Mission command in the Royal Netherlands Army

Leadership theory, mission command, and stress recognition

Master thesis Science, Management & Innovation master track Faculty of Science, Radboud University Nijmegen

Name Samuel Golub

Student number s4168674

Discipline Medical Biology

Host organisation Nederlandse Defensie Academie

Start date 1-3-2016

Presentation date 26-8-2016

University coach Dr. Marijke de Vries

Host organisation coach Dr. Peter Olsthoorn

Reader Dr. Erwin van Rijswoud

This thesis is confidential? No

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“I delegated the authority to my subordinates and allowed them to use their initiative to execute the

mission. There is no need to tell someone how to do his job if you have properly trained your team.”1

Major Richard “Dick” Winters

506th PIR, 101st Airborne Division

1 From the memoirs of Major Dick Winters (Winters & Kingseed, 2006, p. 288).

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Table of contents

Acknowledgements .............................................................. 3

Abstract .................................................................................... 4

Executive summary ............................................................. 5

Introduction ............................................................................ 7

Part I: A Theoretical Framework .......................... 14

Chapter 1: Leadership in theory ........................................ 15

Chapter 2: Leadership in the military ............................ 35

Chapter 3: Military operations and stress ...................... 49

Part II: Empirical Findings ..................................... 61

Results ................................................................................. 62

Part III: Integrative Analysis .............................. 92

Discussion........................................................................... 93

Conclusion ....................................................................... 102

References ........................................................................... 105

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Acknowledgements First and foremost, I want to thank the soldiers that participated in my study. They let me stumble around in their world and exposed themselves, retelling their oftentimes emotional stories for my perusal. They extended their trust to me and, in a way, let me become part of their band of brothers. I would, however, never have been in a position to thank anyone, if it were not for Lieutenant Colonel Erwin Bieri. It is he who made this study possible by reaching out to his officer corps brethren, and in doing so providing me with much needed participants. I also want to thank Dr Peter Olsthoorn, my supervisor, for always being there when I needed him, but above all for his trust and faith, and respect for my autonomous manner of working. I cannot imagine having had a more pleasant last year anywhere else. Lastly, I want to thank my parents and my girlfriend Lisette for their enduring support. I want to apologise to Lisette, for depriving her of precious time with me during her holiday, when I was instead ferociously typing; and I want to apologise to my parents for making them almost forget my name and the look of my face. The time has come to shave off my beard.

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Abstract Mission command and stress recognition are two very important aspects of military action. Lives depend on them. This study links multiple leadership theories to both mission command and stress recognition, and shows that these two things have the same foundation. It is also shown that the pillars of military action, namely mission command and stress recognition were not used by the Dutch military during the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The identified cause for this is the undermining of the foundation (mutual trust) of these two concepts, through the way the mission was structured. Recommendations are made, to ensure improvement with regard to mission command and stress recognition in future missions.

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Executive summary Leadership is phenomenon that has always interested mankind. However, systemic leadership research only really took hold in the beginning of the 20th century. First it was thought that certain character traits make or break leaders. Over the years, leadership paradigms changed rapidly. After traits, behaviours were thought to be central to leadership. From there contingency theories were developed in which leadership was thought to be contingent on multiple situational factors. Next, the paradigm changed to inspirational and charismatic leadership. And finally, some new leadership approaches were coined, which are still being developed. Military leadership is based on the doctrine of mission command. Mission command is a concept that is founded on mutual trust and clarity of objectives. Leaders delegate tasks and decision making, but not ultimate responsibility, to subordinates. This is needed because modern military operations are simply too ridden with uncertainty to effectively organise and control at the central level. However, from a 2004 study into the use of mission command in the Dutch military, it appeared that there were multiple obstacles to its use. The study found that military leaders always had an excuse not to use mission command, for a large part due to lack of mutual trust and clarity of goals. After this study, no more research was done with regard to use of mission command in more recent Dutch military operations. Stress recognition, like mission command, is an important aspect of military action. Military operations, such as combat operations, but also low intensity peace support operations, can induce stress in military personnel. This stress can, and does, undermine military effectiveness and wellbeing of military personnel. In order to safeguard military effectiveness and wellbeing of personnel, the Dutch defence stress policy attributes a key position to commanders. These military leaders are trained and educated to be able to recognise and manage stress in their personnel. However, from a 2013 study it appears that, during the Dutch military participation in the stabilisation mission in Afghanistan, commanders could not remember much about their stress recognition training. The ones that could remember anything, rated their training as unsatisfactory or insufficient. After this study, no more research concerning this topic was performed.

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The identified impediments to mission command and stress recognition pose an impediment to operational effectiveness, wellbeing of personnel. The Dutch Ministry of Defence regards national and international safety as a continuum, and thus the aforementioned impediments are of great societal relevance. This study was set up to fill up the hiatuses in knowledge that were left void after the last known studies into mission command and stress recognition. The goal of this study was to show the linkages between leadership theory, mission command and stress recognition, to assess the current state of mission command and stress recognition usage, and to provide the defence organisation with recommendations for improvement. To this end eighteen Afghanistan infantry veterans, from section commander to company commander, were interviewed with regard to mission command and stress recognition. The data were coded and analysed in ATLAS.ti. This study’s findings indicate that there were grave impediments and obstacles to both mission command and stress recognition, during the Dutch mission in Afghanistan. Significant obstacles to mission command were found to be the mixing of units, skipping of layers in the chain of command, inexperienced and/or incompetent personnel, and lack of clear mission goals/intent. Obstacles to stress recognition were found to be skipping layers in the chain of command, no emphasis on stress in preparatory training, and neglected group bonding. These obstacles resemble the ones found in the aforementioned previous studies into mission command and stress recognition. This study has also found links between multiple leadership theories and mission command and stress recognition, most notably a revival of the trait approach. In convergence of these results, mission command and stress recognition are found to have a common fundament, based on mutual trust, clarity of mission goals/commander’s intent. This common fundament, based on the social side of military leadership, is incorporated into a mission command/stress prevention contingency model. To prevent future disruption of the common fundament of mission command and stress recognition, several policy recommendations are made. Among other things, stress education and training should be concretised for a better theory to practice transition. Also, seeing as the social side of military leadership is neglected, military leaders should be selected on social character traits (i.e. extroversion and empathy) and social behaviours should be stimulated. Also, there is a strong need to spend more time on group bonding and formation of group cohesion.

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Introduction

The Netherlands Defence Academy The NLDA (Nederlandse Defensie Academie) is the Netherlands Defence Academy. The NLDA consists of several organisational divisions: two university level educational institutes where future officers receive their education, an educational institute for senior officers, the Dutch institute for Military History, an expertise center on leadership, a language center and the Faculty of Military Sciences (Faculteit Militaire Wetenschappen; FMW). The FMW consists of several sections which carry out research into specific areas of military relevance and interest. There are three main departments: Militaire Bedrijfswetenschappen (organisational/logistics research; acronym MBW), Krijgwetenschappen (strategic research) and Militair Technische Wetenschappen (technological research). This study was performed at the organisational department.

Armed forces leadership In, and before, the cold war era the battlespace was huge and there was excellent intelligence about the enemy’s plans. The doctrine of the armed forces was then also a centralised one wherein operational units worked out possible scenarios and prepared in accordance with these plans. However, the operations in which the modern armed forces are involved, such as peace support operations, are less certain. They are characterized by chaos and ambiguity. This chaos and ambiguity is epitomized by phenomena such as unpredictability of behavior of the local populace and warring parties, spontaneous outbursts of aggression, the sometimes far from soldier-like tasks (social patrols) and non-compliance of belligerents with agreements (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). The modern military environment thus requires leaders who possess the intellectual confidence which enables them to explore these situations from different angles. In short: the modern military environment, i.e. peace support operations, requires commanders to be “thinking commanders” rather than only “rule-following commanders” (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). The Dutch defence doctrine on leadership propagates this ideology of the “thinking commander” that delegates tasks to subordinates (who are closer to the most recent information) and assumes a decentral position. In the Dutch defence doctrine this is called opdrachtgerichte commandovoering (English: mission command), modeled after the German model of

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Auftragstaktik developed and used in the Second World War. In German military operations, Auftragstaktik achieved great tactical successes (Alexander, 2010).. The Dutch defence doctrine defines mission command as: “The freedom to make decisions in a situation one is faced with, without referral, but operating within set guidelines and in pursuance of superior’s intent” (cited in Essens, 2001, p. 205). The decentralisation that mission command brings with it helps organisations deal directly and effectively with the daily uncertainties confronting them (which are ever abundant in peace support operations). However, it appears that Dutch military leaders, in the successive peace support operations in Bosnia (UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR) often fell back on centralised, directive, leadership due to a plethora of reasons, of which the most important are: lack of clarity of mission goals, lack of adequate means to accomplish the mission and a lack of mutual trust up and down the hierarchy (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004).

The innovation pathway of leadership theories While leadership has always interested scholars, systemic leadership research only began at the beginning of the 20th century. In the 1930s and 1940s it was presupposed that what makes great leaders are character traits. This theory, called the trait approach, presupposed that effective leaders are born and it tried to discern good leader material from bad leader material on the basis of character traits, such as intelligence, responsibility and sociability (Stogdill, 1948; Stogdill, 1974). In the 50s and 60s the focus shifted to the so called behavioural approach. Instead of personal traits, behaviours were now considered the fundament of effective leadership. All behaviours appeared to be reducible to two categories: personnel oriented and task oriented leadership (Northouse, 2016). Then, in the 60s and 70s so called contingency theories emerged. These theories operated from the assumption that good leadership is contingent on the leader, the subordinate and the situation. An early iteration was the situational approach to leadership, in which leadership style was contingent on follower development level (Hersey & Blanchard, 1969). After that, in the 70s, the path-goal theory, next to leadership behaviour and follower characteristics, added task characteristics to the mix (Evans, 1970; House, 1971). Then in the 80s a new paradigm emerged: transformational leadership, which was an answer to the question of how leaders are able to lead employees, successfully, through organisational changes. Central to transformational leadership is the leader that intellectually stimulates his

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followers and provides a sense of purpose and a strong vision (Bass & Avolio, 1994). With the turn of the century new leadership approaches were added to the literature. Among these new additions were: authentic leadership, servant leadership and adaptive leadership. In the authentic leadership approach the authenticity of leaders is regarded as key to good leadership. Authentic leaders are passionate, compassionate, provide followers with a strong vision, a moral framework and establish trusting relationships through their self-discipline (George, 2003). In servant leadership, leaders are again conceptualised as strong visionaries, but more emphasis is put on the commitment to growth of people (Spears, 2002). Lastly, adaptive leadership is concerned with facilitating the adaptation of followers to new organisational challenges (Heifetz, 1994).

Stress & Military leadership Stress is a phenomenon that presents itself in all forms of military action, combat operations and peace support operations alike (Pearn, 2000). Operational stressors can, in the worst case lead to chronic negative stress outcomes and thus disrupt the wellbeing and effectiveness of military personnel. As much as 20 percent of Dutch military personnel is left with insufficiently explained physical complaints, concentration problems, or memory loss, and even 4 to 5 percent returns home having developed Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Gersons, 2005; Weerts, 2008). However, findings indicate that only 2 to 8 percent of military personnel with stress issues seek help (Pearn, 2000), making the need for early stress recognition even greater. The Dutch defence stress policy underscores this need and uses a so called ring model for mental healthcare. Commanders play a big role in this policy, as the ring model attributes them the role of early stress recognisers (Gersons, 2005). However, it appears that due to several reasons, such as a prevalent warrior mentality and emphasis on tactical aspects of military operations, commanders find themselves inadequately prepared for stress recognition (Geerling, 2013).

Study goal Mission command and stress recognition are two very important aspects of military operations. Mission command is needed due to high uncertainty in operations, and stress recognition is of importance for the safeguarding of the wellbeing of military personnel and for the maintenance of soldiers’ effectiveness (and by extension mission command). We have seen that with regard to both aspects, serious obstacles were found to be present in

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the presented studies. Due to these obstacles, military action is not effective, and thus, seeing as the Ministry of Defence perceives international and national safety as one continuum, Dutch society is at risk. Hence these issues are societally very relevant ones. The goal of this study is to give an answer to the question of whether mission command was actually used in the recent Dutch peace support operation in Afghanistan, and if not to provide an analysis of the obstacles and a solution to the problem. It is also the goal to show the linkage between leadership theory, mission command and early stress detection and management (Figure 1). Since the 1990s there has been no research into this subject. Added to that, nothing at all is known about the impact of attributes found in the variety of leadership approaches, on early stress recognition and management by Dutch commanders. This study will hopefully take the defence organisation one step in the right direction on the aspects of leadership and stress recognition.

Figure 1. The main components of this study and how they are interlinked

Research questions The data needed to answer these questions was acquired through interviews and literature study (see methodology). In the interviews all of the research questions were dealt with according to an interview guide based on the questions (Appendix A). The research questions can be subdivided into primary and secondary questions.

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Primary:

1. Is mission command being used in the current Dutch military practice (Afghanistan)?

2. How are early stress detection, leadership theory attributes, and mission command interlinked?

Secondary:

a) What are the obstacles for the fruitful use of mission command; do they correspond with Vogelaar and Kramer’s study? b) What are the weights of the obstacles? c) How can these obstacles be overcome? (policy recommendations) d) How can the aforementioned relation be used to improve detection of stress and stress management by commanders? (policy recommendations)

Methodology Literature study To have a solid fundament on which to build the qualitative component of the study, a literature study was done. This literature study helped put the empirical findings into a broader context for a better understanding of the results. In the first chapter the history and necessity of organisational management and leadership is shown and also its scientific spirit. Also the evolvement and innovation of leadership theory throughout the 20th and 21st centuries is described. In the second chapter the transition from civilian organisational management to military organisational management is made: is military leadership different? Why? Here the concept of mission command is introduced and its history, right of existence and integration into the Dutch defence doctrine are outlined. The empirical study that laid the foundation for this study is also described and the results (identified obstacles for use of mission command) are summarily posited. Chapter three centres on the general concept of stress and the integration thereof in Dutch military policy and practice. Here, the Dutch defence guidelines on stress recognition and management and the central role of the (platoon commander) concerning the aforementioned are described. Lastly, the Dutch study into the awareness of platoon commanders with regard to the impact of mission stressors on stress development and the ability and preparation of platoon commanders concerning the task of stress recognition and management, is discussed.

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Interviews Qualitative data was used for this study. This data was acquired from semi-structured interviews with military veterans who served in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. An interview guide (Appendix A) was established, containing a core of guiding questions to account for comparability between interviews and some logistical remarks. The interview guide contains topics, pertaining to the research questions, such as: the advantages and disadvantages of mission command, prerequisites and obstacles to mission command, the ability to recognise stress, received stress training and education and propositions for improvement. Preliminary inclusion criteria for this study were: 1) falling within the function span of section commander (sergeant) up to company commander (captain, or major) and 2) having served in Afghanistan (Battlegroup part of Task Force Uruzgan) within the time frame of 2006 - 2010. Participants (n = 18) were recruited through NLDA contacts. Six section commanders, six platoon commanders and six company commanders were recruited. Justification of sample selection The equal distribution of section commanders, platoon commanders and company commanders was chosen to give all hierarchical levels equal opportunity to speak out about their experiences. Platoon commanders were selected because of their central role in Dutch defence stress recognition guidelines, because of their central positions between the lowest level of the hierarchical ladder (enlisted, Non Commissioned Officers) and the first non-fieldgrade (company) hierarchical level. The leadership of a platoon often is also the first executive function of a junior officer fresh out of the Royal Military Academy, which makes them ideal candidates to determine hiatuses in the academy training program. Section commanders were chosen because they are the leaders that are the lowest level of leadership and the closest to the action. They were able to provide valuable information about what is going on at the individual level of enlisted men, where the gaze of the platoon leader does not effectively reach. The sample size of 18 was chosen by taking in consideration the amount of participants needed for data saturation (based on my experiences with a six month long interview study with twenty participants) and the amount of time available for the study. Lastly, the inclusion criterion “Battlegroup

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2006 - 2010” was set because the military personnel that made up the Battlegroup were mostly infantrymen (and the Battlegroup was only active from 2006 till 2010). Firstly the infantry is a good representation of the “average soldier that does the brunt of the work” and secondly participants from the infantry make for a good comparability with the sole existing study into Dutch use of mission command that is used as a foundation for this study (seeing as the participants used in that study also were infantrymen). The request for participation was made known in written form through the internal email service. This informational letter contains information about the study (and accompanying terms) and contact information for the principal researcher and supervisor. On acceptance to enter the study the participant was asked to sign an informed consent form, stating that participation would be on voluntary basis, that an audio recording of the interview would be made, that data would potentially be used for publication, that the data would be anonymised and would not be retraceable, and lastly that refusing or dropping out of the study prematurely would not result in any negative consequences. The duration of the interviews varied from 45 to 120 minutes. The audio recordings were transcribed using the application oTranscribe and subsequently coded and thematically analysed in the application ATLAS.ti version 7.

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Part I: A Theoretical Framework

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Chapter 1

Leadership in theory

What is leadership? Leadership as a concept has always been apparent, and interesting, to man. Already in ancient times, men now regarded as great historic figures, busied themselves with thoughts about leadership. In ancient China, the philosopher, military strategist and general Sun Tzu codified his insights on (military) leadership in his book The Art of War (Sun Tzu, 1971). Later, the classical Greek philosopher Plato wrote and spoke about, civilian and political, leadership (Plato, 1987). And, later still, the now infamous but nonetheless highly regarded Italian Renaissance thinker and statesman, Niccolò Machiavelli, codified his musings on state leadership in Il Principe (Machiavelli, 1979). Many more preceded and followed these three thinkers. However, when the sciences bloomed, the transcendence of the concept of leadership beyond “being merely a topic of interest”, did not occur. Only relatively recently, since the start of the 20th century, did the concept of leadership become a full blown object of systematic scientific study. The first definitions of leadership appeared in the first 30 years of the 20th century, but up until the present day, there is no consensus in academia as to the definition of leadership. The late Ralph Stogdill, Professor of Management Science and Psychology at Ohio State University, one of the important contributors to leadership research, remarked in his book: “there are almost as many different definitions of leadership as there are people who have tried to define it” (Stogdill, 1974, p. 7). And Peter Northouse, another modern day leadership key figure, adds: “It is much like the words “democracy”, “love”, and “peace”. Although each of us intuitively knows what we mean by such words, the words can have different meanings for different people” (Northouse, 2016). Leadership research and leadership theory have progressed and evolved throughout the 20th century. Over the past 60 years, more than 60 different leadership classification systems have been developed (Fleishman et al., 1991). The main conceptualisations of leadership can summarily be divided into six classifications (Northouse, 2016). Firstly, leadership can be viewed as the focus of a group process. In this classification, the leader is the central figure in the process of group activity and change, and epitomises the will of the group (Bass et al., 1990 p. 11 - 20). Then there are

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scholars who view leadership as a combination of personal traits and characteristics that an individual (leader) possesses, enabling him to induce others to accomplish tasks. Another approach to leadership is to define it as acts and behaviours. In addition to the previous categorisations, some define leadership as a “power relationship”, existing between followers and leaders, with leaders in possession of authority to effect change in others. Lastly there are the classifications of leadership as a transformational process and as a skills perspective. In the first, leaders induce behaviour in followers that they would otherwise not have exhibited. In the second, the focus is the capabilities that enable a leader to effectively lead. While the, aforementioned, classifications differ from one another, there are certain overlapping core components to be identified. Leadership is (1) a process, (2) involves influence, (3) occurs in groups and (4) involves common goals. The definition of leadership that follows from these four core components is the following: “Leadership is a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal” (Northouse, 2016, p. 7). Seeing as Northouse’s book is one of the core references for this chapter, I shall adhere to his definition. According to this definition, leadership plays an important role in the whole of society and all its aspects. A group of students working on a university course project, a civil servant in charge of a governmental department, a corporate executive officer aiming to bring innovation to the company, an emergency room doctor and staff trying to save the life of a patient. Leadership permeates in all these aforementioned examples, whether on a small or large scale, a situation where the stakes are low or a situation where lives depend on it. Our societies were, and are being, built on leadership, and the progression of civilisation depends on its omnipresence.

