MOBILIZATION

FOR THE VIETNAM WAR:

A POLITICAL AND MILITARY CATASTROPHE

by

JOHN D. STUCKEY and JOSEPH H. PISTORIUS

NONMOBILIZATION IN 1965

The proposition that the National Guardand Reserve would be called into activefederal service had been proven prior toVietnam in every major war. Even the BerlinCrisis of 1961 had witnessed the call-up of119,622 Guard and Reserve members.Because of this historical perspective, therewas an unquestioned readiness to believe thatmobilization of the Guard and Reserve wouldprovide citizen-soldiers for the Vietnam War.

The first momentous year of the Viet­nam War regarding Army manpower was1965, when 44 combat battalions of theUnited States and its allies were deployed toSouth Vietnam, beginning 8 March. Whenthis buildup of ground combat forces began,the Army National Guard (ARNG) and USArmy Reserve (USAR) had a Ready Reservepaid strength of 695,000, organized into 23divisions, 11 separate brigades, and some8000 units. 4 The Regular Army had a strengthof about 970,000 (with 42 percent of itspersonnel deployed overseas), organized into

T he United States has relied extensivelyon its Militia, National Guard, andReserves in every major war in its

history, except for the Vietnam War. Thatonly a diminutive mobilization occurred forthe Vietnam War was a remarkable departurefrom American military history. This articlebriefly reviews the reliance on the citizen­soldier in major American wars, thenexamines the extent to which the Presidentand his civilian and military advisers con­sidered mobilization during the first threeyears of the Vietnam ground war and therationale behind nonmobilization during thatperiod. We then focus on the 1968 call-up ofArmy National Guard and US Army Reserveforces for the Vietnam War and thecharacteristics and problems of that partialmobilization.

The United States has never maintainednor seriously considered maintaining duringpeacetime a Regular Army of sufficient sizeto meet the needs of war. The United Stateshas engaged in nine major wars, and ex­tensive reliance has been placed on thecitizen-soldier in the first eight of them. Thatreliance is made clear in the following table.'The first column of figures shows thestrength of the Regular Army at the begin­ning of the wars listed; the second columnshows the number of Militia, Army NationalGuard, and Army Reserve troops mobilizedfor each.

Revolutionary War l

War of 1812Mexican WarSpanish~AmericanWarWorld War IWorld War IIIKorean WarVietnam War

Initial Strengtho

6.7447,365

28,183127.588187,893591.487970.000

Mobilized250,000458,000

73,532170,954208,000377,000382,90022,786

26 Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

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16 divisions, four regimental combat teams,seven separate brigades, and seven specialforces groups. S

During the first three years of theVietnam ground war (1965-67), mobilizationof the National Guard and Reserve was amajor topic of consideration by PresidentJohnson and his military and civilian ad­visers. From the onset of the buildup ofground combat forces in South Vietnam,mobilization was favored by the Secretary ofDefense, the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS), the National Security Adviser, theSecretaries of the military departments, manymembers of Congress, the National Guardand Reserve leadership, and others.

On 2 April 1965, the JCS asked theSecretary of Defense in JCSM 238-65 for anincreased ability to wage the war by removing"all administrative impediments that hamperus in the prosecution of this war." Thisrequest included atithority to extend militaryterms of service and to conduct consultationswith Congress on mobilizing the Guard andReserve.'

Paul H. Nitze, Secretary of the Navy,reported that both he and Secretary ofDefense McNamara favored mobilization in1965: "We also thought that there should bea greater commitment of support by Con­gress, and that the way you could get thatwould be to put a bill into the Congressasking for the power to call up the Re­serves. "7

On 15 July 1965, Secretary McNamarastated that if increased numbers of American

Colonel John D. Stuckey is a Strategic ResearchAnalyst and the Army National Guard Advisor to theStrategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. Hereceived a Ph.D. from the University of Oregon. He is a1969 graduate of the US ArmyCommand and General StaffCollege and a 1980 graduate ofthe US Army War College. Hehas held numerous commandand staff positions in theOregon Army National Guardand most recently was Chief,Office of Policy and Liaison atthe National Guard Bureau.

Vol. XV, No.1

troops Were to be sent to South Vietnam, "itwill be necessary to consider calling upreserves, extending tours, and increasing thedraft. "S Two days later, Deputy Secretary ofDefense Vance informed Secretary Mc­Namara (by cable since the Secretary was inSouth Vietnam) that President Johnson wasfavorably disposed to the call-up of reservesand extension of tours of active duty per­sonnel.'

Secretary McNamara returned to Wash­ington on 20 July and reported immediatelyto the President. Among his recom­mendations was one to ask Congress for theauthority to call up 235,000 members of theNational Guard and Reserve. He alsoproposed increased recruitment, larger draftcalls, and extensions of tours to raise the sizeof the regular armed forces by 375,000. 10

The President considered McNamara'sproposals very carefully: he met with his topadvisers at the White House on 21 July; withthe JCS and Secretaries of the militarydepartments the following day; and withother advisers on 22 July at the White Houseand on 25 July at Camp David. The Presidentassembled the National Security Council on27 July and laid out five options. In his ownwords,

We can bring the enemy to his knees byusing our Strategic Air Command, I said,describing our first option. Another groupthinks we ought to pack up and go home.

Third, we could stay there as we are­and suffer the consequences, continue to

Colonel Joseph H. Pistorius is a Strategic ResearchAnalyst and the Army Reserve Advisor to the StrategicStudies Institute, US Army War College. He is agraduate of Spring Hill College, Mobile, Alabama andholds a master's degree fromWayne State University.Colonel Pistorius is a graduateof the US Army Command andGeneral Staff College, ICAF,Air War College, and US ArmyWar College. He has served innumerous command and staffassignments within the 79thARCOM in Pennsylvania.

