Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy U S. Relations 1938-1941

8/7/2019 Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy U S. Relations 1938-1941

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Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: Japanese-U. S. Relations, 1938-1941Author(s): Chihiro HosoyaSource: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1968), pp. 97-115Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/423231 .

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MISCALCULATIONS IN DETERRENT POLICY:JAPANESE-U.S. RELATIONS, 1938-1941

ByCHIHIRO HOSOYA

Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo

1. ForewordIt is well known that there is a groupof scholars and critics in the United Statesreferred to as 'revisionist' who criticizethe foreign policy of the Roosevelt ad-ministration from the viewpoint of Roose-velt's responsibilityfor bringing the UnitedStates into the Second World War.Charles C. Tansill, who represents thispoint of view, asserts in his book, BackDoor to War, that Roosevelt managed toinvolve the U.S. in the European War bymaneuvering Japan into attacking theU.S. Although this thesis of the BackDoorto Wartakes various formsdepending on theparticular writer, it is the common basis ofthe approach of the 'revisionist' school.'In contrast, Paul W. Schroeder rep-resents a different critical approach.Schroeder directs his criticism moreagainst Secretary of State Hull than Pres-ident Roosevelt and against the 'in-flexibility' and, in Kennan's terms, the'legalistic and moralistic approach' ofHull's Japanese policy.2 Schroeder writesthat 'the American policy from the endof July to December in 1941 was a gravemistake.' If U.S. had taken a conciliatoryattitude on its objective of 'the liberationof China', Schroeder assumes, it couldhave realized its other two objectives of'splitting the Axis' and 'stopping Japan'ssouthwardadvance', and thushave avoidedwar. He maintains it was the 'inflexibility'in Hull's handling of foreign policy thatprevented the U.S. from achieving itsobjectives.3 In contrast to his criticismof Hull, Schroeder gives high praise tothe conciliatory and realistic approach of

the American Ambassador to Japan,Joseph C. Grew.4This article makes some critical ob-servations on U.S. policy towards Japanin the period preceding the Pacific Warin a way differingfrom the two approachesabove. Specifically, it attempts to analyzethe miscalculations in the deterrent policyadopted by the hard line faction withinthe U.S. Government and to describethe ways in which this policy of deterrence,especially in regard to the imposition ofeconomic sanctions, acted as a crucialimpetus for the intensification of tensions,stimulating all the more Japan's south-ward expansion and, in the end, producingthe unintended result of a Japanese-U.S.armed conflict. This is not to deny thatJapan's expansionist policies provided adirect impetus towards the Pacific War.Particular attention is given to an his-torical analysis of the period from theabrogation of the Japanese-U.S. Treatyof Commerce (July 26, 1939) to the im-position of the ban on the export of pe-troleum to Japan (August 1, 1941).2. Theabrogationof theJapanese-U.S.Treatyof CommerceandNavigationAfter the Marco Polo Bridge incidentof July 7, 1937, Japan's military activitieson the China mainland followed anincreasinglyexpansionistcourse.Beginningwith the Panay incident, infringements ofU.S. economic interests in China becamemore and more frequent, and the U.S.attitude towards Japan gradually stif-fened.6 Such incidents led the U.S.Government repeatedly to issue notes of


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98protest. When confronted with the realitythat these measures were having noappreciable deterrent effect on the Jap-anese military, however, the voiceswithin the Government calling for theimposition of economic sanctions againstJapan became steadily more clamorousin their assertions that, in view of thehigh degree of Japan's economic depen-dence on the U.S.,6 economic sanctionswould be most efficacious in constrainingthe actions of the Japanese Government.In spring-summer 1938, several studieswere undertaken within the State De-partment on the question of economicsanctions against Japan.7 So far as formsof economic sanctions were concerned,measures ranging from the prohibition ofimporting and exporting certain selectedgoods to the total rupture of economicrelations, measures calling for the suspen-sion of the extending of credits, restrictionson monetary exchange, the impositionof a special duty on shipping, discrimi-natory tariffs on commodities, and otherrestrictive measures were considered. Thelegal obstacle to most of these sanctionswas the 1911 Japanese-U.S. Treaty ofCommerce and Navigation. State De-partment expert on Far Eastern affairs,Stanley K. Hornbeck (Adviser on Po-litical Affairs) came out as the first officialto stress the desirability of removing thisobstacle (memorandum to Cordell Hull,July 19, 1938).8'Japan'At this time prevailing opinion withinthe State Department was not sympatheticto Hornbeck's view. Japan's new movein the fall of 1938 seemed to affect theU.S. attitude towards Japan. On No-vember 3, theJapanese Government madepublic its program for a 'New Order inEast Asia'9 and, on November 18, thenew Foreign Minister, Arita Hachiro,stated in a reply to the U.S. Governmentrepresentation of October 6, that, be-cause of the demands of large scale mili-

tary action, some violations of U.S.economic interests in China were un-avoidable despite Japan's intentions torespect such interests.10He asserted, more-over, that it would be impossible to applypre-war standards and principles in un-altered form to present and future situ-ations in Asia.'U.S.'This was taken to be an outrightchallenge to the Nine Power Treaty andgreatly irritated the United States Govern-ment. As a result, majority opinion withinthe State Department became more favor-able to the abrogation of the Japanese-U.S. Treaty of Commerce, and on De-cember 5 the report of Francis Sayre,Assistant Secretary of State, which was asynthesis of this opinion, was submitted.This document argued that measures offull scale economic reprisals carried theserious danger of a military conflict andthe likelihood of giving rise to widespreaddomestic economic confusion and, as such,should be avoided. At the same time itargued that notice should be made of theintention to abrogate the commercialtreaty and that steps be taken to halt thegranting of credits and loans.1lWith the coming of 1939, the U.S.,so as not to violate the treaty agreement,instituted a 'moral embargo' on airplanesand parts (January 14, 1939), and acessation of credits (February 7, 1939).But, so far as notification of the abrogationof the commercial treaty was concerned,the U.S. Government was unable toarrive at a final decision. This was almostcertainly related to the fact that opinionwithin theJapanese Government in regardto the question of strengthening the coali-tion with Germany was divided, and thatthe Japanese course in foreign affairs wasat a delicate stage. Particularly, there wasa group within the State Department,represented by Joseph Grew, Ambassadorto Japan, and Maxwell Hamilton, di-rector of the Far Eastern Division, that


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was hopefully looking for a revival of themoderate faction ('Shidehara diplomacy')within the Japanese Government and thatfeared a strong U.S. policy would workto the advantage of the military.12Thus,in April of 1939, the State Department,searching for 'a policy of prudence andpatience towards Japan,' undertook areappraisal of the question of the abroga-tion of the commerce treaty. This resultedin draughting of an aide-memoireto be hand-ed to Japan, proposing a new commercialtreaty with Japan that would excludearticles five and fourteen from the thenexisting one. Its intention was to lessenthe shock to Japan while having the prac-tical effect of removing the legal restrictionson embargoes and discriminatory duties.13Before making a formal decision, theAdministration decided to send a draftof the aide-memoireand of the new treatyto Senate leaders Key Pittman, chair-man of the Foreign Relations Committee,and Hiram Johnson, and to AmbassadorGrew in Japan.l4 In so doing, however,the State Department's plan for a partialabrogation of the commercial treaty suf-fered a setback.Chairman Pittman stole the lead on theState Department by submitting to theSenate on April 27 a resolution that 'thePresident should be given power to effectan embargo and limit credits against acountry which infringes the Nine PowerTreaty and injures American lives andinterests.' As a result, the State Depart-ment felt it would be inopportune topresent its proposal for a revision of thecommercial treaty toJapan at a time whena connection with this Senate bill mightbe assumed. It was feared that this mightresult in too strong an impression concern-ing U.S. policy towards Japan. Hamiltonstressedthis point and, based on his advice(April 28 memorandum to Sayre),l5 theState Department decided in May topostpone offering its proposal to Japan.6lsIn contrast to the moderate wing ofGrew, Hamilton and Sayre, there was