Leadership versus Management Today, management has become somewhat of a buzzword. But, originally, the emergence of management at the start of the 20th century was meant to, temper the chaos of the advent of industrialised society. And here, already, the difference between leadership and management becomes apparent, with leadership having always been present and management being an artificial construct. Thus, while the concepts of leadership and management might appear the same, and while there is a solid functional overlap, they fundamentally serve different purposes. Henri Fayol, considered the founding father of modern management, identified

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planning, organising, staffing and controlling as the primary functions of management (Fayol, 1927). While these functions serve to attain a level of consistency and order in organisations, the primary function of leadership serves to produce change and movement (Northouse, 2016). In summary: management is often conceptualised as being mechanistic, striving for optimal efficiency, whereas leadership is mostly viewed as a dynamic process. This divide between management and leadership finds its reflection in literature. Some scholars argue that management and leadership mutually exclude each other. At the basis of this paradigm is the assumption that management and leadership cannot occur in the same person; managers and leaders are defined, differently, in such a way that makes the personal traits and characteristics of a manager incompatible with those of a leader, and vice versa. Managers value stability, efficiency, order, and are impersonal and do not like taking risks while being focused on short-term results. On the other hand, leaders are defined by characteristics such as innovation, adaptation, flexibility, caring about people as well as about economic outcomes, but also taking into account the long-term perspective on the strategy level (Zaleznik, 1977). Yet, empirical findings do not support the personal distinction between leaders and managers and furthermore, the aforementioned definitions err on the side of giving off a negative stigma with regard to management (short-term, impersonal, etc.). Taking off from this premises, one arrives at a more forgiving hypothesis, namely one that presupposes that leadership and management are not independent, non unifiable, concepts. While scholars that adhere to this point of view do not dismiss the unifiability of leadership and management, they do define them as different situation dependent processes or roles with characteristic emphases: managers seek to produce predictability and order, while leaders seek to produce organisational change. Both management and leadership are necessary, but the fine balance between the two must be maintained in order to keep problems from arising (Yukl, 2010). An organisation with strong management, but weak leadership, may quickly become a bureaucratic nightmare. On the other hand, organisations with strong leadership, but weak management, may strive for change for change’s sake, resulting in disruption of order (Kotter, 1990). Thus, it becomes clear that both forms of systematic influence are needed in order for an organisation to thrive. The balance between management and leadership is situationally dependent. The more complex (multitude of departments, complex hierarchy) an organisation becomes during its growth, the more important management becomes. On

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the other hand, as the external environment of an organisation becomes ever more dynamic, unpredictable and uncertain, leadership takes the prime role (Yukl, 2010). Thus, for large, complex companies, with a complex external environment, both management and leadership are important. However, while the distinction between management and leadership is scientifically valid, the integration of both might bring more merit than a categorical approach. The integration of the two has proven to be a complex, but essential, issue in organisational literature (Yukl & Lepsinger, 2005).

Progression, evolution and innovation of leadership theory What the field of leadership study lacks in the historic legacy department, it makes up for with its almost sturm und drang maturation and many paradigm changes. However, while sturm und drang implies an irrational movement, the maturation of leadership theory is certainly not that. Rather, leadership theory has progressed logically since its advent, and has evolved from a subject, seemingly simple, to a field, unequivocally complex. In this paragraph, the evolvement and innovation of leadership theory throughout the 20th century will be traced, up until the current state of the field. 1930s - 1940s: Trait approach The trait approach was the first attempt at the systematic study of leadership. Using the trait approach, these first leadership researchers tried to identify shared traits, possessed by great historic leaders such as Napoleon Bonaparte, Abraham Lincoln and Mohandas Gandhi. It was because of this that the theories that came forth from the use of the trait approach, were called “great man” theories. Trait researchers believed that the difference between leaders and followers, was to be found in an array of identifiable, innate traits. Leaders were presupposed to be born possessing these traits, while followers were born without them. It is then also this position that distinguishes the trait approach from other leadership theories. The trait approach does not distinguish between situation dependent leaders or behaviours. Instead, it sets out to find a set of leadership traits, that is crucial to leadership effectiveness. In 1948 Stogdill analysed over 124 trait studies conducted between 1904 en 1947, and identified a set of important traits leadership traits that were related to the difference between leaders and non-leaders (Stogdill, 1948).

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In 1974, in his second survey, Stogdill expanded the list of traits (Stogdill, 1974). After Stogdill, many other authors followed with surveys, analyses and meta-analyses of leadership traits, up into the beginning of the 21st century, keeping the trait approach alive (Table 1). However, while there are still proponents of the trait approach today, it has generally gone out of favour in the leadership community. There are five main criticisms concerning trait theory: firstly, researchers have failed to identify a definitive set of leadership traits. Furthermore, critics of the trait approach posit that the approach fails to take into account, the situational effects on leadership. Thirdly, the trait approach is said to have generated a highly subjective list of most important traits. The fourth category of criticism is aimed at the observation that studies, concerning the trait approach, focus and have focused, exclusively on the emergence of leaders, but have not attempted to correlate traits to leadership outcomes such as effectiveness and employee satisfaction. Lastly, the fixed nature of traits means that the concept of leadership training (a concept in which many organisations partake) is faulty, as leaders are born and not made (Northouse, 2016). Table 1. An overview of sets of leadership traits found to be related to leadership (Northouse, 2016)

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1950s - 1960s: Behavioural approach While the trait approach focuses on innate leadership traits, the behavioural approach focuses on leaders’ behaviours, i.e. the actions of leaders towards followers in various contexts. Through the years, and with the inadequacies of the 1948 Stogdill survey as a starting point, researchers identified two main categories of behaviours with regard to leader-follower interactions, namely: task behaviours and relationship behaviours. Task behaviours being behaviours through which leaders stimulate the achievement of task goals and objectives, whereas relationship behaviours are actions that are aimed at making followers feel at ease with regard to themselves, their colleagues and their leaders. The main objective of the behavioural approach is the integration of these two types of behaviours, into a self-contained theoretical framework (Northouse, 2016). In the 1950s and 1960s many studies conducted researchers from, specifically, the Ohio State University and the University of Michigan, attempted to develop such a self-contained theoretical framework. However, the results remained unclear and contradicted each other (Yukl, 2010). Still, in 1964 the first concept, of what seemed to be a self-contained behavioural approach system, appeared: the Managerial Grid model, now renamed to “Leadership Grid” (Blake & Mouton, 1964). The model integrated task behaviours and relationship behaviours under, respectively, the terms: concern for production (e.g. product development and policy decisions) and concern for people (e.g. building trust and commitment). In the Leadership Grid, concern for results is represented on the horizontal axis and concern for people on the vertical axis. Both axes run from 1, which indicates a minimum concern, to 9, which indicates a maximum concern. Combining different variations of values for both axes, five management styles are distinguishable: Authority-Compliance (9, 1), Country-Club Management (1, 9), Impoverished Management (1, 1), Middle-of-the-Road Management (5, 5), and Team Management (9, 9) (see Figure 2 for an overview of these styles). While the behavioural approach (and its Leadership Grid model) seems like an all-inclusive approach, it has its weaknesses. Firstly, just like the traits approach the behavioural approach has shown to be inadequately correlated to performance outcomes (such as employee satisfaction and morale) (Yukl, 2010). Secondly, like the trait approach, the behavioural approach has failed at formulating a fixed list of universal leadership behaviours, effective in every situation.

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Figure 2. An overview of the five main leadership styles of the Leadership Grid model

(Northouse, 2016)

1960s - 1970s: Situational approach Whereas the trait approach and behavioural approaches both attempt to posit a universal and fixed list of, respectively, traits and behaviours, the situational approach has a different angle. The situational approach presupposes that different situations require different styles, or manners, of leadership. Thus, in order for a leader to be effective, he has to be able to adapt his leadership to the situation at hand. The situational approach is epitomised in the Situational Leadership I model, first developed in 1969 by Hersey and Blanchard (Hersey & Blanchard, 1969). Over the years it was improved further and in 1985 this culminated into the Situational Leadership II model (Blanchard et al., 1985). The Situational Leadership II model consists of two main dimensions, being: leadership style and development level of followers. Leadership style consists of the behaviour

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pattern of a leader. In the Situational Leadership II model leadership styles can be subdivided into two main categories: directive behaviours and supportive behaviours. Directive behaviours are those with which a leader often consist of one-way communication and show followers what is to be done, how it is to be done, and who is going to do it. Supportive behaviours are those with which a leader shows social and emotional support to his followers, thus two-way communication like asking for input and listening to followers’ problems (Northouse, 2016). In this context, there are four leadership styles to be distinguished (see Figure 3): the high directive-low supportive style (S1; directing style), the high directive-high supportive style (S2; coaching approach), the high supportive-low directive style (S3; supporting approach) and the low supportive-low directive style (S4; delegating approach). In the S1, or directing style, the leader focuses on a directive approach in which he gives followers a task, uses communication solely to help followers achieve this task and supervises closely. In the S2, or coaching, approach, the leader uses communication for both directive and supportive purposes (e.g. follower input), but the final call on the “what” and “how” of task accomplishment remains with the leader. In the S3, or supporting approach, the leader focuses his communication on supportive behaviours such as asking for input, listening and coaching to bring out the followers’ skills necessary for task accomplishment. Followers also gain control of day-to-day decisions. Lastly, in the S4, or delegating approach, the leader’s behaviour is aimed at facilitating followers’ confidence and delegating sizeable parts of planning of, and responsibility for task accomplishment to followers. The S4 leader acts so as to minimise intervention in the delegated tasks (Northouse, 2016). Next to the different leadership styles, the Situational Leadership II model also contains the concept of “follower development levels.” There are four development levels, ranging from D1 to D4. These development levels indicate the degree of mastery of the skills needed for (context dependent) task accomplishment and the degree of commitment to the cause (Blanchard et al., 1985; Blanchard & Hersey, 1993). D1 followers are new to a task and have high commitment, but low competence. D2 followers are starting to get the competence required, but are low in commitment as they have lost some initial motivation. D3 followers have moderate to high competence, as they have acquired the basic skills for the task, but possess variable commitment resulting from their insecurity about being able to accomplish a task by themselves. Finally, the D4 follower, being a seasoned

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veteran in the organisation, has both high competence and commitment. In the Situational Leadership II model, the follower development level directly dictates the leadership style to be chosen (as indicated by corresponding shades of blue between development levels and leadership styles). D1 followers require a S1 leader, D2 followers require a S2 leader, D3 followers call for a S3 leader and D4 followers need a S4 leader.

Figure 3. An overview of the four main leadership styles of the Situational Leadership II model. At the bottom of the figure the four development levels of followers can be found

(Northouse, 2016).

While the Situational Leadership II model has been used extensively in leadership training, there are several criticisms. Firstly, because of the lack of a solid body of published research about the model, the validity (e.g. do followers led according to the model perform better than followers who are not?) cannot be confirmed (Vecchio et al., 2006). Secondly, the relation

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between competence and commitment in the four development levels is unclear, making it hard for a leader to categorise a follower (Yukl, 2010). Thirdly, demographic characteristics such as gender, age, education and experience have been shown to be related to directive and supportive leadership styles, such as gender related follower preferences. However, these characteristics are not included in the model (Vecchio & Boatwright, 2002). Lastly, the Situational Leadership II model can be criticised because it does not answer the question of whether a leader should match his style to the overall development level of a group, or to that of individual members. 1970s - 1980s: Path-goal Theory In 1970 the first concept of, what is now known as path-goal theory, appeared in literature (Evans, 1970; House, 1971). Whereas the situational approach posited the direct correlation between certain leadership styles and followers’ development levels, the path-goal theory went a step further: it integrated leadership style, characteristics of the follower, and task characteristics. Path-goal theory dictates a leader to use a certain leadership style, based on the supplementation of what is missing (e.g. information needed for task accomplishment) in the work setting. In other words: followers are provided with those elements that are missing, and are beneficial or even necessary for the completion of their tasks. The main actions that stimulate the progression of followers across the imaginary “path” to task completion are: defining goals, clarifying goals, removing obstacles and providing support (House & Mitchell, 1974). These actions all positively influence the motivation of the follower to complete a task. In path-goal theory, there are four main leadership styles or behaviours a leader can choose from, based on the motivational needs and task characteristics of the follower (see Table 2). Thus, the path-goal theory is a contingency theory, as the chosen leadership style is contingent on both follower and task characteristics. The first leadership style of the path-goal theory, very similar to the directing style from the Situational Leadership II model, is directive leadership. A directive leader tells followers what to do, how to do it, when to have reached task completion and sets boundaries wherein followers should stay. The second style is supportive leadership. This style resembles the supporting approach from the Situational Leadership II model. A supportive leader is friendly and approachable, attends to the human needs of followers and sets out to make work pleasant for followers. Thirdly, in participative leadership

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leaders invite followers to participate in the decision-making process. He does this by consulting with followers and implementing their input into his decisions. Lastly, there is achievement-oriented leadership in which leaders set high standards, call on followers to perform at the highest possible level and express a high degree of confidence in those followers. Leaders can use any of the four styles when needed in different situations (thus a leader is not bound to any one style). A follower could for example first need a directive approach, but at a later point in his path-goal process (for the same task) a participative approach could be called for. Furthermore, all styles could be used at the same time (House & Mitchell, 1974).

Table 2. An overview of the leadership styles of the path-goal theory, and the situations (dependent on follower characteristics and task characteristics) in which they are called for

(Northouse, 2016).

. Like other theories, the path-goal theory has its criticisms. Firstly, the path-goal theory attempts to integrate so many different factors that it becomes a challenging endeavour for leaders to exactly categorise individual follower and task characteristics. Thus, path-goal theory is difficult to use in practice. Secondly, like we have already seen for aforementioned leadership approaches, empirical research and the associated evidence is inconclusive on the validity of the theory (House &

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Mitchell, 1974; Indvik, 1986; Schriesheim & Kerr, 1977). Some research for example fails to confirm the benefit in follower satisfaction, when directive leadership is used in a situation that, according to path-goal theory, calls for such an approach. Lastly, path-goal theory attributes a great deal of responsibility to the leader, but views followers as basically passive individuals in need of help. From a practical point of view, this leader centric position might prove counterproductive in the long run, with the potential side-effect of followers becoming dependent on their leaders (Northouse, 2016). 1980s - 1990s: Transformational and Charismatic leadership Since its advent at the end of the 1970s by sociologist James MacGregor Burns (Burns, 1978), the transformational leadership approach has been the subject of many studies. First and foremost, this approach, unlike preceding approaches does not offer a concrete model with clearly defined leadership styles from which leaders can pick one, depending on the situation: it rather presents general behaviours and characteristics that are typical, and useful, for leaders that find themselves in a context that requires transforming. Furthermore, the transformational approach represents, in a way, a schism between the preceding leader centric leadership theories and approaches: in transformational leadership, the leader centric position is shifted to a position that emphasises the intrinsic motivation of followers, and their development, and aims at linking leadership and followership. Burns first distinguished transformational from so called transactional leadership. With the denominator transactional leadership, he indicated the preceding leadership theories and approaches, mostly leader centric and focused on the exchange between leaders and followers (e.g. a leader rewarding a follower with a bonus for extraordinary performance, a teacher marking a student’s completed work). Contrary to this, his newly coined transformational approach was, and is, focused on “a leadership process whereby a person engages with others and creates a connection that raises the level of motivation and morality, in both the leader and the follower” (Northouse, 2016). Within the framework of transformational leadership, a leader is committed to facilitate followers in reaching their full potential and thus transforming an organisation. In his work Burns uses Mohandas Gandhi as the transformational leader epitomised, raising the hopes of millions of people and changing himself in the process as well. Around the same time as the concept of transformational leadership was born, the concept of charismatic leadership originated (House, 1976). In the theory of

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charismatic leadership, it was suggested that charismatic leaders act in ways that have specific charismatic effects on their followers (Table 3).

Table 3. An overview of unique personality characteristics and behaviours found in charismatic leaders, as well as the effects on followers (Northouse, 2016).

In 1985, Bernard M. Bass, finally came up with a self-contained transformational leadership model, based on the research by House and Burns (Bass, 1985). In this model, Bass incorporated transactional and transformational leadership as being on the same slider, with transformational leadership at the one end and the so called “laissez-faire leadership” at the other end. In this model, the previous research on charismatic leadership was also incorporated. This model was consecutively improved, and eventually this led to the conception of the Full Range of Leadership model in 1994 (Bass & Avolio, 1994). The Full Range of Leadership model (Figure 4) consists of seven factors, subdividable into the categories of transformational leadership, transactional leadership and laissez-faire leadership (Table 4). For conceptual clarity of transformational leadership and the Full Range of Leadership model, an overview of the seven factors is needed. Factor 1 indicates strong, charismatic leaders that are perceived by their followers as role models, and as special. These charismatic leaders have a very strong moral, and ethical, compass, and provide a vision and a sense of mission to their followers. The charisma makes people want to follow the vision and mission held by the leader in question.

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Table 4. An overview of the seven factors that make up the Full Range of Leadership model (Northouse, 2016).

Factor 2, inspirational motivation, indicates leaders who communicate to followers that they have high expectations of them. This in turn inspires followers to transcend their self-interest and become committed to the vision of the organisation. Factor 3, intellectual stimulation, refers to leaders who stimulate unconventional, out of the box, thinking and problem solving in their followers. Factor 4, individualised consideration, refers to leaders who coach and support their followers by carefully listening to their needs and helping them to develop themselves. Delegation is a tool that leaders exhibiting this behaviour use to help followers overcome challenges. These aforementioned factors are conceptualised as behaviours, that are to be used in conjunction with the factors and behaviours from transactional leadership. While transactional leadership aims for expected outcomes, transformational leadership can, and does, help, indeed, to transform expected outcomes into “performance beyond expectations.” (Northouse, 2016). The Full Range of Leadership model clearly shows that leadership by use of factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 (or “the 4 I’s”), is the most effective at transforming followers and organisations. The transactional leadership factors (factors 5 and 6) can be used to exert influence, because it is in the best interest of followers to do as a leader using these factors says or does (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987). Factor 5,

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contingent reward, indicates an exchange between a leader and a follower, in which followers obtain rewards for specific efforts.

Figure 4. The Full Range of Leadership model in which the seven factors of transformational leadership are rated for passiveness and activeness (horizontal axis) and effectiveness

(vertical axis). The “4 I’s” approach clearly is rated as being the most effective at transforming followers and organisations (Northouse, 2016).

Factor 6, management-by-exception, refers to the punishment, or in a more positive light correction, of followers. The working mechanism behind the use of this as a performance boosting factor is negative reinforcement. The active variant of this factor refers to a leader who immediately corrects a follower after he makes a mistake. The passive variant of this factor refers to a leader who gives of a negative reinforcement, only after the erroneous deed has been done.

