Mo u meunarodnim odnosima

I Razliita vienja moi u meunarodnim odnosimaII Merenje moi u meunarodnim odnosimaIII Problemi sa merenjem moi u meunarodnim odnosimaIV Literatura

I Razliita vienja moi u meunarodnim odnosima

Power is an of the essentailly contested concepts in tne study of international relations (Evans, Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations)The concept of Power is one of the most troublesome in the field of international politics (Robert Gilpin)Power, like a host of other important concepts in IR, is an essentially contested concept it means quite different things to different people (Brian C. Schmidt)Mo je, kao i ljubav, mnogo lake iskusiti nego definisati ili izmeriti. (Dzozef Naj)Ono to je energija u fizici to je mo u politici Bertrand Rasel (1938, Power: A New Social Analysis, London: George Allen & Unwin)

i want to begin by suggesting three reasons for both the trouble and controversy. The first is that the concept of power is primitive in the specific sense that its meaning cannot be elucidated by reference to other notions whose meaning is less controversial than is own. (Truth is another such primitive concept) The second reason is that the concept of power is essentially contested in other words, it cannot be disconnected from what we commonly call the value assumptions of the person making the judgment.Third, the contestedness of power the fact that what counts as power and being powerful is controversial matters. For, as Stefano Guzzini argues, it has performative role in our discourse and, more particularly, our political discourse: how we conceive of power makes a difference to how we think amd act in general and more particularly in political context. (Steven Lukes)

David Baldwin describes the two dominant traditions of power analysis in International Relations: in terms of elements of national power approach which depicts power as resources and the relational power approach, which depicts power as an actual or potential relationship.

National power approachProponents of the elements-of-national power approach equate power with possession of specific resources. All of the important resources that a state possesses are typically combined in some fashion to determine its overall aggregate power. The resources that are most often used as an indicator of national power include the level of military expenditure, gross domestic product, size of the armed forces, size of the territory and population.

Nemaki fiziar Vilhelm Fuks je svoju formulu moi izrazio kao sumu proizvedene energije, proizvedenog elika i kubnog korena broja stanovnika. Godine 1963. njegova tako dobijena tablica najmonijih imala je na vrhu SAD (100), SSSR (67), Kinu (41), SR Nemaku (15), Japan (14), Beliku Britaniju (12) i Francusku (7) dok su mu predvianja za 1980. godinu davala sledeu sliku: Kina (250), SAD (160), SSSR (120), Japan (39), SR Nemaka (25), Velika Britanija (19).

Relational power approach This approach was championed by behavioral oriented political scientists during the 1950s and 1960s. According to Robert Dahl, who was an influential advocate of the relational conception of power, A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.Fundamental to the relational conception of power is the ability to demonstrate a change in outcomes.Power as a set of material resources id deemed to be less important than the actual ability of Actor A to change the behavior of actor B.

Rather than power being a one size fits all category, the relational approach disaggregates power into a number of component parts in order to demonstrate how it is exercised in specific issue areas. The dimension of power typically include its scope (the objectives of an attempt to gain influence over which issue), its domain (the target of the influence attempt(, its weight (the quantity of resources) and its costs (opportunity costs if forgoing a relation).

Vojin Dimitrijevi, Radoslav StojanoviMo je stepen sposobnosti da se drugi subjekti privole ili nateraju da ponaanje koje posednik moi eli. Kibernetiki mo se moe odrediti kao stupanj verovatnoe da e ishod biti onakav kakv subjekt eli. Ovako odreena mo je bezvrednosna: sam apo sebi, ona nije ni dobra ni loa, dobre su i loe svrhe za koje e se ona upotrebiti. Tekoe u odmeravanju moi pa i uspeh da se ona nametne lani o njoj, zansovane su na okolnosti da se ispoljavanje moi ne moe zamisliti bez sudelovanja jednog nematerijalnog, pa prema tome i objektivno nemerljivog elementa. Kao to je poznato re je o moralu, koji u ovom kontekstu dobija voljno znaenje reenosti i spremnosti stanovnitva na zalaganje, samopregor i borbu. U sri morla je motivacija. Vanost moralnog elementa obavezuje nas da nainimo jasnu razliku izmeu mogue i stvarne mo. Latentna mo bi se onda oznaila kao potencijal koji u datom odnosu moe biti iskorien ili neiskorien. Da bi se dakle potencijal oiveo, potrebno je dejstvo moralnog inioca: bez njega potencijal ostaje mrtav, ali se naravno skromni potencijal nikakvim naporom ne moe arobno uveati.Dok se ranije pomenuti elementi moi mogu na manje ili vie savrene naine meriti i uporeivati, moralni elementi se mogu samo procenjivati...

