Modernization of the Chinese Navy: Implications for Southeast Asia
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Transcript of Modernization of the Chinese Navy: Implications for Southeast Asia
The Modernization of the Chinese Navy:
Implications for Southeast Asia
Craig Jeffries University of California, San Diego
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies
June 2010
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 I. Introduction Since the mid 1990s China has sought to modernize its navy so as to better
respond to the challenges affecting its national interests. After the Taiwan Strait Crisis in
1995-96, the importance of this mission was further pressed into the daily thinking of the
top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Having witnessed first-hand the
overwhelming naval force that the U.S. could deploy, during the crisis, officials in Beijing
began to rethink their current investment strategy of its navy. Consequently, China’s
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) began a serious modernization effort.
Today, the result of this modernization effort is that China now possesses the
largest navy of any Asian country. In the past ten years, China has deployed ten new
classes of naval vessels, expanded their submarine force to include 8 nuclear submarines,
and has built a naval base on the southern island of Hainan that can house it submarines
and allows direct access to the South China Sea (SCS).1 These developments have come
as the result of the PLAN’s new focus on ‚far-sea defense‛, which places less emphasis on
Taiwan and more toward external power projection. One of the areas where China’s naval
modernization is to play an important role in the future is Southeast Asia, specifically
within the SCS and around the Strait of Malacca. Consequently, this paper will focus on
1 “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2009, p. 22 & p. 49
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 the implications of China’s naval modernization and new ‚far-sea defense‛ strategy for
states in Southeast Asia, with a particular emphasis on the Philippines, Singapore and Viet
Nam.
This paper first examines the evolution of the PLAN’s structure, roles and
capabilities. The second section discusses in detail the driving factors behind Beijing’s
naval modernization in Southeast Asia. The third section focuses on how particular states
in Southeast Asia have reacted to China’s naval expansion. In particular, the Philippines
and Viet Nam have concerns over China’s intentions in the SCS maritime dispute over the
Spratly and Paracel island-chains; while Singapore is concerned that China’s naval
modernization will upset the regional balance of power vis-à-vis the U.S. navy. This paper
concludes by attempting to undress Beijing’s intentions in the Southeast Asian maritime
sphere, and the meaning of its policy of ‚far-sea defense‛. The question of whether PLAN
modernization poses a legitimate threat to regional states will also be raised.
II. Evolution of the PLAN: Overview of the Structure, Roles and Capabilities of China’s Navy
With its origins dating back to the beginning of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), the Chinese navy was established in 1950 after Mao Zedong declared that the
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 country needed to build a powerful navy in order to keep out imperial aggressors.2 In the
mid-1950s China built up its naval capabilities by adding vessels purchased from
Moscow. During this time the navy was split into three organizational divisions based on
geographic location: a North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet and South Sea Fleet. In the late-
1950s China began producing primitive indigenous naval vessels with the help of its newly
established commercial shipbuilding industry.3
The PLAN was mostly spared from the devastating effects of the Great Leap
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, as the PLA ground forces had the responsibility of
enforcing Mao’s edicts during these campaigns. However, naval modernization was
severely disrupted with the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, with Moscow withdrawing all of its
financial and technical support. Consequently, Beijing had to develop its naval forces on
its own and began to establish numerous national naval research centers to facilitate its
domestic naval innovation and production capacity. The result was the development of
first generation vessels, including the first nuclear-powered submarine—produced mostly
as a result of reversed engineering Soviet versions.4
2 “People’s Liberation Navy – History”, Global Security, accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-history.htm 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 The 1970s began the ‚golden era‛ of naval modernization, when the PLAN’s budget
represented about 20 percent of overall annual military spending. During this decade
China dramatically expanded its arsenal by building up its submarine force and adding
several new types of surface vessels. In the 1980s, naval modernization dropped off
somewhat due to across-the-board cuts in the PLA budget due to Deng Xiaoping’s new
emphasis on economic development. Yet, during this decade and continuing into the
1990s, the PLAN reformed its officer training techniques seeking to ‚professionalize‛ the
service.5
Historically, the PLAN’s roles have been to protect the coastline of the Chinese
mainland and immediate littoral sphere. And the fact that China’s navy was a ‚brown-
water‛ navy limited its roles to primarily coastal defense. As Deng Xiaoping took over
leadership he shifted the nation’s resources away from the military and to the economic
sector further weakening the navy’s ability to project it force further afield. Throughout the
1980s and the 1990s the limited resources that were going to the navy were for
investment in capabilities that would assist in the reclamation of Taiwan. For example, in
the 1990s CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin turned down a request from Admiral Liu
Huaqing’s to build an aircraft carrier because Jiang saw little value of such an asset in a
5 Ibid.
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 confrontation with Taiwan, particularity considering the enormous cost developing such a
vessel would entail.6 As many naval analysts have pointed out, China’s military and
political leaders remained obsessed with Taiwan.
