Military Review December 1961

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U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort leavenworth, Kansas

In This IssHe

+: How Tough Is Tough?~ T h e Third Berlin Offensive

~ Hiroshima-Yesferday's Tomorrow!

December61


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UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COW:GE LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS I

"o.,

........ ....ii

COMMANDANTMaj Gen Harold K. Johnson

ASSISTANT COMMANDANTBrig Gen Harry J. Lemley, Jr.DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

Col Edward Chalgren, Jr.


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MilitaryReview VOLUME XLI DECEMBER 1961 NUMBER 12

ditor in ChiefCol Kenneth E. Layssistant EditorU Col Jerry G. Wallaceeatures EditorLt Col Cleo S. Freedayout Editor2d Lt Russell W. Munson, Jr.

S ~ a n i s h A m e r i c a n EditorLt Col C. BetallcesRamirez

Associate EditorLt Col Daniel E. HalpinArmy War College

Executive Officer.lfaj Lorenzo D. Laughlin

Production OfficerLt Col Louis Ruiz

~ t a f f ArtistCilarles A. MooreThe Military Review, aublication of the UNITED

STATES ARMY, provides aorum for the expression ofilitary thought and a me-dium for the disseminationof Army doctrine of the di-ision and higher levels.The VIEWS expressed intbis magazine ARE THE

AUTHORS' and not neees-rity thqse of the Army orhe Comllland and GeneralStaff College.

CONTENTSHow Tough Is Tough?

Maj Reginald Ha,g,eaves.British Army. Ret

2

Hjroshima-Yesterday'sTomorrow? . 10Ma,i Gen Oh Duk-jun,. Republic of Korea A,my. Ret

The Third Berlin Offensiveof the Cold War 17

Alfons DalmaDefense of the British Commonwealthin North America and EuropeHamid Husemann

26Effect of Specialization onLeadershipMaj Herbert A. Schulke, Jr., USA 39Logistic Support in Willow Freeze

Lt Col Fmnk B. Case, USA 43A Program for Self"lmprovementMaj Lucian K. Truscott III. USA 56On the Principles of WarJohn D. Keegan . 61

Origin of the Metric SystemLt Col Oska,' Albrecht, FederalArmy of West Germany 73Command in the Pacific: 194145 76Louis .MortonReorganization of the Swiss Army

Maj Hans Rudolf Meye,',Swiss Army

89

Military Notes 92Military Books 107


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USA CGSC EXTENSION SUBCOURSESCORPS AND ARMY OPERATIONS

,rmed Forces personnel interested in the latest doctrine 'on corpsand rmy operations should enroll in. the 1962 sllbcourses being madeavai ble soon by the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.

ubcourse 8/2, " I n t r o d u ~ t i o n to the Field Army and Administra-tive upport," introduces the field army organization, operations, corn-man, relationships, organization for combat, theater and field army ad-mini ,rative support system, and the integration of conventional andunco ventional warfare operations.

,'orps organization, operations and administrative support, func-tions of the corps general staff sections, and organizations for combatare cilvered in Subcourse 21/2, "Larger Unit Operations."

An applicant for enrollment in the USA CGSC Extension Coursesmust complete and submit one copy of DA Form 145, "Army ExtensionCourse Enrollment Application," to his commanding officer, unit ad-visor. or Professor of Military Science (PMS), as appropriate, for ap-proval and forwarding through channels, including appropriate branchschool, to USA CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.


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Major Reginald Hargreaves, Briti8h Armll. Retired

There is no sense in tryiny to round the rouyh angles of war.-Abraham Lincoln

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,T IS a s t ~ n d a r d gibe that in peacethe armed forces busy themselves preparing for the last war. What is sooften overlooked is that it would befar easier to plan for the next war,if it were known against whom itwould be waged, and exactly wherethe struggle would be fought.

In these days of quasi-peace theWestern Powers can entertain fewdoubts as to the identity of their mosti likely antagonists. With the approxi

mate parity in nuclear weapons oper-December 1961

ating as a deterrent to their employment, g r e a t e r attention must bedevoted to the likelihood of a conflictarising that would be fought withconventional weapons on more or lesstraditional lines. In envisaging thispossibility, the further problem hasto be considered-woulll such a warbe fought against one or another ofthe principal opponents themselves. orwith one of their obedient stooges? .

Behind both the campaign in Ko-rea and tte bitter struggle in Malayaloomed the two colossi of Communist'imperialism, a I th o ugh the Sovietarmed forces never openly took thefield. In the current trouble spot ofLaos the Pathet Lao guerrillas arebased on North Vietnam, but everyone is perfectly aware that they areinspired and supported by the ChineseCommunists.

Warfare waged by cat's-paw forcesfor a limited objective, and primarilydesigned to distract and fritter awayanti-Communist manpower and resources, constitutes a challenge theWestern Alliance must always be prepared to meet with the utmost resolution and dispatch. Sometimes a determined display of force-;-as in Lebanon-will obviate the need for itsactive employment. Sometimes-as inKorea-the counterchallenge will haveto be made good by a resort to armsthat stops short only at the introduction of major nuclear weapons. I t issolely by such thoroughgoing measures that the satellite forces frontingfor the manipulators of Sino-Sovietpolicy can be brought to question theadvisability of "sticking their necksout" primarily for someone else's benefit.

With two-thirds of the world tochoose from, the Communist leadersare in a position to forrtent a war ill


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HOW TOUGH IS TOUGH?

anyone of a number' of territories.These territories differ widell' in theirclimatic and topographical characteristics, each making special and peculiar demands on the troops committedto fight in them. There is every likelihood of the Communist leaders continuing their successful attempts tostage these exigent localized wars ofattrition. Thus the question inevitablyarises-is the training of the Westernserviceman sufficiently diversified andrigorous for him to go into actionanywhere in the world without thehandicap of insufficient preparationfor the task confronting him?Climate and TerrainBecause Communist forces are sowidely deployed. the possible theatersof war are almost endless. Even in asingle theater the variety of physicalcharacteristics of terrain and climateare wide. Our soldiers would find thatfighting conditions in the Himalayancrags and the mountain ranges of thePamirs differ widely from those in theJungles of Laos. The only thing common to both areas is an absence ofanything like a developed road system.

On India's northwest frontier thereare good highways penetrating intoAfghanistan and' into so m e of thetribal areas to the south. But lateralcommunications are sparse and difficult. In Laos the Western servicemanwould find himself committed almostexclusively to j u n g I e fighting. OnN A TO's northern flank he would face

'conditions in Norway that called forMajor Reginald Hargreaves, Brit-ish Army, Retil'ed. served in WorldWars I and IJ. A frequent contributorto the MILITARY REVIEW. his latestwork. "Thorn in the Flesh" appearedin the June 1961 issue. He has writtenon numerous military topics for pub-lications throughout the world.

training such as is normally reser

Isfahan to

for the French Alpin;. To defendoilfields at the head of theGulf, operations could as wellhim to the Lut Desert as to the tangleof peaks that run fromKerman. .All of this suggests, amoQg other1things, that it is high time that Oursoldiers are reintroduced to their feet. 1as furnishing the best all-round means fof locomotion. This means all soldiers j- no t just infantrymen. For it ap Ipears to have been far too widely over, ilooked that there are many localitiesin which the employment of the armored troop carrier and much of the 1motorized transport. upon which the!supply services have come to rely, ;would virtually be out of the question. ;Lessons From the Past 1

A similar situation to that which!arose in 1944-when the Allied 5th iand 8th Armies. fighting in Italy, hadto fall back almost exclusively on pack '1transport-could easily 0 c cu r else'-1where. Veterans of the Korean campaigns will have no difficulty in re'calling man y situations in whichwheeJed transport was useless, andthe unit or the individual could moveonly by putting one foot steadily infront of the other. To many of thetroops it was a new and painfullywearing process. The Western servoiceman of World War II had been encouraged to rely on mechanical transport to such a degree as to inhibit hismarching powers almost entirely.This is starkly revealed by an ind,dent chronicled by Captain AntonyKimmins. Royal Navy. Shortly afterthe descent on North Africa Kimminslanded in the disembarkation area.He records:

I talked with an American soldierwhile halting to bind up his blisteredMilitary Review


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feet, on the see 0 n d day after welanded. He had been as game as youmake 'em, but was furious with him-self and his ci.vilian occupation. 'Howcan you ex p e c t us to march?' hefumed. 'A few months ago I was a bell-hop in Chicago. I used to drive Ihet'ein my automobile in Ihe morning, goup and down in the elevator all daylong. and take my girl friend to themovies in my automobile in the eve-ning. Hell! I've never used my legsbefore.' But he got up and staggeredon iust the same.The thought is not to be repressed,however, that had this unfortunateyoungster's training inc Iud e d the: weekly 20-mile route march common,to most infantry battalions in pre; 1914 days, he would have been an infinitely less distressed and considerably more efficient soldier; not thathis plight was in any way uncommon.Conditioning by MarchingMajor John Dalgleish, in his book,How We Planned the Second Front,relates that when the troops gathered"on Britain's south coast prior to embarkation for Normandy and D-day,an important point affecting the maini tenance of morale was the marchingdistance between marshaling areasand embarkation areas. One pioneercompany had marched 15 miles withfull packs, and they had arrived atthe embarkation point "flaked out."This was a bad thing, and the fieldforce laid it down that the maximumdistance to be marched must not exceed five miles. Eventually. this distance was reduced to three mnes. Itis evident that contemporary planninghad lamentably failed to recall Suvoroy's wise dictum that. "Victory depends upon the feet; the hands areonly the tools of victory."That this dangerous neglect to cul-December 1961

tivate the soldier's marching powershas not been remedied is witnessed bya recent report from Western Germany. A contingent of British troops,returning from a combined exercisewith Bundeswehr elements, reportedunfavorably on the German rations,but gleefully added, "we were takeneverywhere by armored troop carriersand hardly had to march at all." Allthis mechanical transport was provided by the descendants of the menwho, un d e r Frederick the Great,marched 170 miles in less than a fortnight to fight and win the battle ofRossbach; and then immediately retraced their steps to cr4sh the Austrians at Leuthen.Difference in Background

What is so frequently :and dangerously overlooked is the funda"mentaldifference in the c o m p o ~ i t i o n of thearmies of the Western ,Powers andthose of the Sino-Russian powers andtheir satellites.