27

lose territory and take casualties. Youwouldn't want your own boy to be out therecrying for help and not get it.

Then, we could go to Congress and askfor great sums of money; we could call upthe Reserves and increase the draft; go on awar footing, declare a state of emergency.There is a good deal of feeling that ought tobe done. We have considered this. But if wego into that kind of land war, then NorthVietnam would go to its friends, China andRussia, and ask them to help. They would beforced into increasing aid. For that reason Idon't want to be overly dramatic and causetensions. I think we can get our people tosupport us without having to be tooprovocative and warlike [emphasis added]. ~

Finally, we can give our commanders inthe field the men and supplies they say theyneed.

I had concluded that the last course wasthe right one. I had listened to and weighedall the arguments and counterarguments foreach of the possible lines of action. Ibelieved that we should do what wasnecessary to resist aggression but that weshould not be provoked into a major war.We would get the required appropriation inthe new budget, and we would not boastabout what we were doing. We would notmake threatening scenes to the Chinese orthe Russians by calling up Reserves in largenumbers [emphasis added]. At the sametime, we would press hard on the diplomaticfront to try to find some path to a peacefulsettlement.

I asked if anyone objected to the courseof action I had spelled out. I questioned eachman in turn. Did he agree? Each nodded hisapproval or said' 'yes. "II

The President also reported in hismemoirs that even then (27 July 1965) thenonmobilization decision was not final. Henext met with leaders of Congress on theevening of the same day. Following thesesessions with key civilian and military ad­visers, the President held a press conferenceon 28 July at which he explained the UScommitment of ground combat forces toresist communist aggression in South Viet-

28

nam. In his prepared statements he said;

First, we intend to convince theCommunists that we cannot be defeated byforce of arms or by superior power. They arenot easily convinced. In recent months theyhave greatly increased their fighting forcesand their attacks and the number of in­cidents. I have asked the CommandingGeneral, General Westmoreland, what morehe needs to meet this mounting aggression.He has told me. We will meet his needs.

I have today ordered to Vietnam theAirmobile Division and certain other forceswhich will raise our fighting strength from75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately.Additional forces will be needed later, andthey will be sent as requested. This will makeit necessary to increase our active fightingforces by raising the monthly draft call from17,000 over a period of time to 35,000 permonth, and for us to step up our campaignfor voluntary enlistments.

After this past week of deliberations, Ihave concluded that it is not essential toorder Reserve units into service now. If thatnecessity should later be indicated, I will givethe matter more careful consideration and Iwill give the country due and adequate noticebefore taking such action, but only after fullpreparations. 12

Whatever was personally felt by thepolitical, military, and intelligence players in1965, and by observers, they all had one thingin common: they recognized that deploying44 combat battalions to Vietnam in 1965 wasthe crossing of an important threshold andthe beginning of a major new course whoseend was not in sight. General Westmoreland'splans called for increasing the troops inVietnam and included the expectation thatthe war would last well beyond a year. Theauthors of United States- Vietnam Relations("The Pentagon Papers") made the follow­ing conclusion pertaining to mobilization andthe length of the war in the 1965 period:

The decision not to call up the Reserves,which was made some time during the weekjust prior to the President's press conference

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

of 28 July, indicated that the President alsoexpected the war to last in Vietnam wellbeyond a year. No doubt the Secretary ofDefense told him that without a declarationof national emergency-a move the Presi­dent found politically unpalatable-theReseFes as an asset would be fully expendedin one year, leaving the military establish­ment in worse shape than before if the warstill continued.' 3

US military contingency plans for In­dochina, which were being drafted as early asthe 1950s, were based upon the campaign inKorea, upon the fundamental concept of themassive use of force-air power, navalpower, and ground power-and uponconcurrent mobilization of the Guard andReserve. Mobilization was a cornerstone ofthe planning. Douglas Kinnard wrote that"contingency planning viewed the ActiveArmy and Reserves as one force, and warplans were drawn up accordingly."" JamesGavin, who was Chief of Plans of the ArmyStaff in the mid-1950s, wrote about warplanning for Vietnam, "We believed it wouldbe necessary to call up the Army Reserve andNational Guard."" General Donald V.Bennett, Director of Strategic Plans in theJoint Staff, reported that he was.probably themost shocked man in the world upon hearingof the 1965 decision not to mobilize."

Even though the President rejected therecommendations of his Secretary ofDefense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, andothers, the Department of Defense never­theles.s ciung to a hope that mobilizationwould occur for the Vietnam War. ThePresident did not foreciose that possibility. InAugust 1965, Secretary McNamara reportedto Congress that "the buildup of the activeArmy and the improvement of the. readinessof a portion of the Reserve Components werenecessary to offset planned deployments toSoutheast Asia, to provide additional forcesfor possible new deployments, and to be ableto deal with crises elsewhere in the world.''''

President Johnson presented only onereason for nonmobilization in 1965: his fearthat such a warlike action might trigger agreater war with China and Russia. DorisKearns tells of other reasons:

Vol. XV, No.1

In private conversation, Johnson ad­mitted two other considerations: His fear of"touching off a right-wing stampede" andhis concern for the Great Society. Convincedthat McCarthyism was dormant but notdefeated, Johnson feared that if the fullextent of our difficulties in Vietnam wereknown, the political right-a force of un­determined size whose power Johnsonalmost certainly overestimated-would seizethe initiative and demand an invasion ofNorth Vietnam and the bombing of Hanoi.Johnson was much more concerned with thekind of furor that men like John Stennis,Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and othersmight have created than he was about anydove opposition. This reflected his know­ledge of the sources of congressional power.Dissembling was the only way to keep thestampede from beginning. By pretendingthere was no major conflict, by minimizingthe level of spending and by refusing to callup the Reserves or ask Congress for anacknowledgement of acceptance of the war,Johnson believed he could keep the levers ofcontrol in his hands."

