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MobilityAppandCitizens

YingGao

MobilityAppandCitizensViewsfromJakartaLivelihood,SocialandGovernanceImplicationsofInnovationinInformalTransportationintheDevelopingWorld

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MOBILITYAPPANDCITIZENS 2

Acknowledgements

This study is an independent academic research conducted mainly in July-August 2017(MITCOUHESProtocol#1707014280“UnderstandingandMeasuringCitizenPerceptionsofInformal Public Service Provision in the Case of Urban Transport in Indonesia”). ThefieldworkwasfundedbyMITD-LabInternationalDevelopmentInnovationNetwork(IDIN,https://d-lab.mit.edu/idin)andMITGovernanceLab(MITGOV/LAB,www.mitgovlab.org).ThisdocumentisaresearchprojectoutputsubmittedtoIDIN.

IamindebtedtowonderfulcolleaguesinIndonesiafortheirkindsupport. Iwouldliketoexpress special thanks to fieldwork research assistants Alisa Delmafitri, Balqisa Farhani,Efod Pangkerego, Irena Lucy Ishimora, Joce Timoty Pardosi, MalindoMarpaung,MeidycaFebriandila,NurRatnaMukti, andWahyuWidiAstuti, aswell as colleagues atKemitraanHabitat,MITUrbanRiskLabPetaBencanaJakartaprojectoffice,RuangWaktu–KnowledgeHubforSustainable(Urban)Development,Universityof IndonesiaFacultyofLawStudentCouncil,Universityof IndonesiaGeographyDepartment, andUSAID JakartaOffice. Manyothersalsogenerouslygavehelpandinsights,towhichIamgrateful.

Iftherearemistakesorinconsistenciesofinformationinthisdocument,theyaremine.

ContactInformation

YingGaoemail:[email protected]|Dept.ofPoliticalScienceMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology(MIT)

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TableofContentsListofAcronyms 4

I. Introduction 5

FromInnovationtoImpact 5

Jakarta:SettingtheScene 6

ResearchDesign:StakeholderInterviews 8

II. DriversandStreet-LevelGovernance 12

Pangkalan:SolidarityGroupsinIndonesia’sStreets 12

SolidaritywithinInequality 16

InformalSectoras“CoproducedPublicGood” 18

III. ViewForward Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

SketchingOutPolicyLessons Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

NextQuests Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

References 21

Appendices 23

InterviewQuestions 23

ConsentForm 29

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ListofAcronyms

BI BankIndonesia,thecentralbankofIndonesia

BPTJ Transportation Management Agency of Jabodetabek (Indonesian: BadanPengelolaTransportasiJabodetabek),aregulatoryagencyunderMoT

BRT Busrapidtransit;alsocalledbusway

DKIJakarta Special Capital Region of Jakarta (Indonesian: Daerah Khusus IbukotaJakarta),aprovincial-levelstatusgovernment

IDR IndonesianRupiah

Jabodetabek JakartametropolitanareaorGreaterJakarta;anadministrativedefinitionofthe urban area combining the municipalities of Bogor, Depok, Tangerang,SouthTangerangandBekasi,andJakarta

KRL CommuterrailinJabodetabek(Indonesian:KretaRelListrik)

LRT Lightrailtransit

MoT MinistryofTransportation

MRT Massrapidtransit

Opang Motorcycletaxi(Indonesian:ojek)drivers’associations(Indonesian:ojek pangkalan)

SatpolPP PublicOrderEnforcer(Indonesian:SatuanPolisiPamongPraja),amunicipalsecurity and public order authority, not to be confused with the NationalPolice

TOD Transit-orienteddevelopment

USD USDollar

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I. Introduction

FromInnovationtoImpactInnovationinInformalTransport

Much has been studied about mobility networkcompanies, such as Uber and Lyft, and the rise ofsharing economy in advanced economies (e.g. Halland Krueger 2016; Cohen et al. 2016). Similartechnologies have made headway into rapidlyurbanizing developing countries. But thistechnological innovation’s consequences indevelopment contexts are not fully explored. Inparticular,whether thepolicyconcernsraisedaboutthese apps in developed economies also apply tocircumstances of high labor informality and urbaninequalitysowidespreadincitiesoftheglobalsouthremainstobeevaluated.

In Southeast Asia, an additional difference is theprevalence of motorcycles not just as personalvehiclebutalsoaspublictransportforhire–andtheinterplayof this informal industrywith themobilityapps. Starting from 2015, at least three mobilitynetwork companies have incorporated hundreds ofthousandsofmotorcycletaxisintheregionintoapp-basedeconomy. Inashort time, theresulthasbeenthattheappinnovationmayhavetransformedcitizenbehavior on the production (drivers) andconsumption (users) of an informal public service,which is urban informal public transport. Themassive scale of disruptions has in turn created theneed for those in the government to respond, too –though most policy ideas are still only beingdebated. 1 These impacts are the subject of thisresearchfocusingoncitizensandactorsinJakarta.

1For indicators of the scale of the apps’ influence, it is sufficient to review publicly availableinformation on three leading service providers: GO-JEK, Grab and Uber. They are respectivelyIndonesian, Southeast Asia regional, and global companies. All three are “unicorn” startups i.e.

FIGURE2:APPSOFFERAVARIETYOFON-DEMAND MOBILITY, E-PAYMENT ANDADDITIONALSERVICES ININDONESIA. ALLPHOTOSBYYINGGAO.

FIGURE 1: APP MOTORCYCLE TAXI, OR"ONLINEOJEK"

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Jakarta:SettingtheSceneCitizensinRapidlyGrowingMetropolitanRegion

Greater Jakarta is one of the largest metropolitan regions in the global south. It has apopulation of 28million and a dynamic and growing economy,with high levels of urbaninequality and informality. Throughout Jakarta’s history, informal sectors and informalsettlementshaveplayedalargepartincitizens’lives.GreaterJakarta’surbandevelopmentin the 20th century in different economic periods show informal sectors growingpersistently—or, resiliently—togetherwith, and in spite of pressures from, urban formalsectors(Sarosa1993;Silver2008).2

Jakarta citizens also tend to spend long hours onthe road, due to limited mass transit (thereforemore road traffic), and poor service quality ofpublictransportationingeneral. Inthepast,ithasbeen suggested that citizens experience transportmore as suffering than service – a situation thatcontinues, even as national and provincialgovernments are making significant investmentsfor expanding the TransJakarta BRT system (DKIJakarta), and MRT and LRT systems scheduled toopen in thenext fewyears (nationalgovernment).Fornow,trafficjamsinGreaterJakartacostaroundUSD 5 billion in economic losses annually,according to estimates by Indonesia Ministry of

privately held, young companies with over USD 1 billion in valuation. Grab has 45 million appdownloadsand1milliondriversproviding2.5milliondaily ridesacrossSoutheastAsia,asof June2017.Itishardertoobtaininformationonmotorcyclepassengerservicesalone.Theseservicesarecalled GO-RIDE, GrabBike and UberMotor. GO-JEK, which started as an exclusively motorcycle-focused platform, claims 200,000 drivers across 25 cities in Indonesia, as of May 2017. If theIndonesiantaxiindustry’sgeographicconcentrationisanyindication,alargemajorityofdriverscanbeexpectedtobeworkinginGreaterJakarta.2Thelogicofpersistentinformalsectorgrowthisasfollows.Informalsectorsgrowwhenthecity’sformaleconomyisinboombecausetheysupplycheaplabor,goodsandservices,feedingintoformalsectors. Informalsectorsalsogrowwhentheformaleconomyisstagnant. Ineconomicdownturn,informalsectorsplaytheroleof“employmentsponge”toabsorbthosewhohavefallenofffromtheformal jobmarket; the ratio of informal sectors therefore rise relative to the formal counterpart.ThishasbeenthesituationduringtheAsianFinancialCrisis in late1990sandmostrecently inthe2008globalrecession.Inshort,ahistoricalpatternhasbeenthatJakarta’sinformalsectorsgrowinabsolutetermsduringeconomicbooms,andinrelativetermsineconomicstagnationanddownturn.Fromthestagnationof1950sand1960stooilboomyearsof1980s,andtomorerecentyears,therehas not been decisive evidence that informal sectors and informal settlements would eventuallydisappear.Whydoeseconomicgrowthfailtoshrinkurbaninformalityasmuchasonemightexpectitto?AuthorssuchasSarosaandSilverpointoutthenegativeeffectsofencroachmentoninformalsettlementsbydevelopmentprojectsduringgoodeconomictimes.

