MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC …fdro%e8n%ed%20zpr%e1va... · 7.7 Primary tasks...

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

ANNUAL REPORT

on Activities of Military Intelligence in 2012

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FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR

Dear Madam, Dear Sir,

I have the pleasure of presenting the 2012 Annual Report on the Activities of Czech Military Intelligence, which includes a comprehensive overview of its activities, general structure and budget.

Despite the recent affair that primarily concerns the Director of Military Intelligence and his predecessor in the post, it is fair to conclude that all tasks assigned to Military Intelli-gence according to the Act No. 153/1994 Coll., On Intelligence Services of the Czech Repub-lic, were accomplished fully in 2012, and that the affair has not affected day-to-day operations of Military Intelligence institutionally.

That primarily involved the performance of intelligence tasks assigned by the Govern-ment of the Czech Republic and Military Intelligence’s commitments as part of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Another and, same as previously, again successful deployment of SOF task force in Afghanistan should be mentioned too.

Acting Director of Military Intelligence Brigadier General Rostislav PILC

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CONTENTS

1 PUBLIC RELATIONS ..................................................................................................... 3

2 BASIC INFORMATION ................................................................................................ 4

2.1 General structure ............................................................................................................... 5 2.2 Budgetary funds ................................................................................................................ 5

3 TASKING AND PERFORMANCE ............................................................................... 7

4 PRODUCTS ..................................................................................................................... 8

4.1 Crisis regions ..................................................................................................................... 8 4.2 Terrorism and extremism ................................................................................................ 17 4.3 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons and dual-use materials ................................................................................................................................... 19 4.4 Cyber threats ................................................................................................................... 21 4.5 Activities by foreign intelligence services in the territory of the Czech Republic concerning defence ................................................................................................................... 22 4.6 Intentions and activities directed against defence of the Czech Republic ...................... 23 4.7 Intentions and activities threatening information security in the domain of national defence ..................................................................................................................................... 23

5 COOPERATION WITHIN THE CZECH REPUBLIC ............. ............................... 24

6 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ........................................................................ 25

6.1 Multilateral cooperation .................................................................................................. 25 6.2 Bilateral cooperation ....................................................................................................... 26 6.3 Military diplomacy .......................................................................................................... 26

7 INFORMATION SECURITY ...................................................................................... 27

7.1 Personnel security ........................................................................................................... 27 7.2 Communications and information systems security ........................................................ 27 7.3 Physical security .............................................................................................................. 27 7.4 Administrative security ................................................................................................... 28 7.5 Records management ...................................................................................................... 28 7.6 Archive management ....................................................................................................... 28 7.7 Primary tasks performed in release of documents of the former Military Counterintelligence Service and the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak People’s Armed Forces and replies to inquiries by authorised entities in 2012 29

8 INSPECTION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE’S ACTIVITIES .. ...................... 30

8.1 External inspection and its outcomes .............................................................................. 30 8.2 Internal inspection and its outcomes ............................................................................... 30

9 601ST SPECIAL FORCES GROUP ............................................................................. 32

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1 PUBLIC RELATIONS

In terms of communication with the public and the media, 2012 did not differ from the previous years. Military Intelligence responded to the requests for information in accordance with the Act No. 106/1999 Coll., On Free Access to Information.

Those were predominantly queries concerning the terms and conditions of enlistment and aspects of service with Military Intelligence. Another group of questions related to the current affairs in the authorised purview of Military Intelligence and topical developments worldwide.

To communicate with the media and the general public, Military Intelligence also uses the www.vzcr.cz website.

Media and public also showed their interest in current deployments and activities of the 601st Special Forces Group (601st SFG) both in the territory of the Czech Republic and on foreign operations. Their activities may be followed at www.601skss.cz, where commentaries are provided on the unit’s ongoing activities.

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2 BASIC INFORMATION

Military Intelligence is a component of the Ministry of Defence. The Director of Mili-tary Intelligence reports directly to the Minister of Defence.

Military Intelligence is an integrated armed intelligence service of the Czech Republic combining intelligence and counterintelligence activities, which gathers, collects, and assesses intelligence crucial for ensuring defence of the Czech Republic.

The position, purview and oversight over Military Intelligence are regulated by the Act No. 153/1994 Coll., On Intelligence Services of the Czech Republic, as subsequently amend-ed. The Act No. 289/2005 Coll., On Military Intelligence, further sets the scope of authority of Military Intelligence, i.e. the status of its members, specific means for acquiring infor-mation, employing persons to act in favour of Military Intelligence, maintenance of registries and oversight of activities of Military Intelligence. The internal structure and activities are defined by The Statute of Military Intelligence endorsed by the Government of the Czech Re-public.

The Government of the Czech Republic tasks Military Intelligence within the aforemen-tioned scope of authority and, at the same time, the Government of the Czech Republic is re-sponsible for activities of Military Intelligence. With cognizance of the Government, Military Intelligence can be also tasked by the President of the Czech Republic.

The primary mission of Military Intelligence is to provide information support to the top officials of the Czech Republic who are responsible for defence and security of the Czech Republic (the President, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Defence). In addition, Mili-tary Intelligence provides information support to the representatives of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic to the effect of providing security of the Czech Armed Forces units de-ployed in foreign operations and in the context of developments in crisis regions worldwide.

With respect to the Czech Republic’s membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-sation (NATO) and the European Union (EU), Military Intelligence also performs tasks as part of commitments to those organisations.

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2.1 General structure

2.2 Budgetary funds

Management of funds observed the mandatory rules pursuant to the Act No. 218/2000 Coll., On Budgetary Rules and on Amendments in Some Related Acts, as subsequently amended, the Act No. 320/2001 Coll., On Financial Control in the Public Administration and on Amendments in Some Acts, as subsequently amended, and the Act No. 563/1991 Coll., On Accountancy, as subsequently amended. Inspections did not identify any unauthorised use of budgetary funds. The budget of Military Intelligence was included in the authorised budget of the Ministry of Defence and amounted to CZK 1,966,990.50.

Human Resources and Education

Chief of Staff MI Deputy Director MI

Plans and Policy

Special Support and Training

Information Security

Logistic Support

Planning

Budfin

Director of Military Intelligence

Command and Control Support

Source s

Analysis

Inspection and Internal Security

Comms and Information Systems

Deputy Director MI Command Sergeant Major

DirectorateŘeditelství

601st Special Forces Group Signals Intelligence

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Structure of Military Intelligence’s budget in 2012

51%

34%

15%

Personnel expenditures

Other currentexpenditures

Investments

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3 TASKING AND PERFORMANCE

In 2012, Military Intelligence primarily performed the tasks according to the intelligence priorities set by the Government of the Czech Republic. Another task of Military Intelligence was to deliver on the commitments to NATO and EU intelligence authorities, which particularly involved provision of intelligence based on their requests for information.

In performance of its tasks, Military Intelligence observed relevant provisions of the Act No. 289/2005 Coll. and made use of information obtained by human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT) as well as through bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

In 2012, Military Intelligence developed, distributed in writing or delivered in the form of briefings to authorised recipients the total of 731 intelligence products. That represents the grand total of intelligence products, with some of them distributed to multiple recipients.

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4 PRODUCTS

4.1 Crisis regions

The Balkans

Military-political and security stability of western Balkans is crucial for security of Europe, including the Czech Republic. Alt-hough the region does not represent a security issue as opposed to the recent past, the unset-tled disputes still make it a potential threat of occurrence of local and short-term conflicts in Europe. Military Intelligence has consistently focused on the security situation in Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ethnic issues, organised crime, poor social-economic situation, nationalism, and Islamist radicalism continue to represent the main destabilising factors in the region. Preventive measures under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and the prospects of progressive Euro-pean integration help contain the tensions in the Balkans within the limits that do not repre-sent a threat to the political and security stability in Europe.

Military Intelligence has also paid a high attention to important information essential for the provision of security to Czech citizens working in the region in international organisa-tions, especially in KFOR1), UNMIK 2), EULEX3) and at Czech diplomatic missions.

In Kosovo, the year 2012 did not see significant security incidents that would have the potential to aggravate the overall security situation. It was neither affected by the termination of the so-called Supervised Independence of Kosovo, which was declared in connection with the closure of the International Civilian Office4).