Chester L. Cooper wrote that thenonmobilization decision was a balancebetween military requirements in Vietnamversus political consequences at home:

The announced increase to 125,000 menwas almost certainly substantially less thaneither the Joint Chiefs or Westmoreland hadrequested and expected. Johnson wasdetermined to fight the war with minimumdisruption at home. and the troop increasewas not .based on the estimated numberrequired, but rather on the maximumnumber that could be deployed withouthaving to call up the Reserves. Doling outadditional forces with a view to balancingoff military requirements in Vietnam andpolitical consequences at home typified thePresident's approach. He wished to avoidgiving the impression that the United Stateswas, in fact, "at war. "19

Another, similar explimation of thePresident's decision is given by Kearns:"Johnson recoiled from the dramatic display

29

of presidential action of a presidentialdeclaration, asking Congress for higher taxesto pay for the war, and ordering amobilization. The alternate strategy-whichwas Johnson's strategy-was to tell Congressand the public no more than absolutelynecessary.' '20

David Halberstam's analysis of Presi­dent Johnson's decision not to mobilize in1965 is also particularly revealing:

If there were no decisions which werecrystallized and hard, then they could notleak, and if they could not leak, then theopposition could not point to them. Whichwas why he was not about to call up thereserves, because the use of the reserveswould blow it all. It would be self-evidentthat we were really going to war, and that wewould in fact have to pay a price. Whichwent against all the Administration plan­ning: this would be a war without a price, asilent, politically invisible war. The militarywanted to call up the Reserves.

He was against a call-up of the Reservesfor other reasons as well. It would, hethought, telegraph the wrong signals to theadversaries, particularly China and theSoviet Union (frighten them into the ideathat this was a real war) and Hanoi, whichmight decide that it was going to be a longwar (he did not intend to go into a long war),and he felt if you called up the Reserves youhad to be prepared to go the distance andyou might force your adversary to do thesame. He also felt that it would frighten thecountry, and he had just run as a peacecandidate; similarly, he felt it would be toomuch of a sign that the military were incharge and that the civilians would turn overtoo much responsibility to the military.Finally, and above all, he feared that itwould cost him the Great Society, that hisenemies in Congress would seize on the waras a means of denying him his sociallegislation. "

John K. Mahon has written that therewere three major reasons for PresidentJohnson's refusal to mobilize the Guard andReserve in 1965: (I) to conceal America's

30

military commitment in Vietnam from theAmerican people; (2) to avoid sending abelligerent message to the North Vietnamese,Chinese, and Soviets; and (3) to preserve thereserves for other contingencies. 22

Whatever President Johnson's motiva­tions were to not mobilize the Guard andReserve in 1965, one of his objectives is nowclear: he wished to conceal the expandedAmerican participation in Vietnam from thepublic at large, from Congress, and frommost of his own government. This policy ofconcealment was made explicit in NationalSecurity Action Memorandum 328, 6 April1965." Calling up the National Guard andReserve would have destroyed the duplicity.

NONMOBILIZATION IN 1966 AND 1967

By the autumn of 1965, the infiltrationof North Vietnamese units into SouthVietnam had increased substantially. GeneralWestmoreland requested additional forces on22 November 1965, and following anothertrip to South Vietnam, Secretary McNamararecommended troop deployments totaling 74battalions and 400,000 US personnel by theend of 1966, with possibly 200,000 more in1967." The Joint Chiefs continued to ad­vocate a call-up of the reserves. They believedthat commitments to NATO and elsewhere,as well as General Westmoreland's trooprequirements for Vietnam, could not be metwithout a mobilization. The JCS also felt thatonly a massive deployment of troops andfirepower would end the war in the least timeand with the least cost. They did not sharewith President Johnson any illusioll. ofwishful thinking about the length of the waror its requirements.

On 1 March 1966, the JCS forwardedtheir recommendation regarding 1966 deploy­ments (Phase II A [Rl forces-later namedPhase 3) to Vietnam and reconstituting theStrategic Reserve. They stated that to.satisfyfurther force requirements in Vietnam all.d toreconstitute the Strategic Reserve wouldrequire "a selective call-up of Reserve unitsand personnel and extension of terms ofservice." The JCS also recommended that ifthe reserves were not called up nor terms of

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

service extended, then the deployments for1966 (Phase 3) should be extended into 1967.On 10 March 1966, the Secretary of Defenserejected this advice and directed the JCS toplan for deployment of forces without eithera call-up or extension of terms of service. 2S

On 7 October 1966, the JCS forwardedto the Secretary of Defense their analysis ofthe worldwide US military posture in light ofmeeting the 1966 and 1967 deploymentrequirements for Vietnam. This analysisconcluded that without a call-up of reserves,with no change in rotation policy (from theone-year tour), and assuming that resourcesfor the proposed 1967 deployment to Viet­nam would be taken from existing USworldwide structure, the Army would have aforce deficiency of three and two-thirds activedivisions. 26

In November 1966, the President madehis decision on force deployments forVietnam through FY 1967 (Program 4). Theforces programmed were to be significantlyless than requested by the field commander: aceiling of 470,000 to be reached by June 1968,as opposed to the request for 542,000 by the.end of calendar year 1967. However, therewould not be a mobilization of the Guard andReserve. 27 The Program 4 decision met withdisagreement, for various reasons, on Capi­tol Hill and in the press. Many politicalleaders spoke out against the restricted forcelevels. Senator John Stennis, chairman of theArmed Services Committee, argued formeeting General Westmoreland's trooprequests "even if it should requiremobilization or partial mobilization." TheJCS also sharply disagreed with the ceiling of470,000."