FIGURE 3: SATURATED ROAD TRAFFIC INCENTRALJAKARTA

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PublicWorksandHousing(TheJakartaPost2015).

In recentyears, theeconomyof Jakartahasbeenupbeat. Transportandcommunicationsindustryenjoyedthehighestgrowthratein2010;butcitizensarealsohitbyhighercostofliving in the city,which is producing urban sprawl,with suburban agricultural areas andinformalsettlementsincreasinglyturnedintourbanlandfordevelopment(Mulyana2012,5–6).TheshareofworkersinDKIJakartaemployedininformaljobshashoveredatslightlybelow30%in2005-2010(Mulyana2012,22).

BeingadriverofonekindoranotherisoneofthetopjobsourcesinJakarta,acrossformalandinformalsectors.Relatedly,GreaterJakartaisoneofthelargestmarketsformotorcycletaxiservicenowincorporatedintothedigitaleconomybymobilityapps.3Thepopularityofappmobility services, especially appmotorcycle taxis, is an indisputable situation on theground,despitethefactthatmotorcyclestakingpassengersandactingaspublictransporthavebeen,andremainatthemoment,illegalunderIndonesianlaw,strictlyspeaking.4

QuestionsandMotivationsforStudyingImpactsinJakarta

In this context, my research aims to explore the livelihood, social and governanceimpacts of a digital innovation on informal urban communities in Jakarta. Theinnovationinquestionisthemobilityapps.Thefocusofmyinquiryistodescribethelocaluptake,adaptation,influence,reactions,etc.inresponsetoaglobalinnovation.5

The question of mobility innovation’s influences on citizens in urban informality is animportantone.Urbantransport,particularlyitsinformalvariantslikemotorcycletaxisandshared minibuses, is a major employment sector for low-skilled workers in developingcities–Jakartabeingnoexception(Khayesi,Nafukho,andKemuma2015). Italsomatters

3CitizensrelyheavilyonmotorcyclestogetaroundinSoutheastAsia. In2014,motorcyclesinDKIJakartaoutnumberedcarsfourtooneintermsofvehicleregistration:13,084,372motorcycleswereregistered, compared to3,266,009cars (BadanPusatStatistik2017). However, thisdatadoesnotdistinguishbetweenprivatemotorcyclesandmotorcycletaxisforhire. Asaroughreferencepoint,Bangkokmetropolitanregionkeepsdataonmotorcycle taxisalongwithcar taxis. Four-wheelandtwo-wheeltaxistogetherrepresented18.9%oftransportinBangkokin2015(Suparee2017).4For example, Law No. 22/2009 on Road Traffic states: “Chapter X Transportation: Paragraph 4Passenger transportation by Public motorized Vehicles not in Trajectories: Article 151 PassengertransportationservicebypublicMotorizedVehiclesnot intrajectoriesasreferred to inArticle140letterbshall consistof:a.Passenger transportationby taxi;b.Passenger transportationbycertaindestination; c. Passenger transportation for tourism purpose; and d. Passenger transportation incertain area.” https://www.scribd.com/doc/100587986/Law-no-22-year-2009-on-Road-Traffic.Though the specificwordingof theLawNo.22/2009 isnotwithout ambiguities, practical rulesoflicensingmeansthatmotorcyclepassengertransportationservice,whichisfoundineverystreetinJakarta,actuallylacksanyclearlydefinedlegalbasisforexisting.5Myfocusinthisresearchthereforeisnotonthemechanicsoftheoriginaltechnologyoritsbusinessmodel,thoughtheyareinterestingsubjectsintheirownright,particularlythecountry-by-countryorevencity-by-citylocalevolutionofthebusinessandinnovationstrategiesoftheseplatforms.

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for thewelfareof citizensat large. Informal transportprovidesvitalmobilityoptions forpoor urban residents, playing a key role in their access to jobs, resources, and services(Cervero2000;ESCAPandUN-HABITAT2015;Taylor2015).

Therefore, keymotivatingquestionsbehindmy inquiry intomobility appsand citizens inGreaterJakartaare:

1. Is the innovation influencingcitizens’ livelihood, forworkers in informal transportsector,andamongvarioussubgroupsinthissector?Andifso,how?

2. Istheinnovationinfluencingcitizens’socialbehavior,forthoseworkingininformaltransportsector,aswellasotherrelevantinformalcommunities?Andifso,how?

3. Is the innovation influencing local capacity for good governance, especially forpublic service provision? If so, what are the roles of data and information, anddifferentinstitutionsincludingthegovernment,civilsociety,andotherinstitutions?

ResearchDesign:StakeholderInterviewsResearchActivities

In this research, I approach the above three broad questions on livelihood, social andgovernanceimpactsby:

a) Identifyingstakeholders(stakeholdermapping);and

b) Conductingpreliminaryanalysisofaseriesofqualitativeinterviewswithmembersoftheidentifiedstakeholdergroupsorcategories.

The analysis in this report is based on data from qualitative stakeholder interviewsconductedinselectedlocationsinGreaterJakarta,inJuly-August2017.

Thesemistructured interviewsaredesigned tomakesenseof recenteventsasofAugust2017 by collecting insights and lived experiences of diverse stakeholder groups, bothpotentialwinnersandlosers,whileemphasizingthetangiblecontextsofurbaninformalityandinequality,includinganycriticalinstitutionalconditions.

TimingandExpectedOutcomes

Theresearchactuallytakesadvantageofanopportunemoment.Thedisruptionscausedbythemobility apps in Jakartapresent twokinds of opportunity for research: as awindow,andasashock.Forresearchersandpolicymakersinterestedinunderstandingthepoliticaleconomyofurbaninformalsectors,thedatafromtheapps(includingqualitativedata)isawindow intounderlying informal sectors, andgroups and communitiesof citizens in thatspace.Followingthetracesofcitizenbehaviorinresponsetotheappsoffersthepossibility

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–atleastintheory–totracesomeoftheactivitiesinthesocialandeconomiclifeofcitizenswherelittleharddataexists.

The mobility apps are clearly also a shock to the system. Responses from differentcommunities of citizens and various institutions can give helpful information formakingpredictionsandgeneratingrecommendationsforthefuture.Inparticular,thiscanbeusefulknowledge for how to (or how not to) manage, govern, and improve mixed formal /informal public service systems at a metropolitan scale. Hearing from various urbancommunitiesisastarterintheprocess.

Finally, it should be noted that this study is preliminary, exploratory, qualitative, anddescriptive in nature, and interviewprotocols reflect it (please seeAppendix for details).The findings presented in this document are notmeant to conclusively answer questionsrelated to innovation in mobility in Greater Jakarta; that is a situation that continues toevolve rapidly. Thehope is for this short report to contribute toopen (policy)dialoguesand to inform a hopefully greater variety of different ways of framing questions on thistopic,includingfuturequantitativeresearchthatstakeholdersmaywishtoconduct.