Continuing resistance of Kosovo Serbs to the activation of the Kosovo government’s administrative office in Mitrovica and against the reform of the border regime, nevertheless, locally deteriorated the security situation in the north of Kosovo. Coupled with insufficient readiness of the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF), those developments led NATO authorities to postpone the planned KFOR force reduction.

Military-political situation in Serbia was monitored especially with a view to the possi-ble effect on the security situation in Kosovo. Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections caused mutual dialogue to stagnate tentatively, but it nevertheless resumed upon the estab-lishment of the new Cabinet. Military Intelligence, however, only expects a moderate pro-gress in settling mutual relations.

Military Intelligence noticed a growing interest of the Russian Federation to deepen its economic and commercial relations with Serbia in 2012. It is likely that their alliance will also spawn development of defence technology cooperation to possibly renew or expand produc-

1) Kosovo Force – a NATO-led international military mission in Kosovo 2) United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 3) European Union Rule of Law Mission 4) International Civilian Office – supports development of government institutions in Kosovo

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tion in Serbian defence industries, which will effectively help increase revenues of the Serbi-an national budget as well as strengthen Serbian position in the international arms market.

The security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was stabilised in 2012, but coexist-ence of the local three ethnic groups (Muslims, Serbs and Croats) was marked by a strong mutual isolation and continuing distrust. In addition, state cohesion of Bosnia and Herze-govina was weakened by manifestations of separatism showed by the political leaders of the Republika Srpska. Worsening socioeconomic conditions of the population in Bosnia and Her-zegovina may impact the local security situation through escalating social tensions or growing crime rate in the future. The gravest risk associated with high crime is the excessive quantity of illegally possessed weapons and ammunition in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has not been disposed yet.

Complications ensuing from the political and economic situation of the country also af-fect the process of forming unified armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fulfilment of NATO requirements for the armed forces’ compatibility and readiness has been suspended and the country has failed to meet the conditions for the transfer of title to the armed forces’ property to the state administration, which is a precondition for the country’s potential Euro-Atlantic integration.

Reports on the Balkans: Recipient Delivered products

Political and military officials of the Czech Republic 10 National cooperation 10 International cooperation 9

The Middle East

In 2012, developments in the region of the Middle East were af-fected by ongoing revolutionary changes that began in 2010. Con-tinuation of the armed conflict in Syria and the dramatic internal po-litical events in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood took power, are regarded key developments.

Security situation in the Mid-dle East continues to be affected by the absence of essential endeavour to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as by the controversy sur-rounding Iran’s nuclear program that arouses serious concerns over another potential war conflict.

The situation in Syria altered substantially after antigovernment protests broke out in March 2011 and progressively grew into a general crisis that further escalated in 2012. The developments are primarily shaped by the increasing level of violence exercised both by the regime and the armed opposition, and through the growing influence of religiously motivated combatants among rebels. The proportion of military capabilities owned by the Syrian regime and the opposition alters rather slowly, but it is obvious that the regime’s capabilities are downgrading whereas the opposition’s capabilities are growing. The aggravated security situ-

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ation in most of Syria’s territory forces numerous groups of Syrian citizens to flee into the neighbouring countries, which increases regional instability. The number of registered refu-gees exceeded 600,000 at the end of 2012. Possible ways ahead towards resolution of the Syr-ian crisis through an international intervention or political solution have been thwarted by differing positions of the principal world powers and neither the UN observer mission5) in-volving three Czech representatives facilitated any viable solutions to the crisis.

A new umbrella organisation named the National Coalition for Syrian Opposition and Revolutionary Forces was established in November 2012 to unify what had been largely fragmented opposition by then. The National Coalition is meant to become an overarching authority uniting all opposing groups and their representatives vis-à-vis the international community.

Developments in Syria will continue to be characterised by considerable instability and unpredictability. Potential fall of the Syrian regime will not mark an end to the Syrian crisis. With a high degree of probability, the fall of President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime would bring about a chaotic situation in Syria characterised by security vacuum. Radicalism combined with religious and ethnic cleansings and fight for power would than jeopardise both overall stabilisation of Syria but also the fragile stability among the religiously and ethnically varie-gated populations across the Middle East region.

In addition to the Syrian crisis itself, Military Intelligence evaluated the security situa-tion of the Czech Embassy in Damascus, which was active as of the day when the present publication was produced. In substantiated cases, information by the media, some of which reported on the situation in Syria in a biased and incorrect way, was corrected. Hence, Mili-tary Intelligence regularly informed top state officials on the true situation on the ground in Syria and actively contributed to the discussions on the subject in the framework of NATO and EU intelligence authorities.

Internal political, security and political-military situation in Lebanon was largely shaped by the crisis mounting in the neighbouring country of Syria and escalation of the mili-tary conflict in that country. The Syrian crisis once again exposed persistent tensions in Lebanon, which remains constantly divided in sectarian terms. Especially the Sunni popu-lation radicalised, and more intensively joined crossborder support to the Syrian opposition’s fight against the ruling regime. The pro-Syrian government in Lebanon attempted to calm the situation down using the military, which they managed in their compass of possibility with a relative degree of success. Meant to prevent the interethnic and religiously motivated violence from spilling over from Syria to Lebanon, the stabilisation process was also supported by the pro-Iran Hezbollah, which acts very moderately on the domestic political scene. Hezbollah’s unwillingness to get rid of its arms potential, however, keeps other religious groups convinced that Hezbollah stands over and above the law and is “a state in the state”. Hezbollah’s military potential also motivated other religious groups in the country to arm themselves, as tensions and the armed conflict escalated in the neighbouring country of Syria. Militant factions of Palestinian refugees, who have occasionally joined clashes on the side of radical Sunni group-ings against Hezbollah followers in Lebanon, were a principal destabilising factor. Christians and Druze in Lebanon remain divided into those pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian, but they have not significantly fuelled tensions between Sunni and Shia in the country. Military Intelligence continuously evaluated indicators of crisis development in Lebanon and informed about key developments and the effect they had on regional security with emphasis on early warning to potential occurrence of a larger conflict.

5) The UNSMIS mission mandate was approved by the UN Security Council on 21 April 2012, and expired on

19 August 2012

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In 2012, military political and security instability in Egypt continued, as initiated par-ticularly by revolutionary changes that started at the beginning of 2011. Military Intelligence evaluated security impact of the changing concept of the state of Egypt, which was affected by the election success of candidates associated with the Muslim Brotherhood ideology in presidential, parliamentary and senate elections. The key state in the region in terms of its size and importance, Egypt, was progressively heading for a state system based on the Islam law and its principles as a result of the political changes. To the effect of securing a sufficiently powerful position, the new leadership of the state took systemic steps to fill the decisive sen-ior military command positions; the armed forces’ high command (with direct ties to the for-mer regime of Hosni Mubarak) was disbanded and replaced by a younger generation of gen-erals. That significantly reduced the previous strong influence of the Egyptian armed forces on political events in the country. The Islamic leadership won over loyalty of officers and non-commissioned officers by increasing their monthly wages and improving healthcare and social support provided to military personnel. The Islamists applied such course of action to penetrate their influence into other state power components, public institutions and govern-mental departments. Those facts, coupled with the worsened economic situation, were behind the increasing number of violent protest demonstrations that expressed a growing discontent of minority secular political streams with the acting Islamist cabinet headed by President Mursi, who strived to win absolute power in the country through progressively taking control over state institutions. In that context, Egypt apparently saw a major decrease in security of local Christians (Copts), and expressions of religious intolerance towards persons of Christian religion may also be expected in 2013.

Sinai represented an area of permanent instability in 2012. After the fall of the previous regime, major police forces withdrew from Sinai, fearing of retaliation by local tribes for po-lice brutality during the Mubarak rule. The rise of security vacuum turned the northern part of the peninsula and areas along the Israeli border into a zone with the highest level of threat in the country. Increased threat of terrorist attack and kidnapping was also detected against tour-ist destinations and also posed an indirect threat to the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) mission, which included three Czech officers. In the course of 2012, MFO bases in Sinai were subject to armed blockades mounted by local Bedouin tribes who used that lever-age to exert pressure on Egyptian authorities in support of their requirements for releasing their relatives from Egyptian prisons.

