MilitaryIntelligence BlundersColonelJohnHughes-WilsonCarroll&Graf Publishers,Inc.NEWYORKCarroll&Graf Publishers,Inc.19 West 21st StreetNewYorkNY10010-6805First published intheUK byRobinson PublishingLtd1999CopyrightJohnHughes-Wilson1999MapsanddiagramscopyrightJohnHughes-Wilson1999Allrightsreserved.Nopartof thispublicationmaybereproducedinanyformorbyanymeanswithoutthepriorwrittenpermissionof thepublishers.ISBN 0-7394-0689-2ManufacturedintheUSAForVictor Andersen +oftheBritishIntelligenceServicesAndVal Heller +of theUSDefenseIntelligence AgencyWhobothmadeitpossibleContentsPrefaceix1OnIntelligence12TheMisinterpreters-D-Day,1944163"ComradeStalinKnowsBest"-Barbarossa,1941384"TheFinestIntelligenceinOurHistory"-PearlHarbor,1941605"TheGreatestDisasterEvertoBefallBritishArms"-Singapore,19421026UncombinedOperations-Dieppe,19421337"IThoughtWeWereSupposedtobeWinning?"-TheTetOffensive,19681658"PrimeMinister,theWar'sBegun"-YomKippur, 19732189"Nothing WeDon'tAlready Know"-TheFalklandIslands, 198226010"If KuwaitGrewCarrots,WeWouldn'tGiveaDamn"-TheGulf, 199130811WillItEverGetAny Better?353Suggested Reading List361GlossaryofTerms365Index367vnMaps and DiagramsThe Intelligence CycleAnIntelligenceCollection Plan'sEssentialElementsofInformationDispositions June1944TheAlliedDeceptionPlansforD-DayOperationBarbarossaPearlHarbor-Japan'sGrabforEmpire,1941/2MalayaandSingapore,1942DisasteratDieppe,19August1942TheVietnamWar,1956-75TheTetOffensive,South Vietnam,30-31January1968"Greater Israel",1967-73Yom Kippur,1973:SuezandSinaiTheFalklands War,1982:relativedistancesTheSouthAtlantic,1982AThreatCurveTheGulf War,1990/1via61122304575112153182199232255276293306324PrefaceThis is abook that triestotellthestory of some recent events,allwithinlivingmemory,fromadifferentangle:intelligence.Mostofushavereadpressaccountsandbooksabouttheevents that unfold on these pages. But very few of us have seenthe events from the inside. The inside implies knowledge: andknowledge means power.By "inside", I do not mean the views of politicians or otherself-satisfied classes like those senior civil servants or even verygrand journalists who write memoirs on the lines of, "Well, asMargaretsaidtome..."Thereal"insideknowledge"isalways the intelligence available at the time.It was that secretintelligencethatshapedeventsandmadethepeople whotookthedecisionsheroesor villains.Thisbooktriestolifttheveilonwhatreallyhappenedbehindthescenesintheintelligenceworldduringsomeof the most well-known military eventsofthe last half-century. It tries to show why decisions were made,forgoodorill,byanumberof famousandnotsofamouscharacters,basedontheintelligenceandthesecretsthey hadtoworkwithatthetime.Thisbookconcentratesonintelli-gencemistakesandblundersforthesimplereasonthattheyare more interesting than the far more numerous successes ofintelligence, and in many cases the intelligence disasters haveoftenbeen concealed fromthetaxpayer whofunded them.Thebookalsoidentifiesnumerousdeceptions,liesandcover-ups.Notallofthesewerecommittedtodeceivetheenemy.ThiswillnotmakethestoriesoutlinedinitspagesIXPrefaceuniversally popular. Turning over stones invariably lets a hardsunlightontosome creaturesof theshadows.There are manyintelligenceofficersandgovernmentofficials,inallregimes,whoprefertokeeptheirroleanddecisionssecret,andthriveonsecrecyinordertoprotect theircareersand wayof life.Itguaranteestheirincome,theirstatusandtheirpensions.Secrecyiseverythingtothem.Inthistheyareonlyoutclassedbytheir bosses,thoseveryseniorcivilservantsof everycountry'sadministration,whoequally thriveand prosper in thesureand certain knowledgethataccesstosecretintelligencegivesthemtheultimatebenefitof theharem:powerwithoutresponsibility,mistakeswithoutconsequences.Liketheirpoliticalmasters,goodintelligenceofficersshouldalwayshavethecourageof theirconvictions,andbereadytoshowmoralcourage.Intelli-genceis,afterall,aboutpredictingthemostlikelyfuture,notjustregalingconcerneddecision-makerswithrecentevents.CNNandtheBBCWorldServicedothatfarbetter,aseveryprofessionalmodernintelligenceofficerknows.Whencareersareatstake,however,thepastalwaysseemseasiertoexplainthanthefuture.Thevariouscase-studiesareintendedtoprovideanacces-sibleandreadablenarrativeoftheeventstheydescribe,accompaniedbysomeprofessionalintelligenceinsightsintohowthoseeventscameaboutandunfolded.Theytreadadelicatepathbetweenthelaboriouslyfootnotedandexhaus-tivedetailof theacademic tome,and thetrivial,flippant (andofteninaccurate)"popularhistory"ofcheapjournalism.Wherepossible,quotationsareclearlyindicated.Forthosewho would like to delve into the stories in more detail, a shortreading list is provided at the endof the booksothat they canbebetterinformedabouteventsandindividuals.Historyis,afterall,"anever-endingargument".InputtingtogetherthisbookIhavebeenaidedenor-xPrefacemouslybytheDirectorandstaffoftheRoyalUnitedServicesInstituteinWhitehall,andinparticularbytheirpatientandhelpfullibrarian,JohnMontgomery.Fordetailsof VietnamIowea considerable debttomy many Americanfriends and colleagues over the years, especially Colonel JohnMoonandColonel JohnRobbinsof theUnitedStatesArmyfortheirperceptivecommentsonmydraftsofAmericanevents and also for their previously unpublished memories ofthe Tet Offensive.The staff of the Conflict Studies Centre attheRoyalMilitaryAcademy,Sandhurst,havealsobeeninvaluablealliesoverBarbarossaandtheByzantinedetailsofStalin'scourt,whilePeterShepherd'sastonishingre-eva-lations of his meeting with a drunken Japanese engineer whorevealed the secrets of Pearl Harbor really deserves a book ofitsown.On the Falklands and the Gulf I should declare a personalinterest,having been intimately involved in both wars.How-ever, the best recollections of the intelligence organization andoperations"downsouth"duringtheFalklandsWarhaveinvariablycomefromthosewhofoughtthewardirectly.Many othersintheintelligence worldof severalnationalitieshavehelpedme,bothonandoff therecord,andIcouldnothavedonethiswithouttheirhelpandguidance.MrsHughes-Wilsonmadeanimportantcontributiontothebooktoo-shetypedup mostof it,andonlyCathrynCorns'skill and patience with the computer made the maps possible.The book also owes much to refinements to the manuscript bytheeagle-eyed,tactfulandpatienteditor,MarkCrean:todistorttheoldmilitarytruism,"therearenogoodauthors:onlygoodeditors."Anyerrorsandomissionsare,however,mine, as are the opinions expressed. They represent the broadoverviewoftwenty-fiveyearsworkingwith,andthinkingabout,"military intelligence".Having saidthat,this is mostcertainlynotaheavy,theoreticaltextaboutinternationalXIPrefaceaffairs.Instead I have tried to provide an accessible collectionof true stories for the interested outsider that will, I hope, addweight to the idea that "history is a novel that has already beenwritten",basedonasoundblendof factandcomment.Aboveall,thisisa book that is meant tobereadand enjoyed bythegeneralreaderandtheintelligenceprofessionalalike;Igen-uinelyhopebothgainsomethingfrommylabours.John Hughes-WilsonJune1999xn1OnIntelligence"MilitaryIntelligence",runstheoldsaying,"isacontra-dictioninterms".Thiswearyoldjokehasaboutthesameimpactonprofessionalintelligenceofficersasjokesaboutstrikingoilhaveondrillingdentists.Itisacommonlyheldview,however,becausehistoryislitteredwithdisastrousintelligence mistakes.From the earliest recorded times downtotheGulfWar,soldiersofallkindshavebeentakenbysurprise.Howcouldthemilitarybesostupid?Yetsurpriseisoneof thecardinalprinciplesof war.Everymilitaryacademyandstaff collegeintheworldteachestheneedtoachievesurprise-andtoguardagainstit-toeverysinglestudentofthemilitaryart.Despitethis,themilitaryappearstohavebeencaughtoutwithalmostpredictableregularity.Isthefailingoneof endemicstupidityorof anopponent's cunning?The answer is both. Just as every military commander hopesnot to be taken by surprise, potential adversaries strive equallyhardwitheverytrickandresourcetomislead,todeceiveandtocatchtheirenemyunawares.Toavoidbeingsurprised,commandersrelyonintelligenceandtheirintelligencestaffs.Sometimes they are successful,sometimes not.On the successof intelligence hinges a military commander's decisions and hisreputation;andveryoftenthefutureof hiscountryanditspopulation as well.Therein liesour fascination with the decisionsof the mili-tary professional,andthedifferencebetweenhisandotherOn Intelligencecallings.Militarydecisionssimplycarrymoreweightthanthoseofotherprofessions.For whileother professionalsinahostof occupations makekeydecisions,noneof them,withperhapstheexceptionof apoliticianinwar,carrysuchanawesomeresponsibility.Ifabanker makes a fatal error, economies crash and people lose theirsavings and jobs. If a surgeon makes a dreadful mistake, a patientdies.Butwhenageneral,admiralorairmarshalblunders,soldiers and civilians alike die, sometimes in appalling numbers.To take just one example: Hitler and von Paulus sent no less thanquarterof amillionmentotheirdoomaroundStalingrad.Ofthatnumber,only5,000brokenmenevercamebackfromRussia.Would Hitler haveorderedthe6th Army tostand fasthad he had accurate intelligence about the Soviet generals' plans?Althoughintelligencecanhelp,itcannotmakeacomman-der'sdecisionsforhim.Evenwhenconfrontedwithcrystal-clear reports, accurate, up to date and supported byfirst-handevidence,historyhasshownusoverandoveragainthatastubborn,ambitiousormisguidedcommanderwillsimplyignorethecast-ironproofbeforehim.Wedonothavetogoveryfartofindanexample.InSeptember1944,General"Boy"BrowningdisregardedMajorBrianUrquhart'sblack-and-whiteaerialintelligencephotographsclearlyshowingthepresenceofGermanSSpanzerdivisionsrefittingbeforeArnhem.Notonlythat;Browning promptlydismissedhisunfortunateintelligenceofficeron the grounds that"he was mentally disturbed by stress andoverwork".Urquhart was escorted out of the headquarters byagrim-facedDirectorofMedicalServicesandsentoffonconvalescentleave.Dayslater,theparasdropped.TheconsequencesofBrowning'sordersledtothecata-strophiclossof theBritish1stAirborneDivisionontheill-fated Operation Market Garden.It need never have happenedbut for Browning's decision, which seems to have been basedOnIntelligenceprimarilyonadesirenottobeleftoutof theactionwhenthewar's end was thought, wrongly, to be in sight. The soldiers oftheBritishandPolishairbornebrigadespaidaterriblepricefortheconceitandarrogancethatmotivatedBrowning'srefusaltoacknowledgetheaccurateinformationputbeforehimbyhisintelligencestaff.Ironically,yearslater,whenUrquhartwastheseniorad-visoronsecurityoperationstotheSecretary-GeneraloftheUnited Nations, he recounted the story of that fateful wartimeautumninsad,almosthumorousterms,endingwith,"ButIdon'treallyblameGeneralBrowning;inhisshoes,whatelsecouldhehavedone?"By and large, military commanders are not stupid. Even themostintellectuallychallengedgeneralhasalwaysunderstoodthatwarisamatterofatleasttwosidesandwants,under-standably, to be on the winning team.Victory will bring himhonours,riches, rewards and the applause of his