ContributorsDennis Showalter isa professor of his-tory at Colorado Col-lege and past presi-dent of the Societyfor Military Histo-ry. Co-editor of thequarterly journalWar in History., he speciahzes in com-parative military history. Showalter isthe author of Hitler's Panzers (2009)and Patton and Rommel: Men of Warin the 20th Century (2005).

11 ]l Rear Adm. Joseph F.Callo, U.S. Naval Re-.scrve (Ret.), won theSamuel Fliot Mori-son Award for excel-lence in naval liter-ature for his latestbook,Jofin Pauljones:

Ameruas IHM Sea Warrior (2006) . Hehas written three books about AdmiralLord Nelson and was U.S. editor forWho's Who in Naval History.

Roger Crowley is a graduate of Cam-bridge University and a former resi-dent of Istanbul. Hehas traveled widelyin the Mediterra-nean and has a deepknowledge of itsgeography and past.Crowley is the au-thor of Empires of

the Sea (2008), 1453: The Holy War forConstantinople and the Clash of Islamand the West (2005) and a forthcomingbook on the Venetian Mediterranean.

Edward G. Lengel is a professor at theUniversity of Virginia and editor inchief of the Papers of George Wash-ington documen-tary editing project.He is the author ofseveral books on mil-itary history, includ-ing To Conquer Hell:The Meuse-Argonne,1918 (2008) andGeneral George Washington: A Mili-tary Life (2005).

Stephan Wilkinson is a regular contrib-utor to Military History and AviationHistory. He is also amember of the boardof contributors olAir & Spaee/Smith-sonian. Wilkinson isauthor of the bookThe Gold-Plated Por-sche (2004). \

William H. McMichael has covered themilitary for a quarter century in localesfrom Vietnam to the Persian Gulf. Afterthree years as the Military Times News-papers' Pentagon correspondent, he isnow the Navy Times' Hampton Roads,Va., bureau chief.

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Japanese Brutality

WhywereJapaneseSoldiersin WWIIso brutal?

for no reason at all. This wasnot limited to the enlistedranks; even junior officerscould be struck. This wasdeeply humiliating, as a slapto the face was a deep insultin Japanese culture.

The top-down, or com-mand, climate of condoningor even encouraging mal-treatment of POWs and civil-ians in conquered territoriesallowed even the most juniorJapanese soldier to physicallyabuse POWs or civilians, bydefinition all ranking belowhim, without the need to bedirected to do so. It is wellaccepted that those who areabused in their youth are athigh risk to become abusersthemselves, and this appliesto the learned behavior in-culcated in the IJA amonglower ranks. Combining thiswith an official policy accept-ing or promoting abuse, sce-narios where semi-starvedPOWs would be incapable ofmeeting demands for promptobedience or adequate workoutput, and significant lan-guage barriers produced thetragic outcome.

Mark Felton's article "The Culture of Cruelty" in theJanuary 2011 issue looked at the issue of the hehav-ior of the Japanese military, particularly the army,during World War II from the top down. Equally ifnot more important was the pervasive culture ofahuse and violence that existed within the ImperialJapanese Army (IJA). Draftees were called ni sen ("twocents"), referring to the postage on the card sentlo induct them. Physical abuse—including slap-ping, punching and kicking, and outright heatings—were administered hy those of higher rank forfailure to obey or perform quickly or correctly, or

Given how the IJA treatedits own men, and the realitythat soldiers of any national-ity are not usually overly em-pathetic with their formerenemies, expecting decenttreatment of POWs by theJapanese was a forlorn hope—it would have meant thesoldiers of the IJA treatingtheir enemies better than theytreated themselves.

Steven L. OreckCaptain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

MADISON, WIS.

A longtime subscriber to Mil-itary History, I was moved byyour cover story on JapaneseWorld War II atrocities. Theopening segment detailingthe murder of the 22 Austra-lian nurses and dozens ofwounded Allied soldiers wasespecially shocking. Your fullpage of poignant individualphotos of 12 of the nurseswill not soon be forgotten.

Possibly under the guiseof "political correctness," theAmerican, British and Aus-tralian media—and their na-tions' historians—have neveradequately made this partic-

ular outrage known to theworld. Your magazine is tobe commended.

Unfortunately, your articleincludes the totally inaccu-rate statement, "While just 4percent of Allied prisoners inGerman hands perished inthe war, 27 percent of thosecaptured by the Japanesedied." France and Poland—whose combat with Germanywas brief but intense—stillclaim that many of their sol-diers taken prisoner by theGermans never returned,while Russia estimates thatless than one half of the es-timated 1 million Russian sol-diers taken prisoner by theGermans ever made it home.

As for prisoners of the Jap-anese, the known number ofAmerican, Canadian, Britishand Dutch prisoners rendersthe 27 percent figure abys-mally low. And this is not tomention the unknown num-bers of Chinese and Filipinoscaptured by the Japanese andwho are now lost to history.

No psychocultural ration-alization is necessary whenexploring Japanese barbar-

ism in World War II.They undertook theirwar of conquest simplyto steal the land, naturalresources and financialassets of their neighbors,using murder and terror-ism as weapons.

Edwin HouldsworthHILTON HEAD, S .C .

10 BattlesThe section on ManilaBay, part of "10 BattlesThat Shaped America"[by Thomas Fleming,January], caught my eye.My father's mother, LauraDewey (1868-1942), wasrelated to Admiral of theNavy George Dewey. Hewas granted that exaltedrank after bis victory atManila Bay and was theonly officer ever to holdthat rank; it died withhim. Grandmother Dew-ey was rightly proud ofthe admiral, and it wasshe who gave me my firstexposure to patriotism.

"One Revolution, TwoWars," in the same issue,gave me additional back-ground on three paternalancestors. One enlistedin the New York Line ofthe Continental Army andserved at Fort Stanwix,N.Y. His father served inthe Orange Coimty mili-tia, and his uncle, Wil-liam Allison, was colonelof that unit. Allison's sonwas killed in the captureof Fort Montgomery, andWilliam was capturedand imprisoned on aBritish hulk. He waseventually exchanged ina prisoner swap, pro-

WIÎLITARY HISTORY

nioted lo brigadier andcommanded a division atthe Battle of Long Island.Until I read your article,I'd never heard of the"Neutral Ground" andhad no idea that OrangeCounty was such a hot-bed of Loyalists.

My only problem withMilitaiy Histoiy is waiting30 days for the next issue.

Bob AllisonVENTURA, CALIF.

1 disagree with the im-plication in "10 BattlesThat Shaped America"that the United Stateswould not have etnergeda world power had theNonnandy landings failedin 1944. The Allies' willto fight would not havebeen crushed. Yes, thewar would have goneon much longer. Germantroops and resourceswould have slowed So-viet advances insteadof fighting in the west.It would have taken lon-ger to defeat Japan dueto reverses in Europe.Nevei iheless, Germa-ny would have been de-feated. The war in Europewould have continuedlong enough for Berlinand other German citiesto be devastated by Amer-ican atomic bombs.

Kurt HelmigBERWYN, I I I .

Thomas Fleming's Janu-ary 2011 article " 10 Bat-tles That Shaped Amer-ica" was superb. GeorgeDewey's victory at the Bat-tle of Manila Bay showed

us that Americans think ofthemselves as a nation thathas never sought to occupyothers and has been a lib-erating force. But histori-ans tell us that all dominantpowers thought they werespecial. Their very successconfirmed for them that theywere blessed. But as they be-came ever more powerful,the world saw them differ-ently. English satirist JohnDryden described this phe-nomenon in "Absalom andAchitophel," a poem set dur-ing the Biblical King David'sreign: "But when the chosenpeople grew too strong / Therightful cause at length be-came the wrong."

Evan Dale SantosADELANTO, CALIE

Toy Soldiers[Re. "Playing at War," Janu-ary;] Wow! P. 56 had a fewmemories. 1 recall that [themachine gunner's] helmetwas fixed to a pin in the topof his head. That means itwas lost, quite early. Also,that grenade thrower still hasan impact on memory. But,they were Dad's toys.

In the '40s, when I was learn-ing to walk and play, no newmetal figures went on sale un-til after the war. Everyone usedthe "rubber guys," or greenArmy guys. They were madeof plastic, some very flexible,but that meant very few losthelmets during catnpaigns.

Dennis R. RoederGAHANNA, OHIO

Your caption identified [thetoy soldiers] as "tnetal troops.. .from the 1940s and 1950s."That may be true, but they

are certainly inferior attemptsto reproduce those manufac-tured in the late 1930s. By1940 Barclay had dispensedwith the separate tin helmetsand switched to one-piecesoldiers with cast helmets.World War 11 needs broughtproduction of lead soldiersto a close.

Bill LatshawBETHLEHEM, PA.

iSailfish sankChuyo. On board

were 21 of thecrew rescued

from Sculpin twoweeks earlierf

Sister to SculpinThe September 2010 Valor[ "Dovm vidth His Submarine" ]relates the stirring story ofCaptain John Cromwell, whosacrificed his life when hechose to go down with USSSculpin rather than face inter-rogation by the Japanese andrisk reveahng highly classifiedinformation. The article men-tions that many Sculpin sur-vivors captured by the enemylater died when another U.S.submarine sank the ship inwhich they were being trans-ferred to Japan. The detailsbecome more poignant whenone learns about a previousencounter between Sculpinand a sister submarine.

USS Squalus was under-going sea trials off the Isle ofShoals [off Portsmouth, N.H.]on May 23, 1939. During a

dive an open valve permitteduncontrollable flooding aft,resulting in her sinking in243 feet of water and drown-ing 26 men. When Squalusfailed to report, a search wasordered, and Sculpin, her sis-ter ship from Portsmouth,discovered the stricken ship'smessenger buoy. The subse-quent rescue effort brought33 survivors from the for-

ward end of the ship tosafety using the McCannRescue Chamber.

Three months laterSqualus was raised andreturned to the Ports-mouth Navy Yard. Theship was repaired, re-named and returned tothe Navy as USS Sailfish.On Dec. 3,1943, Sailfishattacked the Japanese es-cort carrier Chuyo 300

miles southeast of Tokyo. Thefollovdng day Sailfish renewedthe attack and sank Chuyo.On board were 21 of the crewrescued from Sculpin whenCromwell had scuttled hertwo weeks earlier. Only oneSculpin survivor was recov-ered from the destruction in-flicted by the submarine thatmore than four years earlierhad been rescued by Crom-well's very submarine.

John T. PierceCaptain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

STONE MOUNTAIN, GA.

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West Florida (see inset) declared its independence from Sp . on Sept. 26,1810.

Louisianans Celebrate the Birthof a Nation—West Florida, That IsIn 1810, decades before Texians raised tbeLone Star Flag or Californians tbe Bear Flagover tbeir respective republics, a band ofpeeved Gulf Coast rebels stormed tbe Span-ish garrison in Baton Rouge and raised tbeBonnie Blue over tbe sbort-lived Republic ofWest Florida. Tbe tiny breakaway nation—wbicb spanned parts of modem-day Louisiana,Mississippi, Alabama and tbeFlorida Panbandle—remainedindependent little more tban amonth before being annexedby tbe United States. BatonRougeans marked its bicenten-nial last fall at Capitol Park, siteof tbe original Spanisb fort.

Passed over by tbe Louisiana Purchase in1804, West Floridians grew disaffected withSpanish rule and plotted an overthrow of theprovincial government in Baton Rouge. Anearlier rebellion failed, but in tbe predawnbours of Sept. 23, 1810, a group of armed

'Whenever the time shall come when we must choose hetween a loss ofour constitutional rights and revoiution, i shail choose the latter'

—Sam Houston

farmers and tradesmen slipped into Fort SanCarlos, subduing the garrison in what wasdescribed as a "sbarp and bloody firefigbt."Tbree days later tbe rebels signed a declara-tion of independence establishing "tbe freeand independent state of West Florida."

Tbe rebels initially claimed all Spanisbholdings east tbrougb Mississippi Territory

to tbe Perdido River, but an at-tempt to seize Mobile failed,and tbe populace outside Loui-siana never actively rebelled.Seeking to bead off diplomaticprotests from Spain and GreatBritain, President James Madi-son declared "a crisis.. .subver-

sive of tbe order of tbings under tbe Span-ish authorities" and annexed the nascentrepublic on October 27. The Bonnie Blue lastñew on Dec. 10,1810, when U.S. troops ar-rived in Baton Rouge and raised Old Gloryover Fort San Carlos.

DISPATCHES

World War IOfficially EndsGermany made its finalWorld War I reparationspayment last fall, officiallyending the Great War 92years after the Nov. 11,1918,armistice. The last install-ment, roughly $95 million,satisfies Germany's debt fromthe 1919 Treaty of Versailles,compensating war-tornFrance and Belgium and re-

munerating the Allies for theimmense cost of the conflict.The initial 1919 sum was226 billion Reichsmarks,later reduced to 11.' billionReichsmarks, the equivalentof $35 billion at the time.

Pentagon AddsPOW/MIA DisplayThe Pentagon Ipcniagoiialisostl mill has unveiled a newpublic corridor dedicated toAmerican POWs and MIAsfrom all conflicts. The third-floor exhibit features panelsthat relate tbe POW/MIAexperience. POW nuruora-

bilia, artifacts from excava-tions for wartime remainsand examples of grass-rootspublic awareness efforts byMIA families. The Penta-gon's free reserve 1 tourswill visit the corridor.

MILITARY HISTORY

Norwegian SurveyFinds Viking ShipsArchaeologists using ground-penetrating radar have re-corded the imprints of burialmounds and two large Vi-king ships near Kaupang, a

dig Mil- MiLUli ol c)hlo, Nor-way. One of the ships may be80 feet long—the largest yetdiscovered. Images of thefind by the Norwegian In-stitute for Cultural HeritageResearch | www.niku.nol andLudwig Boltzmann Institutelarciipro.lbg.ac.atl clearlyshow the ship silhouettes.Though the hulls may havedisintegrated, researchershope to find period artifacts.

Museum Comingto Appomattox, Va.Riclimonds Museum of theConfederacy | www.inoc.orglbroke ground this fall on asister museum a mile fromAppomattox Court HouseNational Historic Park | wwwiipsgov/apcol, site of the

surrender ceremony thatended the Civil War. Thegroundbreaking comes as

the nation marks the sesqui-centennial of that conflict.The 11,700-square-foot facil-ity is slated to open by April2012. Exhibits will relate thewars final phase, the surren-der itself and reunification.

Boston Harbor toHost Tea Party ReduxTea parties may be back in fashion, but Boston, home to theoriginal Tea Party, has lacked a proper venue since the BostonTea Party Ships & Museum | www.bostonteapartyship.comlwas struck by lightning in 2001 and then gutted by fire in 2007.But this fall city and state tourism officials put up fundingtoward a new $25 mil-lion museum off theCongress Street Bridge,centered on replicas ofthe tea ships Dartmouth,Eleanor and Beaver.

On the evening ofDec. 16,1773, more than100 Patriot men and boys, ihinly di.->guibtd as Mohawk Indi-ans, boarded the ships and dumped their cargoes into BostonHarbor in symbolic defiance of the recently passed Tea Actand the British monopoly on tea imports. Visitors to the newmuseum, slated to open by spring 2012, will gather at areplica of the Old South Meeting House for background anda bit of sedition before touring the ships.

'It does not require a majority to prevail,but ratiier an irate, tireless minority keen to

set brushf ires in peopies' minds'—Samuel Adams

Mayan Tactics RevealedThousand-year-old templemurals in Mexico's northernYucatán Peninsula have shednew light on Mayan militaryformations and tactics. Ed-uardo Tejeda Monroy of theNational Institute of Anthro-pology and History [wwwitiah.gob.mxl presented his

findings last fall followingextensive iconographie analy-sis of murals at four sites.

Like their Roman con-temporaries halfway aroundthe globe, Mayan armies

marched in column andformed an initial battle line.They also fielded specializedtroops, such as long-rangedart throwers and close-ininfantry armed with clubsand axes and bearing salt-hardened cotton breastplatesand wooden shields. Unlikethe Romans, however, theMaya did not fight head-onbut launched lightning flank-ing maneuvers from differentdirections to quickly cornerand overwhelm opponents.

WAR RECORDThe transition from winterto spring augurs change, forbetter or worse. Whether itbe shifts in leadership or law,political upheaval or the endof protracted tension, histor-ical combatants have oftenfaced an altered landscape.

• Feb. 6.1940: Afterpleading with Adolf Hitler,German Field Marshal ErwinRommel is given commandof the 7th Panzer Division inanticipation of the invasionof France. Rommel's WorldWar I experiences (P 26)inform his ensuing tactics.

• Feb. 21,1944: After theirarrest, torture and publictrial, 22 partisans (P 42)of the Communist Francs-tireurs face a Germanfiring squad in Fort Mont-Valérien, France. The group'smessenger, a woman, islater beheaded with an ax.

• MarcK 3,1813: Congressauthorizes the enlistmentof free black sailors intothe U.S. Navy. They latercomprise up to a quarterof Oliver Hazard Perry'sGreat Lakes crews duringthe War of 1812, contributingto the Americans' navalvictories (see P 36).

• March 26,1848: LongtimeAustrian occupiers withdrawfrom Venice, Italy, four daysafter rebels led by DanieleManin seize its arsenal (seeP 62), the most powerfulnaval complex of its time.Manin capitulates withinsix months and is exiled.

News

Bronze Honors BearThat'Fought'NazisScottish sculptor Alan Her-riot is crafting a statue toPrivate Voytek, a 500-poundbrown bear tbat workedalongside Polish soldiers inWorld War 11 and lived outhis postwar days at the Edin-

burgb Zoo. Adopted by sol-diers as a cub and officiallydrafted into the Polish armyin 1942, Voytek (Polish for"happy warrior") served asan artillery company mascotand was present at the 1944Battle of Monte Cassino,where be toted ammunition.The statue will be unveiledin Edinburgh later this year.

NPS Opens Trailof Tears PathwayTbe National Park Servicebas opened tbe first seg-ments of its Trail of TearsNational Historic Trail | wwwnps.gov/trtel, wbicb will

trace the 800-mile route trav-

Cedar Town

eled by more tban 16,000Eastern Cberokees forciblyremoved to Oklaboma byU.S. soldiers in 1838. Tbecompleted trail will crosstbrougb parts of nine states(Alabama, Arkansas, Geor-gia, Illinois, Kentucky, Mis-souri, North Carolina, Okla-homa and Tennessee).

John Paul Jones made naval history with his victory at the 1779 Battle of Flamborough Head.

Navy Seeks Bonhomme RichardAn underwater research team vdth the NavalHistory and Heritage Command [www.histor)'.navytnil] joined a large-scale search last fallfor USS Bonhomme Richard, flagship of famedContinental Navy Captain John Paul Jones,which sank in battle with the Royal Navy onSept. 25, 1779, somewhere off the coast ofnortheast England. The latest 10-day mappingexpedition marks the fifth time the U.S. Navyhas sought to pinpoint the legendary EastIndiaman, which has also eluded countlesstreasure hunters through the years.

On Sept. 23, 1779, an American squadronled by Jones aboard the 42-gun BonhommeRichard encountered a British merchant fleetunder escort off Flamborough Head in York-shire. Jones quickly engaged in a ship-to-shipduel with Captain Richard Pearson aboard the44-gun fifth rate HMS Serapis. The British shipgot the early upper hand, and after poundinghis opponent for several hours, Pearson calledfor Jones to strike his colors and surrender.

"I may sink," replied Jones, "but I'll be damnedif 1 strike!" He was right on both counts, ashis ship would indeed sink, but not beforethe American crew had lashed the ships to-gether, subdued Serapis' crew in viciousclose-quarters flghting and taken the Britishwarship as a prize. The shattered BonhommeRichard, adrift and on fire, sank 36 hours later.That's where the picture gets hazy.