The development of the Peace Process, which continued to represent a significant risk of destabilising the security situation in the area throughout 2012, was essentially affected by the protracted suspension of talks between Palestinians and Israel. The reason was Israel’s decline to abandon building settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory. Despite efforts of external negotiators, the year 2012 saw no progress achieved in Israeli-Palestinian rela-tions. The only act to have approximated Palestinians to the creation of their own state was the unilateral successful request by the Palestinian Authority for acceptance as a UN member with observer status during the General Assembly meeting on 29 November 2012.

Sustained sporadic attacks on the Israeli Armed Forces deployed in proximity of Gaza, irregular bombardment of the Israeli territory with rockets launched by Palestinian militants and the subsequent reciprocal air attacks by the Israeli Air Force on Palestinian targets result-ed in an eight-day armed conflict between the Israeli Defence Forces and radical Palestinian groups in Gaza. During intensive fighting from 14 to 22 November 2012, the Palestinian armed groups used unguided rockets capable of reaching the capital city of Israel.

The security situation in Iraq was continuously deteriorating throughout 2012 as a re-sult of deep disagreements within the local society. Negative developments were fuelled by

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the occurrence of security vacuum after the U.S. forces had withdrawn at the end of 2011, whose capabilities the Iraqi security forces were unable to substitute for. The Iraqi national security forces may only be expected to achieve a full operational capability in 2020 at earli-est. Seeking to decompose the state system, the instable security environment in the country was exploited by groups motivated by the concept of global jihad, who expediently capital-ised on tensions within the Arab part of the Iraqi population in central and southern parts of the country, and particularly on the aversion of minority Sunni hold against the Shia gov-ernment and the Shia-dominated security forces.

The influence of Iraqi religious radicals on the situation in the neighbouring state of Syria was assessed to follow a moderately rising trend in 2012. Radicals from Iraq had, how-ever, represented a minority in the overall number of Islamists active in Syria. One of the rea-sons was the reserved stance taken by Iraqi tribes at the border towards those fundamentalists and their activities in border areas. Notwithstanding that, supplies of weapons continued to flow from Iraq into Syria. Strong Arab-Kurd tensions in the north of Iraq grew in the course of the year and culminated in several local armed conflicts between the Iraqi military and Kurd Peshmerga paramilitary forces. Disagreement between Arabs and Kurds continued over disputed areas rich in oil and distribution of proceeds from the sale of oil from oilfields in northern Iraq. Those disputes were also present on the political level, and the central gov-ernment in Baghdad, moreover, tried to win a greater influence over areas officially adminis-tered by the Kurdish regional government.

An instable security situation prevailed in Yemen, primarily as a result of unrestricted operation by Al-Qaeda inspired radicals in extensive territories in Yemen, and their continu-ing establishment in there. Immediate threat either to the Czech Republic or the European area was, however, not identified in that context.

As in the previous years, Military Intelligence monitored and evaluated Iran’s military activities. Iran continued to pursue efforts designed to fulfil its regional superpower ambitions and strengthen defences against external threats in 2012. Those activities involved develop-ment of Iranian armed forces, nuclear capability, support of friendly regimes and intervention into internal affairs of other states in the region. Iran’s nuclear ambitions and uncooperative attitude however embroiled states outside the region into the Middle East security, which also reflected in the strengthening economic sanctions on Iran and related growth of tensions in the Persian Gulf. Iran repeatedly threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, which passes roughly 35% of the world’s petroleum traded by sea on a daily basis. Seeking to send a strong signal to Iran, a number of Western and Arab countries held an intensive twelve-day naval exercise IMCMEX-126) in the Persian Gulf in September 2012.

No facts possibly posing a direct threat to the Czech Republic’s security were detected in relation to Iran’s activities. While Iran continues to develop its missile and nuclear technol-ogy programs, it is becoming increasingly likely that it could pose a threat to the security of the Czech Republic in the mid to long term.

Reports on the Middle East: Recipient Delivered products


Afghanistan – Pakistan

6) IMCMEX – International Mine Countermeasures Exercise: over 30 nations participated

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In 2012, Military Intelligence carried on assessing and sharing intelligence on security developments in Afghanistan, with particular emphasis on the interest provinces of Kabul, Logar, Nangarhar and Wardak, where the Czech Armed Forces deployments were stationed. Given the progressive drawdown of ISAF7) coa-lition forces and the ongoing security transition to the Afghan Government, the priority was given to the development and assessment of capabilities and readiness of the Afghan Nation-al Security Forces (ANSF). Activities by an-tigovernment forces were monitored in areas of the Czech Armed Forces’ deployments to pro-vide early detection of threats to the Czech and coalition forces.

As opposed to 2011, the year 2012 saw a decline in the total number of security incidents in the territory of Afghanistan, which was nevertheless not coupled with decrease in influence and operational capabilities of insurgencies. Their activities primarily focused on southern and eastern regions of the country, where the number of attacks targeting the Afghan Government officials and the number of the killed ANSF members grew, which probably relates to the ongo-ing transition of responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces. The number of incidents in which ANSF members targeted coalition personnel, the so-called green-on-blue attacks, dou-bled. Incidents were also detected in the Czech Armed Forces’ areas of deployment; none of them, however, targeted the Czech forces directly. The numbers of foreign fighters present in the areas where the Czech forces operated were monitored to be increased. Another trend prov-en in the country is an increased engagement of Iran.

On both central and provincial levels, the Afghan political scene has seen an intensify-ing struggle for power in relation to the 2014 presidential elections and parliamentary elec-tions in 2015. In that rally, prominent Afghan politicians and other influential personalities strived to attain favourable positions and forge alliances for their future endeavours. In June 2012, phase three (out of five) of the process of transition to the Afghan National Security Forces was announced, which should bring a territory with nearly three fourths of the Afghan population under the Afghan administration. Changes in the posts of the defence and the inte-rior ministers in September 2012 did not have a major influence on ANSF development and training underway. Despite some improvements, ANSF readiness remains low, same as their ability to maintain stability in areas already handed over without assistance of the coalition forces. That state of affairs calls for a continuing foreign financial aid, material support and assistance of the international forces in training.

7) International Security Assistance Force

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Processes of reconciliation with the leaders of key insurgencies and reintegration of their members into the society again failed to produce any significant achievements in 2012. Nevertheless, the Afghan Government obviously sought to sell the limited progress as important steps in the frame of the peace pro-cess. Nationwide, the Military Intelligence noted formation of a range of anti-Taliban movements, particularly in the eastern part of the country. Their ability to withstand the pressure of insurgencies on sustained basis is assessed as low.

In spite of the overall decline in the number of security incidents, the security situation in Pakistan deteriorated in the course of 2012 as opposed to 2011. Sectarian violence is on the rise in the country, the population’s economic situation worsens and the society now dis-plays an increasing rate of anti-west attitudes. Replacements in important positions in the Pa-kistani Government and armed forces and security services in 2012 did not affect Pakistan’s security orientation. As concerns Afghanistan, Pakistan intends to maintain a bigger influence there than India. Pakistan increases its nuclear arsenal, probably in connection with India’s pursuit of conventional arms and to the effect of increasing credibility of its strategic plan-ning.

The importance of the Supreme Court grew, but judicial power still operates within lim-itations determined by the military. Neither in 2012 did the Pakistani military launch the pre-viously announced operation to counter insurgencies active in Northern Waziristan and car-ried on using insurgents to shape the development of security situation and to advance own interests in Afghanistan.

Cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan has only made a slow progress that has been hampered by the two countries’ blaming crossborder attacks on each other. Although the Pakistani Government had officially supported the Afghan peace process, no specific steps had been made until the release of imprisoned Afghan insurgents in November 2012. Paki-stani Government reopened ISAF supply routes at the beginning of 2012 after negotiations that had lasted for more than seven months.

During 2012, Military Intelligence did not have information available that would de-mand modification or alteration of the decisions that the top Czech officials had previously made concerning military presence in the areas, where the Czech Armed Forces were de-ployed in. Obtained observations were used to minimise the impact of detected threats and take preventive measures. Security of Czech citizens working in Afghanistan in military, dip-lomatic and civilian missions remains a high intelligence priority.