countrymen.Whythen,withsuch incentives,doapproximately50per centof themgetitsoconsistentlywrong?In thegreat majority of cases,defeat can usually be tracedbacktoalackofknowledgeoftheenemy.Whetherfromoverconfidence,ignorance,gullibilityorjustafailuretocomprehendthefacts,militarydefeatisalmostinvariablyassociatedwithanintelligencedefeat.InMalayain1941,BritishandImperialcommandersbelievedthattheJapanesewere puny little Asiatics, incapable of fighting in the jungle letaloneoperatingmoderncombataircraft,whoposedlittleornothreatatall.Theywerewrong.It is hard in hindsight to grasp how such misjudgments everbecame partof anation'smilitary policy.Wemustthereforelookcloselyattheactualmechanismsofintelligenceitself,longregardedasablackandmysteriousartpractisedbyanonymous men and women far from the limelight. Are theirfailingsand failuresthetruereasonbehindsomany militaryOnIntelligenceblunders? How can"intelligence"ever get itsobadly wrong?We should not be too surprised. Considering how importantgoodintelligenceis,themilitaryhastraditionallynotbeenlavishinitssupportforanoperationthatcansometimessaveanarmy'sskin.Inmanyanarmy,navyorairforce,theintelligencestaff isoften a Cinderellaorganization.The prob-lem is that the path to military glory invariably lies in thefieldof operations. Shooting down aeroplanes, sinking ships, captur-ing enemy brigades or being an operational commander isthesurepathtorecognitionandhighcommandinallmilitaryorganizations. The result is that, with its fellow battle-winningpartner,logistics, intelligence is often treated like a backwateroramysterioushauntof cleverbutdifficultindividuals.Yetironically,bothintelligenceandlogisticsareacknowledgedbyevery staff college in the world as two of the fundamental keysthat can guarantee a commander's success on the field of battle.Therealizationthatintelligencecanbedisregardedorchal-lengedasbeingunpalatableorinaccuratehasforcedmodernintelligence services to make their intelligence ever more robust.The aim is to force their "customers", be they military or political,to acknowledge the truth staring them in the face. To achieve this,militaryintelligencenowadayshasbeenturnedintoasystemdesigned to reduce error and anomaly to a minimum. The processis known as the Intelligence Cycle. It is a simple system designed totransforminformation intointelligence.It is important for us to understand these basic processes ofthe intelligence world. Only then can we understand what wentwrongin thepast,and why.TheIntelligenceCycleIntelligence is nothing more or less than information that hasbeensystematicallyandprofessionallyprocessedandana-OnIntelligencelyzed.Therearemanydefinitionsofintelligence,buteveryprofessional intelligence officer understands precisely what heor she is required to deliver.For the professional, intelligenceissimplydefinedas"processed,accurateinformation,pre-sented insufficienttimetoenableadecision-makertotakewhatever action is required''.Theintelligencecycleisusuallypresentedgraphicallyasacircular process,as in fig. 1. Inaccurate informationspeaks foritself;noonegets credit for wrong facts.Even junior reportersarefiredforfailingtochecktheirsources.Equally,toshout"Lookout!"afterthepianocrashestothegroundishardlytimely intelligence. But the intelligence officer confronts another,moresubtle,problem:thatofcapabilitiesversusintentions.CAPABILITIES VERSUSINTENTIONSUnderstandingthedifferencebetweenapotentialenemy'scapabilities andhisintentions iscrucialtounderstanding thedifficulties facing the purveyor of intelligence. For example, ifIhaveagungatheringdustinadrawer,thenIhavethecapabilityforviolentaction.Butthereisnoevidenceofintention.Iposeonlya potentialthreat,basedsolelyonmypossessionof anobjectdesignedforkilling.If,ontheotherhand,Ihaveasharpenedpencil,butI amwaving it in front of your face absolutely determined to stab you inthe eye, then I am an extremely dangerous individual. Despiteanapparently limitedaggressive capability (every household orofficehasapencilortwo),myintentionmakesmeamajorthreat.Capabilitiesandintentionsareverydifferentthings.Thisproblemof separatingintentionsandcapabilitieswillrecur throughout our examinationof intelligence failures.Theintelligence cycle makes an effort toseparate the two, thoughhowsuccessfullyisopentoquestion.Butthedistinctionisclear.OnIntelligence6OnIntelligenceThe reason is simple. Capabilities are relatively easy to mea-sure - anyone can count tanksor aeroplanes - but determiningan adversary's true intentions is fiendishly difficult to quantify.A man's intentions can change like the weather.Even the mostsophisticated intelligence breaks down when confronted by thevagaries of the human mind. Just what were Saddam Hussein'sreal intentions before he invaded Kuwait in1990?In fact, the classic Cold War intelligence briefing invariablycentredaroundtheissueofSovietcapabilities(lotsoftanksand missiles) versus Soviet intentions for their use. During theColdWar,the"beancounters"(thatis,thecapabilities men)ruled the intelligence roost with a vengeance. For the first timeinhistory,technologyenabledintelligenceorganizationstocollectinformationonamassivescale.Intelligencewasre-ducedtotheacquisitionofhugequantitiesofinformation,ofteninveryexpensiveandcareer-enhancingways,andthendrawing dubiousconclusionsfromtheevidence.ThiswassummedupelegantlyinaNATOintelligencebriefingin1979,packedwithpicturesofSoviettanksandgunsandshipsandaeroplanesandmissiles.ItconcludedwiththeSupremeAlliedCommandersaying"Sowe'reoutnum-bered,then"totheyoungintelligencebriefingofficer."Yes,sir!"herepliedenthusiastically."Will they use them?"came thequiet question.Crestfallen,the briefing officer replied,"We don't have thatinformation, sir." Then he brightened up. "But they coulddo, sir!"Sometimesitishardnottofeelsomesympathyforacommander confrontedwiththislevelof advice.Capabilitiesarenotalwaysintentions.INTELLIGENCEREQ UIREMENTSIn order better to understand the intelligence process, we mustreturntoourmilitarycommanderandhiswishes.Thefirst7OnIntelligencestageoftheintelligencecycleisthedefinitionbythecom-manderof hisintelligencerequirements.Whatpreciselydoeshewanttoknow?Surprisingly, many commanders have been unclear about thisvital aspect of their task. It is often as if their potential adversaryand the whole business of intelligence can be disregarded as amereimpediment totheir own impressive plans.At Waterloo,even Napoleon and Wellington, twoof the greatest captains inhistory,bothignoredtheiropponent'sintentionsandwiderdispositions,concentratingonlyonfightingtheirownbattle,despite Machiavelli's advice three hundred years earlier: "Noth-ingismoreworthyof theattentionof agoodgeneralthantoendeavourtopenetratethedesignsof theenemy."However, with prompting, most sensible generals will usuallycometoaddressthisvitalquestion.Forexample,"WilltheArgentines invade the Falkland Islands? If so, when, where andin what strength?" is a classic and clear example of a comman-der's intelligence requirement, enabling the intelligence cycle tobegin.If theBritish JointIntelligenceCommitteehaddebatedthese particular questionsinsuchcleartermsinlate1981,theFalklands War might never have erupted in the way it did.THECOLLECTIONPLANThesevariousrequirementsarethentaskedtothevariouscollection sources and agencies as part of a collection plan. Toconstructacollectionplan,itisessentialthattheintelligenceusersunderstandthestrengthsandweaknessesofallthevariousagenciesinvolved.For example,"humint"(human intelligence, the business ofrunningagents,traditionallytheprovinceoftheCIA,MI6andtheJamesBondsof fiction)isgoodatreportingonanenemy'sintentions,whereassatellitephotography(thepro-vinceof the USA's NationalReconnaissance Office,or NRO)8OnIntelligencecan count an enemy's capabilities, measured in tanks or rock-ets.Bothagencieswouldfinditdifficult,if notimpossible,todo it theother way round, giventheir sourcesof information.Plainly,itmakeslittlesensetotaskanintelligencesourceoragencywithajobforwhichitisillsuited.Noonewouldexpectamaritimesearchradartoprovideup-to-dateintelli-genceonaland-based nuclearresearch programme.Anintelligencecollectionplanworksasfollows:An Intelligence Collection PlanA Commander's Intelligence Requirement:Does the enemy intend to invade or not? If so, when, where and inwhat strength!Whatare the essential elements of information?Enemyforcedispositions?Readinessstates?Exercisesandtraining?Patternofairandmaritimeactivity?Civil mobilization?Logisticpreparations?Statedintentions?The detailed intelligence collection plan is prepared by theIntelligence Staff and tasked to as many different sources andagenciesaspossible.Notalltheinformationcollectedwillbesecret:what is vital, however, is that the very secret informa-tioniskeptseparate("compartmentalized")andthatatime-limitisplacedontheagenciesforreportingback.Thecollec-tion programme is monitored and managed on a regular basis."Hot"itemsareusuallyreportedimmediately.On IntelligenceAn intelligencecollection plan'srequirement can bebrokendownintoevenmorespecific"essentialelementsof informa-tion", as shown in fig. 2.Collation - PuttingItAllTogetherOnce information has been collected, it has to be collated. Thiscanbelaboriousandunglamorous,butthegreater partof theintelligence operative's work is taken up with collating a massof information rather than collecting it. This is the province ofthecleverandindustriousclerkandisfarremovedfromtheexcitingworldofgunsandmissiles.Nowadays,collationsystemsandrecordsdataarecomputerized;inNapoleon'sdaytheyreliedonquillpensandgoodmemories.Interest-ingly,Hitler'sprimeexpertontheSovietArmy,ColonelGehlenofFremdeHeereOst,orForeignArmiesEast,whohad painstakingly collated the best card index and records onthe Eastern Front, was promptly recruited by the US Army attheendof1945.GehlenwentontofoundWestGermany'snewSecretService,theEND.Auniqueintelligencedatabasecanovercomealmostanyscruples.Collationisimportantforanotherreason.Intoday'stech-nicalage it is,perhapsfor thefirsttime,possibletooverloadan intelligence system with too much data.For example, in theVietnamWartheAmericansfamouslyhelddrawersfullofunlocked at aerial photographs.This "foot-drawer of photo-graphic intelligence" became a derisive symbol of the failure ofUSmilitary intelligence tocope withthe massof informationavailable,letalonepresentittotheirmasters.Theresimplywasnotthetimeorthemanpowertolookateverysingleimage.And-whoknows?