The majority of Western recruitsare urbanites, with all, the city-bredindividual's advantages-,and defects.R ea d i I y responsive to instruction,speedily rendered adept with all themechanical aids to warfare, at thesame time they are far more excitableand pernickety, and less hardy physically than men brought up under theharsher conditions t h a t accompanymanual labor on the soH. Trainingtoughens the t o w n - d w e l l e ~ , and by thetime he is ready to join a unit he hasseme right to consider himself tough.But the point is- in this ~ o n t e x t , justhow tough is tough? i

The Russian and Chinese armies,like those of their satellites, are madeup almost exclusively of men of extremely virile, hard-wea111ng peasantstock. Writing of the Russian soldier,5


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HOW TOUGH IS TOUGH?in paxticulal', Otto Skorzeny has recorded:

They can sleep ICitllOut hurt inIcringing-Icet clothes, march incredible distances, Ii! '. on ,'oats from thefields, and digest anything. They canteal' hunks from f! long-dead horse,and march on, ,cfreshed. They candrink from marshes and shell holes;and subsist l'irtually without supply

yard. I believe he considered itfeeny naluml that none of the hasp;. 'tal staff offaed him any assistance.To which may be added that, withthe fullblooded oriental the sheer capacity for RU rvival, like his stoicismunder strain. his incredible stamina,and his disregard of injury or depri,vation. is even more pronounced thanwith the sem'i-Asiatic Russian.

US 1 r m ~The Western ~ o l d i e r must have a barbarian body controlled by a civilized mind

columns. since they never hesitate toemploy a human chain of old men andIi'omen to man-handk food and humpammunition. We lce,'e amazed at thestoicism 1I'ith lI'hieh they bore theirinjuries. They could stand far morepain than a Western European. I my.elf 8alll a soldier, both of whose armshad bee n amputated, a jew hoursearlie?', get up f"om his matt,pss andIl'alk ?t,r/aided to the latrine in the

Realistic TrainingThe Western serviceman, un de r

everyday garrison conditions. is entitled to all the amenities with whichhe can be furnished. I t cannot be toostrongly emphasized or too clearlyborne in mind that such conditionsrepresent the abnormal. His normalstate is that of a man committed towarfare, with everything I'educed tothat condition of primitiveness of

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which conflict itself is the highestexpression.For all that, training programsrarely make provision for an exercise

based upon sustained and stringentdeprivation. Yet such a condition oftemporarily having to do withoutarises in wartime over and over again.A detached force is ordered to holdon to an outlying position, which for

mate d r 0 p of water-everything.I t is in such a situation that some

drastic earlier training in deprivation- in the art and science of survivingon nothing much more than the smellof an oily rag-would payoff handsomely. To undergo the experience ofprogressively "doing without" as partof the normal military education wouldgreatly minimize its shock-potential

US ArmllAmerican guerrillas are \\ell"adept in self ..defense. Judo techniques are demonstratl!'dhere by two Army Special Forces instructors.the time being cannot be reached byany ordinary means. To attempt anairdrop-such as Wingate's Chinditsrelied upon for their supplies whenfighting in the Burmese jungle-wouldbe only to draw attention to a location dangerously enough exposed asit is. Everything, from ammunition toemergency rations, has to be hoardedto the final round, the last crumb offood and shred of tobacco, the u ~ t i -

when it has to be endur$d in the faceof the enemy.

Sir Charles Snow, iti his Scienceand GOI'emment, has cogently pointedout that, i

Societies at about the Isame level oftechnology will produce $imilar inventions. It is quite unreali$tic, and Ve1')Jdangp'ous, to imagine flwt the Westas a wllole can e . ~ p e c t :a permanentand decisive lead in milftary technol-I

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'-HOWTDUGH IS TOUGH?ogy over the East as a whole. Thate.r:pectation is a typical piece of gadg:eteel"s thinking. ,It has done the WestlllOl'e hann than any olhel' kind ofthinkinlJ. History and science do notwork that way.

If the Wegt can aspire to hold itsown in the invention and fabricationof weapons of mass destruction, thenthe nuclear deterrent will continue tooperate, But the longer it persists, thegreater the chance that, in mattersthat reach the stage of armed dispute,'resort will be made to conventionalweapons and the men who wield them.I f the 'Western Powers can achieveand maintain parity with their Communist .opponents in the means ofwaging scientific warfare, an equaleffort is demanded of t1:1em to indoctrinate and train their manpower toattain a phygical and mental toughness equal, if not guperior, to that oftheir antagonists.Decline of Nations

So far, history has invariably shownthat degeneration fotIowg upon a highstate of civilization; the re,cord ofancient times is the story of the decline and fall of one great nation afteranother. Civilization. after a certainpoint, tends to render a nation enervated and unfit for the struggle oflife at a primitive level. Its, people,thereLlpon, suffer conquest by othershardier and more ruthless who haveattained no such exquisiteness of cultiv.ation-although subconsciously the

" b a r b ~ r i a n " may envy it and long forit. Just as the Greeks were destroyedby the unregarding power of Rome,so Rome itself-become decadent andsoft-fell before the ruthless onrushof the Goths. In later days Francecultivated, civilized, refined, and sensitive-was overwhelmed by the rough

and brutal strength of the Germanyof 1870.

Primitive peoples live under fal'harsher conditions than are known tomore civilized nations. I t follows that 'Jnaturl\l selection has greater play;weaklings die out at an early age, jand those who survive to manhood arebetter adapted to the struggle of ex-istence than the beneficiaries of atenderly nurtured, luxurious way oflife. Their grosser instincts are morepowerful, more resilient.Remedying the Situation

The first step in countering a dan-ger is to recognize its existence.

The durable qualities boasted by theearly Romans and the Goths noWa-days characterize the warrior-massesof Communist imperialism, which arenothing less than the hordes of Gen-ghis Khan and Tamerlane rendereddoubly dangerous by possession of the I,most modern weapons. And it is upon [-their primitive level of forcefulness.endurance. and indifference to deathor mutilation that the defenders ofthe Free World must be prepared tomeet them. Their toughness must findsomething more than a match in ours- and toughness means a good dealmore than exhibiting a hairy chestand r e l a p s i ~ g into squalor at the vel yfirst opportunity.

There are, of course, specialist formations among the allied battle orderthat can compare in genuine toughness with any body,of men that Com-munist imperialism can put into thefield: the United States Special ForcesGroups and the best of the Fleet Ma-rine Force, the Parachute Regimentand the Royal Marine Commandos, theFrench Foreign Legion. But campaigns are not won by a few handpicked COI'PS d'elite; they are won-

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lost-according to the quality of The Attraction of Hardship~ the run of the ordinary rank and file.And their quality depends on the typef training to which they are subjected.j On their arrival in India, for ex-,'ample, the divisions that were to provethe backbone of the successful fight:; for Burma's recovery were no better

: : ~ a n d no worse than any other wartime formations. But it was painfully obvi-OliS that, as they stood, they were quiteunequal to the task of fighting Japa.nese troops especially schooled for op-erations in this particular theater ofwar. So they were put to training, 'andthey were trained the hard way-as\\'ere all their reinforcements. I t tooktime, and it called for a lot of weed-mg out of those who found the de-mands made upon them altogether too'grueling. In the end, what had been

an ordinary run-of-the-mill formation:turned into a body of men capable of'bringing a wily, resourceful, and ex-. ceedingly tou'gh enemy to surrender.

Fitting Words:

I t is a cardinal mistake, moreover,to believe that easygoing, undemanding training is the lure which attractsmen to the ranks. On the contrary, asa recent British Parliamentary Reportaffirmed, "The arms which have leastdifficulty in attracting recruits arethose where training is rigorous, dis-cipline is strict, and smartness highlydeveloped."

"Aptitude for war," Napoleon in-RiRted, "ie aptitude for movement";and in his day m 0 vern e n t meantmarching. "All the mystery of move-ment and combat," wrote MarshalSaxe, "is in the legs, and it is to thelegs that we should apply oursel\'es."In short, toughness-that is training-should start at the legs and workupward. What the Western service-man muet try to achieve is a barbarianbody controlled by a civilized mind.With that, he is oue up on his mostprobable opponents. With that, butwith nothing short of that, he willbe really tough.

1. "Push right along, close up fast."2. "Close up, men, close up; push on, push on."

These were the verbal proddings of (1) Grant and (2) of StonewallJackson as they marched with their armies, on opposite sides of the strug-gle, to some specified rendezvous. For eal:h it was imperative to reach adesignated objective at X hours. Time and place entered into their esti-mate of the situation, absorbed their innermost thoughts, c.irculatedthrough their nervous systE'ms. The distance to the crossroads was trans-lated into so many ticks of the clock, and the capability of the foot soldierwas resolved' into steps per minute. Stragglers have never won battles.Close up, push on.