Reports on Afghanistan - Pakistan: Recipient Delivered products


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States of the former Soviet Union

The Russian Federation is a major geopolitical actor and seeks to strengthen its posi-tion using political, economic and military tools. Modern and mobile armed forces represent one of such tools and the Russian armed forces continued through 2012 to carry out reforms started in previous years. Modernising weapons and equipment in the inventory of all branch-es, arms and services, the reform is implemented to increase operational and combat capabili-ties and make the military service more attractive. Another vehicle that the Russian Federa-tion uses to promote national interests is its dominant position in regional organisations – the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

Significant changes at top posts of the Russian Ministry of Defence took place in 2012. As a result of a corruption affair associated with the Oboronservis enterprise and problems in delivering the Russian Armed Forces’ State Armaments Plan, Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov was recalled and replaced by Sergey Shoygu. The Chief of the General Staff and most deputy ministers were recalled in the wake of that. Colonel-General V. Gerasimov was newly appointed the Chief of the General Staff and the 1st Deputy Minister of Defence at the same time. One of the goals behind personnel replacements was to improve cooperation be-tween the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation and the military-industrial complex and continue in the Russian Armed Forces reform. Changes in key posts did not have substan-tial influence on the ongoing Russian Armed Forces reform.

Reform and modernisation of the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces are tied with permanent increase of Russian defence expenditures and implementation of the Russian Armed Forces’ State Armaments Program (GPV) 2011-2020. The principal owner of respon-sibility for deliveries of high-tech military equipment is the Russian military-industrial com-plex, which, however, does not possess adequate production capacity and high-quality tech-nology standards. To redress those shortfalls, restructuring and modernisation started in ma-jority of the Russian defence industry production plants. Delivering all approved GPV pro-jects in full is, nevertheless, questionable.

On the international level, the Russian Federation managed to push through expedition-ary capabilities of CSTO forces and install its candidate into the newly created permanent post of the Chief of Joint Staff of CSTO forces, which both demonstrated and strengthened Russian influence. Both CSTO and SCO intensively entertained potential deterioration of security situation, especially in Central Asia, after the end of ISAF mission in Afghanistan after 2014.

The Russian Federation also advanced its interests on bilateral level, particularly vis-à-vis Belorussia, Ukraine, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan, with a high priority attached to economic and military domain. In the former Soviet republics in the Central Asia region, the Russian foreign policy seeks to weaken U.S. influence.

In the military-political domain in Ukraine, the Minister of Defence was replaced and subsequently the Chief of General Staff too. With a view to the worsening economic situation in Ukraine, actual defence spending decreased; this resulted in a forced reform of the Ukraini-an Armed Forces. As a result, personnel strength is reduced and armaments in the inventory gets continuously obsolete, which will hamper Ukraine’s national defence posture.

Following parliamentary elections in Georgia in 2012, changes took place both in the country’s political leadership and in key posts in the armed forces. Those changes nevertheless

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did not influence the country’s military-political orientation. Georgia has carried on the NATO accession talks. The new Georgian cabinet is committed to tackling the issues of separatist provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by diplomatic means, which marks obvious progress on official rhetoric voiced by President Mikhail Saakashvili’s Cabinet. In the area of the South-ern Caucasus, the possibility of recurring conflict over Nagorno Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan remained the highest security threat. Limited incidents continued to be moni-tored along the line of contact as both parties continue to display tenaciousness in solving the situation on the political level.

Reports on the states of the former Soviet Union:

Recipient Delivered products Political and military officials of the Czech Republic 11 National cooperation 15 International cooperation 35

Africa

The region of western Sahel and North Africa (especially south Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Libya) was affected by negative phenomena, including prolifera-tion and terrorism, which have affected not only the regional security situation, but also security in Europe on the long-term basis. In 2012, intelligence coverage of developments regarding the security situation in Africa was also driven by the growing likelihood of the international community’s engagement in local security problems.

Developments in Mali were closely monitored given its significant security ramifications. Fighting on the internal political scene did not allow solving prob-lems of the Malian Armed Forces, especially to im-prove their low training standards and their ability to operate in the north of the country. A conflict between Tuareg insurgents from the MNLA8) and Islamist groups such as MUJAO9), AQIM10) and Ansar Dine, in which the Islamists soon succeeded, was mounted in the north of Mali. That situation made external actors (especially the states of ECOWAS11), U.S. and France) negotiate about the possible shape of foreign tance, including an armed intervention, which resulted in planning a military intervention by international forces and preparation of the EU Training Mission.

The process of post-conflict consolidation continued in Libya with serious problems. Alt-hough the Provisional Government achieved success by properly holding democratic elections, the situation was assessed unstable in terms of security. A clear reason for that is the minimum

8) MNLA – Mouvement national de liberation de l´Azawad 9) MUJAO –Mouvement pour l unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l Ouest (Movement for Monotheism and Jihad in Western

Africa) 10) AQIM – Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb 11) ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

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progress achieved on development of defence and security forces. Therefore, the Government had to rely in the period in question on autonomous revolutionary brigades that, however, were not fully under the central command. An equally important factor is the growing activity of rad-ical Islamists, who could, in the future, start kidnapping western citizens or mounting attacks targeting locations where foreigners stay in Libya.

In the Horn of Africa, the focus was on the development in Somalia, where a military operation was performed against the Al-Shabaab militant Islamist group, which thus lost con-trol over the strategic seaport in the city of Kismayo. Al-Shabaab responded by stepping up asymmetric warfare, which in turn increased the threat of terrorist attacks in the neighbouring state of Kenya.

In another area of the Horn of Africa, the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia tem-porarily escalated as the Ethiopian forces attacked an Eritrean military installation. Ethiopia sought to justify the action that it had taken as a response to the killing of five European tour-ists in its territory by terrorists allegedly trained in Eritrea. After that limited border clash, relations of the two states returned to a calm, but tense animosity.

Disagreements between Sudan and South Sudan showed markedly in the period at hand. Unsettled territorial disputes and the absence of an agreement on cooperation in export of South Sudanese oil led to a growing tension that escalated into a limited armed conflict between the two states in March and April 2012. Subsequent negotiations paved the way for armistice and the signing of several agreements, based on which South Sudan resumed oil production and export via Sudan. Besides economic interdependency of the two countries, Military Intelligence concluded that a large-scale armed conflict did not resurrect because none of the parties has available armed forces capable of prevailing in the potential conflict.

Reports on Africa: Recipient Delivered products


4.2 Terrorism and extremism

Terrorism

The risk of a terrorist attack against the interest of the West was higher outside Europe in 2012; that applies to the areas of regional operation of terrorist organisations, particularly in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Those areas have represented a perma-nent threat, including to the interests of the Czech Republic and Czech citizens sent for coun-terterrorist and counterinsurgency missions in international operations under the UN, NATO or EU mandate.

Al-Qaeda with its affiliates (both groups and individuals) inspired by the Al-Qaeda ide-ology remained the principal entity to have resorted to exploiting religiously motivated terror-ism. Expectations deeming the Al-Qaeda phenomenon for progressive extinction have not materialised. However, the compass of possibility shrank for Al-Qaeda headquarters to con-duct high-visibility terrorist attacks on targets in the territory of NATO and EU states. The reason was not only that a number of Al-Qaeda leaders had been killed, including the second highest ranking Al-Qaeda leader Abu Yahya Al-Libi in June and his successor Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti in December 2012, but also for not very effective management of Al-Qaeda by its highest commander Ayman Al-Zawahiri from the Afghan-Pakistani border area.

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Likewise, combat potential of Al-Qaeda affiliates has also dropped recently. Groups op-erating in Somalia and Yemen were pushed into defensive. Somali affiliate, the Al-Shabaab, and the Yemeni Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) concurrently lost control over the territories that they had gained before. In addition, Al-Shabaab lost an important logistic base in Kismayo and AQAP lost a number of commanders as a result of the government’s counterterrorist measures and effectiveness of unmanned aerial vehicles. Al-Qaeda in the Is-lamic Maghreb (AQIM), who mostly operate in northeast Algeria, also suffered major losses.

Only AQIM groups operating in the Sahel region and other Sahel affiliates following the Al-Qaeda ideology, such as MUJAO, Ansar Al-Sharia and partly also Ansar Dine, were the only ones to improve their possibilities and positions. The key reasons behind significant strengthening of terrorists’ and radicals’ positions in Sahel was the collapse of Libya and the fact that the groupings gained control over important territories in the north of Mali.