While Taiwan is still an important feature in the PLAN’s overall strategy today, it is
no longer the sole focus—or even the most salient driver—of Beijing’s current naval
modernization efforts. As Nan Li points out when discussing China’s ‚new historic
missions‛, externalization is the PLA’s new focus with the PLAN being the primary military
branch to execute this strategy.7 This new external strategy referred to as ‚far-sea defense‛
has particularly focused its efforts south toward the SCS and other areas of Southeast
Asia. Li also notes that this strategic shift has become acutely noticeable under the
leadership of Hu Jintao, as Hu has been consumed by thinking of a way to secure China’s
energy supplies passing through maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca.8
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in its annual report to Congress on China’s
military power suggests that the China’s navy now has three core missions, which are: 1)
resist seaborne aggression; 2) protect national sovereignty; and 3) safeguard maritime
rights.9 With this new focus on external and far-reaching goals, China will need to pour
6 Li, Nan, “Scanning the Horizon for ‘New Historical Missions’”, Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, April 2010, p. 21 7 Ibid., p. 19 8 Ibid, p. 21 9 “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2009, p. 11
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 greater investments into its navy with increases in training and equipment; yet, some
Chinese publicly worry that such an expansion in its naval capabilities will alarm regional
states resulting in an naval arms race and a possible confrontation.10 This concerned
seems to be merited as Robert Kaplan believes that in the twenty-first China will project its
hard power through its navy.11 Similarly, Richard Bitzinger feels that China’s naval
modernization allows Beijing to grow its hard power capabilities so as to complement its
already strong soft power—economic and diplomatic.12 The most recent Chinese defense
white paper seems to correspond with these views as it stresses the need for ‚the navy to
gradually develop its capabilities of conducting cooperation in distant waters and
countering non-traditional security threats‛.13 As we will see in the next section, most of the
new missions assigned to the PLAN will take place in the SCS; consequently the South
Sea Fleet has received the most attention in recent years, as evidenced by Beijing shifting
its largest destroyers to the fleet’s headquarters in Zhanjiang, Guangdong province, as
well as developing an underground submarine base on Hainan island.14
To meet the challenges proposed under the new ‚far-sea defense‛ strategy the
PLAN has produced and purchased modern naval equipment with the goal of
10 Ibid, p. 22 & p. 18 11 Kaplan, Robert, “The Geography of Chinese Power”, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2010, pp. 19-27 12 Bitzinger, Richard, “China: Expansion of Military Power in the Asia-Pacific”, A presentation to the Singapore Ministry of Defence, March 9, 2010 13 “China’s National Defence in 2008”, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China”, January 2009, p. 31 14 “China: Beijing Strengthens its Claims in the SCS”, Stratfor, May 12, 2009
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 transforming its current ‚brown-water‛ navy into the much sought after ‚blue-water‛
variant. Recent estimates by the U.S. DoD state that the PLAN maintains about 260 vessels
including 75 principal combatants, around 60 submarines—four of which are nuclear-
powered and can carry long-range ballistic missiles—and 55 medium to large
amphibious ships.15
Defense analysts primarily point to the expansion of China’s submarine fleet—the
world’s second largest—as being the most worrying trend for both the U.S. naval fleet and
regional navies.16 Robert Kaplan suggests that current Chinese naval modernization does
not mean buying ships across the board but rather focusing on select areas to excel in,
such as submarines. Thus, Beijing favors quality over quality for its submarine fleet buying
conventional diesel and electric-powered submarines from Russia while building new and
sophisticated classes of nuclear-attack and ballistic-capable submarines domestically
with the help of the robust Chinese commercial shipbuilding industry.17 Focusing on
developing its submarine fleet makes sense because these are the only vessels in the
PLAN fleet to have nuclear attack capability and are agile and stealthy enough to pose a
credible threat to enemy vessels. China’s current submarine force includes two nuclear-
15 “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2009, p. 48 16 Trevethan, Sidney, ‚The PLAN Submarine Force‛, Federation of American Scientists, May 2004 17 Kaplan, Robert, “The Geography of Chinese Power”, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2010, p. 26
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 powered attack submarines (Shang-093) and two nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines (Jin-094) along with 53 diesel or electric-powered submarines.18
The PLAN is also investing in upgrading its sea-detection technology, which
includes over-the-horizon backscatter radars, over-the-horizon surface wave radars,
electro-optical satellites and seabed sonar networks.19 These sea-detection systems are
meant to increase the PLAN’s ability to identify intrusions into its sphere of influence by
foreign navies and will prove to be quite useful to China while it seeks to protect its
interests within the first-island chain.