-perhapsthevitalpieceofintelligencethatcouldhavealertedtheUSAtoanimportanteventandsavedlivesinVietnamwasneverlookedat.10OnIntelligence11OnIntelligenceTechnologycanoverwhelmresources.Modernpolicesur-veillance cameras suffer from the same problem. So a collationsystem must have a"rapid retrieval response capability",to beimmediatelyaccessibletousers whenthey needtogetat data,for it tobeof anyreal value.Forthe collator,the cardinalsinis to have vital evidence and not know it or be able to find it inordertointerpretit.Interpretation-WhatDoesItAllMean?Oncecollated,informationthenhastobeinterpretedorprocessed.Thismeansthatitiscomparedwithallotherexistinginformationtoanswerfourbasicquestions:isittrue? who is it?whatisitdoing?whatdoesitmean?Ontheobjectiveanswerstothesedeceptivelysimpleques-tions the whole expensive intelligence effort canstandor fall.Maddeninglyforthetechnocrats,thehumanfactor,withitsflair,expertise,experienceandintuition,cannotbebettered.Interpretationremainsfirmlytheprovinceof theintelligenceexpert.Dissemination - TellingTheBossThisfinalpartoftheintelligencecycleisperhapsthemostfraught.Althoughthedaysof killingthebearerof illtidingsarelongpast,nobureaucracyrelishestheprospectof passingon unwelcomeinformation toitspolitical or military masters.12OnIntelligenceIntelligenceofficersareashumanastherestof us,andthetemptationforthenervous,ambitiousorsycophanticofficertotailorthestorytosuitasuperior'swishesoravoidhisdispleasurecanbeverystrong.WhowouldrelishsayingtoWinstonChurchillorGeneral"Stormin'"NormanSchwarz-kopf intheGulf,"I'mafraidyouarewrong..."Interpretations can be andoften are twistedtosuit politicalpreconceptionswithnobasisinfact,ashappenedtotheIsraelisin1973withtheirmantra"noattackispossiblewithout full Egyptian mobilization".Even worse, intelligencereports can be blatantly excluded altogether. In1916 and 1917Haig'sintelligencechief,Charteris,smoothlyorderedhisjuniorstaff nottoreportbadnewsorintelligencethatcontra-dictedtheBritishC.-in-C.'sassessmentof theGermanArmy:"Weshouldn'tupsettheChiefwiththissortofstuff. . .itmerelyincreaseshisburdensandmakeshimdepressed."Againstthissortof bureaucraticmanipulationthereislittledefence.Inauniversity,suchbehaviourcouldbeairilydis-missed as"intellectually dishonest".In the First World War itledtotheslaughterof hundredsof thousandsof men.Militarydecisionscarryagrimmerresponsibilitythanadiscreditedacademic thesis.Dissemination, then, should be accurate, timely and clearlydistinguishintelligence factfrominterpretativecommentorassessment.It should also be secure and free from prying eyes(iftheenemyknowswhatyouareupto,hewillprobablychangehisplans).Aboveall,itshouldbebrutallyhonestandobjective. These are easy sentiments; but who in reality reallylikestoconfrontanall-powerful politicianorgeneral withtheknowledgethattheirbest-laidplansareeithernonsenseorsoonwillbebecausetheenemyrefusestoco-operate?Hitler,thesupreme warlord who dictated both the strategicandthetacticaldispositionsoftheGermanArmyintheSecondWorldWar,couldfallintotoweringrageswhen13On Intelligencecontradictedbyhisstaff.OnoneoccasionbeforethefinalRussianattackatStalingrad,abraveintelligenceofficerbriefed himonthe growingSoviet capability in theDonBend.TheFuhrerexplodedwithrage,shouting"Iwon'thavethatsortof talkinmyheadquarters...ridiculouspessimism!",then physically attacked the unfortunate individual before hisastonishedgeneralsandhadhimsackedfromhisstaff.Asevery intelligence officer has known throughout history, tell-ingthetruthcansometimesbeaverybadcareermove.Thepinnacleofthewholeintelligenceprocessisoftenadevice called the I&W Display.Indicators and Warning is themostimportantwayof keepingtrackof anenemy'scapabil-ities and intentions. It effectively fuses all known intelligenceintoaneasilyread matrix,usually codedlikeatrafficlight'sgreen,amberandredfordanger.Blackusuallymeansun-known.Itisreallynothingmorethanacomprehensiveall-sourcecollectionchart.Technicallydevelopedgovernmentslike the USA and high-tech agenciessuch as North AmericanAirDefenseCommand[NORAD]relynowadaysonhighlysophisticatedcomputer-drivenI&Wdisplays.Traditional,politically-consciousorganizations(suchasthemandarinsofBritain'sForeign&CommonwealthOfficeortheJointIntelligence Committee) have tended to look down on such anobvious technical tool as lacking the intellectual subtlety of themoreelegant"diplomaticassessment".However,the deceptively simple I&W display can be reliedonbymilitaryandpoliticalplannersfarmorethanthevagaries of individual minds, however brilliant or experienced,becauseitappliesruthlessacademicdisciplinethatcannotbedenied.Forexample,if intheCypruscrisisof late1974theBritishForeignOfficehadaskedthekeyquestions"AretheTurkish Air Force's aircraft at flight dispersal or not? Are theybombedup?AretheTurkishpilotsatreadinessorawayfortheweekend?"theymighthavebeenbetterserved.Ifthe14OnIntelligenceForeignOfficehadlistenedtotheMinistryofDefence'spolitical-militaryI&WassessmentoftheTurkishgovern-ment'sintentionsoverCyprusinlate1974,whichwasbasedonanswerstothesesimplequestions,itneedneverhaveembarrassedtheForeignSecretaryandforcedanapologyatCabinetlevel,afactwhichisstillconcealedwithsomeembarrassment.I&W,doneproperlybyobjectivethirdparties,andusingrigorous techniques of critical source analysis, can successfullyfuse intelligence from all sources to give realistic estimates of apotentialenemy'scapabilitiesandintentions.Evenwhereitcannot,agoodI&Wdisplaywillhighlightevenforthemostobtuseministerorcommanderpreciselywhichcriticalele-mentsof informationareneededtomakeupthefullpicture.Armedwithabetterunderstandingofthemechanicsoftheintelligenceprocess,andablenowtodiscernthetrueroleof"intelligence",wecanlookmorecloselyatthetruthbehindsomeoftheintelligenceblundersthathaveshapedarmies,warsandthedestiniesofnations.Ourcase-studiesandex-amplescanbegroupedundertheheadingsof theintelligenceprocess itself:failuresof collection,of collation,andof inter-pretationwithaparticularhellbeingreservedforfailurestodisseminateintelligencetothosewhoreallyneededit.(Itisimpossiblenottofeelsomesympathyforthoseunfortunatecommanders who just didn't know, because someone with theinformation failed to pass it on.)Forourfirstforayintothemurkyworldofpoorintelli-gence,itisreasonabletostartwithagenuineerror:thoseunfortunate intelligence officers in the run-up to D-Day whoweredeceivedbytheevidencetheyhadsoconscientiouslycollected and collated, and who failed to interpret it correctly -the misinterpreters.They undoubtedly did their job;they justdidn'tdoitverywell.152TheMisinterpretersD-Day,1 944If the D-Day landings had failed, then the rest of the twentiethcentury would have been very different. If there was one eventintheSecondWorldWarthatcouldpossiblyhavechangedthe course of history more than any other, an Allied repulse ontheNormandybeacheswouldhavehadcataclysmicconse-quences.TheGermangeneralswouldhavebeenunlikelytorisktheirbombassassinationplotagainstavictoriousAdolfHitler.HitlercouldhaveredeployedEastandboughttime,new secret weapons would have become available and Stalin'sSoviet Army would have faced the full might of a rearmed andvictoriousWehrmacht,equippedwiththegreatestoutpour-ingsofGermanindustrysofar(GermanarmsproductionpeakedinSeptember1944).TodaywetakeitforgrantedthatD-Day,codenamedOperationOverlord,wasasuccess.Atthetime,however,there wasareal fear that thelandings might failandthattheGermans would be waiting to hurl the invaders back into thesea,astheyhaddoneatDieppein1942.Churchillhimselffearedanother first dayof theSommewith its60,000casual-ties.Weevenknowthatonthemorningof6June1944,Eisenhowersecretlybegantodraftasignalbeginning"ThelandingsinNormandyhavefailed", justincasetheinvasionwasthedisasteritcouldsoeasilyhavebeen.AndifGermanintelligencehadinterpretedtheevidence16D-Day, 1944they had collected correctly, Eisenhower might well have gonedownasadefeatedanddisgracedcommander.However,blindedbythegreatestdeceptionoperationinhistory,theGermanintelligencestaff wasconfused,misledandtrickedintoacalamitousmisinterpretationofAlliedintentions.Tothe key intelligence requirement questions of "Will the Alliesinvade? If so, when, where and in what strength?" the baffledGerman intelligenceofficersandtheir mastersgot threeoutoffour answers wrong.It wasnot as if the Germans failed torealize the Allies werecoming;onthecontrary,theyexpectedaninvasion.EarlyinJanuary1944, the Chief of Fremde Heere West (Foreign ArmiesWest,orFHW),ColonelBaronAlexisvonRoenne,receivedacrucial signal from one of German military intelligence service'ssecretagentsinEngland,tellinghimthatGeneralEisenhowerwasexpectedbackinBritain.AfterthecatastrophicGermandefeat in North Africa in1943, such an appointment could onlyhaveonesignificance:1944 was expected to bethe year of theSecond Front and Ike was to command the invasion forces in theWest. Von Roenne would have been less pleased had he realizedthat the signal from his agent had in fact been dictated by AgentTate,anMISdoubleagent.The German C.-in-C. West, von Rundstedt,and his Atlan-ticWalldeputy,Rommel,CommanderofArmyGroupB,also understood the dangers of invasion only too well. The keyquestion was where the Allies would strike.On the other sideof theChannel,vonRundstedtandRommel'sdilemmawasunsurprisinglyalsothekeytopicof conversationamongtheOverlordplanners.EveniftheAlliescouldnothidethataninvasion was imminent, they were determined to sow as muchconfusion intheGerman intelligence serviceas possible.TheorganizationchargedwiththecrucialtaskofdeceivingtheGermanHighCommandwasauniquegroup,theAlliedDeceptionStaff,betterknownbyitscovernameofthe17The MisinterpretersLondonControllingSectionorLCS.TheLCS's primarytaskwassimple:todeceiveandconfusetheGermanHighCom-mand,and Hitler himself,as to the Allies' intentions over theD-Daylandings.LCSwasaremarkableorganization.Asbefitted its extra-ordinarytask-to"puzzleanddefeat"theGermanintelli-gencestaff-itwasstaffedbysomeremarkablemen.InColonelJohnBevan,itsleader,supportedbymenlikeDenisWheatley,thenovelist,SirReginaldHoare,thebanker,andSevan'sbrilliantmultilingualdeputy,Lieutenant-ColonelSirRonaldWingate,theLCSboastedoneofthemosthigh-poweredcollectionsoftalentonanywartimestaff.Moreimportantly,LCS'smembershadanextraordinarynetworkofpersonalcontactsandlinkswithnearlyeverycentreofpowerandinfluenceintheAlliedcamp.Asaresult,andperhapsmostimportantofall,LCSenjoyedthecompleteconfidence of the Allied Chiefs of Staff, even Churchill himselfand the War Cabinet.This trust was crucial,because at timesLCS was effectively co-ordinating and directing the efforts ofnearly all the argumentative and competing Allied intelligenceandsecurityagenciesintheir ownintelligenceattacksontheGermans'indicatorandwarningsystem.Hitler was keenly aware that the Allies' first priority was todeceivehim.InMarch1944,hetoldhiscommandersintheWest,"Whateverconcentrationsof shippingexist,theycan-not,and must not, be taken as evidence or any indication thatthechoicehasfallenonanyonesectorof the'Long WesternFront'fromNorwaytotheBayofBiscay."Likemanyacommander before andsince,theFuhrerbelieved that he washisownintelligenceofficerandwasdeterminedtodictatetermstohisintelligenceprofessionals.Hitler and his military experts were, however, convinced ofone thing: in order for a successful invasion to work, the Allieswouldneedtoseizeaportonlanding.Thispreconception,18D-Day, 1944basedonsoundGermannavaladviceandtheexperienceofthe Allied raid on Dieppe in 1942, was to seriously damage anyobjectiveintelligenceassessment.Acrosstheothersideof