Among the reasons Bonhomme Richard hasdefied detection is that researchers are unsureof the ship's course after the battle. The searchgrid comprises 900 square nautical miles inless than 200 feet of seawater. That shallowdepth likely exposed the wreck to damagefrom fishing nets, further reducing its sonarproflle. Operating from the 329-foot surveyship USNS Henson, the Navy surveyors usedside-scan sonar, electro-optical imagers andremotely operated underwater vehicles tomap the search zone. Researchers will studythe resulting images and revisit likely targets.

'I wish to have no connection with any ship that does not sail fast;for I intend to go in harm's way'

^ - —John Paul Jones

MILITARY HISTORY

News

Bentley Priory toHost RAF MuseumNorthwest Londons Har-row Council has approvedplans for a Battle of Britainmuseum in Bentley Priory[www.bcnlleypriory.org], themanor house that served as

the Royal Air Force (RAF)Fighter Command head-quarters during World WarII. Work crews will restorethe priory's ground floor toits 1940 appearance, includ-ing then-Air Chief MarshalLord Hugh Dowding's officeand a large map of Britainover the ballroom dancefloor. The museum is slatedto open in spring 2013.

Design Chosen forSpitfire MemorialNorth London architectNick Hancock [www.nickhancock.com] has won arecent competition to de-sign a national memorial tothe Supermarine Spitfire,

Xo

the Royal Air Force's iconicWorld War II single-seatfighter. The $3 million me-morial, featuring a polishedsteel Spitfire atop a 131-footpolished steel column, willrise from the waterfront inSouthampton, where Su-permarine designed andbuilt the plane.

Roman Parade HelmetFetches $3.6 MillionA rare classical Roman cavalry parade helmet sold at a recentChristie's London lwww.christies.com] auction for $3.6 mil-lion—10 times its présale estimate. TheCrosby Garrett helmet (named for thenorthern England town where it was un-earthed last spring) dates from the late 1stto 2nd century and is one of just threesuch headpieces ever found in Britain.

Its copper alloy face mask is remark-ably intact, with open eyes, incised eye-lashes, herringbone eyelashes and piercednostrils. Capping the Phrygian-style peakis a winged bronze griffin. Roman cavalrysoldiers wore such plumed helmets morefor pomp than protection in ceremonial sporting events calledhippika gymnasia ("horse exercises).

'Man is a military animal, glories in gunpowderand loves parade'

—Philip James Bailey

H.L Hunley to SurfaceThis spring the Confederatesubmarine H.L. Hunley ]www. hunley org 1, the first combatsub to sink an enemy warship,will roll into an uprigbt posi-tion for tbe first timesince it went to tbebottom off Cbarlestonnearly 150 years ago.A recovery barge raisedHunley in 2000 andkept it at its 45-degreestarboard list to pre-serve artifacts and re-mains aboard the sub. Con-servationists will scour Hun-ley's bull of concretion andin 2015 begin its full resto-ration for display on theCharleston waterfront.

On Feb. 17, 1864, Hunleypierced the hull of the Unionblockader USS Housatonicwitb a spar torpedo, whichdetonated as the sub pulled

away, sinking the sloop andkilling five of its crew. Hunleyand its eight-man crew mys-teriously failed to return fromthe mission. Restorers hopeto learn what sank the sub.

WAR SPOILSIn a recent issue we told thestory of a former Scottishparatrooper who returned atrumpet confiscated froman Argentine soldier duringthe Falklands War. lt is notthe only spoil of war to havemade a notable homecoming.

• Flying Tricolor: An anony-mous World War II Armyveteran from New Yorkrecently returned the Frenchflag that hung from the Arcde Triomphe during theLiberation of Paris. Membersof the French Resistancesuspended the flag fromthe arch on Aug. 25, 1944.

• Adolf's Album: WorldWar II veteran John Pistonereturned to Germany a 12-pound tome he pinchedfrom Adolf Hitler's Berchtes-gaden retreat in the BavarianAlps. The book was one of31 pboto albums of seizedartwork Hitler intended fora Fuhrermuseum in Austria.

• Turkish Delight: BritisbEighth Army veteran StanleyParry returned an 18lhcentury Turkish coral andsilver flintlock pistol lootedfrom Florence's StibbertMuseum in 1944. Parryhad saved the gun froma guilt-ridden mate aboutto toss it into the sea.

• Cannon on "Loan": The

FBI recently turned up aCivil War cannon lost morethan 30 years ago when re-enactors "borrowed" it fromtbe Illinois State MilitaryMuseum in Springfield.

MILITARY HISTORY

interview

Gary Sheffield:Rethinking World War I

P rofessor Gary Sheffield, chair ofWar Studies at Britain's Univer-sity of Birmingham, is a former

instructor at both the Royal MilitaryAcademy, Sandhurst, and the British JointServices Command and Staff College.Sheffield has written extensively on 20thcentury military history, particularly onWorld War I. His 2001 book. ForgottenVictory: The First World War, Mythsand Realities, is a high-ly acclaimed analysis ' 'of the many falsehoods ^about the conflict that -„-aover the years have cometo be accepted as histor-ical fact. Sheffield's lat-est book is The Chief:Douglas Haig and theBritish Army (20JJ).

You've said that WorldWar I was not an "acci-dental" war into whichthe great powers stum-bled. How so?German historian FritzFischer argued that Ger-many had gone to warin a bid for world pow-er—the events of July1914 were the occasionrather than the causeof the war. I simplifyFischer's arguments, ofcourse, and I don't accept them in theirentirety, but at the very least he pointedto an expansionist, militaristic tendencyamong German policy makers.

How did Germans react to Fischer'sconclusions?They caused absolute fury in WestGermany when they first appeared in1961, because he was basically saying

«Berlingambled theBritish could

be starved intosubmission

before Americacould make adifference f

the Nazi era was not a one-off, thatthere were continuities with the kai-ser's Germany. This was a body blowto more conservative Germans, wholooked back to before 1933 as the"normal" Germany.

What was Austria-Hungary's role inprecipitating the war?There is no doubt Vienna deliberately

initiated a war againstSerbia after the assas-sination of Archduke[Franz Ferdinandl inSarajevo in June 1914,in the full knowledgethis might bring inRussia, which in turnran the risk of a majorEuropean war. In thisthe Austrians werebacked by Germany,which gave them ablank check on July 5.Berlin, too, knew thata limited war in theBalkans might turninto something muchbigger and nastier. Soat best in 1914 youhave Germany andAustria deliberatelyrisking a major war;at worst there wasconscious aggression

aimed at Russia and France.

Why was the United Kingdom so con-cerned about Germany's emergenceas a naval power?Simple: British security against inva-sion of the British Isles and safety ofthe sea-lanes that connected its globalempire rested upon command of theseas. Tbe German High Seas Fleet, de-

veloped after about 1900, could haveno other target than the Royal Navy. Toget anywhere the German navy wouldhave to pass through the North Sea,which would mean challenging the RN.

And how did Britain view America'semerging naval strength?London pragmatically accepted thegrowth of U.S. power, including thedevelopment of the Navy, realizingthere was nothing Britain could doabout it and that Washington wouldnot pose a threat to the major Britishinterest in the area—Canada—let aloneto Britain itself Things were very dif-ferent with Germany, of course, sinceit was seen as a militaristic state.

What was the most significant WorldWar I battle?Inevitably national allegiances colorsuch considerations. British and Com-monwealth historians tend to arguethat the turning point in 1918 was theBattle of Amiens, in August, where Aus-tralian, British, Canadian and Frenchtroops won a major victory. The Frenchand some Americans, on the otherhand, favor the Second Battle of theMame, a few weeks earlier. The argu-ment in favor of Amiens is based on thefact that while Second Marne finallyhalted the German offensives, it wasthe battle of August 8 tbat seized thestrategic initiative for the Allies andinitiated the "Hundred Days" of Alliedvictories that ended with the Germancapitulation in November 1918.

How about your view of the mostdecisive battle?I would argue that the single most de-cisive battle came two years earlier, onthe Somme. The fighting in the longterm had an attritional impact on theGerman army, while the amateur Brit-ish army learned how to fight, albeit ata terrible cost in casualties. As a resultof the Somme, the Germans began un-restricted submarine warfare, knowing

MILITARY HISTORY

Sheffield disputes the widespread postwar perception that British soldiers hatedField Marshal Sir Douglas Haig (above, speaking with Canadian troops in May 1918).

this was likely to bring America intothe war. Berlin gambled the Britishcould be starved into submission be-fore America could make a difference.It was a huge miscalculation, and Ger-many later paid the price.

The British experienced few large-scalemutinies, despite ghastly conditions,staggering casualties and a perceivedcallous leadership. Why?You are right and wrong about this—right in that there was only one large-scale mutiny (at Étaples base camp inSeptember 1917), but wrong about thetroops' views of leadership. Contraryto the postwar perception that soldiershated Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig,there is very little contemporary evi-dence they thought very much abouthim at all. Haig was a remote figure,as were most generals.

Things were very different at theunit level. Enlightened, paternal, regi-mental-level leadership was in myview the key to maintaining soldiers'morale. The prewar ethos of the Brit-ish officer, which laid heavy stress onputting the ordinary solder first, waspassed on to wartime officers. And the

British working class was prepared todefer to those of a higher socioeco-nomic class, provided they kept theirpart of an unspoken bargain to lookafter them. So, for the most part, rela-tions were good, if formal—and don'tforget that the generals were at heartregimental officers, which helps ex-plain the army's attempts to supportsoldiers' welfare. Paradoxically, all thisexisted side by side with tough, evenharsh discipline, but the paternalismtended to counterbalance the darkerside. Étaples was really a one-off

How do you address the perception ofHaig as a stubborn butcher who wasbent on frontal attack, believed in aperpetual role for cavalry and thoughtmachine guns were a passing fad?1 concluded that the general percep-tion you mention is almost entirelywrong. I am not claiming he was amilitary genius, but the nature of theWestern Front meant that every attackby either side had to be frontal—therewere no flanks to turn. Haig activelypromoted the methods and technolo-gies that eventually helped break thedeadlock—new tactics, machine guns,

effective training, airpower, artillery,tanks and the like. In my book I arguethat Haig's role in the transformationof the British army from the clumsyamateur force of 1916 to a superb in-strument of war in 1918 was his great-est achievement.

As for cavalry, along with manyother thinking officers he continuedto believe it had a battlefield role, andevents on the Western Front (espe-cially in 1918) and elsewhere, notably[Field Marshal Fdmund[ Allenby'scampaign in Palestine, show he wasright. Haig was undoubtedly too am-bitious in some of his plans for use ofcavalry, but that is not to say he wasentirely wrong to use them.

Was Haig a "stubborn butcher?" Hewas too profligate with lives and pro-longed some battles, but there werepolitical or operational/tactical im-peratives for doing so, certainly at theSomme and Passchendaele. Ultimately,he was a winner.

How did the conduct of World War Iaffect the conduct of World War II andsubsequent wars?The British junior officers of the GreatWar who became the senior command-ers of 1939-45 rejected much of theWestern Front approach. Many—likeWilliam Slim and Bernard Montgom-ery—deliberately rejected the "châteaugeneralship" fashion of Haig, adopt-ing an informal, "people's general" per-sona. In the desert in 1941-42 therewas a conscious rejection of the tried-and-trusted methods of 1918 in favorof a half-baked form of maneuver war-fare, and the British simply weren't verygood at it.

More generally, what happened from1939-45 was in large part a develop-ment of methods learned by trial anderror in the earlier war. "Three-dimen-sional" warfare, involving airpower andindirect artillery fire, was born around1915 and continues to dominate con-ventional warfare today. (^

What We Learned...from the Moro RebellionBy William H. McMichael

While the Moro Rehellion lastedroughly from 1903 to 1913,it's perhaps more accurate to

describe the insurgency by Muslimsouthern Filipinos—dubbed Morosby the Spanish—as a 600-year strugglefor religious autonomy and independ-ence that has never really ended.

In 1903 U.S. commanders in thePhilippines weren't hamstrung by thelack of forces or resources that havehindered them in subsequent conflicts.Nor was the force itself inexperienced.Atnedcan troops had heen fighting Fili-pino nationalist insurgents in the north-ern Philippines since the 1898 end ofthe Spanish-American War.

On the southern island of Min-danao, the Moros weren't a majorconcern. Under the terms of the 1899Bates Agreement, the Moro leaders(datus) who recognized American sov-ereignty retained power and stayedneutral in the fight between Ameri-can and Filipino nationalist forces.But when that insurrection ended in1902, the United States sought to ex-

pand its control of Moro territory, im-posing a military government as partof the annexation of the Philippines.The Moros rebelled to defend their au-tonotny and culture against what theysaw as a foreign, and Christian, assault.

Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, the firstU.S. military governor, tried to establisha layered government down to the locallevel, believing exposure to the Ameri-can system would win converts. ButMoro attacks on U.S. outposts forcedhim to fight hack, with limited success.Succeeding Wood was Maj. Gen. Task-er H. Bliss, who introduced economicand social reforms while restraining U.S.troops. The strategy made headway—but only in American-controlled areas.

When Maj. Gen. John Pershing tookthe reins in 1909, he concluded thattoo tnany U.S. troops were being keptin garrison. He dispersed units deepinto Moroland and more broadly en-gaged the datus, whose several thou-sand combatants were armed mostlywith primitive weapons and whoseleaders operated in what amounted to

Pooriy armed Moros rareiy fared weii in pitched batties against American troops.

individual fiefdoms. Pershing also be-gan disarming the Moro groups with an"acquiesce or fight" approach.

Pershing's strategy worked: Ameri-can authority was established, the reb-els were crushed and generally peace-ful years followed. Indeed, the MoroRebellion is often cited by military theo-rists as America's most striking successin counterinsurgency.

Yet the desire for independence re-appeared 55 years later with the 1968founding of the Moro National Liher-ation Front. An eight-year uprisingchallenged President Ferdinand Mar-cos, who used martial law, the arrest ofopposition leaders and military forceto quell the insurgency.

The global emergence of Islamicextremist groups, however, has in thePhilippines seen formation of suchviolent antigovernment factions asthe Moro Islamic Liberation Front andAbu Sayyaf Fighting cotitinues in thesouth, and the United Nations esti-mates the conflict has killed as manyas 20,000 people since the 1970s.

Lessons:• Study local culture and identify keyleaders. Theirs are the most importanthearts and minds to win.• Decentralize. Send uniformed troopsinto the countryside to negate insur-gent influence among the people.• Learn from others. Pershing huilton his predecessors' experiences andadded his own refinements—an ap-proach today's counterinsurgency ad-vocates have taken.U Provide or facilitate good governance.It's far easier to defeat an insurgencywhen locals trust their governmentmore than the insurgents.• Kill the holdouts. The stiffest resist-ance is not going to capitulate andmust be militarily defeated.• Patience is a virtue. Insurgenciesare persistent and incredibly difficultto eradicate, flu

Britain's American HeroBy Stephen Harding

Ordinary Seaman William SeeleyRoyal NavyVictoria CrossShimonoseki, JapanSeptember 6,1864

I n the 155 years since it was institutedby royal warrant, the Victoria Cross—Britain's highest military honor

for valor in battle—has been awardedto just 1,353 individuals. Of those,only five were Americans, and the firstYank so honored was a slight and un-assuming sailor whose acts of valorviolated U.S. law.

While we know that William HenryHarrison Seeley was born in Topsham,Maine, on May 1, 1840, details of hisearly life are scarce. In his teens hebecame a merchant seaman, sailingfrom East Coast ports aboard Ameri-can ships bound for Asia. In 1860 hejumped ship—most probably in a FarEastern port—and joined the Royal

Navy, at a time when it was illegal forAmerican citizens to serve in Britain'smilitary forces.

Seeley's first assignment was aboardHMS Impérieuse, flagship of the RoyalNavy's East India and China Stationuntil replaced by HMS Euryalus in 1863.Seeley transferred to the latter vessel atthat time, a decision that within a yearwould thrust him into the midst of abrief, vicious and largely forgotten bat-tle that pitted three European naviesagainst a Japanese warlord.

Though "opened" to foreigners fol-lowing the 1853-54 visits of U.S. Com-modore Matthew C. Perry and his fleet,Japan remained deeply xenophobic.Attacks on foreign diplomats, tradersand seamen increased throughout thelate 1850s and early 1860s. In the springof 1863 Emperor Komei's "Order to ex-pel barbarians" prompted several ofJapan's powerful clans to undertakeunilateral action against foreigners.

Among those roused to military ac-tion was Mori Takachika of the Cho-shu clan, whose territory straddled theShimonoseki Straits, separating the is-lands of Honshu and Kyushu. Taka-chika etnplaced 100 cannon—includ-ing five modem 8-inch Dahlgren guns,an earlier goodwill gift to Japan fromAmerica—atop the hills dominatingthe waterway and began firing on anyWestern vessel transiting through tothe Inland Sea. Though repeatedly en-gaged by U.S., French and Dutch war-ships, the Japanese artillery remainedobstinately active. By mid-August 1864British Vice Admiral Sir Augustus Ku-per had had enough. He sortied fromYokohama aboard Euryalus at the headof a multinational ñeet—nine British,four Dutch and three French warshipscarrying several thousand troops—to

force Takachika to surrender and openthe straits.

The battle began on September 5with a furious but ineffective bom-bardment of the Japanese positions,followed by the landing of severalthousand soldiers, marines and sailorstasked with silencing the guns. As-signed to a small reconnaissance party,Seeley was sent to reconnoiter the Japa-nese positions and on the way backto the beach was ambushed by severalsword-wielding Japanese. After dis-patching the attackers with pistol, rifleand bayonet, he made his report to aLieutenant Edwards, commander ofthe landing force's 3rd Company.

Seeley's careful observation of theJapanese batteries was used to helpplan the September 6 final allied as-sault, in which the American played aprominent role. He advanced in thefirst wave, which the enemy targetedwith heavy fire. Seeley maintained hisposition despite being shot in the armand distinguished himself during thefierce hand-to-hand fighting that led tothe capture of a key Japanese battery.

The allied victory at Shimonosekimade the waterway safe for Europeanships; revitalized Western interest in,and trade with, Japan; and, ironically,spurred Japanese interest in acquiringthe modern military technologies thatwithin a few decades would make themAsia's dominant military power.

Seeley recovered from his wound andon Sept. 22, 1865, was presented theVictoria Cross for his "intelligence anddaring" at Shimonoseki by Admiral SirMichael Seymour, commander in chiefof Britain's Portsmouth naval base.Seeley left the Royal Navy soon after,returned to America and led a quiet lifeuntil his death in October 1914.

Though four other Americans laterreceived VCs—all while serving in theCanadian army during World War 1—William Seeley retnains the only Yankto be so honored while fighting, albeitillegally, in the British armed forces. (^

Hand ToolSocket BayonetThe plug was ugly—then came the socket

By Jon Guttman ' Illustration by Gregory Proch

The socket bayonetwas easy to affix forclose-quarters combat:

L First, slide back to thelug/sight atop the muzzle.

2. Then twist clockwiseto second groove.

3. Finally, fix flush to theforestock and lug/sight.

Note bayonet's triangularcross section—the bestcompromise betweenstrength and flexibility.

For more than acentury the Frenchmusketeer used thesocket bayonet, whichallowed him to reloadand fire even with thebayonet fixed in place.

