Minna Starck April 4, 2005 University of Helsinki Email: [email protected]
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Transcript of Minna Starck April 4, 2005 University of Helsinki Email: [email protected]
The Finnish Exploitation of The Finnish Exploitation of DétenteDétente
From the US Perspective in From the US Perspective in the Early 1970s:the Early 1970s:
The Case of the CSCEThe Case of the CSCE
Minna StarckMinna StarckApril 4, 2005April 4, 2005
University of HelsinkiUniversity of HelsinkiEmail: [email protected]: [email protected]
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The topics that this lecture will The topics that this lecture will cover are:cover are:
Détente in the early 1970sDétente in the early 1970s
American-Soviet relations during détenteAmerican-Soviet relations during détente
European détenteEuropean détente
Finland and the United StatesFinland and the United States
Kekkonen’s visit to the White House in July 1970Kekkonen’s visit to the White House in July 1970
Historical background to the CSCEHistorical background to the CSCE
American attitude towards the CSCEAmerican attitude towards the CSCE
Outcomes from the CSCEOutcomes from the CSCE
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History of DétenteHistory of Détente
A possible end to a post-war A possible end to a post-war adjustment to the division of Europe.adjustment to the division of Europe.
The beginning of a new phase in the The beginning of a new phase in the Cold War characterized by ongoing Cold War characterized by ongoing dialogue e. g. SALT and CSCE.dialogue e. g. SALT and CSCE.
It accelerated the process of It accelerated the process of exchanges between East and Westexchanges between East and West. .
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The Rise of DétenteThe Rise of DétenteSALT ISALT I
Nixon-Brezhnev SummitsNixon-Brezhnev Summits
Opening to ChinaOpening to China
German QuestionGerman Question
Four-Power agreementFour-Power agreement
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What was this man thinking?What was this man thinking?
Czechoslovak crisis?
Finnish ‘active neutrality policy’?
East-West détente?
CSCE ?
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Finnish NeutralityFinnish Neutrality
After the Warsaw Pact invasion of After the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union ceased to Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union ceased to refer to Finland as a neutral country in its official refer to Finland as a neutral country in its official texts.texts.It insisted on giving the 1948 Finnish-Soviet It insisted on giving the 1948 Finnish-Soviet treaty priority.treaty priority.What followed was a long drawn-out battle of What followed was a long drawn-out battle of words. words. Finally a compromise was reached and both the Finally a compromise was reached and both the 1948 treaty and Finland’s policy of neutrality 1948 treaty and Finland’s policy of neutrality were mentioned in a single paragraph.were mentioned in a single paragraph.
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President Kekkonen’s trip to President Kekkonen’s trip to Washington in July 1970Washington in July 1970
“We respect you in the field of foreign policy, a policy of independence, and a policy of neutrality”
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Finland and the United StatesFinland and the United States
Much as from the 1940s onwards, in 1970 the Much as from the 1940s onwards, in 1970 the U.S. policy formulation towards Finland U.S. policy formulation towards Finland consisted of three main elements:consisted of three main elements:
1. To maintain an independent and democratic 1. To maintain an independent and democratic Finland with the truly neutral foreign policy Finland with the truly neutral foreign policy
2. the strengthening of Finland’s ties with the 2. the strengthening of Finland’s ties with the WestWest
3. Reduction of Finnish vulnerability to Soviet 3. Reduction of Finnish vulnerability to Soviet political and economic pressures political and economic pressures
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America’s foreign policyAmerica’s foreign policy
Richard Nixon came to power in January 1969
Henry Kissinger was his closest advisor
“era of negotiations”
Nixon and his successor Gerald Ford
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The American Conception of The American Conception of DétenteDétente
Nixon in 1968: The United States “must Nixon in 1968: The United States “must move away from confrontations in this move away from confrontations in this nuclear age into a new era – the era of nuclear age into a new era – the era of negotiation” negotiation”
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American–Soviet Relations American–Soviet Relations During Détente During Détente
A turning pointA turning point
American domestic problems – American domestic problems – Watergate etc..Watergate etc..
Soviet view of American recognition of Soviet view of American recognition of parity – SALT etc…parity – SALT etc…
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Superpower relations Superpower relations continued…continued…
Carrots and sticks?Carrots and sticks?
Unexpected outcomes?Unexpected outcomes?
Misconceptions of strengths and Misconceptions of strengths and weaknesses?weaknesses?