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Lastly, there is one non leadership factor (factor 7) at the end of the transformational, transactional, laissez faire slider, called laissez-faire. Like its literal French meaning, laissez-faire represents the absence of leadership. A laissez-faire leader makes no attempts to develop his followers and let them grow. This leader abdicates responsibility and delays decisions (Northouse, 2016). While transformational leadership is theoretically interesting, therein also the first criticism lies: the transformational leadership model is conceptually unclear, as it covers a wide array of behaviours and characteristics (Tracey & Hinkin, 1998). This makes practical application hard. Secondly, it is not unreasonable to posit that transformational leadership treats leaders as people who have special qualities and as visionaries, being the only ones able to transform followers. These positions imply trait approach (Bryman, 1992), leading to the obstacle of the inability to train leaders in this approach. Furthermore, like previously seen, the transformational approach too, lacks evidence correlating use of transformational leadership to organisational change (Antonakis, 2012). Finally, there is a potential for abuse of transformational leadership. The goal of transformational leadership is the transformation of people’s vision, in accordance with the vision of the leader. But, this implies a value judgement, and who is to say what moral, or ethical, position is desirable? There is ample evidence in history of charismatic leaders, who used their charisma to achieve evil ends. Therefore, followers need to be made aware of the need to be vigilant (Christie et al., 2011). Developments in the 21st century: Authentic, Servant and Adaptive theories Today, the aforementioned leadership approaches and theories all remain standing, some more than other, and research into them continues. However, the leadership research community has not stood still, and there are several new developments in leadership land. However, these new leadership approaches and theories are still in development, thus incomplete, and hence of limited value for a study that requires established and solidly grounded theory. Therefore, I will describe them only summarily. One of the new additions to leadership literature is the notion of authentic leadership. Unsurprisingly, authentic leadership revolves around the authenticity of leaders and their leadership. The concept of authentic leadership originated a byproduct of transformational leadership research, but was never really picked up until recently (Bass & Stogdill, 1990; Burns,

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1978). One of the problems with authentic leadership is that, up until today, there is no consensus in the scientific community as to the definition of this approach (Chan, 2005). The first way of looking at authentic leadership is from the so called intrapersonal perspective, which incorporates several attributes such as self-knowledge, self-regulation and self-concept. This emphasises the importance of a leader’s life experience in the emergence as an authentic leader (Shamir & Eilam, 2005). Another way of looking at authentic leadership is as an interpersonal process, of which the purport is that authentic leadership can only result as an interplay between leaders’ efforts and followers’ responses (Eagly, 2005). The third, and last way of defining authentic leadership is from a developmental perspective, which posits that authentic leadership is something that can develop in(side) a leader and can be triggered by certain life events (Avolio & Gardner, 2005). The practical authentic leadership approach (Figure 5), developed by Bill George, demonstrates the characteristics leaders need to acquire and develop in order to become an authentic leader (George, 2003; George & Sims, 2007). This approach is based on research that found that, authentic leaders have: a clear senseb of purpose, a strong moral compass and values, they actively establish trusting relationships with others, they demonstrate self-discipline and act on their values, and they are passionate about their mission (George, 2003). Authentic leaders give followers a sense of trust and closeness, by both sharing their personal stories as well as listening to their followers’ stories. The consistency and self-discipline of authentic leaders give followers a sense of security, as they know what to expect. Lastly, compassion and heart give an authentic leader the ability to be sensitive to other cultures and background. Criticisms of George’s model of authentic leadership include the observation that the model does not have a solid empirical basis, which weakens its validity. Furthermore, as we have seen before, it is unclear as to how authentic leadership correlates with positive leadership outcomes. The second addition to modern leadership theory is servant leadership. It originated in the 1970s (Greenleaf, 1970), but until recently there was not much empirical foundation for it. Only in the past decade, empirical evidence to substantiate the approach has been published. Servant leadership emphasises empathy and concern for followers, development of followers’ capacities, and behaviours aimed at serving the greater good of the concerning organisation. In other words: servant leaders put the

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follower first, possessing a deep rooted need to serve. In 2002, ten characteristics that are crucial to the development of a servant leader were identified, making up for the conceptualisation of servant leadership (Spears, 2002): servant leaders listen first and ask questions later. They realise that this course of action is needed, in order to make followers feel taken seriously. Servant leaders are also empathic, always attempting to see things from the follower’s point of view, trying to understand the follower’s feelings. By doing this, leaders show their followers that they understand what followers are dealing, or coping with at a certain point in time. It makes followers feel unique.

Figure 5. A conceptualisation of Bill George’s Authentic Leadership approach, with the characteristics needed to become an authentic leader in light blue, and the characteristics

that one needs to develop in order to cultivate the five core characteristics (Northouse, 2016).

Thirdly, servant leaders are healers, caring about the wellbeing of their followers. Servant leaders are aware, meaning they are receptive to signals from their environments and are able to consider themselves as a part of a greater whole. Persuasion is another characteristic that servant leaders are in possession of, being able to convince followers to change by using clear

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communication. Servant leaders are also conceptualised as visionaries, having a clear sense of direction. The seventh characteristic is foresight, which entails the ability to foresee events in the future, that could be reasonably foreseen. Stewardship, commitment to the growth of people, and building community are the last characteristics of servant leadership. Stewardship indicates the seising of the responsibility of being a leader. A particularly heavy emphasis is placed on commitment to the growth of people, this conduces to the treatment of each follower as a unique individual and the commitment to the professional and personal growth of followers (e.g. through participation in decision-making) (Spears, 2002). Finally, servant leaders build a community in which followers feel safe and connected with others, but are still able to express their individuality. Criticisms of servant leadership include the fact that there is yet a consensus to be found with regard to the definition and conceptualisation of servant leadership (van Dierendonck, 2011). Another criticism lies in the observation that servant leadership has, somewhat of a moralising overtone (i.e. if you do not put others first, you are not a good leader). This clashes with the autonomy of individuals, and the fact that some leadership tasks simply can’t always take into account, the positions of all followers. The last addition to modern leadership literature is adaptive leadership. The term was first coined in 1994, and after that grabbed the interest of the leadership research community (Heifetz, 1994). As the name implies, adaptive leadership is concerned with the adaptive challenges followers are faced with in changing (organisational) environments. Adaptive leadership is largely follower centered, as the premise of this approach is that it is the leader’s task to help his followers adapt to new environments. Unlike the authentic approach, adaptive leadership is based primarily on leader behaviour, and not character traits. Central to this approach are, unsurprisingly, adaptive challenges. These challenges are so ill-defined, that they can be only solved through the formation of a definition by followers, with support from the leader, and then the formation of a solution by the followers. The nature of adaptive challenges, being complex, requires followers to question their presuppositions and be flexible in their thought patterns, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. Adaptive leadership prescribes six behaviours which leaders can, or must, call on in order to solve adaptive challenges. The first behaviour is called “getting on the balcony.” In the context of adaptive leadership, getting on the balcony means that, when confronted with an adaptive challenge, leaders have to take a moment to step back,

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and try to visualise the situation from a bird’s-eye perspective. This enables an adaptive leader to identify underlying causes for the adaptive challenge at hand. The next behaviour is the identification of adaptive challenges. Adaptive challenges require adaptive leadership, however there are also technical challenges which are simply resolved by a leader’s authority. Trying to solve a technical challenge (e.g. inability of followers to work with certain software) with adaptive leadership, is ineffective. Identifying of adaptive challenges can be done on the basis of their characteristics: adaptive challenges are often value laden, potentially disrupt follower’s emotions and require the followers to learn new ways of coping (Northouse, 2016). Regulating distress is a third behaviour. The process of change creates uncertainty and distress for followers, adaptive leaders need to stimulate followers to recognise the need for change, but while monitoring stress levels and keeping them within a productive range. A fourth adaptive leadership behaviour is maintaining disciplined attention. People naturally have an aversion to challenges, or problems, which require them to change their core values and beliefs. This is why an adaptive leader has to be weary of avoidance behaviour, and help followers to confront challenges that require change. The penultimate behaviour on the list is called “giving the work back to the people.” Adaptive leaders have to provide a sense of direction and structure to followers, in their confrontation with change. However, they have to be cautious as behaviour that is too directive has the potential of suppressing creative capacities, and deadening the impulse for initiative in followers. Lastly, adaptive leaders have to protect leadership voices from below, meaning that they have to listen equally to marginalised, or minority, group members. By doing this, outlying group members actually are made to feel part of the team, and are stimulated to participate in the group process. Like all newer additions to leadership theory, adaptive leadership can be criticised for lacking empirical evidence. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of adaptive leadership, as it is now, is fairly vague and abstract. For example, the phrase and prescribed behaviour “give the work back to the people” is not clearly specified and can be (mis)interpreted in many ways. Lastly, adaptive leadership hints at a moral dimension, but it does not explain fully, or at all concretely, how the moral dimension fits into dealing with adaptive challenges, and how it leads to positive social outcomes (Northouse, 2016).

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Chapter 2 Leadership in the military: Mission command

The military: a unique environment One could posit: leadership is leadership, wherever one may go, the core values and workings stay the same. This is true. However, on a practical level there is a side note to be made here: organisational characteristics emphasise certain leadership principles. The question is whether the working environment of the armed forces is essentially different from other, civilian organisations, with regard to the subject of leadership. To answer this question: it is (Ministry of Defence, 2012b). The operational environment in which military personnel operate, differs from the working environment of civilian organisations. Firstly, the operational environment in which military personnel operate is unique: when deployed, military leaders are supposed to make decisions concerning life and death. The main task of the armed forces is to be available for the maintenance of peace and safety, everywhere, at any given time. To be able to sufficiently fulfill this task, the armed forces have been, constitutionally, given the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force (or monopoly on violence). This permission of the armed forces to use violence in the fulfillment of their task, however, comes with laws, rules and hierarchy. Military decisions thus can only be made after deliberation of military leaders concerning the morality and ethicality of one’s own, and one’s followers’, actions. Next to that, military leaders know that the possibility of a court martial and disciplinary punitive measures are always hovering above them, unlike in civilian organisations where these forms of accountability do not exist. In the worst case scenario, the military leader might even have to take the life of another individual, or put the lives of his followers (and his own life) at risk, in order to accomplish his task. Delegating and taking responsibility, and deliberate justification of one’s actions are therefore emphasised in military leadership. Another unique aspect with regard to the armed forces, is the fact that leadership in a military environment is influenced by the many different military tasks and situations. Because military leaders are put in a wide array of different situations, and teams of various compositions, the use of a single leadership style is not possible. Military leaders have to possess a great amount of flexibility and improvisational skill (creativity) in order to lead their teams successfully. To continue on the subject of the unique

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military environment, the armed forces are submerged in duality. On the one hand, the peacetime military is seen as a slow, bureaucratic government agency wherein decision-making processes take up a disproportionate amount of time, when compared to civilian organisations. This is in part caused by the fact that the Dutch Ministry of Defence, is the Netherlands’ second largest employer, with 58.800 employees (Ministry of Defence, 2016). On the other hand, when deployed, the military’s operational environment offers a quickly changing, dynamic and flexible working environment, which requires leaders who can quickly switch styles and roles. The military executes their tasks under a political mandate. Political decisions can be erratic and unpredictable, there is even the possibility that a leader does not support a certain political position. However, notwithstanding his own personal feelings, a military leader will have to inspire his followers and motivate them in the execution of their tasks. It is therefore important that a military leader is able to explain political decisions, and is able to convey to his followers their added value in the context of the higher cause. Because the military is a political instrument, and is indirectly financed by the taxpayer (i.e. everyone), society is able to track military developments. Incidents can be, and are, heavily scrutinised by the public. The military leader thus has to realise that he bears responsibility and has to be able to justify himself, before the public and the media. Maybe the largest difference that distinguishes military from civilian leadership is the fact that the organisational culture within the army is different from civilian organisations. The culture within the military is one of pride, and is exemplified by a powerful group dynamic and a feeling of solidarity, best described with the phrase: “A band of brothers.” Because of this, and because of the nature of military tasks, military leaders work together with their followers intensively (e.g. going on patrols), whereas a civilian leader often works in separation from his followers. Finally, military personnel change jobs every 3 years (defence policy), stimulating behaviours pertaining to self-interest, which is detrimental to the care for their personnel (Ministry of Defence, 2012b). To conclude the comparison of military and civilian leadership, I shall posit the military concept (another difference) of which leadership is a part. The military has an overarching concept under which leadership can be categorised as one of the three main pillars: leadership, decision-

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making and execution of command tasks (Figure 6). This overarching concept is called: command.

Military leadership: command Command is one of the functions of military action. The function of command contains the leading2 and steering of a military organisation towards the achievement of its goals (Royal Netherlands Army, 2000). This means that command is the integrative link between all the other functions of military action, namely: manoeuvre, firepower, intelligence and military information, defence and logistics. As mentioned above, command consists of three, partly overlapping, elements: leadership, defined as “the influencing of behaviour of others in order to achieve the collective goals with full commitment.” Decision-making, defined as “the making of decisions about the manner in which will be acted for the achievement of the goal.” And thirdly, execution of command tasks, which is defined as “the process of directing and coordinating troops” (Royal Netherlands Army, 2000, p. 43). I shall abstain from elaborating on the latter two, as they fall beyond the scope of this study. Thus, elaborations on military command must be seen within the context of leadership.

Figure 6. The main elements of command. Leidinggeven (leadership), Besluitvorming (decision-making) and Bevelvoering (execution of command tasks), (Royal Netherlands

Army, 2000).

2 Thus, military leaders are called commanders.

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A historical overview of military command Up until the end of the Cold War era (around 1992), command in the Royal Netherlands Army3 had a centralised and directive nature. This becomes apparent from the following statement by Air Chief Marshal Brian Burridge (anti-submarine operator during the Cold War): “Then there was this huge battle space and we knew just about everything about it: who the enemy was, as well as their doctrine, their kit and training. As anti-submarine operator I knew their names. All one had to do was adhere to the tactical doctrine that flowed from the NATO’s general defense plans,” (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). In other words: the NATO doctrine, and thus that of the Royal Netherlands Army, was built on the conviction that the Warsaw Pact would conduct their operations in a predictable manner. Thus, responsibility and authority were highly centralised (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). This becomes clear when looking at the doctrine of the Royal Netherlands Army from the period 1968 - 1985. In this period, a strongly directive and centralised defence doctrine emerged, which was amplified further by a very (overly) detailed, and fragmented, decision-making process. So too in the period between 1985 and 1992 the emphasis lay on centralised command, through detailed written orders. This came forth from the Active Defence doctrine, for which elaborate planning was required (Royal Netherlands Army, 2000; Romjue, 1984). However, after 1992 a revision, or better yet reform, of the Royal Netherlands Army doctrine was initiated. This was a necessary consequence of the altered geopolitical situation (i.e. the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, and that of the Soviet Union shortly after). The Cold War had ended. In a high paced tempo, the situation with regard to international security changed, seemingly into the direction of global stability. Yet, quickly the reality showed itself to be nothing close to stable: it became more violent, more diffuse and unpredictable, with ethnical and religious conflicts in South Africa, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia and the Caucasus. In 2000, three new core tasks, or competencies, were formulated, military wide. Firstly, the protection of the integrity of Dutch, and allied, territory. Secondly, the promotion of the international rule of law and stability. And thirdly, the support of civil authorities with their maintenance of law and order, disaster response, and humanitarian support, nationally and internationally (Royal Netherlands Army, 2000). Uncertainty, pluriformity, instability and unpredictability emerged as characteristics of these new defence tasks. Before, only one

3 From now on the emphasis will lie on the Royal Netherlands Army, as it is the focal point of this study.

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organisational context was thinkable: that of the First Royal Netherlands Army Corps. Now, all kinds of organisational relations were imaginable: military action under supervision of the United Nations, military action by small units only (not in the context of an Army Corps), and other ad-hoc coalitions. These organisational contexts required commanders, from senior to junior, to show improvisational skill and flexibility. But, more important: in order for them to do so, room to maneuver, to take responsibility, and to take initiative, was needed. It was four years before the official documentation of the new defence tasks, that the first concept of the new Royal Netherlands Army doctrine was published (Royal Netherlands Army, 1996). Enter mission command.

The history of mission command Mission command originated in the Napoleonic Era. When, in 1806, The Prussians lost the battle at Jena and Auerstedt from the French army, the Prussian army staff analysed the French doctrine (Hourtoulle & Jouineau, 1998). They found it was characterised by a high operational tempo, through rapid communication of Napoleon’s general notion of direction for the battle (intent), which stimulated initiative and enabled junior officers to act freely. The Prussians, in turn, reformed their rigid, hierarchical, army into an army that had “independence of mind” and “thinking obedience” as its doctrinal foundation. Even mistakes on the part of subordinate officers were supported, as it was believed that these were preferable to a hesitant attitude on the battlefield (Case, 2014). In 1832 the Prussian strategist and military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz published his great work, On War (German: Vom Kriege). In it he posited a set of presuppositions about the nature of war, most importantly that war is full of chaos (friction)4, and that this friction will always hinder elaborately planned operations, calling for decentralisation (von Clausewitz, 1935). During the following years, under the auspices of Prussian Field Marshal von Moltke, what is now known as mission command was first developed into a concrete military doctrine (Moltke is often indicated to be the father of mission command). Mission command, under its German name Auftragstaktik, became the cornerstone of the Prussian, and later German, army. Von Moltke realised, that to achieve decentralisation not only investment in financial resources and materiel would be required, but that time also was an important factor. Von Moltke understood that, in order

4 Or as one of the respondents of this study aptly illustrated (in Dutch): “Bij de eerste kogels flikkert je plan toch in het water.” In English: “When the first bullets start flying, your plan is worth bugger all.”

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for Auftragstaktik to work, junior officers would have to be trained, developed and would have to get to know their commanders closely, as to understand their intent (Echevarria, 2000). To say that Auftragstaktik had its heyday in World War II would be erroneous, as it is now as popular as ever (albeit under the name mission command), but World War II was surely a demonstration of its effectiveness. Starting out after World War I with a 100.000 man army, the Germans mechanised half their army, borrowed Clausewitz’s and Moltke’s ideas of decentralisation, short written instructions (to leave open initiative of subordinate commanders), and the concept of schwerpunkt (center of gravity), and molded them into their doctrine called Blitzkrieg (literally: flashwar, because of its aggressiveness and shocking speed) (Citino, 1999). Under the German army, Auftragstaktik proved to be very effective, especially in the early campaigns (Alexander, 2010). A beautiful illustration of Auftragstaktik is what the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Panzer Group told his subordinate commanders, at the beginning of the Battle of France in May 1940: "Gentlemen, I demand that your divisions completely cross the German borders, completely cross the Belgian borders and completely cross the River Meuse. I don't care how you do it, that's completely up to you." Why did the Germans lose the war then? First and foremost, Auftragstaktik takes place on a tactical level, and tactical success does not guarantee strategic success. Secondly, Auftragstaktik only works on the basis of trust, and Hitler never trusted his General staff (Case, 2014). After World War II, the concept of Auftragstaktik got transferred into English as mission command, but it did never really take hold. It appeared in United States Army manuals (United States, 1962), but in practice mission command was nowhere to be found as both the United States, as well as the NATO as a whole were too busy preparing for full scale war. Its introduction into United States Army and NATO doctrine only occurred after the cold war. So too the introduction of mission command as a cornerstone of the doctrine of the Dutch Armed Forces, took until the 1990s. However, the Dutch legacy of mission command differs from that of the Americans in a fairly curious fashion. The Royal Netherlands East Indies Army or KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger) was responsible for the security in the Dutch East Indies. Through its contra-guerilla experience, the KNIL developed its own doctrine, which very much resembled what we now call mission command (Royal Netherlands Army, 2000). However, after the disbandment of the KNIL in 1950, and diffusion of its members through the defence organisation, experience and

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knowledge of mission command waned, until its reestablishment in the 1990s.

Mission command in the Royal Netherlands Army doctrine Mission command and maneuver warfare are the pillars of the Royal Netherlands Army doctrine. These two concepts are interrelated: as we have seen, mission command is a style of command that entails the freedom of action by junior commanders, for the purpose of optimal action with regard to the commander’s intent. Maneuver warfare then, is the most appropriate manner of action for mission command to flourish and be effective. Turned around, without mission command maneuver warfare is impossible, as a high operational tempo and freedom of action are required. The maneuver warfare approach, namely posits that except for physical speed, mental speed is essential. The side of the conflict that is the quickest to acquire an overview of the battlefield, and an idea of the intentions of the enemy, has the advantage over the other side (Dalen et al., 2014). This mental speed can be gained through training, by building situational awareness and through consistent application of mission command (Royal Netherlands Army, 2000). The goal, and main concept of mission command thus, is to provide the army with a system that is able to guarantee unity of effort on all levels. In order for this to be achieved, mission command has to be used both during peacetime (train as you fight) and in an operational setting, be it peace support operations or fighting operations (fight as you train). Mission command consists of five elements: a commander provides subordinates with very concise, preferably verbal instead of written, orders which assure that subordinates understand the commander’s intent, their own task (the what), the goals they have to achieve, and the broader context of the task. Next, a commander provides subordinates with a justification of the task and goal at hand (the why). A commander also makes sure that he appoints adequate means to subordinates, for them to be able to fulfil their tasks. Furthermore, a commander does not interfere with the planning (the how) of a subordinate's task to maintain unity of effort and subordinate autonomy. For this to be achieved, the intent of a commander has to be understood, at least two levels up and two levels down the chain of command. Lastly, a commander does not restrict subordinates in their actions, except then when absolutely necessary for the success of the operation (Royal Netherlands Army, 2000).