A mong single-shot musket-bearingtroops of 17th century Europe,cold steel remained more effec-

tive than lead in close-quarters clashes.As early as 1611 put-upon musketeerswere jamming pocket daggers into themuzzles of their guns. This makeshiftweapon of last resort evolved into theplug bayonet, its name likely derivedfrom the cutlery center of Bayonne,Erance. The first known mention ofits military application appears in thememoirs of Chevalier Jacques de Chas-tenet, seigneur de Puységur, who de-scribes the Erench use of crude, foot-

long plug bayonets during the ThirtyYears' War (1618-48). Not until 1671,however, did General Jean Martinetstandardize plug bayonets for his fusi-lier regiment. English dragoons adoptedthe weapon a year later.

By then the plug bayonet had proveda mixed blessing, as it was difficult toremove from the muzzle should an in-fantryman need to reload his musketand resume firing. At the July 1689 Bat-tle of Killicrankie, Scottish Maj. Gen.Hugh Mackay lost half of his 4,000-maninfantry to a Highlander charge whenhis troops failed to fix their plug bayo-

nets in time. An early solution was thering bayonet, offset from the barrel toallow firing with the bayonet fixed inplace. Mackay re-equipped his survivinginfantrymen with this variation.

In 1703 the French army chose thesocket bayonet for its infantry. Securedto a lug/sight atop the muzzle by a zig-zag slot, a butterfly screw or a spring-loaded catch, socket bayonets predom-inated on battlefields through the 1840s.Over the next half century, sword orknife bayonets eclipsed the socket type,as soldiers could wield such bayonetsindependent of their other weapons. (^

Power Tool By Jon Guttman • Illustration by Gregory Proch

FlammenwerferSpewing hell on earth in the trenches

Though lighter than somemodels, the M.1916Kleifstill weighed nearly 70pounds and was usuallyoperated by two men.

Protected by a metalcap, the gas cockcontrolled the flow ofpropeilant into the4-gallon oil reservoir.

A heavy leather carrying harnessdistributed the weapon's weight.

An igniter fixed to theend of the metal lanceturned the stream of oilinto a tongue of flamewith a range of 60 feet.

The propeilant flowedthrough a metal hose,forcing the flammableoil out of the tankat high pressure.

The Flammenwerferoperator controlledthe rate and rangeof the flame withthis release valve.

The 5-foot rubber tubefrom tank to lance wascovered with linen andwrapped in heavy wireto keep it from kinking.

As World War I bogged down in thetrenches, each side sought a meansof breaking the stalemate. Ger-

many's first attempt was a weapon devel-oped in secret more than a decade earlier.

In 1901 Richard Fiedler rolled out aprototype of what he called a Flammen-werfer ("flamethrower"). Fiedler's earlydesign centered on a vertical tank dividedinto two compartments. The lower sec-tion held compressed gas, usually nitro-gen, which forced flammable oil from theupper section through a rubber tube andpast a simple ignition device in the steelnozzle. A stationary form of the weapon.

the grosse Flammenwerfer, or Grof, wascapable of throwing fire as far as 120 feet.Its smaller cousin the kleine Flammen-werfer, or Kleif, could project flames onlyhalf as far but was portable, small enoughto be operated by two men.

The German army adopted the Kleifin 1906, and by 1912 the Guard ReservePioneer Regiment boasted its own regimentof Flammenwerfer troops. The weapon andits units largely remained a secret, however,until the Germans finally unleashed it atVerdun on Feb. 26,1915. Shaking off theirinitial terror, the French counterattacked,retook the lost ground and managed to

capture a Kleif, which its weapons re-searchers promptly disassembled.

At the Second Battle of Ypres, a half-dozen Kleif operators so terrified Britishsoldiers on the night of July 29-30,1915,that the Germans were able to capture sev-eral trench lines. But its material effective-ness seldom exceeded its psychologicaleffect, as the fuel lacked a thickening agentto make it stick to its target—a shortcom-ing remedied by World War II. Regardless,the Allies soon developed their own ver-sions of the weapon, canceling out whatlittle advantage the Flammenwerfer hadbriefly granted its inventors. (©

What Made Rommel

HOW A 26-YEAR-OLD LIEUTENANT, FIGHTING AT CAPORETTO

IN THE ITALIAN ALPS IN 1917, BECAME THE LEGENDARY ROMMEL

BY DENNIS SHOWALTER

Iust after midnight on Oct. 24,1917, it began to rain in Italy'sIsonzo River valley. Conditionswere wet, dark and overcast—"attack weather" to the 15 Ger-

man and Austro-Hungarian divi-sions moving into final position, y s .They were massing for an ^ çintended decisive counter- " ^*-.attack against an Italian army Nthat in the previous twoyears had worn the Habs- -burg army and German Empire tothe hmits of their endurance. ^

The assault was an all-or-nothing

commanders. He would also become asymbol of soldiers' honor misused and per-verted by the Third Reich. But in 1917 hewas an obscure junior officer, one of thou-sands in a war where a subaltern's average

lifespan was measured in weeks./ y Obscure though young Rommel?//L might have been, he was

' hardly anonymous. He had. won the Iron Cross in France

. in 1914, and in Romania^ he had bolstered his repu-

tation for fearlessness by leading^ ^ from the front and for a tactical

sense that seemed to intuit angamble, and Germany had The/»our/eAfér/ïe,above,was enemy's moves. Men saw, andcommitted some of its best established in 174O and remained jyien spoke: "Everybody was

, . . ^ . the highest Prussian military order . . , ^ -, , .units to the mission. Serving through 1918.Rommel,opposite, inspired by his initiative, hisin one of them was 1st Lieu- proudly wore the "Blue Max" he courage, his dazzling acts of

tenant Erwm Johannes Eugen ZZ'^SjZ' g^"^""^." ""'ed one of Rom-Rommel. Rommel would even- mel's platoon leaders. As yettually master maneuver warfare, reach the his reputation did not extend muchrank of field marshal and become one of beyond his immediate milieu. But overthe most feared of World War II battlefield the following weeks in northern Italy,

MILITARY HISTORY

Rommel would begin making a name forhimself in the German army as an expertin a new approach to war, an approachtranscending the trench warfare thathad stifled momentum and multipliedcasualty lists since the war's early weeks.

R ommel's extraordinary tacticalprowess did not develop ina vacuum. He served most of

his war with arguably the best unit inone of history's finest fighting armies.The Württemberg Mountain Battalion

eal miSprösser [at left]allowed Rommel

to extendhimself withoii

overextending tn^battalion and neverlet him forget wlwas commander

(Württembergische Gebirgs-Bataillon),formed in 1915, was in fact an infantryunit with supplementary training inrock climbing and not a true "alpine"unit like those in the French and Ital-ian armies. The WGB's original volun-teers included everyone from wintersports enthusiasts to bored cavalry-men. One hundred fifty of them hadalready earned bravery awards. Rom-mel, who had won both classes of theIron Cross on the Western front, fittedin admirably

The WGB's structure was optimizedfor flexibility. Its developed order ofbattle was six rifle companies and sixmachine-gun companies, plus mortarand signal units. The companies inturn were grouped into two or threedetachments (Abteilungen) whose com-position changed with the require-

ments of a particular action. Whenproperly employed by the WGB's offl-cers, this adaptability enabled the unitto meet the war's two greatest tacticalchallenges: reinforcing advances andexploiting battlefield opportunities.

Major Theodor Sprösser commandedthe battalion throughout Rommel's ser-vice with it. Sprösser rejected the ortho-doxies of trench warfare and recognizedRommel's talent and potential An idealmentor, Sprösser allowed Rommel toextend himself without overextendingthe battalion, restrained the young offi-

cer when necessary and never let himforget who was the WGB's commanderAnd at 5 a.m. on October 25 Rommelneeded his help.

The day before, Rommel had ledthree companies across broken groundin front of Hill 1114, a heavily fortifiedItalian strongpoint. A frontal attackpromised only high casualties. ThenRommel spotted a supply trail leadinginto the Italian defenses. Reinforced bythree additional companies, he followedit. The rewards of his boldness includedthe capture of an artillery battery—with-out firing a shot—a thoroughly wel-come hot lunch and a favorable jump-offpoint for the next day's attack.

The Italian main line of defense layalong the Kolovrat ridge and evensteeper Mount Matajur. A major withthe elite Royal Bavarian Guard Regi-

ment (Königlich Bayerisches Leib-Regi-ment) announced that his unit wouldlead the attack on the liigh ground; theWürttembergers could mop up whatthey left. But when Sprösser arrived,Rommel outlined an alternate plan: toswing west, outside the Leib-Regiment'ssector, bypass Hill 1114 and go straightfor Mount Kuk, the sector's first keyterrain feature. Sprösser gave his lieu-tenant three companies and his bless-ing, then informed the Bavarian majorhe could observe the WGB's progressthrough his field glasses.

One reason Rommel often achievedsurprise in his attacks involved the dif-ficulty of sounding an alarm through aslit throat, as his patrols ruthlessly dis-patched enemy lookouts and skirmish-ers. When one such patrol reportedpart of the ridgeline unoccupied, Rom-mel ordered a charge that caught mostof the ostensible defenders in their bun-kers. Shouts of "Rtiu.s! Hände hochl"("Come out! Hands high!") broughtthe Italians to the surface. But that vic-tory left the Germans isolated, facingtrench systems too strong to clear anda developing counterattack too power-ful to resist head-on. Rommel's responsewas to press forward, ignoring odds of2-to-l or better

A British officer once remarked of asimilar combat encounter that "bloodwas flying about like spray from a hair-wash bottle." Rommel spoke more so-berly of his Württembergers' "savageresolution." Most of an enemy battal-ion, 500 men, decided within minutestheir war was over That made Rommelresponsible for more than 1,500 pris-oners—three times his own remainingstrength. The Germans were by nowtaking machine-gun fire from threesides, and Italian reserves were movingup in truckloads for a new attack.

R ommel had 300 men scatteredacross the high ground justshort of Mount Kuk. And he

had three options: withdraw, stand orattack. His decision was predictable.While he was arranging artillery supportand planning lines of advance. Sprösserappeared at the head of two rifle compa-nies and two machine-gun companies

MILITARY HISTORY

rman and Ausiro-Hungarilops rest briefly following t..

itial assault of what ultimatelybecame known as the Battle ofCaporetto. Rommel and his menplayed a key role in penetratingthe Italian front line, crushingenemy morale and breaking upattempted counterattacks.

«

Overwhelmed by fast-moving, grenade-throwingGermans-perhaps ones led by Rommel-Italiansoldiers lie dead in a ravine on the approachto Cividale. The speed of the attack promptedmany Italian defenders to surrender or flee.

of the WGB and gave Rommel three ofthem. What for another officer mighthave been a mere force multiplier forRommel multiplied maneuver opportu-nities—especially since WGB machine-gun companies were able to functionas assault units as well as flre support.And when one of his forward patrols en-countered another force of Italians whosurrendered after the Württembergerswaved handkerchiefs at them, the wayto Kuk's summit seemed open. ThenRommel spotted another possibility—acamouflaged supply track that led downthe southwest slope of Kuk to the Ital-ian rear Just after 10:30 a.m. he led tworifle and two machine-gun companiesat a dead run downhill along a blindtrail his patrols had no time to scout.

Rommel's men had been marching,climbing and fighting for two daysstraight. His machine-gunners carriedloads of up to 100 pounds on theirbacks: water jackets, mounts, ammu-nition boxes. Nevertheless, they literallyoverran Italian supply dumps, artillerybatteries and command posts, scatter-ing men and animals, the surprise socomplete that even token resistanceseldom developed.

By then Rommel had shifted his ob-jective from the Italians' immediaterear to the Luico-Savogna valley below.Block that, he reasoned, and he wouldtrap the entire sector of Italians. TheWürttembergers stumbled downhillat the double, slaking their thirst witheggs and grapes snatched from thebaskets of abandoned pack mules. At12:30 the detachment's leading ele-ments—including Rommel and hisstaff officers—appeared like wraithsfrom the underbrush along the Luico-Savogna road. As surprised Italians

scattered in all directions, Rommel'stroopers cut the Italian field telephonewires and began digging in.

Their progress had been remark-able, Rommel observed, and his sol-diers' morale remained high. Italiantruck and wagon drivers unwitting-ly continued using the road, and thehungry Germans who stopped themenjoyed the chocolate, jam and whitebread in their cargos—delicacies thathad vanished from German rationslong before. Still, only about 150 ofRommel's men had as yet reached thevalley, and a scout soon reported a longcolumn of Italian infantry marchingtoward the roadblock. Rommel lot theItalians advance into the killing zoneof his machine guns, then sent an offi-cer to demand their surrender. The Ital-ians, part of the elite 20th BersaglieriRegiment {20'Reggimento Bersaglieri),responded with a few random shots.Rommel blew his whistle, German ma-chine guns swept the road, and a 10-

MILITARY HISTORY

minute firefight ensued. Then Italianresistance collapsed. Fifty officers and2,000 men—most of whom never hada chance to get into the fight—surren-dered to a German force fewer thanone-tenth their number.

As his men were disarming thisnew bag of POWs, Rommel mounteda heavy machine gun on a capturedautomobile and drove into the vil-lage of Luico. There he found Sprösser,the rest of the WGB and the Bavarianbattalion, which had taken Kuk andadvanced on Luico from a differentdirection. Again Rommel urged action.His detachment, he argued, shouldmove cross-country immediately tothe next high ground, Hill 1096. Thatwould put the Germans even deeper inthe enemy rear, in a position to cut themain Italian supply routes.

Sprösser concurred and gave Rom-mel command of six companies, in-cluding all the WGB's heavy machineguns. The advance rapidly turned into

a demanding climb through gullies andthombushes, with more and more mendropping out with twisted ankles andother minor injuries. When patrols re-ported strong Italian positions ahead,Rommel camped for the night whilehis scouts searched for an alternateroute up to Hill 1096. And when theGermans moved out at 5:30 a.m., theyfound the defenders alert and ready tofight. Indeed, the Italians quickly andeffectively pinned down the bulk ofRommel's assault force. With most ofhis men shooting instead of moving,Rommel pulled three light machine-gun squads out of the line and led themacross dead ground to the enemy rear.A shout of, "Surrender!" prompted1,600 surprised Bersaglieri in now-exposed positions to drop their riñeswithout the Germans firing a shot.

It had been a Hghtning attack, butthe rest of the fight was not exactly aCakewalk. Hill 1096 was in Germanhands by 7:15 that morning, but theItaUans fought it out, trench by trenchand bunker by bunker. WGB casual-ties were heavy, Rommel's flanks werewide open, and he had no idea whereany other German troops were.

True to form, Rommel rejectedthe idea of waiting for rein-forcements or allowing his ex-

hausted troops to rest and reorganize.

His next objective was Mrzli Peak—a mile away—the next and last highground before Mount Matajur. By 10a.m. Rommel had assembled the equiv-alent of three companies from the menwho had followed him that morning.As this improvised and attenuated forceclimbed toward Mrzli, Rommel sawwhat appeared to be two or three bat-tahons' worth of Italians blocking thepath. Fully armed, on high ground,they nevertheless watched the Germanadvance without firing. Rommel riskedwalking forward, waving a handker-chief, calling for their surrender. Sud-denly, hundreds of Italians started run-ning toward him, throwing down theirrifles and shouting, "Viva la GermaniaV("Long live Germany!"). The first mento reach Rommel hoisted him on theirshoulders, while others shot one oftheir own officers who seemed reluc-tant to surrender.

As Rommel's detachment began todisarm what turned out to more than1,500 men of the Salerno Brigade, hereceived an order from Sprösser towithdraw. The major had arrived atHill 1096 and, on seeing the mass ofprisoners, had assumed the fightingwas over and Matajur too was in Ger-man hands. In a neat piece of superior-finessing, Rommel sent back most ofhis detachment as instructed but kept100 riflemen and six heavy machine-

ROMMEL AT CAPORETTO, OCT. 24-26,1917

T he 11th Battle of the Isonzo hadplayed out much the same as theprevious 10 battles—with artillery

exchanges, attacks and counterattacks untilsurvivors in the opposing armies lay ex-hausted and out of ammunition. In thelead-up to the Battle of Caporetto (aka 12thIsonzo), however, the Italians lacked mohilereserves while the Austro-Hungarians wereahle to draw on German reinforcements.Among the latter was 26-year-old ErwinRommel, a hattle-tested lieutenant in theWürttemberg Mountain Battalion and alreadya two-time recipient of the Iron Cross.

Rommel had witnessed the futility of 'trench warfare on the Western Front andwas doubtless familiar with the seesaw warof attrition along the Isonzo. He knew Jhkey lay in taking the luj^jground, bupiiwas determined not tcSHKipped like a #treed fox. Scouting the foothills to gaugeenemy strength and map likely routes oiattack, he launched a series of lightninastrikes and flanking maneuvers, promptH^the Italian defenders to surrender en masseand capturing the key peak of Mount Maj^ 'jur by noon on the third day. Ronimel ^s^mthe Pour le Mérite for his acti«

i'

f\

n on October 2_.e Major Sprösser anRoyal Bavarian Guar

rengage the Italians at^Hill 1114, Rommel headsvwest toward Mount Kuflcf

Italian DefensivePos/tj#s (red lines)

2. Ronimel leaves the pathto engage the enemy above,taking positions along theridge to Hill 1066 by 11 a^and reaching Hevnicit pe4it noon. By 6 p.m. the W..,^

RBG have taken Hill 1066,re they camp for the night.

' RöjrHBavarian .^Guards /

WürttembergMountain <Battaliotyy

1. October 24, fa.Rommel detachmeheads to the rightalong a traii towardthe town of Foni.

12th Division

6. OutnumbeiRommel engagesthe Italians alongthe road from Polavato Luico, capturingmore than 2,000 ofthe enemy by 1:30 p.m.

POLAVA

p a.m.!S the

artillery engagement onMount Kuk and heads' wnhiii toward Poiava.

Moue Kuk(1,263 ml

8. October 26. Pinndown at the town ofJevsek in the earlymorning hours, Rommelleads a bold assaultinto the enemy rear andcaptures another 1,600Italians. By 7:15 a.m.he has taken Hill 1096.

Hill 1096

^JEVSEK,

9. As Romtraversesroad to MountMirzli, 1,500 ,Italian soidiers.throw down ;their armsand surrender.

10. October 26,11:40 a.jt With a minimal assault

force, Rommel capturesMatajur and its remaining1,200 Italian defenders.

Mount Matajur- i 1,642 mi •>..

Mount Mirzli(1,356 m)

• LUICO

Hill 11924. Evading detection, Rommelsnakes between defensivepositions along the KolovratRidge and finds an openinga miie west of Mount Kuk.His unexpected appearancetakes defenders by surpriseat 9:15 a.m. By 2 p.m. he hastaken a half-mile of the ridge—all the way to Hill 1192.

12th Division,

7. At 3:30 p.m.Rommel meets withMajor Sprösser attuico, then headstoward Hill 1096.

t

i«»

THE BATTLES OF THE ISONZOThe 60-mile-long Isonzo River valley,which paralleled the Italian border just

. inside Austria-Hungary, presented theItalian army an opportunity in World War I.If it could just thread this narrow gap,the road to Vienna lay open. Determined tostop it were the combined divisions ofthe Austro-Hungarian and German armies.The 1917 Battle of Caporetto itselfrepresented something of a denouementin the Isonzo campaign. Eleven timesover the preceding two years the Italianshad tried and failed to break through thevalley. Geography played a role, as anyapproach along the river left attackersvulnerable to artillery in the surroundingheights. In his sector Rommel would relyon tactical agility and speed to outflankand outfight the Italian defenders.