theChannel,an ingenious planhadbeen drawn up with thesolepurpose of feeding these German preconceptions:PlanBody-guard.Bodyguard was the Allied cover name for a comprehensiverangeofstrategicdeceptionsaimedatusingtheGermanintelligencesystemtopassfalsemessages.Ithadtwoclearaims: first, to weaken Hitler's forces by making him spread hiskey divisions and armies throughout Europe, from Norway totheBalkans;andsecond,todelay anyGerman reactiontotheinvasionforaslongaspossiblebykeepingtheGermanplannersunsurewhetherthefirstlandingwas justafeint.Inordertodothis,Bevan'sLCSproposedanextraordi-narily wide-ranging seriesof deceptionoperationstofeed theGermanintelligencestaffwithexactlytheinformationtheywereseeking.Moreover,byusingrealintelligenceasfaraspossible, Bodyguard would even offer Colonel von Roenne ofFHWareasonablyaccurate pictureof Alliedtroopstrengths.The real subtleties lay in clever distortions designed to misleadtheGermanstaffabouttheexacttimeandplaceofthelandingsandthesizeanddispositionsofAlliedunits.Thesereports were embedded in a huge mass of conflicting informa-tionthatwastobepumpeddirectlyintotheGermanintelli-gencesystem.Someofit,astonishingly,wastrue.Theonlyproblem for the German planners was, which parts? To use themodern language of intelligence, LCS's aim was to overwhelmtheGermanintelligenceservices'I&Wdisplaywith"noise".ThesheerscopeoftheBodyguardplanwasvast,andinAnthony Cave Brown's words, "resembled nothing less than alargescalecorporationfraud".Bodyguardwassplitintosixteenmainstratagemsorintelligenceareas,eachdesignedto feed the Germans' known intelligence collection plan, from19TheMisinterpretershumint to electronic warfare, from bombing target analysis toFrenchresistanceactivity.InthistheBritishwerehelpedimmeasurablybyUltra,thehighlysecretcode-breakingop-erationatBletchleyParkthatenabledtheBritishtoreadHitler'smostsecretEnigma-encipheredmessagessometimeseven before the intended Nazi recipient had seen them.UsingUltra, the Allies were able to discover precisely what informa-tiontheGermanswerelookingforandthen,obligingly,toprovideitforthem;suitablydoctoredtomisleadandmisin-form,of course.EnigmawasaremarkablecoupfortheBritishandatriumphofsecrecy.Evenso,thestoryofthebreakingofthe Enigma machines has probably had more nonsense writtenaboutitthanalmostanyothereventoftheSecondWorldWar.Forastart,theEnigmastorywasnotatriumphofBritishskillandintellect:thePolesbrokeEnigma,andtheFrenchgaveittotheBritish.Thetruestoryof theEnigmamachine,or"SecretNumbersMachine"to give it its proper title,goes back to the end of theGreat War. In 1919 the mechanical cipher machine, looking likeaheavytypewriterinawoodenbox,wasdevelopedfromaDutchinventionbyaGerman,ArthurScherbius,andsoldopenlyasacommercialventureattheInternationalPostalUnion Congress in 1923. Scherbius didn't sell many and becamedisenchanted, but in 1926 the German Navy bought a number ofEnigma machines and modified them for military use.In1929analertPolishcustomsofficerinWarsawinter-cepted a crate allegedly containing radio equipment addressedtoaGermancompany.Onmakingtheusualchecks,anexcited official appeared from the German Embassy claimingthattherehadbeenaterriblemistake,andthatthecrateshouldbereturnedtoGermanyimmediately.Intrigued,thecustoms officers decided something odd was going on, but as itwas a Friday they agreed to deal with the matter first thing on20D-Day, 1944Monday morning.Overthe weekendthePolishGeneralStaff,havingbeentippedoffbythenowthoroughlysuspiciouscustomsmen,covertlyopenedthecrateandcopieditscon-tentswithdrawingsandphotographs.The crate contained a secret Enigma cipher machine for theGermanEmbassy.Realizingthepotentialoftheirfind-ifthey couldmakeit work - thePolesbeganthelaborious jobof"reverseengineering"tore-createanEnigmaand,moreimportantly,workouthowtoreaditstraffic.ThePoleshadapowerfulmotivation;between1928and1932allGer-many'sarmedforcesanditsForeignServiceadoptedtheEnigmamachineastheirprincipalencodingdeviceonthegrounds that it was completely unbreakable.In1932CaptainBertrand,ChiefoftheFrenchCrypto-graphicDepartment,recruitedaGermanagentcalledHansSchmidt.Schmidt'sclaimtofamewasthatheworkedintheGermanMilitaryCipherDepartment.Asagent"Asche"hebecamearegularsupplierofcodesandciphermanualstoFrenchIntelligence,handingover303Germansecretdocu-ments, including at least one long enciphered Enigma messageand severalsetsof cipher keys.TheFrench directedBertrandtoofferthisintelligencetotheBritishandPoles,friendlynationsequallyworriedbyHitler'srisetopower.OntheinstructionsoftheForeignOffice,theBritishturnedagentAsche'sintelligencematerialdown.However,the Poles gratefully accepted Asche's windfallandgaveittoabrilliantyoungteamofmathematiciansfromPoznanUniversity,wherethefirstcoursesincode-breakingwerenowonthesyllabus.Inco-operationwiththeFrench,andarmedwithbrand-new,legallyacquiredcommercialEn-igma machines and Asche's sets of keys,Marian Rjewski andtwoassistantsinasecretteamcodenamedBS-4brokethesecretsof Enigma.By the mid-1930sthey had begun reading"up to 80 per cent" of some secret German military traffic.By21TheMisinterpreters22D-Day, 19441937 the Polish mathematical team had even managed to buildarudimentarymechanicalcomputer-whichtheycalledabombe-toreplacetheirearliermethodsofusingpunchedcardsandlong paper"keys".OnceSudetanCzechoslovakiahadfallentoHitlerafterMunichin1938,thePolesknewthatawarwithGermanycouldnotbeavoided.InJanuary1939theyheldasecretintelligence conference in Paris to discuss code-breaking withtheBritish.AccordingtoMeyer,theheadofPolishIntelli-gence,thedisappointedPolesofferedlittletotheBritishbecauseitwas"obvioustheyknewlittleaboutEnigma"andquiteclearlyhad"nothingtoofferinthecode-breakingof Enigmainreturn".(Thiswasnotstrictlytrue;theBritishhadbeguntoreadsomelow-levelEnigmatrafficfromGer-many's Kondor Legion in1938during theSpanish Civil Warandwereintriguedbythepotentialforcode-breaking.)ByJuly1939thesituationhadchangedcompletely.ThePoleswerenolongerabletoreadEnigmatrafficbecausetheGermanshadincreasedthenumberof rotorsontheirservicemachines. With war now inevitable, the Poles had not the timetostartanothermathematicallogichuntforthenewcipherkeys. So, on16 August 1939, nineteen days before war brokeout,CaptainBertrandof FrenchSignalsIntelligenceperson-allyhandedoveraPolish-builtcopyof anEnigmamachinetogetherwithdocuments,keys,ciphersandeventechnicaldrawingsofthefirst-eversecretPoznancomputertoanastonished-andgrateful-BritishSecretServicesLiaisonOfficeratBletchleyPark.TheBritishhadbeengiventheirwar-winning weapon on a plate by the Poles. Armed with thisinvaluabletool,suitablydevelopedandrefinedtomeetthechangesthatthewarbroughtabout,theBritishdeceptionservice could not only feed the Germans false information,buttheirintelligenceservicescouldalsomonitorwhethertheirenemyhadtakenthebait.23TheMisinterpretersLondonControllingSectionwasalsokeenlyawareofan-othervitalfact:fewintelligenceorganizationsbelieveeasily-woninformation.Justasawealthycollectormayresolutelyrefuse to believe that an expensive painting could be a fake,sointelligenceofficerstendtobelievethatthemosthard-wonsecrets are more likely to be true than easily-gathered informa-tion.Thisisofcoursenonsense,butBevanandhisstaffpreparedaseriesof inspiredleaksthat wouldcometoColonelvonRoenneandhisstaff onlybythemostroundabout-andsometimesexpensive-means:throughobscureagentrunnersin Madrid,theSwedishstock exchangeand hastilysuppressed"leaks"intheneutralpresstonamebutthree.Inallthis,Bevanwasaidedbyaremarkablehumintcoup.Since1940,theBritishSecurityService,MIS,hadeffectivelybeen running and controlling every known German agent in theUK.Insteadof executingthemajorityofthelacklustrespiessent by the Abwehr, the German military intelligence bureau, in1940and1941,aspecialBritishMISteamhadarrangedforthemtobepickedupshortlyafterlandingand"turned"themto work for the British by sending false messages to their formermasters.Facedwiththechoicebetweenafiringsquadinthe;Towerof Londonoraspellof warm,safehousearrest witharadiotosendfakemessagestoexpectantGermancontrollers,mostagentsbecameextremelyco-operative.Using MIS's network of long-established double agents, the;DoubleCrossCommittee,headedbySirJohnMasterman,couldsendtheGermanswhateverliestheBodyguardplanrequired.AgentTate'smessageaboutEisenhower'sarrivalinEngland was merely the first of an elaborately conceived seriesof lies that would continue until well after the D-Day landings.AtleastsixothertrustedDoubleCrossagentspumpedmes-sagesdirecttotheirAbwehrcontrollersinHamburgorMadrid,givingsuchdetailsasunitbadges,tankandinfantrylanding-craftconcentrationsandsightingsoftroops.24D-Day, 1944InOperationFortitudeNorth,oneofBodyguard'smajorsub-plans,aphantom'British"4thArmy"wasreportedaroundEdinburghinScotland,painstakinglyrecordedbytwoDoubleCrossagents,"Mutt"and"Jeff.Thesewereinfact loyal Norwegian patriots who had defected to theBritishimmediatelyonlanding.Fromtheirmythicalnetworkof con-tacts and sub-agents,the two Norwegians informed Hamburgabout 4th Army's new "commander", Lieutenant-General SirAndrewThorne,deliberatelychosenbecausehewaswellknowntoHitlerpersonallyastheBritishMilitaryAttachein Berlin before the war. For good measure they also threw inlocalScottishnewspaperreportsof civilianwelcomecommit-teesandmilitarytrafficaccidents.MeanwhiletheGermansthemselves could log 4th Army's ceaseless administrative localradio chatter. In fact "4th Army" never amounted to more thanaboutfortystaffofficersandafewheavy-handedwirelessoperatorsdiligently churningoutatightly controlledscript.ThesewirelessoperatorswerethenextstageinColonelSevan'scomplexdeception.KnowingthattheGermanStaffwould,likeanyprofessionalintelligenceoperation,lookfor"collateral"(reportsfromothersources,confirmingthehu-mintagents'information),theever-helpfulBevanthought-fullyprovidedvonRoenneandhispeoplewithjustthematerialtheywereseeking.Thefake"4thArmy"headquar-tersanditsbusysub-unitstransmittedandreceivedastreamof credible messagesfor the excellent AbwehrSignals Intelli-genceorYServicetointerceptandplot.Hereanofficer-easilycheckedagainsttheArmyList-wouldbesentoncompassionateleave;thereaniratequartermasterwouldbeindentingforquantitiesof missingskiequipment.Whateverthevariations,themessages,whencarefullycol-latedby the diligent Abwehr intelligencestaff,all indicatedthattherewasamajorBritishArmyassemblinginScotland,pre-paring for a campaign in mountainous or arctic terrain. Allied to25TheMisinterpretersthe dangerous RAF photo-reconnaissance flights over the fiordsandtheincreasedRoyalNavydestroyeractivityoff theNor-wegian coast, it could only mean one thing. Hitler was eventuallyto tie down no less than twelve divisions in Norway against aninvasion that never came,from an army that never existed.These humint and sigint (signals intelligence) reports had tobecomplementedbyothersourcesthatLCSknewtheGer-manswoulduse.WhilephotographicreconnaissancewasunlikelytobeabletochecktheFortitudeNorthdispositionsaround Edinburgh - few