DefinitionofInformalityandInformalTransport

Next,Iclarifykeydefinitionsorconcepts,andthescope(i.e.Who?What?)ofinvestigation.Tostartoff,thefirstassumptionofthisresearchisthaturbaninformalcommunitiescanbespatialornon-spatial.Thisistosaycommunitiescanbeplace-bound,network-based,orofavarietyofotherforms.Onewaytoexplainthisdefinitionofinformalityisthatitis(group)activity-based,andnotbasedautomaticallyonintrinsiccharacteristicsofaplaceorperson.In Jakarta, formal and informal sectors and settlements tend to operate closely together,with overlaps and symbiotic links, and a flexible working definition informality may besuited(Sarosa1993).

An example of spatial or place-bound urban informal community is slum neighborhoodcommunities,whicharegenerallycalledkampung(literally,village)inIndonesia.Examplesof non-spatial urban informal communities can be work-related associations, includingdrivers’ groups, religious or ethnic groups, etc. Thus, I will extensively discuss informaltransportdrivers’membershipassociationsasanoccupation-basedinformalcommunityinthemainchapter.

Thedefinitionof informal transport should alsobe explained. The seminalUN reportoninformal transport in the developing world gives a flexible definition of “informal”,emphasizingthecontextsofoperationratherthanphysicalattributes.Thereportsays,“thissector operates – informally and illicitly, somewhat in the background, and outside theofficially sanctionedpublic transport sector” (Cervero2000,3). Thedegreeorpatternofdeviationfromformalpublictransportmayvary,asthereportdescribes:

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In some instances, operators lack the necessary permits or registration formarketentryinwhatisarestricted,regulatedmarketplace.Inotherinstances,operatorsfailtomeetcertificationrequirementsforcommercial,common-carriervehicles–suchasminimumvehicle size,maximumage,or fitness standards. Otherviolations includelackofliabilityinsurance,absenceofacommercialdrivingpermit,andoperationofaunclassifiedorsubstandardvehicle.(Cervero2000,3)

Theactualphysicalformsofinformaltransport(e.g.vehicletypes,routepatterns)cancomeinmany flavors, then. This definition thus encompasses informal transportmodes of allsizes and shapes, and equally embraces “paratransit”, which usually refers to vehiclesofferingfixedorpredictableroutes(e.g.various“sharedtaxis”),aswellassmaller,door-to-doorvehicles(e.g.tuktuk inThailandandmotorcycletaxis inmanyregions). Inaddition,thedefinitiondescribestheinformalbyrelatingittotheformal.Itsuggestssomegradationof informality; an informal public transport can be more or less informal, compared toanotherservice.

Extending the definitional guidelines to the plethora of public transport on offer in thestreetsofJakarta,belowpartiallistofmodeswillbethefocusofthisreport.

§ [Becak–pedicab(informal/prohibited)]§ Ojek–motorcycletaxis(informal)

o App-basedo Traditional

§ Bajaj(informal/semiformal)§ Angkotmikrolet–sharedtaxis(semiformal/formal)§ Kopajabus(semiformal/formal)§ Taxi(formal)§ [TransJakartaBRT,KRLcommuterrail(formal)]

Without going into extreme details, it should be noted that motorcycle taxis in Jakartarepresent a bona fide informal transport for purposes of this research; other transportoptions havemixed formal characteristics. Those in square brackets are not directly thefocusofthisresearch.

Another thing to keep inmind is that even though I beginwith Cervero’s definition, theinterviewfindingspresentedinthelatersectionsmaycallintoquestiontheassumptionthatinformaltransportis“unsanctioned”bygovernmentauthorities.

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ScopeofImpacts

FIGURE4: PRELIMINARYMAPOF STAKEHOLDERS ILLUSTRATINGPOTENTIAL IMPACTS FROM INNOVATIONININFORMALTRANSPORT,ANDGROUPSANDINSTITUTIONSWHOMAYINFLUENCEORBEINFLUENCEDBYANYDEVELOPMENTINTHATSECTOR

Who(whichstakeholdergroups)andwhat(whatkindandextentofimpacts)arecoveredinthe scope of investigation, exactly? In addition, impacts from the mobility apps can bedirectorindirect,andcanbepositiveornegative.

Since this is an exploratory study, I opt for casting awide net for potential categories ofstakeholders, as the abovemap shows (Figure 4). Something that is also implicit in theabove definition of informal transport in terms of operational contexts is that there aremorestakeholdersbesidestheoperatorandpassenger,affectinginformaltransport. Whomakes it possible that a service is illegal, but not so illegal as to be purged from streets?Who (or what) influences the sector to have somewhat predictable price and servicestandards, or sufficient availability throughout the city? Are these aspects determinedthrough pure laissez-faire market mechanisms as suggested by some studies of urbaninformalsectors,orcouldtherebeinterveningactors,groups,organizations,etc.,withamixofeconomicandpoliticalmotivations?Theseareallopenquestionsforthisresearch.

Reflecting audience feedback during the preliminary findings presentation in Jakarta (3August2017),analysisofinterviewresultsfromthisresearchinthenextsectionwillfocuson two or three particular stakeholder groups, their relations, and how they view or areviewedby institutional actors, especially related to governance at the street level. Thesegroupsare“entrepreneurdriver”andtheirpeer(orcomparative)drivers inrivalservices(Figure4).

InformalTransportproviders

Capital/Tech

Entrepreneurdriver

FormalTransportproviders

Capital/Tech

Employeedriver

MiddleClasscitizens

LowIncomecitizens

Politician

Bureaucracy

Government

Street-level

RegulatesInvestsData

Enables

Innovation

Coordinates

Rivalservices:Taxi,bajaj,angkot,KOPAJA…

Otherurbaninformalsectors

Investors

Sales

Competition

Unskilledlabor

•  Publicserviceaccess&accountability?

•  Newdata?

Citizen/users

Lowcost

Civilsociety

IntegratesInvestsData

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II. DriversandStreet-LevelGovernance

Pangkalan:SolidarityGroupsinIndonesia’sStreets

FIGURE5:ALOGOOFAPPMOTORCYCLECOMMUNITYSPELLS"BIGFAMILY,""UNITY"

AppIsaLayeronExistingSocialSystems

Thefirstpointofdeparturewhenitcomestoappojek(motorcycletaxi)driversinJakartacomparedtodriversofcarsharingservicesindevelopedcountriesishowhighlyorganizedJakarta drivers seem to be. Though precise percentage could not be obtained, a highproportionoffulltimeappojekdriversbelongtoamembership-baseddrivers’community.Andthesefulltimedriversfulfillmostrides,sincetheyarefarmorefrequentlyontheroad.

The preeminence of organized drivers flies in the face of the notion that mobility appscreate gig economy, which is like a marketplace populated by part-time, individualisticfreelancersmaking dealswith individual user / citizens in a decentralizedmanner. ThedealsarestilldecentralizedinJakarta,butprovidersareorganizedinformally,atgrassrootslevel. Soon, however, it becomes obvious that Jakarta drivers in other types of informaltransport are just asorganizedas theappmotorcycle taxis, ifnotmore. Therearemanyvariationsoflocaldrivers’communities, includingtraditionalojekdrivers(motorcycletaxidriversnotenrolledwiththeapps)andbajajdrivers.Evenindividualsdrivinghirecarsorcargotruckssocializeingroups.