PORETT

ModernH u n g a r y Austria

ModemItaly

ModemSlovenia

•S

DETAIL •AREA

Italy

Fortunate to have survived the German andAustro-Hungarian assault, Italian POWs-among the quarter million captured in lessthan four weeks-head into captivity. Caporettoclaimed more than 30,000 Italian casualties.

gun crews witb bim—and started upthe road to Matajur. He was confidentthe small force could infiltrate Italiandefenses and break them open fromthe inside. Fven before he could testhis hypothesis, the firing died down.Rounding a bend in the road, the Ger-mans encountered 1,200 more Ital-ians, surrendering their arms as theircolonel wept.

Rommel sent his prisoners down-hifl under a token guard and contin-ued toward Matajur's summit with thefew men he had left. Again he took ad-vantage of broken ground to force thepace while keeping out of sight of de-fending Italians above. Along the waythe Germans passed scores of Italians,some armed and some not, makingtheir way downhill. One Italian com-

pany engaged with Germans attackingfrom another direction surrenderedwhen Rommel's men appeared behindthem. The WGB detachment broughtup its machine guns, and Rommel wasmaking final preparations to stormMatajur's summit when what remainedof the garrison there raised a whiteflag. At 11:40 the Germans sent upflares—three white, one green—an-nouncing Matajur's capture. Rommelgave his men a well-deserved hour'srest, spent a few minutes admiringthe spectacular views and settled into write his report. Then, relieved byother German troops, the Rommel de-tachment moved slowly back downthe Kolovrat ridge.

I n a war in which gains were meas-ured in hundreds of yards and lossesin tens of thousands, the saga of the

WGB reads like military melodrama.In the first 52 hours of the offensiveRommel and his men had traversedsome 12 miles of Italian defenses, as-

cending 8,000 feet and descending3,000. The Rommel detachment, nevermuch more than 500 men at the contactpoint, had destroyed five Italian regi-ments, in the process capturing some9,000 men and 81 guns. Total Germancasualties, once all stragglers reported,were six dead and 30 wounded.

Sprösser basked in an order of theday praising the WGB's "resolute leader"and his "courageous officers" for play-ing the principal role in the collapse ofItalian defenses across the sector. Thecollapse itself remains a point of con-troversy. Popular histories regularlyascribe it to low morale in the Italianunits following the spread of defeatismamong the soldiers, though that is anegregious oversimplification. Italy'swar to date, characterized by head-down frontal attacks and draconianpunishments for failure, did little toprepare its officers for the situationsthey faced in October 1917. For exam-ple, tbe Italian high command hadrushed the garrison of Matajur into the

MILITARY HISTORY

é ^

line with no time to reconnoiter theposition or evaluate its defenses. Anx-iety and uncertainty are war's most con-tagious diseases. Small wonder thatsubstantial numbers of Italians, losingconfidence in the army's culture ofcompetence, straggled to the rear fromexhaustion and confusion.

The WGB pressed forward. On No-vember 9-10 Rommel replicated atthe town of Longarone his downhilldash of October, this time taking10,000 prisoners and 200 machineguns. But the Central Powers' offensivewas running out of steam, as had eachprevious one. Their supply lines wereoverextended. Winter was coming.More important, the Italians were find-ing their feet. They were no longerthe obliging enemy who left gaps forRotnmel's patrols to discover and whosurrendered to a waving handkerchiefSprösser, moreover, had reached apoint where he took as given "the testedand brilliant Rommel would find away to break through" no matter the

circumstances. A bloody nose at MonteSalarol on November 25 was a signalit was time to rest.

By then Rommel, Sprösser and theWGB had achieved folkloric renownalong the battle line. On December 13Sprösser announced to the WGB that heand Rorntnel had each been awardedthe German Pour le Mérite (aka "BlueMax"). Originally reserved for senior of-ficers in recognition of major victories,the Blue Max was being increasinglyawarded to deserving junior officers atafl levels. It recognized performance,not heroism, and two recipients ina single battalion was an unheard-ofhonor. When on December 18 theWGB's mail caught up, it includedtwo small packages, each containingone of the coveted medals—not ex-actly a formal award ceremony. Butthough the record is silent on the sub-ject, it seems a reasonable assumptionthat the WGB's Christmas celebrationwas correspondingly enhanced.

The WGB was transferred to theWestern Front, where it foughtuntil the 1918 Armistice. Rom-

mel eventually earned promotion tocaptain and was assigned to the staffof a rear-echelon corps headquarters.It would seetn appropriate had theduty been a recognition of his specialtalent, a talent worth placing in a safe

job and cultivating. In fact, the promo-tion and transfer were routine. Rom-mel spent the war's final weeks as justanother junior officer, moving file fold-ers instead of combat teatns. He did lec-ture on his Italian experiences, thoughno one seemed particularly interested.But unlike many of his counterparts,Rommel survived the carnage of WorldWar I to dwell on and draw lessons fromhis front-line years.

His conclusions were basic but sig-nificant: Fmphasize surprise, speedand initiative; paralyze and demoralizethe enemy; win the tactical battle as anecessary condition for operationaland strategic success. Years later theseprinciples—applied in the context ofinternal-combustion engines, trackedvehicles and field radios—would placeRommel among history's most fearedand respected tank commanders. Butthe man who ultimately became the"Desert Fox" learned his craft on foot inthe rugged mountains of northern Italy,one bloody fight at a time. ®

For further reading Dennis Showalterrecommends his own Hitler's Panzers:The Lightning Attacks that Revolu-tionized Warfare, as well as InfantryAttacks, by Erwin Rommel; Rommeland Caporetto, by John Wilks and EileenWilks; and Futility Fnding in Disaster,by Gaetano V. Cavallaro.

ONE CLEAR WINNER IN A MURKY WAR WAS

THE NEW-AND OVERMATCHED-U.S. NAVY

BYJOSEPHF. CALLO

I ate on the afternoon of June 22, 1807, the 36-gun frigate USSChesapeake cleared Virginia's Hampton Roads and enteredinternational waters. Outbound for the Mediterranean,the vessel was provisioned for a long patrol and carryingpassengers and their baggage, its decks cluttered and

guns obstructed by unstowed equipment.Just off the coast of Norfolk, Chesapeake encountered the 50-

gun HMS Leopard, one of several British vessels blockading Frenchwarships that had sought shelter in American waters. Leopard'scaptain, Salisbury Pryce Humphreys, demanded permission tosearch Chesapeake for Royal Navy deserters he believed had joinedthe American frigate's crew. Commodore James Barron refused,and Humphreys opened fire on the unprepared U.S. vessel. Afterenduring 20 minutes of unanswered broadsides from Leopard—which killed three Americans and wounded 18, includingBarron—the frigate's captain struck his colors. A boarding partyremoved four seamen, one of whom the With her main, mizzen and fore-British hanged as a deserter. The U.S. Navyultimately blamed Barron for the debacle.He was court-martialed, convicted of negli-gence and poor leadership and suspendedfrom Navy service for five years.

masts shot away, HMS Guerrièrelies dead in the water and at themercy of Captain Isaac Hull's USSConstitution. The British vessel'sdefeat was a clear signal that theU.S. Navy, though outnumbered,was a force to be reckoned with.

MILITARY HISTORY

T^'fws

fr

oCM

OOC

Stephen Decatur Asa veteran of the Quasi-War with France andthe First Barbary War, heentered the War of 1812as one of the Navy's bestcombat leaders, a facthe proved beyond doubtwith his masterful actionagainst HMS Macedonian.

James Lawrence Anexperienced and highlycapable naval officer,Lawrence had enjoyedseveral notable successesagainst the Royal Navybefore he and his USSChesapeake ran afoul ofHMS Shannon off BostonHarbor on June 1, 1813.

tsaac Hull His victoryover the 38-gun HMSGuerrière in August 1812provided America a hugemorale boost, earnedUSS Constitution thenickname "Old Ironsides"and proved conclusivelythe U.S. Navy couldoutfight Britain's best.

William Bainbridge Incommand of the battle-proven "Old Ironsides,"Bainbridge encounteredHMS Java off Brazil onDec. 29, 1812, and in athree-hour fight—whichleft him with wounds toboth legs—pounded theBritish ship into defeat.

Oliver Hazard Perry Hisdefeat of a Royal Navysquadron at the 1813Battle of Lake Frie wasamong the most significantnaval actions of the war,as it secured Americancontrol of the waterwayand opened Canada toa potential U.S. attack.

Thomas Macdonough Ayear after Perry's victory,Macdonough matchedit with his decisive winon Lake Champlain.His victory helped foilthe invasion of New Yorkand stymied Britain'sland claims during latertreaty talks at Ghent.

While Barron's dismissal may havebeen a personal tragedy. Leopard's attackon his ship sparked outrage across Amer-ica and was seen as a haughty assault onthe national honor. London's grudgingapology for the attack in November 1811did little to assuage American publicdisgust with what it widely perceivedas Britain's arrogance, and on June 18,1812, the United States declared war.

Neither America nor Great Britainwas prepared for the subsequent con-flict, and both sides would ultimatelypay dearly in blood and treasure. Yetat war's end both would justly be ableto claim victory

The War of 1812 was a conflictneither belligerent governmentreally wanted. Great Britain

was militarily and economically over-extended in its ongoing global conflictwith France, and in the years since theAmerican Revolution it had come toconsider the United States an impor-tant trading partner. The Americanshad fought a brief war of their ownagainst France and were politically di-vided along regional lines over thequestion of war with Britain. But aboveall the United States was militarily un-prepared for a shooting war against anation that was a leading global power.

Its unreadiness for war was particu-larly evident at sea. President JamesMadison's predecessor, Thomas Jeffer-son, had advocated a defensive courseof action to counter Britain's aggressiveforeign policy, implementing a policyof proactive diplomacy with a limitednaval plan based on gunboats sta-tioned in American ports.

At the outbreak of the war Britainwas the most powerful maritime nationin the world, with approximately 1,000commissioned ships in the Royal Navy.It deployed more than 100 of thoseships in the American theater, includ-ing seven ships of the line and 31 frig-ates. The entire U.S. Navy comprisedjust 18 warships, none larger than afrigate, and some largely irrelevantgunboats. On paper, at least, the out-come of a war at sea between the Unit-ed States and Great Britain seemed aforegone conclusion.

Despite the obvious naval mismatch,some positive surprises for Americaemerged as the war unfolded. The firstoccurred on August 19, during a single-ship fight between the 44-gun USS Con-stitution and the 38-gun HMS Guerrière.

The American ship, comtnanded byCaptain Isaac Hull, had a leg up in theweight of metal it could deliver. ButHull's opponent. Captain James Rich-ard Dacres, could rely on seasoned guncrews to maintain a faster rate of fire.Hull gained the early advantage throughmore aggressive tactics and eventuallyshot away Guerriere's mizzenmast. Withthe British ship's maneuverability com-promised, Hull then raked Guerrièreseveral times. As both sides preparedboarders, Guerriere's main and foremastfollowed its mizzen over the side. TheBritish ship was helpless, and Dacresstruck his colors.

Hull's victory was stunning. Twocomparable ships had met, and the U.S.captain and crew had won a clear victoryover their British opponents. It had beendecades since a Royal Navy captain hadbeen bested in a one-on-one struggleand surrendered his ship. But the out-come of the battle between Constitutionand Guerrière proved more than meregood luck; two additional U.S. Navyvictories followed in rapid succession.In late October the 44-gun USS UnitedStates, commanded by Captain StephenDecatur, bested the 38-gun HMS Mace-donian. And in December Constitution,under Commodore William Bainbridge,defeated the 38-gun HMS Java.

What accounted for the Americanfrigates' upset victories of over theirRoyal Navy opponents? First, the U.S.Navy was beginning to develop a newbreed of commanders who could winin combat when on roughly equalterms with any opponent. Second, thenew heavy frigates being designed andbuilt in America were proving a break-through in vessel design. With sea-manlike verbal economy, it was saidthe U.S. Navy's new frigates "could out-fight any ship they couldn't outrun."

The quick U.S. victories sent Britaina clear message that the war—at leastat sea—was not going to be a walkover.The message for America was that its

MILITARY HISTORY

Navy now could, under equal circum-stances, hold its own against the RoyalNavy. That was a disturbing surprise inBritain and a significant psychologicalplus in America.

The naval vision expressed by JohnPaul Jones more than three decades ear-lier had finally begun to gain real tractionwith Congress and the Atnerican public.In a letter to a friend in 1778 Jones hadwritten about the nascent Navy: "Ourmarine [Navy) will rise as if by enchant-ment and become... the wonder andenvy of the world." This vision of a navyanticipated far more than gunboats.

The most far-reaching result of theAmerican frigate victories was to shiftthe thinking in the United States aboutthe importance of a blue-water navy. Thefact that U.S. vessels had defeated war-ships of the vaunted Royal Navy encour-aged those who believed that America'shonor, as well as its economic and diplo-matic future, were inextricably linked tothe nations ability to deploy a powerfuland capable navy. Tangible evidenceof that shift in mindset was Congress'

WhJie thundering broadsides could quicklydetermine the victor in a naval battle, it wasoften an aggressive boarding action thatcarried the day. Here, Marines in USS Wasp'%rigging support the assault on HMS Reindeer.

quick vote to fund six more frigatesand four larger ships of the line.

Encouraging events, for Britain,soon counterbalanced thoseU.S. Navy victories. The early

score in naval actions between the U.S.Navy and Royal Navy wound up closeto a draw, with five U.S. triumphs andfour British victories. Great Britainwas also able to successfully apply twosignificant elements of naval poweragainst the United States: blockadesand expeditionary raids.

Thus, when the British Admiraltyadmonished Admiral Sir John BorlaseWarren, commander in chief of theRoyal Navy's North American Station,that "the naval force of the enemyshould be quickly and completely dis-posed of," Warren responded with a

naval blockade and punitive raids alongthe U.S. Atlantic coast. To a degree War-ren was able to check the U.S. Navy'snewfound combat proficiency.

The efficacy of the blockade was un-derscored by a battle on June 1, 1813,between Chesapeake, under CaptainJames Lawrence, and Captain PhilipBroke's 38-gun HMS Shannon. Chesa-peake had been bottled up in Boston,and its crew lacked training. When theU.S. frigate left port, it took Broke andhis well-drilled crew only a quarterhour to pound Chesapeake into sub-mission and fatally wound its captain.

The British blockade—^which initial-ly targeted the Chesapeake Bay area andeventually expanded to the entire Atlan-tic coast —had the broader effect of crip-pling U.S. foreign trade. By 1814 U.S.merchant ship traffic was just 11 per-cent of what it had been before the war.

The Royal Navy's punitive coastalraids made the blockade still morepainful. The govemor of Connecticut,for instance, complained, "Serious dep-redations have been committed even

in our harbors and to such an extentthat the usual communication throughthe [Long Island] Sound is almostwholly interrupted." Through suchraids the British also sought to suppressthe very active privateers—essentiallypirates acting under U.S. governmentauspices—who had become an eco-nomic thorn in Britain's side.

The most noteworthy of the raidswas the British attack on Washingtonin mid-August 1814. A British forcesailed up the Patuxent River and putashore in Maryland, sent Americandefenders packing at Bladensburg andquickly fought its way through mostlymilitia defenses to Washington. Therethey set fire to the Capitol, the WhiteHouse and other federal buildings.A classic application of expedition-ary warfare, it emphasized speed andfocused impact to achieve its objec-tive. Within a month the British forcethat occupied Washington had with-drawn, but the point had been made:Fvery harbor on the U.S. Atlantic coastwas vulnerable.

The most significant actions ofthe war, in the view of manynaval theorists, occurred not

along the Atlantic, but on the conflict'snorthern front. Before the war Ameri-can political leaders generally believedthat a ground invasion of Canadawould be the most efficient way tofight Great Britain. But U.S. groundcampaigns in that theater were poorlyled and mostly met with frustration.In fact, until the autumn of 1813 itwas the British who enjoyed a string ofsuccesses on the war's northern front.An ill-conceived American groundattack on Montreal had failed, as hadone on Niagara. And the British hadseized the U.S. forts at Detroit andMackinac. But the Battle of Lake Friewould turn the military tide in the north.

On Sept. 10, 1813, Master Com-mandant Oliver Hazard Perry put con-trol of the lake on the line just northof Put-in-Bay, Ohio, with a nine-shipsquadron formed around the newlybuilt 20-gun brigs USS Lawrence andUSS Niagara. Opposing Perry was aforce of six British ships led by the 19-

gun HMS Detroit and the 17-gun HMSQueen Charlotte.

As the squadrons closed on one an-other. Perry pulled Lawrence out of theAmerican formation and charged head-on at the British line—a tactic reminis-cent of Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson atTrafalgar in 1805. For two hours andat point-blank range, Lawrence and the

à When thesmoke cleared,

Macdonough hadreinforced the

lesson of Perry'sLake Erie victory:

The U.S. Navynow had officerswho could winfleet actions V

British ships poured heavy fire into oneanother untu Lawrence was a total wreck.Perry transferred his flag to Niagara, re-entered the fray and carried the day. Af-ter the action Perry sent a now-famousmessage to his military commander,Maj. Gen. William Henry Harrison: "Wehave met the enemy, and they are ours."Perry's victory put Lake Frie under effec-tive U.S. control, dashing British hopesof establishing a buffer Indian statebetween the United States and Canada.

A year later 31-year-old Master Com-mandant Thomas Macdonough won a

battle of comparable importance onLake Champlain. British forces un-der Lt. Gen. Sir George Prévost hadlaunched an invasion of the UnitedStates through the Lake Champlainregion. Operating in close supportof Brig. Gen. Alexander Macomb, theAmerican general opposing Prévost,Macdonough's squadron fought froman anchored position between Cumber-land Head and Plattsburgh, N.Y.

Macdonough's flagship was the 26-gun corvette USS Saratoga. Three otherships—the 20-gun brig USS Eagle, the17-gun schooner USS Ticonderoga andthe 9-gun sloop USS Preble—formedthe American line, with 10 gunboats insupport. The British squadron com-prised the 36-gun frigate—and flag-ship—HMS Confiance, the 16-gun brigHMS Linnet, the 11-gun sloops HMSChubb and HMS Finch, and a dozengunboats. They approached frorn thenorth, with the intention of rakingthe American ships as they passed. TheBritish were thwarted, however, bythe strength of Macdonough's positionand fickle winds.

After more than two hours of with-ering exchanges, the British flagship, itscommander dead, stnick its colors, andthe other British ships followed suit.When the smoke cleared, Macdonoughhad reinforced the lesson of Perry's LakeErie victory: The U.S. Navy now hadofficers who could win fleet actionsas well as single-ship battles.

The timing of the Lake Champlainvictory was crucial. The United Statesand Britain had already begun peacenegotiations in Ghent, then part ofHolland. In their seminal work SeaPower: A Naval History, editors F.BPotter and Admiral Chester W. Nimitzsummed up the strategic impact ofMacdonough's victory:

Macdonough's victory and Macomb's stub-born resistance to heavy British attackspersuaded Prévost to retire to Canada forthe winter As a consequence of his failurethe British government restudied its posi-tion, accepted Wellington's estimate thatthe cost of launching a successful offensiveoutweighed the probable gain and modi-fied instructions to its delegates at Ghent,

MILITARY HISTORY

paving the way for conclusion of peace

before the end of the year.

I ndeed, Britain and the United Statessigned the Treaty of Ghent within afew months of the Lake Champlain

battle, ending the War of 1812. They re-turned prisoners and captured territoryThe treaty imposed neither indemnitiesnor any territorial boundary changes.Surprisingly, the treaty also did not ad-dress Britain's infringement of neutralrights in ocean commerce, nor did it callfor any official British concessions re-garding impressment, although the lat-ter issue faded away after the war due toa reduction in the size of the Royal Navy

America was free to continue push-ing its boundaries farther into theNorthwest. The war also enhanced U.S.stature internationally, while domesti-cally Americans felt they had success-fully stood up to Great Britain and par-ticularly to the Royal Navy That feelingwas enhanced by the decisive U.S. vic-tory at the Battle of New Orleans, whichunfolded before news of the war's endhad reached the combatants.