99a hard line faction in the State Depart-ment led by Stanley Hornbeck. Thesetwo groups disagreed strongly on theappropriateness, timing, scope, and prob-able effectiveness of economic sanctionsagainst Japan. Hornbeck, for example, ina memorandum to Sayre on December 20,1938, asserted that a strong U.S. stand ofcomprehensive retaliatory measures couldpossibly prevent the development of amilitary conflict and, moreover, mightwell lead to revisions in the Japaneseprogram as recently made public (viz.the proclamation of a New Order inEast Asia). He asserted, 'I consider ithighly desirable that a plan be made atthis time for a comprehensive andthorough-going program of measures ofmaterial pressure which might be applied...i17 In the State Department at thattime, however, the balance of power be-tween the two factions favored the mod-erate group. Its stand, furthermore, wasbasically supported by army and navyauthorities who did not feel the countrywas sufficiently prepared to engage in anarmed conflict with Japan.l8 In contrastto this, the general populace (as demon-strated in the Gallup poll surveys whichshowed 66 % in favor of a boycott onJapanese goods and 72% in favor of anembargo on weapons and munitions toJapan) as well as the atmosphere in theSenate, as expressed in Pittman's resolu-tion, seemed to support the hard linefaction's stand towardsJapan.'9'Japan'The strained relations between Englandand Japan due to the blockade of theTientsin settlement in June, which re-sulted from British refusal to acceptJapan's demand for the delivery of fouraccused Chinese, and the news of theJapanese intention to eliminate forcefullyEnglish interests in China, aroused theemotions of the U.S. public and workedto the advantage of the hard line faction'sstand on Japanese policy.


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100'U.S.'On June 16 a top level conference ofthe State Department and the Army wasconvened to examine the general FarEastern situation. It resulted in generalagreement that the U.S. Governmentshould continue to avoid measures whichrisked the danger of war with Japan, andthat the U.S. should do no more thandispatch a declaration of protest (issuedonJune 19).20But the Arita-Craigie agree-ment concluded on July 22 by means ofunilateral concessions on the part ofGreat Britain seemed to have stronglyinfluenced the U.S. policy makers. Inaddition, the submission of a bill on July18 by Republican party member of theSenate, Arthur Vandenberg, calling forthe abrogation of the Japanese-U.S. com-mercial treaty,21caused President Roose-velt out of considerations of domesticpolitics to decide to abrogate the treaty.Thus on July 26, the U.S. Governmentissued formal notification to the JapaneseGovernment of the abrogation of the treatyof commerce.There is a detailed memo by Hull con-cerning this decision which makes clearthat the aim was to restrain Japaneseconduct in China by strongly warningthat when the termination of the treatywould become effective on January 26,1940, the U.S. Government could, if itfound it necessary, institute economicsanctions at any time. In so doing, itwas expected that Japan would realizeeven more its economic dependence onthe United States.22In other words, to useSayre's expression, it was expected thatthe notification would probably have a'sobering effect' on Japan.23'Japan'In response to this new U.S. mea-sure, Foreign Minister Arita took a calmattitude and is reported to have explainedin a cabinet meeting on August 1 thatthe 'American move was largely political,first in order to settle the question of

its rightsand interests in China, and secondas a gesture in connection with the comingelections this fall.' The shock felt amongmany circles of Japanese society, however,was difficult to conceal.24 Dismay wasespecially severe in economic circles en-gaged in trade with the U.S., and amongpro-Anglo-American political groups ap-prehension for the future of Japanese-U.S. relations was quickly heightened.However, it is quite doubtful that theJapanese Government fully grasped thetrue import of this U.S. 'warning'. Forexample, the view prevailing in the ForeignOffice, as expressedin the Arita statement,was a generally optimistic one that thismeasure was for Roosevelt's domesticpurposes and that 'a modus vivendicould be arranged.'25Moreover, a docu-ment entitled 'A Brief Analysis of PolicyTowards the United States', drafted onAugust 1, partly reflecting the attitudeof the middle grade official in the ForeignOffice, urged that the Japanese Govern-ment should not just remain content witha passive 'wait and see policy' in the faceof this U.S. measure. Rather, to 'effectivelycounter' this measure, Japan should'denounce the unfriendly attitude of theU.S. Government', appeal to the U.S.public, and provide a 'pretext' for theisolationist faction and the oppositionparty to 'commence an attack on thePresident'.26

The shock of the signing of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, however,precipitated the fall of the Hiranumacabinet towards the end of August. Thenew cabinet of Abe Nobuyuki had as oneof its most important tasks the improve-ment of Japanese-U.S. relations. Theappointment of Admiral Nomura Ki-chisaburo as Foreign Minister was in-dicative of the direction towards whichthe new cabinet intended to move.27On October 4, shortly after Nomuratook office as Foreign Minister, a docu-ment entitled 'A Current Foreign Policyin Keeping With the European War' was


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drawn up in the Foreign Office with anArmy plan as the basis. It devoted greatdeal of attention to the question of policytowards the U.S., expressing the intentionto treat in a friendly manner U.S. interestsin China, to protect U.S. citizens residingin China, to moderate restrictions oncommercial travel, to bring outstandingquestions to a rapid settlement, and toavoid applying unnecessary pressure onU.S. economic activities in China. Itfurther expressed the intention to expeditethe concluding of a new commercialtreaty and to implement the plan to dis-patch an influential economic delegationto the U.S. for this purpose.28This docu-ment reflected the new Foreign Minister'sintention of instituting new steps for therespect of U.S. interests in China with aview to lessening U.S. discontent andbettering Japanese-U.S. relations. In thisregard, it could be argued, the anticipatedrestraining effect of the U.S. hard linepolicy was to some degree realized.

The Navy's interest in the governmentplan for a betterment of Japanese-U.S.relations was reflected in a documententitled 'Proposed Policy Measures to-wards the United States' prepared by theNavy General Staff on the 20th of October.It stressed the necessity of immediatelyholding a Japanese-U.S. conference inTokyo for a 'general readjustment ofJapanese-U.S. relations', and emphasizedthat the most important problem for theproposed conference was the conclusionof a new commercial treaty. 'If the Govern-ment finds itself unable to fulfill its desireof concluding a new treaty on the basisof the principle of reciprocity', the docu-ment asserted, 'Japan has no choice butto accept a generalized, temporary agree-ment even if it fails to specifically affirmthe principle of non-discriminatory treat-ment.' In treating the 'Nine Power TreatyProblem', the document asserted thatno mention of the problem was the bestpolicy for the present, and it argued that,in principle, Japan should agree to the

101opening of the Yangtze and CantonRivers. In regard to the problem of thehandling of the settlements, the question ofcompensation for U.S. interests in China,the problem of U.S. businessand commercein China, and the moderation of restrictionson U.S. culturalwork, the document offeredan extremely flexible plan.However, while in the sections referredto above the document reflected a moder-ate policy, another section warned thatdevelopments in U.S. attitude mightnecessitate measures of a non-diplomaticnature and thus called attention to theproblems of a southward advance andrapid war preparations. In this regardthe document asserted: 1. To be able tooppose U.S. economic pressure, Japanmust make arrangements with countriesother than the U.S. for the acquisition ofraw materials from a specific thirdcountry;2. In view of the tendency of U.S. foreignpolicy to change rapidly, Japan mustaccelerate her war preparations so as tobe in a position to meet all contingencies.The document, therefore, indicated thatthe Navy General Staff had under con-sideration both a moderate and hard linepolicy.29Having thus obtained the support ofthe Army and Navy for the basic plan forthe readjustment of relations with theU.S., Foreign Minister Nomura, uponGrew's return to Tokyo, opened the firstsession of the Tokyo Conference onNovember 4. At the third session of theconference on December 18, Nomura,in accord with the pre-arranged plan,promised that in dealing with the questionof compensation for damages to U.S. citi-zens in China arising out of the bombingsconcerning which the U.S. had alreadyprotested as well as in regard to the settle-ment problem, taxes, and currency prob-lems, Japan would consider the problemsin a manner that would prove satisfactoryto the U.S. Furthermore, in addition toassuring the opening of the Yangtze andCanton Rivers in two months, he stated