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Constituting the foundation of mission command, are four pillars (Defence staff, 2005) which I will elaborate on now. Unity of effort and autonomy of action First and foremost, the practical application of mission command is based on effective leadership behaviour. Thus, from a subordinate military leader it is expected that he uses his sense of initiative and responsibility to bring the odds of the battle in his favour, within the scope of his commander’s intent (unity of effort). Correlated with the aforementioned is the taking of risks and resolute decisions. There is never enough information in the eyes of a commander and every situation is a unique one, hence there are no optimal solutions. This is why, one of the most important virtues of a military leader is the ability to make decisions on the basis of incomplete information, and commit to them. Decentralisation As we have seen in the history of mission command, the French army of Napoleonic times had already realised that to achieve a high operational tempo, decentralisation was necessary. Decentralisation is not only a prerequisite for the maintenance of operational tempo, but it is also beneficial due to the fact that it enables junior commanders at the scene of the conflict, who have the most recent information (situational awareness), to act accordingly. Another advantage of decentralisation is that it reduces the amount of information that has to travel upwards through the chain of command, preventing information overload at the central level of command. Indivisibility of responsibility Decentralisation is a cornerstone of mission command, but while it entails the delegation of authority, it does not bring with it the delegation of responsibility. Because of this, the commander, in the end, remains responsible and is the one who has to the actions of subordinates. As a result of this responsibility, the commander will have to track subordinates’ actions and, if there is no other option available, intervene directly when the mission is in danger. Mutual trust and team spirit Unity of effort is necessary for the effective use of mission command. However, the cultivation of the qualities that are required from subordinate commanders (initiative and decisiveness) is something that can only come with training and time. Therefore, commanders are

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responsible for the coaching of their subordinate officers in the doctrine of mission command. For this purpose, field exercises and command exercises can, and must, be used, with decent evaluations and after action reports to instil the aforementioned leadership values in junior commanders. Secondly, through training and evaluating together, commanders and subordinate officers develop an intimate relation: next to that of leader and follower, also one of mentor and pupil. The result of this is that commanders and their subordinate officers get to know each other extremely well, not only personally, but also with regard to their thought patterns. In turn, this leads to subordinate officers being able to, almost perfectly understand and remain within the boundaries, of their commander’s intent, establishing a solid basis for unity of effort. Thirdly, intensively working together cultivates mutual trust. Because of the emergence of mutual trust, subordinate commanders are not afraid of taking initiative, as they know their commander would approve. Vice versa, their commanders are more prone to let go and accept the potential negative consequences of their subordinate’s autonomy of action, as they know who they are and how they work.

The necessity of mission command in peace support operations The armed forces of today are focused on one task in particular, namely peace support operations. As we have seen before, the Royal Netherlands Army doctrine prescribes the use of mission command in all operations and peacetime tasks (training). The concept of mission command and the manoeuvrist approach, however, were conceptualised in a time where the notion of classic, international, full out war was still alive and kicking. The question then is: what justifies the use of mission command in peace support operations, other than “train as you fight”? The answer to that question is that mission command is the perfect way, to tackle the core problem of peace support operations: uncertainty. Mission command’s right to exist lies in the fact that it, together with its core concept decentralisation, enables militaries to deal with the uncertainties confronting them. Vogelaar and Kramer identified four types of uncertainty in peace support operations (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). The first kind of uncertainty revolves around the cultural aspects and unpredictability of the local population and the different parties involved in the conflict. Whereas during the Cold War there was only one enemy (the Warsaw Pact) with a high predictability due to abundance of intelligence, today there is an infinite number of adversary and third

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parties to be imagined. The unfamiliarity with the values and way of life of the local populace may lead to misunderstandings Another aspect of this first type of uncertainty is the fact that local political developments are hard to understand for soldiers (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). Alliances may for example change from one day to the other and this requires commanders to continuously assess the local situation and develop good working relationships. The second form of uncertainty is danger. As peace soldiers are often caught between two fires (two sides of a conflict), acts of aggression can transfer onto them very suddenly. Junior commanders who are on scene will have to assess the situation and will have to be able to be decisive in their actions. Thirdly, uncertainty emerges due to the “unsoldier-like” nature of the tasks soldiers often have to perform during peace support missions. Peace support missions often require the cooperation of soldiers with different conflict parties, such as militaries and paramilitary organisations, but also with local civilian authorities. This last type of cooperation, in its ultimate form, is the taking over of tasks that would normally be ascribed to these local authorities, such as construction tasks. To bring these tasks to a good end, junior commanders have to improvise (Avant, 2001). Lastly, the possibility exists, as learned from practice, that local parties will not comply and keep on fighting, causing human suffering and the potential observation of human rights violations by peacekeepers. This requires commanders to take into account the stakes of various parties, and to make decisions that are based on them (Vogelaar et al., 1998). In summary, uncertainties are plentiful in the modern defence environment, and this requires on scene commanders to take decisive action and solve problems they have not solved before.

Mission command in Dutch military practice: a worrisome case Four years after the first Royal Netherlands Army doctrinal publication, four factors of influence with regard to mission command were already identified (Royal Netherlands Army, 2000). Firstly, political sensitivity was identified as potentially having a limiting influence on the use of mission command, specifically autonomy of action. The reason being that commanders are often aware that their subordinates’ actions can have political consequences, in such situations thus potentially using their authority to steer centrally rather than to grant optimal freedom of action. Secondly, mixed units were identified as a threat to mission command. As we have seen, one of the pillars of mission command is mutual trust and

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team spirit through intimate commander-subordinate relations. In peace support operations, united are often mixed, sometimes shortly before a deployment. In such cases the formation of an intimate commander-subordinate relation and a strong group dynamic is endangered, calling for more attention in this area to safeguard the use of mission command. The last two factors that were found to be of influence were international cooperation (due to differences in organisational culture) and differences in task execution due to decentralisation. When in 1992 Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed independence, a civil war erupted between the Serbian community and the Muslim and Croatian communities. Because of the large stream of refugees resulting from this conflict, the United Nations (UN) decided that intervention for the sake of humanitarian help and peacekeeping was needed. This peacekeeping force, called UNPROFOR, lasted from 1992 until 1995. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which divided Bosnia into two regions, a consecutive UN force (IFOR) was instated for the enforcement of the agreement terms. When in 1996 basic peace had returned, IFOR was succeeded by a smaller stabilisation force, SFOR, remaining active up until 2004. As the militaries of many countries contributed military manpower and materiel, so too did the Royal Netherlands Army. It was also in a qualitative review of the application of mission command in the Royal Netherlands Army during these three UN missions, that fundamental obstacles to mission command, largely overlapping with the aforementioned ones, were found (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). Mission command in doctrine and theory: yes. Mission command in practice: not so much. In their study, Vogelaar and Kramer examined their interviews with regard to the following indicators of the successful use of mission command (based on the mission command elements and pillars from the doctrine): autonomy of action granted to subordinate commanders, the clarity of objectives for subordinate commanders, the adequacy of means at the disposal of subordinate commanders and their units, and lastly to what extent an atmosphere of mutual trust was present. Not only did they confirm that the factors of influence described above (see Royal Netherlands Army, 2000) were indeed obstacles to mission command, but they found another six categories. Firstly, lack of clarity, lack of means and lack of mutual trust were confirmed to be factors that negatively influence the use of mission command. Commanders were found to be reluctant in the delegation of authority to their subordinates. They would rather make

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the decisions themselves, in fear of potential negative, and politically sensitive, consequences of the autonomous initiatives of subordinates. Lack of adequate means conduced to a higher safety risk for subordinate personnel in the fulfilment of their task, therefore commanders felt the need to interfere more directly in the decision making process for the sake of the safety of their personnel. Finally the last of the three, mutual trust, first and foremost was found to have the ability to compensate for the lack of the two preceding factors. Commanders who trust their subordinates fully, feel less, or no, need to directly intervene and/or control subordinates’ actions. In addition, seeing as lack of clarity and inadequate means can always present themselves, the development of mutual trust deserves special attention. However, during all three UN missions, there were grave issues undermining mutual trust. During UNPROFOR mutual trust was impeded by personnel turning cynical about the inability (due to inadequate means and clarity of mission goal) to accomplish their task. Furthermore, because it was thought that the mission required so, the chain of command was altered, leading to the levels of company commander and platoon commander being passed over. This led those levels (platoon, company) being passed over to feel redundant, and conflicts about the distribution of tasks, responsibilities and miscommunication. During IFOR, impediments to mutual trust found their cause in the mixed deployment of units. Because of this, commanders and their subordinate officers often did not understand each other, and commanders also lacked knowledge of how to use units they had no experience commanding, resulting in miscommunication. Finally, during SFOR mutual trust was disrupted by the fact that the Dutch battalion was made up of different units, with different cultures, leading to cultural clashes. Secondly, personnel was changed up until the last minute, disintegrating the cohesion and trust of units that had trained together for a long time. Secondly, online information and communication systems were found to hinder the use of mission command. Especially when a comparison was made between the early years with limited tracking tools, and the later years where such tools and systems were present, it was found that commanders, from their place in the operations room (ops room) started to intervene in their subordinates’ actions more intensively. This led to reduced mutual trust and the deadening of the impulse for initiative in junior commanders (Boas et al., 1996; Roderick & Kramer, 1999; Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). Next, the slow pace of the operation was found to be detrimental to mission

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command. Mission command has its right of existence as a tool for the maintenance of a high operational tempo. Especially the SFOR mission can, and could, be characterised by exactly a slow operational tempo. Commanders seemed to know and realise this and what happened was that patrols were monitored very closely by commanders in the ops room, maybe even directly caused by this slow operational pace (i.e. lack of action). If something suddenly happened, commanders expected feedback from the subordinate commanders on the ground, and decisions were centrally made. Another obstacle was the development of routines: in practice, because commanders in the ops room were so experienced, there were written scripts present in which courses of action for a variety of situations were documented. This obstacle can be broken up into two problems: firstly it inhibits the learning process of junior commanders by taking things out of their hands, and secondly commanders in the ops room may overlook subtleties, only perceptible by their subordinates out there, doing the patrol. Safety as a first priority also proved to be a hurdle. It was found that during the relatively safe SFOR mission, commanders were even more steadfast in their determination not to lose a single soldier, than in the more dangerous UNPROFOR mission. Because commanders were determined to bring every soldier back home again, they acted more centralised in their leadership due to prescriptive behaviour. Furthermore, political sensitivity of actions deemed to be an obstacle. Peace keeping tasks, such as weapon site inspections, can be very sensitive and behaviour can easily be interpreted by the local population as taking sides (Last, 1995). Commanders therefore felt the need to be restrictive in the control of their soldiers, as they did not want their soldiers to cause unnecessary trouble and incidents (with potential international political consequences) with the local population or warring factions. Lastly, the deployment of mixed units was an impediment to the development and presence of mutual trust. During IFOR and SFOR the battalions were made up of mixed units. Culture clashes between commanders and attached subordinates from different units caused difficulty in communication and cooperation, leading commanders to be very restrictive with regard to decentralising authority. Concludingly, what was found was that commanders were always able to come up with a reason to not use mission command: in situations with high political stakes, to be able to keep a firm grip on the situation and to prevent unwanted incidents. And in stable situations with high certainty,

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because of the effectivity and efficiency of centrally standardised procedures (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2014). Since UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR, the Royal Netherlands Army has gone on to participate in many other peace support missions, of which one of the most recent ones is the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. From 2006 until 2010 the Royal Netherlands Army participated in ISAF by providing troops and a Provincial Reconstruction Team for the reconstruction of the Southern province Uruzgan. After political support for the mission in Uruzgan was withdrawn, the Royal Netherlands Army, together with the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (military police corps) participated in a police training mission in the province Kunduz from 2011 until 2013. However, what is most interesting in the context of this study, is that the last time the use of mission command was benchmarked in Dutch military practice, was during the UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR missions. Thus, up until today nothing is known about the failure or success of mission command in recent Dutch military practice. This study changes that fact.

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Chapter 3 Military operations and stress: the Dutch Ministry of Defence stress policy

What is stress? Just like leadership, stress is a concept that is hard to define. In scientific literature, there are many definitions. The cause of this discord is the fact that there are multiple angles of perspective on stress. The term stress can be used to denote physical and mental sensory input from the environment, as well as the resultant behaviour that results from individuals’ reactions to these triggers (Bartone, 1998; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Krueger, 2008). As a result of these two perspectives, there are two schools of stress research. On the one hand, researchers who study stress from a psychosocial position, consider stress as the subjective perception of the environment by the studied subject (Gaillard, 2006). Accordingly, the definition these scholars adhere to is that “Psychological stress is a particular relationship between the person and the environment that is appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering his or her well-being” (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 19). On the other hand, there are scholars who consider stress to be a concept which has the relation between the individual and his environment as its central idea. Correspondingly, the definition that follows is: “Stress is the response to stressors in the environment” (Le Fevre et al., 2003, p. 730). According to the first definition, stress is inherently subjective and a situation that one person would find “taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering his or her well-being”, another person would find positively challenging and no threat at all. From this it follows that stress reactions are not inherently negative. In the literature, positive stress is indicated as eustress and negative stress is called distress (Le Fevre et al., 2003). Eustress positively affects the behaviour of an individual, or in other terms: it enhances performance. An individual that is affected by eustress is often more focused, more alert and has a higher pain threshold (Compernolle, 2006). However, this study solely concerns itself with distress and its effects (which will be discussed shortly). In this study I shall adhere to the psychosocial perspective of stress, and its definition. The reason for this is that the stress course that soldiers receive prior to deployment is based on this definition. Furthermore, previous studies with regard to Dutch

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military stress policy have used the same definition (Geerling, 2013). The aforementioned definition that is used in the military stress course is as follows: “A disruption of the equilibrium between the carrying capacity and the burden of an individual.” Carrying capacity herein indicates the amount of stress that an individual can handle through the mental and physical resilience he possesses or has developed. The term burden conversely refers to the amount of stress an individual is experiencing. When the equilibrium, between the amount of stress a person can handle and the amount of stress an individual is experiencing, is disrupted, stress negatively affects his performance. The individual, at this point, rather than experiencing the situation as a challenge to overcome, experiences it as unpleasant and unwanted. Stress is a phenomenon that is not limited to one certain form of military action or deployment. Whether there is a high safety risk (classical warfare) or more moderate one (some peace support operations), stress can be present in both situations (Pearn, 2000). Military operational stress can present itself on the battlefield, but also during life on the base. Operational stressors can, in the worst case lead to the inability of a soldier to function, thus not only posing a risk to the wellbeing of the concerning individual, but also to the effectiveness of military action. While most soldiers return home healthy, even having experienced their tour of duty as beneficial for their career and experience, others are not so lucky. Numbers from research indicate that as high of a number as 20 percent of military personnel is left with what is known as somatically insufficiently explained physical complaints (Dutch: SOLK), concentration problems, tiredness or memory loss (Gersons, 2005). Of the deployed service personnel, 4 to 5 percent even returns home having developed Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a psychiatric disorder of which the symptoms include suicidal feelings, feelings of distress, flashbacks of the traumatic experience and nightmares (Weerts, 2008). What makes these findings even more poignant however, is the fact that military personnel often do not seek out (professional) help on their own initiative. Many servicemen first seek help only years after the development of their symptoms. This is reflected in research findings which indicate that, while 27 percent of service personnel feels the need to be helped, only half seeks help (Weerts, 2008). Other findings indicate an even lower 2 to 8 percent of servicemen seeking help (Pearn, 2000). Waiting a long period of time before seeking help allows stress to potentially become chronic and deteriorate. Seeking help in the early stages of stress development prevents

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this deterioration. It is this preventability that emphasises the importance of early stress recognition by military leaders.

A model for military stress In 2003, Bliese and Castro developed the so called Soldier Adaptation Model (SAM). In this model, they integrated the causes, influencing factors and consequences of operational stress, under the respective denominators of stressors (causes), individual factors and organisational factors (influencing factors), and outcomes (consequences) (Bliese & Castro, 2003). In 2010 an updated iteration of this model was published (Figure 6) (Buijs et al., 2010) which will now be summarily examined.

Figure 7. A representation of the updated Soldier Adaptation Model (Geerling, 2013).

Stressors Stressors are environmental factors causing sensory input that an individual might consider stressful. As the SAM model shows, there are different categories of environmental triggers that are able to cause stress. The model, of which the stressor categorisation is based on Bartone’s work

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(Bartone, 2006), distinguishes between isolation, ambiguity, powerlessness, boredom, workload and danger as stressors (see Table 5 for examples). As we have seen, the perception of an environmental trigger as a stressor is subjective. This makes that some people are more susceptible to the development of feelings of stress, than others, which leads them to develop symptoms earlier (Bartone, 2006). Moderators In the SAM model, factors that have the potential to influence the development of perceived stressors into concrete outcomes are called moderators. Two categories of moderators the model incorporates are individual factors and organisational factors. Individual moderators are job involvement, self-efficacy, coping, social support, and hardiness and resilience (Figure 7). Firstly, job involvement is related to the category of ambiguity from Bartone’s six stressor categories. The clearer a task is for a soldier, the more motivated he is and the better he is able to justify, and cope with, stressors. Secondly, self-efficacy concerns the level of personal competencies that are necessary for task fulfilment. Tasks a soldier is competent at proceed smoothly and therefore cause minimal amounts of stress, if at all. On the other hand, tasks a soldier is relatively incompetent at have the potential to cause severe stress. Thirdly, coping refers to the manner in which a soldier deals with stressful situations (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Some individuals cope with stress by withdrawing from group activities, while others will actively seek them out. The next individual moderator, social support, indicates the support a soldier receives from his colleagues, his commanders and from his relatives at home. Lastly, hardness and resilience refer to the resiliency of a soldier to stress. Hardness and resilience can be developed through physical and mental training, but it can also be a result of previous deployment experience. Organisational moderators consist of the following three categories: collective efficacy, leadership climate, and policy decisions (Figure 7). Collective efficacy refers to the trust of group members with regard to the fact, that the group as a collective is able to competently accomplish tasks. Related to this is tight group cohesion, as it also inhibits the development of stress (Krueger, 2008). Another factor of influence is leadership.

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Table 5. The six stressor categories that are used in the Soldier Adaptation Model (Bartone, 2006).

When leaders create a climate of trust and approachability, group members are more prone to discuss issues with others and therefore development of stress outcomes is inhibited (Geerling, 2013). Lastly, policy decisions are organisational policy level decisions (e.g. deployment length). With regard to this, it is reasonable to assume that, under comparable

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conditions, the longer the deployment length, the more stress outcomes an individual develops. Outcomes In the SAM model stressors have the potential to lead to three types of outcomes, namely: health outcomes (e.g. depression), attitude outcomes (lessened job involvement) and finally performance outcomes (Figure 7). With regard to the symptoms of these outcomes, different categorisations can be made. The categorisation that is used by the Dutch military differentiates between six symptom categories: physical, cognitive, behavioural, emotional, misconduct and positive symptoms. These categories are the basis for an instructional card which is used to inform military leadership about stress before a deployment (Care pathway deployments, 2008; see Table 6).

From theory to practice: the ring model While the SAM model provides a solid theoretical representation of the causes and consequences of, and influences on, military stress, it is the translation into practice that is ultimately the goal. Management and prevention of operational military stress are concepts that receive much attention in military healthcare systems around the globe. So too, for this purpose the Dutch Ministry of Defence (MoD) has developed a military mental healthcare system (Dutch: MGGZ), the goal being: “To safeguard the (long term) employability and the optimal performance of military personnel, before, during, and after a deployment” (Gersons, 2005, p. 28). As a conceptual basis to achieve this goal, the MGGZ uses the so called ring model. In this model the four different levels of healthcare, and the involved actors, are represented (Figure 8). The goal of the model is to prevent unnecessary use of an unwarranted specialised care levels. There are three reasons for the

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Table 6. An English translation of the table featured on the instructional card on stress for Dutch military personnel (Care pathway deployments, 2008).