In May 1967, considerable attention wasfocused on determining capabilities of theservices to provide troops and units withoutcalling the reserves or a further drawing downof units in Europe. A Systems AnalysisOffice study of 5 May concluded that theservices could provide only 66,000 of theadditional 186,000 troops requested byMACV, and only 19 combat battalions of the42 requested. 29

Significant attention was devoted in thefall of 1967 to accelerate deployments of

VoL XV, No.1

Program 5 and to find new approaches tomilitary operations in Vietnam. Calendaryear 1967 ended with the Program 5 combatelements either closing in Vietnam or on theirway there, with mobilization continuing to bea major issue, and with a continuingpresidential decision not to mobilize.

EVENTS AND MOBILIZATION IN 1968

When calendar year 1968 began,American Army combat units had beenfighting in Vietnam for 34 months (sinceMarch 1965), and no mobilization had beenpermitted by the President. The approvedforce levels in Program 5 totaled 525,000,with an Army portion of 351,618, which wasa net increase of 26,983 over Program 4. 30

In January 1968, the Army NationalGuard and Army Reserve had a combinedReady Reserve unit strength of ap­proximately 680,000, organized into some7000 units, plus an Individual Ready Reserve(lRR) strength of over 540,000. The forcestructure of these Army reserve componentsincluded eight combat divisions, 13 trainingdivisions, 21 separate combat brigades, twoengineer brigades, seven support brigades,250 separate combat battalions, and otherunits. The Regular Army structure in January1968 included 19 numbered divisions, with atotal active Army strength of about 1.5million: five divisions were located in theUnited States, two in Korea, five in Europe,and seven were in the Republic of Vietnam."

On 25 January 1968, President Johnsondirected, by Executive Order, a partial call-upof some Guard and Reserve units as a resultof the USS Pueblo incident. He refrainedfrom declaring a national emergency, whichwould have permitted him to bring up to onemillion Ready Reservists on active duty for aperiod of up to one year. The legal authorityactually used by the President for themobilization was Public Law 89-687 (the1967 DOD Appropriation Act), which in­cluded the following key language: "Not­withstanding any other provision of law,until June 30, 1968, the President may, whenhe deems it necessary, order to active dutyany unit of the Ready Reserve of an armed

31

force for a period of not to exceed twenty­four months. ""

Twenty-eight units involving 14,801 unitmembers were mobilized under the Januaryorder: six units with 593 Navy Reservemembers; 14 units having 9340 members ofthe Air National Guard; and eight unitshaving 4868 Air Reserve members. No ArmyNational Guard, Army Reserve, MarineCorps Reserve, or Coast Guard Reserve unitsor individuals were called. Although the 25January mobilization was not ordered at thetime specifically for Vietnam, four of the AirNational Guard units (tactical fightersquadrons) were deployed to RVN in May1968. All six of the activated Naval Reserveunits were demobilized by the end of calendaryear 1968, as were seven of the eight AirReserve units. By December 1969, all of theunits mobilized under the 25 January 1968order were deactivated. 33

Although the 25 January 1968 mobiliza­tion did not include Army reserve com­ponents, the Army Staff nevertheless beganformal planning for a partial mobilization ofthe ARNG and USAR on 25 January inresponse to a directive from the Secretary ofthe Army to do so. The Army had developedin 1962 a Partial Mobilization Plan, based onthe experience of the limited mobilization in1961 during the Berlin Crisis, but the planwas not kept current following the 1965decision to not mobilize the reserve com­ponents for the Vietnam War. The Armyconducted no serious mobilization planningbetween 1965 and 1968. H

The new planning in 1968 was orientedinitially toward the buildup of US Armyforces in Korea and reconstitution of theStrategic Army Forces, but later was ex­panded to include the need for additionalArmy forces in Vietnam. 35 The Armymobilization planning phase lasted from 25January to 10 April 1968 and consisted oftwo types of planning: (I) intensive, specific,close-hold planning characterized by minimalguidance, restriction to a few selected personson the Army Staff, short suspense dates, lackof staff coordination, changes in the type ofunits and strength of the force which might beauthorized, and secrecy; and, (2) general

32

planning, which included a review of the 1961mobilization during the Berlin Crisis, up­dated personnel procedures, and preparationof a congressional information plan. Thisgeneral planning was well coordinated withinthe Army Staff and with US ContinentalArmy Command (CONARC) headquarters. 36

The first type of planning (intensive,close-hold) focused on developing troop lists,and lasted II weeks (25 January to 10 April).This planning was actually accomplished intwo distinct subperiods: the period 25January to 9 February concentrated ondeveloping plans to reinforce the Eighth USArmy in Korea and to reconstitute theStrategic Army Forces; during the period 10February to 10 April, planning for deploy­ment of additional forces to South Vietnamwas added to the task. Approximately 75force packages were developed during the 11­week period. Revisions in lists of selectedunits occurred almost daily. There was nocoordination in developing troop lists be­tween the full Army staff, CONARCheadquarters, the Continental US Armies,State Adjutants General, or Reserve com­mands. 37

Planning was thus restricted andhampered. Further, the Army Guard andArmy Reserve were undergoing substantialreorganizations that began I December 1967and were not completed until 31 May 1968.Current unit readiness data were notavailable at HQDA because the readinessreporting system of reserve components hadbeen suspended by the Undersecretary of theArmy in 1966. 38