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In streets of Indonesia, these drivers’ communities are ubiquitous, and they are calledpangkalan (literally, “base camp”). Expert interviews suggest two reasons for whypangkalan communities exist widely in Indonesian society. The first is to say thatpangkalan-like groups have always existed since the dawn of public transportation inIndonesiawiththecolonialbecak(pedicab)drivers.Thesecondisthatthesecommunitiesaretheprimarytoolforworkersininformal(andlow-endformal)transportsectorstocopewithwhatisbasicallydifficultconditionsofwork.

Membership,Leadership,andFunctionsofPangkalan

What are the typical membership, leadership selection, and functions of pangkalancommunities?Concreteexamplesinthissectionaremostlyfromappmotorcyclepangkalancommunities, which are the groups most often interviewed in this research. But thecharacteristics are shared with pangkalan communities of other transport modes, andinsightsfrompangkalancommunitiesofothermodeswillbebroughtinlater,too.

A pangkalan is a local work-based community in transportation sector(s), with commonbenefitsandusefulfeaturesformemberdrivers.Thephysical“base”,i.e.fixedlocationforqueuingandresting,canbepinpointedtospecific(andoftentiny)physicalspot:e.g. trainstationX’sgateY,partofacertainstreetunderashadytree,aresidentialneighborhood’snortheastcorner,etc.Membersofapangkalanaremadeupofdriversofthesametransportmode.Hence,bajaj,traditionalojek,andappojek(infact,eachbrand)drawingonthesamestreamofpassengersinanareawilleachformtheirownbasecamp.Theoriginandbasisofsocialization of pangkalan is therefore economicand occupational. It is emphatically not the casethattherearepreexistingsocialgroups,whichthendecidetostartapangkalantogether.

Diverse,HorizontalGroups

In termsofmembership, thedrivers’communitiesare inclusive groups and the standards for joiningaretobeworking inthe job, to followtherulesornorms of doing that job in the area, includingqueuingnorms,and,moreoften thannot, tomakesmallweekly contributions to a communal saving.In my interviews, the size of a pangkalan andpangkalan-likedrivers’ ranges from five toaround70; most frequently they were 20-40, and apangkalan with more than 50 members may beconsideredlarge.

FIGURE 6: SOME APP MOTORCYCLEDRIVERSAREWOMEN

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Members belong to diverse ethnicity, religion,migration status, etc. For instance, one relativelylarge app ojek pangkalan includes members whoare originally from Java, Sumatra, Papua, and soforth, and who are Muslims and Christians.Traditional motorcycle pangkalans have beenexclusively male due to that occupation beingdominated by men (Cervero 2000). As a newdevelopment, app ojek pangkalan tend to includearound10%womendrivers.6Howmatter-of-factlywomen drivers are incorporated into app ojekpangkalans is a testament to these communitiesbeingwork-based.

Though member drivers’ backgrounds are thusquite diverse, what we can expect to be similaramongpangkalanmembersistheirincome.Thisisa functionof locationandsizeofthepangkalan. Intraditional pangkalans of ojek and bajaj, anegalitarian queuing norm all but ensured thiswithin-group income equality. For app drivers,there are no longer queues, and there can beincome differences from, algorithms prioritizingexperienced drivers. But the specific location ofbasecampwillstill likelyhaveanequalizingeffecton earnings among drivers belonging to thatcommunity (i.e. theyspend their “idle time” in thebasecamp,waitingfornearbyriderequests).

QualitiesofaLeader

In addition, a pangkalan always has a leader; theleader is often called coordinator, implying anonhierarchical, horizontal feeling of thesecommunities. According to app motorcyclepangkalan drivers, there are three criteria thatmake a good coordinator. The criteria are:seniority,experience,andindigenousness.

6This is a very rough and unscientific guess, though it came up in company interviews aswell asdriver interviews. Observations at pangkalan hangout spots generally supported it. Some newsreportshavequotedtheratioofwomenappmotorcycledriverstobeashighas20%.

FIGURE 7: VARIOUS EXPRESSIONS OFCOMMUNITY IDENTITY IN APPMOTORCYCLEPANGKALANLOGOS

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Seniority, or respect for wisdom of an elder figure, is easy to comprehend. For appmotorcyclepangkalan,thesecondcriterionisparticularlyimportantbecauseitmeansthata coordinatorshouldbesomeonewhoworkedpreviouslyasa traditionalmotorcycle taxidriver, and who knows the ins and outs of that trade. Multiple interviewees both fromdriver groups and some from private sector suggest that diffused, horizontal interactionbetween leaders of traditional and new app pangkalans, enabled by more and moretraditionaldriversparticipatinginapppangkalans,helpedreduceextremecompetitionandatmosphereofconflictthatwereprevalentin2016.Anotherdriverintervieweesimplysaysthatacoordinatorissomeonewhoknowsothercoordinators,andthereforecanhaveanewpangkalanrecognizedbyothers.

This suggests that there exists inter-pangkalan coordination mechanisms, and that suchmechanisms are highly horizontal and network-like, and effective institution of solvingproblems. Indeed,apppangkalancoordinatorshavesetup information infrastructures inthe formof closed socialnetworkgroups, for all coordinators inDKI Jakarta, andGreaterJakarta, to conduct coordination. One intervieweequoted the number of coordinators as700forGreaterJakarta(foroneservice).

Thethirdcriterionofleader,indigenousness,oranative(Indonesian:asli)person,i.e.bornandraisedinthesurroundingcommunity,isalsoaninterestingone.Itisnotenoughthatacoordinatorshouldbe fromJakartaandnotrecent immigrant. Thecriterionof“native” isbasedonamuchsmallercircle.Infact“native”orasliisarecurrentthemeinconversationswithdrivers.Inlargerpangkalangroups,theleadershipseemstogothrougharegularanddemocraticprocess. Sometimes the leadermaybe informalor implicit – a “champion,” afigure of experience, seniority and respect who can use his personal charisma to solveproblemsandconflicts.

SocialFunctionsofPangkalan

So far, pangkalan communities seem to be an important system of labor solidarity ininformal transport, a large employment sector in Jakarta’s informal economy. But thesecommunities are not purely instrumental. “Fulltime” driverswork extremely long hours.Typically,thismaybe15hoursaday(e.g.7amto10pm),with1-2hourbreak,andperhaps1-2 rest day(s) permonth. And drivers spendmost “idle time” at the base camp of thepangkalantheybelongto,andthelevelofsocialinteractionisnaturallyintense.

Many interviewees are eager to say that they think about their pangkalan as “secondfamily”, “big family”, or “brotherhood” (though also inclusive of women). These wordsimplymeaningfulconnections.Almostallappojekpangkalangroupsinvestinnames,logos,banners,stickers,andsoforth(Figure7). Familyeventsareatypicalwayofspendingthecommunalsaving,aswellaspayingforaccidentsorinjuriesofmembers.

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HowPangkalanAffectsSpreadofInnovation

Torecap,totheuntrainedeye,pangkalanmemberdrivers may look like drivers who happen to bequeuing, relaxing, or charging their phonestogether at the moment. But these informalcommunities are essential for understanding thespeedandscaleoftheinfluenceofmobilityappsinGreater Jakarta. Pangkalan communities enabledriverstolearnandadapttonewtechnology,whilereducingsocialfriction.

Understanding economic and social solidarity ofpangkalan helps one to grasp what may be thenecessary conditions for the apps to becomeaccepted in a short period of time despiteconflicting economic interests on the ground.Mobility apps thrive inGreater Jakartanotdespitethese informal communities at the grassroots, butpartlybecauseofthem.

In fact, mobility app companies’ operations inIndonesia pay considerable attention to theseinformal communities, from initial recruitment ofdrivers when entering new city, to ensuring thatsufficient number of drivers are actively on theappstomeetdemand.

