Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

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Outline Introduction The Bitmap Filter Evaluations Discussions Conclusion Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter Chun-Ying Huang Kuan-Ta Chen Chin-Laung Lei Distributed Computing and Network Security Lab Department of Electrical Engineering National Taiwan University June 26, 2006 C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 1/31

description

With the emergence of active worms, the targets of attacks have been moved from well-known Internet servers to generic Internet hosts, and since the rate at which patches can be applied is always much slower than the spread of a worm, an Internet worm can usually attack or infect millions of hosts in a short time. It is difficult to eliminate Internet attacks globally; thus, protecting client networks from being attacked or infected is a relatively critical issue. In this paper, we propose a method that protects client networks from being attacked by people who try to scan, attack, or infect hosts in local networks via unpatched vulnerabilities. Based on the symmetry of network traffic in both temporal and spatial domains, a bitmap filter is installed at the entry point of a client network to filter out possible attack traffic. Our evaluation shows that with a small amount of memory (less than 1 megabyte), more than 95% of attack traffic can be filtered out in a small- or medium-scale client network.

Transcript of Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

Page 1: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Mitigating Active Attacks TowardsClient Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

Chun-Ying Huang Kuan-Ta Chen Chin-Laung Lei

Distributed Computing and Network Security LabDepartment of Electrical Engineering

National Taiwan University

June 26, 2006

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 1/31

Page 2: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Outline

1 Introduction

2 The Bitmap Filter

3 Evaluations

4 Discussions

5 Conclusion

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 2/31

Page 3: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Definitions and MotivationsStateful Packet Inspection

Outline

1 Introduction

2 The Bitmap Filter

3 Evaluations

4 Discussions

5 Conclusion

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 3/31

Page 4: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Definitions and MotivationsStateful Packet Inspection

Active Attacks

Definition

An active attack is behavior that deliberately scans, probes, orintrudes on certain hosts or networks with malicious intent.

Motivations

The popularity of Internet worms moves the victims.

Most defense mechanisms are required to deploy globally.

How does an ISP prevent customers/clients from attacks?

Construct an efficient stateful packet inspection (SPI) filter.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 4/31

Page 5: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Definitions and MotivationsStateful Packet Inspection

Active Attacks

Definition

An active attack is behavior that deliberately scans, probes, orintrudes on certain hosts or networks with malicious intent.

Motivations

The popularity of Internet worms moves the victims.

Most defense mechanisms are required to deploy globally.

How does an ISP prevent customers/clients from attacks?

Construct an efficient stateful packet inspection (SPI) filter.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 4/31

Page 6: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Definitions and MotivationsStateful Packet Inspection

Active Attacks

Definition

An active attack is behavior that deliberately scans, probes, orintrudes on certain hosts or networks with malicious intent.

Motivations

The popularity of Internet worms moves the victims.

Most defense mechanisms are required to deploy globally.

How does an ISP prevent customers/clients from attacks?

Construct an efficient stateful packet inspection (SPI) filter.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 4/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Definitions and MotivationsStateful Packet Inspection

Stateful Packet Inspection

Server – S

Attacker – A

Client – C SPI Filter

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 5/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Definitions and MotivationsStateful Packet Inspection

Stateful Packet Inspection

Server – S

Attacker – A

Client – C SPI Filter

Request:C:1234 S:80

C 1234 S 80

Src Src-Port Dst-PortDst

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. .

. .

. .

. .

State Table

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 5/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Definitions and MotivationsStateful Packet Inspection

Stateful Packet Inspection

Server – S

Attacker – A

Client – C SPI Filter

Request:C:1234 S:80

C 1234 S 80

Src Src-Port Dst-PortDst

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. .

. .

. .

. .

State Table

R e s p on s e :S:80 C :1234

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Definitions and MotivationsStateful Packet Inspection

Stateful Packet Inspection

Server – S

Attacker – A

Client – C SPI Filter

Request:C:1234 S:80

C 1234 S 80

Src Src-Port Dst-PortDst

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. .

. .

. .

. .

State Table

R e s p on s e :S:80 C :1234

A t t a ck #

2 :

X : 1 23 4

C : 5 67 8

A t ta c k

# 1 :

A : 80

C :4 5 6

7

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 5/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Definitions and MotivationsStateful Packet Inspection

Stateful Packet Inspection (cont’d)

The Problem

The linearly increased costs on bothstorage spaces and computations.

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

Outline

1 Introduction

2 The Bitmap Filter

3 Evaluations

4 Discussions

5 Conclusion

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 7/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

Client Network Traffic Characteristics

Observations

1 Connection/Session lifetime

2 Out-In packet delay

Data source: aggregated six class-C campus client networks

A 6-hour TCP and UDP packet trace.