Dragan R. Simi

ta je mo uopte i posebno u meunarodnim odnosima?Koji su i kavi su izvori moi nekada i danas?U kojim se sve vidovima mo ispoljava?Kako zadovoljiti teorijsku i praktinu potrebu za tanim merenjem moi?

Za Maksa Vebera mo predstavlja izglede da se u okviru jednog drutvenog odnosa sprovede sopstvena volja uprkos otporu, bez obzira na emu se zansivaju ti izgledi.Kenet Volc Moan je onaj ko utie na drugog vie nego onaj na njegaMo za ta? (Naj)Postoji jedna neuhvatljivost povodom moi koja joj daje skoro avetinjsko svojstvo... Mi znamo ta je a ipak se sreemo sa beskrajnim tekoama u pokuaju da je odredimo. Mi moemo da kaemo su pojedinac ili grupa moniji od ostalih, ali ipak mo ne moemo meriti (Arnold Rouz)

Georg varcenberger

Mesto moi je na pola puta izmeu uticaja i sile (force), Uticaj se vri ubeivanjem. Sila predstavlja fiziki postignuto potinjavanje volje drugoga. Nasuprot uticaju i sili, mo podrazumeva nametanje sopstvene volje grupi ili volje jedne grupe drugoj, ako je mogue bez primene sile, ali ako to nije mogue, primenom najmanje potrebne sile.

Karl Doj

Mo se moe ralaniti na nove dimenzije, koje onda bolje govore o njenoj promenjivosti i neprimenjivosti, pa ak i o eventualnoj nemoi moi. U tom pogledu najdalje je otiao Karl Doj koji predlae sledee dimezije moi. Prva je njena koliina, teina (weight) koja pokazuje do koje mere nosilac moi moe da promeni tok dogaaja, odnosno tue ponaanje. U sluajevima koi se ponavljaju, ova se koliina moe meriti time to se uobiajeni ishodi poredes ishodom za koji se zalagao posednik moi (npr. Glasanje u UN-u)

Druga dimenzija je prostor (domain) koji ukazuje na to gde se nalaze qudi ije se ponaanje ispoljavanjem moi verovatno menja. U ovom pogledu najupadljivija je razlika izmeu moi jedne drave na sopstvenoj teritoriji i u inostranstvu.U opisivanju moi dalje treba uzeti u obzir njen opseg (range) koji Doj definie kao razmak izmeu najvie nagrade i najstroe kazne koje nosilac moi moe dati ili izvriti.I na kraju, mo ima svoj i svoj domaaj (scope), prema vrstama ili klasama ponaanja na koje se moe uticati.

Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall

The potentially system-defining attacks of September 11, the war on terrorism, and the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq have caused scholars and practitioners to refocus attention on a central concept in international politics: power.Ever since Carr delivered his devastating rhetorical blow against the utopians and claimed power for realism, the discipline of international relations has tended to treat power as the exclusive province of realism. Accordingly, a concern with power in international politics is frequently interpreted as a disciplinary attachment to realism.

Associated with this tendency, there is a widely accepted conceptualization that is viewed as the only way to understand power: how one state uses its material resources to compel another state to do something it does not want to do.Most introductory texts to international relations cleave to this formulation. Attempts by scholars to operationalize power follow from this definition. The substantial literature on the paradoxes of power revolves around the disconnect between capabilities and outcomes.

The starting point for opening the conceptual aperture is to identify the critical dimensions that generate different conceptualizations of power. In general terms, power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate.

This definition informs our argument that conceptual distinctions of power should be represented in terms of two analytical dimensions that are at the core of the general concept: the kinds of social relations through which power works; and the specificity of social relations through which effects on actors capacities are produced. The first dimensionkindsrefers to the polar positions of social relations of interaction and social relations of constitution. Accordingly, power is either an attribute of particular actors and their interactions or a social process of constituting what actors are as social beings, that is, their social identities and capacities. It can operate, for example, by pointing a gun and issuing commands, or in underlying social structures and systems of knowledge that advantage some and disadvantage others. The second dimensionspecificityconcerns the degree to which the social relations through which power works are direct and socially specific or indirect and socially diffuse. It can operate, for example, at the very instant when the gun is brandished, or through diffuse processes embedded in international institutions that establish rules determining who gets to participate in debates and make decisions.

These two dimensions generate our taxonomy of four types of power.The first type is power as relations of interaction of direct control by one actor over another Compulsory Power; the second is the control actors exercise indirectly over others through diffuse relations of interactionInstitutional Power; the third is the constitution of subjects capacities in direct structural relation to one another Structural Power; and the fourth is the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and significationProductive Power. These different conceptualizations provide distinct answers to the fundamental question: in what respects are actors able to determine their fate, and how is that ability limited or enhanced through social relations with others?