SolidaritywithinInequalityDifferencesamongDrivers

Whatdoescomparinginterviewresultsfromdrivercommunities of different modes tell us about thelarger picture? How may it help to illustrateadditional characteristics of pangkalan andinformaltransportsectorfromthepointofviewofdrivers? Comparisons of different pangkalangroups bring home the uniqueness of pangkalan’sability to channel occupation-based solidarity inthe face of high levels of inequality in the sector(transport)bylocationandbymode.

Forbrevity,Ilimitcomparisontobetweenappand FIGURE8:VARIOUSGROUPSOFDRIVERS

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non-app ojek drivers, though it should be noted that many bajaj drivers shared similaropinionsastraditionalojekdrivers.

A frequent question I encounter in my conversations with the business community,especiallywithexpatswhoarefamiliarwithhowUberandLyftworkintheUnitedStates,isabout motorcycle drivers who refuse to join the apps. “What is preventing them fromsigningupforfree,andhavingmoreoptionstoearnmoney?Theycanevenswitchdifferentappsonandoff,maximizingthebonusestheycanwin.”Indeed,whatmaybethereasons?

Partoftheanswerisstructural. Thesetupofpangkalanasaninformalinstitutionalreadydiscussed can prevent, or at least add cost to, casual participation in multiple informaltransport types. Techcompaniesalsoaddcostbyaskingdrivers towearbranded jacketsand helmets, making it hard to switch on and off, and between, apps and traditionalservices. In all of ourdriver interviews, one respondent saidhehad tried all threemainservices,andthereforewasinapositiontosharehisexperienceofattemptingtoswitchtheapps tomaximize earning. In short, this approach is impractical since the driver has toreturnhome to change intodifferent gears. The cumbersomehelmet for customerposesmajorchallengefornimblychangingtheappplatforms.

Besides structural barriers, there are individual-level reasons for traditional ojek driversnot to join the bandwagon of appmotorcycles. In fact the process of joining the apps ishighlyself-selective.Driverintervieweeswhohadswitchedfrombeingamemberofopangtoappplatformwerereadytoshareinsights.“Therearethreereasons,”saysarespondentwhodownloaded the app twoyears ago (i.e. early adopter) afterbeing anojek driver fornearlyadecade.Thefirstisthattheymaynothavedriver’slicense.Thesecondisthattheymaynothavepaidpropertaxesforowningtheirmotorcycles.Forexample,theymayhavepaid the taxeswhenthey firstgot thevehicle,butneglected torenew. Thirdly, someold-timerssimply“don'twanttolearnnewtricks.”

Anopangoldtimer,whohasacareerof17yearsdrivingojekandcontinuestodoittheoldway at a major train station, confirms the last point. He is dismissive of the earningpotentialfromtheapps. Intheheydayofmotorcycletaxis(presumablyrelativelyrecent),hewasabletoearn500thousandrupiahs/day.Nowhisincomeisdowntoarevenueofaround150thousandrupiahs/day.Buthesuspects,correctly,thatitisnotmuchdifferentfromanappdriver’sdailyincome.Giventhedeclineofsignupbonusesovertime,joiningthe apps implies more effort for the same money. Hence, there is some logical andbehavioralsupportforojekdriverswhorefusetojointheappbandwagon.

WhoBenefits?InequalityasCriticalContextofImpacts

The above discussion raises a cautionary point for conducting evaluation of the newinnovation’scausaleffectsonanumberofoutcomeswemightcareabout,suchasincreaseddriverearning,socialpatterns(e.g.levelofsocialactivitiesandnetworksinpangkalan),or

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behavioral change (e.g. safer driving, better customer service, different attitudes). Sincedrivers voluntarily sign up for apps, app drivers tend to be noticeably and predictablydifferentinbasicpersonalattributes,suchasage,education,andpreviousjobs(andgender,asmentionedearlier),thandriversoftraditionalojek,bajaj,etc. Anyevaluationofdriver-level outcomes must take into account, or “control for”, the self-selection and baselinedifferencesthatexistamongdriversofdifferentmodes,andindifferentmicrolocations.

Concretely,thesepointsofcautionmeanthattherearevariouspotentialorpossibleeffectswhenitcomestolivelihood,evenwhenthegeneraltrendseemstobethatmobilityappsarecreatingmorejobs.Theappsmaybeincreasingorreducinginequalityinvariousdirectandindirectways,ormaybequalitativelytransformingthekindsofinequalityfacedbyworkersin low-skilled job sectors. Itmaybe thatdrivers are earningmore, or lessonaverage; itmay also be that with more or less the same take-home income, drivers are finding itvaluable to have intangible improvements in livelihood, such as financial informationbenefits(e.g.earningandcredithistoryintheapp),skills,predictabilityofincome,orsocialstatus.Thebottomlineisthatanyhypothesistestingoftheapps“effects”canbenefitfromcareful identification of comparative groups among the enormously diverse drivercommunitieswithinJakarta(orelsewhere).

InformalSectoras“CoproducedPublicGood”OtherInformalActorsandTheirRoles

Ascentralastheyareforthesociallifeofmemberdrivers,pangkalangroupsalonedonotmakeinformaltransporthappen,anddriversalonedonotparticipateinproducinginformalpublic service. For vehicles like motorcycle taxi and bajaj to be a public service, i.e. amobility option widely available for hire throughout the city in pretty much the sameformat, it takes four key stakeholders. Interview results based on the wider cast ofstakeholders,asshowninFigure4,provideinformationontheseactors’roles.Theseare:

1) Acommunityofinformallabor,i.e.pangkalan-likegroup;

2) Informalcapitalandtechnology;and

3) Abroker,whoarranges:

4) Street-levelgovernmentnon-intervention,tolerance,orcollaboration.

For2),adrivermayownhisorhervehicle,suchasinthecaseofmotorcycledrivers,ormaydriveforsomeownerofthevehicleandpayarentalfee.Inthecaseofappmotorcycletaxi,the service is subsidized by the tech startups that provide the app platform. Moreover,when asked about the origin of their pangkalan groups, drivers tend to describenegotiationswith

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Thearrangementsbetween4)street-levelbureaucraciessuchasthepoliceand3)brokerisone of the most fascinating aspects. There exists a class of street-level brokers calledpremanwhoseroleseemshighlyambiguousandcriticalinshapingurbaninformalservicessector.Elsewhereinpoliticalscienceliterature,researchinterestsonpremanhavefocusedon theiroutrightpoliticalactivities, suchasactingas toolsof intimidationduringelectioncampaigns(Wilson2010),whileurbananthropologyworkshavedescribedthepreman inextremelymulti-dimensionalterms,suchas“figuresofstreetauthorityandcharisma”and“criminal, entrepreneur, philanthropist, enforcer, local political leader, gambler, sage,mercenary, guerrilla, mediator, broker, entertainer, conciliator, historian, insider, andoutsider”(Simone2014,13;232).

However, interviewingdrivers and civil society experts in Jakarta suggested these actors’everydayfunctioninfacilitatinginformalserviceprovision.Forexample,abajajdriverpays9,000rupiahperdayforthelocalpreman’sservice,oraround5-10%ofhisrevenue,andthepreman in turn“handles” thepolice,municipalenforcers,etc. Apreman canalsohelp thepolice to “secure the area” when needed, sometimeswith the help of informal transportdrivers. Driversareuseful for lawenforcementofficersforbeingabletoserveaseyesonthe street (Jacobs 1961), butmobile. What is being traded, then, is amixture of private,clubbed,andpublicgoods,andthetransactionconnectstheformalandtheinformalatthestreetlevel. Tofurthercomplicatethepicture,thelinksoftransactionorbrokerageisnotthroughofficialbureaucratichierarchy,butthroughpatronage-likebrokering(Scott1972).Thesecertain,key,non-driveractorstendtobeinvolvedfromtheget-go,shapingtheoriginofpangkalanandtheavailabilityofinformaltransportserviceinagivenlocation.