Al-Qaeda sought to capitalise on political developments in Arab countries. Its propa-ganda, radicalisation and recruitment efforts largely focused on fighting underway in Syria. Although no Al-Qaeda affiliate has officially established in Syria yet, those fighting the re-gime include individuals as well as groups such as Jabhat Al-Nusra, with indisputable links to the Al-Qaeda core or affiliates, especially Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

Besides Syria, Al-Qaeda radicalisation and recruitment campaigns continue to address North African countries, where local authoritarian regimes, which had showed, inter alia, re-lentlessness against any signs of militant Islamism, underwent a major liberalisation as a part of the so-called Arab Spring. The liberalisation, however, also opened up the room to be quickly occupied by newly formed groupings that largely follow the Al-Qaeda ideology. Those developments brought into existence several new groupings that are not tied with Al-Qaeda organisationally, but share, often under the name of Ansar al-Sharia, a number of ideo-logical goals with Al-Qaeda. The September 2012 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia, the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, in September 2012, as well as the attempts to form terrorist groups in the Sinai Peninsula all point to the fact that groupings of this kind have also become the source of security risks in North Africa. Intensifying militant Islamism and geographical expansion of religiously motivated terrorism in Africa also reflects in devel-opments in Sahel, continuing attacks by Boko Haram fighters against Christians and security forces in Nigeria and increasing application of terrorist methods in Kenya.

Analyses developed by Military Intelligence using observations obtained in cases that in-volved real threats of terrorist attacks on Czech or Allied targets and interests were continuously sent to authorised recipients. Observations were also shared within the national intelligence com-munity in regular sessions of the Joint Intelligence Group and relevant NATO and EU partners. In terms of information, Military Intelligence also worked with the National Contact Point for Ter-rorism.

According to the observations gained by Military Intelligence, it is highly likely that terror-ism building on a narrow interpretation of Islam will continue to pose a high security threat to the Czech Republic and the NATO Allies in the near future. Given possible ramifications of the on-going economic and social crisis, there may even be an increased risk associated with the threat of terrorism that leftist or rightist extremism could grow into in case of absence of positive develop-ments in Europe.

Intelligence support to the Czech Armed Forces’ foreign deployments was one of the activities, to which Military Intelligence attaches a high priority. In case of the Czech Armed Forces Task Force ISAF, that primarily involves protecting the Czech deployments against foreign intelligence services and obtaining information to enhance the deployments’ opera-tional security. Information on insurgent activities and IED threats were gathered and handed

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over to command authorities in the period at hand. In addition, locals applying for a job with the Czech deployments were vetted and subsequently periodically checked to the effect of eliminating security risks with those persons, such as cooperation with the Opposing Militant Forces. In 2012, such risks were identified with several persons applying for a job with the Czech Armed Forces Task Force ISAF.

Extremism

In terms of possible links to extremist environment, Military Intelligence continues to attach a high priority both to identification of new supporters of rightwing extremism, especially on their enlistment with the Czech Armed Forces, and monitoring of activities undertaken by those who had previously been already identified as sympathisers. The military profession is attractive for rightwing supporters particularly for the possibility to obtain special training. Year-to-year, the occurrence of those risks was evaluated comparable. Military Intelligence reported the established facts to the MoD leadership.

In 2012, the principal trend showed by rightwing extremism was a progressive decline of their activities in the Czech Armed Forces and partially also in public. In the wake of measures taken by all involved law enforcement and security services and in response to critical attitude by the public, extremists tend to close up into ideology-driven groups outside the Czech Armed Forces installations, where open manifestations of rightwing extremism carry on and often esca-late in presumed privacy.

Another monitored domain was the Czech Armed Forces Active Reserve Component. Mili-tary Intelligence monitored new cases of rightwing extremist and sympathisers being identified among the Active Reserve Component personnel. Those were mostly ex military professionals, whose contract ended for various reasons and who failed to reenlist with the Czech Armed Forces.

Military Intelligence evaluated the threat of leftwing extremism as well as religious extrem-ism as marginal, which is primarily given by the essential characteristics of the military environ-ment, strict order, and rules.

Reports on terrorism and extremism: Recipient Delivered products


4.3 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons and dual-use materials

Same as in the previous years, Military Intelligence identified proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (weapons of mass destruction -WMD) and their means of delivery, and illegal trading in military material and conventional weapons as one the most prominent areas of interest in 2012.

The principal security risks associated with abuse of weapons of mass destruction against the EU Member States are primarily associated with the instable security environment and political development in rogue and collapsed states in South and East Asia, in the Middle East, and North Africa.

Most recently, that was the question of Syria that owns an advanced chemical weapons program. The progressively deteriorating security situation in Syria increases the risk of pos-sible seizure of chemical weapons stockpiled in military depots and subsequent proliferation towards extremist groups, particularly in the Middle East.

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The unstable post-war situation in Libya poses a similar threat. It entails a poor security of its chemical weapons stockpiles or unrestrained proliferation of small arms, including ground-to-air weapons, into North Africa, the Sahel region and the Middle East, for use espe-cially by terrorist groups.

A typical problem that proliferation brings about is the recurring interest of some countries in starting own civilian nuclear programs and fulfilment of their nuclear ambitions. A persisting risk of WMD proliferation is posed by the countries that are not members of international control regimes or have violated their binding terms, UN resolutions and embargoes imposed by the in-ternational community. Such countries include Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Pakistan, which mutually cooperate in development of national civilian and military nuclear programs and ballistic missiles programs.

Some of the states with a major nuclear proliferation potential have been suspected of shar-ing know-how on essential and yet not mastered elements of nuclear research of transfer of com-plete technology, which could eventually be used for weaponisation. In such cases, there might be go-betweens who could provide materials, technology and equipment under UN Security Council sanctions and/or EU restrictions to the third countries. Some attempts to transfer technology were also probably implemented using front trading companies involved in technology and arms pro-jects containing information of interest. Given an advanced industrial base and its developed sys-tem of technical schools, the Czech Republic also represents the target of activities seeking to obtain dual-use materials and technology transfer.

Gathered information confirms the trend of developments in proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, which entails an increased likelihood of abusing chemical or biological agents or indeed weapons of mass destruction by actors. In turn, the risk may increase of state-sponsored terrorism seeking to destabilise neighbouring countries (particularly in MENA), which may pose a direct threat to NATO, including the Czech Republic.

Therefore, Military Intelligence activities continued to focus on information on behavioural patterns displayed by proliferation networks, methods of circumventing the control regimes and practices used by the proliferators. In 2102, Military Intelligence specialists were intensively in-volved in the workings of the international control regimes including development of documents in the regimes’ expert groups. A high number of countries worldwide, nevertheless, stay com-pletely out of international proliferation regimes, which hampers coordination of joint action and allows creation of different export policies to cater for market divergence.

One of the important tasks that Military Intelligence has is its involvement in the control of trading in military material within the Czech law (particularly the Act No. 38/1994 Coll., On For-eign Trade in Military Material) and as part of international commitments. Therefore, Military Intelligence provides opinions as part of licensing procedure on applications by individual busi-nesses both as concerns commodity items and territorial coverage with a view to the security situ-ation in the countries of destination and effective international limitations. On request, Military Intelligence also provides its opinion on trading in industrial explosives and requests by individual entities to dispose hazardous materials.

In 2012, Military Intelligence provided licences, permissions or extension of existing li-cences for export/import of military material, high explosives and handling hazardous material in response to application by individual businesses:

a. In compliance with the Act No. 38/1994 Coll. - 129 opinions on licences for foreign trading in military material, of which 10 with reserva-

tions in connection with embargoes or military-political situation in the country in question;

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- 54 opinions on permissions for trading in military material, of which 48 with reservations in connection with embargoes or military-political situation in the relevant region;

- 15 opinions on extension of permission, of which 8 with reservations in connection with the embargo of military-political situation in connection with embargo or military-political situa-tion in the state in question;

b. In compliance with the Act No. 61/1988 Coll. - 71 permissions to repeated export of explosives, of which 6 with reservations;

c. In compliance with the Act No. 19/1997 Coll. - 13 opinions on application for licences and on disposing of hazardous materials without

reservations.