III. Strategic Goals of Chinese Naval Modernization in Southeast Asia
PLAN’s current modernization has not come as a result from the desire to
overwhelm Taiwan; rather, Beijing has modernized its navy to achieve other goals, such
as protecting vital sea lanes of communication (SLC), leveraging its naval capabilities to
secure its maritime rights and interests in the SCS, to improve China’s international image
by using the navy in global operations and humanitarian missions, and finally to establish
a new sphere of influence to counter current U.S. naval superiority in the region.
a) Securing Sea-lanes vital to China’s Economic Growth
18 O’Rourke, Ronald, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities”, Congressional Research Service, December 23, 2009 19 Ibid.
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 History illustrates that rising economic powers possess strong navies with
examples being the Portuguese, Spanish and British empires, the Dutch global
commercial empire and current American hegemony; all were global sea powers
possessing ‚blue-water‛ navies. China, seeing itself as a rising global power and perhaps
a current regional power feels that it must have a navy that is commensurate to its
economic power. China’s rapid economic expansion, primarily export-driven, necessarily
requires a strong navy in order to protect the vital SLCs where most of its commodities
pass through. Additionally, to sustain its economic growth, China has relied on imports of
raw materials and natural resources, which are primarily transported by sea.20 With China
being the world’s second largest importer of oil with 78 percent of these imports coming
from the Middle East and Africa, China must ensure that these resources receive safe
passage through the pirate-infested waters in the Straits of Malacca and Lombok.21
Currently, China must rely on the U.S. navy to protect these sea lanes and the commercial
ships that pass through them. Consequently, Beijing is desperately trying to strengthen its
naval capabilities in order to break this reliance.
20 Pehrson, Christopher J., “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral”, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2006, p. 5 21“Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2009, p. 3
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 One attempt to mitigate the risks associated to these SLCs is the so-called ‚string
of pearls‛ strategy that Beijing may or may not be implicitly pursuing. According to
Christopher Pehrson of the Strategic Studies Institute, the ‚string of pearls‛ strategy is the
aggregation of China’s efforts to increase its geopolitical influence by increasing its
access to ports and airfields abroad, developing diplomatic relations and modernizing its
military that extends from the SCS through the Strait of Malacca and onto the Arabian
Gulf.22
b) Leveraging PLAN’s capabilities in the SCS Territorial Dispute
CCP Secretary Hu Jintao has stressed the need for China to develop a ‚powerful
people’s navy‛ to uphold China’s maritime rights and interests.23 Within the SCS, Beijing
claims two island chains, the Spratlys and the Paracels—both are within waters
potentially rich in natural gas and oil deposits, and are prime fishing grounds.