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M';" ~ ) h Dok-;",Republic of Korea Armg, Retired

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HIROSHIMA Y E S T E R D A Y ' ~

T O M O R R O W ~ iThe views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department ofthe Army, the U. S. Army Commandand General Stal! College, or thegovernment of the Republic of Ko-rea.-Editor.

MONDA Y, 6 August 1945 brokebright and hot over Hiroshima. AIready at 0800 the glare outside m,office window on the second floor ofthe brick barracks that housed the104th Infantry Regiment gave promise of an uncomfortable day ahead

In keeping with Japanese militar)custom I was serving the entire firstweek of August as duty officer. On thenight of the 5th an alert had soundedand all officers and enlisted men movedto air raid shelters outside the city.,Flights over Hiroshima suggested that'the planes were reconnoitering preparatory to major air attack.Copyright


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At this time the war was goingbadly for Japan-a continuous succession of battles and losses. Many B-29'sflew daily over Japan, dropping their, bombs on Nagoya, Tokyo, and othert large cities. Hiroshima, however, had

,0 been spared; according to rumor the, Americans were preparing something1pecial for it. My regimental com.! mander had said, "Hiroshima must be:i an open city and will not be bombed."; Nevertheless, the t roo p s workedi around the clock digging and shoringl up tunnels in the hills near the city;tunnels that would shelter the headquarters and enable it to carry oh itsactivities in eveiit of major bombings.The work continued into August., Although I am a Korean, my presti ence in Hiroshima on duty with theI Japanese Imperial Army was not unu'pual. During World War II I was in; Japan attending college. I had not ex:1 pected to join the military service,'j but in January 1944 the Japanese ex'j tended conscription to include Korean': college students. Thus forcefully conscripted, the Japanese Army assigned" me on 20 January 1944 to the 48thi Infantry Regiment at Okayama, as a;: second-class private. Following sixi: months' recruit training I attained ai: first-class private's rank and then rei.l ceived noncommissioned officer train:; ing for .the following four months." Promotion to corporal and sergeant! Major General Oh Duk-jun, Republlic of Korea Army, Retired, is Chair!l man of the Pusan Commercial Girls'IHigh School. He is a veteran of 15! years' service in the ROK Army durI ing which time he commanded the 9th,i 11th, and 15th ROK Divisions. andf served as commanding general of theIII and V ROK Corps. He was graduated from the U. S. Army Commandand General Staff College in 1954.

followed quickly and then success inthe examination for officers' candidateschool. Upon being graduated fromthe Officer Candidate School at Fukuchiyama, near Kyoto, I was assignedto Central Army Headquarters at Hiroshima. My assignment was effectiveon 30 June 1945, whereupon I undertook my duties in the headquarters located some 600 yards southwest offamous old Hiroshima Castle.Target CityHiroshima was a fan-shaped city,spread across the delta of the OtaRiver, whose seven estuarial mouths.ribs in the fan, formed six islandsextending into Hiroshima Bay. Aboutthree-quarters of its 380,000 inhabitants normally lived in the main c6mmercial and residential areas covering10 square kilometers in the center ofthe city. Factories and suburbs layaround the city's perimeter, rimmedby mountains that rose around thethree sides of the delta. To the southwere the nocks, and then the sea itselfspeck\t=d with little islands. Five evacuation programs had reduced the population to about 245,000 persons, anda sixth program was underway in August 1945.

The military barracks" centrally located within the city. sprawled overa roughly rectangular area about 1,000by 1,200 meters, northeast of the pointwhere the Motoyasu broke away fromthe Ota River. Hiroshima Castle, likewise centrally located within the military area, was approximately 1,000meters northeast of the fateful riverjuncture, a natural reference point foranyone desirous of aiming at Hiroshima's vitals.

Nothing significant ocourred duringthe night of the alert llnd my unitmoved back to its duty station in townthe n ex t morning. B e ~ a u s e of the


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ing, apparently are su i t of beingthrown about by the blast.Upon arrival at the tunnels, werested for the most part; althoughsome soldiers futilely searched formedicine in the rubble of nearby farmhouses. About 1700 I found some beanoil in a half-gallon jug. As a child .I:j had known this to be an effective remedy for burns. I slathered some on my

US ArmuGeneral Oh Duk-jun taken before hisretirement from the Republi1: of KoreaArmyface and also assisted the soldiers intreating their burns. ( l am convincedthat had I not used the bean oil, myface today would be a mass of scars., It so happens that it is possible to, see under a strong light only a few

,small patches of scar tissue on my. neck and none on my face.)Food and Medication LimitedA search of our tunnel turned uponly rice and no other food to go withit. The men organized a hunting party,which brought back a pig. Because wehad never h e a r d of radiation weslaughtered the pig, cooked it, and ateDecember 1961

it in a kind of soup along with therice.That evening my face and neck and

the torn knee became increasinglypainful. All of us admitted to severeheadaches but considering our experience we felt that this was not unusual.By 1400 the next day the translucent water blisters, which had grownto the size of eggs, had turned yellow. We had no mirrors with which

to examine our own wounds but wecould look at each other and know thatour injuries were similar. The eggsized, yolk-colored blisters gave off anoffensive odor. On some of the menwho had been severely burned, I notedthat the upper half of their bodieswere covered with blisters the size ofa man's fist. Since we were unable tolocate medicine, we continued to daubeach other with the bean oil. Thatnight the pain and malaise increased.The following day-8 August

eight men from myoid regiment atOkayama arrived at the tunnel to helpus, but they brought only Mercurochrome in the way of m e d i c i n ~ . Weresembled a platoon of Santa Clausesafter the tincture was applied. Thatnight we were evacuated by train toHiba-gun, about 80 kilometers westof Hiroshima.

During the r id e to Hiba-gun Imused over my experience of the pastthree days. I had witnessed death toan extent experienced by only a fewmen. Three hundred dead in one place-500 in another-and 1,000 deadin yet another; repeated many times.Natu re had conspired against the Japanese in one respect. The 6th of August was a nice day full of sunshine.Adults unwittingly invited death whenthey lined up at bus and streetcar stations, and the children when they

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HIROSHIMAromped in their schoolyards. All in allthe consequences resembled a hugeant colony that had been stamped outby the boot of a giant.None of us. had really known whathad happened or th(\ n a t u ~ e of theweapon. My personal conclusion wasthat the US had dropped , ~ o m e typeof new weapon or somehow had managed to release a tremendous quantityof some old type. Naturally. a constantsource of concern was the possibilitythat they might return and attackagain. But down.. in my heart I feltthat this one raid really had endedthe war.Rolling along' through the black ofnight. I recalled that my Christianminister in Korea had told my peoplethat sometime in the future God wouldtry man by fire. Perhaps this had beenthe trial.Upon arrival at Riba-gun I foundthat about 200 men had been assembled; we were quartered in a primaryschool. Treatment of the injured wasinadequate because Mercurochromestill was the only medicine available.One of my men lived near the schoolhouse. At my suggestion his family obtained some zinc oxide. which some ofthe soldiers applied to th e i r burnwounds.

About 10 or 20 victims died dailyand the bodies were burned regularlyabout 90 meters from where we werequartered. I kept thinking that tomorrow might be my day. But I retained a belief in God and a strongdetermination to continue my medication.Treatment ContinuedAt the end of the week about onehalf of the patients at the school haddied. I was mote fortunate. My burnshad begun to heal over. Up to thattime I had feared that I was not a

sound man--lhat I might lose my nose'or part of my neck and ear. Now theskin dried and it peeled, a little eachday. After 10 days about one-half ofthe skin had peeled and I grew increasingly confident that I would live,r continued to use the bean oil andgave i t to my soldiers, but many othersused only the Mercurochrome. Manyfaces looked like lcabocha (pumpkin),

On 5 September I left the emergency infirmary at Hiba-gun and re:turned to Korea by ship, arriving atPusan on the 12th. By then almost allof the old skin had peeled from mywounds. Our real trouble throughoutthe ordeal was that no one knew howto treat such wounds.

I was all bandaged when my wifemet me in Pusan (we had been married in 1943 and had one son). Shewept. fearing that perhaps I had lostmy nose or ear or other vital parts,

The next day I removed the bandages and happily my face appearednormal. except it was red as a beet,I then submitted to a Dr. No in Pusanwho continued treatment. He. as theothers. had no experience with nuclearinjuries. and. therefore, didn't knowwhat to prescribe. We continued themedication I already had used, andnothing else. We stopped treatmentin November 1945 and by the summerof 1947 I had recovered fully. with abosolutely no aftereffects.

My friends had told me that I wouldnever recover, but I surprised themall. Both Japanese and US doctors hadsaid that some atomic victims wouldlose their hair, some would die. andothers would be incapable of reproduction. Today. 16 years after Hiro'shima, I have a full head of hair andhave fathered three sons and threedaughters. I am very much alive.r do not speCUlate on the gracious

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ness of the Almighty, but I think someere d i t for my fortunate situationsprings from the simple treatment Iused and my determination to survive.Of course, I was not exposed directlyto radiation, but I incurred much ofthe thermal and blast effects of theweapon. I know other men could su rvive such 'a nuclear burst under similar conditions.Strength Through Knowledge

I am telling this story to Americans and other people of the Free World

We know that the 20-kiloton bombdropped on Hiroshima was a smallweapon by today's standards. In thefuture, much higher yield weaponsmay be used. Nevertheless, the Hiroshima weapon spelled Japan's defeat.All people must realize that it wasused only to end the war and to winpeace. I t did end the war-and broughtpeace temporarily.