Reports on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: Recipient Delivered products

Political and military officials of the Czech Republic and national cooperation

1

International cooperation 3

4.4 Cyber threats

Military Intelligence evaluates the threat of violating the Czech Republic’s cyberspace security as posing a medium risk and having the potential of rapid growth. A considerable growth of cyber espionage seeking to obtain military, political or economic information was identified. Military Intelligence also noted an increased activity and attempts to penetrate the Czech MoD and Czech Armed Forces’ systems.

Using sophisticated viruses, such as Flame, miniFlame and Shamoon, cyber attacks indi-cated a growing ability of the actors to successfully target critical defence infrastructures in se-lected countries in 2012. Likewise, state actors have been identified as having an increasing interest in employing cyber operations to advance their military-political and international interests. That is proven by the fact that cyber warfare has become an integral part of national defence and security strategies and doctrines.

The highest rate of attacks in 2012 was launched by activists (or hacktivists), who pri-marily focus on influencing public opinion through various protest activities and by running media operations. The Anonymous movement was the most active; it was behind the protests against the Anti Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in Europe and the Czech Republic and behind attacks against websites of the Czech parliamentary political parties.

Criminal groups and individuals represented another serious risk, as they primarily seek to generate profit and gather sensitive information from non-public information systems, ac-counts and websites employing various methods of cyber espionage and especially by acquir-ing access data deceptively (phishing).

Military Intelligence evaluates that both the scope and frequency of activities by such entities will grow rapidly, much like the cyber potential of the armed forces of many nations. Cyber attacks will be more sophisticated, which will increase the costs and consequence man-agement.

Reports on cyber threats: Recipient Delivered products

Political and military officials of the Czech Repub-lic, national cooperation

2

International cooperation 3

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4.5 Activities by foreign intelligence services in the territory of the Czech Republic con-cerning defence

The Military Intelligence’s principal missions include detecting operations by for-eign intelligence services in the domain of defence, which are directed against the inter-est of the Czech Republic and its Allies. Ac-tivities by Russian intelligence services, the GRU Main Intelligence Directorate (Главное разведывательное управление) and SVR Foreign Intelligence Service (Служба внешней разведки) represented the highest threat in 2012. As opposed to previous years, those services partially decreased their activi-ties seeking to gather information and develop actionable contacts in the domain of defence.

Diplomatic posts at the Russian Federation’s embassy and consulates are traditionally used to provide cover for members of the Russian Federation in the Czech Republic. Mem-bers of the Russian intelligence services, however, also operate under the so-called illegal cover. Numerous cases of illegal agents covered by media in foreign countries testify to the

fact that Russian intelligence services have continued to use them.

In 2012, Military Intelligence also paid attention to the activities of Chinese intelli-gence services. The Chinese military intelli-gence service (2PLA - 2nd Department of the People‘s Liberation Army General Staff) as well as civilian intelligence services (MSS - Ministry of State Security) rank among the highly active intelligence services operating in the Czech Republic. Chinese intelligence members mostly operate under diplomatic cov-

er of the Chinese embassy. The Czech Armed Forces do not rank among their high priority inter-ests and they rather concentrate key efforts on political-economic sphere.

No information on Chinese intelligence services’ activities posing threat to the Ministry of Defence or national defence of the Czech Republic were gained in 2012.

Intelligence services of the former Soviet Union countries, as well as those from the Middle East, were identified to run intelligence efforts in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2012.

Information on activities by foreign intelligence services in the territory of the Czech Republic concerning defence:

Recipient Delivered products Political and military officials of the Czech Republic 1 Cooperation with Czech services of BIS and UZSI 38 International cooperation 28

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4.6 Intentions and activities directed against defence of the Czech Republic

In accordance with its mandatory purview, Military Intelligence monitored intentions and ac-tivities directed against the Czech Republic’s defence. As was the case in the past, various domestic and foreign businesses and individuals strived to make inadequate profit at the expense of the Minis-try of Defence. Hence, Military Intelligence had intensive efforts to provide intelligence on activities directed at inefficient spending of MoD budget.

The findings were always submitted in time to authorised MoD officials to take ade-quate measures. In addition, more serious find-ings were conveyed to the Inspection of the Minister or the Military Police.

Reports on intentions and activities directed against defence of the Czech Republic:

Recipient Delivered products Political and military officials of the Czech Republic 13 Cooperation with Czech services of BIS and UZSI 3

4.7 Intentions and activities threatening information security in the domain of national defence

Military Intelligence continued through 2012 to monitor possible breaches of security of classified information and sharing sensitive information on public data storage media. Alt-hough there were no serious faults, necessary adjustments were made in conjunction with responsible command authorities and the persons concerned were advised appropriately to the effect of eliminating any further risks.

Neither in administrative security nor in information systems security, there were any relevant findings made that would indicate breaching classified MoD information or infor-mation provided to the MoD by NATO, the EU, and partner nations, to the security of which the Czech Republic committed.

Reports on intentions and activities threatening information security in the defence domain: Recipient Delivered products

Political and military officials of the Czech Republic 3

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5 COOPERATION WITHIN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

To perform its mission, Military Intelligence cooperates with Czech intelligence ser-vices and other government authorities. In compliance with the Act No. 153/1994 Coll., co-operation with intelligence services is based on agreements endorsed by the Government of the Czech Republic.

Same as in previous years, Military Intelligence carried on cooperation with the BIS Se-curity Information Service, the UZSI Office for Foreign Relations and Information, the Minis-try of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Police of the Czech Republic and the General Customs Directorate. The existing cooperation was further intensified in 2012 in the context of security developments in Europe and worldwide, and primarily involved regular as well as ad hoc exchange of intelligence products (reports) and in the frame of bilateral and multilateral discussions. Military Intelligence specialists have regularly taken part in expert meetings on exports of sensitive technology, materials and equipment not covered under in-ternational control regimes. All those discussions took place on the basis of effective agree-ments and with endorsement by the Government of the Czech Republic. In the Police of the Czech Republic, that cooperation mostly involved the Organised Crime Detection Unit, where Military Intelligence specifically worked with the National Point of Contact for Counterter-rorism.

Military Intelligence was also actively involved in the workings of the National Joint In-telligence Group (JIG) that coordinates security measures especially among the Czech Repub-lic’s intelligence services, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Police of the Czech Republic. The primary mission of the JIG is to gather and analyse all in-formation associated with possible terrorist threat to the Czech Republic.

Military Intelligence’s cooperation with Czech intelligence services and other government authorities (except for requirements by the National Security Authority):

Recipient Delivered products BIS Security Information Service 73 UZSI Office for Foreign Relations and Information 625* Ministry of Foreign Affairs 582

* The aggregate number comprises 500 OSINT products, four requests for information (RFI) and an organisation related report.

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6 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

As far as Military Intelligence’s cooperation with foreign partners is concerned, the principal effort focused on cooperating with intelligence services of Allied and Partner na-tions, NATO and EU authorities while increasing the Military Intelligence’s capabilities to perform its mandatory tasks and the Government’s intelligence priorities. The cooperation was organised in compliance with § 10 of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll. There was a multi-layered bilateral cooperation between Czech Military Intelligence and other countries’ intelli-gence services in 2012. That primarily involved bilateral discussions with exchange of intelli-gence, operative collaboration of expert teams and sharing lessons learnt in specific domains of intelligence operations.

Intelligence-oriented specialist training and education activities were organised to the effect of mastering and deepening professional skills in crisis environments to the effect of improving counterintelligence efforts in performance of NATO and EU international commitments arising from the Czech Republic’s membership in those international organisations. Specialist training and education activities particularly covering information analysis and fusion with the objective to expand professional skills in working information and analysis development represented an important part of bilateral cooperation.

6.1 Multilateral cooperation

Military Intelligence performed its commitments to the principal NATO and EU intelli-gence authorities, particularly the Intelligence Division of the NATO International Military Staff.

Cooperation on multilateral level continued mainly in the form of distributing intelli-gence products (reports), engagement in joint NATO intelligence policies and an active par-ticipation in NATO and EU conferences. For instance, that involved conferences of analysts evaluating crisis areas and regions, specific focus conferences of analysts on selected regions and conferences focusing on optimising the processes of multilateral intelligence sharing within NATO and on deployed operations. Furthermore, an important part of international cooperation was the attendance of Military Intelligence’s experts in conferences and meetings discussing the situation in crisis regions and conferences on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the framework of individual international control regimes.