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European DétenteEuropean Détente
Differences between European and Differences between European and superpower détentesuperpower détenteEuropean détente – dynamic process European détente – dynamic process Independent European initiativesIndependent European initiativesPeoples interest – human rights agenda in Peoples interest – human rights agenda in the CSCEthe CSCE
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Historical Background of the Historical Background of the CSCECSCE
Original proposals for a pan-European Original proposals for a pan-European security conferencesecurity conference
Development of Warsaw Pact and NATODevelopment of Warsaw Pact and NATO
1960s – renewed interest in a multilateral 1960s – renewed interest in a multilateral security conferencesecurity conference
Inclusion of the North AmericansInclusion of the North Americans
Kekkonen’s invitation Kekkonen’s invitation
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Facts about CSCEFacts about CSCE
OstpolitikOstpolitik
Acceptance of the status quoAcceptance of the status quo
Getting something backGetting something back
Low level of expectationsLow level of expectations
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Kissinger worked closely with Kissinger worked closely with DobryninDobrynin from Helsinki meeting Nov. 17, from Helsinki meeting Nov. 17,
1969 to Moscow summit May 22-29, 19721969 to Moscow summit May 22-29, 1972
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American attitude towards the American attitude towards the CSCECSCE
United States considers CSCE as a United States considers CSCE as a peripheral affairperipheral affairFocus of US diplomatic efforts elsewhereFocus of US diplomatic efforts elsewhereMechanics of US diplomacy and CSCEMechanics of US diplomacy and CSCEA pragmatic approachA pragmatic approach
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Soviet interests in the CSCESoviet interests in the CSCE
To gain general acceptance of the territorial and To gain general acceptance of the territorial and political status quo in central and eastern Europe political status quo in central and eastern Europe
Enlarging on the bilateral West German Enlarging on the bilateral West German agreements with the Soviet Union, Poland and agreements with the Soviet Union, Poland and East EuropeEast Europe
To support reduction of interstate barriers to To support reduction of interstate barriers to increased economic relations and to further the increased economic relations and to further the general process of East-West detente general process of East-West detente
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CSCE was a part of a broader CSCE was a part of a broader diplomatic strategydiplomatic strategy
CSCE- a diplomatic strategy to be used in CSCE- a diplomatic strategy to be used in dealing with the USSRdealing with the USSR-and a political necessity when viewed from the -and a political necessity when viewed from the perspective of transatlantic relationsperspective of transatlantic relationsBut still – the “real” decisions were made in But still – the “real” decisions were made in bilateral context with the leaders of the Soviet bilateral context with the leaders of the Soviet UnionUnionA key point in this regard was the May 1972 A key point in this regard was the May 1972 Moscow summit where Nixon and Brezhnev Moscow summit where Nixon and Brezhnev agreed agreed on a linkage between CSCE and the on a linkage between CSCE and the Multilateral Balanced Forces Reduction talks Multilateral Balanced Forces Reduction talks (MBFR)(MBFR)
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Outcome of the CSCEOutcome of the CSCE
Lack of interest but concessions madeLack of interest but concessions made
Soviet triumph????Soviet triumph????
Implications of the Final ActImplications of the Final Act
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Friends forever!...Friends forever!...
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Soviet reaction to the Final ActSoviet reaction to the Final Act
Great deal, major triumphGreat deal, major triumph
Highlight of European détenteHighlight of European détente
The existence of the two German states The existence of the two German states had finally been recognized by the whole had finally been recognized by the whole worldworld
The Soviet leaders clearly believed ”the The Soviet leaders clearly believed ”the correlation of forces” in the world had correlation of forces” in the world had shifted decisively in their favour shifted decisively in their favour
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The Reaction to the Final Act in The Reaction to the Final Act in the United Statesthe United States
Different from that in the SU and Western Different from that in the SU and Western EuropeEurope
Unknown to most Americans’Unknown to most Americans’
The growing disenchantment with détente The growing disenchantment with détente and politicking in the upcoming and politicking in the upcoming presidential election in 1976 led to presidential election in 1976 led to criticism of the CSCE and of President criticism of the CSCE and of President Ford’s journey to Helsinki to sign itFord’s journey to Helsinki to sign it
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European reactionEuropean reaction
CSCE Final Act was positive. CSCE Final Act was positive.
Perception of a real relaxation of tensionsPerception of a real relaxation of tensions
Cynical commentators as well as those Cynical commentators as well as those carried away by euphoriacarried away by euphoria
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Effects for FinlandEffects for Finland
Urho Kekkonen’s Urho Kekkonen’s ’project’’project’
Significance for Significance for Finnish neutrality and Finnish neutrality and foreign policyforeign policy
Kekkonen’s moment Kekkonen’s moment in the sunin the sun
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Outcomes from the CSCEOutcomes from the CSCE
A shift in American attitudes – the A shift in American attitudes – the significance of human rights in significance of human rights in criticism of the Soviet unioncriticism of the Soviet union
Post-Helsinki popular action - Post-Helsinki popular action - Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union itself.Soviet Union itself.
Legitimacy for dissidents Legitimacy for dissidents
The Helsinki review conferences The Helsinki review conferences
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Irony of the Soviet-American Irony of the Soviet-American detentedetente
The Nixon-Kissinger détente doctrineThe Nixon-Kissinger détente doctrine promoted the eventual collapse of the promoted the eventual collapse of the USSR? USSR?
Soviet over-stretch in the belief that the Soviet over-stretch in the belief that the U.S. was weaker?U.S. was weaker?
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ConclusionConclusion
““The Soviets desperately wanted the CSCE, they The Soviets desperately wanted the CSCE, they got it and it laid the foundations for the end of got it and it laid the foundations for the end of their empire. We resisted it for years, went their empire. We resisted it for years, went grudgingly, Ford paid a terrible price for going – grudgingly, Ford paid a terrible price for going – perhaps re-election itself – only to discover perhaps re-election itself – only to discover years later that CSCE had yielded benefits years later that CSCE had yielded benefits beyond our wildest imagination. Go figure.”beyond our wildest imagination. Go figure.”
Robert Gates Robert Gates The Former Director of the CIA. In his book From the Shadows: The Former Director of the CIA. In his book From the Shadows: The Ultimate insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Helped Win the Cold The Ultimate insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Helped Win the Cold War, 1996. War, 1996.
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Some faces that mattered…Some faces that mattered…
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Henry Kissinger, Leonid Brezhnev, Gerald Ford, and Andrei Gromyko during the Helsinki summit, July 1975
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Further reading:Further reading:
Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy 1994.Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy 1994.Raymond L.Garthoff: Détente and Raymond L.Garthoff: Détente and Confrontation, American-Soviet Relations Confrontation, American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan 1985.from Nixon to Reagan 1985.Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, Interpretations, Theory. Ed. Odd Arne Interpretations, Theory. Ed. Odd Arne Westad 2000.Westad 2000.Johan Lewis Gaddis: We Know Now. Johan Lewis Gaddis: We Know Now. Rethinking Cold War History 1997.Rethinking Cold War History 1997.