Interviewswith civil society groups familiarwith urban informal sectors point out otherinformal sectors likely to involve activities of similar state-society brokerage, as: streetvendors,traditionalmarkets,parking,water,andwastemanagement.

WhoGoverns?InformalSectoras“CoproducedPublicGood”

Informal transport is famous for being “gap-fillers” (Cervero 2000, 3). It has also beensuggestedthatthesectoris“aboutasclosetolaissez-fairetransportationascanbefound,”and “it isonlybecause regulationsand rules are laxly enforced thatunlicensedoperatorsare ‘informally’abletostepinandpickupwherepublictransportoperatorshaveleftoff”(Cervero2000,3).Theseparationbetweenformalandinformaltransportmayseemlikeanaccuratepicturefromanoperator-centricpointofview.ItseemstobethatwheneverBRTorcommuterraildonotprovide the last legof the trip,variousservicesshowupandareready to pick up the remainder of the trip. It is clear enough thatmost semiformal andinformaltransportserviceswerenotinthegovernment’smasterplanoftransportationforGreaterJakarta.

Yet it is also the case that government authorities treat similar informal sectors, orsubsectorswithinabroadinformalsector(e.g.thevariousdifferentmodeswithininformal

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public transport), differently. Reviewing the 20th century development of Jakarta, Sarosaremarks:

[T]he government’s treatments of different jobs in the informal sector variedconsiderably.Andbylookingatthosepolicies,wemayconcludethatthegovernmenthasbeenambivalentinitsattitudetowardsinformalsector.Harshtreatmentwithoutrealalternativesindicatesthatthegovernmentactuallylooksattheproblemscreatedby the informal sector above the solutions it offers. Yet in other occasions, someinformalsectoractivitiesaresupported,ifnotencouraged,aspotentialjobabsorbers(Sarosa1993,149).

Might it be that the variations in informal sectors reflect no more than accidentaldifferences inthe limitsof formalgovernmentservices? Or,could itbethat thedegreeofinformality,availabilityofinformalservices,andsimilaroutcomesreflectacertaindecisionorintentiononthepartofstakeholders(includingstateactors)connectedwitheachotherinapatternofinformalgovernance?Theinterviewresponsesfromthisresearchbringmetointerpretationsinthedirectionofthelatter.InformaltransportinthestreetsofJakartaapparentlyreflectthecontributionsofmultiple,differentstakeholders–andeventhenewappmobilityservicessharethishybridnature.Thepicturethatemerges,then,isthaturbaninformality,atleastsomevariants,maybethoughtofascoproducedpublicgood.

FIGURE9:ASPATIALEXAMPLEOFURBANINFORMALITYAS"COPRODUCEDPUBLICGOOD"

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ReferencesBadanPusat Statistik. 2017. “Transportation Statistics ofDKI Jakarta 2015.”KatalogBPS:

8301009.31. http://jakarta.bps.go.id/backend/pdf_publikasi/Statistik-Transportasi-DKI-Jakarta-2015.pdf. Accessed October 6.http://jakarta.bps.go.id/backend/pdf_publikasi/Statistik-Transportasi-DKI-Jakarta-2015.pdf.

Cervero,Robert.2000. InformalTransportintheDevelopingWorld.Nairobi,Kenya:UnitedNations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat).http://unhabitat.org/books/informal-transport-in-the-developing-world/.

Cohen,Peter,RobertHahn,JonathanHall,StevenLevitt,andRobertMetcalfe.2016.“UsingBig Data to Estimate Consumer Surplus: The Case of Uber.” No. 22627. NBERWorking Paper. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.http://www.nber.org/papers/w22627.pdf.

ESCAP, and UN-HABITAT. 2015. “The State of Asian and Pacific Cities 2015.”http://unhabitat.org/books/the-state-of-asian-and-pacific-cities-2015/.

Ford,Michele,andVivianHonan.2017.“TheGo-JekEffect.”InDigitalIndonesia:Connectivityand Divergence, edited by Edwin Jurriëns and Ross Tapsell, 275–88. IndonesiaUpdateSeries.Singapore:ISEAS-YusofIshakInstitute.

Goodfellow,Tom.2015. “Taming the ‘Rogue’Sector:StudyingStateEffectiveness inAfricathrough Informal Transport Politics.” Comparative Politics 47 (2): 127–47.doi:10.5129/001041515814224462.

Hall,Jonathan,andAlanKrueger.2016.“AnAnalysisoftheLaborMarketforUber’sDriver-Partners in the United States.” NBER Working Paper 22843. Cambridge, MA:NationalBureauofEconomicResearch.doi:10.3386/w22843.

Jacobs, Jane.1961.TheDeathandLifeofGreatAmericanCities.VintageBooksedition.NewYork,NY:VintageBooks.

Jennings,Gail,andRogerBehrens.2017. “TheCase for Investing inParatransit:Strategiesfor Regulation and Reform.” Gothenburg, Sweden: Volvo Research & EducationFoundations (VREF).http://www.vref.se/download/18.4e2c682015cbc9804d6e5b49/1499247366131/Investing+in+Paratransit+-+Jennings_Behrens+-+June+2017.pdf.

Khayesi, Meleckidzedeck, Fredrick Muyia Nafukho, and Joyce Kemuma. 2015. InformalPublic Transport in Practice: Matatu Entrepreneurship. Transport and Society.Burlington,VT:Ashgate.

Mulyana,Wahyu.2012.DecentWorkinJakarta:AnIntegratedApproach.Bangkok,Thailand:ILO Regional Office for Asia & the Pacific.http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2012/468521.pdf.

Sarosa, Wicaksono. 1993. “The Dual ‘formal-Informal’ growth of Jakarta: A Study of theMorphological Impacts of Economic Growth in a Metropolis of the DevelopingWorld.” M.A. Thesis in City Planning, Berkeley, CA: University of California atBerkeley.

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Scott, James C. 1972. “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia.”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview66(1):91–113.

Silver,Christopher.2008.PlanningtheMegacity:JakartaintheTwentiethCentury.London;NewYork:Routledge.

Simone,AbdouMaliq. 2014. Jakarta,DrawingtheCitynear.Minneapolis,MN ; London,UK:UniversityofMinnesotaPress.

Sopranzetti,Claudio.2013.“TheOwnersoftheMap:MotorcycleTaxiDrivers,Mobility,andPolitics in Bangkok.” Doctoral dissertation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11169780.

Suparee, Thosapol. 2017. “Sustainable Urban Transport in Bangkok - Traffic andTransportation Department, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA).”presentedattheUNESCAPRegionalMeetingonSustainableUrbanTransportIndex(SUTI), Jakarta, Indonesia, March 2.http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Report_Thailand-1_SUTI.pdf.

Taylor, John. 2015. “The Angkots of Solo: Report on Batik Solo Transit and AngkotIntegration.” Surakarta; Denpasar: Yayasan Kota Kita and Urban Launchpad.http://www.kotakita.org/publications-docs/The%20Angkots%20of%20Solo_150528.pdf.

The Jakarta Post. 2015. “Greater Jakarta: Jakarta Traffic Jams Cause Rp 65 Trillion inLosses.” The Jakarta Post, May 23.http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/05/23/greater-jakarta-jakarta-traffic-jams-cause-rp-65-trillion-losses.html.