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102that the 'abrogation of the Japanese-U.S.commercial treaty is throwing a darkshadow across Japanese-U.S. relations'and expressed his desire that the U.S., inresponse to Japan's concessions, alsoacknowledge the need for mutual con-cessions and agree to begin negotiationsfor the concluding of a new treaty or toarrange a modus vivendi.30 The detailsof this modus vivendi were made clearwhen on December 22 the Japanese Am-bassadorto the U.S., Horinouchi Kensuke,presented the Japanese proposal to Hull.According to this proposal the followingpoints were to be agreed upon in a formalexchange of notes: 1. In regard to com-merce, navigation, and tariffs, the prin-ciple of the most favored nation treatment;2. Freedom of entry, travel, and residencewhere the object is to engage in trade;3. The handling of taxes, duties, and com-missions, direct or indirect, on the basisof non-discrimination or the most favorednation principle.3''U.S.'What reaction did the U.S. Govern-ment show to the Abe cabinet's willingnessto concede with the view of Japanese-U.S.relations? Within the State Departmentat that time there existed two diametricallyopposed ways of thinking in regard tothe way the United States should respondto Japan's conciliatory attitude. One wasrepresented by Ambassador Grew, theother by Hornbeck.After GrewreturnedtoJapan in Octoberhe repeatedly sent telegrams to his homegovernment reporting that Japanese-U.S.relations were at a crucial brink and that,in order to prevent their collapse, it wasnecessary for the United States to adopt aconciliatory policy. On December 18,Foreign Minister Nomura presented Grewwith a formal proposal for the concludingof a modus vivendi setting forth Japan'sconciliatory attitude. Grew reacted favor-ably and immediately sent a strongly-worded telegram to Washington.

The simple fact is that we are heredealing not with a unified Japan butwith a Japanese Government which isendeavoring courageously, even withonly gradual success, to fight againsta recalcitrantJapanese Army, a battlewhich happens to be our own battle.The Government needs support inthat fight. If we now rebuff the Govern-ment we shall not be serving to dis-credit the Japanese Army but ratherto furnish the Army with powerfularguments to be used in its own sup-port ... Whatever reply I am to beinstructed to return to the ForeignMinister in answer to his initiative Iearnestly recommend that it not closethe door and that it be of such acharacter as to encourage the Ministerin continuing his patent efforts to meetour position. Such a reply will be farmore likely to bring in its train furtherJapanese steps towards amelioratingthe situation of our interests in Chinathan would result from a rebuff.I am convinced that at this juncturewe are in a position either to directAmerican-Japanese relations into aprogressively healthy channel or toaccelerate their movement straightdown hill.32

In direct conflict with Grew's thinkingwas the view of Hornbeck. In a memo-randum of December 19 he opposed Grew,by expressing a very sceptical view of thepower and objectives of the moderatefaction in Japan and with his assessmentthat a modus vivendi would probablyhave no effect in restraining the actions ofthe Japanese military in China.

... In my opinion adoption as a majorpremise of the thought that the'civilian' element in the Japanesenation may gain an ascendancy overthe 'military' element and, having doneso, would alter the objectives of Ja-panese policy can lead to nothing butconfusion and error in reasoning. ...Practically the whole of the Japanesepopulation believes in and is enthusi-astic over the policy of expansion andaggrandisement of the Japanese em-pire. ... Unless and until theJapanesemilitary meet with reverses,the chancesof the Japanese civilian element gain-ing the ascendancy are infinitely


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slender if existent at all. ... Whetherwe do or do not conclude at this timea modus vivendi with Japan willhave very little effect as regards thatquestion. ... Military and economicfactors will influence the course ofthe Japanese military machine. Dip-lomatic moves may slightly accelerateor slightly retard the movements of thatmachine, but they will not determineits direction or its effectiveness.33

Hornbeck used every opportunity tostress to the policy makers his convictionthat the changes the Abe cabinet was try-ing to effect in its policy towards the U.S.were designed 'to improve the situationas regards petty harassing', and 'there isno indication ... of reorienting theirpolicy in regard to major matters.'34 Hefurther asserted 'the only change is aslightly perceptible change in strategyand tactics' and 'there is a change neitherof attitude nor of heart'.36The opinions of Grew and Hornbeckreflected two contrasting views within theU.S. government concerning, on the onehand, perception of the Japanese politicalsituation, and, on the other, basic con-ceptions of policy towardsJapan. Further-more, Grew's belief in the efficacy of agradual reduction in tensions or 'de-escalation' strategy36and Hornbeck's rad-ical position that without the other side'ssubmission (to be obtained by powerfulmilitary and economic blows) there wasno 'complete solution' to problems, re-flected an important difference in the twomen's conception of the internationalpolitical system.While not entirely agreeing with Horn-beck's hard line policy towards Japan,Secretary of State Hull did have a similarconception of the relationship between theJapanese Government and the military.37In his decision that the U.S. should notimmediately impose duties on Japanesecommerce or shipping upon the termina-tion of the commercial treaty, he did notfollow the arguments of the hard linefaction (December 11, 1939 memorandum

103to Roosevelt).38 He refused, however, tofollow Grew's advice concerning negoti-ations for concluding a new treaty or amodus vivendi (December 20).39'Japan'Failure of the Tokyo Conference dealtthe final blow to the Abe cabinet, alreadyon the verge of collapse with internaleconomic problems. On January 16, 1940,the Abe cabinet gave way to a cabinetformed by Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa.Foreign Minister Arita, faced with thetermination of the Japanese-U.S. com-mercial treaty, immediately upon takingoffice made a proposal to the U.S.Government calling for a modus vivendito regulate relations following the treaty'sabrogation. But the proposal containedno new elements to stimulate a recon-sideration of the policy already decidedupon by the U.S. Government.40 Con-sequently, on January 26, the treaty whichhad regulated Japanese-U.S. commercialrelations for nearly 30 years lapsed, andthe non-treaty period commenced.3. The commencementof economicsanctionsAs had been assured to the Japaneseby the State Department officials, theU.S. abrogation of the commercial treatyhad no immediate substantial effect onJapanese-U.S. commercial relations. Nodiscriminatory tariffs were levied and nonew restrictions placed on entering thecountry or on residence.41The commence-ment of a non-treaty relationship wassignificant, however, in that it gave theU.S. the freedom to impose economicsanctions against Japan at any time. Dueto Japan's economic dependence on theU.S., this had a strong psychological effect.While there naturally grew in influencethe view that 'Japan must end as quicklyas possible the present high level of eco-nomic dependence on the U.S. and presson for a policy to establish an economicsystem which would not be endangered bythe U.S. attitude' (Foreign Office Mem-


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104orandum),42 attention had to be givento the problems of immediately importingfrom the U.S. a large quantity of essentialproducts and of finding other areas forobtaining those materials. Consequently,the region of natural resourcesto the southcame to loom ever larger in the eyes ofJapan's political leaders. Because of Ja-pan's inability to produce even 10% ofits petroleum needs and its importationof about 70% of such needs from the U.S.,the possibility existed that an oil embargowould paralyse its military and economicactivity.43