German planes had the range, serviceceiling or speed to survive after a long flight across the NorthSea - in thesouthof England it wasanother matter.Speciallyequipped high-flying Luftwaffe PR planes could easily overflyKent.Bodyguarddecided,aspartofOperationFortitudeSouth,toofferthemsuitable"targets"tofeedintotheAbwehr collection plan.Ever mindful of German nervousnessabout an invasion across the short sea crossing against the PasdeCalais,Bevan'steamdecidedtostrengthentheimageof anArmyGroupmassinginthesouth-east.ThiswouldhavetheeffectofdivertingattentionawayfromNormandyandre-inforcingtheGermans'anxietiesabouttheCalaisarea.AmassivedummyoildepotwasbuiltonthecoastnearDover,completewithpipes,valves,storagetanksandevenwell-publicizedinspectionsbyKingGeorgeVI.From34,000feet the German aerial photographs could not reveal that whattheywererecordingwasawoodenfakewhosebuildinghadbeen directedbytheillusionistJasperMaskelyneandSirBasilSpence.The photographic interpreters could notspot that thehundredsof tanks parked in theKentish orchards werereallynothingmorethaninflatablerubberShermans.Onefarmerevensawhisbullchargea"tank"andwatchedinastonish-ment as the pierced dummyslowly deflated.Andthe linesoflandingcraftmooredintheMedway,withtheirsailors'washinghangingonthelineslookedrealenough.26D-Day, 1944When the evidence of aerial photography was added to agentreports, analysis of signals traffic (which showed that all overKent, Essex and Sussex well-known US Army radio operatorswere transmitting) and the well-publicized presence of GeneralGeorgePattoninthearea,Germanintelligenceanalystsre-ceived a clear message. Patton's1 st US Army Group (FUSAG)didexist,anditwaspoisedinthesouth-eastof England justacrossfromthePasdeCalais.Masterman'sdoubleagentsBrutusandGarboenthusiasticallyreportedeveryfictitiousdetail,whiletheever-loyalTatefaithfullyconfirmedtheirreports in his own radio messages from Wye in Kent."Some-thing big is building in the Dover area", he told his controller. Itwas;Bevan and hisLCS were building an illusion that wouldpindownthebulkof German Panzer divisionsinFrance150miles tothe east of thereal invasion site.By now the fastidious and aristocratic vonRoenne had thekeycomponentsofhiscollectionplancollated:humint,re-porting a massive build-up; sigint, confirming new formationsarrivingintheUK;andimageryintelligence,whoseaerialphotographsclearlyindicatedanenormousconcentrationoftroopsandmaterielinthesouth-easterncornerofEngland.All now depended on vonRoenne and his experts' evaluationandinterpretationof themassof intelligencereportsthey werestudying.Were they true? Which units were they? What weretheAlliesdoing?Andwhatdiditallmean?VonRoenne'spersonalassessmentwasvitalbecausehe,unlike many of Hitler's inner circle of senior army officers, wasimplicitlytrustedbytheNazidictator.ButvonRoennewasfightingtwoenemiesashesatinhisZossenofficetryingtointerpret the intelligence in frontof him:the Allied deceptionstaffs, clever, well-resourced and playing him like a fish on thehook;and,amazingly,hisownside-specificallytheSicher-heits Dienst, or SD, the Nazi Party's own security service, nowfirmlyin controlof all Germany's intelligence services.27TheMisinterpretersInearly1944,theheadof themilitaryintelligencebureau,theAbwehr,AdmiralCanaris,hadbeenquietlyretiredbyHitlerandpensionedoff.WilhelmCanariswasacomplexcharacter and one of the real enigmas of the war.The DirectoroftheBritishSecretIntelligenceService(SIS,popularlyknownasMl6)laterdescribedhimas"adamnedbraveman and a true patriot",an unusual accolade from an enemy.WasCanarisa leader of theanti-Nazi resistance and a Britishspy? It seems an astonishing question, and highly unlikely, andyetthereisenoughcircumstantialevidencethathewasincontactwithSirStuartMenzies,theDirectorof SIS,toraiseseriousdoubtsabouthisroleinthemysteriousintelligenceexchangesthatseemtohavetakenplacebetweentheBritishandthoseGermans whoabhorred theNazi Party.Theroleofthese murky links between the Abwehr and theSIS may wellhaveinfluencedtheoutcomeof D-Day.Canaris hadbeen a resourceful and gallant navalofficerntheGreatWar,escapingfromthedoomedSMSDresdenoffChilein1915andmakinghiswayoverlandtoBuenosAiresand back home toGermany in a series of adventures that readlike a Hornblower novel.Once back he wasawarded theIronCrossandsecondedtosecretintelligencedutiesinSpain.(Interestingly,oneoftheBritishagenthandlersinSpainatthistimewasayoungBritishM16officer,StuartMenzies.)EscapingaBritishplottokillhim,CanarisfledSpainandendedthewarasasuccessfulU-boatcommanderintheMediterraneanwherehesankeighteenenemyships.AfterthewarCanarisdroppedintotheshadowyworldofthe post-Versailles Reichswehr and its unofficial secret service.In1934 thenewChancellor Adolf Hitler,offered himthe jobof head of the Abwehr with the words,"what I want from youisanintelligenceserviceliketheBritishSecretService."CanariswasnoNazi,however,andwhenwarbrokeoutaseriesof mysteriousintelligence coupshelped theBritish.For28D-Day, 1944example,packagesofpricelesstechnicalinformationturnedupanonymouslyonthedoorstepoftheBritishEmbassyinOslo,among other places.(The information wassogood thattheBritishdidn'tbelieveitatfirst.)Asthewardeveloped,theleaks and links between the Abwehr and its opposition becametooobvious.AsuspiciousHitler finally pensionedoff CanarisandgavehisresponsibilityforintelligencetohisarchrivalandPartystalwartGeneralWalterSchellenberg,theheadoftheSD.Canaris'sdiscredited Abwehr was merged withSchellenberg'sSDtoformasingle unifiedNaziintelligenceorganization,theReichSecurityandIntelligenceService,firmlyunderpartycontrol.Even in the middleof war,the inevitable bureaucraticturf battlenowbrokeoutbetweentheSD'sNaziidealoguesandtheremnantsoftheAbwehraseachsidetriedtokeepcontrol of their own area of expertise.In the event the militaryintelligence professionals were consistently overruled or takenovercompletely.However, the Amt Mil or military section of the new servicewasstill- just-underGeneralStaff control.ItsBritishAreaintelligenceofficerwasacheerfulextrovertcalledOberstLeutnantRogerMichel,wholikeallhisbrotherofficersheartilydetestedhisnewPartybosses.Worse,Michelwaslabouringunderaparticularhandicap.Wheneverhesub-mittedanorder-of-battleestimatetoheadquarters,itwasinvariablysanitizedanddilutedbytheSDofficialsabovehim.They halvedevery estimatehemadeof Alliedstrength inGreat Britain.For any professional intelligence officer to havehisreports alteredon ostensibly political grounds islikea redrag to a bull. It impugns his professional capabilities, integrityandobjectivity.Thehot-bloodedMichelwasnoexception.ColonelvonRoenne,however,haddevisedawayforhisfrustrated subordinate to thwart their Nazi masters tamperingwith,astheysaw it,perfectly good intelligenceassessments.If29TheMisinterpreters30D-Day, 1944the newSD was going tohalve their estimates, what could beeasier than doubling them in the first place? So, in the spring of1944,vonRoenneandMichelbegantomultiplytheirassess-mentsofAlliedstrengthbyafactoroftwo,secureintheknowledgethattheSDwouldthenhalvetheirfigures,thusensuringthatthereportwhichwenttoHitler'sdeskwasanaccurate reflection of the General Staffs original estimate.Toadd verisimilitude to this breathtaking scheme,the two plot-tersuncriticallyaccepted thefloodof FortitudereportsabouttheBritish4thArmyinScotland,Patton'sFUSAGandthemilitary build-up in the south-east of England. Ironically, vonRoenne and Michel needed the LCS's flood of false evidencealmost as much as the Allied deception staff needed to send it.Only the false Fortitude reports could be relied on to satisfytheGermans'desperateneedforeveryscrapofcollateralabouttroopdispositionsinBritaintosupporttheirinflatedfigures.InMay,vonRoenne's crucial pre-invasion"FHW Assess-mentoftheEnemy'sOrderofBattle"(ORBAT)waspub-lished.Tohishorror,thistimetheSDdidnothalvehisestimateof Alliedstrength.Thereasonwassimple:theSDofficer whohadbeencuttingtheestimateshadbeen posted.VonRoenne'sassessment wassentoutastheofficialsecretcombinedintelligenceORBAT toall Wehrmachtformationsand headquarters in the West. Von Roenne dare not admit thedeception -todosowouldinvitesummary executioninthefeveredatmosphereofsuspicionandintriguesurroundingHitler'scourtinspring1944-andsohehadtoacceptthattheinfluentialreportissuedunderhisnamehadeffectivelydoubled the true known strength of the Allied forces in Britainfromfortydivisiontoovereighty.Itwasadeceptionthatwould ultimately cost vonRoenne his life.Colonel Bevan's ever-resourceful LCS intelligence hoaxershadonefinaltrickuptheirsleeve.Howmuchbetter,they31TheMisinterpretersreasoned,if atrustedGermangeneralcouldhimself corrobo-ratethemassof falsereportstheyhadfedintotheGermanintelligence machine. And, as chance would have it, the BritishjusthappenedtohaveaspareGermangeneral.GeneralvonCramerhadbeencapturedinMay1943astheAxisforcescollapsedinTunisia.AsaprisonerofwarinEnglandhishealthhaddeteriorated,andinMay1944theRedCrossarrangedtorepatriatehimbacktoGermanyinaneutralSwedishship.Sevan'sstaff ensuredthattheGeneraldidnotgoempty-handed.Hisdrivetothedockstookhimthroughsomeof theheaviesttroopconcentrationsinsouthernEng-land,endingupatPatton's"HQ"forhislastnightbeforeembarkation.VonCramerhadn'tthefaintestideawherehehadbeenbutwasdinedoutasamilitarycourtesytoasickmanbyPattonhimself.Healsometsomeof Patton's"divi-sionalcommanders"whowerecoolandcorrecttoanenemygeneralofficer,however ill,butgossipedawayamongthem-selvesabout"Calais".Theruseworked.By24May,onlythirteendaysbeforeD-Day,vonCramerwasbackinBerlinfaithfullyreportingtoGeneralZeitzler,Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht,everythingthathehadseenandheardinEngland.Unsurprisingly,hisinformation tallied with everything the Germans had collectedandprovidedfurthercollateralfor vonRoenne'sintelligenceestimate. So, in the final days before the landings, the great LCSdeceptionplanhad,remarkably,becomethebasisfortheGermanintelligenceappreciation.EvenHitlerhimself,despitean almost feminine intuition that suddenly swung him towardsNormandy at the last moment,forbore tochange his disposi-tions.OftheGermanArmy's300divisions,onlysixtywereactive in the West: less than 20 per cent. And of those, only eightdivisions were in place to oppose the Allies directly as they cameashore. The remainder were spread between the Balkans, Italy,Russia,the south of France, Denmark,Holland, Norway and,32D-Day, 1944most important of all, the Pas de Calais. From their reading ofthedecryptedUltrainterceptson1and2June,Sevan'sdelightedstaff couldreadthatBaronOshima,theJapaneseenvoy in Berlin, was reporting to Tokyo that no less a personthanAdolf Hitlerhimself hadassessedthatthelikelyattackwouldfall inthe PasdeCalais,with feints elsewhere.For Bevan and his LCS, it had been an intelligence triumph.Asmall,highlytalentedandinfluentialstaff hadsuccessfullyorchestrated the most complex deception in history against analert and highly competent adversary.One slip,one mistake inthescript,onepieceof