E. H. Carr

Carr argued that power is indivisible, yet he claimed that for purposes of discussion it could be divided into three categories: military power, economic power, and power over opinion.Yet because of the ever-present possibility of war breaking out, Carr argued that military power was the most important form of power in international politicsThe supreme importance of instrument lies in the fact that the ultima ratio of power in international politics is warOni koji imaju i oni koji nemaju

Hans J. Morgenthau

International Politics, like all politics is a struggle for powerWhatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aimWhen we speak of power we mean mans control over the minds and actions of other men this is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those who over whom it is exercised.

Like other classical realists, Morgenthau equated power with the possession of both material and non-material resources. Morgenthau distinguished between two types of elements that contributed to the power of a nation: those that are stable and those subject to a constant change.

The stable elements which are largely of a quantitative nature, included geography, natural resources (food and raw materials), industrial capacity, military preparedness and population.Morgenthau identified four qualitative, non-material factors that have a bearing on a national power: national character, national morale, the quality of government and the quality of a nations diplomacy.

Morgenthau signaled out the quality of diplomacy as the most important factor contributing to the power of a nation. According to Morgenthau, the conduct of a nations foreign affairs by its diplomats is for national power in peace what military strategy and tactics by its military leaders are for national power in war

Joseph Nye, Jr.

Mo je sposobnost da se postignu neije svrhe ili ciljevi. Jo preciznije reeno, to je sposobnost da se utie na druge i da se ostvare eljeni rezultati. Robert Dal, politikolog sa Jejl Univerziteta, definie mo kao sposobnost da se drugi primoraju da urade neto to inae ne bi uradili. Ali, kada merimo mo u smislu promenjenog ponaanja drugih, potrebno je da poznajemo njihove elje. U suprotnom, bili bismo u pogrenom uverenju o stanju moi, kao to je to sluaj sa lisicom koja misli da e povrediti zeca koji ivi u trnju ako ga u njega baci. esto je teko unapred znati kako e se drugi ljudi ili drave ponaati u odsustvu uticaja sa strane, .Bihejvioristika definicija moi moe biti od koristi analitiarima i istoriarima koji znatno vreme posveuju rekonstruisanju prolosti, ali za politiare u svakodnevnim poslovima i za voe, ona se moe initi kao isuvie efemernog karaktera. Zbog toga to se sposobnost uticaja na druge esto povezuje sa posedovanjem odreenih resursa, politike voe uopteno definiu mo na ovaj nain. Ti resursi izmeu ostalog ukljuuju stanovnitvo, veliinu terirorije, prirodna bogatstva, ekonomsku snagu, vojnu mo, i politiku stabilnost. Prednost ove definicije jeste u tome da tu mo izgleda mnogo konkretnija, merljivija i predvidljivija, nego to je to sluaj sa bihejvioristikom definicijom. Mo u ovom smislu znai posedovanje jakih karata u partiji pokera meunarodne politike. Osnovno pravilo pokera je da, ako va protivnik pokae karte koje su jae od svake od vaih karata, spustite ruke. Ako znate da ete izgubiti rat, ne zapoinjite ga.

Kao u pokeru, vetine kao to su blefiranje i varanje mogu da nekim igraima daju znaajnu prednost. ak i kad nema obmanjivanja, moe se pogreiti povodom toga koji od izvora moi su relevantni u nekoj odreenoj situaciji. Na primer, Francuska i Britanija su 1940. godine imale vie tenkova nego Hitler, ali je on imao bolju sposobnost manevrisanja i bolju vojnu strategiju.

Uz to, postoji i faktor koji se ponekad zove drugo lice moi. Primoravanje drugih drava na promene moe se nazvati direktnim ili zapovednim metodom sprovoenja moi. Takva tvrda mo moe poivati na obeanju nagrade (argarepa) ili pretnji (tap) Postoje, meutim, i meki ili indirektni nain za ostvarenje moi. Neka zemlja moe da u svetskoj politici postigne eljene rezultate zato to druge zemlje ele da je imitiraju ili su saglasne sa sistemom koji takve rezultate proizvodi. U tom smislu, podjednako je vano postaviti dnevni red i privui druge aktere u svetskoj politici kao i primoravati druge na promene u konkretnim situacijama. Ovaj aspekt moi - navesti druge da hoe ono to vi hoete - moe se nazvati mo privlanosti ili ponaanje zasnovano na mekoj moi. Meka mo moe poivati na takvim izvorima kao to su privlanost neijih ideja ili sposobnost da se politiki prioriteti postave na nain koji oblikuje elje drugih. Roditelji tinejdera znaju da e, ako su oblikovali uverenja i preference svoje dece, njihova mo biti vea i trajae due nego da su se oslanjali samo na aktivnu kontrolu. Na slian nain, politike voe i pristalice konstruktivistike teorije ve dugo razumeju mo koja dolazi iz postavljanja dnevnog reda i odreivanja okvira rasprave. Sposobnost da se ustanove elje tei da se povee sa neopipljivim izvorima moi kao to su kultura, ideologija i ustanove.