Negative stress reactions

Positive stress

reactions

Think

Confusion Disorientation,

Pondering Intrusive thoughts and

images Self-blame

Determination Solution seeking Thinking sharper

Alertness Courage

Optimism Trust

Feel

Shock Grief Fear

Anger Irritation

Shame Guilt

Feeling involved Feeling challenged

Being active

Social

Extreme withdrawal Social involvement Need to help other

Physical

Tiredness Headaches

Tense muscles Stomach aches

Tachycardia Excessive jitteriness

Sleeping issues

Alertness Heightened energy

necessity of a stepped model. Firstly, it prevents an unnecessarily high workload on higher levels of specialised care. Secondly, excessive medicalisation is prevented and thirdly it encourages the self-healing ability of military personnel (Gersons, 2005). The ring model is composed of four circles. The very core of the model is not counted as a circle and represents the self-healing ability and the responsibility of an individual for his own well-being. In case of persisting problems one can step up and enter the first circle. In the first circle individuals that have a close relationship with the concerning individual

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Figure 8. A representation of the ring model used by Dutch military mental healthcare. The

position of the commander as care provider is indicated by the two red arrows (Gersons, 2005).

are represented: the serviceman’s own group, family, and friend. The concerning individual can draw social support from this group of people, preventing escalation of his problems. If this support is proved insufficient, the step to circle two can be made. This circle is made up of key figures, such as fellow-sufferers, padres, and the commander. These people are able to provide support and care, but do not possess the ability to provide help, thus they are not deemed healthcare providers. Also, the central registration office for the Veterans Institute (CAP-Vi) is featured in this circle. In the third circle, professional healthcare (also called first-line care) is represented, e.g. doctors and social workers. First-line healthcare busies itself with mild mental and psychosocial issues. In case a patient’s issues do

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not respond and appear to be graver, the patient is referred to the fourth and last circle (also called second-line care). The fourth circle consists of healthcare providers that are specialised in the treatment of severe mental or psychosocial problems. Furthermore, second-line healthcare providers have an advisory role with regard to the actors in the three preceding circles (Delahaij et al., 2010). Dutch defence stress policy Seeing as, in the Dutch defence policy concerning stress, commanders are given a significant role in the prevention and management of negative stress outcomes (Figure 8), they have to be able to detect stress in an early stage, and manage it effectively. In order to achieve this, Dutch military personnel (both followers and leaders) are brought into contact with stress at several point in their careers: during their military training and education, during peacetime activities, during their deployment preparation, during the deployment, and after their deployment (Geerling, 2013). Firstly, to raise awareness with regard to the importance of early stress recognition, military personnel are, already during their training, confronted with the concept of stress and resilience. The focus here is on the ability of military personnel to recognise stress in peers (Delahaij et al., 2010). In the education and training of military leaders, even more emphasis is laid on the concept of stress. During their years as cadets, officers are made aware of early warning signs of stress and of how they, as leaders, should deal with them (the courses are given by padres and military psychologists). To complement theory, boundary pushing physical activities (Dutch: GVA, e.g. scaling mountains) and mental exercises (Dutch: MT, e.g. unexpected situations) also contribute to the awareness with regard to stress responses in peers (Buijs et al., 2010). After completion of their education, officers (but also other military leaders, such as Non Commissioned Officers) become responsible for the wellbeing of their personnel, both in peacetime and during deployments (Gersons, 2005). When a unit is selected for a deployment, a 4 to 6 month preparation trajectory is initiated. At some point in this trajectory, a so called mission oriented instruction takes place (Dutch: MGI). During this instruction military personnel are informed about the specifics of a deployment, such as cultural and geographical aspects of the region in which the deployment

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will take place. However, also stress is covered during the MGI. A course called “Stress and trauma” is taught, in which the emphasis lies on recognition of stressors, stress reactions and the symptoms of stress (Ambaum, 2007). Commanding officers and NCOs are subjected to a different course, called “Stress management”, in which they are trained, through role playing, to manage stress reactions in their personnel. Furthermore, instructional cards concerning stress are handed out to all military personnel (Geerling, 2013). When a unit is finally deployed, a so called social medical team (SMT) is deployed with it. While most issues are handled internally, and while the commander is the one responsible for the wellbeing of his personnel (through maintaining group cohesion), the SMT can provide valuable advice. SMTs are composed of a padre, a social worker, a psychologist, a physician and a personnel officer from the company or battalion staff (Geerling, 2013). When, during a patrol or mission, an incident has occurred, soldiers are expected to reach out to group members and/or their commander (first circle). Social support is thus of great importance, as the self-healing ability of military personnel is the starting point here. However, following a patrol, commanders are also expected to debrief their personnel, and it is during this debrief that commanders can request the presence of SMT members to aid them with stress detection and management (Delahaij et al., 2010). At the end of a unit´s deployment it is sent to participate in an adaptation program. The location for this program during ISAF was Crete (Ambaum, 2007). The goal of this so called adaptation program is to ensure a gradual transition from the area of the deployment to the home situation (Buijs et al., 2010). During the adaptation program group talks are held in which, things such as the necessity of turning off the fighting mindset, potential adaptation problems and where to get help are discussed (Ambaum, 2007). Finally, upon return to the Netherlands, commanders remain responsible for the monitoring of the wellbeing of their personnel. Because of the high peacetime workload and disintegration of mixed units upon return, precautions are instated to prevent issues slipping past the commander’s attention. These precautions come in the form of individual, so called “return talks”. After 3 months, commanders are required to sign, previously deployed, personnel up for these individual talks. These talks are performed by either a padre or a social worker, the goal being to assess whether the concerning soldier has adapted adequately to normal life (Ambaum, 2007; Buijs et al., 2010). If problems become apparent a subsequent appointment can be made, or the soldier can be referred to military mental healthcare professionals. After 6 months, all previously

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deployed military personnel, and their families, receive a questionnaire of which the goal is similar to the return talks. However, even after active involvement of the military in assessment of soldiers’ adaptation stops (after the 6 month questionnaire), the commander’s task is to remain vigilant with regard to mental health issues among his personnel.

The commander as stress sensor The Dutch defence stress policy provides commanders with guidelines to aid them in the management of stress in their subordinates. However, there are also general concepts they can apply for this purpose (Geerling, 2013). Trust As mentioned before, a climate of trust, social support and strong group cohesion have the ability to mitigate, or even prevent, the development of harmful stress outcomes, as well as contributing to early stress detection (Delahaij et al., 2010; Greenberg & Jones, 2011). These factors all contribute to the willingness of group members to be open about what is on their minds (Gersons, 2005). The role of the commander herein is to minimise the stigma with regard to stress, as this stigma prevents soldiers from seeking help for their problems. As mentioned, group cohesion positively influences early stress recognition. However, it has been shown that not only trust within the group, but also trust in the commander is beneficial, as commanders who communicate clearly reduce uncertainty and stress in unit members (Campise et al., 2006). By building trust and group cohesion through spending time with personnel, leaders get to know their

personnel’s idiosyncrasies. It is this knowledge that is ultimately needed to detect abnormal behaviour which often indicates stress (Campise et al., 2006). Resilience The acquisition of resilience can be achieved through training of mental fitness. By training the mental fitness, soldiers learn to signal stress reactions in themselves and in colleagues (Ambaum, 2007). Commanders can contribute to mental training by incorporating it in exercises and in the preparation trajectory. Justification and signification Justification and signification of military action, on a concrete level as well as on the strategical geo-political level, aid greatly with regard to the

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prevention of negative stress outcomes (Bartone, 2006). In this regard, there is a key role for the commander. By making the goal of a mission clear, and translating it to seemingly unrelated, concrete, military actions, soldiers are able to put their stress reactions in a positive context (e.g. helping the Afghan people). Closely related to this is the acknowledgement of the civilian population, but also the military as an organisation, of the significance of a deployment (Unck, 2008).

Theory versus Practice While, as we have seen, theory and Dutch defence stress policy appear to provide commanders with ample tools and knowledge for the recognition and management of stress, practice has shown to be different (Geerling, 2013). In concordance with the Dutch defence policy, platoon commanders indicate that their function as caregiver is primarily aimed at the early recognition of stress. However, while they realise this, many platoon commanders have trouble recalling any education or training with regard to the recognition of stress. The ones that are able to recall anything categorise the received education or training as insufficient or unsatisfactory. Furthermore, platoon commanders rate practical scenarios such as mental exercises and boundary pushing physical activities, which they received during their time as cadets, as fruitless due to the lack of evaluations. While platoon commanders indicate that they, mostly subconsciously, attempt early stress recognition, many platoon commanders state that they only became aware of the importance of stress recognition after their deployment (Geerling, 2013). This is reflected in the finding that, in the preparatory trajectory preceding a deployment, platoon commanders emphasise seemingly more important aspects, such as operational and tactical competence, i.e. training skills and drills. The result of this being that, while a solid theoretical fundament regarding stress (recognition) is provided, due to a lack of focus platoon commanders do not retain much of it.

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Part II: Empirical Findings

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Results To be able to answer the research questions, each interview was performed using an interview guide (Appendix A) containing relevant questions with regard to mission command and stress (recognition). In this section, the most significant results are stated. As this study is of explorative, qualitative nature, no quantification was attempted as this is not the purpose of exploration. The results section consists of two parts: in the first part findings with regard to mission command are presented, and in the second part results regarding stress and stress recognition are outlined. Participants that took part in the mission in multiple roles are indicated as such with a slash in their names.

Part I: Mission command

The most important prerequisite for mission command During the interviews, participants were confronted with the three core negative influences on mission command that were identified by Vogelaar & Kramer (2004): lack of clarity, lack of means and lack of mutual trust. They were first asked if they agreed, then to complement these three if possible, but most importantly: participants were asked to pick the most important prerequisite for the successful use of mission command from the presented factors. As I have stated, quantification does not belong in this study, yet the matter at hand is the sole exception. In Table 7 it can be seen that lack of mutual trust was rated as the most significant obstacle to, and thus also the most important prerequisite for, the successful use of mission command. When platoon commander 7 was asked to rate the three factors, he responded: I really think trust and being harmonised with each other is the most important factor. I really think it’s the most important prerequisite to be able to apply mission command. Personally, I know that when I do not trust my personnel, or if I know they are not able, I tend to supervise things a whole lot more meticulously. In contrast, if I know I can trust them, I am able to let them do their jobs much more freely. To the same question, company commander/battle captain 13 responded as follows:

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Trust is the most important thing. Because, those other two factors… you are aware of what you have and what you do not have. You know, you can still accomplish goals with the means that are at your disposal, whatever they may be. You’re still able to achieve something, if you have a clearly set assignment. But… if you do not trust each other, you simply can’t send someone away with a shortly formulated assignment and expect everything to turn out fine. That’s why trust is the most important factor. And company commander 18 responded: I think mutual trust, mutual respect. Not means. Means should be present, but with the mental component you can achieve a whole lot more. I can have possession of splendid materiel and very well trained personnel, but if between the ears things are not well, then we’re simply not effective on the battlefield. If someone is mentally sound, but he has lacking materiel, I am sure he will perform way better than vice versa. And as company 2IC 15 aptly, and summarily, replied: “Mutual trust. Mutual trust is essential; those other two are mere conditions.”

Table 7. The amount of times each “lack” was chosen as being the most significant negative influence on the use of mission command.

Lack of clarity

Lack of means

Lack of trust

Number of

picks (N = 18)

4

3

11

Prerequisites for the use of mission command To continue in the realm of prerequisites for mission command, participants identified a number of necessary conditions in order for mission command to be fruitfully used. The most significant ones are outlined below. Mutual trust For completeness’ sake, next to having been featured as the most important prerequisite, mutual trust is also featured in this subsection. Company commander 14 stated:

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Trust is the basis. You have to know what your personnel are capable of, and what they are not capable of; you have to know that they are able to translate the ‘what’ [order] to a ‘how’ [their plan], and that they are capable of actually executing their ‘how’ on the basis of leadership.” Platoon commander 11 stated: “Mission command only works if you know each other’s manner of working and if you trust each other.” Lastly, mutual trust is not something that can be enforced as company commander 8 outlined: “Trust takes time.” Platoon commander 11: “Mutual trust only comes with time, by working together intensively, by doing other things together; but we often don’t get the chance to do that in the army, because of people coming in at different times and deployments.” Signification or justification Participants indicated that it is paramount for subordinates to be aware of the significance of concrete military actions. Platoon commander 1 said: Well you know, you give an assignment and the guys start planning, but the subtasks they are planning have to be always mirrored to the actual assignment and the higher purpose/goal of the mission: ‘Guys, I know what we are doing might seem useless to you, but… we’re doing it because, and here you need to zoom out, insert the goal of the mission.’ Platoon commander 9 had some men who were displeased: Some of my guys thought we were just wasting our time. It’s then important to explain to them why we are doing something. Because you know, as I told them: we maybe didn’t get shot at much, but we did arrest so many suiciders and found so many IEDs. That’s not useless. But you know guys are quick to forget such nuances: they think it was a shitty deployment, because it didn’t rain bullets on them. Company commander 14 stated that a commander has the duty to provide context for, and signification to, concrete, small unit, military action: As a commander, you have the duty to explain the bigger picture to your personnel. What has to happen? How does that fit in the bigger picture? How does it fit in at the level of the Battlegroup or the Task Force Uruzgan level? You have to be on that continuously, because otherwise people working on small military tasks will get alienated from the bigger picture. There was never ‘just a patrol for the heck of it’, it always served a higher cause. It fitted in the bigger picture.

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Clarity of mission goals and commander’s intent Clarity of mission goals and clarity of the commander’s intent were both identified as prerequisites. Section commander 4 stated, when asked what he thought to be prerequisites for mission command: “Well, that there is no uncovered ground for you as a commander, that you know what the limits are and how far you can go freely using your initiative,” indicating the importance of demarcation of boundaries by higher commanders. As to the clarity of a commander’s intent, platoon commander 11 vouched: If you give someone an assignment and an intent, you have to make sure that the demarcation of both of those two things is sound. So you have to hand out a solid assignment, a solid intent and make sure the boundaries are known. Knowing each other From the analysis it became clear that there was another prerequisite for mission command, interlinked with both mutual trust and clarity of commander’s intent: knowing each other. To this point platoon commander 7 testified: Ok, a commander can formulate an intent, but what does he actually mean? An intent often consists of keywords, in Air Assault being: speed, aggression and surprise. Ok. What do you mean with speed? How do you imagine that? If you work together with your commander well, and if you’ve already been through intensive training together, then you will know what he means by those words. Company commander 8 stated: “Mission command starts with knowing and trusting your people. Well, I trusted his [subordinate officer] professional qualities but I didn’t know his personality, and that’s where it went wrong.” Platoon commander 9 indicated that knowing each other is an important to be able to make sound decisions: People have got to know each other. I think that’s very important. That you know your subordinates and that they know you. Look, there’s a big difference between talking to someone face-to-face or not: 55 percent of all communication is non-verbal. So, if I speak to someone over the radio, I’m missing that 55 percent. So, in such a case I simply have to know the person to whom I am speaking very well, to be able to make a judgement of the situation. Therefore, in my opinion it is not necessary to do all communication face-to-face, but in such cases it is a prerequisite to know the guy through and through.

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When asked what was needed for successful use of mission command, Company 2IC 15 responded: You have to know each other, and that’s different from trusting each other. To be able to think in the spirit of the commander, you have to talk with the commander, you have to get to know him. If you don’t know me [commander], you can’t think in the spirit of the commander. On the other hand, if I don’t know you, I can’t predict your behaviour, I don’t know how you’ll handle a certain assignment, how you’ll translate my assignment into practice. I want to know what you are capable of mentally, physically, creatively, where your boundaries are, what your qualities are. That’s why knowing each other is so important. Competent personnel and training The last identified prerequisite for the use of mission command is having competent subordinates. As section commander 5 concisely stated: “The prerequisites are that they [subordinates] have to be educated and well trained.” Company commander 8 indicated: “He [subordinate officer] has to have expertise and professional knowledge, professionally he just has to know what he’s talking about.” Company 2IC 15 concretised this: It requires capable people as in: what knowledge do you have of soldiering? If you’re still learning to ride a bike, participating in the Tour de France is not wise… So, you have to possess the skills that are part of your job description. If I’m a Fennek [reconnaissance vehicle] commander, and I don’t know how to use the capabilities of even a single one of those vehicles, how am I going to make a plan for eight Fenneks. So, yeah. Professional knowledge. Company commander 18 indicated that mission command is only possible, if a commander trains and coaches his subordinates intensively in the preparatory trajectory: “In order to achieve that [mission command], you have to guide and coach your subordinates during training, long before deployment,” emphasising a solid mentor-pupil relationship. Not only training and knowledge with regard to concrete skills were identified as important factors. Knowledge and training with regard to the theoretical concept of mission command were also deemed important. Company commander 14 stated: Being well trained in, and having knowledge of, the concept of mission command is crucial. It takes up a lot more time than achieving mastery of a weapon system, and those infantry weapon systems aren’t that complex… This [mission command] takes

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months of training and preparation to do right. It has to become a second nature to people. And, you have to be willing to make free the time required, because doing so simply saves lives.

Obstacles to the use of mission command From the analysis, a number of factors that negatively affected the success and use of mission command were identified. The most significant ones are outlined below.

Skipping layers in the chain of command and central control In Afghanistan, the Dutch modus operandi was structured as such that platoons were designated the Smallest Unit of Action (SUA). As a result most operations and patrols were performed by platoons under the leadership of a platoon commander (lieutenant). Platoon commanders had a direct communication link with the operations room (ops room) on the base, in which battalion staff (in the form of a so called Battle Captain) monitored their actions. Thus, the normal chain of command of, platoon – company – battalion was disrupted and the level of the company commander, who is normally the platoon commander’s direct boss, was disregarded. This led to confusion of responsibilities and feelings of senselessness among company commanders. Company commander 8 stated: I didn’t like the fact that the battalion commander had the inclination to control individual platoons, instead of using the normal company structure. The lieutenants are mine to take care of. Taking central decisions from an ops room is irresponsible. You have to be able to trust the picture he’s [a lieutenant] painting for you, is right. That guy in the ops room [battle captain] doesn’t even know my lieutenants… He barely knows their names, and the pace of combat operations is so much faster that it isn’t even possible to do so in that case. The span of control under heavy pressure is four. There’s a reason we are structured hierarchically the way we are. This statement from company commander/battle captain 13, reinforces this point: The battalion level can never know the platoon commanders as well as the company commanders. A conversation of two words between a platoon commander and a

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battalion commander will never suffice, as it indeed would between a platoon commander and his company commander, so to speak. Platoon commander 11 stated: “In Afghanistan it was the battalion level that mostly busied itself with the platoons, and the company level was thus skipped.” During ISAF, instead of being responsible for planning, pre-planned task rosters (synchronisation matrices) were handed down to companies, platoon commander 12: If I, as a company commander [hypothetical] were to receive only a synchronisation matrix wherein every detail regarding tasks of my platoons is already worked out, then I’d also not worry about it. And that’s how it was, a situation wherein company staffs didn’t give a shit, because they wondered why the heck they were even there. Let’s be honest, in all the preparations you work with the same mission command structure. And then suddenly, you get deployed and instead of the normal command process you get a synchronisation matrix and we drop the normal command structure. Look I thought it was amazing, I had all the freedom of the world. But it had nothing to do with mission command anymore. Sometimes even the Task Force Uruzgan commander would get involved with a platoon action, company commander/battle captain 13: And sometimes, not only the battalion level, but also its higher level, the brigade level, that was literally watching along in the ops room, would interfere with matters. Company 2IC 15: “The company commander sat in the ops room, but he was only some kind of mouthpiece to transfer information from the battalion to the platoon. And if something really went wrong, then the TFU commander suddenly took the ops room floor. The problem with this is that the hierarchical lines become blurred and unclear. The result is that company commanders, when they become battalion commanders, will start to exhibit the same behaviour, as they were never shown how to do it right.” Illustrating the feeling of purposelessness from being passed over, he concluded: Well, as time passes you start to feel redundant as the company level. As a result I become uninterested. It’s not good for morale, it arouses a bit of a laissez-faire feeling in me: ‘You know what to do? Fine. I’m in the gym; you know where to find me.’