Thus, interest rapidly came to be di-rected to the oil resources of the Nether-lands East Indies as a substitute for U.S.oil. For example, on February 2, the Jap-anese Government presented a demandto the Dutch Indies authorities for theabolition of restrictions on Japanesecommercial activity and the eliminationof export restrictions.The new developments on the Europeanscene, however, were without questionthe decisive factor in provoking Japan'ssouthern advance. Following upon theNorwegian campaign in the early part ofApril, the German army, on May 10,began its invasion of Holland, Belgium,and Luxemburg and, on the 15th, broughtabout Holland's surrender. It then in-flicted an annihilating attack on theBritish and French armies ending, in thelate part of May, in the 'Tragedy atDunkirk' and, on June 17, in France'ssurrender.These European developments had aprofound repercussion on the situation inAsia, especially in causing a sudden in-crease in Japanese interest in the DutchEast Indies and French Indo-China,whose metropolitan areas were now underthe control of the German army.'Japan'On April 15, Foreign Minister Aritastated 'the Japanese Government can notbut be deeply concerned over any devel-

opments accompanying an aggravation ofthe war in Europe that may affect thestatus quo of the Netherlands East Indies'.On June 18, he filed a representation withthe Dutch Indies' Authorities demandingthat they make a 'firm promise concerningthe export to Japan [of thirteen importantmaterials as well as a million tons of oil]regardless what conditions might arisein the future'. Further,immediately follow-ing upon France's surrender to Germany,the Japanese Government, on June 19,protested to the French Ambassador thesending of war materials by the FrenchIndies to Chiang Kai-shek and proposedthe dispatch of a military group to super-intend the blockade of the border withChina. Furthermore, in the fevered atmo-sphere for a southern advance whichfound fitting expression in the phrase'don't miss the bus', a plan was beingworked out among the Army and Navyauthorities for a drive to the south.'U.S.'The U.S. Government was united in re-gard to the basic objectives of preventing aJapanese southern advance and thwartingJapan's going deep into a military alliancewith Germany, but when it came todeciding on measures with which toachieve these goals, opinion was onceagain split along the two lines of the hardand moderate factions.On May 1, Sayre, en route to his newpost as High Commissioner for the Phil-ippines, called on Foreign Minister Aritain Tokyo. His holding a conference, di-vided into four sessions, with Arita gaverise to speculation of a new approach inU.S. foreign policy. At these meetings,Sayre proposed that representatives fromJapan and China hold a secret preparatorymeeting at some neutral place ( for in-stance, Hongkong) to pave the way fora formal peace conference, and he sug-gested the possibility of the U.S. Govern-ment's good offices.44Even though Sayrelater formally denied any intention on the


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part of the U.S. to offer its good offices45and though, in instructions to Tokyo,the State Department asserted that Sayrehad no authority to enter into such talks,46it can be said that his action reflected aconciliatory approach within the U.S.Government for the purpose of betteringrelations with Japan.Once again it was Ambassador Grewwho was most concerned about the de-terioration in relations with Japan, andwho most strongly asserted the need forconcessions on the U.S. side for the pur-pose of bettering relations and preventingaJapanese military alliance with Germany.He advised that in order to break thedeadlock in Japanese-U.S. relations 'theUnited States could make known itswillingness to discuss the conclusion of anew commercial treaty, and possibly ex-presswillingness to extend credits coveringshipments of raw cotton and other non-military supplies to Japan.'47Within the State Department a meetingwas held on May 24 between Hull,Hornbeck, and Hamilton concerning 'thepossible desirability of taking diplomaticsteps towards discouraging Japan fromcloser association with Germany and en-couraging Japan towards a closer associa-tion with the United States'. At this meet-ing Hornbeck questioned whether a newdiplomatic approach to Japan would notbe received by the Japanese Governmentas proof of U.S. weakness, be interpretedas giving a 'green light' forJapan's actions,and, thus, serve to incite new aggressions.He argued that present conditions wereworking to Japan's disadvantage and, ex-pressing his belief that the U.S. shouldstick fast to its previous policy, he opposedany new moves.48In contrast, Hull showed considerableinterest in talking with the Japanese.While emphasizing to Grew that the im-pression should not be given to theJapanese that the U.S. Government wasleaning towards a policy of compromisethat would mean an abandonment of

105principle, he did instruct the Ambassadorto search for ways to restore friendly rela-tions withJapan.49Most of Hull's messagesto Grew from May through June, incomparison with his past memoranda,are striking in the cautious softening ofthe critical tone in regard to Japan'sactions, and the persuasive tone whichtried to impress on Japan that it was inher own interest to expand the trade ofboth countries on the basis of the principleof free trade and promote a 'strengtheningof Japanese-U.S. relations' by variousmethods of economic cooperation innumerous spheres.50It is not clear to what extent Hull ex-pected any concrete results from this newdiplomatic measure. He may have actedout of his concern, as Hornbeck said, that'we should at this time speak gently toJapan and we should not give any pre-text to be used by Japanese jingoists toprompt the Japanese Navy to movetowards the south'.5' In any event, Hull'sinstructions resulted in opening the Grew-Arita conference on June 10.

Despite Grew's zeal, the basic po-sition of both sides at this conference re-mained on unaltered, separate lines.Grew asserted that the prior conditionsfor the betterment of Japanese-U.S. re-lations were the halting of the use offorce in effecting national policy and non-interference with U.S. interests. To this,Arita retorted, the lack of a commercialtreaty was the greatest hindrance to thebetterment of relations. To break thisdeadlock, Grew cabled Washington onthe necessity of talks for a modus vivendi,52but, with the coming ofJuly, Hull's desirefor negotiations with Japan had alreadydwindled. The fall of the Yonai cabinet,as well, was right at hand.On July 16, while the Grew-Arita con-ference was failing to produce any agree-ment, the Yonai cabinet finally resigned.The new cabinet of Konoye Fumimarowith Matsuoka Yosuke as Foreign Min-ister, was seen as taking a much more


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106positive stance in regard to the problem ofthe southern advance and the questionof a coalition with the Axis powers;consequently, the position of the hard linefaction within the U.S. Government wasgreatly strengthened. Hornbeck, who hadadvocated restrictive measures on im-ports from Japan in response to Japan'sclosing of the Burma Road,63 asserted onJuly 19 that the U.S. should immediatelyimpose export restrictions on aviationgasoline to Japan or implement a fullscale embargo on exports, when news ofJapan's large order for aviation gasolinecame to light, in his conviction that thismight 'retard or prevent new adventur-ing.54The U.S. Government at this time hadalready devised various measures toparallel its diplomatic approach towardsJapan. One was the order of May 4 tocontinue the stationing of the fleet atHawaii. Chief of Naval Operations,Harold Stark, explained to the Com-mander of the Pacific Fleet that theGovernment took the view that 'the pre-sence of the Fleet at Hawaii... would serveas a deterrent, even if the U.S. were notin fact prepared to take action if theJapanese attacked the Dutch Indies. Themere uncertainty as to U.S. intentionswould hold them back'.55 On June 4,the export of special machine tools wasput under license control and, on July 2,the National Defense Act was passedwhich gave the President the authorityto place under license the export of arms,munitions, raw materials, airplane parts,optical instruments, and other items.Petroleum and scrap iron were, however,prudently omitted from the list of articles.This omission was due to the State De-partment's concern as to how the Japanesewould react if the two items which wereof the utmost importance to Japan'swartime economy and military activitywere subjected to licensing. Hamiltonstated on June 7, 'I believe that such re-striction or prohibition would tend to