Tvrda i meka mo su povezane, ali nisu iste. Materijalni uspeh ini kulturu i ideologiju privlanom, a izostanak rezultata u ekonomskoj i vojnoj sferi dovodi do sumnji u same sebe i do krize identiteta. Meka mo se ne zasniva iskljuivo na tvrdoj moi. Meka mo Vatikana nije iezla sa smanjenjem veliine papske drave u devetnaestom veku. Kanada, vedska i Holandija danas tee da imaju vie uticaja nego neke druge drave podjednakih ekonomskih ili vojnih kapaciteta. Sovjetski Savez je posedovao znaajnu meku mo u Evropi posle Drugog svetskog rata, ali ju je protraio nakon invazije Maarske 1956. i ehoslovake 1968. godine.

Hard and Soft PowerPower is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get a desired outcome. Historically, power has been measured by such criteria as population size and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. Hard power enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want. The Pentagons budget for FY2008 is more than $750 billion and growing, many times more than the nearest competitor. The United States has the worlds largest economy, and more than a third of the top 500 global companies are American. There is no other global power, and yet American hard power does not always translate into influence.

Trends such as these have made power less tangible and coercion less effective. Machiavelli said it was safer to be feared than to be loved. Today, in the global information age, it is better to be both.Soft power is the ability to attract people to our side without coercion. Legitimacy is central to soft power. If a people or nation believes American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow our lead without using threats and bribes.Legitimacy can also reduce oppositionand the costsof using hard power when the situation demands. Appealing to others values, interests and preferences can, in certain circumstances, replace the dependence on carrots and sticks. Cooperation is always a matter of degree, and it is profoundly influenced by attraction.Militaries are well suited to defeating states, but they are often poor instruments to fight ideas. Today, victory depends on attracting foreign populations to our side and helping them to build capable, democratic states. Soft power is essential to winning the peace. It is easier to attract people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic.

Smart PowerSmart power is neither hard nor softit is the skillful combination of both. Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action. Providing for the global good is central to this effort because it helps America reconcile its overwhelming power with the rest of the worlds interests and values.

: The second face of power

The second face of power

The United States has in its past wielded hard and soft power in concert, with each contributing a necessary component to a larger aim. We used hard power to deter the Soviet Union during the Cold War and soft power to rebuild Japan and Europe with the Marshall Plan and to establish institutions and norms that have become the core of the international system. Todays context presents a unique set of challenges, however, and requires a new way of thinking about American power.

Pol Kenedi

Declinists vs. Revivalists

Declinists: , :The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Random House, New York, 1987 : , , , , , 1999

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Revivalists . , ., John Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University:Bound to lead: the Changing Nature of American Power, Basic Books, New York, 1990:Understanding U. S. Strenth, Foreign Policy, Fall 1988; Soft Power, Foreign Policy, Fall, 1990; Against Declinism, The New Republic, October 15, 1990, pp. 12-13.

The founding fathers were already worrying about decline on the eighteenth century. The theme returned in the 1890s with the closing of the American frontier. More recently, in the 1950s the Soviet launch of Sputnik was taken as a sign of relative American decline, as was the oil crisis of 1973.Americans are worried about national decline. Many believe that the country is overextended and should reduce its external commitments. But in a world of growing interdependence among nations, this advice is the wrong answer, and U. S. decline is the wrong question. Not only is the premise debatable, but it diverts our attention from the real question: How is power changed in modern international politics

By 1989, half the American public believed that the nation was in decline Immanuel Walerstein sees overstretch as a regular happening with decline starting in Venice around 1500, in Holland around 1660, in Britain around 1873, and in America around 1967.Historical analogies as misleading thingsFor the last decade and half the American share of world product has held stable at about 23 percent of the total. For Kennedy theory applied to the American situation, the burden of defense should have increased over time. Yet even before the end of the cold war, the opposite was the case: defense was 10 percent of GNP in 1950s, 6 percent in the 1980s, and falling toward a projected 4 percent by the mid 1990s.

The United States are still the largest possessor of both hard power the ability to command others, usually through the use of tangible resources such as military and economic might and soft power the ability to co-op rather than command, to get others to want what you want. There is no reason why Americans cannot afford both Social Security and International Security . , . . , .