Consequently, many nations have competing territorial claims with Beijing in these
waters. Currently Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Viet Nam all claim portions
of the Spratly island-chain, while Viet Nam disputes the ownerships of the Paracels with
China. As China sees these island-chains as archipelagic extensions of the Chinese
22 Pehrson, Christopher J., “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral”, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2006, p. 1 23 “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2009, p. 17
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 landmass, Chinese naval officials have produced aggressive strategies to assert Beijing’s
control of the contested areas via the deployment of its navy—a force that is
overwhelming superior relative to other claimants.24
Even as China has publicly stated that it would prefer to solve the SCS territorial
dispute diplomatically it is building up its naval capabilities to ensure that it has the upper
hand in these negotiations. Thus, we see the PLAN being used as a political tool in China’s
coercive diplomacy in the SCS. In the past, China employed its navy in aggressive moves
to displace Vietnamese forces from the disputed island-chains. The first incident was in
1974 when the Chinese defeated the Vietnamese to take control over the entire Paracel
island-chain, with a second episode occurring in 1988 when the Chinese navy
overwhelmed a united Vietnamese force, displacing it from a cluster of islands in the
Spratly-chain.25 Additionally, Chinese naval forces took control of Mischief Island in the
Spratly-chain after a battle with the Philippine navy, and have in recent years built up the
island to serve its naval expansion.26 More recently, China established the Sansha city
administration on Hainan in 2007 to regulate all activities on the Paracel and Spratly
island-chains. While in 2009, China dispatched its navy to enforce a unilateral fishing ban
24 Kaplan, Robert, “The Geography of Chinese Power”, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2010, p. 24 25 Percival, Bronson, “The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century, p. 84 26 Ibid, p. 84
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 it imposed in the SCS. The ban took effect from May 16-August 1 during the height of the
Vietnamese fishing season resulting in numerous incidents—some fatal—with
Vietnamese fishermen.27
While the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC) agreement signed
by all SCS claimants in 2002 diffused much of the tension by calling for claimants to
restrain themselves from taking unilateral actions such as military build-ups on disputed
islands or any new construction, China’s current naval modernization alarms many in the
region, and will no doubt allow China to gain the upper hand in any final negotiations
focusing on final status issues to maritime dispute.28 For example, China’s Sanya naval
base on Hainan Island, equipped with an underground submarine facility—a secret until
2009—has caused alarm in places like Hanoi, Manila and Singapore. This new installation
gives China instant access to the SCS, allowing it to deploy its submarines and surface
vessels to the disputed island-chains within a short time-frame. Additionally, China has
built an air base on Woody Island in its occupied Paracel island-chain, allowing its Su-30
MKK fighters to refuel and resume missions in the SCS.29
27Thayer, Carlyle A., “Recent Developments in the SCS: Implications for Peace, Stability and Cooperation in the Region”, paper presented to the International Workshop on ‘The SCS: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development’ co-organized by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association, Hanoi, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, November 26-28, 2009 28 McIndoe, Alastair, “Tensions Growing in SCS; Philippines, Malaysia, China Act to Stake Claim on Disputed Islands”, The Straits Times, March 18, 2009 29 Bitzinger, Richard, “China: Expansion of Military Power in the Asia-Pacific”, A presentation to the Singapore Ministry of Defence, March 9,
2010
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 c) Improving China’s International Image using PLAN in Global Operations and Humanitarian Missions
Another example of using the PLAN to achieve political gains is Beijing’s
deployment in December 2008 of two PLAN destroyers to Gulf of Aden, off the East African
Coast to defend its commercial vessels from attack from pirates.30 Not only does soft-
power projection demonstrates Beijing’s commitment to participating in global
cooperation but it also signals to regional navies that China’s navy now has the capability
to deploy further afield. China’s strategy appears to have worked when in April 2009 the
Chinese naval group came to the rescue of the Philippine chemical tanker M/T Stolt
Strength who had 23 Filipino sailors aboard.31 Five other vessels flying the Philippines’ flag
were also escorted out of the Gulf of Aden. As a result, the PLAN task force made a port-
call to Manila in April 2010 at the invitation of the Philippine Navy.32 Beijing has hailed its
African excursion as a success demonstrating China’s commitment to being a
responsible international player seeking to maintain peace and security.
In addition to deploying its navy on anti-piracy missions, Beijing has also publicly
declared its desire to use its navy for humanitarian purposes. Having seen the
effectiveness of the American, Indian and Japanese navies’ response to the 2004
30 O’Rourke, Ronald, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities”, Congressional Research Service, December 23, 2009 31 “China’s Escort Mission in the Gulf of Aden to Make Five-Day Port Call in Manila”, BBC News, April 11, 2010 32 Ibid.