The enemy's Tet Offensive began on 31January 1968, only eight days after the USSPueblo was seized. As the large-scale Tetoperations continued, Secretary McNamaraasked the JCS on 9 February to provide plansfor emergency reinforcements. A formalrequest by General Westmoreland forreinforcements was made on 12 February. 39

President Johnson met with his advisers(Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Wheeler,Taylor, Helms, and Reston) on 12 Februaryto discuss General Westmoreland's requestfor reinforcements. Calling up reserves wasdiscussed. The President approved rein-

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

forcements but again rejected mobilization.President Johnson wrote of the 12 Februarymobilization question: "Wheeler was infavor; McNamara was opposed. 1asked themto study the problem further and to agree ona recommendation.'''' The meeting con­tinued the following day, and the Presidentreported the following in his memoirs aboutthe discussion:

My advisers still disagree on whetherReserves should be called, and, if so, howmany and in what categories. I told Mc­Namara and Wheeler there were manyquestions I wanted them to answer. Iremember the complaints about the call-upof Reserves during President Kennedy'sadministration and, more recently, thefailure to use effectively those who had beencalled up during the Pueblo crisis.

Why, I asked, is it necessary to call upReserve units at this time? If we decided on acall-up, how large should it be? Could wereduce the numbers by drawing on forcesstationed in Europe or South Korea? Couldwe avoid or at least postpone individualReserve call-ups? If Reserves were called,where would they be assigned? How longwould they serve? What would be thebudgetary implications? Would congression­al action be necessary? I said that I wouldtake no action until I received satisfactoryanswers to these and several otherquestions. 41

On 13 February, the reinforcementdecision of the day before was being im­plemented, to consist of the deployment ofone brigade of the 82d Airborne Division andone Marine regimental landing team, for atotal emergency reinforcement of 10,500men. Responding to this decision, the JCSimmediately forwarded their recommenda­tions for a call-up of reserve forces: theminimum call-up, which would replacedeploying forces, would require 32,000 forthe Army, 12,000 for the Marine Corps, 2300Navy Reserves, and none for the Air Force.In addition, the Joint Chiefs stressed that itwould be both prudent and advisable for alarger mobilization of 136,650: 58,000 Army,

Vol. XV, No.1

51,000 Marines, 5150 Navy, and 22,500 AirForce. The Joint Chiefs of Staff alsoreiterated their recommendation that legisla­tion be sought for mobilization and extensionof terms of service. <2

General Westmoreland also saw the needfor a mobilization at that time in order toprovide reinforcements and to increase theStrategic Reserve. He reported, however, thatGeneral Wheeler had informed him on 24March, under the President's direction, that"making a major call-up of Reserves andcontesting the enemy's geographical wideningof the war was politically infeasible.' '43

On 29 February, Secretary of Defensedesignate Clark Clifford (sworn in asSecretary on 1 March) initiated, at the orderof the President, a complete reexamination ofUS strategy in Vietnam which became knownas the"A to Z" reassessment. The last weekof February and first week of March 1968were characterized by frantic preparation,discussion, consultation, and writing. On 4March, the President was presented with the"A to Z" reassessment, which contained arecommendation to mobilize 262,000Guardsmen and Reservists for the war."

MOBILIZATION DECISIONAND POLICIES

On 13 March, the President made thedecision to have a mobilization, but thespecific size of the mobilized force was notthen decided. The Office of the Secretary ofDefense began planning on 14 March for acall-up of 96,000 personnel, of which 43,500were to be deployed to Vietnam. 4S

On 28 March, the President made thedecision that mobilization would be limited toabout 24,500 personnel. On 2 April, the finaltroop list submitted by the Army to the JCStotaled 54,000. Two days later, the Secretaryof Defense decreed that 54,000 was too highbecause of cost." It is pathetic that after allthe debate and arguments about the need fora mobilization, all the planning and con­sideration about the size and composition ofthe mobilized force, despite the requirementsfor forces to be deployed and to reconstitutethe Strategic Reserve, and regardless of the

33

money spent on the war over the previousseveral years, in the end the size of themobilized force was decided by financial andpolitical considerations and not operationalrequirements.

On 31 March 1968, President Johnsonaddressed the nation on television. Hesummarized his efforts to achieve peace inVietnam over the years, and made thefollowing brief comment about a call-up ofthe Reserves:

In order that these forces [the to,500emergency reinforcements] may reachmaximum combat effectiveness, the JointChiefs of Staff have recommended to methat we should be prepared to send-duringthe next five months-support troopstotalling approximately 13,500 men.

A portion of these men will be madeavailable from our active forces. Thebalance will come from Reserve Componentunits which will be called up for service."

The President then reiterated US ob­jectives in Vietnam, and closed his addresswith the startling announcement, "I shall notseek, and I will not accept, the nomination ofmy party for another term as your Presi­dent.'''' Thus, two of the major decisions ofthe Johnson presidency were made in March1968. It is interesting to speculate on thepossible linkage of these two decisions,although there is no recorded evidence ofany.

President Johnson signed an ExecutiveOrder (No. 11406) authorizing the mobiliza­tion for the Vietnam War. The actualmobilization authority exercised by thePresident (and delegated to the Secretary ofDefense) was contained in the 1967 DODAppropriations Act, which was the sameauthority utilized for the 25 January 1968partial mobilization resulting from the USSPueblo incident. The mobilization was basedneither on a declaration of emergency nor ona declaration of war. 49

At 1000 hours on II April 1968,Secretary of Defense Clifford announced at anews conference that 24,500 men in some 88units from the reserve components of the

34

Army, Navy, and Air Force and 3600members of the Individual Ready Reserve(IRR) would be mobilized. 50 The mobiliza­tion order was dated that same day, anddirected the call-up to occur on 13 May (M­Day). Seventy-six ARNG and USAR units,with a strength of 20,034, were actuallymobilized. In addition, 2752 members of theIRR were called up. There were two ob­jectives for the 13 May 1968 mobilization: (I)to provide troops for actual deployment toVietnam, and (2) to provide troops to buildup the strategic reserves in the United States.Forty-three units were deployed to Vietnam,and 33 units remained in the United States."