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John J. Mearsheimer

Power lies at the heart of international politics, yet there is considerable disagreemnet about what power is and how to measure it.Power as a currency of international relations and force is a ultimate ratio of international politics.States have a two kind of power: latent power and military power. These two forms of power are closely related but not synonymous, because they are derived from different kind of assets. Latent power refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power; it is largely based on a states wealth and the overall size of its population. Great powers need money, technology, a and personnel to build military forces and to fight wars, and a states latent power refers to the raw potential it can draw on when competing with rival states.In international politics, however, a states effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces and how they compare with the military forces of rival statesTherefore, the balance of power is largely synonymous with the balance of military power. I define power largely in military terms (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics)

Power as an goal

Power as an asset

Koji su glavni problemi kad se procenjuje mo u meunarodnim odnosima?Power is an elusive concept. It is hard to define, measure or describe exactly how it works. Former John Kennedy School of Government Dean, Joseph Nye wrote: Power is like weather. Everyone talks about it, but few understand it.. Power is like love easier to experience than to define or measure

Stalna promenljivostSubjektivnostPercepcija moiNepostojanje instrumenata za merenje moi rat kao najbolji instrument za merenje moi?Problem kriterijuma GDP, GNP, PPP, GDP per capitaUspon i opadanje u moi je pre proces nego neto to se deava brzo.

Power is not a simple and stable phenomenon. Indeed, it is very much a political chameleon, constantly changing even while it remains the same (John T. Rourk)Power DynamicsAbsolute and relative powerObjective and subjective powerSituational power

Mo je uvek mo u odnosu na neke druge , , . ( , )

Konverzija moi je osnovni problem koji se pojavljuje kada govorimo o moi u smislu izvora. Neke zemlje su bolje od drugih u u pretvaranju svojih resursa u neki praktian uticaj, slino kao to neki veti igrai pobeuju uprkos tome to su im u rukama slabe karte. Konverzija moi je sposobnost da se potencijalna mo, koja se meri resursima, pretvori u stvarnu mo, koja se meri promenom ponaanja drugih. Da bismo ispravno predvideli ishode, potrebno je da poznajemo i vetine zemlje po pitanju konverzije moi i izvore moi koje poseduje.Drugi problem tie se odreivanja koji resursi pruaju najbolju osnovu za mo u nekom odreenom kontekstu. Resursi moi uvek zavise od konteksta. Tenkovi nisu tako dobri u movarama; u devetnaestom veku uranijum nije bio resurs moi. U ranijim razdobljima ljudske istorije bilo je lake suditi o vrednosti izvora moi. Na primer, u vreme agrarnih ekonomija Evrope 18. veka, stanovnitvo je predstavljalo izvor moi od presudne vanosti, jer je ono obezbeivalo osnov za prikupljanje poreza i regrutovanje peadije.

WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTHThe Rules of Power AnalysisRule No. 1: Be Clear About Definitions of PowerRule No. 2: Watch the GoalpostsRule No. 3: Do Not Rely on a Single IndicatorRule No. 4: Consider Latent Power

Rule No. 1: Be Clear About Definitions of Power

What have shifted are peoples' views of the real utility of these resources and capabilities. Current discussions of the limits of US power are really focused on the limited usefulness of large amounts of military and economic capabilities. Political scientists generally use the term "power" to refer to a relationship of influence. As Robert Dahl put it, power is "ability to get B to do something it would not otherwise have done" or, of course, to prevent B from doing something it otherwise would have done). In international relations, the same term of "power" is often equated with resources: measurable elements that states possess and use to influence others. In popular commentary-, these two meanings of power are often conflated, with unfortunate results.

To begin with, the challenge of converting power-as resources into power-as-influence is not a uniquely US problem. All great powers confront these challenges. If the cause of the new gloominess concerning US power had to he reduced to one word, it would be "Iraq." In 2003, fresh from apparent military- victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States appeared to be a colossus. Yet in 2007, its inability to suppress the Iraqi counterinsurgency- and civil war seems to have revealed feet of clay. All the hard data on US military superiorityits over one-half of global defense spending, .some 70 percent of global military R&D, and dominance in information-intensive warfarenow appear in a new light. The world's most vaunted military machine is not even able to tame disorganized Sunni and Shi'a militias in Mesopotamia.But the example of Iraq exhibits a balance of power dynamic between states and non-state insurgents, not one between several different states. There is no reason to believe that China, Russia, India, or the European Union would perform any better if faced with the challenges that the US military confronts in Iraq. Some scholars argue that Iraq demonstrates new information about the state versus non-state balance.

Once an insurgency takes root, governments rarely prevail. When they doas in die case of Britain in South Africa at the turn of the last century and more recently, Russia in Chechnyait is usually the result of deploying very large military forces willing to use ferocious violence on a mass scale against innocent civilians. With a comparatively small force in a large and populous country, the United States' inability to foster stability in Iraq is tragic, but not surprising.

Rule No. 2: Watch the Goalposts

The larger problem with conflating power-as-resources with power-as-influences that it leads to a constant shifting of the goalposts. The better die United States becomes at acquiring resources, the greater the array of global problems it is expected to be able to resolve, and the greater the apparent gap between its material capabilities and die ends it can achieve.