thestorythatdidnotquitefit,couldhave unravelled the whole fraudulent network that was Body-guard,Fortitudeandtheirinterlockinglayersof hoaxes.Bycomplete understandingof theGermans'professional intelli-gencemethods,andaidedbytheabilitytoreadtheEnigmatraffic,LCShadeffectivelyhighjackedtheGermanintelli-gence staff assessment for D-Day and forced von Roenne andthewholeGerman intelligence machinetodo precisely whattheAllieswanted.ThefinalGermanintelligencesummariesfortheendof May1944readlikeacatalogueof errors:theGermanswereconvincedthattheAllieswouldattackingoodweather,inthedark near a large portandat high tide.Theyalsoassessedthattherewouldbeseveralfeintlandingsde-signed to draw German reserves away from the true landing -in the Pas de Calais.Astonishingly,thedeceptionoperationscontinuedwellaftertheAlliedtroopscameashoreon6June1944.During9and10Juneafreshwaveof resistanceattacks,heavyairraidsandanunheard-of tempoofoffshorepreparationshittheCalaisarea.Masterman'sever-faithfulDoubleCrossagentssentextensivehumint"collateral"explainingthattheNormandylandingsweremerelyadiversionandtherealblow - the landing of Patton's FUSAG - was just about to fallon the Pas deCalais.33TheMisinterpretersVon Roenne, who had by now probably begun to believe hisown inflated assessments,accordinglysentoutan intelligencesummarytoallWehrmachtWesternFrontheadquartersandformations:"Inall probability major enemylanding expectedBelgiancoastlinefrom10June."Tocompoundhismisinter-pretation and after consultation with Marshals Keitel and Jodlof Fuhrer Hauptquartier, Roenne then added a fatal operational,notintelligence,assessment:"Withdrawalof [German]forcesfrom the Pas de Calais/15th Army Sector unwise." Intelligenceassessments should never include operational recommendations.Tofurthercompoundthiscatalogueoferrors,RoennepersonallycontactedHitler'sintelligenceliaisonofficer,oneColonelKrummacher,andreinforcedFHW'swrittenintelli-genceestimatebyinsistingthatanydiversionof forcesfromthe PasdeCalaistoNormandy wouldbea mistake,as"vonRoennepersonallyhaddefiniteintelligencethatanewinva-sion was about to fall on the 15th Army Sector, beginning witha waveof resistanceattacksstarting onthe night9/10 June."Armed with this highly unusual special pleading from a seniorstaffintelligenceofficer,KrummacheragreedtorepresentFHW's view at Hitler's crucial middaysituation and planningconference.Atthatconference,MarshalJodlreportedFHW'sassess-menttoHitlerandaddedtoittheweightofGeneralKuh-lentahl'slatestsecretradiomessagefromhisever-diligentagentGarbo,givingfreshcollateralforanimminentmainforce attack on Calais by Patton's non-existent FUSAG basedin Kent.Kuhlentahl was the senior agent controller in Portu-galandSpain.Hitlertookthebait.Atthemidnightstaffconferenceon9/10June,theSupremeCommanderoftheArmed Forces abruptly ordered a halt to any movement fromthe Pas de Calais to Normandy. Not only that, but theFuhrerordered extra divisions to the15th Army Sector and not to thehard-pressedWehrmachtbattlefrontinNormandy.34D-Day, 1944Hitler might have been less happy with his decision and withtheFHW/Kuhlentahl intelligenceassessment hadherealizedthat Garbo's radio message had taken two hours to send.ThecriticalquestionwhytheextremelyefficientBritishSignalsSecurityServicehadfailedtopinpointatwo-hourtransmis-sionandcatchtheillegalsenderneverseemstohaveoccurredtothegullibleKuhlentahlandvonRoenne.Intelligenceofficersneedahighlydevelopedcriticalfactor,andnevermorethanwhentheirprejudicesarebeingpanderedtosoobligingly.Back in London, the delighted Bevan and his LCS saw themaplinesheadingtowardsNormandysuddenlystop,andoverthefollowingdayscoalesceintothePasdeCalais.FortitudeandBodyguardhadworked.Eventhen,thegreatintelligencedeceptionwasnotoverandcontinuedwellintoJuly. In addition to the mock invasion off Calais on 10 June, aslateasthelastweekinJunethereweremoreAlliedspoofairborneandnavaloperationsoffBoulogneandDieppe.ThesefeintsweresuccessfulenoughforHitlertopersonallyauthorize an order (a full month after D-Day) for all divisionsstillheldbackinthePasdeCalaistogoonfullanti-invasionalert for 8 July. For Bevan and his LCS, it had been a triumphof deception;forvonRoenne'sFHWandtheGermanHighCommand,ithadbeenanintelligencedisaster.WasvonRoenneanincompetentintelligenceofficer?Farfromit.Histrackrecordbefore1944hadbeenoutstanding.His mistake was probably to allow his belief in his own systemtoovercomehisdoubtsandtoforgettheneedforcriticalanalysis.Theoldintelligenceassessmentof source material -Isittrue?Isitcredible?Isitconfirmedbyothersources?-seems to have either broken down or just been saturated by anenemydeceptionoperationthatknew,thankstoEnigma, justhowFHW'sintelligencesystemworkedandhowtofoolit.Facedbythekeyquestionsof"WilltheAlliesinvade?If so,35TheMisinterpreterswhen,where and in what strength?"theGerman intelligencestaff got it completely wrong.It was a mistake that was to endintheruinsofBerlinandthecollapseoftheThirdReich.Rarelycanamistakenintelligenceestimatehavehadsuchcatastrophicconsequences.The D-Day intelligence deception story has a postscript thatelegantly sums up Sevan's cunning,Masterman's profession-alism and the German tragedy. At 3 a.m. on the morning of D-Day,Masterman'strusteddoubleagent,Garbo,franticallysignalledhisGermancontrollerstoinformthemthatoneofhis"networkof agents"hadreportedthattheAlliedtroopshad left camp, complete with sea-sickness bags. Only by dawndid the message get through to Berlin, by which time the Allieshadbeguntoland,thusboostingGarbo'scredibilityasanagentwithoutdamagingAlliedoperations.Bitterly,GarbocastigatedhisGermancontrollers:"Isentyouthispricelessinformation and it makes me seriously question your profes-sionalismandresponsibility."Twomonthslater,Garbore-ceivedamessageawardinghimtheIronCrossbyHitler'scommand.VonRoennewasnotsolucky.HewasarrestedintheaftermathofthebombplotagainstHitlerof20July1944.He was joined later by his old boss, Admiral Canaris, who maywellhavebeenapartytosomeofthedeceptionsandwasalmost certainly in touch withtheBritish.For the Nazis,thefinalstrawovertheintelligenceduplicitiesoftheAbwehrappearstohavebeenamysteriousjourneythatCanarisundertook toFrance in June1944.HisreplacementSchellen-berg knewthatCanarishadbeentalkingtoanumberof thegenerals who were later implicated in the plot. Three days laterCanariswasarrestedbySchellenbergandhismen."Hello,"saidthelittleadmiraltohisarrestingofficer,"I'vebeenexpectingyou."On11October1944,ColonelBaronAlexisvonRoenne,36D-Day, 1944latelyChiefofForeignArmiesWestof theGermanGeneralStaff, was executed by the Nazi authorities for treason in thebloody aftermath of the bomb plot on Hitler's life.Rarely canan intelligence officer have paid such a high price for getting itsobadlywrong.Canaris,whoseroleinthewholeD-Daydeception has never been clear, was to follow. An SD search oftheoldAbwehrofficesrevealedrecordsanddiariesthatimplicatedtheAdmiralandhisstaffashavingbeenintheknowaboutmanythingsheshouldhavereported.Thelastheadof theAbwehrwasfinally condemnedfor contactwiththeenemy.InvainCanarisprotestedthatcontactwiththeenemy was the job of a secret intelligence service, and that hewasa loyal Germanandnotraitor to theReich.It wastonoavail; he was imprisoned, and as the Reich crashed around thederangeddictator,Hitlerfinallyorderedhimkilled.Canaris's end was not easy. After being beaten by SD thugs,and with blood dripping from a smashed nose and jaw, he wasslowly strangled by hanging from a meat hook on 9 April 1945at Flossenburg,a lonely sacrifice to Nazi vengeance.In theirown way,thetwoGerman intelligenceofficers,vonRoenneandCanaris,werebothamongthefinalvictimsofthesuc-cessfulAllieddeceptiononD-Day.37"ComradeStalin Knows Best"Thestandardresponse byStalin'sstaff in1941toany expressionof concernaboutanimpendingGermanattack.Barbarossa, 1 941At01.45onthemorningof22June1941,aSoviettrainsteameduptothefrontierpostontheRussian-GermanborderatBrestLitovsk,loadedwith1,500tonsofgrain.Thetruckswerepartofthe200,000tonsofgrainand100,000tonsofpetroleumproductsdeliveredtothewestevery monthfortheGermanwar economybyStalin,keepinghiswordtoAdolfHitlerunderthetheNazi-Sovietnon-aggressionpact's"co-operativeeconomicventures".Thescene at the border was of routine, calm and order. The UnionofSovietSocialistRepublicsandtheNaziParty'sGreaterGermanReichwereallies,bysolemntreaty.Anhourandahalflater,theall-conqueringWehrmachtbursteastacrossthatsamebridgeinanotherferociousblitz-krieg,tobegintheinvasionof communistRussia."We justneedtokickinthedoor,"theFuhrerboastedtohisinnercircle,"andthewholerottenedificeof theBolshevikregimewillcomecrashingdown."TheNazileadership,inaphrasethat has eerie echoes,believed that it would all be over by theautumn,letbyalonebyChristmas.By1941,theSovietUnionhadthelargest,mostefficientand best informed intelligence service in the world. Under the38Barbarossa, 1941leadershipof therevolutionaryfounderoftheSovietSecretService, Felix Dzerzhinsky, by the 1920s the Soviet intelligenceservicehadgrownboth insizeandscope until itreached intoeveryaspectofRussianlifeaswellasoverseascommunistparties and foreign Chanceries. Using a vast network of agentsandsympathizers,littlewentonintherestof theworldthatdidnotfinditswaybacktotheseatofthecommunistrevolutioninMoscow.ComradeStalin,GeneralSecretaryof theCommunist Party of theSovietUnion,was determinedthat inthehistoricclashof ideologiesbetweencapitalismandcommunism, the heirs of Marx and Lenin would not be foundwanting.Yet justbeforedawnon22June1941,overthreemillionmenand3,350tanksofthearmiesoftheGreaterGermanReichinvadedtheSovietUnionandtookitsunpreparedwesternborderdefencesalmostcompletelybysurprise.Howonearthcouldsuchafailureofintelligence,whichledtothe most destructive war inhuman history,have happenedapparentlywithoutwarning?Theanswerissimple.ThedictatoroftheSovietUnionrefused to acknowledge a truth presented to him over and overagain:Nazi Germany was going to invade the Union of SovietSocialistRepublics.Stalin istheroot causeof the intelligencedisasterthatbefellSovietRussiain1941.Hisobsession withavoiding a war with the ThirdReich,coupled with his persis-tentrefusaltoacknowledgeclearintelligencethattheGer-manswereabouttoinvade,weretoensurethathiscountrysufferedacatastrophicdefeatasOperationBarbarossapushedtheRussiansbacktothegatesof Moscowitself.Stalin'smotiveswerecomplexbutseemtostemfromanoverriding desire to buy time. He knew better than anyone justhow unpreparedtheRedArmy wasforwar,andheseemstohavebeenpreparedtoignorethemostaccuratereportsoftroubleinavainattempttoconvincehimself thatitcouldn't39"Comrade Stalin Knows Best"happen. Stalin expected war. Indeed, in the analysis beloved ofMarxist-Leninists,afinalclashbetweencommunismandcapitalismwasanhistoricinevitability.Stalin'sproblemwashewasnotyetreadyforthisparticularstageintheunfoldingoftheHegelian-Marxistdialectic.Forjustthreeyearsbefore,hehadwrecked-deliberatelywrecked-hisarmy.In the spring of 1937,as part of what became known as