You. may wonder Why a man whosuffered from the bomb returned tohis homeland only to become a pro

.. ".;

US ArmllHiroshima, Japan, after the explosion on 5 Augllst 1945

be,ause I think that my experiencewas one by which they may profit.I g n o r a n c ~ is fear; today, we musthave strength born of knowledge.No people ever has been surprisedlike the Japanese were in 1945 bythe use of atomic weapons. The FreeWorld must not be similarly taken bysurprise. The Japanese were afraidbecause they lacked knowledge.December 1961

fessional soldier. The reason lies inthe thinking of the people of my village.After the war I returned home and

thought of teaching school, but somefriends thought that we should buildan army' for the defense of Korea. Sofor two years I fought as a battalionand regimental commander in SouthKorea. Then I served as a regimental

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HIROSHIMAand division commander in the Republic of Korea Army during the KoreanWar. r did this gladly because as longas there are human beings on thisearth, they must have a country, andthey must be ready to defend it. Today, progress in the development ofnuclear weapons proceeds apace; thusthe need to defend freedom and peaceis correspondingly great. We must beprepared to fight for freedom underGod; not ad m it to pessimism andwishy-washy acquiescence to peace atany price. The thought of nuclear waris appalling, but ' the thought of certain servitude is more appalling.Many persons around the world saythat we cannot defend against nuclearweapons. But I say that while we maynot be able to prevent their use, wecan defend ourselves. My experiencesuggests that it can be done.Civilian and Military SupportIf nuclear war comes, it wiII notonly be a war of military units butall mankind wiII be involved. A strategy to prevent such war is absolutelynecessary. I t must be supported byboth civilian and military measures.if for no other reason than to showthe world that we understand whatis at stake.As a bare minimum, civil defenseshould undertake the following threepoint program:

Train the public to understand whatmight occur and how to deal with it.

Disperse cities and vulnerable industrial areas.Stockpile emergency food suppliesand medicines outside populated areas.

Military training should be aimed atimproving our readiness andproficiency in a nuclear environment. I fthe schools that I have attended are

.indicative of our over-all training, Ibelieve that our knowledge of the theory of nuclear weapons is adequate.I believe, too, that our weapons areadequate. Ne'lertheless, the trainingof ground combat units to cope withnuclear war is not what it must be,if we are to survive and win.

If I were charged with preparing aprogram, I would list these essentials.We need the simplest possible chain ofcommand, and units must be dispersedfar greater than they are now. Thephysical layout and dense concentrations of our headquarters overseas areoutstanding examples of targets in-viting disaster.

The same is true in the UnitedStates. In 1955 I covered the countryfrom coast to coast. Last year I tri'veled more than 20,000 miles over' thesame territory and I could detect noappreciable change in the situation.

Digging is of the utmost impor-;tance. This applies to troops at thefront, troops at the rear, and to CI-'vilians wherever they are located. Todate, we have had too much talk andnot enough action.

The situation throughout. the Fr.eeWorld concerning defense against nu-clear attack reminds me of Hiroshimain 1945-no dispersion, and wishfulthinking that the allied nations are"open cities" not susceptible to enemyattack.

Major James A. Buck, UnitedStates Army, a Japanese linguistrecently assigned to the US ArmyIntelligence School from Headquarters, 8th US Army, assistedin the interviews and collectionof factual data for this article.-Editor .

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This ar.ticle presents an analysisof the cold war problem of Berlinand what the situation portends forthe future as seen by a mature andinformed West German observer.Mr. Da/ma emphasizes the interre-lationship between military and po-litical strategy as he presents thecycles through which the Sovietshave passed in their efforts to dis-lodge the fl'ee nations of the Westfrom their rightful position in WestBerlin.

The author is the Editor in Chiefof the Munchner Merkur, a lectm'el'in political strategy'at the Academyfor Political Science in Munich, anda frequent contributor to major pro-'essional journals. The viewpointsexpressed here are those of the au-thor and are not necessarily en-dorsed by the MILITARY REVIEW, theU. S. Army Command and GeneralStaff College, or the United StatesArmy.-Editor.

December 1961

THE Soviet cold war offensive of1961 against Berlin, Germany, andWestern Europe is founded on thesame basis as earlier crises in thisarea. I t could be described as the sec-ond phase of the sam e operation.Added are perhaps the changes in thepolitical and military power relationbetween East and West which haveoccurred in the meantime, and slightlymodified and refined methods of coldwar strategy.

The political and strategic planningof the Soviet Union stresses two car-dinal points. First, the defensive posi-tion of West Berlin is militarily weakbecause' of the outpost position of the

Translated and digested fromthe original article w h ie h ap-peared in WEHRKUNDE (FederalRepublic of Germany) August1961. ;17


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~ E R L I N OFFENSIVEcity and the vulnerability of its linesof communication. Second. the political and strategic significance of WestBerlin is so great that its loss wouldhave an incalculable effect upon theFederal Republic. Western Europe.and upon the effectiveness of the entire Atlantic Alliance.

Moscow's political and strategic action in the Berlin crisis has two related objectives; The demonstrationof the ineffectiveness of the WesternAlliance by eventual capitulation ofthe Western Powers before the demands of Moscow on Berlin and theGerman problem. and the moral separation of the German people from theWestern Powers which wiII follow ifthe Western Powers are forced to acknowledge the partitioning of Germany as legal and final.

Should this occur the Federal Republic would have to seek an arrange-ment directly with the Soviet Union.Within the equation of the power relation of East and West. the FederalRepublic. the third industrial powerin the world. is an important factor inmilitary strength. Such a reorientation of West German policy wouldcause all of Western EUrope to faIlblindly into the Soviet sphere of influence. Soviet influence would becomepredominant.

Responsible political and militarycircles in the United States have recognized this' goal for years. The atti-tude of the President shows that hekl'oWS a withdrawal of the UnitedStates from Berlin under pressure andcompulsion would shake the credibility of the Western Alliance and destroy confidence in the American guar-anty of protection. The Fed e ra IRepublic would then be exposed tofar more effective physical blackmail

ing under unfavorable national. Politoical. and psychological conditions.The masses, whose memories aregenerally short. are frequently in.c1ined to consider each crisis individually; governments and military plan.

ners must keep an eye on the generaltrends and the Soviets' German policy. In this light. Khrushchev's plainspoken demands and generous assur.ances fall into true perspective. Theyare neither harmless nor modest.The First Offensive

The current Berlin offensive is thethird. The first two fell in 1948-49and 1958-60. All three arose withinMoscow's u n i f i ~ d German policy whichshows three phases over the span of16 years. In each of the phases thepurpose and trend of Soviet policyhave remained the same.

During the first phase. from theYalta Conference in 1944 until theend of the Berlin blockade in 1949.Moscow sought to take possession oGermany by taking advantage of thepolitical oversights of the WesternPowers. In her own occupation zone.the Soviet Union immediately beganto liquidate the historically developedGerman society by establishing a Communist power machine and installinga Socialist economic system. In theWestern zones she tried to prompt thetrusting Americans to eliminate thenational and conservative German elements. to split up the German formsof society. to introduce an economicsystem of extreme Socialist mold. andto let Communists (as reliable. antiFascist democrats) gain influence.

From today'S pel'spective this phaseof the Soviets' Gennan policy appearsfantastic if not surrealistic. Moscowalmost achieved its goal in this phaseof operations. The disadvantages o


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the West's position in Berlin orIgInated from the planned and farsightedmoves of the Soviets as well as fromthe gullibility and the blind confidenceof the Western Powers during theyea.rs of this first phase. Only in thefall of 1947 did the United Statesbecome disenchanted and alert.

The Berlin blockade of 1948 was aprecipitate attempt of Moscow to ex-

The Second OffensiveThe tactics of this phase operatedin an environment of internal Western conflicts of opinion caused by theFederal Republic coming into existence as a potential rival of Great Brit-ain and France. Moscow's method inthat decade was primarily politicaland psychological enticement and tactical exploitation of the old forms of

us Arm1JFlourishing West Berlin, in the heart of a failing communistic economy, provides anunpalatable contrast to the Sovietstort by force and blackmail what could

no longer be obtained by trickery andideological doubletalk. The Be r l inblockade failed. The American monopoly in nuclear weapons was takeninto account in the second phase ofthe Soviets' German policy. Moscowavoided drastic methods and bindingthreats of force. The monopoly grad-ually, however, changed into a mereAmerican superiority.December 1961

national interests. Moscow turned toGreat Britain and France portrayingGermany, which had gradually regained her strength, as the l'esurrection of the old German danger.

Stalin and later Khrushchev dangledbefore the eyes of the Germans theprospects of reunification, of the reparation of the national catastrophe of1945, under Soviet conditions. Evenat that time a song was being softly

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I

BERLIN OFFENSIVE

sung which is how being played to anew arrangement-the betrayal of theWest for the cause of German unity.Moscow's diverse methods had specific objectives-to prevent the inte-'gration of the Federal Republic in theWestern defense system, to frustratethe recovery of Germany as a militaryfactor, and to neutralize Germany,thereby exposing Europe to Sovietsuperiority and ultimately Soviet domination.