Rule No. 3: Do Not Rely on a Single IndicatorCurrent projections of China's economic rise may well be overstated. Iraq aside, what is most responsible for the virtual shift to multipolarity is not a word but an acronym: PPP. PPP stands for the "purchasing power parity" estimate of countries' exchange ratesthe size of their economies in dollar terms. Although the prices oi many manufactured products tend to be equalized by international trade, the price of labor is not, and therefore labor-intensive products and services tend to be relatively cheap in poor counties. PPP corrects for this discontinuity by using prices for a locally selected basket of goods to adjust the exchange rate for converting local currency into dollars. As University of Pennsylvania professor Avery Goldstein notes, "the World Bank's decision in 1994 to shift to a PPP estimate for China's economy was crucial in propelling perceptions of that country's imminent rise to great power status."

But forecasts about China's rise should not he based on predictions on its living standards. They should discuss China's presence as a great power in international politics its ability- to use money to purchase goods and influence matters abroad. PPP clearly exaggerates this sort of power. No one knows how much to discount the PPP numbers for the purposes of making comparisons of national power. What is certain, economist .Albert Keidel notes, is that one should not "use projections of national accounting growth rates from a PPP base. This common practice seriously inflates estimates of Chinas future economic sizeexaggerating the speed with which China's economy will overtake that of the United States in total size." Projections must take into account the fact that growth will cause prices to converge with international norms, and thus the PPP to converge with the market exchange rate. Using such a methodology, Keidel estimates that it will take until 2050 for China's total economic size to equal the United States. National power is a complex phenomenon.

Rule No. 4: Consider Latent PowerUS military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits arc high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroadnotably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from "imperial overstretch." And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must he careful to take Into account both the level of resources that can he mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged."self-inflicted overstretch" in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power ;and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today.

Gregory Treverton, Seth G. Jones (RAND)Measuring power: how to predict future balances, Harvard International Review, Summer, 2005

Power is an elusive concept. As the political scientist Hans Morgenthau wrote, "The concept of political power poses one of the most difficult and controversial problems of political science." Understanding the nature of power has long been central to the study of international relations and to the work of the US Intelligence Community. The task is now all the more important and elusive, because the United States enjoys an unprecedented amount of economic, military, and technological might in comparison to other states. Yet it must exercise its power in a world not only of state-related constraints on that power, but also of transnational forces and non-state actors that act as competitors, qualifiers, constrainers, and, sometimes, enhancers of that power.

State power can be conceived at three levels: the level of resources or capabilities, also known as power-in-being, the level of power conversion through national processes, and the level of power in outcomes, by which we refer to a state's tendency to prevail in particular circumstances.

The starting point for thinking about--and developing metrics for--national power is to view states as "capability containers." Yet those capabilities--demographic, economic, technological, and others--become manifest only through a process of conversion. States need to convert material resources, or economic prowess, into more usable instruments such as combat proficiency. In the end, however, what policymakers care most about is not power as capability, or even power converted from national ethos, polities, and social cohesion. They care about power in outcomes. That third level of power is by far the most elusive, for it is contingent and relative. It depends on how the power manifests itself, and against whom the power is exercised.

the first level of state power The main categories used to identify the first level of state power, the level of capability, are gross domestic product (GDP), population, defense spending, and a less precise factor capturing innovation in technology. Using these estimates, power is summed as a percent of total global power, and fourteen states hold at least a one percent share. The United States is at the top of the power structure, though it is hardly an isolated and unilateral power. While the United States currently holds nearly a fifth of total global power, it is closely followed by the European Union, considered as a unified actor, and China, which each hold about 14 percent. India, moreover, holds about 9 percent, while Brazil, South Korea, and Russia each hold about 2 percent.

These numbers, though only estimates, suggest possible alliances that could match the power of the United States acting alone or with its traditional allies. Such a power assessment also examines the most likely locations for future conflict, based on six criteria. Projections indicate that Asia is by far the most dangerous region, with six of the eight most conflict-prone bilateral balances involving China. The assessment also indicates that by 2015, the level of US power will be closely threatened by China and India, while the European Union and all non-US members of the Group of Eight will experience a slow decline in power.

Converting Resources into Power Carnegie scholar Ashley Tellis and his colleagues at RAND have recently offered a re-examination of the concept of "national power." They began by assuming that a meticulous detailing of visible military assets is required to understand the true basis of national power. It also requires a scrutiny of such variables as the aptitude for innovation, the nature of social institutions, and the quality of the knowledge base. For Tellis and his colleagues, all of these factors influence a country's capacity to produce the one element that is still fundamental to international politics--effective military power.