Louis Sénirier, French foreign minis-ter in Washington at the time, observed:"Finally, the war has given the Amer-icans what they so essentially lacked—a national character founded on agloiy common to all." Part of that na-tional character was an appreciation ofthe importance of both a blue-waternavy and of the tradition of courageand professionalism established by thevictories of Hull, Decatur, Bainbridge,Perry and Macdonough. Back acrossthe Atlantic, the British exploited thecessation of hostilities to concentrateon building their mercantile and colo-nial power for the next century.

Thus the War of 1812 can fairlybe described as a long-range strategicvictory for each side—a war that bothsides won. (^

For further reading Joseph Callo recom-mends Sea Power: A Naval History,edited by E.B. Potter and Chester W.Nimitzi This People's Navy: The Mak-ing of American Sea Power, by KennethJ. Hagan; and Mahan on Naval Warfare,edited by Allan Westcott.

t..

I

Huzza Î Old Iron Sides

3.

T.TUBE OretamUh Peasinatr.

HE Consiitution's glory 1Her crew so bold and brjve !

Are faiTi'd in brilliant story !Our righti dtfeiid and save.

Who true to every duty,For thsir couiiiry's honor fight ;

VVhili- ashore, wealth, fame, and beauty.Reward them with delight.

Ahoy ! brave bo\ s, superior !Weigh anchor—nothing fear.

Our enemy's inferior .'Then fight, far all that's dear.

Wasn't Hull a Nelson ? tell me, •With stern chase-guns and sweejis ;

To " dear off"—boys, and qilelt ye.While grim Britannia weeps !

By the noble Constuution,Wsj captured la Guerrière ;

John Bull's complete confusion.Huzza ! boys^—nothing fear.

Ahoy ! my lads, superior !Chaunt Hull's deserving praise,

Yourenetny's inferior .'i luzza ! for better dayj !

Huzza ! for valiant Bainbritlge,Who on Brazilian coast ;

The pride of Alhion—Jav» hitch.The Constitution's second boast.

Who after a smart beating,Gave up to her hrave foes ;

For cooling off her heating.To the bottom snug she goes.

Ahoy ' my boys, superior !Pass round the flowing can.

Your enemy'« inferior !A pri.Te-'-for every mrtti.

E68

At the Madeira station.Two cruisers hove a >ight :

Our Captain made'the motion.My boys ! 'tis time to fight ?

Now let us prove with spirit,S And »how Britannia's boys :S That Yankees make a merit,S That two to one are toys.\ Ahoy ! tny tars, superior !y Our thunders shall proclaim^\ Our enemy's inferior !{j Huzza ! for Naval Fame.

i We catne into an action.Two ships along side ride,

i O u r bull dogs told by fraction,From honest Iron-side.

i Our lad« they cry'd with spirit :} We'll give you balls—by heart 1t Shall prove to you the merit,I , Of Commodore Stewart.

Ahoy ! niiy boys, superior !Three cheer*—give every man ;

Our enemy's inferior !We'll beat them two to one.

After fifty minutes fighting.They b Jth " gave up the ship j "

" Old Iron-side" was riding.Had scarcely lost a chip.

While the sloops Levant, Cyane,In less than in an hour ;

Acknowledg'd on the Main,Columbia's Naval Power !

Ahoy ! brave lads, superior fTrue honor now invites.

Your enemy's inferior !1 " Free trnile and ssilors' rights.

THE ONLY THING IRRESISTIBLE ABOUT THE WORLD WAR II FRENCH RESISTANCEWASHOLLYWOOD'S ROMANTICIZATION OF THE SMALL, SECRET, DISORGANIZED MOVEMENT

BY STEPHAN WILKINSON

Blame Ernest Hemingway.Ever since he wrote For Whom the Bell

Tolls (1940), the popular image of the war-time partisan has been one of T-handlesshoved down into detonator boxes, ofbridges blowing and railway tracks pretzel-ing, of snipers taking out troops that stum-ble into their sights. That image has alsoshaped modern-day impressions of the

Erench Resistance, the multifaceted, mis-understood World War II movement thateventually coalesced among brave civiliansafter Germany steamrolled Erance in 1940.

But the Hemingwayesque view of resist-ance in For Whom the Bell Tolls (set duringthe 1936-39 Spanish Civil War) bears littlesemblance to the real-life Erench Resist-ance. The truth, however, is hard to deter-

MILITARY HISTORY

Buttressed by heroic imagesof steely-eyed partisans-such as the trio of CorsicanMaquis fighters, opposite,waiting in ambush-andeye-catching posters laudingthe importance of armedaction against the occupyingGerman forces, this page,the true efficacy and extentof the French Resistancehas often been exaggerated.

FRENCHHELPS THRO

SISTANCE

mine—what the Resistance was, whatit accomplished, who its memberswere, how big and effective or smalland ineffective it was—because theFrance of World War II had one largepiece of dirty linen waving in the wind:Alone among the countries of Eur-ope overrun by the Wehrmacht, Francechose to collaborate actively with theenemy, and the French people becamedeeply ashamed of that choice as soonas the Allies liberated them. The coun-try compensated for that shame by

nation of resisters. Anti-Nazi parti-sans in Yugoslavia, Poland and Greecewere far more effective and consti-tuted a substantially higher percentageof the population of each country. AsTime described Marcel Ophul's Resist-ance-debunking 1969 documentaryThe Sorrow and the Pity, the film "triesto puncture the bourgeois myth—or protectively askew memory—thatallows France generally to act as ifhardly any Frenchmen collaboratedwith the Germans."

While France's relatively quick capitulationundoubtedly prompted many citizens toresist the German occupation in ways bothviolent and passive, others were happy tofraternize-and even openly collaborate-with troops of the victorious Wehrmacht.

sometimes exaggerating the accom-plishments of those partisans who didpropagandize, spy upon, sabotage andeven openly fight the Germans.

The French, understandably, re-acted [after liberation] to theirordeal by retreating into a myth,"

writes Ian Ousby in Occupation: TheOrdeal of France, 1940-1944. "A mythof a people united in hostility to theNazi occupiers, of a nation of résis-tants." In truth France was far from a

Fully 90 percent of France's popu-lation either supported the collabora-tionist Vichy regime or were too fright-ened to have anything to do with theunderground. Most civilians evidentlyno longer wanted to be part of any war,and many French soldiers lacked thewill to continue the fight. German sol-diers were stunned when some of theFrench they captured in June 1940danced jigs and sang folksongs, de-lighted to be done with warfighting.

A considerable number of Frenchmen and women were outright collab-orationists, and those who weren'twere content to simply coexist withtheir conquerors. To many, collabora-tion meant making the best of an awk-ward situation, sharing space (andsometimes beds) with fellow Euro-

peans, albeit ones in gray Wehrmachtand black SS uniforms. After all, thethinking went, national socialism atleast looked preferable to the commu-nism that was already a powerful forceamong French workers. The Germansdid their part by being polite to theFrench populace, giving up Métro seatsto old people, handing candy to chil-dren and spending freely at Paris caba-rets, restaurants and couturiers. SomeFrenchmen went so far as to fight onthe German side: more than 7,000Frenchmen volunteered for the Wehr-macht and eventually fonned the Char-lemagne Division, which fought onthe Eastern Front and in Berlin.

So the French Resistance grewslowly. Paris and much of therest of occupied France flew

swastika flags on every hotel and publicbuilding until the August 1944 libera-tion. By contrast, when the Germansinvaded Greece and flew their garishbanner from the Acropolis, resisterstore it down within days. Initially, atleast, the French were far more inter-ested in getting along with the Ger-mans than in challenging them.

The Resistance first revealed itselfas underground publishers of anti-Nazi broadsides and mimeographedmini-newspapers. It was an offensethat could get one arrested, jailed, tor-tured or even executed, so this wasindeed resistance. Clandestine pub-lishing also made good use of the tal-ents of these early French partisans, formany were intellectuals and had noidea how to fire a gun. This remaineda problem for the Resistance. Themovement eventually comprised well-meaning anti-Fascist activists, espe-cially communists; a relatively smallnumber of the bourgeoisie and intel-lectuals; the inevitable young thugs,malcontents and outcasts who gravi-tate toward the action; and a core ofmen and women who despised whatthe Germans had done to France.

What the Resistance didn't have wasmilitary professionals; most of theFrench army had been captured andimprisoned—1,540,000 men were inGerman captivity. A few had fled to

MILITARY HISTORY

In the months immediatelyfollowing France's surrender,German troops could sightseein Paris with little fear for theirsafety. But the Aug. 21,1941,shooting of a low-level Germannaval adjutant in a Métro stationheralded the beginning ofviolent resistance in France.

England to join Brig. Gen. Charles deGaulle's fledgling Free French forces,but among those few remaining inFrance, guerrilla warfare was somethingthey neither understood nor wantedany part of. So the Resistance was anamateur "army," ready and able to pro-duce anti-Nazi propaganda and gatherintelligence but not do battle.

Small groups of Resistance fightersdid harass and annoy the German oc-cupiers, but whenever larger bandsgathered to fight the occasional skir-mish, Wehrmacht firepower, armorand air support quickly destroyedthem. The Resistance initially had fewweapons—obsolete World War I pis-tols, a few hunting rifles and shot-guns—and even fewer people whoknew how to use them. Nor was thereany way to get more guns until theBritish began air-dropping weapons,ammunition, explosives and othersupplies in 1943.

The first violent act of armed re-sistance to the occupation ofFrance is generally thought to

have been the shooting of Alfons Mo-ser, a low-level German naval adjutant,in the Paris Métro on Aug. 21, 1941.The shooter was Pierre Georges, a com-munist. The Parti Communiste Fran-çais was at the core of much of theearly Resistance movement. Experi-enced agitators, skilled at organizingstrikes and rabble-rousing, the com-munists gravitated toward the Resist-ance, especially after Adolf Hitler brokehis nonaggression pact with the Sovi-et Union and attacked on the FasternFront on June 22, 1941. At that pointthe communist resisters took it uponthemselves to commit as much may-hem as possible, particularly in metro-politan areas, and force the Germansto deploy additional troops againstthem, thus diverting soldiers fromservice in war zones."

Jews were another major group ofresisters, for obvious reasons. Account-ing for just 1 percent of the populationin an infamously anti-Semitic country,they were said to comprise 15 to 20percent of its Resistance. The Vichygovernment had handed over to the

Germans all foreign Jews who had fledto France as refugees, most of whomdied in concentration camps and forcedlabor. It went even further in its 1940Statute on Jews, denaturalizing severalthousand French-born Jews and thenrounding them up for deportation toconcentration camps.

The murder on the Métro elicitedfrom the Germans a brutal but effec-tive response: reprisal executions. Forevery German killed by the Resistance,the Nazis would kill dozens, even hun-

i What theResistance didn'thave was military

professionals; mostof the French armyhad been captured

and imprisoned—1,540,000 menwere in German

captivity f

dreds, of civilians. At first the Germanschose victims from among existingprisoners—communists, anarchists,GauUists and other categories of of-fenders. Eventually, however, they be-came less discriminating about whomthey shot or hanged. In such repri-sals the Germans killed an estimated30,000 innocent French men and wom-en by the time of the liberation. Resist-ers ultimately had as much to fear fromcountrymen-tumed-informants as theydid from the Nazis.

The most valuable work theFrench Resistance did was toprovide, for the British and later

the Americans, pre-invasion intel-ligence about German troop move-

ments and coastal defenses, as well asaccurate maps and photos to be usedby D-Day planners. After the war. Su-preme Allied Commander in EuropeGeneral Dwight D. Eisenhower grandlyestimated the French Resistance hadbeen worth "an extra six divisions." Itwas a rare bit of Eisenhower hyper-bole likely foisted upon him by deGaulle, but Ike certainly never meantthe resisters were the equal of 90,000fully armed and trained troops. It wasthe intelligence they provided he feltwas priceless.

Some of the intel made its way toEngland in the hands of British agents,picked up at night in pastures andfields by slow, black-painted WestlandLysanders of the Royal Air Force. Muchmore was transmitted by radio. Giventhe diligence with which the GeheimeStaatspolizei, or Gestapo, sought toferret them out. Resistance radio oper-ators were reputed to have an averagelife expectancy of just six months.They weren't particularly skillful ama-teurs, and their radios were bulky,hard-to-hide units. Mobile Germanradio direction finders could triangu-late their positions as the French madetheir slow transmissions, virtually en-suring their capture.

The British and Americans dis-missed much of the Resistance intelli-gence, however, as amateurish, uselessor just plain wrong. "As late as the firstmonths of 1943," wrote historian Dou-glas Porch in his thorough book TheFrench Secret Services, "40 percent ofResistance broadcasts were on frequen-cies which only the Germans were ca-pable of listening to."

In England, de Gaulle, who hadcontroversially and single-handedlyestablished the Free French govern-ment in exile, claimed credit for insti-gating the Resistance, but that was aconsiderable exaggeration. In a June1940 BBC speech broadcast to France,de Gaulle had urged "resistance," butwhat he clearly meant was for able-bodied Frenchmen to make their wayto England to join the Free Frencharmy to resist the Germans. Home-grown resistance, especially not underhis command, was not his intent.

MILITARY HISTORY

Allied airdrops of weapons, explosives andadvisers allowed the Resistance to expandits activities. A favorite tactic was to concealtimed or pressure-triggered charges beneathraiiroad tracks, right, to disrupt-albeittemporarily-German supply lines, above.

A measure of enmity also existedbetween the Free French and the Re-sistance. Frenchmen who made theirway to England often discountedresisters as those who had cravenly"stayed behind," while the resistersconsidered the expatriates Frenchmenwho had "fled to safety." Few under-stood or respected the other's motive.

Regardless, few early resisters everheard the de Gaulle speech. Entirelyseparate cells and cadres formed spon-taneously among such disparate groupsas Paris museum curators and angrycafé esthetes. They initially served aspropagandists, intelligence gatherersand couriers to return downed Alliedairmen to England. The latter networkcomprised safe houses and trekkingguides who would deliver the downedairmen to Allied submarines off French

beaches or to safety in neutral Spainand Portugal.

While some Resistance mythologiz-ers have compared this network to the19th century Underground Railroad,others say it bore more similarities tothe "coyotes" who today prey on ille-

gal immigrants, as many ol the pass-eurs who guided the escapees over thePyrenees were well paid for their work.Some collected fees twice—once fromtheir clients and again from the Ger-mans to whom they turned over theairmen. The Resistance also sometimes

oCM

charged fees for its intelligence, saying"the cause" needed the money.

Whatever its initial shortcom-ings, the Resistance was sub-stantially strengthened when

in early 1943 the collaborationist Vichygovernment made a fateful concessionto the Germans—agreeing to the Serv-ice du travail obligatoire (STO), newwork rules requiring the forced labor

in Germany of virtually all able-bodiedFrenchmen. Almost immediately, thou-sands of young men—especially in thesouth—fled to the countryside, livingin the scrubland that covered muchof the south. They called themselvesthe Maquis, a word that loosely trans-lates to "the bush."

Resistance leaders soon realizedthese maquisards were not only nu-merous but desperate, brave, trainable

Resistance groups in remote areas (above,

in the French Alps) were often more effective

than their urban counterparts. The liberation

brought retribution for enemy collaborators:

Female fraternizers, left, endured public

ridicule, while men often faced execution.

and useful. These weren't Parisian cafe-sitters or underground newspaper edi-tors but rough-hewn, would-be sabo-teurs and fighters, and they becamethe Hemingwayesque public image ofthe Resistance—those cinematic guysin berets with Sten guns slung fromtheir shoulders and Gauloises droop-ing from their lips.

The Resistance came to maturityin the months just before andafter the June 1944 Allied in-

vasion of Normandy. The intelligence,maps, photos and reports they sent toEngland were helpful to invasion plan-ners and would have been even moreuseful had the Allies fully trusted the re-sisters. There had always been a strongundercurrent of doubt, particularlyamong the Americans, regarding the

MILITARY HISTORY

veracity of the intel the amateurs pro-vided. Despite Ike's "extra six divi-sions" valuation of the Resistance, hisSupreme Headquarters Allied Expedi-tionary Force wouldn't even providede Gaulle with the D-Day date, a snubthe French commander never forgave.

But for the first time, the Resistancehad planned specific, well-coordinatedsabotage campaigns against railroads,power networks, highways, fuel andammunition depots, command centersand communications lines to aid theinvasion they knew was inevitable.The Resistance reportedly destroyed1,800 railway targets in the monthsbefore and after the invasion, versus2,400 hit by Allied bombers. The re-sisters also learned they didn't evenneed explosives and the accompanyingdanger. They simply removed the boltsholding track lengths together. Al-ihough the Hollywood image is one ofvast derailments, with entire trains andtheir cargoes tumbling down moun-tainsides, such sabotage was more an-noying than disruptive to the Germans,who usually made repairs and resumedservice within hours.

With the August 1944 Liberationof Paris, spearheaded by General Phil-ippe Leclerc and his Free French 2ndArmored Division, the work of theResistance was essentially finished, yetit also augured its darkest hour: Re-sisters were not the only citizens toindulge in the orgy of lynchings andsvnnmary executions that followed theliberation, but many were enthusiasticparticipants. Accustomed to beinga law unto themselves, resisters andothers took out their fury on every-body from acknowledged collabora-tors—particularly women who hadslept with Germans—to innocents onthe vwong end of an informant neigh-bor's grudge. This lawless, post-libera-tion purge was called l'Épuration légale("the legal purification"). Some 10,000suspected collaborators were sentencedto death, though officials carried outfewer than 800 executions.

"In countless postwar films andnovels, shadowy agents whispered in-formation vital to the war effort, whileresisters intrepidly derailed trains, ma-

chine-gunned convoys of sinister,Gestapo-stuffed Citroens or sent mo-torcycles of the Feldpolizei and theirsidecar passengers careening intoditches along lonely French roads,"wrote Porch in The French Secret Serv-ices. "So powerful was the Resistancemyth, so important did it become toFrench self-esteem, that only gradu-ally, and not without controversy, havehistorians been able to assess its sizeand significance." ,

ling,the inflated

mythology thattoday surrounds

the FrenchResistance only

profanes thememory of those

who really didserve bravely f

Citizen resistance works well. Porchpoints out, when a populace is deeplycommitted to the cause. But in France,"a handful of German police backedby Vichy authorities and the ruthlessreprisals of the Wehrmacht and SS wereenough to keep the population ac-ceptably docile until the very eve ofD-Day and beyond."

So, was the French Resistanceeffective? Perhaps, in someplaces at some times, but its

value was often grossly exaggerated.The Resistance, for example, claimedit had killed 6,000 members of thevicious Das Reich Division. Britishhistorian Max Hastings, however, ex-amined the unit's records for his bookDas Reich: The March of the Second SS

Panzer Division Through France, June1944 and concluded the French wereresponsible for the death of approxi-mately 35 soldiers out of the divi-sion's 15,000. The French have longboasted the Resistance so harried thatdivision that it took the Germansmore than three weeks to move fromStrasbourg to Caen after the Nor-mandy Invasion, normally a three-day slog for an armored division. Thetruth, however, was that the Germanunit had been ordered to move delib-erately and pulverize the Maquis inthe region through which it passed,which it did.

Such mythmaking abounds inFrench, British and American post-war accounts. Resistance records claimthat ultimately there were 400,000 re-sisters. But official French governmentnumbers say 220,000, while Porch'sresearch shows 75,000. The truth maynever be known.