I t is characteristic that this phaseends where a new relationship ofstrategic armame}lt begins. After theSoviets had created thermonucle/lrweapons and a strong missile systemand thus reached a military parity bfsorts with the United States (a gratlually increasing process during theperiod 1954-58), they shifted theirGerman policy again from enticementand multiple-purpose dec e p t ion toblackmailing, force, and pressure."D"-day for the inception of this thirdphase, which very likely will reach itsclimax in the months to come, was 28November 191)8.The Third Offensive-ObjectivesTo merely compel the West to recognize the partitioning of Germanyunder international law aIfd to acknowledge the legality of the government of the Soviet zone is not the trueobjective of Operation Berlin. Therisk to which the Soviet Union hasexposed herself in the Berlin crisis,a risk which could involve a nuclearwar, is not compatible with such alimited objective. But if the stakesare all of Germany and Western Europe as a whole then her readiness totake the risk becomes understandable.

The same observation holds true onthe American side. The United Statesacceptance of the risk of general war.rather than accept the Soviet demands,

' O O " ' ~ " M W M " ~ @ bmw. ,""Ithis is not a matter of fixing the'status quo but that it is preparatinfor further dynamic expansion of the;Soviet empire into the German andWest European area. I t would be abosurd for the United States and t;hFederal Republic to risk a thermo uclear war solely to avoid de facto eeognition of the Ulbricht regime. Butit becomes logical when the securityof Western Europe and the existenceof the entire Western Alliance is inbalance. Christian Herter expressedthis in the summer of 1959 when hesaid:

The long-range objective of the Soviets is to maintain a divided Germany until the opportunity arises tocreate one single German state underCommunist influence. Their Berlinproposal shall lead . . . to expedite theachievement of this goal. To go along,with these proposals u'ould involve asignificant ,'etreat on the part of theWest from which the world ,{"ouldlearn that the brutal strength of theSoviets is the "uling p01"er in thispart of Europe.

Khrushchev, in his Leipzig addressof 7 March 1959, described a free cityof Berlin as the best way for a transition into an all-Communist Berlin;and the theory of two German statesas the best way for one Germany tobe established through the battle ofthe classes with Walter Ulbricht asthe chief of state and Otto Grotewohlas the chancellor of all Germany. Andnow, shortly after the resumption ofhis Berlin offens;ve with the allegedgoal of permanently establishing a divided Germany, the Soviet MinisterPresident spoke before students of theMilitary Academy in the Kremlinabout the necessity of German reunification. ~ e urged that the Federal

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Republic accept the proposal for a federation of Germall states and to come to an agreement with the government of the Soviet zone on reuni-

Ification. This was on 7 July of this year.I Even the Vienna Memorandum of the I Soviet Government of 3 July does not i expressly reject the principle of fuI ture German reunification in spite of I the pressing for the recognition of two ! "legal" German states. I Thus the dialectic of the Soviets'

German policy ranges from the de facto division of Germany. forced and maintained by the So v ie t Union through acknowledgment of the existence of two German sovereign states.' to German unification under a Soviet system. Military Factors

The third Berlin crisis of the postwar period, its political goals and thedanger it involves, bears directly uponmilitary considerations.The relative military power of theEast and the West is one of the motivating reasons for the political andstrategic offensive by Moscow againstBerlin. However, the course of thecdsis will depend upon a series ofdefensive, political. and military measures taken by the East and the We,!and upon the credibility of these measures. In this sense the Berlin crisi"is a test case for the entire militarypolicy of a scaled deterrent Rtrategy.Until the settlern:ent of the crisis oruntil the t e r m i n ~ t i o n of the contlictstemming therefTom. each politicaland military measure taken by eitherside will serve to increase confidencein the effectiveness of the deterrentstrategy or to turn the conflict to theadvantage of one opponent.Iii view of the far-reaching worldwide interests and objectives whichDecember HiS!

are involved in the Serlin criSIS, itis conceivable that a donflict, initiallylocal, may develop into a large-scaleoperation expanding geographicallyand increasing in i n t ~ n s i t y as it develops. Because of the technologicaldevelopment of nuclea\' weapons it isalso conceivable that ~ h e risk of increased intensity in an expanded conflict could become a strong factor inthe efforts to contain it.

I f the strategy of deterrence is toprevent the outbreak of an armed contlict. it obviously must be adapted toall degrees of the scale ranging fromaccidental military incidents to geographically limited sma 11 war withconventional arms, to Ii geographicallylimited nuclear war. or to an all-outwar which would include the territo-ries of the principal opponents andthe entire War potential of the UnitedStates and the USSR.

The strategy of deterrence is effective when readiness for -waging warand preparedness for any type andform of contlict that can be anticipated is so evident that in any imaginable case the chances for success appear to the potential aggressor smallerthan the chances of defeat; the riskin any phase must obviously be greaterthan the expected advantages.Politico-Military Interrelationships

The interrelated military and political nature of the Berlin crisis can beseen from the course of events. On theSoviet side the efforts to increase thecre(libility of their determination formilitary actions ranging from smallconventional operations to thermonuclear war are obvious. On the American side most of the deterrent measures are relative either to an accelerated increase in the conventionalarms potential or in demonstrating thereadiness for thermonuclear warfare.

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BERLIN OFFENSIVEThe demand made by General Maxwell D. Taylor years ago stressing thecapability of the American and AlliedArmed Forces to' wage conventional

and paraconventional war has becomethe official defense doctrine of theUnited States. But, as the strategy ofscaled deterrence is a whole and onlyeffective in its entirety, the preparations for limited conflicts at the conventional or paraconventional level donot preclude an increase in intensityof a conflict, nor do they make preparedness for such an increase unnecessary. "

The containment of a conflict hingesupon the next higher step on the scaleof deterrence. As Joseph Alsop saidin the spring of 1961:

Ultimately e:ve"ylking depends upona question /I'hich no statesman in his-t01'Y has as yet had to answer: Is theUnited States will;ng to bargain witha thermonuclear lcar in order to main-ta;n hel' s a I e m n obligations? Thisquestion has to be answered before wemalee all other conceivable and cleardecisions on a valid defense of Berlin.Deterrence and Determination

From the standpoint of deterrentstrategy it is relatively simple to convince an opponent of the determination to wage offensive or defensivewarfare in a limited geographicalarea with conventional arms, but i tis extremely difficult to convince himof a readiness for intensified warfarereaching into the sphere of thermonuclear weapons.

The risk of a thermonuclear warwith weapons known today is so greatfor both of the superpowers that political and strategic planning musttake into account greater risk of ageneral nuclear war than would havebeen necessary a few years or evenmonths ago. I t follows that the critical

military element of the Berlin crisislies in the unknown and hard to foresee medium ranges of the possibleconflict.There are so many possi)Jle eventualities in the medium range of conflict above the threshold of conventional and below the threshold of thermonuclear operations that the chances>for a miscalculation are great, Undoubtedly, in the months to come itwill be the task of the Western polito

ical leaders to form a strategy of deterrence in this area in a more convincing, more differentiating, and>thusmore effective mold.Dangers in a Limited WarTwo reasons force us to focus ourattention upon the possibility of a warlimited to the German or central European area-which because of alliances would expand to a general nuclear war-in order to seek effectivedeterrent measures against such a development. In his speech of 21 JuneKhrushchev threatened the FederalRepublic. The speech was intended tointimidate. but, nevertheless, it compelled us to take notice that the chiefof the Soviet Government toys withthe idea of a devastating war limitedto German soil.

In the catalog of considerations wemust make room for the special temptation which arises for the Sovietplanners when they perhaps, by puIting too much trust in the remotenessof a direct Soviet-American thermonuclear war, calculate the advantagesof a nuclear war limited to the German area which would very likely endin a draw. Even if, at the time oftruce, today's territorial status quowere reestablished and on the surfaceno party were victorious in the conflict (as in Korea), in reality the Soviet Union would be the absolute win-

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ner. In the big power equation, the insignificant Soviet zone would be on the Eastern side. On the Western side the essential, yes, even decisive, political, economic, and military factor of the Federal Republic would have, for all practical purposes, been destroyed. The Soviet Union would haveachieved one of the major goals of herGerman policy: the elimination of theFederal Republic as an obstacle toSoviet expansion.The prospect of such a gain for Soviet glohal s1jl'ategy makes it probablethat any a t t ~ m p t to attain it wouldsimply compel the United States toincrease the intensity of the conflictto a large-scale thermonuclear war.However, the danger rests in the factthat the Soviet leaders particularly,in this point. may be the victim ofmiscalculation. The Soviets try to convince themselves and the world thatpresently the USSR is ahead in regard to armament for an all-out thermonuclear war.Military Deterrent to Limited WarDeterring measures which will convince the Soviet leadership that risksinvolved in a limited paranuclear conflict on German territory are greaterthan the expected advantages will haveto be taken by the West if the dangersof a Soviet miscalculation are to beprecluded.Two categories are conceivable:purely military measures, and politicostrategic deterrent measures. 0 n ewould be to assemble a strategic-nuclear retaliation capacity in case ofthe nuclear devastation of the FederalRepublic by the Soviet armed forces.Moreover, it should be made clear toMo"cow that the weakness of the inner structure and the military systemof the Soviet zone is, in the event ofa conflict. a potential danger to theDecember 1961

Soviet military forces, to the reliability of the entire satellite sphere, andto the worldwide prestige of the Soviet Union.