As part of information cooperation with NATO intelligence structures, Military Intelli-gence distributed summaries using an automated data transmission system. The summaries were sent either directly to the NATO Headquarters intelligence authorities or released on the NATO information server.

Another form of information cooperation was the development of Military Intelli-gence’s interaction with the EU Military Staff. That involved responses to requests for infor-mation on situation in crisis regions. MI members also took part in an analytical conference on Syria.

Military Intelligence pursued information cooperation with partner services, which con-sisted in developing replies to requests for information from crisis regions and information sharing in the domains of joint intelligence interest.

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6.2 Bilateral cooperation

Bilateral cooperation is an effective tool that facilitates Military Intelligence’s capabili-ties in performance of tasks mandatory under the Act No. 153/1994 Coll., which are further specified by the Government of the Czech Republic in the form of the intelligence priority list.

The key focus of bilateral cooperation is on intelligence sharing, expert meetings of analysts to discuss interest subjects of Military Intelligence and operative forms of coopera-tion. Sharing lessons learnt and participation in specialised and expert courses are also vital.

To the effect of expanding its capabilities and possibilities, Military Intelligence contin-ued through 2012 in discussions and followed on successful cooperation with several addi-tional foreign military intelligence services, with which the Czech Republic shares the same values and Military Intelligence has a joint intelligence interest. An example of this coopera-tion was deepening and rationalisation of counterintelligence activities and combined intelli-gence operations that represent the highest form of cooperation.

The most intensive cooperation traditionally took place with NATO nations’ intelli-gence services.

Cooperation with foreign intelligence services, NATO and EU authorities: Recipient Delivered products

NATO 161 EU 298 Intelligence services 887

Seventeen joint expert meetings with foreign partner intelligence services took place on operational level.

6.3 Military diplomacy

Represented by defence attaché offices, military diplomacy is one of the important source elements of Military Intelligence.

While military diplomacy as part of official Czech foreign missions poses quite considerable requirements for the budget of Military Intelligence, the allocated funding is still proportionate to the scope of duties performed by the military diplomacy and to conditions in the countries military diplomats are posted in.

A new concept of optimising defence attaché offices in countries and regions of crises made it possible to increase both quality and quantity of relevant information distributed both to state officials vested with responsibility for defence and security of the Czech Republic and officials of the Czech Armed Forces, as well as intelligence support of operationally deployed forces. The Czech defence attaché offices in Belgium and Italy were closed as part of the concept in 2012. At the end of 2012, Military Intelligence had defence attachés accredited to 27 countries and additional 29 countries were co-accredited.

The structure of military diplomacy also includes a permanent security adviser at the Permanent UN Mission in New York and two intelligence liaison officers.

In cooperation with individual MoD Divisions and cabinets or offices of senior MoD officials, defence attaché offices were involved in supporting top-level activities, including foreign trips and visits, remembrance functions, care for veterans and war monuments, etc.

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7 INFORMATION SECURITY

7.1 Personnel security

In 2012, 253 applications were accepted for the issuance of Personnel Security Clear-ance Certificate (PSCC), 196 PSCCs were issued and 2 cases of revocation of PSCC were performed.

Academic training and inspection activities were also among high priorities.

In the sphere of personnel security, Military Intelligence also closely cooperated with the National Security Authority.

7.2 Communications and information systems security

The communications and information systems and cryptographic security section of Mili-tary Intelligence provided security administration of the total of 9 certified Military Intelligence communications and information systems designed for processing classified information and the associated cryptographic security of classified information.

Security administration of the existing systems primarily focused on accreditation pro-cedures, inspection and evaluating security aspects associated with user requirements. Train-ing courses were organised for security administrators, operation administrators and new Military Intelligence members.

Most important tasks performed in 2012 included expansion of tools designed to pro-vide automated security checking and realtime evaluation of security tracking data.

Based on an agreement between the National Security Authority and Military Intelli-gence, zone measuring was carried out using an in-house capability.

In the domain of cyber security, Military Intelligence focused mostly on sphere of pre-ventive measures (courses for users and designing technical and organisational measures to defend against some current threats).

7.3 Physical security

In the sphere of physical security, Military Intelligence focused primarily on meeting mandatory requirements under the Act No. 412/2005 Coll. and associated implementing regu-lations, especially Ordinance No. 528/2005 Coll., On Physical Security and Certification of Equipment, as amended by Ordinance No. 19/2008 Coll. in the context of providing physical security during reorganisation and realignment of its components and during the implementa-tion of encrypted communications at permanent foreign missions. Military Intelligence ran or directly implemented, installed, serviced and maintained security systems and checked for possible use of unauthorised information gathering equipment in monitored areas.

In performance of its tasks in the sphere of physical security, Military Intelligence worked closely with its partner, particularly specialist authorities of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Security Authority, the Military Police, the Po-lice of the Czech Republic and the BIS Security Information Service.

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7.4 Administrative security

In the second half of 2012, an internal Military Intelligence directive, the File Manage-ment Order of Military Intelligence, was revised, which regulates the organisation of the file registry service, archiving and administrative security of Military Intelligence.

In the military specialist training of members of individual organisational components, training courses were held on the subject of records management and administrative security for all Military Intelligence employees. Special training courses were held for MI members deployed in foreign missions and foreign operations. Specialist consultancy was provided on requests by individual employees or as part of inspection activities.

7.5 Records management

In 2012, the Military Intelligence information security point processed the total of 23,748 national documents (files). The total of 9,115 documents was sent; 14,633 documents were accepted, of which there were 1,030 data messages from state entities, for example from the Ministry of the Interior and the Police of the Czech Republic, received by the means of data boxes.

In the course of 2012, a file registry inspection check was performed with all entities of Military Intelligence. No serious shortcomings were identified.

The File Register of Military Intelligence processed the total of 5,861 documents pro-vided as a part of international relations, of which there were 3,961 NATO documents and 1,900 EU documents in 2012.

In 2012, the Military Intelligence’s Register performed an inventory taking of NATO, EU and ATOMAL classified documents. No shortcomings were identified.

The Military Intelligence information security point and registers performed preventive and inspection activities and specialist control of subordinates and auxiliary registries staff in the course of 2012.

An electronic signature system was used on a wider scale to rationalise the system of the records management service.

7.6 Archive management

Since 1990, the Security Archive of Military Intelligence has kept 8 archive collections in the National Archive Heritage registry. Evaluation of the performance by the Security Ar-chive of Military Intelligence is a subject to the annual report of the Security Archive of Mili-tary Intelligence.

The Security and Administrative Archive of Military Intelligence stores in total 290 linear metres of documents and archival documents.

During 2012, the Security Archive and the Administrative Archive of Military Intelli-gence accepted the total of 90 linear metres of documents from sources and predecessors of Military Intelligence.

The Security Archive of Military Intelligence issued 28 certificates on specialist archive inspection and authorised discarding documents in the total scope of 71.4 linear metres in 2012.

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Central discarding point of Military Intelligence with the Security Archive of Military Intelligence and the Administrative Archive of Military Intelligence physically disposed of 5,100 kg of documents in 2012.

7.7 Primary tasks performed in release of documents of the former Military Counterin-telligence Service and the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Czecho-slovak People’s Armed Forces and replies to inquiries by authorised entities in 2012

A process of archive documents digitisation is implemented under the Agreement be-tween the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic and the Ministry of Defence of the Slo-vak Republic on using documents originating before the abolishment of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic (hereinafter the Agreement).

Document digitisation under the agreement: Task Persons Scans

Handover of scans originating from former Military Counterintelligence and Intelligence Services of the General Staff to the Slovak MoD – year 2012

436 94,014

Handover of scans originating from former Military Counterintelligence and Intelligence Services of the General Staff to the Slovak MoD – total (2007 – 2012)

4,140 326,109

Based on the requirements by authorised entities, documents of the Military Counterin-

telligence Service and the Intelligence Service of the General Staff stored at the Security Ar-chive of Military Intelligence were made accessible on the number of vetted persons indicated below in 2012. At the same time, 1,081 persons were screened in the registries of the former Counterintelligence Service and the Intelligence Service of the General Staff.