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 Southeast Asian Tsunami, China’s perception of the using the navy in such a capacity has
changed. As a result, naval planners have revived Liu Huaqing’s dream of developing an
indigenous aircraft carrier, as a carrier could serve multiple purposes for China within
Southeast Asia. For example, not only would a carrier be the focal point for providing relief
support during a humanitarian incident but it would also provide air-cover for Chinese
submarines and surface vessels deployed around the SCS disputed island-chains, and
allow China to project its naval power in the Strait of Malacca to protect Chinese
commercial vessels, not to mention serving as a great boost to China’s prestige as a
world power.33
d) Establishing a New Sphere of Influence to Counter Current U.S. Naval Superiority in the Region
Latent within PLAN’s current modernization is the desire for Beijing to develop its
naval capabilities to a level in which it can limit the effectiveness of the U.S. navy within
the first-island chain that runs from Japan down to the Philippines and throughout the
SCS. Not only is such a desire influenced by the issue of Taiwan, but also by Beijing’s
preference to free up the waters to its south. As such, specific efforts have been taken by
the PLAN to develop its capabilities to set up a ‚sea control zone‛ within the first-island
33 O’Rourke, Ronald, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities”, Congressional Research Service, December 23, 2009
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 chain, and a ‚sea contest zone‛ out to the second island chain.34 Actions taken within the
‚sea contest zone‛ would include the PLAN deploying its submarines throughout the first-
island chain with backup from surface vessels and land-based anti-ship missiles.35
Chinese officials made their preference of reducing U.S. naval involvement in the SCS
clear when it told two visiting Obama administration officials that it would not tolerate any
American interference in the SCS, stressing that the SCS was now part of China’s ‚core
interest‛ of sovereignty issues similar to the issues of Taiwan and Tibet.36 Beijing’s warning
was most likely taken quite seriously by the Americans given the USS Impeccable’s
harassment by Chinese naval and civilian vessels the prior year while it was conducting a
submarine detection exercise in the SCS.37
Determining how Beijing will use its navy in the future will be difficult for both the
U.S. and other regional states. However, Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes attempt to
predict the deployment strategies of Chinese submarines. They argued that China could
opt to follow the U.S. model of open-ocean patrol strategy, where its submarines would
patrol as far out as the Indian and Eastern Pacific on a regular basis. Alternatively, Beijing
could adopt the Soviet model, which stresses a bastion strategy, where Chinese
34 Ding, Arthur, “China’s Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles”, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, January 8, 2008 35 Yoshihar, Toshi and James R. Holmes, “China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent” Joint-Forces Quarterly, 3rd Quarter 2008, p. 36 36 Wong, Edward, “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend its Naval Power”, New York Times, April 23, 2010 37 Doronila, Amando, “SCS Standoff:, Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 18, 2009
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 submarines would deploy within the first-island chain in reach of its naval bases.38
Obviously, the bastion strategy would impact Southeast Asia the greatest, as most of the
Chinese south sea fleet would remain in the SCS. Based on its current capabilities it
seems that this is the strategy that Beijing currently favors.
Given the strategic rationale provided above for PLAN modernization and its new
roles in the SCS the challenge for Beijing remains how to sooth regional fears of a
powerful and ambitious Chinese navy. To those perceptions we now turn.
IV. Strategic Implications of Chinese Naval Modernization for Southeast Asian States
As a result of China’s naval modernization some states in Southeast Asia have
been seeking to boost their sea-defense capabilities. The Philippines, Singapore and Viet
Nam have all undertaken efforts to acquire more advanced naval vessels and
technologies to counter the PLAN’s current dominance in the waters of Southeast Asia.
However, the three states’ efforts at modernizing their fleets vary quite markedly in degree.
One explanation for this variation may be that two of the three states enjoy formal defense
agreements with the U.S. (the Philippines and Singapore) while one does not (Viet Nam).
38 Yoshihar, Toshi and James R. Holmes, “China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent” Joint-Forces Quarterly, 3rd Quarter 2008, p.
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 Also of note is Singapore’s vastly superior ship-building industry relative to the other two
states, as well as its easier access to financial resources.