The technical prerequisites for astrategic nuclear potential by Germanarmed forces exist today. The retaliation potential, however, is not in German but in American hands. For adeterrent purpose it would serve wellto convince the Soviet leaders that incase of a conflict with nuclear weap- 'ons on German territory a nuclear retaliation. potential would be placed atthe disposal of German military leadership which:

I . Could inflict damage on Sovietterritory equivalent to the devastations in the Federal Republic.

2. Could compel the Soviet Union totake the next step if she does not wantto. be at a power disadvantage withthe United States which until thattime would not have been touched.

The automatic increase and effectiveness of defense readiness to givecredibility to the maintenance of allstages of scaled deterrent strategy is,in view of the Soviet goal, not only ameans or method to settle the Berlincrisis. This maintenance is, as matters stand, a substantial political problem raised by the crisis. The crisis ispolyvalent. Moscow can strive alternately for a new status of Berlin andrecognition of the Ulbricht regime,or a ban of nuclear arms and warheads at the periphery of NATO. especially the Federal Republic.

I t is conceivable, and there are manyindications, that Khrushchev wouldback down from essential demands inregard to the Berlin dispute and theGerman problem if the Western Powers would concede a zone in centralEurope in which nuclear weapons arebanned.

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.

BERLIN OffENSIVEThis would be victory of nearly his-torical significance for the S 0 v ie tUnion. The Federal Republic thenwould be excluded from the area pro-tected by the nuclear deterrent. TheGermans and the Germ a n armedforces would lose confidence in thealliance and in the U n i t e d Statesthrough such a decision.THese are precisely the two objec-tives of the Soviets' German policy in

internal weakness of the Ulbricht reogime. The Soviets seem to know andevents reveal l1aiIy that the entirepopulace of East Germany is in a stateof permanent. although latent. r e s i s ~ance against the Soviet rulers andtheir German executors.Already the danger of war. evokedby the Soviets. has had a galvanizingeffect upon the discontent of the Germans in the Soviet zone. I t would be

Df'je1lSf? MllI!steT of Ih'(;(,111/.(/." Fcd('T({1 R( I,uhl"West German troops prepare an Honest John launcher for actiongeneral and the policy in the Berlincrisis in particular; that is. to declarethe p r o ~ e c t i o n of the alliance an evi-dent failure and to bring about themoral separation of Germany and theUnited States.Political Deterrent to Limited War

A second effective means of West-ern deterrent strategy would resultfrom a systematic exploitation of the

possible to con v inc e the Sovietsthrough stronger propaganda and fre-quent hints on diplomatic levels thatin the event of war the passive re-sistance. especially between the Elbeand Oder. would increase to a totalresistance. and would lead to a gen-eral revolt of the people and the col-lapse of the administrative police andmilitary machine in the Soviet zone.The strategy of deterrence of the

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est would become clearer, more convincing., more credible, and more ef, fective throug.h military, politico-strategic, a n,d economic precautionarymeasures of this kind., In summarizing the analysis of the)political objective and the politico'qdefense background of the current:jBerlin crisis, the appraisal of the sit,juation shows that the Soviet Union'istrives to increase the credibility of'her military threats and that the West;is building up the credibility of their\ deterrent defense in readiness for allHoreseeable possibilities. Each practi

cal oversight of the t h e o ~ e t i c a l necessities of a complete scaled deterrentstrategy could be fatef\!1 and couldchannel the course of t ~ e crisis to amilitary conflict. ' 'In the normal course ~ f events andwith uninterrupted functioning of thedeterrent strategy, the ctisis may endin the course of time without a changein the status quo by runIhing agroundin endless as well as fLlti1e negotiations; however, the different phasesof negotiations would h ~ v e to be accompanied by corresponding measuresof defense readiness. I

If there is a dangerous crisis in Berlin-and there is-it is because ofthreats against the vital interests and the deep commitments of the Westem Powers and the freedom of West Berlin. We cannot yield these Interests.We cannot fail these commitments. We cannot surrender the freedom ofthese people for whom we are responsible. A 'peace treaty' which carriedwith it the provisions which destroy the peace would be a fraud. A 'freedty' which was not genuinely free would suffocate freedom and would be aninfamy....

The Western Powers have calmly resolved to defend, by whatever meansare forced upon them, their obligations and. their access to the free citizensof West Berlin and the self-determination of those citizens. This generationlearned from hitter experience t.hat either brandishing or yielding to threatsean only lead to war. But firmness and reason can, lead to the kind of peace ..ful solution in which my country profoundly believes. .

President John F. Kennedy

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DEFENSE OFTHE BRITISHCOMMON.WEALTHIN NORTH AMERICAAND EUROPEHarald Husemann

Changes in power ratios and fac-tors of economic interdependenceundoubtedly affect the historic func-tion of the British Commonwealthof Nations as a unifying and stabi-lizing influence within the FreeWorld. This article discusses the ele-ments of the British Commonwealthassociation which bear directly onthe North Atlantic Alliance. A sub-sequent article to be published inthe January 1962 issue will extendthis discussion to the members ofthe Commonwealth in the Asiaticand Pacific aleas.-Edit01..

THE British Commonwealth, today, is a free association of sovereignstates and of territories dependentupon them. There is no central organ

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for these states, each nation being responsible for its own domestic andforeign policies. However, in regardto matters of common interest, thereis close eontact between the individualgovernments through correspondence,exchange of High Commissioners, conferences of ministers, and a networkof common commissions.There is also no central defense ordefense planning in this very loosealliance-a fact which raises severalquestions: To what extent does national defense of the individual countries exist under the aspect of a com, man Commonwealth defense? To whatextent are the defense efforts of theindividual countries determined by apact system rather than by the COm-monwealth? What other defense prob

lems do the Commonwealth nationshave outside their Comm


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DEfENSE OF THE COMMONWEALTHtions with experts assigned to theHigh Commissioners in London. Therewas also cooperation within the Imperial Defense College in London,founded in 1927 and attended by offi-cers from all Commonwealth countries. A final instrument of cooperation was the Committee of ImperialDefense, established in 1904.Although in World War II no Imperial War Cabinet was formed, thearmed furces of the Commonwealthmembers operated jointly. Taking partin join't actions ,,!ere "Visiting Forces"in which the troops of the individualcountries operated under their own.commander, and ''Combined Forces"in which the troops operated under ajoint high command. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the United States considered the Commonwealth as a unionand negotiated with London on jointactions.Postwar PolicyPostwar defense planning for theCommonwealth became known from areport which Prime Minister Chiefleymade to the Australian Parliament.According to this report four conditions had been decided upon as indispensable for the security of the Commonwealth: Commonwealth t roo p swere to be placed at the disposal ofthe United Nations for the maintenance of peace. There should be cooperation among the armed forces ofthe Commonwealth members, in accordance with Article 51 of the UnitedNations Charter on the right of collective self-defense. Armed forces ofeach Commonwealth member shouldbe organized for self-defense. Cooperatidn in the Commonwealth defense,finally, should exist without violatingthe sovereign policies of the members.

In . later statements, Chiefley set

forth a decisive development of Cmonwealth defense---a trendregional responsibility. He welcthe establishment of Americanon Australian soil as part of an allembracing defense plan for the Pa.cific. England, he observed, had losl enough riches and blood in defense ofthe Commonwealth; A u ~ t r a J j a , in thefuture, would make a larger contribution to defense especially in thePacific.Proposals for DefenseChiefle:v reported further Englishproposals: Each member of the Com-mOl/wealth should assume responsibility for defending its own territory andadjacent strategic zones, while sharing a common responsibility for thesecurity of communication routes. Fors t r a t e g i c reasons, the popUlationwithin the Commonwealth should bedistributed more evenly, by means ofan easier migration procedure. Thedominions should organize troop training in such a manner as to enablerapid expansion in case of war. Thedominions, finally, should work closertogether in defense research and establish common information bureausThe prewar agencies for militaryconsultation and cooperation continuedin existence after the war. Exchangeof weapons, troops, training personnel, and research re s u I ts was increased, and joint maneuvers wereheld. As most Commonwealth memobers have continued to purchase heavyweapons-war vessels, aircraft, t a n ~ .and rocket weapons-from England orto build them according to Englishblueprints, there has been an extensive standardization of weapons.

In February 1952 England, Canada,and the United States made an agreement to build and equip jointly theSabre aircraft. In March 1952 the

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Australian Government a p pro v e d'adoption of English standards forweapons and equipment. England andCanada have adopted the Belgian FNrifle recommended by NATO, and Can-ada procures Centurion tanks fromEngland.i Ships and Aircraft1 Jet aircraft manufactured in Aus-:! tralia have English A d d ~ r and Vipe)'i turbojet motors, and Australia builds

gades of the division w e ~ e comprisedof troops from England, panada, Aus-tralia, and New Zealand, 'with one In-dian medical unit. Ships Iand aircraftof the Royal Navy and w!1rships fromCanada, Australia, New 'Zealand, andSouth Africa were also aSSigned anactive part. The Commonwealth troopcontingent in K 0 re a was at times33,000 men, of whom 20,000 were inthe Commonwealth division. Of these,

Canad,an National DefenseCanadian Centurion tanks, product of British-Canadian cooperationEnglish gas turbine motors for' theAustralian Canberra bombers andSabre fighter planes. In 1955 the Aus-tralian Naval Air Force was equippedwith English fighter aircraft. New Zealand in 1950 and 1952 receivedwar vessels from England and Aus-tralia.In July 1951 the members of theCommonwealth provided one Common-wealth division under UN commandfor operations in Korea. The three bri-

~ e c e m b e r 1961

England contributed 20,000, Canada8,000, Australia 2,500, and New Zea-land 2,000.After the truce of Panmunjom in1953 India especially assisted in the

repatriation of Prisoners of War. Thechairman of the Repatriation Com-mission was an Indian.Cooperation in military research,especially nuclear research, a m 0 n gCommonwealth and other nations be-gan in November 1945 with the con-

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DEfENSE OF THE COMMONWEALTH

ference of Truman, Mackenzie King,and Attlee on joint control of atomicenergy. Their final communique of 15November stated that the signatorystates saw cause to recommend inter-national control, and were willing toshare results of research, sub j e c tto effective international safeguards

ons; the first test with bombs oftype was made in 1957 onIsland in the Pacific.