Selection of the 76 ARNG and USARunits to be mobilized was made by theAssistant Chief of Staff for Force Develop­ment in frantic consultation with the Chief,National Guard Bureau, and the Chief, ArmyReserve. No other Army staff, major Armycommands, or states were involved in the unitselection determination.

Although 74 of the 76 needed types ofunits were in the Selected Reserve Force(SRF) in 1968, or had recently been in theSRF, only 59 units were selected from theSRF category for mobilization. 52 Thus, theprimary criterion of highest operationalreadiness was applied to only 66 percent ofthe unit selection. Other criteria which in­fluenced selection were geographic distribu­tion (34 states provided units), proportionatecontribution by the ARNG and USAR (68percent and 32 percent, respectively), and thecivil disturbance threat (no state was denudedof its ARNG). 53

Because the mobilization of units wassmall, only 3069 enlisted IRR fillers wererequired. From a total IRR paper strength of540,000, only 4132 of its members wereeligible for call-up because the 1967 DODAppropriations Act prohibited calling upIRR members who had completed two ormore years of active service and those whohad fulfilled their statutory military obliga­tions. No officers in the IRR were recalledbecause the number eligible was too small todeal with; only 93 were eligible from an initialprojection of 2400. The number of IRRpersonnel actually mobilized was 2752, which

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

was only one-half of one percent of the IRR.Of these, 1060 were assigned to the activeArmy and 1692 went to mobilized ARNG andUSAR units. 54

HQDA attempted from the onset tomanage mobilized personnel (unit membersand nonunit members) in the same mannerand under the same regulations as RegularArmy personnel. It didn't work. Personnelactions and problems associated with the1968 partial mobilization for Vietnam in­cluded reassignments, promotions, delays,exemptions, deferments, separations, medi­cal exams, proficiency pay eligibility, per­sonnel accounting, reporting, and control. 56

These problems and issues had occurred withevery mobilization in US history.

As was the case with mobilizationplanning in general, the preparation ofstationing plans did not begin until 25January 1968. Considerable difficulty wasencountered because of the many changes inthe type and number of units in the troop listsduring the mobilization planning period of 25January to 10 April. Developing stationingplans was difficult also because the plannersdid not know what units would be mobilized,when the mobilizations would occur, whatactive Army deployments would be made, orthe length of time between alert andmovement to mobilization stations."

Determining the Army's capability toequip mobilized ARNG and USAR units wasimpossible during the mobilization planningperiod. In addition to problems similar to theones encountered by those attempting todevelop stationing plans, the DA staff did notknow the true equipment status of the unitsthat were on the final list to be mobilized.

The incredible assumption was madethat units scheduled for deployment were in acombat-ready status. In fact, everyone of the76 mobilized units was rated C-4 (notcombat-ready) in equipment readiness. Inmany cases the DA analysts did not know theTOE under which the mobilized units wereorganized. Following M-Day there wereserious problems with assumptions, equip­ment status reporting, distribution, andredistribution. A consistent feature of everymobilization in US history has been the

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requirement to provide equipment for themobilized units."

Unit training at mobilization stationswas adversely affected by the large number ofpersonnel who were not branch- or MOS­qualified, by understrength units, by equip­ment shortages, and by the issuance ofequipment not previously used by the ARNGand USAR. The major reorganization of thereserve components immediately before themobilization degraded readiness, as had theinclusion of civil disturbance training in theGuard's inactive-duty training program. Therequirement to conduct individual training aswell as unit training to overcome theseproblems resulted in an extension of thepostmobilization training beyond that pre­scribed in the Army Training Program for 58of the 76 mobilized units."

That mobilized units had to undergo acomplete unit training program in 1968 toachieve deployability readiness was nodifferent from the experience of earliermobilizations. Whenever mobilized unitshave a readiness condition of C-4 inequipment, which all had in 1968, a post­mobilization training program will berequired. Whenever units are less than C-I(combat-ready, no deficiencies) in personnel,which all were in 1968, a postmobilizationtraining program will be necessary. Even ifmobilized units were C-I in both personneland equipment, the question of operationalreadiness from a training perspective wouldarise. The historical experience withmobilizations demands the realization thatpostmobilization training will be mandatory,and that it will take at least several weeks toachieve operational readiness. Peacetimetraining and the peacetime equipment statusof the Army National Guard and ArmyReserve have never, in US history, beensufficient for immediate deployment.

The question of how to use mobilizedunits of the Guard and Reserve hashistorically been an issue and became con­troversial again during the Vietnam War.Unit integrity was not maintained either withthe units that deployed to Vietnam or thosethat were not deployed. For example, of the12,234 mobilized Army National Guards-

35

men, 2729 reported to Vietnam with theirGuard units, but many were subsequentlytransferred to other units. Of the 9505Guardsmen whose units remained in theUnited States, 4311 were sent to Vietnam asfillers. "

Unit history and unit integrity arematters of great pride and intense concernwithin the National Guard and Reserve.Those forces have been built on the basis ofunits, beginning with the initial militiasystem. Training, equipment, organization,tactics, and readiness are all based oncohesion of units. Using unit members asfillers and individual replacements alwayscauses considerable dissatisfaction, and theuse of the reserve component units as somesort of individual recruiting preserve isneither proper nor wise.