impel Japan towards moving into theDutch East Indies and I therefore re-commend that, if at all practicable, norestrictions be placed at this time onexportation of petroleum products'.56The appointment of Henry Stimson asSecretary of War in the first part of Julymeant an increase in the relative strengthof the hard line faction within the U.S.Government. Simson, who as Secretary ofState at the time of the Manchurian in-cident had supported economic sanctionsagainst Japan,57had repeatedly advocatedfrom outside the Government the necessityfor a strong policy toward Japan sincethe Sino-Japanese War broke out. Forinstance, in a letter to the New YorkTimeson January 11, 1940, he denounced U.S.merchants for supplying iron ore, steel,scrap iron, and aviation gasoline to Japanin spite of its atrocities in China. He alsocriticized the isolationist politicians who'tried to frighten our Government fromdoing anything to prevent wrong by warn-ing that to do so would surely throw theminto war with Japan'. He professed thatwar with Japan would never occur, asthe Japanese were anxious to avoid warwith the United States at all costs. Ac-cordingly, the U.S. should, in additionto abrogating the commercial treaty,prohibit the export to Japan of munitionsand war materials.58Stimson was also infrequent contact with the hard line factionof Hornbeck and others in the StateDepartment and expounded on the ne-cessity of suspending exports to as wellas imports from Japan.59The addition of Stimson to the U.S.decision-makers greatly strengthened theposition of Hornbeck and Secretary ofthe Treasury, H. Morgenthau, who hadheretofore been most representative ofthe hard line faction within the cabinet.Invited to a dinner party at the BritishEmbassy onJuly 18 together with Morgen-thau and Secretary of the Navy, F. Knox,Stimson stated: 'The only way to treatJapan is not to give in to her on anything'.


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He also expressed the strong convictionthat Japan's southern advance wouldbecome more and more unlikely as shedug herself deeper into the China quag-mire.60'U.S.'

Everyone within this hard line factionwas united in the view that the mosteffective method for deterring Japan'smilitary actions was a complete embargoon petroleum and scrap iron. Morgen-thau's plan for an embargo on petroleumseemed to arouse the interest of PresidentRoosevelt and, as a result, a conferencewas opened at the President's request,with Morgenthau, the Secretaries of theArmy and Navy, and Acting Secretaryof State Sumner Welles participating, atwhich the question of the regulation ofexports to Japan was debated for severaldays. Welles, acting for Hull, adamantlyopposed the licensing of oil exports toJapan on the basis that this measure mightprovoke a southern advance. In spite ofhis opposition, however, Roosevelt, whoperhaps was strongly impressed by thenews of Japan's large order for petroleum,put his signature on July 25 to an orderexpanding the export license system toinclude petroleum and scrap iron.61When the State Department was in-formed of the new order it was filled withapprehension lest this measure producea crisis situation with Japan. Particularlypronounced was the excitement amongthose in the Far Eastern Division.62 Atthe following cabinet meeting on the 26th,Welles reiterated his position and ex-changed sharp words with Morgenthau.Due to Welles' stubborn opposition, Mor-genthau and Stimson finally retreated astep, and the cabinet decision was, in theend, a compromise in which petroleumto be subjected to export restrictions waslimited to aviation motor fuel and lubri-cants, and scrap iron restrictions limitedto No. I heavy melting iron and steelscrap.63 Although the strength of the

107economic sanctions was weakened as aresult of the State Department opposition,that the Government had moved a bigstep forward in imposing an embargo onpetroleum to Japan constituted a cause ofrejoicing for Stimson. On August 1 Stim-son wrote in his diary, 'we have won at along battle, which we have been wagingagainst Japan for about four years'.64'Japan'The imposition by the U.S. of economicsanctions in a decisive form produceda deep shock in all quarters of Japan.65The secret war diary of the Army GeneralStaff remarked there was a proposalwithin the staff on August 2 regarding'Steps to Be Taken Against the UnitedStates Embargo on Petroleum and ScrapIron to Japan', and a strong argument infavor of the strengthening of the southernpolicy. At the same time the First Sectionof the Navy General Staff drew up onAugust 1 a 'Study Relating to Policy To-wards French Indo-China.' These docu-ments clearly indicated that the Army andNavy intended to 'strengthen' the southernpolicy as a response to the pressure ofeconomic sanctions.

Further, the Navy document made itclear that the middle echelon officers inthe Navy General Staff estimated that,if the Japanese military advanced intothe whole of French Indo-China, the U.S.Government would probably impose anembargo on all petroleum and scrap iron.In that case, Japan, as 'a matter of lifeand death', would have to face 'a situationin which it would have no choice but tostiffen its determination to invade theDutch Indies in order to obtain oil fields.'66The conviction that in case of 'U.S. im-position of a complete embargo' the 'useof military force towards the south' wouldbecome inevitable, was confirmed by theNavy General Staff towards the end ofAugust67and, at about the same time, re-ceived unanimous support at a roundtableconference of the middle echelon officers


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108of the Army General Staff and NavyGeneral Staff.68Two crucial miscalculations of the U.S.hard line faction concerning Japan'sreaction to economic sanctions are re-flected in these developments. First, theeconomic sanctions, rather than serving asa 'deterrent to a southern advance', pro-duced precisely the opposite effect. Second,a complete embargo, rather than resultingin Japan's submission, carried with it thedanger of driving Japan to a militaryadvance into the south in spite of the re-sulting possibility of a war with the U.S.On these points the observations of thesoft line faction in the State Departmentwere indeed more correct. True, as rep-resented by the Minister for NavalAffairs, Yoshida Zengo, there existed anegative opinion on the use of force evenin the event of a complete embargo;69however, one must take note that in thisperiod the middle echelon officers of theJapanese Army and Navy had a strongvoice in the process of determining Jap-anese foreign policy.70 The psychologicalreaction of these officers to a completeembargo is, therefore, significant enoughto be more considered.Needless to say, the best southernpolicy for Japan was the one in whichJapan could establish its control overIndo-China and the Dutch Indies sofirmly as to insure the obtaining of es-sential products, without resorting to theuse of force and thereby minimizingUnited States opposition. With this inmind, Foreign Minister Matsuoka begannegotiations with the French AmbassadortoJapan, CharlesArstne-Henry on August1, making Japanese economic demandsand asking for permission for Japanesetroops to pass through the Tonkin regionand to use airport facilities in Indo-China.In addition, Kobayashi Ichizo was ap-pointed Special Ambassador to the DutchIndies on August 27 to conduct nego-tiations there for the insuring of petroleumimports of more than 3,000,000 tons a year

for a five year period.71The negotiationsin regard to Indo-China resulted in atentative agreement between Matsuokaand Henry on August 30, but subsequentnegotiations concerning practical detailsof the agreement ran into difficulties,causing a delay in the entry of the Jap-anese army.72 The Army and Navyauthorities, out of impatience, then sub-mitted their demand for the setting of adefinite time limit. The argument that,in case of a failure to reach an agreement,an advance should be made even if ithad to be by the use of military forcegradually gained strength. Consideration,of course, had to be given to the U.S.reaction to an 'advance by force'. At thisjuncture there was evidently a negativeopinion among the Navy on a 'forcefuladvance' which might produce an 'in-tensification of American export restric-tions' (Navy Department),73but the middleechelon officers in the Army and Navytook a firm stand in response to U.S.economic pressure, by maintaining thata delay in the advance would 'appear asJapan being tricked by Indo-China'sdelay tactics and, as well, as submittingtoU.S. pressure.The root of evil left un-eradicated in the future would be great'(September 9, Navy General Staff).74Finally, on September 10, with the con-cession of the Minister of the Navy, theArmy and Navy came to an agreementon a plan to issue an ultimatum and, re-gardless of the result of the negotiations,to advance into Indo-China after Sep-tember 22. This received final approvalat the four ministers' conference of Sep-tember 13.75The enforcement of U.S. economicsanctions thus turned out to stiffen theattitude of the middle echelon officersandprovoked them to execute the plan for asouthern advance. The information of this'acceleration of policy towards the south'by Japan in turn had a 'feedback' effecton the U.S. Government and reinforcedthe position of the hard line faction.