Among the most caustic commentson the Resistance was uttered by Ger-man Rcichministcr for Armaments andWar Production Albert Speer. Whenasked by British economic historianAlan Milward to comment upon theeffectiveness of the Resistance in ham-pering German wartime efforts, Speerresponded, "What French Resistance?"And when General Alfred Jodl, opera-dons chief of the German Armed ForcesHigh Command, in November 1943outlined for Heinrich Himmler themilitary situation on the Western Front,the only guerrilla group Jodl saw fitto mention was the Yugoslav parti-sans. To Jodl, the French Resistancewas irrelevant.

Still, for those of us who have neverexperienced enemy occupation or ill-equipped, marginal guerrilla warfare—criticism comes too easily in retrospect.If anything, the inflated mythology thattoday surrounds the French Resistanceonly profanes the memory of thosewho really did serve bravely. (^

For further reading Stephan Wilkinsonrecommends France: The Dark Years,1940-1944, by Julian Jackson, and Occu-pation: The Ordeal of France, 1940-1944, by Ian Ousby.

his Civil War mural "Battle ofNashville") was prolific: Between1877 and 1909 he rendered 88illustrations of Colonial andRevolutionary War subjects, mostof them for magazines. "ThomasJefferson Writing the Declaration ofIndependence," opposite, ran in theMarch 1898 Scribner's Magazine.

ITHWARFAMOUS FOR HIS KNIGHTS AND PIRATES,

HOWARD PYLE ALSO TOOK INSPIRATION FROMAMERICA'S FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE

Delaware-born illustrator and author Howard Pyle (1853-1911) was fascinated from an early age by stories of bucca-neers, cowboys and knights, and his widely acknowledged

status as the father of American graphic illustrationI is due in large part to the enduring popularity of

such works as The Merry Adventures of Robin Hood

and Howard Pyle's Book of Pirates.But Pyle—whose career included assignments for

such illustrated magazines as Scrihner's, Collier's andHarper's Weekly—was also fascinated by American

H- history. He was particularly interested in the eventsleading up to, and conduct of, the RevolutionaryWar, and his illustrations for other authors' books

; and articles on the birth of the United States areug his most accomplished and popular works.

As with all the subjects to which he turned his brush,Pyle sought to depict as accurately as possible the eventsand those who participated in them. He carefully researchedtactics and uniforms, terrain and weaponry; but he was nomere technical illustrator, for he also sought to infuse hisworks with an overarching sense of both the participants'humanity and the import of their actions.

As teacher and mentor Pyle imbued younger artists—includ-ing N.C. Wyeth—^with his love of chivalry, adventure and heroicart. Just as important, he passed on his love for Amer

''.i

\

Ji

Common, April 19,1775," top, to illustrate the12-part series "The Story of the Revolution,"which ran In Scribner's Magazine in 1898.

Pyle's "Battle of Bunker Hill, June 17,1775,"above, depicts the second British advanceon American positions atop Breed's Hill.

on Makers," ope2,1906,issue ,.

It is the only one of Pyle's Revolutionary Warimages not created for a specific article.

HISTORY

Induded fn "The Story of tfie Revol"The Attack Upon the Chew House," top,depicts Americans trying to dislodge Britishtroops from a private home in Germantown, Pa.

In another Illustration for the Scribner'sseries, "The Retreat Through the Jerseys,"above, George Washington and his men fallback from New York in the final days of 1776.

ey Scrambled Up the Parapet anWent Over the Top, Pell Mell, Upon theBritish," opposite, illustrated the Battleof Yorktown for a book published in 1899.

> 1 .'•.

OFTH! GLE RUINED

«

/ / jf //'Here they come!"-y ""í&í i• -J / . ' / ' 7 - T<!To t^e surviving doughboyé, the cry seemed like a deatk knell. Only aiew'^íof them rerhained, scattered in the cellars of half-ruified hoiis&s-and stryngbehind a batte.red stor e wall that spanned the northern edge of thé villageV/h^y'

frazzled and lungs wracked by gas, they slumped at their postsrseemingly^than alive. They had long since used up th:e ''gre i*a<les. GermarP^t.ilîety'h'gà.knocked out -their only machine gun< Their-Ti^¿g^inmti«ition was runiTÍH¿'Í6a»í.And they were trapped. Jc - ""^ "^^ ^

The doughboys occupied the village of iismette, on the north bank^ot FranceV'Vesle River. German troops occupied the steep hillsides that dominated fhb^iUageto the north, east and west. To the south the debris-choked river flowed 45 feet v^de».and 15 deep. A man could swim it if he didn't mind slithering across submergedxcoils of barbed wire and risking German machine-gun fire. Otherwise, the onlyway across was a shattered stpne footbridge that barely linked one bank to the other.Clambering over the bridge was a slow business—impossible in daylight, due toenemy mortars and machine guns, and risky at night.

° y Í3 An exploding phosphorous

For the past two hours the Germans had bombarded Fismette round silhouettes a heimetedwith every gun in their arsenal. Now dawn had broken, and American doughboy of ther- 1 . J 1 1 1 1 1 n - . 28th Division at Fismette,

German observers stationed on the hills above or flying in France, in August 1918.Theplanes overhead would watch the Americans' every movement French-ordered attack failed,for at least the next 12 hours" It was at this moment—when ¡"P f ecausedefending

Germans controlled the

the doughboys' situation seemed impossibly desperate—the heights surrounding town. .

ÄRY HISTORY

Wi

I

Soissons Fismette

Físmes

Belleau ChateauWood Thierry

o

Reims^^ Germans chose to attack.

v/e****" A ^^^^ battalion of elitestormtroopers armedwith rifles, grenades and

flamethrowers rushed theweak American line. As

thick black smoke and flamesspurted toward them, the rank-

ing American officer. Major AlanDonnelly, could find only two words

to say."Hold on!" he shouted.

TIhe Pennsylvania National Guard's 28thDivision, the famed "Keystone," wasamong the best the Americans had in

France in the summer of 1918. "They struckme as the best soldiers I had ever seen," said

Brig. Gen. Dennis Nolan, commander of the division's 55thInfantry Brigade. "They were veterans, survivors who didn'tseem to be oppressed by the death of other men."

When the United States entered World War 1 in April 1917,the Pennsylvania National Guard's 109th, 110th, 111th and112th infantry regiments formed the 7th Division. Laterthat year the unit was redesignated the 28th Divi-sion, assigned to the American ExpeditionaryForces and shipped to France under the commandof Maj. Gen. Charles H. Muir Though grouchy andinflexible. Muir knew what fighting meant. Serving as asharpshooter during the Spanish-American War, he had re-ceived the Distinguished Service Cross for single-handedlykilling the entire crew of a Spanish artillery piece. Muir's menaffectionately called him "Uncle Charley"

The Pennsylvanians entered combat for the flrst time inearly July 1918, fighting as part of the American III Corpsunder Maj. Gen. Robert Lee Bullard. As no independentAmerican Army in France yet existed, however, they wereunder the overall command of Maj. Gen. Jean Degoutte'sFrench Sixth Army. Attacking northward from the MarneRiver about 50 miles east of Paris, they pushed into an

enemy-held salient backed by the Aisne River. On August 4the Americans captured the town of Fismes on the southbank of the 'Vesle River. They had advanced 20 miles in justover a month and cleared out most of the German salient.Dégoutte nevertheless ordered the 28th Division to cross theVesle, capture Fismette and hold it as a bridgehead.

Muir and Bullard vehemently disagreed with Degoutte'sorders. The bridgehead at Fismette was too vulnerable, theyargued. Enemy-held hills overlooked it on all sides, and with-drawal under fire over the Vesle would be next to impossi-ble. But Dégoutte would have none of it, and the Americangenerals had to swallow their objections. Until the inde-pendent American Army that General John J. Pershing hadsought for so long became a reality, they had no choice butto follow the Erenchman's orders.

The Germans did not concede Fismette easily. On thenight of August 6-7, troops of the 112th Infantry attacked

the village, but German resistance was too strong, and theyhad to withdraw. They tried again the following morningafter American artillery had laid down a heavy barrage, andafter a savage street fight they gained enough of a toeholdto hang on. Eor the next 24 hours attacks, counterattacksand constant hand-to-hand fighting engulfed Fismette inan inferno of flame, smoke and noise.

Lieutenant Hervey Allen, a literate young man fromPittsburgh who would later become a successful novelist,approached the riverbank opposite Fismette late on theevening of August 9. His company of the 111th Infantryhad been fighting the Germans for six weeks and had notreceived rations for the past few days. Allen's thoughts wereless than cheerful as he gazed across the Vesle at a churn-ing cloud of smoke flickering with muzzle flashes andechoing with gunfire and explosions. Somewhere in therelay Fismette.

The infantrymen crossed the stone bridge just after mid-night. As they picked their way forward, they prayed enemyflares would not light up the sky and expose them to ma-chine-gun flre. Fortunately, the sky remained dark. Rifle flreintensified, however, as the doughboys entered Fismette.The Germans still held much of the village, and contestedthe Americans house to house. Allen's captain led them

MILITARY HISTORY

through the village, dodging and sprinting, until they reachedits northern edge just before dawn. Ahead, on a half-woodedupward slope cut by a small gully German machine gunsbarked at them furiously from the shelter of some trees.

The captain ordered an attack but was shot dead as he ledhis men into the open. Allen and the others continued for-ward another 50 yards before retiring to the village withheavy losses. The few remaining officers in Allen's com-pany held a hurried conference in an old dugout. Theirstanding orders were to attack and seize the hills above Fis-mette, but this seemed insane when even survival was prob-lematic. One of them, they decided, had to return to head-quarters in Fismes and seek further orders. Allen said hecould swim, so the other officers chose him.

Allen approached the riverbank by slithering down amuddy ditch, dragging his belly painfully over strands ofbarbed wire half-submerged in the mud. Small clouds ofGerman mustard gas filled the ditch in places, and althoughhe wore his mask, the gas burned his hands and other ex-posed patches of skin. Enemy shells fell nearby, stunninghim into near-unconsciousness. Allen nevertheless made itto the river's edge, where he slipped into the water, discard-ing his gas mask and pistol.

The lieutenant crossed the Vesle beneath the bridge, some-times swimming and other times crawling over submergedbarbed wire. As he reached the opposite bank, Allen's heartsank. American and German machine guns constandy rakedthe shore. There seemed no way forward and no way back."I lay there in the river for a minute and gave up," he laterremembered. "When you do that, something dies inside."

After a moment, fortunately Allen noticed a small culvertthat offered just enough cover for him to make his way intoFismes. A few minutes later he was racing down rubble-strewn streets toward the dugout serving as battalion head-quarters. No signposts were necessary—all he had to do wasfollow the macabre trail of dead runners' corpses. He arrivedat the dugout to the sight of an unexploded German shellwedged into the wall just over the entrance. Inside, Allenwaded through a crowd of officers, wounded soldiers andmalingerers to reach his battalion major. The major lookedrather pleased with himself, for he had so far received only

positive reports of the fighting in Fismette. Allen, as the onlyeyewitness present, quickly disabused him of his optimism.His duty done, the lieutenant saluted, moved to a corner andlost consciousness.

Several hours later an officer shook Allen awake and or-dered him to guide a group of reinforcements back into Fis-mette. Night had fallen. Little remained of the bridge, and thesurrounding area was strewn vnih shell holes, broken equip-

ment and pieces of men. A sentry warned that the slightestsound would provoke German machine guns to open fireon the bridge, and that several runners had been killedtrying to cross. Waves of nausea engulfed Allen. For a mo-ment his resolve wavered. "No more machine guns, no more!"he said to himself over and over. An American sniper, shel-tering nearby and waiting to fire at German muzzle-flashes,hissed, "Don't stoop down, lieutenant—they are shootinglow when they cut loose!"

Allen sucked in his stomach and led his men carefullyover the bridge. As they reached midspan, an enemy flare litup the sky The doughboys stood frozen and prepared to die."That," Allen later recalled, "was undoubtedly the most in-tense moment 1 ever knew." The flare seemed to float eter-nally, until it finally descended in a slow arc, sputtered andwent out. Miraculously, the enemy had not fired a shot.

The hours that followed sank only partially into Allen'smemory, passing in a haze of sights, sounds and impressions.What he remembered most was weariness. "In that greattime," he later wrote, "there was never any rest or let-up untilthe body was killed or it sank exhausted." Around him, thefighting continued without letup.

I onths afterward many members of the regimentwould receive medals in tribute to their bravery in

1 Fismette. Sergeant James I. Mestrovitch rescuedhis wounded company commander under fire on August 10and carried him to safety. Mestrovitch would receive theMedal of Honor for this act of heroism—but posthumously,as he was killed in action on November 4.

Lieutenant Bob Hoffman would return home with aCroix de guerre. He spent his days and nights in Fismette

scouting German positions andfighting off counterattacks. Onemorning Hoffman noticed Germanpreparations for an attack and de-ployed his men in a block of ruinedhouses they had linked togetherwith strongpoints and tunnels. TheAmericans had just taken their po-sitions, poking their rifles throughapertures in the crumbling stonewalls, when German soldiers camerushing down the street. Hoffmannever forgot the sight: "Clumpety-

clump, they were going, with their high boots and hugecoal-bucket helmets. I can see them coming yet—bent over,rifle in one hand, potato-masher grenade in the other;husky, red-faced young fellows, their eyes almost poppingout of their heads as they dashed down the street, necks redand perspiring."

Hoffman had positioned his men well. As the 50 or soGermans advanced further into the village, they stumbledinto preset kill zones and were shot down to a man. Duringthe fighting, a young German popped into the doorway ofthe house where Hoffman had taken shelter and paused tocatch his breath. Hoffman, standing in the semidarkness ofthe ruined house, hesitated for a split second as he decidedwhat to do—shoot the German, challenge him to fight orjust stick a bayonet in him? He chose the last option andlunged forward. The surprised German died spitted on thelieutenant's bayonet.

After three days of flghting the 111th seemed in no con-dition to withstand a determined enemyattack. But everyone knew one was coming.One evening Hoffman led a scouting party thatcaptured a teenaged German soldier. Thefrightened boy told his captors that Germanshock troops had arrived and were preparingan all-out assault on Fismette. Hoffman creptout along the village outskirts in a search forevidence to corroborate the boy's story. Hefound Fismette strangely quiet. German ar-tillery fired intermittently. Enemy snipers hadgone dormant. American reinforcements hadcrossed the bridge without drawing fire. Theonly enemy activity seemed to be in the air. Anunusual number of German planes were aloft,sputtering along slowly—and uncontested—above the vil-lage. A sense of stillness and expectancy reinforced Hoff-man's sense of foreboding.

Fismette and seize the surrounding heights. Hoffman andAllen received their orders early in the morning on August11. They must rouse every available man and attack atdawn. Fismette must be cleared. If the Germans lied as ex-pected, the doughboys must also drive them from the sur-rounding hills.

"It was a frightful order, murder," thought Allen. Heasked Major Donnelly, whose 3rd Battalion would spear-head the attack, to reconsider. Donnelly brushed him off.Orders, he replied—they had no choice. The word "murder"also popped into Hoffman's mind as he watched Donnellyassemble his men, but he stayed quiet. Neither Allen norHoffman took part in the initial attack—but they wouldshare in its aftermath.

As the 3rd Battalion moved forward, the German artilleryburst forth with sudden, frightful intensity. It was, indeed,murder. After a few minutes a handful of doughboys—allthat remained of the battalion—came staggering back downthe hill, chased by German shells. Donnelly, who had sentthem forward, watched in silence. Then the American ar-tillery retaliated, and Fismette burst into flames. Allen tookrefuge in a cellar, surrounded by the dead, the dying andmen driven half-mad by shell concussions. Hoffman, deliri-ous with exhaustion, made a feeble attempt to care for thewounded before he too hunkered down in a basement.There was nothing more any of them could do.

The German bombardment continued all the rest of thatday and through the night. Toward dawn the shelling in-tensified. Then, as daylight broke, the German guns fellsilent. "That," Allen knew, "meant only one thing." Hardlyconscious of what he was doing, he ordered every man who

Bo

ack across the river in Fismes the 111th regimental, officers thought the tide had turned in their favor.Muir kept relaying messages from Dégoutte—

attack, advance, attack—and as the German guns fell silent,it seemed the Frenchman's persistence had borne fruit. Thetime had come, they thought, to clear the Germans out of

could stand out of the dugout and drove them toward a wallto face the enemy attack. "They are all dead up there alongthe wall, lieutenant," someone said. Hoffman, nearby andheading for the same wall, thought the same: "Everywhere1 looked were dead men. There seemed to be no live menaround to man the guns."

"Here they come!" someone shouted. "Hold on!" Don-nelly cried.

Staring past the wall, Allen saw a sudden puff of smokethat rolled forward with a jet of yellow flame. Men curled up

MILITARY HISTORY

as smoke and flame rolled over them, and he dazedlythought of burning leaves. Another flash burst among somenearby houses. One of Allen's men stood up and whirledto face him, his body outlined against the flames. "Oh! MyGod!" he screamed, staring wide-eyed into the lieutenant'sface. "Oh God!"

Hoffman felt the same knot of terror in the pit of hisstomach as he watched the flamethrowers move forward,borne by men with tanks on their backs, clutching hoses thatsjU'wed liquid fire up to 50 yards. His body seemed to shrivelwith the heat as banks of smoke wafted past him.

For all their terror and exhaustion, the doughboys held.From behind the wall and along the village perimeter, theyopened fire on the German stormtroopers. They con-centrated on the men withflamethrowers. Their moralesoared when a bullet punc-tured a flamethrower tank anda German erupted into flames.The other flamethrowers fol-lowed, one by one like romancandles, until all that remainedwas the smell of burning flesh.Rifle and grenade-toting Ger-man infantry surged forwardregardless and managed todrive the doughboys from sev-eral houses. But the enemy hadspent his energy. The Ameri-can hne held.

That night troops of the109th and 112th regiments relieved the survivors. Hoffman'sentire company had been reduced to just 32 men. Allenwas in no condition to call roll for his company. Sufferingfrom gas inhalation and burns, shrapnel wounds and shellshock, he was evacuated and spent the remainder of the warin a French hospital.

The tragedy of Fismette had yet to reach its denoue-ment. The Americans cleared the village step by step,and on August 22 they declared it under control. The

Germans continued to hold the heights, however, and werereinforcing their lines.

By this time the defense of Fismette had reverted to thehands of the 112th Infantry. Its commander, GolonelGeorge C. Rickards, knew the division was exhausted andthat it lacked further reserves to meet a Gennan attack. OnAugust 26, Rickards invited Bullard and Muir to his head-quarters in Fismes. After a brief consultation, all three menagreed the Americans must abandon Fismette. Muirpromptly issued an order to evacuate the "uselessly smallbridgehead," and Bullard approved. Unfortunately, Bull-ard's chief of staff tattled to Dégoutte before Rickards couldexecute the order. Furious, Dégoutte countermandedMuir's order and ordered Bullard and Muir to hold Fismetteat all costs.

That night companies G and H of the 112th—236 menin all—took up positions in Fismette. At dawn the follow-ing morning, August 27, German artillery laid down a bar-rage around the village, destroying the bridge over theVesle and sealing off the beleaguered Americans. Twentyminutes later 1,000 German stormtroopers with machineguns, hand grenades and the dreaded flamethrowers de-scended on Fismette. The Pennsylvanians held on doggedlyfor several hours, inflicting severe casualties on the attack-ers. The Germans nevertheless broke through to the riverat several points, separating the Americans into isolatedpockets they then methodically destroyed. Just over 30doughboys managed to swim across the Vesle to safety. Ofthe remainder, an estimated 75 were killed and 127 taken

prisoner. Fismette was back inGerman hands.