Collected between 10AM and 4PM in a weekday.

96.25% are TCP packets; and 3.75% are UDP packets.

Average packet rate: 24.63K packets per second.

Average bandwidth utilization: 138.55 Mbps.

Average packet size: 720 bytes.

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

Client Network Traffic Characteristics

Observations

1 Connection/Session lifetime

2 Out-In packet delay

Data source: aggregated six class-C campus client networks

A 6-hour TCP and UDP packet trace.

Collected between 10AM and 4PM in a weekday.

96.25% are TCP packets; and 3.75% are UDP packets.

Average packet rate: 24.63K packets per second.

Average bandwidth utilization: 138.55 Mbps.

Average packet size: 720 bytes.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 8/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

Connection/Session Lifetime

Definition

Given a TCP connection, measure

the time between the last TCP-SYN

and the first TCP-FIN packet.

Result summary

90%: < 76 seconds.

95%: < 6 minutes.

99%: < 515 seconds.

Lifetime is short.0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000

1e+

00

1e+

02

1e+

04

1e+

06

a. Connection Lifetime

Lifetime (in seconds)

Num

ber

of

conn

ections

99% connectionsare shorter than515 seconds

515

319

76

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 9/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

Connection/Session Lifetime

Definition

Given a TCP connection, measure

the time between the last TCP-SYN

and the first TCP-FIN packet.

Result summary

90%: < 76 seconds.

95%: < 6 minutes.

99%: < 515 seconds.

Lifetime is short.0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000

1e+

00

1e+

02

1e+

04

1e+

06

a. Connection Lifetime

Lifetime (in seconds)

Num

ber

of connections

99% connectionsare shorter than515 seconds

515

319

76

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 9/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

Out-In Packet Delay

Definition of the Out-In Packet Delay

A connection contains several outgoing and incoming packets.

We measure the elapsed time between the outgoing packet and thesuccessive incoming packets in each connection.

Outgoing Packets

Incoming Packets

LAN WAN

A B C D

1 2 3 4 5 6

A-1A-2A-3

B-4B-5

D-6

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 10/31

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The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

Out-In Packet Delay (cont’d)

Result summary

Observed port-reuse effect.

99% < 2.8 seconds, implies that Internet traffic is bi-directional and

has high locality in the temporal domain.

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

1e+

00

1e+

02

1e+

04

1e+

06

1e+

08

b. Out−In Packet Delay

Delay (in seconds)

Packet C

ount

30

60

100

120

150

160

190

220 290 350 420 480 540

Peaks are interleaved with

intervals of roughly 30 or 60 seconds

0 5 10 15 20

0.8

50.9

00.9

51.0

0

c. Out−In Packet Delay (CDF)

Delay (in seconds)

CD

F

99% out−in packet delays

are shorter than

2.8 seconds

95% out−in packet delays

are shorter than

0.8 seconds

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 11/31

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The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

Construct the Bitmap Filter

With the previous observations:

1 Connection/Session lifetime is short.

2 Out-in packet delays are short.

3 Internet traffic is bi-directional.

A stateful packet inspection (SPI) filter can be modified.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 12/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

A Naıve Method to Modify an SPI Filter

Expire connection state information with timers.

Server – S

Attacker – A

Client – C SPI Filter

Request:C:1234 S:80

C:1234 S:80 10

Connection Info. Timer

. . . .

. . . .

. .

. .

State Table

R e s p on s e :S:80 C :1234

A t t a ck #

2 :

X : 1 23 4

C : 5 67 8

A t ta c k

# 1 :

A : 80

C :4 5 6

7

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 13/31

Page 21: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

A Naıve Method to Modify an SPI Filter

Expire connection state information with timers.

Server – S

Attacker – A

Client – C SPI Filter

Request:C:1234 S:80

C:1234 S:80 10

Connection Info. Timer

. . . .

. . . .

. .

. .

State Table

R e s p on s e :S:80 C :1234

A t t a ck #

2 :

X : 1 23 4

C : 5 67 8

A t ta c k

# 1 :

A : 80

C :4 5 6

7

However: Still linear complexities on storages and computations.

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

Improved Performance: Using the Bitmap Filter

Reduce storages/computations complexities to constant.

DefinitionA bitmap filter is a composition of k

bloom filters of equal size N

(=2n-bit), denoted as a

{k × N}-bitmap filter.

The i th bloom filter is denoted as

bit-vector [i ] in the algorithms.