The mobilization of reserve components,however large or small the call-up, is never aroutine matter. In addition to strategicconsiderations and purely military events andactivities in conducting the mobilization,there will always be political and publicaffairs implications-particularly with par­tial mobilizations. The media, Congress, andthe public will rightfully direct a barrage ofinquiries to the White House and the Pen­tagon. There will initially be considerableexcitement and attention to the topic, and ifDOD is properly prepared for the inquiries,the public attention may soon wane. Of themany questions asked about mobilization,the most important one to answer is "Why?"The next questions will be: "Where are themobilized troops now and what are theydoing?" Three months after the January1968 mobilization, the media reported thatmobilized Reservists were "just waitingaround," which was mostly true. The samecan be said of the May 1968 mobilization.The charge of unsuitable use of mobilizedreserves will always occur when the mobilizedunits are not deployed and when unit integrityis violated.

The 76 units mobilized on 13 May 1968served on active duty between 14 and 19months. During the first half of that time,many unit personnel were assigned to otherunits as fillers, resulting in their being

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scattered all over the world. During the lasthalf of the period, the Army attempted toplan and execute a system to reestablish unitintegrity in order to demobilize the units.

Demobilization of units was accomplish­ed by 12 December 1969, after which one unitwas eliminated from the structure and threewere reorganized. The Army's demobiliza­tion was characterized by poor planning,inefficiency, disinterest, terrible policy, poorexecution, and ill-timing. Nearly everythingabout the demobilization was cause forcomplaint. Of the numerous problems, themost serious was the loss of unit integrity.The strong feeling was widespread within theGuard and Reserve that a breach of goodfaith had been committed by the Army."Thus, after years of neglect and receipt ofequipment which was not considered ap­propriate for active Army use, the Guard andReserve forces were shunted even further intothe background of full and equal treatment asa viable component of the national forcestructure.

PURPOSE AND MEANING OFMOBILIZATION

Mobilization is a military and a politicalevent of crucial importance. The purpose andmeaning of mobilization to the military canbe expressed concisely: the central concept ofstrategy is force; the central concept of forceis manpower; and the central concept ofmanpower is mobilization. Mobilizationincreases the options and the capabilities ofthe Defense Department to carry out nationalmilitary policy, and it directly affects thetiming, size, and composition of deploymentsto a theater of war. In addition, mobilizationaffects other potential theaters, as well as thestrategic reserves. The decision to mobilize isvital to actual and potential militaryoperations and capabilities, as well as topolicy, strategy, and tactics.

The other element of mobilization can bestated as a fundamental proposition: mobili­zation is an act of political will. It makescommitment and determination real andvisible to friends and foes alike. It is aconscious, concrete demonstration of firm

Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College

resolve to achieve political objectives over arecognized and acknowledged enemy orthreat.

As an unambiguous political statement,mobilization is immensely significant to theAmerican people. The response to amobilization by Americans will be im­mediate: it may be negative, but then it maybe gratifying to the decision-makers; in anyevent, it will be illuminating and not oblique.

Mobilization is a symbol of com­mitment, and symbolism is often as im­portant as substance. Mobilization is also asubstantive act, and therefore it is a politicaland military event having mutually supeportive purpose and meaning. It followswithout amplification that nonmobilizationfor a war is also of critical importance andmay be viewed as a disregard for military andpolitical prudence.

Thirty-eight months after the groundwar began for the United States in SouthVietnam, President Johnson made thebelated decision to mobilize a small portionof the National Guard and Reserve. Neverbefore in US history had a president refusedto use early in a major war the military forceof the reserve components. And never beforehad a mobilization for a major war been sominiscule. The 13 May 1968 mobilization forthe Vietnam War occurred far too late andwas far too small to be of any political ormilitary significance.

The mobilization itself, once ordered bythe Commander in Chief, was conducted byOSD and HQDA in a manner of grossineptitude: the preparation for a mobilizationwas impudently unsuitable; the conduct ofthe mobilization was contemptuous; thedemobilization was a comedy of errors. Andonce the forces were mobilized, countlessproblems were inflicted by the RegularArmy-as has been true throughout UShistory.

NOTES

This article is drawn from the authors' larger study"Mobilization of the Army National Guard and ArmyReserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War,"published by the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army WarCollege, 7 September 1984.

Vol. XV, No.1

1. The Civil War is omitted from the table owing to itsuniqueness.

2. The mobilized number includes the ContinentalArmy. Statistics that show the number serving who were notmembers of the Organized Militia are unavailable.

3. Strength of the Regular Army was as of September1939, when President Roosevelt declared a "limited nationalemergency" and began increasing the strength of the RegularArmy as a result of war in Europe.

4. US Department of Defense, Annual Report oj theSecretary oj Dejense on Reserve Ajjairs (Washington: GPO,FY65) (hereinafter referred to' as Annual Report); USDepartment of the Army and the Air Force, Annual Report ojthe Chief, National Guard Bureau (Washington: GPO, FY65),pp. 28-29 (hereinafter referred to as Annual Report CNGB):US Department of Defense, Annual Report of the Secretary ofDeJense and oj the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of theNavy, and Secretary of the Air Force (Washington: GPO,FY65), p. 406 (hereinafter referred to as DOD Report).

5. DOD Report, FY65, pp. 116, 131, 394; AnnualReport, FY65, pp.116-25.

6. US Department of Defense, United States- VietnamRelations, 1945-1967, (Washington: GPO, 1971) Book 4, PartIV C. 5., p. 16. (Popularly known as "The Pentagon Papers. ")

7. Paul H. Nitze, "The Evolution of National SecurityPolicy and the Vietnam War," in W. Scott Thompson andDonaldson D. Frizzell, eds., The Lessons of Vietnam (NewYork: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 7.

