Modeling Attacks to Chesapeake Bay Shipping LT Sarah Watson LT Matt Yokeley.
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Transcript of Modeling Attacks to Chesapeake Bay Shipping LT Sarah Watson LT Matt Yokeley.
Modeling Attacks to Chesapeake Bay ShippingLT Sarah WatsonLT Matt Yokeley
Project Overview
• What is this project about?
• The goal of this project
• The scope of this project
Background
• Terrorism continues to threaten international cargo
• There is a larger threat to sea born attack than air born
• Long term effects of shipping attacks
= + $
The Network
• Chesapeake Bayo Covers 64,299 square miles
o More than 150 rivers feed into it
• Abstractiono One “dummy” start node
o Three supply ports
o Ends at Chesapeake Lighthouse
o 55 arcs
The Model
• Built using Max-flow
Subject to:
The Dual
• The dual gave us optimal attack points
Subject to:
• Iterated through attacks to find optimal subsequent
attacks
ProcessSelect max number of
attackers (x= 1-4)
Determine plan of attack
Remove attacked arcs
from list
Find number of CG vessels required to prevent complete
network shutdown
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1040000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
100000
110000
120000
130000
140000
0
1
2
3
4
Flow of Goods Goods Stopped by TerroristArcs Attacked
Number of Coast Guard VesselsT
ota
l G
oods
(tons
x 1
000)
Num
ber
of
Arc
s
Analysis of One Attacker
• Maximum flow of network = 180,235.3
tons
Attackable arcsOptimal arc for terrorist to attackDefended arcs
At this point the entire path out of Hampton Roads is protected
from attack
0 2 4 6 8 100
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
200000
0
1
2
3
4
Flow of Goods Goods Stopped by TerroristArcs Attacked
Number of Coast Guard VesselsT
ota
l G
oods
(tons
x 1
000)
Num
ber
of
Arc
s
Analysis of Two Attackers
• Maximum flow of network = 180,235.3
tons
Attackable arcsOptimal arc for terrorist to attackDefended arcs
0 3 6 9 120
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
200000
0
1
2
3
4
Flow of Goods Goods Stopped by TerroristArcs Attacked
Number of Coast Guard VesselsT
ota
l G
oods
(tons
x 1
000)
Num
ber
of
Arc
s
Analysis of Three Attackers
• Maximum flow of network = 180,235.3
tons
Attackable arcsOptimal arc for terrorist to attackDefended arcs
0 3 6 9 12 160
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
200000
0
1
2
3
4
Flow of Goods Goods Stopped by TerroristArcs Attacked
Number of Coast Guard VesselsT
ota
l G
oods
(tons
x 1
000)
Num
ber
of
Arc
s
Analysis of Four Attackers
• Maximum flow of network = 180,235.3
tons
Attackable arcsOptimal arc for terrorist to attackDefended arcs
The terrorist is able to employ this extra attack as
a “reserve” to keep the network down
Conclusions
• It’s possible to shut down all cargo flow by only attacking two arcs
• Attacker/defender ratio is not one-to-one
• Compounding increase in goods near the bay entrance causes it to
be the major point of concern
• What’s next?o Model distance from CG stations to attack points
o Use probabilities of attack on arcs
o Assign priorities to arcs base d on cargo
Questions??