Philippines
While Manila has shown some signs of trying to boast its naval capabilities to
respond to the challenge it faces from China in the SCS dispute, the consensus is that the
Philippine navy is vastly inferior to its Chinese counterpart. Former naval vice-commander
Amable Tolentino publicly indentified his country’s navy as being inferior to other SCS
claimant’s navies and not capable to defend Manila’s maritime rights if forced to do so,
noting that the flagship of the Philippine navy is a World War II-era escort destroyer.39
The Philippine navy consists of only one fleet and possesses the capability to
defend its immediate coastal waters. The majority of the fleet consists of World War II-era
surface vessels of small-to-medium size, which lack missile firing capabilities and anti-
submarine weapons (ASW). Additionally, the fleet does not include any submarines.40 Yet,
Manila has committed itself to the modernization of its navy aiming for a more ‚credible‛
force by 2017; however, recent signs of procurement failures and accusations of
39 Gale, Bruce, “China’s Move Impacts on Manila Politics”, The Straits Times, March 25, 2009 40 “Philippine Navy, Global Security accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/phillipines/navy.htm
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 corruption have led some to doubt the government’s ability to achieve this goal.41
Recently, Manila has suggested that it is the process of purchasing two multi-role
naval vessels from either Singapore or South Korea.42 When this acquisition will be
finalized or what is meant by a ‚multi-role‛ vessel is unclear. What is clear is that if such a
purchase went through along with several more ambitious acquisitions, the Philippine
navy would still largely be outgunned by the Chinese navy, as the former’s fleet at the
moment includes only one frigate, 14 corvettes, 47 patrol gunboats and 58 amphibious
naval craft—a force that clearly lacks the ability to deploy far from the coast.43
Within the Spratly island-chain, Manila claims nine islands in what it calls the
‚Kalayaan group‛, as well as in the Scarborough Shoal, which is close to a busy shipping
lane.44 In 1995, China and the Philippines participated in a loud diplomatic spat over
China’s construction on islands in the Mischief Reef. This incident led to a severe strain in
relations between Beijing and Manila, with the latter losing faith in the former’s
commitment to solve the dispute in an amicable and fair way. In February 2009, the
Philippine congress passed the ‚Archipelagic Baselines Act‛. Signed into law by President
41 Ibid. 42 “DND Rushing Acquisition of Naval Vessels”, The Philippine Star, May 16, 2010 43 “Philippine Navy Equipment”, Global Security, accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/phillipines/navy-equipment.htm 44 McIndoe, Alastair, “Tensions Growing in SCS; Philippines, Malaysia, China act to Stake Claim on Disputed Islands”, The Straits Times, March 18, 2009
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 Gloria Macapagal Arroyo the law affirms Manila’s territorial claims in the Spratlys.45
Beijing’s response to this action was to send a naval vessel to the disputed area in a show
of force that Filipino politicians described as ‚gunboat diplomacy‛.46
Singapore
Unlike the Philippines, Singapore maintains a modest navy capable of
posing as a moderate deterrent to Chinese aggression. The Singaporean navy is
comprised of six French and indigenously-built frigates, six missile corvettes capable of
defending against submarine attack, 12 patrol vessels equipped with ASW, four Swedish-
designed mine countermeasure vessels and four landing ship tanks. In addition to these
surface vessels, Singapore possesses six submarines all bought from Sweden.47 The
Singaporean navy is deployed primarily in an escort capacity to protect commercial
vessels passing through the pirate-infested Strait of Malacca.
Singapore wants to ensure that its commerce continues to flow uninterrupted
through the port of Singapore—arguably the world’s busiest port. Former Singaporean
leader Lee Kuan Yew voiced his concern saying that China’s naval modernization causes
45 Bitzinger, Richard, “China: Expansion of Military Power in the Asia-Pacific”, A presentation to the Singapore Ministry of Defence, March 9, 2010 46 Gale, Bruce, “China’s Move Impacts on Manila Politics”, The Straits Times, March 25, 2009 47 Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Defence, “Assets”, accessed at
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/navy/assets.html
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 concern within the region and particularly in Singapore, and pleaded to the U.S. to retain
its regional naval presence, suggesting that the ''U.S. core interest requires that it remains
the superior power on the Pacific,'' and ''to give up this position would diminish America's
role throughout the world.''48 The desire of Singapore to maintain the regional balance of
power was also demonstrated by the series of joint naval exercises it has conducted with
regional navies in the past couple of years. For instance, in 2009 Singapore and India
brought corvettes, destroyers, frigates and submarines from both navies to the SCS in a
continuation of their annual bilateral naval exercise.49 Singapore and the U.S. in their
fifteenth joint exercise under the Singapore-U.S. Cooperation Afloat Readiness and
Training (CARAT) for the first time jointly deployed their own submarine forces in a
submarine tracking exercise in the SCS.50 Finally, in September 2009, Singapore and
Australia conducted a joint-naval exercise named ‚Singaroo‛ in the SCS where the two
navies focused on maritime surveillance, air defense and anti-submarine warfare.51 In
addition to the working with the navies listed above, Singapore has also sought
cooperation with China, specifically in the area of anti-piracy where both states stand to
48Wong, Edward, “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend its Naval Power”, New York Times, April 23, 2010 49 “Singapore, India Conduct Naval Exercise”, Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Defence, April 2, 2009, accessed at
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2009/apr/02apr09_nr.html
50 Singapore, US Deploy Submarines in War Games”, Bernama Malaysian News Agency, June 8, 2009 51 ‚Singapore, Australia Navies Conduct Joint Maritime Exercise‛, Xinhua News Service, September 19, 2009
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 mutually-gain from increased coordination. In a conference with the U.S. and the UK,
China and Singapore agreed that the most effective way to deter piracy was for its navies
to jointly work together by sharing intelligence.52 Yet, these words have yet to be translated
into any real cooperation between the two navies.