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'U.S.'The information of Japan's new de-mands towards Indo-China and theDutch Indies reached the U.S. Govern-ment one after another during the firsttwo weeks of August.76 On August 15Morgenthau again stressed to Hornbeckthe need for a full embargo on oil toJapan.Both were convinced that, in the eventof such an embargo, it was unlikely thatJapan would defy the U.S. with resoluteaction or would set out forcefully to occupythe Dutch Indies.77On the following day,Hornbeck met with representatives of theDutch Indies oil companiesand urged themnot to submit to Japanese pressure, espe-cially in regard to the Japanese demandfor a large quantity of aviation gasoline.78On September 6, when the Japanesetroops caused an incident at the Indo-China border, the U.S. cabinet meetingwitnessed a sharp exchange of wordsbetween Morgenthau and Stimson on theone hand and Hull on the other concerningthe question of an embargo on petroleum.79Hornbeck, in a visit to Stimson on Sep-tember 11, stressed the necessity of adopt-ing a more active policy in the Far Eastin order to restrain Japanese actions.He particularly emphasized that it wouldbe in the interest of the U.S. to promotefriendly relations with the Soviet Unioneven if concessions on commercial ques-tions were necessary to do so.80On September 19, after having heardabout the latest Japanese ultimatum toIndo-China, the cabinet met to examinethe question of a complete embargo onaviation gasoline. Opinion within theGovernment was as divided as before. Hullwas not as adamant in his opposition ashe had earlier been, but his arguments stillreflected the view existing within the StateDepartment that an oil embargo wouldincite Japan to attack the Dutch Indies.81

Though Stimson and Morgenthau de-manded a complete embargo on oil, theState Department continued to opposesuch a move. As a result, the economic

109sanctions decided upon by the U.S.Government in response to Japan's latestaction in northern Indo-China were lim-ited to a prohibition on the export of allgrades of scrap iron. The U.S. Govern-ment waited for Japan to move intoIndo-China and, after granting anotherloan to the Chinese Government on Sep-tember 25, officially announced the em-bargo measure.82'Japan'On October 5 Foreign Minister Mat-suoka invited Ambassador Grew to ex-press his displeasure at the U.S. actionand state that 'such embargoes would notseriously handicap us but would intenselyanger the Japanese people.'83On October8, Ambassador Horinouchi presented Hullwith a note which protested against thescrap iron embargo in strong language thatcould be interpreted as a threat: 'therestrictions effected by the regulationsconstitute a "virtual embargo" and theycannot fail to be regarded as directedagainst Japan and, as such, to be an un-friendly act ... the progressive applicationof restrictions against Japanese trade maycause future relations between the UnitedStates and Japan to become "unpredict-able" '.84On September 27 the Tripartite Pactbetween Japan, Germany, and Italy wassigned. Matsuoka expected that thestrengthening of the Axis would enhanceJapan's position vis-a-vis the United Statesand would result in a moderation of theU.S. hard line attitude towards Japan.The 'resolute attitude' demonstrated bythe Tripartite Pact would in itself, accord-ing to the logic of Matsuoka and Konoyeas well, frustrate the U.S. intention tointervene in a Japanese southern advanceand would lessen the possibility of theoutbreak of war with the U.S.85'U.S.'The U.S. reaction, however, was con-trary to Matsuoka's expectations. Ac-cording to a public opinion survey con-


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110ducted at the end of September, the atti-tude of the U.S. public towards Japan,in comparison even with the unfavorableattitude at the inauguration of the Konoyecabinet, had changed for the worse. Thenumber of people favoring strong actionagainst Japan had greatly increased.86Furthermore, at the cabinet meeting ofOctober 4, there was consensus that theU.S. should clearly indicate its determina-tion not to yield one inch in the face ofJapan's intimidation.87Thus, the hard linefaction argued for the coming of the periodof a 'bold and positive policy in the FarEast' and came up with a proposal forsending a Navy squadron to the DutchIndies or to Singapore.88In a speech onOctober 12, Roosevelt emphasized thatthe U.S. was resolute in its determinationnot to submit to threats and intimidationor to follow the road laid out by dictators.It was now clear to the Japanese that theTripartite Pact had failed to produce theexpected effect on their relations withthe U.S.'Japan'It was evident that the hard line pol-icies of both the U.S. and Japan notonly failed to have an anticipated deterrenteffect but, on the contrary, served furtherto rigidify their respective positions. Fromthe autumn of 1940, the movement amongthe middle echelon officersin the JapaneseArmy for an 'acceleration of the southernpolicy' became more intense. Finally, onJuly 14, 1941,Japan demanded permissionto move troops into southern Indo-China,and implemented it on July 28.'U.S.'

Against this, the U.S. Governmenthad, on July 25, issued an order freezingJapanese assets in the U.S. And on August1, in what could be called the playingof its trump card, the U.S. put into effectan oil embargo against Japan. Now thefinal stage was set before the two countriesplunged into the catastrophe. On August 2,Hull, who had given up his last stronghold

in his battle with the hard line faction,wrote his opinion: 'Nothing will stop themexcept force .. The point is how longwe can maneuver the situation until themilitary matter in Europe is brought toa conclusion.'89'Japan'At the same time, on the Japanese side,the middle echelon officers in the Navyhad already practically resolved themselvesto war with the U.S. in the event of anoil embargo. Most crucial in the eyesof these men was that the exhaustion ofthe existing stock of a year and half'ssupply of oil would reduce the navy to a'scarecrow navy'. The oil embargo alsocaused the middle echelon officers in theArmy to move towards favoring goingquickly to war with the U.S. The secretwar diary of the Army General Staffnoted on August 1 that 'the atmosphereof the inevitability of war with Englandand the U.S. has gradually deepened'and on August 2 that 'the Military AffairsSection (Ministry of War) proposed anImperial Conference to determine to go towar with England and the United States'.At about this time, Ambassador Grew,making his last diplomatic effort to stemthe tide of falling fortunes, laid bare hisstate of despair with the oil embargo:'The vicious circle of reprisalsand counterreprisals is on. Facilis descensusaverni est.Unless radical surprisesoccur in the world,it is difficult to see how the momentum ofthe down-grade movement can be arrested,or how far it will go. The obvious con-clusion is eventual war'.904. ConclusionAs the above observations show, theU.S. Government's warnings concerning,and imposition of, economic sanctions didnot serve the intended function of actingas a deterrence on Japanese externalactivity, but had an adverse escalatingeffect resulting in Japan's southern ad-vance and war. To explain how U.S.