Releasing documents for authorised security vetting entities Task Persons

Making and handover of scans and copies originating from the former Military Counterin-telligence and Intelligence Services of the General Staff (after 15 February 1990)

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Based on 4,875 requirements by authorised applicants, the total of 1,259,973 persons

was vetted in the registries of Military Intelligence.

Performance of vetting requirements in MI registries Vetting in Military Intelligence regis-

tries Requirements Targets Positive

NSA 490 16,147 557 ÚZSI 192 3,423 59 BIS 230 5,058 80 MoI 26 5,945 12

Foreign Police Service- visas 182 1,805 0 Police Presidium - Schengen IS 121 1,013 0

MFA 25 76 0 BIS – visas 3,559 1,226,363 3

Slovak MoD 50 143 119 Total 4,875 1,259,973 830

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8 INSPECTION OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE’S ACTIVITIE S

8.1 External inspection and its outcomes

Oversight of the intelligence services of the Czech Republic is regulated under Sections § 12 and 13 of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll. Those provisions vest the authorisation to inspect the activities of intelligence services with the Government of the Czech Republic and the Par-liament of the Czech Republic.

In compliance with provisions under sections § 21 through 24 of the Act No. 289/2005 Coll., inspection of Military Intelligence is performed by the Permanent Commission of the Chamber of Deputies for inspection of activities of Military Intelligence comprising Members of Parliament of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic.

On 20 November 2012, the Supreme Audit Office started inspection of the acquisition point of Military Intelligence with specific focus on “funding allocated for procurement of selected equipment for the Czech Armed Forces’ Ground Forces and Special Forces”. The inspection was scheduled for completion by 31 August 2013.

Accompanied by the National Security Authority, an inspection of the NOS12) took place at Military Intelligence. The inspection identified no shortcomings.

8.2 Internal inspection and its outcomes

Internal security focused on individual components of Military Intelligence to ensure preventive interception, identification and subsequent elimination of identified security risks. Necessary cooperation with state administration authorities was implemented as a part of ac-tivities providing for the Military Intelligence’s internal security.

Internal oversight of Military Intelligence is done using in-house specialist components. Inspections primarily cover internal security, information security and management of state property. In addition to checking for observance of the Czech law and regulations, the ob-servance of internal regulations and additional internal ones of Military Intelligence is moni-tored alike.

A considerable number of inspections focused on management of public funds and state property with emphasis on the principle of economy, effectiveness and efficiency. No major shortcomings were identified in this respect in 2012; inspections, nevertheless, helped im-prove transparency and effectiveness of managing state property in several instances.

In addition to the domain of information security, inspections were primarily performed in relation with the Act No. 412/2005 Coll., relevant implementing ordinances, internal regu-lations and internal steering acts of Military Intelligence. A high number of inspections of administrative, personnel and physical security, security of communications and information systems and cryptographic security in 2012 helped ensure security of this crucial domain that affects operations of Military Intelligence.

As to the operations, relevant components of Military Intelligence were inspected espe-cially in relation to the performance of operations and in relation to keeping appropriate rec-ords in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll., the Act No. 289/2005 Coll., the Act No. 412/2005 Coll. and relevant internal steering acts of Military In-telligence. No major shortcomings were identified in this sphere either.

12) NOS – NATO Office of Security

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Inspection activities in 2012 were performed in compliance with the Military Intelli-gence’s plan of activities and the annual inspection plan or ad hoc based on decision by the Director of Military Intelligence. An overwhelming majority of planned inspections were ac-tually carried out. The planned inspections were operatively adjusted to current needs and observations in some instances. A high number of inspection tasks, especially those pre-planned, were carried out in the form of subject-matter inspection on a sustained basis.

Internal inspection and internal security of Military Intelligence are also closely tied to the purview of the Police authority of Military Intelligence, which primarily performs activi-ties arising from Section § 12 Art. 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act in case of suspected com-mitment of crime by members of Military Intelligence. The process of legality, legitimacy and transparency during investigation by Military Intelligence’s police authority is subject to su-pervision by relevant prosecuting attorneys.

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9 601st SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

SOF Task Force ISAF – 2nd deployment (December 2011 – June 2012)

The 2nd deployment SOF TF ISAF with the strength of 100 personnel was mandated to perform a whole spectrum of special operations (special reconnaissance, direct action and military assistance in NATO terminology) in the territory of Afghanistan.

In total, the SOF TF ISAF performed almost 150 operations, apprehended a number of wanted persons, some of whom were high-ranking field commanders, and freed 2 hostages. In the course of combat operations, the total of 1,312 kg of hashish, 50 kg of marihuana, 1,300 kg of precursors for improvised explosive devices and a huge amount of weapons and ammu-nition were seized. On operations, the SOF TF ISAF were forced into direct action against the opposing forces, whom they inflicted high losses. The combat activities were performed in compliance with the effective Rules of Engagement (ROEs). The 2nd SOF TF proved their high professionalism in defence of FOB FINLEY SHIELDS that came under attack on 14 April 2012, when they had initially been the only effective combat power to resist the attack on the camp.

As a part of combat assignments, the 2nd SOF TF also distributed humanitarian aid to the local population especially in the form of blankets, winter garments and teaching aids.

The SOF TF ISAF accomplished its operational assignment in full, without serious inju-ries and casualties in 2012.

SOF Task Force KAMBA

In accordance with the Resolution No. 722 of the Government of the Czech Republic dated 6 October 2010, TF KAMBA was mandated to perform security and defence of the Czech Em-bassy and its staff in the territory of Afghanistan through 2012. In accordance with the Resolution, development, training and deployment of subsequent task forces started comprising members of the 601st Special Forces Group with authorised strength of 20 personnel for four-month rotations.

Three task forces consecutively served to provide security of the Embassy in 2012 to per-form their mission under operational command of the Director of Military Intelligence. Difficult security situation notwithstanding, a professional performance by TF KAMBA ensured full pro-tection of the embassy staff. The mission will continue in 2013.

NATO Response Force

Assigned forces and assets of the SOF TF were included into the Response Force Pool (RFP) to perform special operations missions across the operation spectrum from peacetime through conflict containment, high-intensity warfighting and subsequent stabilisation. The RFP is defined as a reserve force ready to reinforce Immediate Response Force (IRF) in case needed.

Tasks arising from the unit’s duties in the NATO Response Force assignment were per-formed in full.

International exercises and cooperation

Members of the 601st SFG successfully took part in 4 training exercises abroad: - LION 2012, from 9 October to 16 December 2012. Training and assistance to the Kenyan

special forces;

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- JACKAL STONE, Croatia, from 8 to 26 September 2012. That NATO Special Opera-tion Forces exercise focused on theory, joint training, harmonisation of operating procedures and coordination in performance of SOF tasks;

- PUMA 2012, from 6 to 16 November 2012, Poland, a command post exercise held at the JFTC (Joint Force Training Centre) under NATO auspices. The aim was to exercise the Special Operations Component Command (SOCC) and served as a preparation for interna-tional exercise COBRA in 2013;

- EAGLE 2012, from 29 May to 23 June 2012, with involvement of U.S. ODA in the Czech Republic. The training focused on theory of advanced parachute training, resupplying, advanced tactical insertion techniques and practical fire and tactical training, CQB and com-bat drills.

Development of the Special Forces´ capabilities

The Special Forces continued to develop and build their capabilities in 2012. The capa-bility development process was fully in line with the Special Forces primary mission. To achieve interoperability with NATO nations’ Special Operations Forces, the capabilities of the Czech Special Forces were also developed in accordance with the requirements under NATO – MC 437/II, AJP 3.5 and ACO standards Vol. X and XI. Therefore, the task forces formed are able to deploy not only for national missions but also capable of a full integration in NATO operations.

As a part of capability development, the process of sharing observations and lessons learned from operations involving the Special Forces was improved and accelerated. Observa-tions and lessons learned were consistently gathered for subsequent evaluation, fusion and implementation already on operational deployment in ISAF. The information was fed back into the Czech Republic and immediately incorporated into the subsequent deployments train-ing as well as the work of the Special Forces Capability Development Board.

The development was also funded using the Foreign Military Funding and Foreign Mili-tary Sales programs.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC …fdro%e8n%ed%20zpr%e1va... · 7.7 Primary tasks...

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