H1(t)H2(t)

Hm(t)

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

...

...

...

...

1 2 3 k...

2n

bitsn-bit

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 14/31

Page 23: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

Improved Performance: Using the Bitmap Filter

Reduce storages/computations complexities to constant.

DefinitionA bitmap filter is a composition of k

bloom filters of equal size N

(=2n-bit), denoted as a

{k × N}-bitmap filter.

The i th bloom filter is denoted as

bit-vector [i ] in the algorithms.

H1(t)H2(t)

Hm(t)

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

...

...

...

...

1 2 3 k...

2n

bitsn-bit

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Page 24: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

Improved Performance: Using the Bitmap Filter

Reduce storages/computations complexities to constant.

DefinitionA bitmap filter is a composition of k

bloom filters of equal size N

(=2n-bit), denoted as a

{k × N}-bitmap filter.

The i th bloom filter is denoted as

bit-vector [i ] in the algorithms.

H1(t)H2(t)

Hm(t)

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

...

...

...

...

1 2 3 k...

2n

bitsn-bit

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 14/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

The Algorithms

Initialization

A {k × N}-bitmap filter is initialized to all bits zero.

All the k bloom filters are configured to share the same m hash functions.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 15/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

The Algorithms

Initialization

A {k × N}-bitmap filter is initialized to all bits zero.

All the k bloom filters are configured to share the same m hash functions.

The concept: Time-rotated bloom filters

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

The Algorithms

The concept: Time-rotated bloom filters

At time = t01 2 K3 ...

...

...

...

eldestcurrent

At time = t0 + ∆t

1 2 K3 ...

...

...

...

currenteldest

At time = t0 + 2∆t

1 2 K3 ...

...

...

...

currenteldest

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 15/31

Page 28: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

The Algorithms

The concept: Time-rotated bloom filters

At time = t01 2 K3 ...

...

...

...

eldestcurrent

At time = t0 + ∆t

1 2 K3 ...

...

...

...

currenteldest

At time = t0 + 2∆t

1 2 K3 ...

...

...

...

currenteldest

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 15/31

Page 29: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

The Algorithms

The concept: Time-rotated bloom filters

At time = t01 2 K3 ...

...

...

...

eldestcurrent

At time = t0 + ∆t

1 2 K3 ...

...

...

...

currenteldest

At time = t0 + 2∆t

1 2 K3 ...

...

...

...

currenteldest

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 15/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

The Algorithms (cont’d)

Algorithm I: Periodically reset the eldest bloom filter

Rotate one time unit, then reset the eldest bloom filter.

Algorithm II: Test and set the bloom filters

Outgoing packets: Mark all corresponding bits on all bloom filters.

Incoming packets: Reject if not all corresponding bits are marked on the current

bloom filter.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 16/31

Page 31: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

The Algorithms (cont’d)

Algorithm I: Periodically reset the eldest bloom filter

Rotate one time unit, then reset the eldest bloom filter.

Algorithm II: Test and set the bloom filters

Outgoing packets: Mark all corresponding bits on all bloom filters.

Incoming packets: Reject if not all corresponding bits are marked on the current

bloom filter.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 16/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

The Algorithms: Illustrated

The two algorithms implement the same concept as the modifiedSPI filter presented before.

2n bits

...

12345678

At time = tk,a snapshot of the current bitmap status.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 17/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

The Algorithms: Illustrated

The two algorithms implement the same concept as the modifiedSPI filter presented before.

2n bits

...

12345678

At time = tk+∆t,all columns are reduced by 1.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 17/31

Page 34: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

The Algorithms: Illustrated

The two algorithms implement the same concept as the modifiedSPI filter presented before.

2n bits

...

12345678

At time = tk+2∆t,all columns are reduced by 1, again.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 17/31

Page 35: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

The Algorithms: Illustrated

The two algorithms implement the same concept as the modifiedSPI filter presented before.

At time = tk+2∆t,with an occurrence of a new connection.

2n bits

...

12345678

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 17/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Client Network Traffic CharacteristicsConstruct the Bitmap FilterParameter Decisions

Parameter Decisions

Parameter List

Name MeaningTe The expired time of a state.∆t The time unit to rotate the bitmap.k The number of used bloom filters.N The size of each bloom filter. The real size is 2n-bit.m The number of used hash functions for the bloom filters.

Guidelines

1 Recall the observed port-reuse effect. Te should not be too large.

2 ∆t should be set properly. Small ∆t increases system loads; large ∆t reduces

system granularity (and precision).

3 k is roughly b Te∆tc.