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deterrent policy produced this oppositeeffect of escalation, it is necessary to con-sider the question of the miscalculationsmade by the hard line faction of theUnited States Government. First of all,behind all their arguments lay two im-portant assumptions concerning the re-action of the Japanese. One was that inspite of an outward appearance of tough-ness, Japan would almost certainly, be-cause of its military and economic pre-dicament, seek to avoid war with the U.S.at all costs. The other assumption wasthat in dealing with the Japanese, a con-ciliatory attitude was to be avoided andpower was the only thing that made anyimpression. If the U.S. showed an un-bending resolution, Japan would withoutfail tamely submit.The hard line faction erred in theircalculations in regard to both of thesepoints. Economic pressure, rather thanrestraining Japan and forcing a retreatin its movement for a southern advance,did in fact produce an 'acceleration ofthe southern policy' and even stiffenedthe Japanese Government's decision togo to war with U.S. What were the factorsthat produced these miscalculations? First,the point is to be made that in their pre-dicting of Japan's reactions they thoughtchiefly in terms of the reactions of thepolitical leadership or the policy decision-makers. They had an exceedingly in-adequate understanding of the importantrole played by the middle echelon militaryofficers in the course of Japanese foreignpolicy decision making at this time. Theythereby overlooked the fact that in theway of thinking and behaving the middleechelon group somewhat differed fromthe upper echelon, and they were moreadventuristic, contemptible of compro-mise, and militarily-minded.Secondly, the hard line faction, in inter-preting Japan's intentions and in antici-pating the effect of deterrent policies, wasparticularly prone to draw analogies withpast experiences. For example, Hornbeck,

111in a memorandum of January 28, 1941,stated that when the Japanese Govern-ment made a decision to go to war in thepast, it tended not to express that intentionpublicly with exaggerated gestures. Theposture of overplay was rather indicativeof a lack of resolve to go to war. Hisconclusion, therefore, was that ForeignMinister Matsuoka was doing no morethan trying to intimidate the U.S.91Stimson's attitude is also of considerableinterest in regard to this point. Shortlyafter Japan's signing of the TripartitePact, he drew up a 'Historical Memo-randum as to Japan's relations with theU.S. which may have a bearing uponthe present situation', and explained toother decision makers how, throughhistory, the methods of dealing with Japanshould be studied.92He referredin particu-lar to the state of Japanese-U.S. relationsat the time of the Siberian expedition and,at a cabinet meeting of October 4, ex-plained it as an 'historical lesson' in thefollowing way: 'in the autumn of 1919President Wilson got his dander up andput on an embargo on all cotton going toJapan and a boycott on her silk, with theresult that she crawled down within twomonths and brought all of her troops outfrom Siberia like whipped puppies.'93 Thisaccount was related to the U.S. responsetoJapan's action when the latter increasedthe number of the expeditionary forcesin Siberia in 1918 in disregard of the'agreement' between the two countries.Stimson had stored this story in his mem-ory as a good precedent demonstratingthe effectiveness of economic sanctionsagainst Japan, and this 'historical lesson'can be said to have been an importantfactor in the formation of the argumentof the hard line faction.There is often a serious danger of mis-calculation when one uses historical anal-ogies as standards of judgment becausesuch analogies frequently overlook differ-ences in actual conditions between thepast and the present. In regard to Sim-


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112son's reasoning in his 'historical lesson',for example, it is certainly true that at thetime of the Siberian expedition the'threat' of United States economic sanc-tions produced in '1918' the effect of a'partial evacuation' of the JapaneseArmy.94However, he either overlooked orignored the fact that Japanese domesticconditions in 1918 were greatly differentfrom those in 1940 in regard both to thepower relationship between the civilianleaders and the military leaders, and theleadership within the military.Thirdly, the hard line faction concludedthat, in light of the disparity in strengthbetween Japan and the U.S., Japanesedecision-makers, having made rationalcalculations as to whether to go to warwith the U.S., could not conceivablydecide on war. In this regard they madethe mistake of applying to the Japanesein unaltered form the western model of thedecision making process and conceptionof rationalistic behavior. Lack of know-ledge about the psychology of theJapanesepeople and especially of the middle echelonofficers in the military in the period im-mediately preceding the war led the hard

line faction to miscalculate Japanesereactions. This psychology was markedby a predisposition to make crucial de-cisions in the face of taking extremelygreat risks as was expressed in TojoHideki's often quoted statement that'sometimes man has to jump with hiseyes closed, from the temple of Kiyomizuinto the ravine below',95as well as by anabsolute abhorrence of submission andchoosing 'death rather than humiliation'.Grew, in stressing the importance of the'psychological factors' in predicting Jap-anese actions, wrote that 'Japan is anation of hard warriors, still [sic] incul-cated with the samurai do-or-die spiritwhich has by tradition and inheritancebecome ingrained in the race' (December1, 1939).96It can be said that Grew wascorrect when he warned the decision-makers in his country not to miscalculatethe peculiarities in the Japanese mode ofaction.This case is no more than an historicalexample of a hard line group's deterrentpolicies giving rise to miscalculations thatresulted in escalation of hostilities in in-ternational politics.

NOTES1 For books on 'revisionism' see especially Charles A. Beard, PresidentRooseveltandthe Comingof the War, 1941; CharlesC. Tansill, BackDoorto War, 1952; GeorgeE. Morgenstern,PearlHarbor;TheStoryoftheSecretWar, 1947; Robert A. Theobald, TheFinal Secretof PearlHarbor,1954.2 Paul W. Schroeder, The Axis AllianceandJapanese-AmericanRelations,1941, 1958.8 Ibid, pp. 202-203.4 Ibid, pp. 203-204.5 For Americanpolicy towardsJapan in the periodfrom the beginningof the Sino-JapaneseWar to 1938, see Dorothy Borg, The UnitedStatesand the Far EasternCrisisof 1933-1938, 1964.6 The figuresindicatethepercentageofJapan'stradewith the UnitedStatesto its totalinter-nationaltrade in the 1930's:

1931......1932......1933......1934 ......1935......1936 ....1937......1938......1939 ....

Export to Import fromthe United States the United States37.1 27.731.6 35.626.5 32.418.7 33.722.4 32.822.1 30.720.1 33.615.8 34.417.9 34.4


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1137 State Department report titled 'Narrative of Developments Leading to the Giving of Noticeby the U.S. of an Intention to Terminate the Japanese-American Commercial Treaty of 1911'(April 30, 1940), StateDepartmentFile (National Archives, Washington, D.C.), 711. 942/627.8 See the above report.9 The main points of a radio speech made by Premier Konoye on November 3 to clarify theconcept of 'New Order in East Asia' were as follows: 'Japan desires to build up a stabilized FarEast by cooperating with the Chinese people who have awakened to the need of self-determinationas an Oriental race. ... History shows that Japan, Manchukuo and China are so related to eachother that they must bind themselves closely together in a common mission for the establishmentof peace and order in the Far East by displaying their own individuality. ... Japan sees thenecessity of effecting a fundamental revision in this situation and desires to establish a new peacefabric in the Far East on the basis of justice. ... The world knows that Japan is earnestly deter-mined to fight it out with communism. What the Comintern intends to do is bolshevisationof the Far East and disturbance of world peace.... Japan is determined also to cooperate in thereestablishment of world order guided by a common view of the world. What the world at presentneeds badly is the establishment of peace on a fair balance of power. There is no denying thefact that various principles in the past have forced the maintenance of the statusquomarked by

an unbalanced state. That the international treaty such as the covenant of the League of Nationshas lost its prestige is fundamentally due to this irrationality.'10 In October 1938, the Japanese forces occupied several important cities, including Hankow,along the middle of thc Yangtze River, and Canton, the most important city in South China,after having undertaken a large scale military offensive.11 United States, Departmentof State, PapersRelatingto the ForeignRelationsof the United States(hereafter abbreviated as ForeignRelations), 1938, Vol. III, 1954, pp. 406-409.12 For example, telegram of Grew to Hull, December 1, 1939, StateDepartmentFile, 711. 94/1396;ForeignRelations,1939, Vol. III, 1955, pp. 604-613.13 State Department Report, op.cit.14 Ibid.15 State Department File, 711.942/1701/2.16 State Department Report, op.cit; memorandum of Sayre to Hull, May 2, 1939, ForeignRelations,1939, Vol. III, 1955, pp. 535-537.17 ForeignRelations,1938, Vol. III, pp. 425-427." William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, TheChallengetoIsolation, 1937-1940, 1952, p. 150.19 Ibid., p. 152.20 Ibid., pp. 152-153.21 In this connection Langer and Gleason remark that Roosevelt was perhaps eager to 'payback the snub' he had recently sufferedfrom the Senate in regard to neutrality legislation. Ibid.,p. 158.22 Cordell Hull, The MemoirsofCordellHull, Vol. I, 1948, pp. 636-639. For a summary of thedevelopments leading to the nullification, see Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Taiheiyo SensoGen-in Kenkyubu, TaiAeiyoSensoe nomichi,[The RoadtothePacificWar]Vol. VI, 1963,pp. 301-309.23 Report of Sayre, December 5, 1938, ForeignRelations,1938, Vol. III, pp. 406-409.24 Telegram of Doorman, August 4, 1939, ForeignRelations,1939, Vol. III, p. 565.26 Morishimu Morito, Shinjuwan,Lisbon,Tokyo [PearlHarbor,Lisbon,Tokyo],1950, p. 1.16 This plan is found in KonoyeShiryo[KonoyeDocuments.]27 In forming his cabinet General Abe received ordersfrom the Emperor that his 'foreign policycooperate with England and the U.S.'. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Taiheiy5Sensde no michi,5, 1963, pp. 161-163.28 KonoyeDocuments.'9 Ibid.0 ForeignRelations,1939, Vol. III, pp. 620-621; Ibid., Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, 1943, pp.48-51.