the"GreatTerror",StalinhadmovedtopurgetheRedArmyof"internalenemies".Duringthenextthreeyearsheexecutedmostofhisseniormilitarycommandersontrumped-upcharges.Thecullwashorrific:75of the80membersof the"MilitarySoviet"werekilled;everycommanderofeverymilitarydistrict:two-thirdsofthedivisionalcommanders,halfthebrigadecommandersandover400of456staffcolonels.Stalineffectivelyslicedtheheadoff theRedArmy.Hardly surprisingly, the Red Army's invasion of neighbour-ingFinlandinthewinterof1939turnedintoamilitarydebacle.LittleFinland's200,000defenderscutthemillion-strongRedArmytopieces,inflictingnearlyaquarterofamillion casualties on the Russians before finally being grounddownbysuperiornumbers.DavidhadnotonlythrashedGoliathbutshownhimtobeasluggishincompetent,afactof whichStalinwasonlytoowellaware.Itistotheinnerrecessesof Stalin'ssecretive,fearfulandcunningpsychethatwemustturnforthetruthbehindthesurprise attack known as Barbarossa. Stalin may have wieldedsupremeauthorityintheUSSR,butathearttheRussiandictator was terrified - paranoic, even - of losing power. WhilehecouldmastereventsintheSovietUnionbykillingoff hisenemies,realorimagined,outsideitonemanandhisall-conqueringarmyposedapotentiallymortalthreattothecommunistregimeandleader.In this light, many of Stalin's actions become not only under-40Barbarossa, 1941standable but also strangely rational. By the bizarre standards ofparanoic ideologicaldictators,Stalin'sbehaviour makesakindof curioussense.Hefelthehadatallcoststopreventawarwhich could destroy him until he was ready for the final historiccombatbetweenthegreatideologies.IfweunderstandthisWeltanschauung, or world view, then Stalin's attempts to ignoreandsuppressunequivocalintelligencewarningsofaGermanattackseemalmostlogical.Atworsttheyoffertheultimatenightmare for the intelligence officer: a commander who choosesto ignore andsuppress the very best intelligence handed to himbecause he has his own agenda,and is prepared to go to anylengths to suppress the truth becoming known, much less actedupon.Stalin was not the first or the last commander to utter theimmortalwords,"Iammyownintelligenceofficer!"He justwasn't a very good one,asevents proved.The facts speak for themselves: between late July1940 and 22June1941, no less than ninety separate, unequivocal warningsof animpendingattackontheSovietUnionwerepassedtoStalin.Ineverycasetheywereprofessionallycollated,evalu-ated, interpreted and briefed to Stalin as supreme commander.So far was we know, none of them was disseminated further. Asa direct consequence of this intelligence failure the USSR lost 4millionsoliders-includingover2millionprisonersof war-14,000 aircraft, 20,000 guns and 17,000 tanks in the battles fromthefrontierstotheoutskirtsofMoscowbetweenJuneandDecember1941atthehandsof theGermaninvaders.Tounderstandhowthiscameabout,wehavetogobackthreeyearstoMunich.TheMunich Agreementof1938hadcomeasagreatshocktotheSovietUnion.ConvincedbyMarxist dogma of the historic inevitability of another Franco-Germancapitalistwar(fromwhichtherecouldonlybeonebeneficiary-theSovietUnion),andstilltrustingintheinternationalsystemof"collectivesecurity"tocontainHi-tler'sresurgentGermany,fortheSovietsMunichspelleda41"Comrade Stalin Knows Best"newanddangerousEurope.TheSovietAmbassadorinLon-don,Maisky,warnedMoscowthat"Internationalrelationsare now entering an era of brute force, savagery and the policyofthemailedfist."FurtherSovietanalysisoftheUSSR'spositioninthepost-MunichworldspelledoutBritishandFrench policy in brutally stark terms:"[British] Foreign Officepolicy now has only twoaims:peace at any cost,and secondly,collusionwithaggressorsattheexpenseof thirdcountriestogranttheaggressorconcessions."Such a policy of colluding with Hitler was seen by Stalin andhisadvisersasbothfundamentallyanti-communistandanti-Russian,andthereforeaseriousthreattotheUSSR.For,looming ever larger inSoviet official thinking, was the beliefthatBritainandFrancewouldbeonlytoohappytouseaconflictbetweenGermanyandtheSovietUniontodivertHitler'srapaciousattentionawayfromthemselves.Alan Clarke's telling phrase about Hitler's advisers,"vanityandselfdelusionareamongthelesservicesofdespoticcourts",appliesequallytotheByzantinepost-revolutionarycircleof StalinandhisBolshevikcronies,whereparanoiaandconspiracywerethenorm.Anyobjectiveanalysisof eventswasfurtherdistortedbycommunistprejudicesanddogma,plusafearof capitalistplotstosnuff outthe fledgling SovietUnion,bothofwhichledtoaruthlesssearchforinternaltraitorsandcounter-revolutionaries.Theproblemof decidingwhatwasrealityinMoscowwasfurtherhinderedbyStalin'sdecisiontokillhisintelligenceanalysts.Like the Red Army, the NIO (the Foreign IntelligenceService)andthe NKVD/NKGB(theStateSecurityIntelligenceApparatus) had both been ruthlessly purged between1937and1939.Litvinov,thearchitectofthefailedcollectivesecurityforeignpolicy,wasremovedandreplacedbyaStalin-ledcommittee early in1939after Munich. Although,surprisingly,Litvinovsurvived,hisstaffdidnot.Manydiplomatsand42Barbarossa, 1941foreignserviceofficerstaintedbyassociationwith"counter-revolutionary elements" disappeared overnight,"liquidated" inthepurgesthatreachedintoeveryaspectofSovietlifeintheyearsimmediately beforetheSecond WorldWar.Inthesecircumstances,itishardlysurprisingthatStalinlackedsoundandinformedforeignpolicyadviceinthemonthsafterMunich.Mostof thosewhounderstoodwhattheBritishandFrenchmightdoweredeadorintheslavecampsoftheGulag,enjoyingthedelightsof"honestprole-tarianlabour".Those whosurvivedwerekeepingtheirheadswelldowninapersonalsurvivalpolicybasedonthewell-knownSovietadage"sniffout,suckup,survive".OnlyabravemanorafoolwasgoingtogainsayComradeStalin'sinterpretationof eventsin1939^40.Theironywasthatthepost-MunichperiodreallymarkedtheendofappeasementbytheFrenchandBritish.Hitler'scynical invasion of the rump of Czechoslovakia in March1939hadinfactstrengthenedAlliedresolveandconvincedhithertotimid politicians that an Anglo-French and German clash wasinevitable.TheSovietsreaditdifferently.FromStalin'sper-spective, the USSR now had a hungry fascist wolf loose on herunprotectedwesternborder,aidedandabettedbyperfidiouscapitalistdemocracies.AnaccommodationwithGermanyhadthereforetobesought:StalinbelievedhehadtobuyHitleroffatallcosts.IftheroadfromMunichsteeledtheWesterndemocraciesforawarwithNaziGermany,then,paradoxically, the road from Munich led Stalin directly downhisownpathofappeasementtotheRibbentrop-Molotovtreatyof August1939.With Soviet policy bent on avoidance of war with Germany,BritainandFrancebecamesecondaryplayers.TheSovietleadershipbelievedtheUSSRwasnowisolatedandaloneinadangerousworld.Almostindesperation,StalinorderedMolotovtoseekanalliancethatwouldbindtheirpotential43"Comrade Stalin Knows Best"ienemy,Germany,intoanon-aggressionpact.Hitler'sper-emptory rupture of the Peace of Munich in March1939 merelyacceleratedtheprocess.However,beforeapproachingGer-manydirect,StalintriedtheWesternAlliesonelasttime,althoughhebelievedthatneitherBritainnorFrancewasinanypositiontoprotecttheirneweasternclients,PolandandRomania.InApril1939StalinproposedanewtripletreatybasedonacollectivedefensiveallianceagainstHitler,con-sistingofBritain,FranceandtheUSSR,toprotecteasternEuropeandbydefinitiontheUSSR.WhetherthiswastoputpressureonHitler,buytimeor,mostlikely,merelytokeepStalin'soptionsopen,theFrenchandBritishresponsetothe proposal wasbothlukewarmandambiguous.Theycounter-proposedamilitarypactwhereRussiawouldcometoBritainandFrance'saidifPolandwasattacked.AseveryintelligentobserverinEuropeknewthatPolandwasnextonHitler'slistof territorialaims,andthat neitherFrance norBritain was capableof protecting thatisolated and encircled nation in the event of a Nazi attack, theAnglo-French proposalslookednot unnaturallytoStalinlikea cynical ploy to suck the USSR into Hitler's coming war withPoland:the very thing he wasdeterminedtoavoid.None theless,desperateforanaccommodation,hedespatchedemis-saries from his new, purged Foreign Ministry to woo the Polesandtheirnewallies.Ifandwhenwarcame,Stalinhadnointentionof fightingtheGermansalone.The negotiationsforthetriplealliancedraggedonthroughthe summer of 1939. Unfortunately, the French and British sawthe talks as a political exercise designed to frighten Hitler andapply pressure to Berlin. The British in particular dragged theirfeet and played for time. The French, correctly, feared that ifthetalkswereunsuccessful,Stalin mightfeelthat hehad nochoicebutdoadealwithHitler.Stalinhimselfviewedthediscussionsdifferently.Low-levelFranco-Britishdelegations44Barbarossa, 194145"Comrade Stalin Knows Best"without authority to sign agreements gave the Russian dictatornocomfortandmerelyconfirmedhissuspicionsof capitalistduplicity.Heneededa result,and heneededonequickly.Exasperatedbythelackofprogressinthetriple-alliancetalks,andreceptivetoGermancounter-approachesdesignedtogiveHitlerthefreehandheneededtodeal withPoland,inAugust1939Stalindecided tomakea pact with his potentialarch-enemy.Inanastonishingvolte-face,heauthorizedface-to-facenegotiationsbetweenMolotovandRibbentrop.Thistime, to ensure success, the negotiations were conducted by theNKVD(the fiefdom of Beria,Stalin'ssecurity chief)and notbythepurgedandcautiousdiplomats.On23August,tothesurpriseofdiplomaticobservers,Ribbentrop flew to Moscow.The Nazi-Soviet Pact was signedthe very next day,on 24 August, just eight days before Hitler'sinvasionofPoland.Thisunholyallianceoftyrantswasadiplomaticcoupthat,inthewordsofoneseasonedreporter,"stupefied the world". At a stroke, Hitler was given a free handtoattackPoland;andforhispart,Stalinhadhischerishedguaranteeof peace.AstheGermandelegatesleft,arelievedStalinannounced,"TheSovietGovernmenttakes[this]newpact very seriously...The Soviet Union will never betray itspartner." He meant it. The price was that over the next eighteenmonths,hesteadfastly chosetoignorethe massof indicationsthathispartnerwasabouttobetrayhim.Whetherthiswascalculation,wishfulthinkingor justfearwewillneverknow.Theseedsof theBarbarossadisasterweresown.Havingsignedhistreaty,Stalindeterminedtokeephisword.Themoststrikingfeatureof theSovietleader'sappea-sementof Germany wasnowaseriesof politicalandeconomicgestures designed to conciliate Hitler.Some of these were puretheatre,as whenStalin bear-hugged the embarrassed GermanAmbassadoratMoscow'srailwaystationandsworeeternalfriendship.Historydoesn'trecallwhatthefastidiousvon46Barbarossa, 1941SchulenburgsaidinreplytothisverypublicdisplayofGeorgianemotion.Others were more devious,asthe Tassofficial denial on8May1941of anyGermantroopconcentrationsontheRus-sianbordershowed.Therewasamassofevidencetothecontrary,of whichStalin waswellaware.EvenovertGermanphoto-reconnaissanceflightswerestudiously"overlooked",despiteatleastonecrashatRovnoon15April1941ofaLuftwaffe plane laden with incriminating exposed intelligencefilmsin the wreckage.Soviet anti-aircraft defences were spe-cifically ordered not toopen fire onGermanaircraft,even iftheystrayedintoSovietairspace.ApparentlynohumiliationwastoomuchforStalin