beable to fit with the stipulations of the Draft Iraq Oil Law, yet the actual arrangements andfuture for the current Kurd contracts and the involvement of the central government is yetto be discovered.

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With Iraq using short-term two-year service contracts in lieu of having a firm oillaw, they will be able to improve the productivity of their current fields and leave thedecisions for future fields for another day. This move will allow the Iraqi governmentand Western powers additional time to work on the security climate of Iraq and continue

efforts to pass a comprehensive oil law.

From researching the draft oil law and the recommendations from experts andwriters of the subject, several recurring points stand out as being important for the futureIraqi oil industry, and many of these issues can be addressed through the establishment ofan Iraqi oil law. Therefore, the law is a very important piece of Iraqs future oil economybecause its effect will be felt throughout the industry. This oil law should work to ensurethe following:

1. Central ownership of petroleum resources rather than regional ownership

With the main Iraqi government as the center point of distribution of oil revenues,this will give greater authority to adhering to the laws governing oil production as well asallow for less biased distribution of resources to the regions. While there is centralownership of resources, compromises could also be made that allow for regions tothemselves determine the specific distributions of their allocated revenues to moreefficiently use money where needed. In this situation, the benefits of both a strongcentral control to govern oil production and revenues and the different situations ofregions can be addressed.

2. A revenue distribution method that acknowledges concerns for long-termdevelopment

The immediate development needs of Iraq should be addressed through a portionof oil revenues but the long-term development of Iraq should not be forgotten. The useof a system, such as a Natural Resource Fund, can be used for other businessdevelopment outside the petroleum industry to ensure the future prosperity of Iraq. Thismoney can also be partially used to address poverty concerns and job development goalsin Iraqs economic growth.

3. Continues use of the Iraq National Oil Company in oil exploration and production

The interests of the INOC are, by default, of the national governments as they arenationally owned and operated. They can be kept competitive through regularcompetition with international companies and should be permitted to participate incurrent and future oil exploration and production. The use of the INOC is in concurrencewith the current nationalistic attitudes present in Iraq but if this changes at a future pointin time, then more privatization of the industry could be allowed, if appropriate.

4. The use of international oil companies to the benefit of Iraqi interests, ideallythrough contracts that have short periods of performance

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Most analysts agree that international oil company assistance in development andproduction would be of benefit to Iraqs aging equipment and lagging behind in the mostrecent technological advances. However, Western nations should not be allowed to setupexploitative contracts with Iraq that would drain the wealth of the nation. Until Iraq

develops a firm oil law and has stronger political stability and overall security, short-termcontracts can be arranged to begin renovating the aging production facilities in Iraq whileholding off on new development for a more ideal time. Contrary to current events of no-bid contracts being awarded to international companies for this effort, proposals shouldall be fairly competed to ensure Iraq obtains the best deal.

The oil law needs to directly address the contracting rules with international oilcompanies and could address types of contracts that could be used, such as buy-backcontracts and service contracts that would be able to acquire the foreign companyassistance yet leave control to Iraq.

The United States and other Western nations involved in Iraqs future should takegreat care in assisting the Iraqi people in development and avoid meddling in their affairsfor self-interest. If Iraq can successfully establish their oil industry with the strategiesoffered, they should be better positioned for future growth and prosperity. A centrallycontrolled economy that makes the best use of international oil companies whileallocating oil revenues to Iraqs future growth is probably an ideal resolution for thestructure of Iraqs oil economy. The legacy of Iraqs oil development is likely to have along-lasting impact on the new Iraq, other nations pursuing oil, the stabilization of theMiddle East, and most important, the Iraqi people.

References Cited

Agence France-Presse. 2007 (November 19). Iraq to Blacklist Firms which Signed OilDeals with Kurds. http://www.iraqdirectory.com/DisplayNews.aspx?id=4996.Accessed 2008 January 23.

Al-Shamma, Karim. 2007 (May 6). Discounting Experts from the Iraqi Oil Law. DarAl-Hayat. http://64.26.31.21:2010/business/05-2007/Article-20070506-60f0e0bf-c0a8-10ed-01b2-ede8e967def5/story.html. Accessed 2008 June 23.

Ali, Reema. 2005 (March 9). Outside View: Libyas Oil Prospects. Ali & Partners anddistributed by UPI.http://www.mideastlaw.com/article_outside_view_libyas_oil_prospects.html.Accessed 2008 May 27.

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Modernizing the Iraq Oil Industry: The Iraq Oil Law and Future Possibilities

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