81 Hull memorandum of December 22, 1939, ibid., 1939, Vol. III, pp. 626-627; Hull telegramto Grew, December 27, ibid., p. 631,289Report of Grew to Hull, December 18, 1939, ibid., p. 622.

33 Memorandum of Hornbeck, December 19, 1939, StateDepartmentFile, 711.942/454.34 Memorandum of Hornbeck, August 2, 1939, State DepartmentFile, 711.941/1302.35 For example, Hornback memorandum to Hull, September 21, 1939, ForeignRelations,1939,Vol. III, pp. 547-548.38 On this problem the proposition of so-called GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation in Tension


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114Reduction) in Charles E. Osgood, An Alternativeto War or Surrender,1962 and the 'Gradualism'approach of Amitai Etzioni, AfterContainment:WinningwithoutWar, 1964 are provocative.37 Hull, op.cit., pp. 727-728.38 Ibid., p. 726. For Roosevelt's reply of approval (December 14), see State DepartmentFile,711.942/413.39 Hull, op.cit., p. 728; Telegram of Hull to Grew, December 21, 1939, ForeignRelations,1939, Vol. III, pp. 625-626.

40 Grew to Hull, January 18, 1940, ForeignRelations, 1940, Vol. IV, 1955, p. 627; Hull toGrew, January 19, 1940, Hull, op.cit., p. 628; Ballantine to Hull, January 20, StateDepartmentFile, 711.942/554.41 Morishima Morito, op.cit., pp. 15-17.42 TaiheiyoSensoe no michi,Vol. VII, p. 43.43 As to the supply of petroleum, Japan heavily depended upon the United States.

(A) The percentage of domestic products to the whole consumption:1937 ....... 8.4%1938 ....... 9.1%1939 ....... 9.8%1940 ....... 7.7%(B) The countries from which Japan imported petroleum as of 1936:1000 tons %U.S .............. 3,043 66Dutch Indies ...... 991 21British Borneo ..... 301 7Manchukuo ....... 73 2North Sakhalin .... 26 1Others . ......... 191 4

Total.............. 4,645 10044 Telegram of Grew to Hull, May 3, 1940, ForeignRelations, 1940, Vol. IV. pp. 322-325.45 Report of Grew, May 6, ibid., pp. 328-330.46 Telegram of Hull to Grew, May 8, ibid., p. 330.47 Report of Grew, June 4, ibid., pp. 342-344.48 Memorandum of Hornbeck to Hull, May 24, ibid., pp. 334-336.49 Telegram of Hull, May 30, ibid., pp. 336-338; Telegram of Hull, June 4, ibid., pp. 345-346.50 For example, telegram of Hull, June 15, ibid., pp. 353-356.61 Memorandum of Hornbeck, June 12, ibid., pp. 351-352.62 Report of Grew, July 11, ibid., pp. 398-400.68 Memorandum of Hornbeck, July 13, ibid., pp. 583-585.64 Ibid., pp. 586-587.55 Langer and Gleason, op.cit., p. 588.56 ForeignRelations,1940, Vol. IV, p. 576.67 For the most detailed research on this point see Armin Rappaport, HenryL. StimsonandJapan, 1931-33, 1963.58 Langer and Gleason, op. cit., p. 578.69 StimsonDiary, entry for May 3, 1940 (The Yale University Library).60 Langer and Gleason, op.cit., p. 721.61 Ibid., pp. 721-722.62 Herbert Feis, The Roadto PearlHarbor,1950, p. 92.63 StimsonDiary,entry forJuly 26, 1940.64 StimsonDiary, entry for August 1, 1940.65 Morishima, op.cit., p. 28.66 GendaiShi Shiryo (Documentson ContemporaryHistory) (Misuzu Shobo), NitchuSenso (3),1965, pp. 369-371.67 Ibid., pp. 497-501.68 Ibid., pp. 504-507.89 TaiheiybSensoe nomichi,Vol. VII, p. 47.


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11570 Ibid., pp. 201-211.71 On negotiations with the Dutch Indies see Itagaki Yoichi'Taiheiyo Sensoto SekiyuMondai'['The Pacific War and the Question of Petroleum'], Nihon Gaiko Gakkai ed., TaiheiyoSensoGen-inRon, [The Causeof the Pacific War] 1953, pp. 613-648, and TaiheiyoSenso e no michi,Vol. VI, pp. 71-98.72 On negotiations with the French regarding Indo-China, see ibid., pp. 43-71, 189-212.73 GendaiShi Shiryo,op.cit., pp. 386-387.74 Ibid., p. 386.75 Ibid., pp. 386-387; TaiheiyoSensoe no michi,Vol. 6, pp. 216-217.76 Feis, op.cit., p. 96.77 Memorandum of Hornbeck, August 15, ForeignRelations, 1940, Vol. IV., pp. 597-598.78 Feis, op.cit., p. 98.79 Ibid., p. 103.80 StimsonDiary,entry for September 11, 1940.81 Ibid., September 19, 1940.82 Feis, op.cit., pp. 105-106.83 Joseph C. Grew, Ten Yearsin Japan, 1944, p. 345.84 Telegram of Hull to Grew, October 8, ForeignRelations, 1940, Vol. IV, p. 608.85 TaiheiyoSensoe no michi,Vol. V, pp. 211-214, 225-226.86 Feis, op.cit., p. 122.87 StimsonDiary, entry for October 4, 1940.88 Ibid., entries for October 8, October 12, December 6, 1940.89 Feis, op.cit., pp. 248-249.90 Ibid., pp. 248.91StateDepartmentFile, 894.00/1008.92 StimsonDiary, entries for October 2 and October 4, 1940.93 Ibid., October 4, 1940.94 Hosoya Chihiro, 'Shiberia Shuppei o meguru Nichibei Kankei' ['Japanese-AmericanRelations and the Siberian Expedition'], KokusaiSeiji, 1961, pp. 73-90.95 On the question of risk taking, see Nathan Kogan and Michael A. Wallach, Risk Taking,1964.96 ForeignRelations, 1939, Vol. III, pp. 606-607.

SU MMARYThis article explores an action-reaction process which occurred between Japan and theU.S. in the years preceding World War II, focusing on the U.S.' imposition of economicsanctions. It maintains that these sanctions failed to deter the Japanese from pursuingtheir expansionist policy, and instead stimulated Japan's southward expansion andeven its determination to go to war with the U.S. Miscalculations of the deterrent policyare ascribed to lack of understanding of the hard-line faction within the U.S. Govern-ment as to the structure of Japan's foreign policy decision-making, and the psychologyof the Japanese, in particular the military.

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Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy U S. Relations 1938-1941

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