8. Chester L. Cooper, The Last Crusade (New York:Dodd, Mead, 1970), p. 280.

9. United States- Vietnam Relations, Book 4, Part IV C.5., pp. 31,110.

10. Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York:Popular Library, 1971), p. 146.

II. Ibid.,p.149.12. United States~Vietnam Relations, Book 4, Part IV C.

5., p. 31: Johnson, pp. 151-53.13. United States~ Vietnam Relations, Book 4, Part IV C.

5.• p. 121.14. Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Hanover,

N.H.: University Press of New England, 1977), p. 11815. James M. Gavin, Crises Now (New York: Random

House, 1968), p. 48.16. BDM Corporation, A Study oj the Strategic Lessons

Learned in Vietnam (McLean: BDM, 1980-81), V, 3~24.

17. DOD Report, FY66, p. 175. Accordingly, the Armycreated the Selected Reserve Force (SRF) to enhancepremobilization readiness of a portion of the ARNG andUSAR.

18. Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the AmericanDream (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), pp. 295-96.

19. Cooper, p. 286.20. Kearns, p. 294.21. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New

York: Random House, 1969), PP. 593-94.22. John K. Mahon, History oj the Militia and the

National Guard (New York: Macmillan, 1983), p. 242.23. Philip Geyelin, "Vietnam and the Press-Limited

War and an Open Society," in The Legacy oj Vietnam, ed.Anthony Lake (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1976), pp.166-93.

24. United S(ates~Vietnam Relations, Book 5, Part IV C.6. (a)., pp. ii and 25.

25. Ibid .• pp. 38-41.26. Ibid., pp. 79-80.27. Ibid., pp. 101-27.28. Ibid .• Book 5. Part IV C. 6. (b)., pp. 22·24.29. Ibid .• p. 133.

37

30. Ibid., p. 213.31. DOD Report, FY67, pp. 21-22; DOD Report, FY68,

pp. 150~57; Annual Report, FY67. pp. 8~9; Annual Report,FY68, pp. 8-10, D-6.

32. United States Code Congressional and Ad~

minislra/lve News (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1967), It1160-61; Annual Report, FY68, p. A·It.

33. Annual Report, FY68, appendix C.; Annual ReportCNOS, FY68, p. 10; Mahon, p. 243.

34. J. Heymont and E. W. McGregor, Review andAnalysis of Recent Mobilization and Deployments Of US ArmyReserve Components (McLean, Va.: Research AnalysisCorporation, October 1972), Ch. 5; Richard P. Weinert,CONARC and the 1968 Reserve Mobilization (HQ. USContinental Army Command. Fort Monroe, August 1970), pp.8·14.

35. US Department of the Army, Assistant Chief ofStaff for Force Development, After Action Report,Mobilization of Reserve Forces, 1968 (Washington: GPO,1971), pp. 1-1, I~2 (hereinafter referred to as After ActionReport).

36. Ibid.37. Ibid., pp. 1-2, 1-3.38. The first readiness report for the ARNG and USAR

after suspension in 1966 of previous reporting was notestablished until April 1969. Ibid.; Annual Report, FY 69, p.41. .

39. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (NewYork: Dell, (976), p. 462.

40. Johnson, p. 386.41. Ibid .. p. 387.42. United States- Vietnam Relations, Book 5 Part IV C.

6., (e), pp. 6-12.43. Westmoreland, pp. 467-72.44. For a detailed treatment of the Clifford Task Force

reassessment, see Herbert Y. Schandler, The Unmaking of aPresident (princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1977), ch. 7; and

United States- Vietnam Relations, Book 5, Part IV C. 6. (c),pp. 16·64.

45. United States· Vietnam Relations, Book 5, Part IV C.6. (e), pp. 51-52, 71-73.

46. Ibid., pp. 76~78j AfterAction Report, p, 1-5.47. United States-Vietnam Relations, Book 5, Part IV C.

6. (e), pp. 80-85.48, Johnson, ch. 17; Kearns, ch. 12; United States­

Vietnam Relations, Book 5, Part IV C. 6. (c), p. 90.49. United States Code Congressional and Ad­

ministrative News, 1968, III, 4698.50. "Army Reserve Units Respond to Call-Up," The

Army Reserve Magazine (May 1968), p. 6.51. After Action Report, p. 2-1; Heymont and

McGregor, ch. 5.52. The Selected Reserve Force (SRF) was created in

1965 to increase greatly the readiness of selected units tomobilize within seven days after alert and enter active duty at93 percent. The initial ARNG and USAR contribution to theSRF was 976 units. The SRF was abandoned on 30 September1969.

53. After Action Report, pp. 1-7, 1-8,3-15.54. Ibid., pp. 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 3-3, 3-10, 3-11.55. Ibid., chs. 2, 3, and 4.56. Ibid., pp. 4-14,1-15,1-16.57. Ibid., ch. 3; Heymont and McGregor, p. 1-4; Joseph

M. Heiser, Jr., Vietnam Studies: Logistics Support(Washington: GPO,1974), pp. 27-29.

58. After Action Report, ch. 3.59. Annual Report, CNGB, FY 69, p. 9.60. US Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of

Staff for Force Development, After-Action Report onDemobilization of Reserve Component Forces, 1969(Washington: GPO, 1 August 1970), pp. 3-4, 3-7, 9~15;AnnualReport, FY69, p. C-2; Heymont and McGregor, pp. 5-10, 5-11jAnnual Report, FY69, p. C~2; Annual Report, FY70, p. A-S.

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Parameters, Journal of the us Army War College