Their core argument is that national power is divided into three linked realms: natural resources, national performance, and military capabilities. The first realm encompasses the level of resources either available to, or produced by, a country. The second realm, national performance, is derived from the external pressures facing a country and the efficiency of its governing institutions and its society at large. The third realm, military capabilities, is understood in terms of operational proficiency or effectiveness. Military capability is produced as a result of both the strategic resources available to a military organization and its ability to convert those resources into effective, coercive power. These three realms taken together describe national power.

The Tellis approach is still one of material capabilities, though it gets to what might be called power-in-being. It is about usable power, but does not involve power outcomes. Rather than regard states as simple "containers of capability," this approach considers ideas, organization, and politics. Its ultimate objective is to understand the process by which national resources are converted into military capabilities--especially those that will improve combat proficiency. In fact, Tellis' approach can be applied to any country, and his team has empirically applied the analysis to China. But since data can easily overwhelm the exercise, it is imperative at a macro level to focus on the three or four most critical factors. Therefore, the interplay of power resources, transformative capabilities, and outcomes have dominated the discussion.

Though many of the issues explored by Tellis and his colleagues are critical, there is still a need to think about broadening the scope of indicators. In general, four additional areas are important for power conversion. The first area encompasses economic issues, including access to capital. Researchers have generally focused on domestic economic resources and capabilities. Changes in the global economy, however, have created an impetus to find new indicators that measure the ability of states to utilize global resources for domestic activities. For example, it will become increasingly important to determine the impact of outsourcing domestic jobs to companies in foreign countries. A second area involves the institutions and political structures specific to a given state. Important indicators include the level of corruption and the size of what is called the "selectorate"--in other words, the size of the group to which a leader is actually accountable. This indicator matters especially because it affects the ability of states to allocate and distribute resources. A third, and related, area incorporates values, trust, social capital, and other aspects of civil society. That is, how do people cooperate and interact in political and economic relationships? The final area is social structure, a measure that includes societal stratification and ethnic and class divisions.

Strategic Resources What variables will help us to identify the great powers in the international system in 2020? Important variables include population, human capital, economic power, technological prowess, and military capabilities. However, the single most important form of power in 2020 will continue to be military power. Though military power is best indicated by defense budgets, other measurements might include specific military expenditures such as ground, air, and naval force spending. While these indicators are easily quantifiable, however, they do not always correlate well with military effectiveness. In fact, history demonstrates that smaller armies have defeated larger opponents because of better training, doctrine, and strategy.

Today, economic power is the ultimate foundation of military power, and the best indicator of economic power is GDP. Like defense budgets, however, GDP provides only a limited picture of power. It says little about the composition of the economy, such as whether it is spearheaded by leading sectors, or dominated by old and declining ones. Therefore, it is often equally important to consider variables such as human capital and technology. The best "off the shelf" measure of human capital is the average year of educational attainment. When measuring technology, the best indicator is per capita expenditure on research and development.

Ultimately, however, none of these indicators provides a complete picture of power in 2020. Articulating an ideal indicator is difficult and, perhaps, impossible. But it is likely to have something to do with "quality": the ability of states to convert these components into outputs and make use of them. What truly determines power in the end is a state's ability, through unity and purpose, to mobilize and pursue national ambitions.

Instruments of Power Why do we evaluate and forecast levels of power? Power assessment is crucial to understanding future national security threats and developing useful instruments to address them. It is argued, for example, that future threats to the United States will be caused by a combination of economic, military, environmental, and other variables. An abbreviated list of these threats includes terrorism, pollution, transnational organized crime, demographic changes, and even new health threats such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. Therefore, a menu of "old" and "new" power instruments will be needed to combat these threats. In fact, several "old" power instruments need to change--one of which is the military. In the past, the military focused on conventional and nuclear warfare. In the future, it will need to focus on countering asymmetric forces. Economic instruments are equally in need of change; smarter government instruments would not stifle markets and innovation, but would provide social protection to populations.

More interesting, perhaps, are the implications for diplomacy as a traditional instrument of power. Diplomacy in the United States has traditionally been about selling the American way of life to foreign governments and populations. A better approach might be to promote local groups, institutions, and policies that are compatible with US goals. For example, the US government might initiate a policy of providing assistance to groups abroad that support ideals and policies compatible with US interests, even when these groups do not explicitly support, and perhaps even oppose, the United States. This strategy may help to legitimize the United States abroad and help it better achieve policy change through diplomacy and cooperative efforts. Moreover, it might be beneficial for the United States to adopt a policy of "strategic restraint." Exercising restraint in the United States' use of hard power abroad will decrease counterbalancing and increase regional cooperation.

Improving Our Ability to Forecast Power Several variables and indicators provide information about the current state of power distribution, especially the softer forms. Such variables--which include cultural attractiveness, political outcomes and rulings, knowledge generation and use, and governance effectiveness--might be incorporated in predicting distributions of power.