BTlttsh Information Setvl(f&British mortar crews of the Commonwealth Division supporting US troops during anassault on an enemy outpost in Koreaagainst military misuse of nuclearenergy.As the exchange of United Statesnuclear information initially was prohibited by law, England was compelledto make efforts on her own in thisfield. The first test explosion of anatomic bomb on the Monte Bello Islands took place in 1952, and issueof nuclear weapons to troops began in1954. In 1955 the English Governmentresolved to make thermonuclear weap-

American Con g re s s to revise the"Atomic Energy Act" and to permitthe exchange of information. Thereupon, on 2 July 1958, a treaty between England and the United Stateswas signed.

The treaty provided for cooperationin defense planning, and in trainingpersonnel in the employment of anddefense against nuclear weapons. Itprovided for joint consultation on thenuclear armament of potential ene

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roies, and for research and planningof military reactors. Finally, it proposed delivery from the US to England of a complete nuclear propulsionunit for a submarine, as well as enriched uranium and construction plans.The treaty made no provisions for thedelivery of atomic weapons and theexchange of information was only toserve defense purposes.In Apri11946 a Commonwealth Ad

~ visory Committee on Defense Science.1

Minister's proposal to test long-rangeweapons jointly with England in Australia. In April 1948 the AustralianParliament announced that Englandplanned to set up in south Australiathe m a j 0 r Commonwealth provingground for supersonic air defenserockets. England, the Commonwealth, and NATO

In spite of the trend toward dominion responsibility, England remains the principal carrier of the

BTitlsh I l l formatlOn SeTVIl"l ' t IBritain's first atomic weapon was detonated on the Monte Bello Islands. Australia, on3 October 1952was founded. During a conference inNovember 1947 it was resolved thatsuch conferences would be held successively in all Commonwealth countries. The major activity of this com-I mittee was consultation on guidedveapons. Later in the year the Austra-

lian Parliament approved the DefenseDecember 1961

Commonwealth defense because of herresponsibilities for the defense of thestill dependent territories and her obligations within the North AtlanticTreaty Organization and 'the Southeast Asia Treaty O r g a n i z ~ t i o n .Under the terms of a :,1949 whitepaper, cooperation within: the Com

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, DEFtNSE OF THE COMMONWEALTHmonwealth would still be governed bythe principles of the Statute of Westminster and the requirements of regional defense:

The natural sfalting point for fu-ture progress in Commonwealth de-fense has been the idea of regionalassociation . . . . Geography largelydecides which problems most dil'ectlyconcern the separate members of theCommonujealth, and it is the aim ofthe val'ious governments to recognizeand take advantage of this fact byarranging that regional questions shallin the first p l a c ~ be studied in.appropriate regional center.

English peacetime a I ' m e d forceswere to be strong enough to providenucleus troops in case of war, to formgarrisons overseas, and to commit security troops to the United Nations.England would furnish occupationforces in Germany, Austria, and Trieste, and would assist in the BerlinAirlift along with Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.Postwar RearmamentIn view of increasing tensions incident to the Berlin Airlift, the Korean War, and the establishment ofN A TO, a new three-year plan wasprojected for rebuilding the armamentwhich had been neglected after thewar. Defense expenditures during the1950-53 period were actually doubledunder this plan but after the trucein Korea armament programs againslowed down.In consideration of England's economic difficulties, the development ofnew weapons, and England's integration into NATO, the English Government published a 1957 white paper,"Defense: Outline of Future Policy,"which set forth a new five-year planentailing big changes. Major tasksof this reorganization were to be co

operation with the allies in resistingand deterring aggression, and defenseof the British colonies by limited operations in overseas emergencies:

"

:1To accomplish these tasks, small. ,imobile, m od e rn units were to be :1formed, equipped with deterrent nu- 1clear weapons, among others. A cen :l

tral strate"c reserve was to be main ;;tained, and the fa c i I i t i e s for airtransport expanded so that these reo "serves could be moved swiftly to anytrouble spot. By the end of 1962 only "volunteers will serve in the armedforces.

The defense cost for 1959-60 wasapproximately 1,514 million poundsGermany, under the provisions ofNATO, .paid about 12 million of fhisamount.The New Royal NavyThe Royal Navy, by the new plan,will be a small but very flexible fleetcentered on aircraft carriers. Groupedaround the carriers will be supportingships with the latest weapons for dealing with air assaults as well as withsurface and underwater attacks. Thekeel of the first nuclear-powered submarine Dreadnought was laid in 1959.Construction of two des t roye r ,equipped with guided missiles has beenunderway since 1959. New vessels builtbetween 1956 and 1960 included 24submarine destroyers, eight frigatesfor air defense, and 13 submarines.

The vessels committed to NATO areequipped primarily for submarine defense. The Far East Fleet, headquartered at Singapore, is able to dealwith any' kind of operation. Economymeasures closed down the shipbuilding yards of Hong Kong and Malta;however, the shipbuilding yards inSingapore and Gilbraltar continue tobe important.

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Army and Air Force DevelopmentsIn the army, armament emphasis'I',' has been placed on air-transportableweapons. By 19(;0 half of the army

was eq\lipped with the Belgian FN, rifle recommended by NATO. One ofI the two regiments e qu i p p e d with: American Cor p p r a 1 missiles is deployed with the Army of the Rhinein Germany. Between 1958 and 1960t roo p .strength declined in Europefrom 282,000 to 243,000, and in otheroverseas areas from 86,000 to 62,000.

The Royal Air Force comprises, besides the Home Commands, four Overseas Commands: the Middle East (Cyprus), the Far East (Singapore)', the2d Tactical (Germany), and BritishForces, Arabian Peninsula. The airforce is equipped with Valiant, Vul-can. and Virtor bombers. Air defense

i is supported by a chain of radar sta, tions distributed all over England.England's first station for missiletraining and missile tests has existedsince 1958 in North Coates, Lincolnshire. Fireflash and Firest>'ealc missiles a ~ e available for air-to-air defense and the Bloodhound missile fori ground-to-air defense (MR, Dec 1960,', PP 68-72).[ Dependent TerritoriesI While cooperation among the domini: ions is voluntal'y, the defense of dependent territories and colonies isEngland's responsibility. In additionto the naval bases in Gibraltar. Malta,Singapore, Aden, Hong Kong, Free

town, and Bermuda, there are airbasesin Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Aden,Nairobi, Singapore, and Hong Kong.England maintains garrisons in Jamaica, British Honduras, Gibraltar,Malta, Cyprus, Aden, Singapore, and, Hong Kong. East Africa, Mauritius,Singapore, Malaya, Hong Kong, andthe Fiji Islands maintain their ownDecember 1961

troops. Officers, of the colonial troopsare generally trained -at English military academies. '

England's obligations ib NATO areclearly defined by t r e a t ~ . The forerunners of this treaty Qsigned on 4April 1949 in Washington) includedthe Anglo-French Treaty of 4 March1947 on m u t u a I aid in the eventof German aggression, (DunkerqueTreaty) .

Another antecedent agreement wasthe B r u s s ~ l s Treaty of 11 March 1948between Bel g i u m, the:Netherlands,Luxembourg, France, and England.This treaty as well as tlie DunkerqueTreaty was primarily dir),cted againsta German aggression. 'Founding of NATO

The American Vandenburg Resolution of 1948, stressing regional, collective self-defense, initiiated the formation of the North Atlantic DefenseCommunity on 4 April 1949. In NATO,England functions as a: link betweenthe economically most p o ~ e r f u l NATOpartners, Can a d a and the UnitedStates, and as a s p r i n g b o ~ r d for America to the Continent. In 1956 approximately 15,000 m en of the UnitedStates Air Force were s ~ a t i o n e d at 18airfields in England. :t.rany NATOcommand posts are in England-theChannel Committee (CHANCOM),the Allied Commander in Chief Channel (CINCHAN), the Allied MaritimeAir Commander in Chief Channel, andthe NATO Commander in Chief andAir Force Commander in Chief EastAtlantic.

About 40 of the 100 Royal Air Forcesquadrons are under NATO command.Most of these 40 squadrons make upthe "2d Tactical Air Fleet" which isthe core of the "2d Allied Tactical AirForce" in Germany.