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Company commander 14 indicated what risk all the aforementioned poses: The risk is that if people have the idea that they are not being involved in an assignment that they have to execute, for which they are being exposed to risks, that they say: ‘Ok, go to hell.’ That’s killing for morale, and thus for the effectiveness. Mixed units and enablers As a result of a policy choice, certain structural requirements were set with regard to unit composition. Units rotating into Afghanistan were to be composed of two airmobile companies and one mechanised infantry company, or vice versa. Company commander/battle captain 13: Exactly contrary to the spirit of mission command, someone high up had thought of a way to do it like that, mixing two mechanised companies and one airmobile company, or vice versa, into a battalion… And that’s how we were all going to do it. Due to this requirement, some units which were selected for deployment had to retrain to another specialty. The selected companies were then attached to a battalion, often not their own, and were deployed. As company commander/battle captain 13 stated: We had a mechanised infantry company that originally was a Brigade Reconnaissance Squadron. So what did we [the army] do? We took a Brigade Reconnaissance Squadron that is trained to use wheeled vehicles, we told them to retrain to be able to use tracked [mechanised] vehicles, and then we all merrily went on deployment together. So actually almost nothing was normal. This resulted in cultural friction, as well as uncertainty between the mixed together units. Company commander 8 experienced a cultural clash: You have to imagine this: we were originally black berets [Brigade Reconnaissance Squadron], we made those black berets into an infantry company by training for a year. We came from Oirschot [the south of the Netherlands] and we we went all the way up to Assen [the north of the Netherlands], to an airmobile battalion, in a northern environment full of Groningers and Friezen [northern people]. Well yeah, that’s a different kind of people than Brabanders [southern people]. And we didn’t have a red beret, so culturally we had some friction. And everyone had something to say about it all.

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He added that, communication wise things did not go smoothly: “I said to him [battalion commander]: ‘I think you’re a brusque Fries [inhabitant of the northern province Friesland].’” Another result of sudden changes in unit composition was a disrupted subordinate-leader relationship and unfamiliarity with each other’s personalities: In my case, mission command really didn’t work out well. Why? I received one subordinate platoon commander a year before the deployment, so was able to invest plenty of time and effort in him. However, one exercise before we were deployed to Uruzgan, the battalion commander decided that I was to hand over my own two platoon commanders to another company, and in their place I got two platoon commanders from two different companies. Those guys had never met me before. We had done two exercises before deploying. And what happens? We’re in Uruzgan, I give one of those new platoon commanders an order, and the lad goes completely bonkers: cursing over the radio. Everyone could hear him. So what appeared to be the problem? Because I didn’t know him well, I wasn’t aware that he regularly had a bit of an electrical breakdown in his head, very briefly. If I had known, I would have adapted my behaviour to suit his. I found it a very unwise decision; by mixing units you completely disrupt group cohesion of units that have always trained together. With regard to another problem of mixed units, platoon commander 11 sometimes got assignments passed down to him directly from the battalion commander; because while platoon commander 11’s company commander was not his original company commander, his battalion commander was his original battalion commander: “I have received assignments from the battalion commander himself.” When asked whether them knowing each other had something do to with it he replied: “Yeah I think so, it’s an easier step to take.” Added to all this, specialists (e.g. engineers, medical troops, Forward Air Controllers, Provincial Reconstruction Teams) were often added to platoons, making a platoon commander, trained to lead around thirty people, suddenly responsible for sometimes more than 60 people. Company commander 8 stated: A platoon commander is too young to bear that enormous responsibility for which he was never trained. You see, a platoon commander is trained to perform military actions with 4 vehicles and his platoon. He isn’t trained to take with him: an

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engineer, all kinds of different vehicles, the Afghan National Army (ANA), a Police Mentoring Team (PMT). I simply find that outrageous. Platoon commander 11 indicated: You aren’t trained for it. Here [at the school for infantry officers] beginning officers don’t train with engineers or fire support functionaries. They are introduced briefly, but nothing more. A company commander fights with combined arms. The problem with it is that, sometimes you’re so focussed on one element to solve a problem, that you don’t realise there are other elements that are better suited; simply because you are not familiar with them. The problem, however, appears to not only be lack of experience, but also lack of mandate and dominance. Company commander/battle captain 13: He [platoon commander] simply doesn’t have the experience nor the required oversight of the situation. But, added to that it puts lieutenants in a difficult position as they have command over higher ranking officers that are attached to them (Majors from Provincial Reconstruction Teams). A young lieutenant doesn’t have the dominance needed and this can lead to conflicts with more experienced higher ranking officers, even though they are placed under the lieutenant’s command. As to the lack of authority or mandate to use enablers company 2IC 15 testified: “A platoon commander’s rank is lower than that of a Forward Air Controller, but also he doesn’t have the authority to use him. A company commander has the mandate to use a Forward Air Controller and mortars.” All the aforementioned mixing of platoons and companies was reportedly the result of a policy decision, as company commander/battle captain 13 stated: “I can’t confirm it, but I’ve heard that it was decided to have sent at least all infantry battalions to Afghanistan, before the end of the ISAF deployment. It was decided: ‘All infantry battalions are going to acquire experience here.’” Giving platoon commanders responsibility and supervision over a platoon, almost the size of a company (because of attached enablers) was also reportedly the result of a policy decision: The individual in the army staff that planned ISAF is a former reconnaissance officer. In previous times, what are now called enablers, were all integrated standardly in a normal reconnaissance platoon, thus platoon commanders were

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trained to use enablers. But, those platoon commanders had trained for years. Our current platoon commanders didn’t… In conclusion, company 2IC 15 succinctly states: “Somewhere in the Elsevier the ISAF deployment was proclaimed ‘deployment of the platoon commander’, well, by doing that, as the Royal Netherlands Army you demonstrate your ignorance.” Incompetent or inexperienced personnel Mission command is based on decentralisation and delegation. From the analysis it appeared that incompetent (i.e. experienced, but just not good at his job) and inexperienced personnel (both leaders and followers) were an obstacle to the two base factors of mission command. As section commander 2 stated: “Because the guys didn’t really have experience, I had to be more directive.” As to the fact that it can also work vice versa, section commander 3 responded: “I just got out of NCO school, 4 months later I was in Afghanistan. So yeah, I can imagine that back then I was more directive towards the group.” When asked whether the directive leadership of his platoon commander had something to do with the composition of the platoon section commander 3 responded: “Yeah I think so, we didn’t really have the most brilliant section commanders of the platoon,” illustrating incompetence an incentive for directive leadership. Platoon commander 7 stated: It also depends on the section commander, because I have experienced a lot of variance in quality. My platoon 2IC was also a section commander, but the other two section commanders were just dramatically bad. In such cases there’s no other option than to leave them no leeway and keep them close. With regard to being undertrained company commander 8 replied: “Look, if your people are not trained enough, and if they lack confidence, mission command is destined to fail.” However, what also emerged is that some leaders were deemed unfit for leadership, due to lack of certain intrinsic qualities, constituting another form of incompetence. Section commander 17: First and foremost, the man [platoon commander] was unfit for leadership. As a person he simply was unfit. He never listened, and always tried to impose his own will. What happened was that, during the briefing we would meekly nod yes, and then during the execution we would just go and do our own thing.

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Company commander 14 stated: “You have to be interested in personnel, if you are not, you are not. But in that case, by the way, you’re a bad commander. And he [platoon commander] didn’t have interest in his personnel” Platoon commander 9 indicated: “Actually you have to already be in possession of certain abilities before becoming a leader. And you can work on those abilities, but some things you just have to innately possess; character traits such as extroversion.” Platoon commander 1 summarised: “I think that in leadership, a lot of things are innate.”

Side note: Royal Military Academy selection policy Seeing as the following statement was only found uttered by a single participant, but is of importance in the light of aforementioned statements nonetheless, it is contained in a side note. Company commander 14 went even further, exposing inadequacies in the selection policy:

I’m convinced of it. What we see in the selection of officers, is mostly people who are of the “look at me” type. Alpha males. Big mouth, able to sell themselves. But how do you measure whether someone is interested in personnel? It may be hard, but I for one am able to immediately assess it in a conversation: is he genuinely

interested in what others think or believe? Or is he the one doing all the talking? We’ve got plenty of those: always sending, never receiving.

Such people you have to fire immediately. Lack of time A lack of time with regard to the planning process was identified as an obstacle. Section commander 5 said: “If there’s more time pressure, then it’s: ‘we’re doing it like this, go!’,” indicating the fact that the spirit of decentralisation was impeded in situations where there was time pressure. Platoon commander 7 testified to this: “If there is no time, I’m going to do the section commander’s [subordinate] thinking process for him; in such a case I’m making the calls for him. Platoon commander 9 illustrates the misinterpretation of mission command: Look, mission command can take place when there is no time pressure or stress. When there is stress and not much time, you will just have to revert to centralised

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and directive leadership. Then there is no time to explain “why”. In such cases you will simply have to give assignments in the form of “this is how it’s going to happen.” Lack of clear mission goals or clear commander’s intent From the analysis it appeared that the goal of the ISAF mission was not always clear to everyone, posing an obstacle to mission command. Furthermore, not only the lack of a clear mission goal, but also the lack of a clear commander’s intent was identified as an obstacle. With regard to the lack of a clear commander’s intent, company commander 8 stated: Sometimes you can’t call your commander. That’s what mission command is about too. It’s about the intent that is formulated thusly that when communication is lost a guy can think to himself: “Ok, I’ve got no comms, but I still have an assignment to fulfil, I know what my boss wants, so without him I can do it too.” And that when we see each other again 2 days later, I can say: “Hey good job man! That’s exactly as I wanted it to happen.” So yeah, a big obstacle to mission command is unclear communication; not being able to put my intent into words well. And platoon commander 12: “I think mission command is nice, provided that the intent is formulated clearly, because I can give you examples of commanders who formulated an intent like ‘what do you even mean by that?’ That it creates more confusion than that it actually clears something up… When asked about the presence of a clear mission goal, platoon commander 11 said: “Look, for Afghanistan there was no long term vision. So that’s something that was not squared away.” When he was then asked whether it was an impediment to mission command, he responded: “Yes, I think it was an impeding factor, because you simply don’t know what is to be achieved in a certain area. If you know what the long term effects should be, you can proceed to formulate assignments for the short term.” Section commander 17 responded as follows to the same question: Did we have a clear mandate? Nah, what were we going to do there? It was said it was a reconstruction mission.. well, I didn’t reconstruct much I can tell you. Let me put it this way: did we know what we were going to do there? Fight. That’s it. As we have seen translation of abstract higher level intent and mission goals, to concrete, seemingly unrelated, military action is deemed an

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important part of mission command. With regard to this, platoon commander 12 stated, when asked whether the intent was clear: Nah. For the life of me I can’t remember what the intent was. That’s something that could have really been done better. The translation of the intent from the Task Force commander, to the battalion commander, to the company commanders and the platoon commanders. Also on the later police training mission in the Afghani province Kunduz (which a bit beyond the scope of this study), mission goals were not clear. Company commander 18 stated: “Mission goal, certainly important, but… I came into the OMLT [Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team] area and I didn’t have a single assignment. No goal. I simply had to find out what to do for myself. “ Tense situations In tense situations, such as firefights or other high pressure situations, the participative nature of mission command was subdued. Section commander 3: “Certainly at the moment when tensions rose, there was less room for input from soldiers. In such moments I was more directive and I decided what we were gonna do next.” Section commander 5 testified to the same: “I was on Martello [forward base] where we were fired upon quite a bit. In such situations it’s just pointing, shouting to guys and at that moment there’s only 1 boss, me: forward, march!” Company commander 8 stated: When tensions rose, and firefights erupted it [leadership] automatically got directive. Because of me, but also because of my soldiers looking at me with a need for leadership. In such situations there is more room for discussions about what the course of action is going to be. Company commander 10 put it into words in infantry speak, talking about an ambush in Iraq: “In such cases time for mission command is over, in such cases it’s just: ‘Here’s the boss, shut your mouth, this is how we’re gonna do it.” Platoon leader 11 provided a reason for the more directive behaviour in tense situations: “I am the one who is responsible for everyone who’s with me.”

Advantages of mission command During the interviews, participants indicated several advantages of mission command in contrast with centralised command.

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Development of personnel Section commander 2 stated: “[by doing mission command] You make people important. You let people think along about the task at hand. Actually what you’re doing is developing your personnel. Actually the section only benefits from it, and thus the platoon and the company.” Company commander 8 reinforced this: “I think that, by using mission command, you make people better, and if you make people better [at their jobs], it is reflected in the quality of the execution of assignments and tasks.” And platoon commander 12 gave a more career development oriented angle: “A section commander is busy with his section, but he also has to develop himself, because eventually he has to become a Platoon Sergeant. And after that Sergeant Major Operations or Company Sergeant Major in the company staff. So yeah, but in order for him to get there he has to carry some tactical experience with him. And if that development is impeded… well.” Stimulation of creativity and initiative in personnel As to mission command stimulating creativity and initiative in personnel section commander 3 testified: “The strength [of mission command] I think is that knowledge and creativity are made use of maximally; because you are forced to think about the assignment yourself.” With regard to this being beneficial for the assignment platoon commander 9 stated: “It offers room for creativity and own interpretation, which strengthens the assignment itself.” Regarding stimulation of the impulse for initiative platoon commander 12 replied: “If you look at the advantages, then freedom of action is an important one, but above all stimulation of initiative in subordinate commanders.” Time-saving Participants acknowledged the fact that mission command saves time. This time-saving advantage can be subdivided into two categories. Firstly, mission command saves time because it depends on short orders. And secondly, mission command frees a commander’s time to busy himself with other (crucial) tasks. Company commander 8 stated, with regard to the second: “If I have to busy myself with all that other stuff, then I’m not doing my own job.” Company commander 14 stated: You don’t have the time. These kind of assignments take preparation, execution, evaluation, etc. It takes up a whole day’s time, while you, as a commander, also have to be working on the bigger picture, spending time on personnel, your boss, so you simply can’t busy yourself with the details too much.

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With regard to the first category (saving preparation time), company commander 10’s quote illustrates its meaning perfectly: “Eventually we had to do a battalion attack with 600 people, and set it up in 4 hours. So 4 hours from the moment the call came in, everyone was mounted in helicopters. Well, that’s only possible with mission command.” Motivation of personnel Mission command motivates personnel and ensures support for the assignment, or mission goals, to be achieved. As section commander stated: “With mission command it’s your own idea, your own process. So you automatically believe in it, contrary to an imposed assignment.” Platoon commander 6 noticed how mission command let his personnel flourish: They liked it. They got motivated from being able to do their own thing. One sergeant was really into personnel, and another was really into materiel. Those were their things, and you saw them become immersed in it. So yeah, if you give people freedom, I think that people get intrinsically motivated. Company commander 8 stated: “You have to make people feel good. For me, leadership is about tying people to you. People have to be glad and willing to work for you. Because else it’s imposed and that’s directive leadership.”

Disadvantages of mission command From the interviews, participants were asked whether they were able to think of any disadvantages of mission command, either from experience or hypothetical. The identified disadvantages are listed below. Inability to switch behaviour By using mission command, certain behaviour is stimulated (creativity, initiative). However, in situations where this behaviour is out of place, the behavioural conditioning of mission command appears to be a disadvantage. Section commander 2 illustrated this: “The disadvantage is, I think, that if the situation arises where people have to do things differently, it is hard for them to switch. As in: ‘I did it like this five times already’.” And company commander 10 concretised: Well, a negative side effect can be the following. There were two times where I had to make the call: “Stop, everyone to the right!’ and two guys just couldn’t switch. They just freezed like: “huh, what?” So that can be a pitfall; that people are so used to mission command that they lose the ability to switch.

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Wrong interpretation of commander’s intent Mission command also appears to have the potential to lead to unwanted military action. Company 2IC 15 stated, when asked about disadvantages of mission command: “Well, it can lead to a kind of chaos, where people decide for themselves what they needs to happen.” Section commander 16 said: “Of course, there is a chance that somebody will head into an absolutely wrong direction. In that case you will have to actively guide someone.” Company commander 18, illustrating the result of such behaviour, indicated: “There are of course very unrestrained people, and those will always try to look for the boundaries of your intent, or even go over them. And if that happens, you get relational conflicts and trust conflicts.” Heavy burden of responsibility The freedom of mission command brings with it, the disadvantage of the pressure of also being (or at least having the feeling of being) responsible. As section commander 4 indicated:

You are aware that there’s quite a burden on your shoulders. I have sat at a police post alone, in the middle of nowhere, with eight of my guys and a big Afghan with his policemen. At such a moment you think: well, that’s it, we’ll be staying here for at least a day; and all of that rests on your shoulders and that’s something you’re pretty aware of when you are given such freedom.

The ideal leader During the interviews, participants were asked to paint the picture of their ideal (of a) leader. The following traits, competencies, behaviours, etc. are the most significant identified factors constituting “the ideal leader.” People-oriented and committed to personnel (i.e. empathy) As we have seen, participants share the conviction that good military leadership is largely innately determined. The most influential, according to frequency, factor that makes a good leader is based on this conviction, namely: being people-oriented and committed to personnel, or as many participants call it: empathy. As platoon commander 9 stated: “Commitment to your personnel is very important. You have to possess a certain amount of empathy, interpersonal sensitivity, to be able to pick up signals, to be able to feel people out.” And to reuse one of quotes from the previous pages, also by platoon commander 9: “But some things you just have to innately possess; character traits such as extroversion.”

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Platoon commander 11 phrased it like this: “Someone who is approachable, someone who knows what is going on among personnel and can act appropriately and accordingly.” Company commander/battle captain 13: “Wanting to work with people, also being able to work with people. Being willing to empathise with your personnel.” Company commander 18 indicated the ultimate importance of the individual in leadership: “You have to be people-oriented, because I think, people are the most important building blocks of your unit, they are the ones who have to do it.” Communicatively competent and able to motivate According to participants the ability to communicate and convey the commander’s intent is paramount to being a good leader. In line with that, ideal leaders possess the ability to motivate their personnel. With regard to the ability to motivate company commander 10 stated: How well can you ultimately convey the assignment? Let’s be honest about it, that’s where mission command starts. Powerpoint is nice and all, but if you can’t bring that platoon commander, or company commander [subordinate officers] to walk out of that briefing room with bloodshot eyes, then you aren’t there yet. When asked what would constitute an ideal leader, company commander/battle captain 13 answered: “Well, being able to inspire. Being able to inspire your personnel to, for a sort of higher cause, give it their best shot.” And section commander 16 said: “An ideal leader would make people aware of what they are doing and what for.” Able to switch leadership dependent on the situation Furthermore, an ideal leader is a leader who is able to vary his leadership depending on the situation, especially with regard to competence level of subordinates. Company commander 10 illustrated this: “Being able to switch your leadership style quickly is an aspect of an ideal leader; knowing that you maybe have to do two different things at the same time, because people differ in development level and competencies.” Platoon commander 12 reinforced this: “That is what makes the perfect leader, I think: being able to sense when you can loosen the reins and when you can’t. That’s pretty hard.” Being ultimately responsible Lastly, ideal leaders give people responsibilities, but remain ultimately responsible for everything that happens. As section commander 2 illustrated: “An ideal leader is someone who gives responsibility to people, but who doesn’t delegate the responsibility; it’s someone who remains ultimately responsible

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himself.” Platoon commander 9 adds to this: “I think it’s important for a leader to feel responsible. If you feel responsible, you also act accordingly.”

Part II: Stress recognition

Prerequisites for stress recognition During the interviews participants were asked what they thought to be prerequisites for stress recognition among their personnel. The following significant factors were identified.