Bullard blamed Dégoutte for thedisaster and wrote a letter to Per-shing describing how the Frenchgeneral had countermanded Muir'sorders to evacuate Fismette. Dé-goutte tried to make amends bypublicly praising the 28th Divisionfor its gallantry. Pershing was notmollified. A few days later he con-fronted Bullard at headquarters."Why did you not disobey the or-der given by General Dégoutte?"he demanded.

Nothing like Fismette, Persh-ing resolved, must ever happen

again. From then on the bulk of American forces in Europewould fight under American command. On August 10, evenas Hervey Allen and Bob Hoffman fought for their lives inFismette, the independent American First Army was formed.It would spearhead the American drive to victory that endedwith the armistice on Nov. 11, 1918. (©

For further reading Ed Lengel recommends Toward the Flame:A Memoir of World War I, by Hervey Allen, and DoughboyWar; The American Expeditionary Force in World War I,edited by James H. Hallas.

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ARSENAyDFVENICWorld's First Weapons Factory

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VENICE'S MARITIME POWER AROSE FROM A SHIPYARD THAT

WITH MASS PRODUCTION TECHNIQUES, SUPERB ORGANIZATION

I SKILLED WORKERS COULD LAUNCH TWO NEW SHIPS A DAY

BY ROGER CROWLEY

Refined over centuries, the VenetianArsenal system saw its ultimatetest at the Battle of Lepanto onOct. 7,1571, when the Venice-builtgalleys and galleasses of the HolyLeague defeated the once-invinciblemain fleet of the Ottoman Empire.

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In 1202, at the outset of the Fourth Crusade, the city-state of Venice accepted a contract from Italian countBoniface of Montferrat to transport 4,500 knights, theirhorses, 9,000 squires and 20,000 foot soldiers to theHoly Land in several hundred ships and to supply andfeed them for one year with the support of 50 of its ownwar galleys. The ships were ready on time, and 30,000

maritime specialists—half of the adult population of Veniceat the time—manned the fleet that sailed from its lagoon.

While the Venetians had constructed the formidable fleetlargely in private shipyards, Venice did boast a small naval fa-cility of 8 acres on drained marshland east of the city proper.Called the arsenal—de-rived from an Arabic termmeaning "house of man-ufacture"—it was des-tined to become the mostfamous and feared mili-tary installation in themedieval and early mod-ern world. By 1500 theshipyard/armory was thenerve center of the Vene-tian state and the largestindustrial complex in theworld. It employed pro-duction methods of un-paralleled efficiency thailong predated HenryFord, including assem-bly lines and the use of standardizedparts; vertical integration; just-in-timedelivery; time management; rigorousaccounting; strict quality control; anda specialized workforce.

Because of these innovations—aswell as advanced shipbuilding skills andthe unique cooperation of the Venetian people—the arse-nal was able to produce incomparable warships with a speedand consistency unmatched by any rival. The arsenal en-abled tiny Venice to dominate the Mediterranean and tobecome, for a time, the richest place on earth. It was the ironfist in Venice's velvet glove.

The Venetian Arsenal's origins are rooted in the city'sunique situation. Stretching across dozens of smallislands, Venice was wholly dependent on the sea for

trade and survival. Everything it required came by ship, andits entire population participated in the maritime life—fromthe wealthiest noble merchant to the humblest artisan.

Commercial rivalry and maritime war drove developmentof the arsenal itself. Within a century of the Fourth Cru-sade the facility had quadrupled in size. In 1303 and 1325laborers added new basins, docks and slipways in an adja-cent area of marsh, transforming the arsenal from a ship-repair and -storage facility into the state-managed center for

Originating in the early 13th century, theVenetian Arsenal was destined to becomethe most famous-and feared-military facilityin the medieval and early modern world. Theinstallation's main gate, the Porta Magna,built about 1460, was suitably impressive.

shipbuilding and the provision of military resources. Thecity-state now required all galleys—the oar-driven vesselsused for war and for such important commercial ventures asthe spice trade—to be built at the facility

The centralization of functions at the arsenal was revolu-tionary. Maritime activities traditionally carried out in smallworkshops scattered around a port were now consolidatedin a central location protected by high walls, making the ar-senal both factory and fortress. It provided for all stages ofshipbuilding and repair, as well as the manufacture of sails,lines and oars. It held forges to create nails, iron fittings andweapons, furnaces for casting anchors and, later, cannon, and

storage facilities to holdall the raw materials onwhich these depended.

The arsenal was phys-ically and psychologicallycentral to Venice. Towns-people experienced adaily reminder of the"house of manufacture"in the ringing of the Ma-rangona (carpenter's bell)atop the campanile in St.Mark's Square—mark-ing the start and endof each working day. Itsworkers, the arsenalotti,were aristocrats amongworkingmen, enjoying

special privileges and direct contact withthe centers of power. Supervising themwas a team of elected nobility who livedon-site; their admiral, who directed theactual shipbuilding, wore a scarlet robeand held an honored place in ceremo-nial processions; and the state jealously

guarded the arsenal's greatest asset—its master shipwrights.

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^ entrai to the Venetian Arsenal's production processeswere specialization and quality control. Each skillhad its own guild and qualification procedures. The

principal guilds were those of the carpenters, who framedthe ships; the caulkers, who planked out and sealed them;and the oar makers. Minor guilds represented the makersof masts, pulleys and gun carriages, the wood-carvers, saw-yers, smiths and coopers. Even the rafters who poled felledtrees downriver to Venice formed a guild.

The carpenters and caulkers underwent a rigorous ap-prenticeship, starting as young as age 10 and stretching sixto eight years; becoming a master depended on a practicalexam taken before the lords of the arsenal. The care withwhich the state oversaw each stage of production was a re-flection of its deep respect for the sea. A ship, its crew andthousands of ducats of valuable merchandise could be lostthrough shoddy construction, so each team's work was the

MILITARY HISTORY

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RSENAL ORGANIZATION.ie arsenal was laid out in

ß logical and efficient plantfiat would he the envy of anymodern shipyard. The launchbasin (at top in both plansat left) was surrounded byslipways and lumber storageareas, while the fitting-outbasin (at bottom) was flankedby wori(shops providingsuch ancillary equipment asrope and cannon. The basinswere connected to each otherand to the open lagoon bya series of small canals.

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subject of continuous oversight. Inspectors checked workdaily holding caulkers accountable for split seams, carpen-ters for snapped masts and rope spinners for weak lines.Poor quality was grounds for dismissal.

Ironically, fueling this exacting labor was a continuoussupply of wine, distributed to the workstations by a teamof a dozen men six times a day. Arsenal workers consumeda prodigious 600,000 liters of wine a year—accounting for

Large and heavily armed, though ponderous, the galieass was the

battleship of its day. Developed from merchant galieys in about 1550,

the gaiieass carried guns in its turretiike forecastle and along both

sides of its hull and was one of the Venetian Arsenal's major products.

some 2 percent of the city-state's annual budget. By the 17thcentury, to the astonishment of visitors, wine was beingdispensed from a fountain that could pump out 10 liters aminute, or more than 6,000 liters every shift.

The arsenalotti worked up to 11 hours per day in summerand six in winter. The core workforce comprised some 2,000skilled men, backed by emergency extra labor and an armyof unskilled laborers and porters. Despite the reportedlyharsh working conditions, the arsenalotti enjoyed excep-tional privileges. They were more or less guaranteed employ-ment for life and benefited from Europe's first pension system;no matter how old or infirm a man might be, he would bepaid for just turning up. Nor was the arsenal solely the pre-serve of men. A workforce of perhaps 100 women cut, sewedand repaired canvas in the enormous sail lofts.

The stars of the whole arsenal system were the mastershipwrights, who laid down each galley's basic shape—thekeel, frame and ribbing. With them rested the art and skillof shipbuilding. These men worked by eye and instinctrather than from drawn plans, and they passed down thesecrets of their craft from father to son. Dynasties of thesecraftsmen continuously refined the Venetian war galley over

two centuries into the most feared attack vessel afloat. Light,narrow, fast and maneuverable, the Venetian model was builtabove all for closing speed under oars—some 7 knots witha well-greased hull at 26 strokes a minute. The key lay in theshaping of the hull and the positioning of rowing equip-ment—benches, thole pins and rigging. Everything else,even seaworthiness, was secondary in the final attack. Togain ergonomie advantage, shipwrights designed the galley

to ride low in the water; thus, it wasa poor sailer in high seas, but inclose combat it was superb.

Venice handsomely rewardedits most talented shipbuilders,and competition among them wasfierce. At the turn of the 15th cen-tury, the leading shipwrights werethe Baxons, a Greek family. An-ticipating the death of patriarchTheodoro Baxon, Venetian offlcialspreserved some of his galleys asprototypes and then tried to poachhis nephew Nicolö Palopano fromRhodes. It took 17 years to temptthe latter to Venice, where he en-countered fierce competition fromhomegrown master Bernardo diBernardo. The state sent both men'sgalleys to the fleet for evaluation,but it was the sea that would de-

cide the contest: In 1437 Venetian officials dismissedBernardo after several of his merchant galleys founderedin a storm. Nicolo's designs prevailed. When he died, hepassed his craft secrets to his son Giorgio. Succeeding him,in turn, were the Bressans, a Venetian family dynasty thatdominated shipbuilding in the first half of the 16th century.The Bressans not only brought the war galley to a new levelof perfection but also constructed innovative round shipswith which to hunt pirates.

I inute attention to detail and relentless sea trialsgave Venetian ships their edge. The state's determi-

I nation to control and integrate all stages of pro-duction extended right down to the raw materials. Woodsupply was a matter of state security, as the fleet requiredvast quantities of oak for the framework, larch and fir formasts, and beech for oars.

The arsenal's lumber requirements were prodigious—asingle mature beech tree, for example, produced just six ofa war galley's complement of 180 thirty-foot oars. By themid-15th century arsenal supervisors were managingVenice's mainland forests, mapping wood supply to the levelof individual trees and branding valuable specimens forstate use. Carpenters visited the forests in person to selectsuitable trees; others ensured a supply of crooked oaks forkeels and ribbing was available by training branches intothe desired shape.

MILITARY HISTORY

11 i i

Similar attention was paid to rope.The best quality hemp came from Bo-logna, but it was expensive and underthe control of occasionally hostile Flo-rence. So in 1453 Venice hired an ex-pert Bolognese hemp grower at a heftysalary, drained suitable land and trainedthe local peasantry in hemp cultivation.

Venice was ahead of the curve in keeping a permanentgalley fleet at sea in the 14th and 15th centuries. Its peace-time active fleet was as small as 10 vessels, swelling to 25or 30 in times of war, but its maritime dominance waslargely unchallenged. All this changed with the 1453 Fallof Constantinople, which made Venice the frontline statein Europe's ongoing confrontation with the OttomanEmpire. The wakeup call came in the summer of 1470 when

The Venetian Arsenal used a highly efficient-though apparently wine-fueled-assemblyprocess in which vessel hulls constructedby shipwrights, above, moved steadily downthe line while such specialists as oar makers,top, added their respective components.

Sultan Mehmcd II, the Conqueror," ar-rived in the Aegean with an enormousfleet and took one of the Venetian repub-lic's most valued naval bases at Negro-ponte, near Attica.

The sense of calamity sparked by Ot-toman conquest plunged the Venetian

Arsenal into a new cycle of growth and innovation. In 1473the state began an ambitious expansion of the facility Whenit was completed, two and a half miles of 50-foot-highblind brick walls, topped by battlements, enclosed 60 acresof basins, covered hangars, workshops, supply depots andlumber yards. The arsenal became the nerve center of a vastwar machine that consumed 10 percent of state revenue. Sur-mounting the ornate new gateway was a grim lion; thoughVenetian lions often held an open Bible, proffering peace.

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this one's book was firmly closed. The message was clear:The arsenal was ready for war

Visitors to this new facility were staggered by its size andthe concentration of industrial activity When Milaneseprelate and diplomat Pietro Casóla visited the arsenal in1494, he observed in the munitions store "covered anduncovered cuirasses, swords... crossbows, bows, large andsmall arrows, headpieces, arquebuses and other artillery."In one of the vast sheds used to store galleys he noted 20compartments, holding "one galley only, but a large one,in each compartment." In his journal, he further describedthe shipbuilding operations:

in one part of the arsenal there was a great crowd of masters andworkmen who do nothing but build galleys or other ships of everykind. ...In one great covered place there are 12 masters, each onewith his own workmen and his forge apart; and they labor con-tinually, making anchors and every other kind of ironwork neces-sary for the galleys and other ships. There seems to be there all the

iron that could be dug out of all the mountains of the world. Thenthere is a large and spacious room where there are many womenwho do nothing but make sails... [and] a most beautiful con-trivance for lifting any large galley or other ship out of the water.

Casóla also saw the Tana, the hemp cable-making factory,a narrow hall 1,000 feet long, "so long that I could hardlysee from one end to the other" Visitors also toured the gun-powder mills (turned by horses), the saltpeter stores andthe giant bombards. The immense production units andthe sense of immaculate order impressed. It looked like avision of the industrial future. And indeed it was.

The concentration of combustible materials and gun-powder within the arsenal—and the fear of sabotage—alsorequired tight security Night watchmen continuously pa-trolled the battlements, calling out to each other on the hourFailure to respond could lead to instant dismissal. The fearof disaster was well founded. In March 1509, for example,Venetian historian Marin Sañudo was attending a session of

MILITAP STORY

the Senate several hundred yards away when an explosionrocked the building: "Two huge blasts of cannon and powderexploded into the air," he later wrote, "so that the housesand the ducal palace and the stars in the sky shook." Sañudoran to the arsenal, where he witnessed terrible scenes. "I en-countered the many bodies pulled from the ruins, someburned, some mangled, some without a head, without anarm, some half-crazy, unable to speak, with faces like Sara-cens, blackened by the fire, who were being carried out onplanks." One of the arsenal's most highly regarded ship-wrights was killed in the blast, which ignited when a workersealing a cask with a hammer and nail sparked the powder.

The unrelenting pressure of the Ottoman menace, withits seemingly inexhaustible manpower and naturalresources, forced the Venetian Arsenal into a furious

half century of technical and organizational innovation.The facility ultimately became a practical laboratory of

mechanical engineering and the science of materials, attract-

The galleys and galleasses built in the Venetian Arsenal in the 16thcentury were such icons of military power and cultural pride that theyeven popped up in depictions of far earlier historical events, such asthis painting ceiehrating Venice's 1380 victory over Genoa at Chioggia;the city walls are accurately rendered, hut the vessels are too "modern."

ing the great figures of the day. W^hen Leonardo da Vincicame to Venice, the arsenal may well have experimented withhis designs, including floating gun batteries on the river Po.A century later its shipwrights sought Galileo's help to im-prove the mechanical efficiency of oars. The underlying issuewas how to adapt their galleys to the new conditions of gun-powder warfare. The Venetians had observed how roundships, carrying cannon, could be a formidable presence inbattle but were extremely difficult to combine with oaredgalleys. How to build galleys that could function as floatinggun platforms and yet still move at reasonable speed?

In 1525 the lords of the arsenal commissioned an exper-imental ship from another scientific mind. Vettor Fausto was

a mathematician and professor of classical languages withno practical shipbuilding experience. He proposed to usemechanical theory to create a heavy galley as fast as any lightone by employing flve oars to a bench, rather than the usualthree. The experimental quinquereme was duly built andsuccessfully tested, but it ultimately proved too expensiveto build and too hazardous to its crewmen.

About 1550 the shipwrights tried another solution: trans-forming merchant galleys into heavily armed oared galle-asses (think precursor of USS Monitor), with a forwardwooden gun turret and cannon along its sides. Extremelyponderous under oars, the galleass nevertheless offered thepotential of a heavier punch.

The arms race also raised the arsenal to a newpitch of efficiency, as administrators coordinatedthe storage of raw materials and introduced scru-pulous accounting procedures and stricttime-keeping measures (men who ar-rived late, for instance, weren't paid).The shipwrights further standardizedgalley designs, enabling faster construc-tion in larger batches by specialist teams.In 1537-38 the arsenal rolled out 50hulls in just 10 months, an astonish-ing production rate. Meanwhile, inter-changeable rudders, rigging and deckfurniture replaced the one-off creationsof individual shipwrights. The arsenalalso rethought the storage of fittings andflxtures, setting aside a separate ware-house for each item and aligning theproduction stages in something ap-proaching a linear assembly line.

With these systems in place, the arse-nal moved to a just-in-time, prefabricatedproduction system. Rather than keep afleet in the water against the possibility ofwar, the arsenal kept a ready supply of planked and deckedbut uncaulked and unmasted hulls in the galley sheds. Eachhull was numbered, and its respective parts—mast, rigging,rowing benches, hand weapons, cannons, flags, anchors—were separately stored and tagged with the same number.

This systematic counting, costing, storage and organi-zation of a galley's requisite parts was critical to the system,which drew increasingly on a hierarchy of sub-managersand gang bosses. At any one time the arsenal might be stock-piling, each in its own warehouse, 5,000 benches and braces,15,000 oars, 300 sails, 100 masts and countless rudders, arms,pitch, cables and ironwork. The Venetians, bean counters totheir flngertips, were masters of Inventory; the gold standardwas to have 100 galleys dry-stored in reserve.

When war broke out, the arsenal would ready its emer-gency fleet for action, rapidly caulking and greasing the shipsbefore sending them down slipways kept perpetually clear. Thefinal fitting of the ships was dramatic and very rapid. Work-ers raised and rigged the masts, and as tow vessels pulled

r brokeout, the arsenalwould ready itsemergency fleet

for action, rapidlycaulking andgreasing theships before

sending themdown slipways f

each ship toward the lagoon past a line of warehouses, porterswould pass out their respective fittings. Spanish traveler PeroTafur witnessed a squadron of galleys being prepared in thisway as early as 1436. One by one the hulls rolled into the basin,where teams of carpenters fltted the rudders and masts. Tafurthen watched as each galley passed down the assembly line:

On one side are windows opening out of the houses of the arse-nal, and the same on the other side, and out came a galley towedby a boat, and from the windows they handed out to than—fromone the cordage, from another the bread, from another the armsand from another the ballistas and mortars—and so from all

sides everything that was required. And when thegalley had reached the end of the street, all the men re-quired were on board, together with the complementofoavs. and she was fully equipped from end to end.

In this manner there came out 10 galleys,fully armed, between the hours of 3 and 9.1 know not how to describe what I sawthere, whether in the manner of its con-struction or in the management of theworkpeople, and I do not think there isanythingfiner in the world.

TIhe speed, efficiency, innovationand quality of the Venetian Arse-nal system saw its ultimate test

after the Ottoman invasion of Cyprus.When war broke out in 1570, the emer-gency fleet of 100 galleys was at sea injust 50 days.

A comparison of Venice's speedy mo-bilization with the far slower perform-ance of its Spanish allies underlined justhow revolutionary the Venetian assem-bly line was. Venice waited many monthsfor the Barcelona arsenal to prepare its

ships, a process the Venetian ambassador watched withmounting fury "I see," he wrote "that, where naval warfareis concerned, every tiny detail takes the longest time andprevents voyages, because not having oars or sails ready,or having sufficient quantities of ovens to bake biscuits, orthe lack of 14 trees for masts, on many occasions holds upon end the progress of the fleet."

Venice's centuries of accumulated skill came to fruitionthe following year at the decisive Battle of Lepanto. OnOct. 7, 1571, the innovative Venetian galleasses first amazedthe Ottoman admiral, then ripped holes in his front line;the light galleys on the left wing spun on their axes, pinnedthe Ottoman right against the Greek shore and obliterated it.