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,DEFENSE OF THE COMMONWEALTHTasks of the Fleet

The task of the EngHsh Fleet withinNATO is especially the defense of theMediterranean, the Atlantic, the arc-tic seas, and the coastal waters. AsEngland's contribution is primarilysubmarine defense. England should,within the framework of NATO, alsoget nuclear submarines .armed with'American Polaris missiles for submarine defense. In November 1958 it became known that arrangements hadbeen made for an Anglo-American corporation to manufacture the Polarismissile in joint production.Besides the 2d Tactical Air Fleet,England maintains the Army of theRhine in Germany as a defense contribution'. With reference to the three-year plan of 1957, the defense whitepaper of 1958 stated that Englandcould not maintain troops in Germanyat present strength without financialaid. England and Germany thereuponagreed that Germany should pay 12million po.unds in each of the FiscalYears 1958-59, 1959-60, and 1960-61.Germany would deposit without receiving interest 50 million pounds forwe a p 0 n purch"ses in England. In1958-59 Germany would pay 22.5 million pounds of war debts which werenot to become due until 1962-64.England, in turn, was prepared toleave in Germany a minimum of 55.000troops in 1958 and 45,000 in 1960-61.The 2d Tactical Air Fleet would re-main at its present strength until1960-61.Canada .Next to England, Canada is the

C ~ m m o n w e a l t h member with the larg-est industrial potential. At the sametime she is, like the United States,one of the most important members ofNATO. While her geographical position facilitates a close cooperation

with the US, the development of herinternal defense policy resembles thatof England.

After the war Canada again estab-lished the post of Defense Minister.The Defense Council for coordinatingthe three branches of service was reoinstituted in 1947 after it had beentemporarily dissolved. A "NationalDefense Headquarters" was established with the Defense Ministry. Thethree Chiefs of Staff and the chair-man of the Defense' Research Boardmake up the Chiefs of Staff Commit-tee which performs preliminary workfor the Defense Committee of theCabinet.

Close military cooperation betweenCanada and the United States beganwith the ,mutual tariff ,agreement in1935 by which Canada retreated fromthe Commonwealth Customs Systemestablished in 1932. This tariff agreement was followed in 1938 by Roosevelt's promise to p ro te e t Canadaagainst ex t e r'n a I aggression. Thispromise was strengthened by the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1938 whichcreated a Permanent Joint Board ofDefense: .I t has been ag"eed that a Pe,.,,,a-nent Joint Board of Defense shallcommence immediate studies "elatingto sea, land, and ail' problems includ-ing personnel and material. I t "'iIIconsider in the broad sense the dr-fense of the north half of the WesternHemisphere.

This agreement was s\lpplementedby 'the Hyde Park Declaration of 1941.which in essence provided for mutualprocurement of war materials. Duringthe war the United States built basesand pipelines in Canada. In 1942 anagreement was reached on the construction of the A I ask a Highwaywhich was to be built by the United


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States. The Canadian section of thehighway was to be tu med over toCanada in peacetime. This highway,built for strategic reasons, led to aneven closer cultu ral contact betweenthe two countries.CanadianUS CooperationIn the postwar period the two governments agreed upon continued cooperation, the goals of which wereannounced by the Canadian PrimeMinister Mackenzie King on 12 February 1947: There would be, he said,exchange of individual persons for thepurpose of gaining knowledge aboutorganizations in the other country,including exchange of observers dur-mg military exercises and tests. Therewould be joint planning and stand-ardization of weapons, equipment, or-ganization, and t r a i n i n g methods.Each country, finally, would providethe other with sea and airbases.Maekenzie King further stated thatcooperation with the United Statesshould be continued on the principlesof the Joint Board on Defense. Atthat time there were no agreementsobligating cooperation over an extended period of time. But, he continued:

The principles of cooperation an-nounced . . . parallel closely the procedutes which have long been applied.between the nations of the BritishComl11ol1ll'ealth . . . . e a s ~ r e s of co-"perution should be unde1'laken bothwith the United Slates and Ihe UniledKin,qdom.In March Hl49 the construction ofthe US-Canadian radar warning system around North America was announced and in April 1949 a jointU S - C a n ~ d a Industrial MobilizationCommittee was established.

Canada and the U n i t e d Statesagreed in 1!l51 to establish a jointDecember 1961

headquarters imd integrated defensecontrol. Within the framework of theagreement the North American Ail'Defense Command (NORAD) was established, in 1957, with headquartersin Colorado Springs, Colorado.

The Commander in Chief of NORAD is responsible to the Chiefs ofStaff of both countries. He submits tothem Pl-oposals on joint air defensematters which are then worked out bytheir governments. The Commanderin Chief operates under a plan approved by both governments, and h a ~operational control of the forces under his command. The NORAD agree-ment is to be in force 10 years or less,depending upon future consultationsby the two countries.

The two countries maintain jointlyunder NORAD command a net of ra-dar warning systems which covers thewhole North American Continent. Thisincludes flying radar stations in theAtlantic. Arctic, and Pacific area, andthe Distant Early Warning (DEW)Line constructed by the United State"between Alaska and Greenland.

Another element is a chain of radarstations along the 55th degree of latitude which was jointly planned butbu ilt, financed, and operated by Canada. The Pinetree System is a jointproject of both countries for the employment of interceptors under NORAD.Provisions for Canadian-Americancooperation 0 u t s id e NORAD weremade by a 1958 agreement which setup the Canada-United States Committee on Joint Defense. The committeehas onlY' a supervisory function anddoes not supplant any othel' board orcommittee.Canada in NATO

Both the United States and Canadajoined NATO in 1949. Defense plan35


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DEFENSE OF THE COMMONWEALTH

ning is the responsibility ci. the Canada-United States Regional PlanningGroup, with headquarters in Washingt.on and Ottawa.Canadian tr.oops committed t.o NATO are under tW.o joint commands:Supreme Allied C.ommander Eur.ope

(SACEUR), and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

Canada is imp.ortant t.o the .otherNATO c.ountries, especially because .of

5,575 pil.ots and navigat.ors from 10countries had been trained.The first elements of equipment

transferred to other countries werechiefly weapons, equipment, and am.munition for tbree European infan.try divisi.ons-one in Belgium, one inthe Netherlands, and .one in Italy. Inlater phases, 500 F.-86 Sabre jets weredelivered in Eur.ope. In 1957 and 1958Turkey received five coastal escort

Ctl11ftdian Natio!,al Dcfo!ReCanadian radar: dome guarding the frontiers of North America against aerial invadersthe Mutual Aid Program which commenced in 1950. This program had aforerunner, the wartime British Commonwealth Air Training Agreement,under which 130,000 Commonwealthsoldiers, as well as Frenchmen, Norwegians, and Poles, were trained inCanada.

Training of NATO aircrews beganin 19in. By the time the trainingcamps were closed in 1958 a tot111 of

vessels and five coastal minesweepers.and 22 Silver Star jet training craftin 1959.Canadian NATO TroopsCanada'S direct troop contributionto NATO consists of an infantry brigade group stationed in Westphalia,Germany. Canada's contribution toEuropean air defense is eight squadrons of F-86 Mark 6 interceptors andfour squadrons of CF-100 Mark J.B

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all-weather interceptors stationed inFrance and Germany. These represent300 aircraft and 8,000 men, and makeup the 1st Canadian Air Division.

Canada maintains under NORADeigbt squadrons of CF-100 jets ineast Canada and one squadron in westCanada. The Roya l Canadian AirForce has a total of 39 squadrons inservice.In 1958 the Canadian Navy had 52,hips in commission and 28 in re-

Even though NATO is primarily aniilitary alliance, Canadians--especially former Minister Lester Pearson-have tried to extend this treatybeyond the military concept. Pearsonobserved when the NATO Treaty wassigned. "This treaty must, althoughit was born out of fear and disappointment. bring positive social, economic,and po l i t i c a I success." Later, theNATO Council appointed a PearsonCommittee. Its task was to investigate

Brtt/8k 1l1formrltton ScrVICI'8Gibraltar. the Commonwealth guard post at the entrance to the MediterraneanserVe. as well as approximately 150naval aircraft. All destroyers were bemg rearmed, equipped with antisubmarine weapons. and reclassified asfleet escorts. The largest part. 47 ships.of the Canadian Fleet is under thecontrol of SACLANT and primarilyequipped for submarine defense.' In25 universities. naval training divisions provide training for students.December 1 ~ 6 1

the potentialities of NATO Treaty Article 2. which mentions stabilizing freeinstitutions of the pact states by economic collaboration.

Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, as early as 1944, stated thata balance among the four powers. theUnited States. the So v ie t Union,China. and the Commonwealth. wasnot a guarantee' for peace, and that37


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. DEFENSE OF THE COMMONWEALTHonly an international system of peaceloving states would provide such a

g u a r a n ~ e e .Gibraltar and Malta

Of ex t rem e importance withinNATO, especially for Commonwealthdefense, is Gibraltar. I t covers 2.5square miles and has a population of23,000. In 1957, a total of 8.566 vessels with a net tonnage of 10 million entered and cleared the port. Situated on the important sea route tothe Near and Far East. Gibraltar isalso. in time of modern warfare. strategically important as an airbase. supply base. and dockyard. The rock provides n a t u r a I protection againstmodern weapons.

Until recently this area was a sorespot between England and Spain. hampering friendly relations between thehvo countries. However. a m 0 r efriendly relation b e t wee n the twocountries can now be detected. TheSpanish press has reported. in fact.that units of the Spanish and EnglishNavy have held joint fleet exercises,and that English Air Force units fromMalta have participated in rescue maneuvers with the Spanish Air Force.

This change is largely due to thefact that the Spanish-American Fleetbase Rota in the Bay of Cadiz hasusurped Gibraltar's predominant p ~sition, and tha,t Spain has acquired amilitary responsibility in this area byher participation in the Americanproject. The strategic triangle of Rota,Gibraltar, and C

Military Review December 1961

Documents

Transcript of Military Review December 1961