Knowing your personnel Knowing your was personnel was deemed to be one of the prerequisites, as only by knowing your personnel abnormal behaviour can be recognised. Section commander 3 stated: “You know. I think stress recognition is only possible if you know your group well. If you know your personnel, you also know when they are stressed” Platoon commander 7 stated: First and foremost, the task of all commanders is the same: to know their personnel, to dare to make issues discussable and to act accordingly. You just have to know your personnel well. Someone who normally has a big mouth, but is suddenly very quiet; you only pick that up by knowing your guys. Company 2IC 15 stated: “My opinion is that leadership is about people, and every individual has his own sensitivities, and as a leader you have to get to know those sensitivities.” Section commander 16 concretised: “You get to know the guys. You get to know who they are, and through training get to know how they react in certain situations. So, if there’s a change then you are automatically alerted.” Social control or group cohesion Social control and group cohesion were identified as prerequisites for stress recognition. Social control is explained as: firstly, subordinate personnel (often NCOs) who feed commanders with actualities and group observations, and secondly the watchfulness of group members with regard to stress signs in their co-workers. Social control can only be achieved by solid group cohesion. Section commander 4 stated: I think social control among each other in a group, is the most important. There’s just so much social control within a section. The guys almost know each other better

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than the wife at home. I really think the place for issues to surface is in a group. I think that if you have a good and social club, issues will surface sooner. Platoon commander implicitly referred to social control constituting the core of the ring model: “We call it zero-line care. The guy next to you, he’s the one that can best detect your peculiarities if you’re behaving abnormally.” Platoon commander 11 stated: “The strength of a unit is that, because you know each other so well, you dare to speak out toward each other with regard to issues.” People-oriented leaders/innate traits Being people-oriented (interested in personnel) was identified as being essential for stress recognition. Furthermore from the interviews it was identified there is a widespread conviction that being people-oriented is a predetermined (or innately determined) character trait/behaviour. Section commander 3 stated: “It’s just really easy for me. I can feel when the boys act differently. It’s just my personality, it has nothing to do with my military education. But of course, there are plenty colleagues who don’t possess that quality.” Platoon commander 11 also identified himself as people-oriented: “I think working with people is really my thing, because it’s just how my personality has always been.” Section commander 5 stated, when asked what was needed for stress recognition: “You have to be a bit empathic by nature of course. If you miss that bit, then it’s [recognising stress] going to be tough.” Company commander 14 stated: “You recognise stress if you’re interested in people.”

Obstacles to stress recognition When asked, most participants indicated that they actually did attempt stress recognition, however, they indicated that they did this subconsciously. The fact that most participants did not actively, or consciously, attempt stress recognition can be attributed to the following identified obstacles. Skipping layers in the chain of command and central control This first category is different from the others. The skipping of layers in the chain of command, and central control, do not constitute obstacles in the sense that they impede conscious stress recognition. Rather, they are general obstacles to stress recognition as they disrupt group cohesion and leader-follower relationships. Section commander 5 testified to the first: “You’re training for days together; and then when someone is taken out of the group or is suddenly added to it, you have to switch.” With regard to the disruption of

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leader-follower relationships company commander/battle captain 13 stated: In the normal situation, a company commander can shout over the radio and know exactly who he’s talking to, as it’s his guys. Certainly if stress is high, or he’s lost it: ‘Pete, take it easy. This is what’s happening, the situation is such and such,’ and by doing that you can make it very personal, because you know him and are able to sense it. From the battalion level to the platoon level that’s of course much less the case, because you [battle captain] just don’t know the guy [platoon commander] as well. No emphasis on stress recognition in training From the interviews it became clear that the most participants share the conviction that stress recognition is a neglected subject during education and training. Platoon commander 1 stated: “Well, it’s not as if the emphasis lies on stress recognition.” Platoon commander 9 stated: At the Royal Military Academy we didn’t really get courses with regard to it [stress recognition]. I think there was one time where we got told something about cognitive psychology, but in practice nothing came of it. I really think it’s a neglected subject. Platoon commander 6 indicated a lack of concretisation: “You are learned to recognise it [stress] a bit, but what you can do with it they don’t teach you; how to react to it. I’d like more tools for that.” So too section commander 2: “You get some stuff, but it’s all pretty vague.” Platoon commander 1 stated: “What you often see is that there’s some kind of generic lecture on stress recognition, where someone comes to explain the instructional card… and that’s it.” Platoon commander 7 couldn’t remember anything stress related from the Royal Military Academy: “Hmm, I know that there was something about it in the preparatory trajectory, but nothing on the Royal Military Academy. Company commander 14 stated it more boldly. When asked whether he had been given enough knowledge and tools to recognise stress he replied: “No. I really dare to say that; it’s something that is totally not emphasised.” Stress recognition comes with experience not with books Many participants indicated that the ability to recognise stress is something that, not necessarily only, but most probably primarily comes with experience. Platoon commander 7 made his doubts known: “I wonder whether you should really spend energy on it [stress education/training]… I think that you mostly just have to learn it yourself [through experience].” Company

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commander 10 said: “I dare say that I can easily spot it by just looking at someone. I think it’s just experience. You only recognise it if you’ve looked it [stress] in the eye for real.” In relation to this cadets were found to be too young to grasp the concept of stress recognition in training and education. Company commander 8 stated: “Cadets, you know; cadets are little 18 and 19 year old greenhorns. They have enough trouble tying their shoelaces. It has to be taught to them, but for it to stick it should be repeated very often.” And company commander 14 recollected his own time as a cadet: “In my Royal Military Academy time I wasn’t ready for it in the slightest. Fresh out of high school… and lectures about stress, if at all, I can’t remember.” Neglected group bonding The formation of tight-knit groups and solid group cohesion appears to be a neglected aspect of stress management. Section commander 3 stated: Formation of groups with all the social aspects that go with it is extremely neglected in my opinion. During your education you also don’t even get the chance, because you’re working with peers all the time, meaning that you really don’t know how that kind of stuff works with soldiers [subordinates]. That’s something that could use more attention. With regard to the same, section commander 17 stated: You have to be given the time and opportunity to get to know your personnel. That means not only training and educating, but also grabbing a beer and socialising with each other, and just talking. You have to take your time for those guys. But each day [operational unit] we’re always running everywhere and evaluating, so things like that are neglected and forgotten. We’re really busy learning how to fight, so all our effort is put into that, and not so much into stress and social stuff. Stress and social stuff are just not prioritised. If you look at the roster, stress or social activities, with the section, platoon or company are nowhere to be seen. Useless adaptation talks At the end of their deployment units are transferred to Crete where they participate in an adaptation program. From the interviews it appears that there is some doubt as to the way in which this program is structured. Section commander 17 stated when asked what he thought about the program and the talks: “It’s useless. Maybe it’s us though, because we were still pretty drunk from the night before.” He added:

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Look. You arrive there, and there’s a whole load of beer, more beer than people. So yeah, within a few minutes guys were floating around in the pool with their clothes on and all drunk; one big chaos. In principle that’s fine, because there has to be a moment of release. But the following morning at 10:00 AM the staff had planned group talks. In what condition do you think those guys, who had gone out the previous night, were? Section commander 3 stated: “You know, that talk I had on Crete… I laughed my ass off. It was completely pointless. People don’t need that stuff at that moment. Platoon commander 1 illustrated how his guys, while out and drunk, got into a fight with locals. The result: The next morning we were missing group talks left, right and centre. Some were still at the police station, some were still sleeping. It was one big fucked up mess; and the people that did go didn’t say much, because, I think, when you abruptly pull people out of a situation and force them to go sit in a group, it just doesn’t work. Maybe it’s just such a tightknit club, that when an outsider is added it’s not the same as if you would have led the conversation yourself. Operational tempo Another identified obstacle to mission command was the operational tempo of the situation. Section commander 5 stated: “You know, at that moment you can’t really do anything about it, because you still have to fulfil your task.” Platoon commander 7 recalled a situation where one of his platoon’s vehicles got hit by an IED: I walked over, I glanced into the car and I glanced at the guys and I say: “Looks like everything’s still in one piece. Did it scare you? Actually we have to leave as soon as possible, can you guys go on?” “Yah I guess we can.” “How long do you need? 5 minutes? Ok, then we’re leaving in 5 minutes.” And for me that was it. But one of those guys got severe PTSS from that incident. Company commander 18 stated: “How am I going to… you know, the assignment has to be continued. You can’t shout to him ‘Just bike back to the base, see you tomorrow!’”

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Having to deal with your own problems Sometimes you have got your hands full with your own problems that are unconsciously negligent with regard to care for personnel and stress recognition. When company commander 8 was asked why he had not sent someone he suspected of experiencing stress to the padre, he replied: Apparently I didn’t find it important enough, it wasn’t in my system. I had enough trouble with myself, with the battalion staff and with my platoon commanders that were spread out and attached to other units. I had too much on my plate, I couldn’t have anything else added to it. Company commander 10 indicated the same being true for inter-follower stress recognition: “You have to be realistic. Those guys are doing something, or they’re busy with themselves. It’s hard enough to keep yourself standing, so you don’t really have time for that.” And as company commander/battle captain 13 illustrated, work can sometimes drown out attention for people: “Well, in general we’re of course always very busy with our work, and sometimes that can lead you to forget that you’re working with people.” Insensitive commander Very much in line with the prerequisite of “People-oriented leaders/innate traits” (and thus only briefly mentioned), the opposite, a lack of interpersonal sensitivity can obviously be an obstacle to stress recognition. Section commander 5 stated: “Exactly, I’m not really such a people guy, I’m not really empathic. I just don’t recognise it [stress] quickly.” Warrior mentality The warrior mentality and macho culture are two things that are often linked to the armed forces. It appears these things are detrimental to stress recognition. Section commander 2 illustrated: I think it’s important to be able to see that kind of thing [stress] and know what to do with it. Starting platoon commander and starting section commanders, though, often are like “What bullshit… I’m not doing anything with that [stress recognition].” They’re infantry you know, ahoeha [infantry war cry]. Section commander 3 stated: “There are plenty of numbed and hardened soldiers walking around in the military, who are not really open to the social aspect of their work. I think that’s something that could be changed for the better.” Platoon commander 7 indicated the importance of openness:

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I think it’s important to be able to speak openly about such things within a unit; for guys to know that it’s ok to bring something up. Because, that’s you know, we have a terrible macho culture. And the danger is that some guys who are scared of something, are overshadowed by the rest. Like: “You’re not a sissy, don’t whine and we’re just gonna do our thing.” So yeah, there’s gotta be room for that. I think it’s important that as a leader, you promote openness. For example at a debrief: “Hey guys, how did you feel when it happened? What did you think?” Yeah that’s important.

Tools used for stress recognition Participants indicated that they used various tools to recognise stress in their subordinates while deployed. The following tools were the ones most used. Banter Banter, or informal conversations, is something that was used as a tool for stress recognition to a large extent. Platoon commander 1 indicated: “If I came there [maintenance area] it was just to banter with them. Just probing and sensing a bit.” Section commander 2 stated: I did talk a lot with those guys. I’d go to their posts at night and we just talked a lot; and at a certain point there’s all kinds of stuff that emerges. Some guys are just glad to have someone to vent to. But I don’t know whether that had really something to do with stress recognition… Platoon commander 9 stated that it was not really necessary for him to be highly conscious of the fact that he was doing stress recognition: I didn’t really approach those guys with that in mind. We lived together 24/7. So there was no thought “Ooh, I’m going to look for stress” floating around in my head. It’s more that I just went to banter with the boys a bit and to laugh, and whatever else, and if that happens you sense it [stress] naturally. Company commander 14 stated the same: “If there was a group of guys sitting there, I’d go sit with them just banter a bit; then you feel, sense or see whether something is up with someone naturally.” Using padres Padres were used by both followers and leaders. Section commander 5 illustrated how approachable the padre of their deployment was:

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My camp was located on the same place where also the padre lived. So that was ideal. If there were things that I wanted to talk about, personally, but also about handling the guys, I could go to her. But she was also very approachable to the guys. Platoon commander 7 used the padre as an additional resource: It has happened that after an action, a soldier with eyes this big *gazes as if shocked*, came to me, telling what he had just experienced. You could see the stress dripping off him. In such a case it’s good to say: “Let’s go have a drink when we’re back.” And if it is then still not resolved, you can tell him to go visit the padre. Adding after that: “The padres were very involved, they also just came to visit us randomly, to talk to us.” Platoon commander 11 also indicated involvement on the part of the padres: “We had a padre that was really involved. She was almost always there.” Input from group members and NCOs Input from group members and NCOs is a passive tool that was used by commanders; meaning that input was not per se actively pursued. When asked in what manner he tried to recognise stress, platoon commander 7 indicated the following to be a solid tool: “A section commander that comes to see you and says: ‘X or Y has been quiet for days now.’” Platoon commander 12 stated the importance of input from the group: “You have to listen well to your section commanders. They will really come to you if something is happening. Because, that’s of course the first layer: section commanders and deputy section commanders signalling things not being in order.” Company commander 18 reinforced this: “To be honest, the NCOs really fed me with information, as in: ‘You gotta watch him, something is not well.’ So I was really fed information by my subordinate commanders.” Evaluations Evaluations, often in the form of debriefs, were also used as a tool to recognise stress in subordinates. Section commander 2 said: “We had quite a lot of time to be put in evaluations, so that’s something we did a lot; albeit unconsciously, let me put it that way. Section commander 3 stated: “… and we did a lot of evaluations with the boys.” Platoon commander 11 illustrated an atmosphere of trust during evaluations: “If something happened, we always reviewed the situation afterwards. Guys would honestly say what they thought. They weren’t afraid to do that in the presence of the platoon commander.” Next to evaluations wherein subordinates were involved, also evaluations wherein higher levels participated were done; section commander 5: “In principle, at the end of the day we came together with all subordinate commanders and in

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presence of the company commander did an evaluation, discussing personnel among other things.

Indicators used to recognise stress During the interviews participants were asked to give indicators of stress, that they used in the recognition of it. The list of all identified indicators, including the amount of their groundedness5 in the interviews, can be found below.

Table 8. The complete list of behaviours and bodily signs that were used by commanders as

indicators of stress in their subordinates.

Indicators Groundedness Withdrawal from group activity 9

Quieter than normal 8

Louder than normal 7 Tired appearance 4

Agitation 4 Sweating 3 Refusing 3

Doing strange things 3

Upset after contact with home 3 Ask critical questions 3

Failing tasks 2 Literally indicating having stress 2

Receiving little mail 2 Anger 2

Having a lot of contact with home 2 Loss of appetite 1

Going to the bathroom often 1 Neglecting uniform regulations 1

Seeking action 1 Visiting church 1

Propositions for improvement At the end of each interview participants were asked whether they thought there was room for improvement with regard to stress recognition, and if yes how. The following propositions for improvement emerged.

5 Groundedness is a measure of how common certain indicators were throughout

all interview; it does however not indicate a 1:1 indicator:participant ratio.

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Invest in group bonding and group formation As we have seen neglected group bonding was one of the identified obstacles to stress recognition. Participants indicated that in order to create favourable conditions for stress recognition, more effort should be put into group bonding. Section commander 3 stated: So in my opinion we should invest more in “How do I form a good club, a good unit,” on the basis of trust. How do you build solid cooperation, how do you get to know your personnel? If you know your personnel well, you know when they’re having stress. The fact that, as a junior leader, you can’t compose your own group, so be it. You have to learn how to make the best of it. But there should be more attention for how to do that. Section commander 5 concretised this investment in group bonding. When asked how this improvement could be achieved he answered: Well, lying in the rain, in the muck, for 2 weeks in the preparatory trajectory. Enduring the same misery together, that’s what makes a group real tight. And scaling rocks in Bad Reichenhall or something like that, that’s nice, that’s also good for group bonding; but you could just as well go lie in the muck under a poncho. There’s plenty options for that. To reuse a quote from the neglected group bonding section, section commander 17 illustrated nicely what is lacking and what should be done: You have to be given the time and opportunity to get to know your personnel. That means not only training and educating, but also grabbing a beer and socialising with each other, and just talking. You have to take your time for those guys. But each day [operational unit] we’re always running everywhere and evaluating, so things like that are neglected and forgotten. We’re really busy learning how to fight, so all our effort is put into that, and not so much into stress and social stuff. Stress and social stuff are just not prioritised. If you look at the roster, stress or social activities, with the section, platoon or company are nowhere to be seen. More stress recognition education Participants indicated that there should be more emphasis on stress recognition during the education of NCO trainees (at the Royal Military School) and cadets (at the Royal Military Academy). It appeared from the interviews that concretisation of stress recognition can take the following forms: theory oriented courses (cognitive psychology) and practice

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oriented courses (symptoms, conversational techniques, required competencies). Section commander 2 stated: “I think that it starts at the Royal Military School for NCOs and at the Royal Military Academy for officers; that they really get some kind of education on it, and not like half a day or a couple of hours.” Section commander 3 indicated the importance of stress education: “Of course it’s good to discuss stress. You have to have some insight into the concept in order to recognise it.” Platoon commander 9 stated: “I think you should reserve a module for it, some kind of module to take on psychology, or maybe even sociology.” He went on to add: “But also practice bound knowledge, there are very easy booklets where you can see examples like ‘If a child lies, it puts its hand before its mouth.’ That kind of stuff.” Company commander 14 stated that also competencies should be trained: During the Royal Military Academy period I think there should be much more emphasis on stress and the training of competencies that are involved, meaning: interest in personnel, but also how to recognise stress, and what questions to ask personnel. This previous quote indicates a need for more concretisation of conversational techniques. Platoon commander 6 reaffirmed this need. When asked what would be needed for better stress recognition he replied: “Conversational techniques. I would like to learn more conversational techniques; how to handle conversations with someone experiencing stress.” Talks with veterans Another proposition for improvement was to let NCO trainees and cadet talk to veterans with or without PTSD or other manifestations of stress. Platoon commander 6 stated: “I would intensify it [stress education], in the form of letting cadets sit and talk to someone with PTSD.” When confronted with his peer’s opinion, company commander 8 replied: Yes, that would be a very nice suggestion. We for example have a wounded veterans lunch two times a year, where wounded veterans come back to the unit to tell their story. We do that, but it has to be done more frequent and in a more structured fashion. Company commander 10 stated:

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I think you have to invite people who actually were confronted, or have experience, with stress. Put them in front of a class of cadets, let them tell their stories. That’s where the knowledge and knowhow is at. Do that in addition to the theory from the books, because there’s nothing wrong with the theory, but it’s not enough. Company 2IC 15 indicated the importance of this: “I think that it’s really important for cadets to be able to come into contact with people, and be able to talk about it [stress] and ask questions.”

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Part III: Integrative analysis

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Discussion

Leadership theory: a connect As we have seen in chapter 1, there are many approaches to leadership. From the trait approach to the current theories, each leadership approach looks at leadership from a different perspective. Observing the results thoroughly it becomes clear that there are certain findings that are strongly linked to leadership theory; even reinforcing the fundaments on which they rely. Dusting off the trait approach Since the heyday of the trait approach in the 1930s and 1940s, its popularity has declined rapidly. First, disillusioned trait approach researchers transitioned from traits to behaviours, but already quickly contingency theories took the stage. Up until now this has been the case. However, the findings of this study appear to rehabilitate the trait approach. The results with regard to both mission command and stress recognition indicate a central convergence to one trait that can be called many names. I have called it being people-oriented, having interest in personnel, empathy and extroversion. In other words, inferring from the sample of this study, military leaders are convinced that what makes a good leader is a character that consists of the collective denominator for the aforementioned terms. Not only does it make a good leader, but is in their opinions a prerequisite for both mission command and stress recognition. The phrase “a character that consists of” already indicates the fact that the concept in question has to be an innate one, and this is also what the participants explicitly stated. This is then where the trait approach is rehabilitated, or at least rejuvenated. While the trait approach has maybe failed to find a conclusive list of fixed traits a good leader must possess, there is one trait that appears on almost every list, under two different names: sociability/extraversion6 (Table 1). It can be thereby said that this study has empirically reinforced the scientific basis for the trait approach, by confirming sociability/extraversion to be essential leadership traits. Hopefully this will reinspire vigour with regard to modern innovation of trait theory.