Wilson, Ian Douglas. 2010. “The Rise and Fall of Political Gangsters in IndonesianDemocracy.”InProblemsofDemocratisationinIndonesia:Elections,Institutions,andSociety, edited by Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, 199–218. IndonesiaUpdateSeries.Singapore:InstituteofSoutheastAsianStudies.

WorldBank.2004.WorldDevelopmentReport2004:MakingServicesWorkforPoorPeople.Washington,DC:WorldBank.

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Appendices

InterviewToolsDriverorOperatorQuestionnaire

BasicInformation

Ask or note these personal details to the extent possible, during the course of naturalconversation.

1. Age/areyoumarried?

2. Gender

3. Migration/residencysituation

a. Areyouoriginallyfromthiscity?

b. Doyoulivenearthisarea?Whichcommunityorarea?

4. Worksituation

a. Isdriving(oroperating transport)yourmainoccupation? How longhaveyoubeendoingthiswork?Howmanyhoursperdaydoyouworkonthisjob?

b. Whatwasyourjobbefore?

5. Educationattainment

TransportServices/Work/Operations

6. Doyouownthevehicle?

a. Didyoubuyanewvehicle forthis,anddidyougeta loan(and ifso,howlongdoesittaketopayback)?

b. Whatisthevehicleage?

7. Doyouparticipateinadrivers’association?Whydoyouparticipate?

a. Describe theorigin, the role andmembership rulesof the association. What’sthesizeofmembership,andlocationof“base”?

b. Istherea“higherorganization”,suchasallianceofassociations?

c. How is the relationship between your drivers’ association,with other drivers’associations(inthearea)/company(app)/government,etc.?

8. What are the typical length and destination you drive (popular destinations ofcustomers)? Howmuchmoneydoyoumakeonanaverage trip? Howmanytripsdoyoumakeonanaverageday?

a. Ifyouareanappdriver,howmuchofyourtripsarefortransportinggoodsvs.passengersvs.otherservices?

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b. Doyoualwayswaitforcustomersoutofhere:__________? DoyouoperateoutoformaketripstoTransjakarta,train,orbusstops? Or,doyoucruisearoundtogetcustomers?

c. Whatisatypicalcustomerlike?Doyougetdiversecustomers?

9. Impactofapps:

a. Ifyoudriveforapp,doyoumakemoremoney,orfindmorepassengersbecauseoftheapp?Whatisthebestpart,andworstpart,aboutdrivingforapp?

b. If you don’t drive for app, has it impacted your work or earning? Does itcompetewithyou?

c. Has the popularity of the apps affected you in otherways? (E.g. e-wallet andcashlesspayment,etc.)

OpinionsonTransport

10. Besidesyourpersonalinterestasadriver,what’syouropinionontheapps?

11. Inyouropinion,whatisthemainproblemoftransportinthis?What’sthemaincauseofthatproblem?

a. In your opinion, do the government’s transport policies benefit everybody inthiscity?

12. Doesgovernmenthavegoodpolicyfortransportservices?

a. Inyourbusiness(yourspecifictransporttype),isthereaproblemthatyouwishthegovernmentwouldsolve?

KnowledgeofTransportGovernance–Extra

Theseareextraquestionsifyoufindyourselfwithtalkativedriver.Alternatively,youcouldaskquestionsaboutthehistorycommunity,oranydetailaboutconflictwithotherdrivers.

13. Doesthecitygovernmentregulateyourtransportservice?How?

14. Doesthenationalgovernmentregulateyourtransportservice?How?

15. Tomaketransportworkbetterinthiscity,drivers/operatorsshould:

a. Improveservicequality,suchassafetyandschedule

b. Voteinelections

c. Submitopinionstocityornationalgovernment

d. Followtrafficlaws

e. Organizeaprotestinthestreets

f. Complainonsocialmedia

g. Other:pleaseexplain

16. Isthereanythingelsethatyouwouldliketosayaboutanyoftheissueswediscussed?

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CitizenQuestionnaire

BasicInformation

Obtaininformationtotheextentpossible:

17. Age

18. Gender

19. Educationattainment

20. Migration/residencysituation

a. Areyouoriginallyfromthiscity?

b. Haveyoualwayslivedinthisarea,orknowmanypeopleinthecommunity?

21. Worksituation

TransportUsage

22. How often do you use the following transportation modes, every week? (E.g. everyweekday,afewtimesaweek,onceaweek,onlyweekend,etc.)

a. Transjakartabusrapidtransit(BRT)

• Fromwheretowheredoyourideitmostoften?b. Commuterrail

• Fromwheretowheredoyourideitmostly?

c. Buses:Angkot,KOPAJA,Metromini,BusBesar,other

d. Motorbiketaxi(ojek/appojek)

• Fromwheretowheredoyourideitmostly?

e. Bajaj

f. Taxi

g. Myownvehicle(ifyouhaveone):Car,Motorbike

h. Other(e.g.boat,bicycle,Ijustwalk,etc.)

23. Whatareyourpurposesforusingthedifferenttransportmodesyoumentioned?Pleasetelluswhichtransportyouuseforthefollowingpurposes,ifitapplies.

a. Commutingtoworkplaceorschool

b. Entrepreneurshipactivities(e.g.tosellormovegoods,toreachcustomers,etc.)

c. Accesstopublicfacilitiesandservices,orcommunityactivities,suchas:

• Hospitals, Government offices, Places of worship (e.g. mosques,churches, temples), Community centers (other than religiousinstitutions),Parksorotherpublicfacilities

d. Accesstocommercialactivities(e.g.groceryshopping):

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• Market

• Shoppingmall(incitycenter?)

• Other

e. Leisureactivities(e.g.visitfriendsorfamily,etc.)

24. Whichtransportmodewouldyouuseifyouwere:

a. Inahurry?

b. Havingtocarrylargebaggage?

c. Goingalonevs.asgroup(e.g.withfriendsorfamily)?

d. Goingforshortdistancevs.longdistance(morethan1hourtraveltime)?

e. Havetogosomewherelateatnight,etc.?

25. Doyouuseanyofthetransportapps(e.g.Grab,GOJEK,Uber,etc.),especiallyappojek?:

a. As passenger? If yes, how often, and for which transport? Do you use thetransport more often because of the app, and if yes, why (e.g. cost, safety,availability,etc.)?

b. Asdriverorcarowner?Ifyes,isbeingadriveryour(main)job?Doyoumakemoremoney,orfindmorepassengersbecauseoftheapp?

26. Whodidtheappsbenefitoraffect,inyouropinion?

OpinionsonTransport

27. Areyousatisfiedwithtransportinthiscity,orinthisarea?Whyorwhynot?

28. In your opinion, what is the main problem (e.g. traffic jam, traffic accidents,environment,badservice,etc.)?What’sthemaincauseofthatproblem?

29. Inyouropinion,dothegovernment’stransportpoliciesbenefiteverybodyinthiscity?

KnowledgeofTransportGovernance

30. DoyouknowabouttheLRTorMRT(orothertransportplan)affectingwhereyoulive?Whatdoyouexpecttohappen?

31. Isthereanythingelsethatyouwouldliketosayaboutanyoftheissueswediscussed?

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PolicymakerorExpertQuestionnaire

TransportUsage

Askthemtoanswerthesewithoutthinkingtoomuch!