4 N and m depends on the scale of the network and the required precision.

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

False Positives and False NegativesPerformanceSimulation

Outline

1 Introduction

2 The Bitmap Filter

3 Evaluations

4 Discussions

5 Conclusion

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 19/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

False Positives and False NegativesPerformanceSimulation

False Positives and False Negatives

Definition

False positive: Normal behavior is rejected.

False negative: Attacks are accepted.

False positives

Since the lifetime of a state is Te seconds, a false positive occurs

only when the out-in packet delay is longer than Te seconds.

As the statistics show, when Te is greater than 2.8 seconds, the

false positive rates should be lower than 1%.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 20/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

False Positives and False NegativesPerformanceSimulation

False Positives and False Negatives

Definition

False positive: Normal behavior is rejected.

False negative: Attacks are accepted.

False positives

Since the lifetime of a state is Te seconds, a false positive occurs

only when the out-in packet delay is longer than Te seconds.

As the statistics show, when Te is greater than 2.8 seconds, the

false positive rates should be lower than 1%.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 20/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

False Positives and False NegativesPerformanceSimulation

False Negatives

Estimating on False Negative Rates

1 Given the expected max number of active connections c in Te and the bitmapsize N, the false negative rate can be estimated by

p ≤ exp(−N

e · c). (1)

2 In contrast, given N and a tolerable maximum value of p, the expected maxnumber of active connections c should satisfy

c ≤ −N

e ln p. (2)

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 21/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

False Positives and False NegativesPerformanceSimulation

Examples

For a small- or medium-scale network

A bitmap filter is constructed using the following configuration

Parameters: k = 4, ∆t = 5, (Te = 20), m = 3

Required memory space: k×2n

8 = 512 K bytes.

Given the tolerable penetration probability of 10%, 5%, and 1%,the bitmap filter provides capacity of 167K, 125K, and 83K activeconnections in Te , respectively.

Compare with the campus network traffic

Only 15K active connections within a Te of 20 seconds.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 22/31

Page 42: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

False Positives and False NegativesPerformanceSimulation

Examples

For a small- or medium-scale network

A bitmap filter is constructed using the following configuration

Parameters: k = 4, ∆t = 5, (Te = 20), m = 3

Required memory space: k×2n

8 = 512 K bytes.

Given the tolerable penetration probability of 10%, 5%, and 1%,the bitmap filter provides capacity of 167K, 125K, and 83K activeconnections in Te , respectively.

Compare with the campus network traffic

Only 15K active connections within a Te of 20 seconds.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 22/31

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OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

False Positives and False NegativesPerformanceSimulation

Performance

Summary

Packet Processing:

For an outgoing packet: O(m) hashes +O(m × k) marks.

For an incoming packet: O(m) hashes +O(m) checks.

Bitmap Rotation:

Reset a bit vector: constant according to the given bitmap size.

Since the bitmap is designed to have fixed size and continuous memory

space and the components used in the algorithms are easy to implement

as hardware, these algorithms can be completely implemented as a

hardware easily.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 23/31

Page 44: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

False Positives and False NegativesPerformanceSimulation

Performance

Summary

Packet Processing:

For an outgoing packet: O(m) hashes +O(m × k) marks.

For an incoming packet: O(m) hashes +O(m) checks.

Bitmap Rotation:

Reset a bit vector: constant according to the given bitmap size.

Since the bitmap is designed to have fixed size and continuous memory

space and the components used in the algorithms are easy to implement

as hardware, these algorithms can be completely implemented as a

hardware easily.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 23/31

Page 45: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

False Positives and False NegativesPerformanceSimulation

Compare with Similar Implementations

Bitmap filterAVL-treeHash + link-list(Linux)

O(c)O(n)O(n)Storage space -Complexity

8M bytes77M bytes77M bytesStorage space -

Handle 2.55M active connections

O(1)O(1) O(log n)Computation Complexity -Insert a new state

Computation Complexity -Search for a state O(n) O(log n) O(1)

Computation Complexity -Garbage collection O(n) O(n) O(c)

Hardware acceleration Possible Expensive Cheap

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 24/31

Page 46: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

False Positives and False NegativesPerformanceSimulation

Simulation I: Drop Rate Comparison

Compare the drop rate of BF and SPI-filter

Environments

Implement an SPI filter (expire idle

state after 240 seconds).

The bitmap filter: n = 20, k = 4,

∆t = 5, Te = 20 (512K bytes).

Drop rates measure in a 5-second

time unit.