Viet Nam
PLAN modernization is viewed as the greatest external threat to Viet Nam. Lacking
the capabilities of the Singaporean navy and the security arrangements that both
Singapore and the Philippines have with the U.S., Viet Nam’s ability to defend its interests
in the SCS are severely threatened by an increasingly modern and confident Chinese
navy. As the Vietnamese military is primarily a land-based force, the task of upgrading its
naval capabilities in a quick and effective way present a huge hurdle to Hanoi. Yet, during
the last two years, Viet Nam has aggressively sought to build its naval forces to a level that
it feels can act as a modest deterrent to China in the SCS. Specific efforts have been the
purchase of six diesel-electric submarines from Russia worth around $2 billion.53 In
addition, Hanoi has ordered frigates, missile boats and 12 SU-30MK2 multi-role flanker
52 Chow, Jermyn, “Sharing of Data will Help Combat Piracy; Navies Urged to Build Trust and Be Proactive in Sharing Information”, The Straits Times, May 14, 2009 53 Wong, Edward, “Vietnam Enlists Allies to Stave Off China’s Reach”, New York Times, February 5, 2010
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 fighter jets from Moscow, as well as asking for Russian assistance in building a submarine
base, a request that was accepted by Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Seryukov. 54
Viet Nam’s recent spending spree also includes orders for three DHC-6 series 400
amphibious aircraft from Canada capable of patrolling the SCS, as well as new short-
range ballistic missile systems from Israel that will significantly increase Viet Nam’s ability
to hit moving enemy ships in the SCS.55 Yet, military expert and Viet Nam scholar Carlyle
Thayer questions the ability of the inexperienced Vietnamese navy to use these new
weapons effectively, suggesting that not only does Hanoi have to ensure that its provides
the requisite financial resources to ensure that these assets are combat ready but it also
must make certain that the currently untested naval personnel receive adequate training
to use these modern technologies.56
Viet Nam and China have long been at odds over sovereignty issues in the SCS
with China defeating the Vietnamese in 1974 taking control over the entire Paracel island-
chain. In 1988 the two countries fought again over Johnson Reef in the Spratly island-
chain with 60 causalities on both sides. More recently, China has been dispatching bigger
and more modern naval vessels to the SCS to assert control over the islands. These acts
54 “Vietnam Asks Russia to Help Build Submarine Base”, Associated Press, March 25, 2010, accessed at http://beta.thehindu.com/news/international/article304542.ece?css=print 55 Karniol, Robert, “Vietnam Bolstering Spratlys Firepower”, The Straits Times, May 10, 2010 56 Thayer, Carlyle, “Background Briefing: Vietnam’s Submarine Force”, December 29, 2009
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 of coercive diplomacy have been the stick that accompany Beijing’s carrot of offering
joint-exploration rights to Viet Nam—an offer that Hanoi has resisted, suggesting that any
deal on the SCS must include all the disputants, thus reducing China’s bargaining
leverage.