6 Called extroversion in this study as a matter of personal preference.

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The behavioural approach If we recall the behavioural approach, it was epitomised in the Leadership Grid model (Blake & Mouton, 1964; Figure 2). In this model, the two central behaviours that comprise the approach, task behaviours and relationship behaviours are renamed to concern for production and concern for people. While in the trait approach sociability is just a trait on a list, the behavioural approach considers it behaviour and furthermore couples a leadership style to it. One could say that the trait approach and behavioural approach are contradictory, as one deems the same concept a trait and the other considers it as behaviour. However, this is not the case. It can well be that, while sociability is an innate trait, it is also behaviour that is highly correlated to the trait. Thus, while one may possess a trait, the correlated behaviour can be in different stages of cultivation in the concerned individual. Herein lies also the link between the study and the behavioural approach: what is called sociability and extroversion in the trait approach, reinforced by this study’s findings, is translated to concern for people in the behavioural approach; thus, by reinforcing the fundament of the trait approach, the relevance of the fundament of the behavioural approach is directly also reaffirmed. However, the additional value the behavioural approach offers over the trait approach, is the fact that it prescribes an optimal leadership style for military leaders: Team Management (Figure 2). This style allows for being effective on the battlefield, as well as creating an atmosphere in which the prerequisites for mission command and stress recognition are met. Situational leadership As we have seen, the situational approach regards leadership as something that is contingent on the situation at hand. The approach was integrated in the Situational Leadership II model (Blanchard et al., 1985; Figure 3). The model is comprised of two types of behaviours: directive behaviours and supportive behaviours, these were explained in chapter 1. However, the Situational Leadership II model’s core is the fact that the amount of directive and supportive behaviour is dependent on the development level of followers. As followers progress through the development levels (i.e. get more competent), the model prescribes leaders to also increasingly taper their directive behaviours and increase their supportive behaviours. There are two things to be remarked here, with regard to the correlation between this study’s results and the situational leadership theory. Firstly, as we have seen, supportive behaviours are paramount for the functioning of mission command and stress recognition (i.e. interest in personnel). Thus, the

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premise here of the Situational Leadership II model, being that supportive behaviour increases from low to high with increase of development level, is false. Supportive behaviour is always needed at a more or less steady level (not fluctuating) in order to be able to effectively execute mission command and stress recognition. Secondly, however, the premise of the model is reaffirmed by the finding7 that leaders tend to take away freedom and are more directive in situations where followers are either inexperienced or just plain incompetent (i.e. low development level, D1 or D2). While the ideal, with regard to mission command and stress recognition, is to maximise supportive behaviour at all times, the finding is understandable; it is understandable because lives depend on giving inexperienced or incompetent persons too much freedom, resulting in leaders resorting to directive behaviours as per Situational Leadership II model. Transformational leadership The premise of transformational leadership has as its core the motivation and the development of followers through certain leader behaviours (Table 3). Research into transformational leadership culminated in the Full Range of Leadership model (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Figure 4). In the Full Range of Leadership model, transformational behaviours are divided into four factors (discussed in chapter 1) that are aimed at making a follower transcend his own self-interest. The results of this study appear to be linked to these four factors, as well as to the seventh non-leadership factor “laissez-faire.” Firstly, signification or justification of military action, clarity of mission goals and commander’s intent, being able to communicate competently, and motivation of personnel were all found to be important factors in the success of mission command. These findings correspond with factors 1 and 2 from the Full Range of Leadership model (Table 4). Idealised influence, or charisma (factor 1), and inspirational motivation (factor 2), both indicate the ability of a leader to motivate personnel, but also the ability to relay a clear intent to subordinates and involve personnel in the task at hand. These things are the pillars of mission command. Even more so, also stress is impeded by these factors as they stimulate job involvement and decrease ambiguity, both mitigating negative stress outcomes (Figure 7). The reported mission command advantages development of personnel, and stimulation of creativity and initiative in personnel, are findings that correspond with intellectual stimulation (factor 3) and individualised

7 See mission command obstacles section: “Incompetent or inexperienced personnel.”

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consideration (factor 4). These factors indicate the stimulation of thinking out of the box in followers, but also the development of individual followers by carefully listening to their needs, of importance for both mission command and stress recognition. Lastly, one remarkable thing is that one participant literally uttered the phrase “laissez-faire”, in the context of the finding that the company level in the chain of command was skipped. This once more indicates a strong link between transformational leadership and the findings, as skipping layers appears to lead to non-leadership in the form of a, transformational leadership factor 7, “laissez-faire” attitude, reinforcing the negative nature of factor 7 in the Full Range of Leadership model. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Now that the linkages and correlations of this study’s findings with leadership theory have been shown, the discussion will be focused at more narrowly selected mission command and stress recognition findings, which are relevant in the light of, respectively, chapter 2 and 3.

Part I: Mission Command Prerequisites for mission command The most significant prerequisites for mission command that were identified from the interviews are mutual trust (also deemed the most important prerequisite), signification/justification, clarity of mission goals and commander’s intent, and knowing each other. What is interesting with regard to these factors is that they are reducible to two basic categories: mutual trust and clarity. This is an interesting finding in the context of the elements and pillars of mission command that were discussed in chapter 2. As we have seen, mutual trust is one of the four main pillars of mission command (Defence staff, 2005), and also clarity (of mission goals and commander’s intent) is a core element of mission command (Royal Netherlands Army, 2000). The core ideology of mission command is unity of effort and autonomy of action through decentralisation. However, as chapter 2, as well as the results of this study, illustrate, the achievement of these principals is only possible through mutual trust and clarity of intent. The only way these two things can be achieved, is through the development of an intimate leader-follower, as well as a mentor-pupil, relationship, and through intensively training together, i.e. getting to know each other.

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By doing this, mutual trust (knowing each other) and understanding are facilitated, and thus the prerequisites are met. Signification and justification of military action is also achieved, because leaders are able to translate to followers, through clear communication, the significance of what they are doing, keeping them involved and motivated. The results show, however, that all this can only be achieved if certain underlying preconditions (the prerequisites of the prerequisites) are met, namely: being people-oriented as a leader (interest in personnel; as per the previous section), and reserving time for social bonding and social activities. Mission command in Dutch military practice: a worrisome case Skipping layers, mixed units, a lack of clear mission goals or commander’s intent, and incompetent or inexperienced personnel, were all identified as significant obstacles to mission command. This corresponds with the prerequisites for, as well as with the obstacles to mission command. We have seen that the prerequisites largely overlap with literature, however also the obstacles overlap significantly. The finding from the Royal Netherlands Army publication (2000), that mixed units pose an obstacle to mission command, is reaffirmed in this study. Mixed units disrupt leader-follower relationships, and as mentioned in the previous section, these are important for the success of mission command through achievement of mutual trust. Next, skipping layers was already identified to be an obstacle by Vogelaar & Kramer (2004), and is found once again to disrupt chain of command and nullify set leader-follower relationships, thus also trust. Battle captains in a battalion ops room did not know the platoon commanders they were controlling, while the company commanders that were passed over did. Furthermore, lack of clear mission goals or commander’s intent also corresponds with Vogelaar & Kramer’s identified obstacles as well as with the prerequisites found in this study. Lastly, this study adds, in the spirit of the trait approach, incompetent or inexperienced personnel to the list; inexperienced personnel invokes a more directive approach in leaders, and incompetent personnel, meaning the perceived lack of people-orientedness in leaders, is detrimental to the required knowledge of personnel. In short it can be said that, just as was the case during the three UN missions in Bosnia, the fundaments of mission command were undermined due to the aforementioned obstacles. As a result of this, mission command was barely used.

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Part II: Stress recognition Prerequisites for stress recognition The identified prerequisites for stress recognition all tie in to the stress literature discussed in chapter 3. Knowing your personnel, social control or group cohesion, and people-oriented leaders (the three identified prerequisites) all correspond with both moderators like job involvement, social support, collective efficacy and leadership climate from the SAM model (Geerling, 2013; Figure 7) as well as with the general concepts of trust and justification and signification (Geerling, 2013). Leaders have to be people-oriented in order to really know their personnel. The result of knowing your personnel is the fact that abnormal behaviours will be easier to spot, seeing as followers’ normal behaviours are known. In turn this creates a trusting leadership environment in which social support and speaking out is encouraged, solidifying group cohesion. Stress recognition in Dutch military practice: a worrisome case While stress recognition is an important part of military action, the results indicate that there are several obstacles which prevent optimal stress recognition. Due to skipping layers in the chain of command and central control, leader-follower relationships are nullified, as followers suddenly get a new leader (battalion battle captain). This new leader has not developed the same leader-follower relationship with the concerning platoon commander, thus impeding stress recognition. Next, no emphasis on stress recognition in training is an obstacle that correlates heavily with Geerling’s (2013) findings. If we recall the 2013 study, it was found that, while in theory participant should have received training regarding stress, in practice not much, if not nothing, was remembered of it. Also, during the education and training of both NCOs and officers, but also in units generally, group bonding appears to be neglected, leading to absence of the prerequisite of group cohesion. Furthermore, insensitive commanders and the warrior mentality seem to pose an impediment to stress recognition, as the social side of military work gets neglected this way. Lastly, it is believed by some participants that stress recognition comes primarily from experience (and/or character traits), and that cadets are too young to be able to grasp the concept.

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Part III: Integration A mission command and stress prevention model Looking at both the mission command and stress recognition results, a common foundation can be found. As becomes apparent from the discussions on the pages before, both mission command and stress recognition are founded, in broad terms, on mutual trust and clarity of the mission goals (be it intent, or strategic goals). Mission command rests on mutual trust, as decentralisation relies on it, but at the same time its rests on clear communication (clarity) to achieve unity of effort. So too stress recognition is dependent on mutual trust, which I have used as a proxy term for group cohesion, social support and a trusting and open leadership climate. On the other hand, which I have not mentioned before, stress recognition, or better prevention, relies on signification of military action. We have looked at signification in the light of mission command, increasing motivation. But, signification of military action (i.e. clarity about the mission, clear communication), is also paramount to putting stress reactions in a positive context (Bartone, 2006; chapter 3). Furthermore this clarity helps military personnel reduce ambiguity, and thus it mitigates stress (Bartone, 2006; Table 5). Thus, a common mission command and stress prevention (broader than recognition) model, based on the integration of literature and study results, arises (Figure 9). As we have seen, mutual trust and clarity are prerequisite to mission command and stress recognition/prevention. However, clear communication and mutual trust can only be achieved if leaders and followers know each other well, as the results demonstrate. Continuing, knowing each other can only be achieved by mixing: a leader who is naturally empathic, extrovert and interested in personnel, has trained together with his subordinates intensively, and lastly the opportunity to invest time in social bonding activities to form a tightknit group. This chain of prerequisites or linkages of causes and consequences is shown in the mission command/stress prevention contingency model (Figure 9). By examining the model bottom-up, it becomes clear why mission command and stress recognition failed in the Dutch military participation in Afghanistan. Firstly, the results indicate little time for social bonding in day-to-day life on military bases. Secondly, as far as is known, the requirement of training together intensively was fulfilled. However, it was nullified because of the mixing of units and the skipping of layers in the chain of command. Commanders received new commanders and new subordinates, and

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subordinates received new commanders, effectively setting back the “knowing each other” scale to zero. Lastly, according to participants, the interest of many military leaders in personnel is suboptimal, and hence an impediment to getting to know each other.

Figure 9. A mission command/stress prevention contingency model.

It now becomes clear why mission command and stress recognition failed. If we look at Figure 9, the foundation for “Knowing each other” was

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completely undermined, as just explained. Consequently, “Knowing each other” is not achieved, nullifying mutual trust and clarity, and thus mission command and stress prevention/recognition. Limitations While providing a solid exploration of the status with regard to mission command and stress recognition in Afghanistan, there are a few limitations to be mentioned regarding this study. Firstly, because this is a qualitative study, the results are not statistically grounded and thus do not provide any quantitative guarantee for validity. However, this is also not the goal. Secondly, participants were deployed to Afghanistan in a time span of 2006 to 2011. Firstly, there might be a chance that the validity of the results is biased for a certain year, and secondly this study did not look at the inter-deployment variation in frequency of findings. However, participants from a late year deployment indicated the same results. The third possible limitation of this study is the fact that the participant sample consists of primarily infantrymen, and even more specific a representation of a specific niche of infantrymen: Airmobile Infantry. Seeing as this is a fighting unit, it would not be unreasonable for one to think that, for example, warrior mindset would be less prevalent in other branches. However, participants indicated that they believed this was not the case.

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Conclusion Mission command and stress recognition are two important aspects of military action and operations. Mission command is called for by the uncertainty of modern peace support operations, as the amount of uncertainty is too high for centralised command to function effectively. In combat operations the operational tempo is even higher, and thus the need to adhere to, and to have internalised, mission command is even higher. Stress recognition is important because it safeguards the wellbeing of military personnel. Furthermore, stress recognition also safeguards the employability and optimal performance of military personnel needed for effective military action. This study has presented findings which show that mission command and stress recognition have a common fundament, based on the link between this study’s findings and leadership theory. It was found that people-oriented and supportive traits and behaviours from the trait approach, behavioural approach, situational approach and transformational approach are constitutive of the fundament for both mission command and stress recognition (mission command/stress prevention contingency model, Figure 9). This fundament was found to be reducible to two cornerstones: firstly mutual trust, and secondly the clarity of mission goals and commander’s intent, with mutual trust being the most important (heaviest weight; see research questions) prerequisite for mission command. However, this study also shows that, much in accordance with previous literature (chapter 2, chapter 3), during the Dutch presence in Afghanistan, the fundaments of mission command and stress recognition were undermined (see Figure 9 and accompanying text). Mutual trust and clarity were undermined by obstacles such as skipping layers in the chain of command, centralised control from battalion ops rooms, and incompetent and inexperienced personnel. With regard to stress recognition neglected group bonding, warrior mentality and a perceived lack of stress training and education can be added to the aforementioned obstacles. It seems that since the UN missions in Bosnia, where commanders could always find an excuse to abstain from using mission command, nothing has really changed too much for the better. So too with regard to stress recognition, previously found perceived neglect of stress education and training is mirrored in this study. Seeing as both mission command and stress recognition are so important for military action, thus for national defence and by extension hence of great societal value, something has to be done.

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Based on the results and the literature I shall put forward recommendations which could improve the situation. First and foremost, mixing units and controlling them centrally is a completely unnecessary impediment to mission command and stress recognition. Firstly, mixing units was a structural choice that was uncalled for from a practical perspective. It is bad for morale, and disrupts carefully built leader-follower relationships. The consequences of this we have thoroughly discussed. So too, central control from a battalion ops room is unnecessary. Not only do these things disrupt the foundation of mission command and stress recognition, they also form an impediment to mission command becoming a second nature. Trains as you fight and fight as you train is the motto. This means using mission command, not synchronisation matrices, and using default units where platoon commanders, company commanders and ideally battalion commanders all have worked together intensively. If we keep on disregarding train as you fight, and fight as you train, there will come a time where the span of control will not be sufficient to successfully control platoons from the battalion level. Using mission command then will do no good, as the army will not have internalised its ideology through and through. Thus, in following operations, the chain of command must be adhered to. Company commanders must be in the field, commanding their lieutenants, not a battalion staff officer. Only this way will we truly be ready for the day on which mission command might save lives. In this study participants have indicated that the social side of military work is neglected: a warrior mentality is present and some participants indicated that cadets are often alpha males, interested in tactics, but not so much in the social side of things. If this were really true, which is something for follow-up studies to research, something has to change. Mission command and stress recognition namely rely on being people-oriented, having interest in personnel and creating an open, trusting and socially supportive environment for subordinates. There are several things that could be attempted in order to create a favourable climate for the use of mission command and stress recognition. Firstly, seeing as this study revives trait theory, cadets (and NCOs) could, and should, be selected on the basis of people-oriented traits, such as extroversion (meaning sociability). This could be done by incorporating roleplay scenarios into NCO and officer selection, where candidates perform a roleplay scenario and are, among other things, graded on people-oriented traits by a trained observer or psychologist. The police already use this concept, giving the Ministry of Defence a starting point to work with.

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Secondly, from a behavioural point of view, people-oriented behaviours should be stimulated during the education and training of NCOs and officers. Seeing as there is no consensus as to whether one or the other (trait or behavioural) leadership approach is more valid, they are not mutually exclusive and all avenues should be explored. How this could work should be concretised in a follow-up study. Thirdly, more time should be made free to spend on social activities and the ability to work on group cohesion and group bonding, this could be materialised in a number of ways, best left to follow-up research. Furthermore, what was mentioned by some participants is that they are convinced that stress recognition comes with experience, not from books. While I do not unconditionally support this claim, there is logic to be found in it. More experienced leaders have more reference material against which to benchmark new experiences. A rather radical proposition would be to stop taking on cadets who are just out of high school, and only proceed with the already existing short model officer trajectory (i.e. only college or university graduates can apply). An even more radical solution would be to only take on individuals with civilian leadership experience. Lastly, something that requires prioritised implementation, just like abstaining from mixing units and using a central battalion ops structure, is improvement of stress education and training. Participants indicated that they could not remember much, if anything at all, from their time at the Royal Military School, Royal Military Academy, or even from their preparatory trajectories before their deployments. There were three categories of solutions they proposed to improve stress recognition: firstly theoretical cognitive psychology or sociology as a mandatory course, secondly practical concretisations of stress theory such as lectures about conversational techniques and recognition of acute stress symptoms, and thirdly confrontations and conversations with, or lectures by veterans with or without PTSD or other forms of stress. While theory (the first proposition) is important, I do firmly believe that the latter two will have greater effect. As per the results, a stronger coupling to, and realisation of what stress in an operational situation is like, is needed to raise awareness for the importance of it. The warrior mentality has its purpose, but it drowns out the inherently social nature of military leadership, that is so much needed for successful use of mission command and stress recognition.

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Appendix A

Interview guide

Logistics Date and time: TBD Duration: ca. 60 minutes Location: Instituut Defensie Leergangen (IDL), FMW, if needed at the participant’s home Interviewer: Samuel Golub Amount of interviewees: single Materials: recorder or phone Goals

1. To acquire an insight into the usage of mission command in recent Dutch military practice

2. To acquire insight into what commanders regard as the ideal leader 3. To acquire insight into commanders’ opinions on their stress

recognition preparation before being deployed 4. To acquire insight into how commanders deal with and recognise

stress in themselves and their personnel during deployment and the influence of this on leadership style (and vica versa)

The goal of this study is to acquire insight into the extent to which mission command was practised in recent military operations in which the Netherlands participated. More specifically it will be attempted to understand the underlying motivations, and their weight, with regard to using (or not using) mission command. Method of interviewing The interviewee will be given the opportunity to speak freely, and follow-up questions will be asked as much as possible (if relevant to the subject). The researcher will conduct the interviews with an openness of mind to be able to respond flexibly to the situation. Of all interviews audio recordings will be made, however only after written and verbal consent of the interviewee. The informed consent form will also contain information about the anonymization of personal data gained from interviews and the amount of disclosure of data on publication. Personal data that will be queried before the start of the interview

Age Sex Rank Function Rank at the time of deployment Function at the time of deployment

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Branch Unit Branch at the time of deployment Unit at the time of deployment Timespan of deployment Region in country of deployment

Questions Before commencement of interview explain mission command as it is explained by Vogelaar et. al 2004 (essence of mission command = autonomy of action) Mission command questions

Can you describe, in terms of the previous question, the ideal leader?

What do you like about the mission command approach? What do you think the benefits of mission command are? What do you think the downsides of mission command are? What do you think the prerequisites for mission command are? Were these prerequisites present in your

situation/platoon/company? Were there obstacles to the successful usage of mission command? What kind of obstacles? In what (problematic) situations did you encounter these obstacles?

In a study into Dutchbat II, the prerequisites: clarity of mission

goals, adequacy of means and mutual trust were identified. Do you agree (in so far as not yet mentioned)?

Were these prerequisites present? (insofar as not yet described) Which of the prerequisites weighs heaviest according to you? How was your relation with your subordinates? Were you content with your leadership overall? Why? Why not? What could improve for better effectiveness? How could the identified obstacles be resolved?

Stress recognition questions

Did you try to either, passively or actively, detect stress in your men?

Can you give indicators that you used to detect and recognise stress in your men?

Do you deem yourself competent and knowledgeable enough (a.k.a. Did your training prepare you well?) to be able to do this well, or is there something lacking?

Do you feel confident in linking mission stressors (aanvullen met voorbeelden) to stress in your men?

What are obstacles for the successful recognition and detection of stress in your men?

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Are you stimulated by the MoD (through training/guidelines/etc.) to detect stress and then act on that information?

What could be improved in your opinion?