1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

Drop rate of the SPI filter (%)

Dro

p r

ate

of

the

bitm

ap

filt

er

(%)

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 25/31

Page 47: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

False Positives and False NegativesPerformanceSimulation

Simulation I: Drop Rate Comparison

Compare the drop rate of BF and SPI-filter

Environments

Implement an SPI filter (expire idle

state after 240 seconds).

The bitmap filter: n = 20, k = 4,

∆t = 5, Te = 20 (512K bytes).

Drop rates measure in a 5-second

time unit.

1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

Drop rate of the SPI filter (%)

Dro

p r

ate

of

the

bitm

ap

filt

er

(%)

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 25/31

Page 48: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

False Positives and False NegativesPerformanceSimulation

Simulation II: Filter Rate

Environments

The same bitmap filter used in simulation I.

Attack rate: spoofed addresses, 500K packets per second.

0 5000 10000 15000 20000

0e+

00

2e+

05

4e+

05

a. Filter Performance

Time (in seconds)

Packet C

ount

12000 14000 16000 18000 20000 22000

99.9

599.9

799.9

9100.0

1

b. Attack Filtering Rate

Time (in seconds)

Filt

ering r

ate

(%

)

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 26/31

Page 49: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

False Positives and False NegativesPerformanceSimulation

Simulation II: Filter Rate

Environments

The same bitmap filter used in simulation I.

Attack rate: spoofed addresses, 500K packets per second.

0 5000 10000 15000 20000

0e+

00

2e+

05

4e+

05

a. Filter Performance

Time (in seconds)

Packet C

ount

12000 14000 16000 18000 20000 22000

99.9

599.9

799.9

9100.0

1

b. Attack Filtering Rate

Time (in seconds)

Filt

ering r

ate

(%

)

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 26/31

Page 50: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Summary

Outline

1 Introduction

2 The Bitmap Filter

3 Evaluations

4 Discussions

5 Conclusion

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 27/31

Page 51: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Summary

Summary of Discussions

1 The Compatibility

The bitmap filter is compatible with all single connection applications.

For multiple connection applications, the bitmap filter is also compatible

with hole-punching like NAT-traversal solutions.

2 Attack from Insiders

An inside attacker may quickly increase the bitmap utilization when

attacking outsiders. It hence increase the false negative rate.

An administrator may increase n or Te to tolerate such attacks. However,

it would be better to identify and eliminate inside attackers.

3 Adaptive Packet Dropping

For bandwidth attacks only, the bitmap filter may consider to adopt

adaptive packet dropping to increase the compatibility.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 28/31

Page 52: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Summary

Summary of Discussions

1 The Compatibility

The bitmap filter is compatible with all single connection applications.

For multiple connection applications, the bitmap filter is also compatible

with hole-punching like NAT-traversal solutions.

2 Attack from Insiders

An inside attacker may quickly increase the bitmap utilization when

attacking outsiders. It hence increase the false negative rate.

An administrator may increase n or Te to tolerate such attacks. However,

it would be better to identify and eliminate inside attackers.

3 Adaptive Packet Dropping

For bandwidth attacks only, the bitmap filter may consider to adopt

adaptive packet dropping to increase the compatibility.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 28/31

Page 53: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Summary

Summary of Discussions

1 The Compatibility

The bitmap filter is compatible with all single connection applications.

For multiple connection applications, the bitmap filter is also compatible

with hole-punching like NAT-traversal solutions.

2 Attack from Insiders

An inside attacker may quickly increase the bitmap utilization when

attacking outsiders. It hence increase the false negative rate.

An administrator may increase n or Te to tolerate such attacks. However,

it would be better to identify and eliminate inside attackers.

3 Adaptive Packet Dropping

For bandwidth attacks only, the bitmap filter may consider to adopt

adaptive packet dropping to increase the compatibility.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 28/31

Page 54: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Outline

1 Introduction

2 The Bitmap Filter

3 Evaluations

4 Discussions

5 Conclusion

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 29/31

Page 55: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Conclusion

We propose the bitmap filter, an alternative implementationto replace the stateful packet inspection (SPI) filter, to stopmalicious traffic for client networks.

The bitmap filter successful reduces the complexities of bothstorage and computation to constants.

Analyses and simulations show that with limited resources,the bitmap filter can filter 90% even 99% attack traffic.

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 30/31

Page 56: Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks Using the Bitmap Filter

OutlineIntroduction

The Bitmap FilterEvaluationsDiscussionsConclusion

Thanks for your attention.Comments or questions?

C.-Y. Huang, K.-T. Chen, C.-L. Lei Mitigating Active Attacks Towards Client Networks 31/31