Despite the rapid buildup of Vietnamese naval capabilities through its recent arms
purchases, the 2009 Viet Nam defense white paper points out Hanoi’s desire to settle the
SCS dispute with China in a peaceful and diplomatic way on the basis of international
law.57 China’s diplomats have stated the same desire in public but have been
concurrently beefing up its naval capabilities to ensure it maintains the upper hand in the
SCS vis-à-vis other claimants. Vietnamese officials feel they have the right to do the same
and have been expanding their naval capabilities not only with recent purchases but also
by establishing a marine militia unit dedicated to protecting Viet Nam’s sovereignty and
entering into a formal defense cooperation agreement with Singapore.58
V. Conclusion
China’s current naval modernization is no longer singularly-driven by the desire to
retake the island of Taiwan—a goal that consumed Chinese naval thinkers for nearly fifty
57 von Kospoth, Nicolas, “Vietnam Releases White Paper on Defence”, December 10, 2009, accessed at http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/466/ 58Ibid.
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 years. Rather, the PLAN’s recent modernization is meant to complement Beijing’s new
naval strategy of ‚far-sea defense‛ focusing on the externalization of its naval forces. This
strategy, pushed by the top Chinese leadership, places less emphasis on preparing the
navy to retake Taiwan and more emphasis—and more investment—toward protecting
Chinese interests further from the mainland, such as protecting China’s SLCs, needed to
be safeguarded for the sake of China’s economic survive. Externalization also sees the
PLAN employed to the SCS in an attempt to leverage Beijing’s coercive diplomacy so as
to secure its maritime rights and interests in the disputed Paracel and Spratly island-
chains. Along with using the navy to project hard power, Beijing also recognizes the utility
of the navy to improve China’s international image during global operations and
humanitarian missions. It must also be recognized that China’s current naval
modernization is being undertaken with the ultimate goal of breaking U.S. naval
dominance in the Western Pacific generally, and within Southeast Asia specifically.
Knowing the drivers of China’s naval modernization however, is not enough to
gauge its wider intentions for use in Southeast Asia. Whether this modernization presents
a legitimate threat to regional states is still up for debate. Analysts like Robert Kaplan
suggest that the buildup of the China’s navy may not be for actual use but more likely for a
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 show of force to deter other states from acting against Chinese interests.59 Yet, it is clear
that the navies in the region are growing concerned and have adjusted their own
capabilities in response, as evidenced by the three Southeast Asian states covered in this
paper. Additionally, whether these responses constitute a naval arms race is also
debatable. But some Chinese naval officials are concerned about recent improvements to
Southeast Asian navies with Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo suggesting that some are ‚seeking to
dominate the southern seas‛, and thus pose a threat to China. He singled out Viet Nam
because of the latter’s purchase of Russian submarines.60 Yet, others within the Chinese
defense establishment have sought to play down China’s naval modernization and the
implications for Southeast Asia. Senior Colonel Chen Zhou, a researcher at the PLA
Academy of Military Services, and a contributor to China’s defense white paper has said
that the Chinese navy will never be a threat to the region because its only purpose is to
maintain Chinese maritime rights and regional sovereignty, and does not wish to emulate
the U.S. navy, whose power projection is global.61
While, this statement may carry some level of truth, the fact that China is
specifically developing its naval capabilities to project power further out to sea in order to
59 Kaplan, Robert, “The Geography of Chinese Power”, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2010, p. 26 60 “China Concerned by ASEAN Subs-Admiral”, RIA Novosti, February 27, 2010 61 “China Exclusive: Chinese Navy Build-Up No Threat to ASEAN Countries: Experts”, Xinhua News Service, March 31, 2010
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010 ensure that its national interests are secure presents real challenges for countries like the
Philippines, Singapore and Viet Nam. Singapore, whose economy depends on the
smooth passage of vessels within the Strait of Malacca and the SCS, desires a peaceful
environment, ultimately desiring the continuation of U.S. naval hegemony in the region.
The Philippines and Viet Nam have been quite alarmed by China’s naval modernization
because it directly decreases their own bargaining leverage relative to China, as their
substandard navies leave them vulnerable. While Manila seems to be relying on the
assistance of the U.S. navy to police the SCS, Hanoi—lacking the U.S. defense agreement
the Philippine navy enjoys—has taken serious efforts to boast its naval capabilities by
buying vessels from abroad. Whether these investments will be needed is ultimately up to
how Beijing will utilize its more robust navy in the future within the waters of Southeast
Asia.
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China A50038324 June 2010
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