Lepanto was a victory manufactured in large part inVenice's forge of war. (^

For further reading Roger Crowley recommends Venetian Shipsand Shipbuilders of the Renaissance, by Frederic Chapin Lane,and Shipbuilders of the Venetian Arsenal, by Robert C. Davis.

MILITARY HISTORY

ReviewsRECOMMENDED

A Matter of Honor and Hubris?Song of Wrath: ThePeloponnesian War Begins,byJ.E. Lendon, Basic Books,2010, $35

For rnore than a generationPeloponnesian War studieshave been an educationalstaple for diplomats andsoldiers alike. Readers ofThucydides' account of the"Great War of the Greeks"have discovered in this three-decade conflict many un-

canny parallels to the modern era. This was particu-larly true during the Cold War, when many viewedthe conflict between Athens and Sparta as a near-perfect analogy for the American-Soviet standoff.Now, however, comes J.E Lendon, a professor of his-tory at the University of Virginia, to inform us thatmuch of what we thought we knew about the Pelo-ponnesian War is wrong.

In Song of Wrath Lendon presents a dramaticallynew construct of the war. Gone are many of the ele-ments underpinning the realist view of the world. Re-

placing them is a new em-phasis on how such conceptsas honor and revenge droveGreek decision making at alllevels of society and politics.Lendon presents Greek war-fare as less the result of calcu-lated strategic thinking thanas a product of a never-end-ing quest for timé ("honor").Whenever a city-state foundits time violated by some in-sult—an act oihybris—it hadtwo choices: ignore it, therebydeeming the insulting cityunworthy of notice, or seekrevenge. Lendon dismissesThucydides' claim that thewar was inevitable due to thegrowth of Athenian power

and the "fear that this causedin Sparta." Rather, he arguesit was Athens' quest for statusand additional timé throughrepeated acts of hybris onSparta that led to the war.

To support this radical in-terpretation, Lendon contendsthat Sparta had successfullydealt with rising Athenianpower since the end of theGreco-Persian Wars. More-over, it had little to fear fromany further Athenian gains,as their spheres of influencedid not overlap in any waythat made Athens an existen-tial threat to Sparta. What didconcern Sparta were Athens'claims to timé equal to Sparta's

own. In Sparta's view its pre-mier rank among other Greekcity-states was not only itsjust due, but also the key toholding together its alliancesand maintaining its grip onpower in the Peloponnesus.Maintaining its rank amongthe other Greek city-statesrequired the humbling of Ath-ens. Accordingly, Athens' re-fusal to submit to even themost meaningless Spartandemand, and thereby admitits inferiority, brought on war.Through this lens Lendon isable to explain almost everymajor decision of the war as aresult of the cyclic interactionof timé, hybris and revenge—reducing strategic planningto a minor concern.

Remarkably, Lendon's revi-sionist analysis works, for itexplains many of the conflict'sseemingly senseless militarydecisions and operations thathave long befuddled histori-ans. Lendon may have gone abit too far in his dismissal ofactive strategic thinking, butno student of the Pelopon-nesian War can ignore his of-ten compelling arguments.

just as important, Lendon'sclear writing style and abili-ty to tell a story make Song ofWrath an easy and often fas-cinating read. The narrativeis lively, informative and, bestof all, provocative. Song ofWrath is essential reading foranyone who hopes to under-stand ancient Greek warfareas the Greeks themselves un-derstood it. This book is a

VALLEYS or DEATH

Valleys of Death, by ColonelWilliam Richardson

This hauiuiiig memoirdetails the author's ex-periences as a youngNCO thrown into battleagainst invading NorthKorean troops, his cap-ture by the Chinese ashe staged a last-ditchsolo defense to allowhis surviving men toescape, and his indom-itable spirit in the faceof brutal treatment asa prisoner of war

Racing the Sunrise,byGlenWiiliford

Americas relativelyquick comeback frotnthe Dec. 7, 194L Japa-nese attack on PearlHarbor was due in largemeasure to the massivereinforcement of its Pa-cific outposts in the sixmonths before the warand the resupply of thePhilippines in 1942—little-known efforts fullyexamined in this well-researched volume.

1

Reviews

must-read and propels Len-don into the front rank of thecommunity of ancient war-fare historians. Hopefully, hehas increased his timé with-out anyone else seeing it asan act of hybris.

—Jim Lacey

Citizens of London: HowBritain Was Rescued in UsDarkest, Finest Hour, byLynne Olson, Bond StreetBooks, 2010, $34.95

The hero of this World WarII history is not a cigar-chomping general or rhetor-ical prime minister but aNew England diplomat whowas so tongue-tied that themost common reaction tohis speeches was sympathy.Certainly Lynne Olson's pleas-ant new book Citizens of Lon-don features a cast of grandAmericans who braved life inLondon between 1939 and1945, but none is describedin the Olympian proportionsthe author reserves for JohnGilbert Winant.

Olson's book—at least thebest parts of it—relates thetale of the Americans who en-dured danger and deprivationin London throughout thewar while their compatriotslived in relative comfort acrossthe Atlantic. They withstoodthe blitz and tried to con-vince the U.S. government todeclare war on Germany Theybrought some consolation tothe hard-pressed Londonersin their hour of need. Andmany remained in Londonthrough the buildup of U.S.troops in 1943-44 and evenafter the troops had shippedout to Normandy.

Some, such as GeneralDwight D. Eisenhower andformer World War I flyingace Lt. Col. Tommy Hitch-cock Jr., were gallant and sol-dierly Others, like presidentialadviser Harry Hopkins andambassador W. Averell Harri-man, were deft political oper-ators. But none could matchWinant for sheer human de-cency, which made him a heroto the Brits with whom hewithstood the Nazi onslaught.His appointment asU.S. ambassador toGreat Britain was astroke of brilliance.

A former Repub-lican governor ofNew Hampshire,Winant was as in-articulate as a politi-cian could possiblybe. But his concern for thepoor was legendary, and hewas at heart a New Dealer be-fore the term was invented.

Winant would walk thestreets after bombings andconsole despondent Lon-doners. His public commentswere never flowery, but theystruck a chord with the greatand the masses in England,and he was viewed as the em-bodiment of American sup-port for England—even whenthat support was lacking. (Ol-son wholly sympathizes withthe British point of view thatthe United States was far tooslow in aiding its cousinacross the Atlantic.)

Winant's seeming sole mor-al shortcoming centered onan affair he pursued withWinston Churchill's daughter,Sarah, while Mrs. Winant wasin the United States. In fact,these bellicose Yanks spent a

C I I I /T. N S

LONDON

good deal of time makinglove as well as war while thebombs fell: Olson meticu-lously chronicles liaisonsbetween Pamela Churchill(the PM's daughter-in-law)and Harriman, then EdwardR. Murrow, as well as be-tween Janet Murrow and an-other journalist.

The author does a splendidjob of bringing these coura-geous, suffering souls to light,and she supplements their

tale with the storyof other nations'expats in London atthe time. The Polescome across as par-ticularly admirablelot, and the bookincludes a fasci-nating descriptionof the invaluable

intelligence they providedto the Allies.

Olson seemingly lackedenough material for an entirebook on the expats in Lon-don, however, as her bookoften drifts into a recitationof the all-too-familiar tale ofWorld War II. Drawing fromsecondary sources and quot-ing contemporary historians,Olson simply tries too hardto set her Londoners in thecontext of the broader con-flict. Yet her prose sparkleswhen she focuses on the bandof London-based Americansand their problematic, crit-ical and often affectionatedeahngs with the Brits.

It is just those exchanges,especially the ones betweenstiff-upper-lip London com-moners and the cat's-got-his-tongue Winant, that willlinger with readers.

— Peter Moreira

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W CAU-DUTYt BLACK OPS

Call of Duty: BlackOps, by Activision,2010, $59.99-$149.99 (Play$tation3. Xbox 360, NintendoWii, PC/Windows,Nintendo DS)

Call oj Duly: lilac h Opsfocuses on deniable op-erations during the C ok!War. The game followsCIA operative Alex Ma-son (voice-over by SamWortbington) and spe-cial agent Jason Hud-son (Ed Harris) tbrougbevents and locales from1961-68. Assisting 1 belliis Viktor Reznov (GaryOldman), formerly oftbe Red Army.

Tbe first half inter-weaves fictional blackops witb actual events(e.g.. an assassination at-tempt on Cuban dictatorFidel Castro during tbeBay of Pigs Invasion, par-ticipation ill tbe defenseof Kbe Sanb. Soutb Viet-nam, and tbe extractionof an informant fromHue during tbe Tet Of-fensive), witb cameos bysucb bistorical figures asRobert McNatnara andJolin H Kennedy. Tbesecond balf is pure fan-tasy, bowever, as Mason'steam tries to stop a rogueSoviet general from re-leasing a Nazi cbemicalweapon on U.S. soil. Intbe end. Black Ops is anentertaining first-personsbooter, witb apologiesto bistor)', wliich takes abackseat to tbe conspir-acy-laden plot.

—Ryan Burke

MILITARY HISTORY

Perilous Fight: Aniírica's IntrepidWar with Britain on the High Seas,I HI 2-1815, by Stephen Budiansky,Knopf, 2011, $35

Among America's less glorious wars, 1812was the most justified. Battling NapoléonBonaparte for a decade, Britain had beenseizing U.S. ships and impressing theircrews into its navy. Unlike America's bun-gled 1812 land campaign, its naval effortwas led by competent, aggressive com-manders who won spectacular victories.

Veteran historian Budiansky seems tohave read every official record, diary, letterand contemporary newspaper. The resultis an authoritative, richly entertaining po-litical history of the early republic centeredon the Navy and culminating in the war.

The founding fathers considered pro-fessional armed forces a threat to freedom,and by the end of George Washington'sadministration America possessed a minus-cule Army, a few revenue cutters and nooceangoing warships. Matters improvedin the mid-1790s in response to the seizureof American merchant vessels by Barbarypirates and the navy of revolutionaryFrance, and by the end of John Adams' ad-

ministration the U.S. Navycould deploy half a dozenfrigates. Progress came toa halt under Thomas Jef-ferson, who abolished allinternal taxes and slashedthe Navy's budget. By 1805America possessed a loneseaworthy frigate.

''' When the Napoleonicwars liealcd up, Britain announced ablockade of continental Europe and be-gan seizing American ships trading withneutral countries, a violation of interna-tional law. This led to national outrageand indignant protests from the Jeffersonadministration but little change in its op-position to a strong Navy. When JamesMadison succeeded Jefferson he initiallyconfined himself to fine-tuning the exist-ing American trade embargo against Brit-ain, but a growing conviction that diplo-

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ENJOYTHESE MAGAZINES FROMTHE WEIDER HISTORY GROUP

AMERICAN HISTORYAMERICA'S CIVIL WAR

BRITISH HERITAGECIVIL WAR TIMES

WILDWESTMILITARY HISTORY QUARTERLY

AVIATION HISTORYMILITARY HISTORY

VIHNAMWORLD WAR II

ARMCHAIR GENERAL

Reviews

macy was hopeless—plus pressure fromcongressional "war hawks" who arrivedafter the 1810 election—ultimatelyconvinced him that a credible Navywas key to America's economic andpolitical survival.

Budiansky delivers a lucid accountof how that Navy developed and ofthe dynamics that shaped its size andcomposition. While the Royal Navy'schronic shortage of sailors meant itsships were often undermanned orcrewed by sullen conscripts, Americanwarships were populated largely bytrained seamen put out of work byBritain's blockade of commercial ship-ping. American warships also tended tobe sturdier, heavier and better armed,with better-trained gun crews. Thesefactors helped produceseveral notable victories .K

for the United States earlyin the naval war (Constitu-tion over Guerrière, UnitedStates over Macedonia),which produced chagrinin Britain and acclaimacross America.

However, in an effort tohusband the nascent Amer-ican fleet. Secretary of theNavy William Jones ordered his cap-tains to concentrate on commerce raid-ing, an effective strategy that ultimatelyhelped turned British popular opinionagainst the war. Commerce raidingworks both ways, though, and by 1815American trade had been crippled.Congress stubbornly refused to raisetaxes, and the United States defaultedon its bonds, thereby admitting insol-vency Madison informed his peace ne-gotiators they could drop free trade andthe end of impressment from their de-mands, so the resulting peace treaty re-turned matters to the status quo ante.

Budiansky's wit, knowledge and livelyprose make this account of America'soccasionally stirring and modestly effec-tual battle with the Royal Navy a delight.

—Mike Oppenheim

EXHIBIT

"Art of the American Soldier"Through Jan. 10, 20t t

(followed by national tour)National Constitution CenterIndependence Mall525 Arch St.Philadelphia, Pa.(215) 409-6600www.constitutioncenter.org

Combat photography brought war hometo people as never before in the 20thcentury—stirring emotions and chang-ing perceptions. But there remain limi-tations on what a photographer can cap-ture. That's where the painter's brush andcartoonist's pen have proved their might,

their power to affect us ona deeper human level.

¿J Through January 10 at/ • the National Constitution

fM Center in Philadelphia,"™ curators offer the public a

rare opportunity to expe-rience combat through theeyes of American soldier-artists from World War 1through the current MiddleEast conflicts. Presented in

partnership with the U.S. Army Center ofMilitary History, "Art of the American Sol-dier" highlights more than 250 works ina variety of media. The exhibition relatesthe ongoing story of the Army Art Pro-gram, drawing on its collection of some15,000 works rendered over the past cen-tury by more than 1,300 soldier-artists.

Among those represented is Tom Lea,a noted Depression-era muralist whohopped a Pacific-bound destroyer in1941—one of 17 civilian artists invitedby Life to illustrate the war. It was duringhis stint with the 1 st Marine Division onPeleliu in 1944 that Lea painted MarinesCall It That 2,000-Yard Stare (above), ahaunting portrait of a Marine sufferingbattle fatigue that in part popularizedthe expression "thousand-yard stare."

—Editor

ILITARY HISTOR'

Hallowed GroundHill 314, Mortain, FranceBy David T. Zabecki

The French village of Mortain sits halfway up the west-ern slope of what during World War II the U.S. Armyreferred to as Hill 314. The promontory's highest point,314 meters above sea level (about 600 feet abovethe valley floor), overlooks a junction from which thearea's only main road runs straight for about eightmiles, west by southwest, to the town of Saint-Hilaire-

du-Harcouët. From there it is another 15 miles to Avranches, on theMont-Saint-Michel Bay estuary, the point where U.S. forces in July1944 broke out of the Cotentin Peninsula to turn the ilankof the German army in Normandy.

Hill 314 (listed in some histories as Hill 317) is a perfectobservation post. A forward observer with radio communica-tions to enough artillery batteries could prevent an armoreddivision from moving down the Mortain-Saint-Hilaire road.And that is exactly whathappened when Germanforces launched an offen-sive meant to drive the Al-lies back into the sea.

By the end of July seniorGerman commanders knewthey had lost the battle tocontain the Allied inva-sion. Most believed theyshould fall back into theFrench interior to re-estab-lish a consolidated defen-sive position. But AdolfHitler, living increasinglyin his own strategic dreamworld, ordered a massive armored GIs follow an M4 Sherman down a batteredcounterattack to reverse the break- Mortain street hours before the Germanout and cut off those American units counterattack pushed them back and ledthat had already passed through the to the entrapment of the men on Hill 314.

breach. The lead echelon of the German attack comprisedthree panzer divisions abreast, from Chérencé-le-Roussel toMortain, a five-mile front. Field Marshal Günther von Klugetasked one panzer division in the second echelon with ad-vancing to Avranches and capturing the critical bridge atPontaubault, across which Lt. Gen. George S. Pattons newly

activated Third Army waspouring as it advanced fromNormandy into Brittany.

7 When the German attackstarted early on August 7,

2 the 2nd SS Panzer DivisionI struck in two columns,* north and south of Mor-

tain, capturing the com-mand post of the U.S. 30thI nfantry Division's 2nd Bat-talion, 120th Infantry Reg-iment, inside the town. Themain body of the 2nd Bat-talion remained entrenchedaround the summit of Hill

314, which the Germans surroundedand sealed olT. Two forward observersof the 230th Field Artillery Battalion,1st Lt. Charles A. Barts and 2nd Lt.

MILITARY HISTORY

Robert L. Weiss, sat within a few feet ofHill 314's summit and could see and callin fire on everything that tried to movedown the road below. Until the Ger-mans eliminated the Americans on Hill314, the southern arm of their counter-attack wasn't going anywhere.

Captain Reynold C. Erichson as-sumed command of the position asthe 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Divisionthrew everything it had (a regiment-sized force) at Hill 314. The battle ragedfor five days, with Barts and Weiss alsocalling in close defensive fire aroundthe hilltop. When the beleaguered Glsran low on ammunition, rations, med-ical supplies and radio batteries, aircrews made several attempts to resup-ply them by parachute, but less thanhalf the supplies landed within theAmerican perimeter. French farmers,meanwhile, risked their lives to smug-gle food to the Americans.

As casualties mounted and the Amer-icans' situation deteriorated, Lt. Col.

Traces remain atop Hill 314, above,of the American position in 1944. Thenearby summit holds a chapel anda memorial to U.S. battle casualties.

Lewis D. Vieman, commander of the230th FA Battalion, hatched the idea oftaking the leaflets out of propagandashell cases and repacking them withmedical supplies. Artillery crews wouldthen fire the rounds into the centerof the American position. Test shotsproved the concept workable, and twoother battalions also started firing thesupply-carrying rounds.

The 2nd Battalion hung on grimlyuntil finally relieved a little after noonon August 12. By that time more than300 of the 700 Gls who'd started thebattle had been killed or wounded, butthe battalion had fought one of the war'soutstanding small-unit actions. Erich-son and company commanders Capt.Delmont K. Byrn, 1st Lt. Ralph A. Ker-ley 1st Lt. Joseph C. Reaser and 1st Lt.

Ronal E. Woody Jr. each received theDistinguished Service Cross, and thebattalion itself earned the PresidentialUnit Citation. The 2nd Battalion didnot stop the German counteroffensivesingle-handedly, but its defense of Hill314 halted the left wing of the attackand completely disrupted the Germanscheme of maneuver. The failure atMortain left the German army over-extended and off balance, which led togreater losses in the subsequent strug-gle for the Falaise Pocket.

Today the top of Hill 314 is a care-fully preserved park. Traces of the Amer-ican fighting positions remain aroundthe hill's crest, near a black granite plinthcommemorating those 30th Infantry Di-vision soldiers killed during the battle.Barts' and Weiss' observation post stilloverlooks the once-vital road, and a me-morial chapel rises from the rocky sum-mit, with plaques and stained-glasspanels commemorating the combat thatonce took place there. (^

Weapons we re glad they never built

Patton's Mobile Six-Gun By Rick Meyerowitz

G eneral George S. "Old Blood and Guts" Patton Jr.loved his ivory-handled Colt revolver and his armorOne night in Casablanca he had a bad terrine of

chicken livers and Moroccan chilies cooked in motor oiland dreamed up the Mobile Six-Gun, or MSG. As the nameimplies, it only fired six shots. Its designer, Lieutenant Corn-wallis Mason, was heir to the Mason jar fortune. His designfeatured an enormous lid that screwed on, sealing the "Jar-

heads" inside—with the extra bullets! Once they fired sixshots, they remained there until found by II Corps' "Lid Men."

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel responded accordingly.Patton's "Fightin' Shootin' Iron" and Rommel's armored"Lugennobile" met for a showdown. Bullets couldn't damageeither machine, but they crashed into one another Rumorhas it the "Desert Fox" was furious the Americans had nocollision insurance, (flö

MILITARY HISTORY