32. Roughly how much, in terms of %, do this city’s citizens depend on the followingtransportation modes? (This can be very rough, just your personal impression –everyonecanhavedifferent impressions, thoughpleasealso letmeknowifyouknowthereisharddatasomewhere.)


b. Commuterrail(KRL)

c. Buses(KOPAJA,Metromini,Angkots,etc.)

d. Motorbiketaxi(ojek)

e. Bajaj

f. Taxi

g. Ownvehicle(car,motorbike)

h. Other(e.g.walking,bicycling,boat,etc.)

33. Aroundhowmanypercentageofthiscity’seconomydoyouthinkis“informal”?

34. Alsoinyourimpression,howmany%ofcitizensinthiscityusethetransportapps(e.g.Grab,Ojek,Uber,etc.)?

OpinionsonTransportandTransportGovernance

35. Couldyouexplaintomeyourorganization’sroleandtasks?(Overview/introduction)

a. As for details if therehas been recent action, institutional change, newpolicy,etc.

36. Are you directly familiar with any drivers’ associations or any trade groups in thetransport sector? How would you characterize their working relations with thegovernment(orregulators)?

37. Inyouropinion,whatisthemainproblemoftransportinthiscity(e.g.trafficjam,trafficaccidents,environment,badservice,etc.)?Doyouexpectimprovement?

a. Ifyes,whatisthecauseofimprovement?

b. Ifnot,whatisthemainobstacle?

38. Inyouropinion,whatisthetoppriorityingovernment’surbantransportpoliciesnow?

39. Isthereaclearpolicy(orpolicies)towards:

a. Informaltransport(i.e.transportthatarenotfullyregulatedorare“gray”),suchasojek,bajaj,etc.?(Areinformaltransport,stillpublictransport?)

b. Isthereaclearpolicy(orpolicies)towardstransportapps?(Areapptransport,stillpublictransport?)

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40. Overall,whohasthemainresponsibilitytoprovidegoodtransportinthiscity?Anotherwaytophrasethisquestionis:whoisresponsiblefordeliveringonthepriority?

a. Citygovernment

b. Nationalgovernment

c. Privatecompanies(marketmechanism)

d. Citizensthemselves(changeofperceptions?)

e. Other:pleaseexplain

41. Supposeordinarycitizensinthiscitywantedbetterpublictransportservices.Effectiveactionsordinarycitizenscantakeare(picktheonesyouthinkareeffective):

a. Useonlygoodtransportservices

b. Voteinelections

c. Complaintodriversorcompanies

d. Complaintocityornationalgovernment

e. Followtrafficlaws

f. Organizeaprotest

g. Complainonsocialmedia

h. Other:pleaseexplain

42. Onthetopicthatwediscussed,ifyouhadonequestionyoucouldaskoronethingthatyouwant to know (if you could ask interview questions instead of answering), whatwouldbeyourquestion?

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ServiceOrganizationsandPrivateSectorQuestionnaire

TransportUsage

Pleaseanswerthesewithoutthinkingtoomuch!

43. Roughly how much, in terms of %, do this city’s citizens depend on the followingtransportation modes? (This can be very rough, just your personal impression –everyonecanhavedifferent impressions, thoughpleasealso letmeknowifyouknowthereisharddatasomewhere.)


b. Commuterrail(KRL)

c. Buses(KOPAJA,Metromini,Angkots,etc.)

d. Motorbiketaxi(ojek)

e. Bajaj

f. Taxi

g. Ownvehicle(car,motorbike)

h. Other(e.g.walking,bicycling,boat,etc.)

44. Aroundhowmanypercentageofthiscity’seconomydoyouthinkis“informal”?

45. Alsoinyourimpression,howmany%ofcitizensinthiscityusethetransportapps(e.g.Grab,Ojek,Uber,etc.)?

OpinionsonTransport,TransportGovernance,&InformalSectors

46. Couldyouexplaintomeyourorganization’sroleandtasks?(Overview/introduction)

a. As for details if therehas been recent action, institutional change, newpolicy,etc.

47. Are you directly familiar with any drivers’ associations or any trade groups in thetransport sector? How would you characterize their working relations with thegovernment(orregulators)?(orotherproducers’associations?)

48. Inyouropinion,whatisthemainproblemoftransportinthiscity(e.g.trafficjam,trafficaccidents,environment,badservice,etc.)?Doyouexpectimprovement?

a. Ifyes,whatisthecauseofimprovement?

b. Ifnot,whatisthemainobstacle?

49. Inyouropinion,whatisthetoppriorityofprovidersnow?

50. Isthereaclearpolicy(orpolicies)towards:

a. Informaltransport(i.e.transportthatarenotfullyregulatedorare“gray”),suchasojek,bajaj,etc.?(Areinformaltransport,stillpublictransport?)

b. Isthereaclearpolicy(orpolicies)towardstransportapps?(Areapptransport,stillpublictransport?)

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51. Overall, who is the main beneficiary of organized services provided by yourconstituents?

52. Onthetopicthatwediscussed,ifyouhadonequestionyoucouldaskoronethingthatyouwant to know (if you could ask interview questions instead of answering), whatwouldbeyourquestion?

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ConsentFormYouhavebeenaskedtoparticipateinaresearchstudyconductedbyYingGao,fromMassachusettsInstitute of Technology (MIT) Political Science department. The purpose of the study is tounderstand the issues of public transportation and innovation, their relations to aspects such asgovernanceandimpactsondifferentgroupsofpeopleandcommunities,inJakarta.

You should read or listen to information below, and ask questions about anything you do notunderstand,beforedecidingtoparticipateornotinthisstudy.

• Voluntary participation: Your participation in interview or focus group for this study iscompletelyvoluntary.Youcanchoosetoanswerornotasmanyquestionsasyouwish.Youarefreetostoporleavetheintervieworfocusgroup,orwithdrawyourparticipationatanytime,evenaftertheparticipation.

• Confidentiality: Your opinions and answers to questionswill be kept anonymous. Duringthisintervieworfocusgroup,writtennoteswillbetaken.Thesenoteswillbeanonymous–who said what will never be attributed individually, in notes, conversations with otherpeople, or in research reports orpresentations. Yournames and contact informationwillneverbesharedwithotherpeople,exceptifrequiredbylaworifyougiveseparate,writtenpermission for sharing. Research data such as interview notes will be kept in securecomputersandwillbeprotectedwithpassword.

• Risks and benefits: The study is an independent academic research, supported by USAIDthrough IDIN(d-lab.mit.edu/idin),andMITGOV/Lab(www.mitgovlab.org/). Since it isanacademicresearchproject,theoutcomesofthestudyisnotlinkedtoanyeconomicbenefitsor development projects or actions. There will not be monetary compensation for yourparticipation inthisstudy. Generalizedfindings fromthisstudymaybesummarized inanoutcomereport.Inaddition,findingsfromthisstudymaybereportedinscholarlyjournals,atacademicseminarsandresearchassociationmeetings,andonsponsorinstitutionoutlets(e.g. IDIN website, MIT GOV/Lab blog, USAID office). If you wish to obtain these publicoutcomereportsorpresentations,justletmeknow.Theprojectisexpectedtobecompletedby31August2017.

• Furtherquestionsorconcerns:Foranyquestionsorconcernsaboutthisresearch,[email protected]+62(0)857-7766-4057.

• Ifyoufeelyouhavebeentreatedunfairlyduringyourparticipationinthisstudy,oryouhavequestionsregardingyourrightsasaresearchsubject,youmaycontacttheChairmanoftheCommittee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects, MIT, Room E25-143b, 77MassachusettsAve,Cambridge,MA02139,USA;phone+1(617)253-6787.

Basedonaboveinformation,pleaseindicatewhetheryouarewillingtoparticipateinthisresearch.

Iagreetoparticipateinthisresearch: YES / NO

Name:___________________________________ Date:___________________________

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