The first of these variables, cultural attractiveness, includes the "consumption" of US culture, the prevalence of English, the spread of US-style institutions, and the allure of US universities. It would be interesting to conduct an opinion poll that asked respondents questions such as: If you could live anywhere in the world, other than your own country, where would you live and why? Would your choice be most influenced by economic, political, or cultural factors? Equally interesting would be an indicator of knowledge generation and use. This includes a variety of research and development expenditures (total amounts, basic research levels, military research levels), the extent of education at the college level and beyond, the quality of education, and knowledge infrastructure, such as computers, telephones, and the prevalence of networked users. A third variable is the set of political outcomes, such as UN votes and World Trade Organization dispute rulings, that determine which states win and which lose, while additional indicators may include the influence of non-state actors, governance effectiveness, and measures of globalization.

It might be useful to build on these variables and indicators in several ways. First, they could be incorporated into the set of factors from which aggregate power indices are computed. In fact, the system of flexible weighting that already exists should make this incorporation easy. In addition, it might be useful to create an absolute power index in contrast to the current index of relative power. Although states are characterized by their percentage of system power, many states and non-state actors have been increasing their absolute power in ways that affect overall system behavior. For instance, when non-state actors such as terrorist groups achieve significant absolute power, including the ability to do harm, that fact may be more important than their relative power, which is likely to be modest. On the other hand, the relative power of the United States, while enormous in absolute terms, has limits--limits that have become visible in Iraq. Indicators or thresholds for absolute power would be helpful.

Second, it may be useful to simplify and improve the user interface for addressing power. It might be helpful, for instance, to add a basic report capability focused on the indices of power and the component elements of it. It might also be worth considering a specialized form to simplify the controlling of weighting and index construction.

Forecasts, however, will only be as good as the underlying model. There are at least three areas where the foundations of any power model can be enhanced. First, it would be useful to turn attention to the production function in the economic model. The quality of economic growth forecasts is fundamental to most of what the model does. It would be helpful to better represent that production function in a way that builds more extensively on current theories of endogenous growth. Another critical change involves the development of the education sub-model. Returns to education, both in terms of quality and prevalence, may have important implications for models of future power structures. Third, an area that needs significant work is the representation of debt and its impact on countries. Significant power shifts could occur in the international system as a result of exchange rate changes and financial crises.

relying only on the base case. The most intuitive set of scenarios would build on different assumptions of economic growth rates. For example, the RAND Corporation has applied a technique called "fault lines" to China. The analysis asked what major "fault lines," or adversities, might seriously affect China's ability to sustain rapid economic growth. It identified such factors as unemployment, poverty, social unrest, corruption, epidemic diseases, as well as water resources and pollution. It then asked how these adversities might occur, and by how much they would affect China's growth. Wild cards--exogenous shocks to the system--are also important to consider. Future shocks might include energy system shocks, financial shocks, collapses of key regimes, or lethal terrorist attacks. One way RAND has looked at shocks is "breaking" continuities--searching for factors where predictions of continuity seem dubious, even if predicting exactly how, let alone when, that continuity might break is elusive. Breaking is especially likely when two measures of continuity are uneasy partners. For example, several years ago, work on the Asian Futures model included exogenous shocks in Korea and China. In Korea, the heavily armed confrontation is sustained even as North Korea declines economically but does not collapse. Similarly, in the China-Taiwan conflict, the stand-off goes up and down in temperature while China does not accept de facto Taiwanese autonomy, and Taiwan does not declare de jure independence.

In sum, there are a number of steps that must be taken if we are to better understand power and forecast international distributions of power. These include strengthening indices of relative and absolute power, enhancing the foundations of the power model, and developing future scenarios. If taken, these steps can provide policy makers with a more useful set of variables to measure power, and ultimately improve their ability to understand the future security environment.

Power resources of the Major U. S. contenders, 1990

Power resources of the Major U. S. contenders, 2008 moja procena

Sources of power United StatesJapanChina RussiaEuropean Union IndiatangibleBasic resourcesstrongmedium strongstrongstrongStrong to mediumMilitarystrongweakmedium strong mediummediumEconomicstrong strong strong and mediummedium and strongstrongmedium to strong Science/ TechnologystrongstrongmediummediumstrongIntangibleNational Cohesionstrongstrongstrongmediumweakweak and mediumUniversalistic CulturestrongmediummediummediumstrongmediumInternational Institutionsstrong strongmediummediumstrongmedium

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Power resources of the Major U. S. contenders in the future?

Sources of power United StatesJapanChina RussiaEuropean Union IndiatangibleBasic resourcesMilitary

EconomicScience/ Technology

IntangibleNational Cohesion

Universalistic Culture

International Institutions

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