in his desiretoavoidprovokingtheGermans and to preventan outbreakof war between autumn1939andspring1941.It is not difficult to understand the workings of Stalin's mindinthisperiod.AccordingtoChurchill,theSovietleaderlaterclaimed ruefully, "I thought I could gain another six months orso", and there is plenty to suggest that Stalin's aim was to delaywaruntiltheSovietUnionwaspreparedforone,perhapsin1942. Unfortunately, Stalin believed that he alone could effectthis. Any adviser bringing him a contrary view was dangerous:not justtoStalin's perceived - andobsessive - beliefs,but alsoto"peace".TheunenviabletaskofbeingoneofStalin'sintelligence officers in the spring of 1941 was thus fraught withdanger.ThelastthingStalinwantedwasobjectiveandhonestreportingthatwouldcompelhimtotakeaction.ItisagainstthistwistedlogicthatthefailureofStalintoheed the intelligence warnings of an impending German attackshouldbeviewed.Andtherewasnoshortageof intelligencewarnings. As early as the end of June 1940, information aboutHitler's future intentions had already been passed to Moscow.Wherethiscamefromisobscure,butitwassubsequentlyreinforcedbynolessthanninetyfactualreports-accurate,47"Comrade Stalin Knows Best"credibleandinmanycasesconfirmedbyothersources-between July 1940 and 22 June 1941. How Stalin could dismisssomeoftheintelligencethatwaspassedtohimpersonallyalmost beggarsbelief.For example,on 25December1940,theSoviet Attache in Berlin passed on a resume of Hitler'sFuhrerDirective21of18December1940,theoperationorderforBarbarossa;andon1March1941inWashingtonSumnerWelles, the US Under-Secretary of State, formally summonedandbriefedtheSovietAmbassador withthefulldetailsof aforthcomingGermanattack.HissourcewasthejuniorUSCommercialAttacheinBerlin,SamE.Woods.Woodshadbeenbriefedbyadisgruntledanti-NaziofficialintheBerlinTradeMinistryondetailedGermanplansforaninvasionoftheUSSRplannedforspring1941.ThestunnedSovietAmbassadorheardthattheAmericanattache had learnedof the details in August1940.The Amer-icanauthoritiesweresoconcernedtoensurethatthereportswereaccuratebeforepassingthemonthattheyhadturnedthemovertotheFBIinJanuary1941for critical evaluation.Afterexhaustivecross-checking,analystsconfirmedthattheintelligenceappearedtobeaccurateandconfirmedbyothersources.Welles gravely informed theSoviet Ambassador thattheevidencewas"sooverwhelmingitshouldbepassedtoForeign Minister Molotov immediately". Urmansky, the Am-bassador,"turnedverywhite",accordingtoWelles.Stalin'sreactiononbeingtoldwasdifferent.HeignoredtheUSreportsandintheRussianphrase"safeditinthewall".And"safed"theintelligencestayed.ThereasonStalincoulddothiswassimple:likemanydictatorsandsurpremecommanders,heallowedanintelli-genceorganizationtogrowuparoundhimthatreflectedhisownprejudices.Onlythe"right"intelligence couldbe passedtothegreatman,ifintelligenceofficerswantedtosurvive.Beinghuman,GeneralGolikov,hischief intelligenceofficer,48Barbarossa, 1941an efficient if doctrinaireoperationsofficer,with noreputa-tionasanintelligenceanalystbutacommendablepoliticalloyaltytothepartyline,madesurethatanyintelligencereportsreachinghismasterwerecarefullysortedinto"reli-able"and"notconfirmed".AstheKremlindefinitionof"reliable" in early1941seems to have embraced any informa-tion that agreed with Comrade Stalin's analysis of the politico-militarysituation,Stalin'spropensityforself-delusionwaspowerfullyreinforced.Golikov'spromotionasheadof theGRU(SovietMilitaryIntelligence)in1940musthavewrungsadfarewellsandtearsover the vodka from his colleagues rather than the congratula-tions that accompany the usual office party. The seven previousincumbentsof theposthadallbeenshotonStalin'sordersYetGolikovsurvived,eventhoughhistwoimmediatesuccessorswerealsoshotbyStalin,doubtlessanxioustore-establishhistrackrecordforconsistencyinthesematters.QuitewhyGolikovsurvived isacuriosity.AftertheGermanattack he was even transferred to England in late 1941 in orderto run the GRU'sagent network from a safe overseas base - afact that the British have been reluctant to advertise. We nowknow from GCHQ's Venona decrypts that there were at leastthirty-threeBritish-basedtraitorsworkingforMoscow,in-cludingsomeverysenior figures, inadditiontothe"famousfive"usualsuspects-Philby,Burgess,MacLean,BluntandCarncross. The Soviets must have been very confident of theirBritish spy network tohave allowedthehead of their MilitaryIntelligenceServicetorunitfromLondon.Golikovwascertainly inStalin'sconfidence;inDecember1940,onStalin'sdirectorders,hehadsecretlybriefedthetwenty-five most senior officersof the GRU,"thatthe Nazi-Soviet Pact,which wasa productsolelyof the political geniusof Comrade Stalin, was no more than a temporary expedient",and that "Hitler would never dare to attack Russia as he was49"Comrade Stalin Knows Best"notunbalanced,andtoarealistsuchacoursewouldbesuicide." This was, of course, little more than wishful thinkingatbest,andatworst,pureself-delusiononGolikov'spart.However, to survive and prosper as Chief Intelligence OfficeramidthemurderousintriguesofStalin'scourt,sycophancywasthenorm,andthe"GreatLeader's"PartyLinetheonlytrueguidetoaccurateintelligenceassessment.Golikovdiedinhisbedin1980.Onlythendidthetruthcome out. Far from being a simple son of peasant stock, as hisrevolutionarybiographersclaimed,likemanyothershehadlied about his origins and even his age tosurvive the Revolu-tion. He had attended the Tsarist Cavalry Academy before theGreatWarin1911(whichwouldhavebeendifficultforanalleged11-year-old)andhadwonhispartycredentialsbybeingaruthlesskillerintherepressionof thepeasantsandkulaks after1918.Stalin had chosen him to bear the poisonedchaliceof theGRU in July1940 precisely because hetrustedGolikov'sslavishdevotiontothepartylineandtohisleaderpersonally.HecouldrelyoncomradeGolikovtofollowhisorderswithoutquestion.Theresultwasthat,withthemilitarycommandersTi-moshenkoandZhukov,GolikovconspiredwithStalintoensure thetotal inactionof theSoviet intelligenceapparatusuntil the Germans struck on 22 June1941. On 20 April1941hehadbrandishedthelatestintelligencewarningsoftheimpendingGermaninvasioninfrontofagroupofGRUofficers and parroted the very words Stalin had just screamedathim:"Thiscannotbetrue.ItisanEnglishprovocation!Investigate!"Golikov was not alone in this. His counterparts, Merkulov,theGeorgianheadof theNKGB,andFitin,theheadof theInternationalDepartment,theINU,adoptedasimilarsurvi-valstrategy.Bothof themalsobackeddownfromany con-frontation over the intelligence flooding in about Barbarossa.50Barbarossa,1941Even when Fitin took his courage in his hands and suggestedtheysignajointwarningtoStalin,afrightenedMerkulovflatlyrefused,saying,"No-upthereatthetop.[ComradeStalin]knowsfar moreabout intelligence than wedo.Com-radeStalinknowsbest."Forthechiefofanationalintelli-genceservicethisisaremarkablestatement.Faced with intelligence advisers like these, Stalin was easilyabletodeludehimselfaboutGermanintentions.WhenChurchill(armedwithhardEnigmadecryptsthateliteNazidivisionswereinCracow,Poland,andnotintheBalkans)decided to alert Stalin with a personal message from a"trustedagent"inApril1941,Stalinisallegedtohavescrawled"AnotherEnglishprovocation!"inthemarginbeforefilingit,andtooknoaction.Churchill'saccurateandtimely warn-ing was by no means the only one. With the advantage of the20/20visionconferredbyhistory,wecantodayseeclearlybothsidesoftheintelligencebuild-uptoBarbarossa,and,equallyclearly,Stalin'sblindrefusaltocountenanceit.Itmakesastonishingreading.Asearlyas22July1940(beforetheBattleofBritainhadreacheditspeak)theGermanArmy'sChiefofStaff,GeneralFranz Haider, noted that Hitler wanted now to "begin planningfor an attack on Russia". A week later, Jodl and Hitler are bothon record assaying thatRussia mustbe smashed.On9 August1940,theGermanHighCommandissuedthedirectivefor"Otto",thepreliminaryplanningforanattackintheeastsetforspring1941.Andon8September1940,theWehrmacht'snew Quartermaster-Generalat Zossen took over a draftopera-tion order for the invasionof Russia in hissafe.There isampleevidence that Stalin was made aware of these German intentions.On1July1940,ChurchillwrotepersonallytotheSovietdictatorwarninghimofHitler'sintentions.AlthoughtheBritish Prime Minister's letter appears not to have been basedonanyspecifichardintelligence,hewasthewrongmanto51"Comrade Stalin Knows Best"alertStalinand,consideringBritain'spost-Dunkirkplight,itwas the wrong time. Stalin read it merely as a feeble attempt toinvolvetheUSSRinBritain'slostwarand,comingasitdidfromthearchanti-BolshevikChurchill,justanotherclumsyprovocation.Amazingly,he passedthe messagedirectly totheGermanAmbassador,vonSchulenburg,asyetanotherex-ampleofperfidiousAlbion.NoonewasgoingtoaccuseComradeStalinofbreakingfaithovertheNazi-SovietPactwithhisvaluedally,HerrHitler.Toaddtothiscatalogueofignoredwarnings,Stalin'sintelligenceservicewasfeedinghimwithhigh-gradehumanintelligencefromanumberof trustedagentsdeepwithinthecombatants'warmachines.Forexample,JohnCairncross(later revealed to have been the KGB's"Fifth Man"in Britain)was Private Secretary to Lord Hankey, the minister responsiblefor theBritish intelligenceservices in Churchill's government.We do not know exactly what Cairncross passed to his mastersinMoscow,butOlegGordievskyhasclaimedthattherewereliterally"tonsofdocuments"intheKGBarchivessourcedfromCairncrossafterhisrecruitmentinSeptember1940.TheintelligencefromBritainwasconfirmedbyotherre-ports:theSchulze-BoysenspynetworkbasedintheGermanAirMinistry,theTrepper"RedOrchestra"andtheGermantraitorvonSchelihaintheGermanEmbassyinWarsawallcontributedtotheflowofalarmingreportslandingonGo-likov'sdeskinMoscow.Theyconfirmedoneclearandcon-stant trend: Hitler and his generals were planning an attack ontheUSSRinspring1941.Inallfairness,Barbarossa,likeanythoroughmilitaryoperationplannedbytheGermanGeneralStaff,hadasub-stantialdeceptionplan.Indeed,itsdeceptionmeasureswerethe biggest the Wehrmacht ever used; only the Allied plans foD-Dayweremoreall-embracing.Themajorthrustofthedeception effort was the pretence first that Hitler was covering52n4Barbarossa, 1941the Balkans (where Mussolini was in deep trouble fighting theGreeksandAlbanians),andsecondthatthemovementoftroopstotheEastinwinter1940/1wasarusetofooltheBritishintothinkingthatOperationSeaLion,theGermaninvasion of England, had been cancelled. The massive Barbar-ossa troop redeployments were represented as a deception planfor aninvasionof Britain.EventhoughtheGermanGeneralStaff operationorderondeceptionforBarbarossacloseswiththeplaintivewords,"Thestronger our troop concentration in the East,the harder [it willbe]to create uncertainty about our plans....Suggestionsandproposals by subordinate unitsare desired",theoverall decep-tion plan worked, despite the numerous accurate warnings thatpresaged it.Stalin's ears were sealed and his eyes were blind; atherapisttodaywouldsaythathewas"indenial".Howevermuch evidence he was given Stalin just ignored it, believing onlyreportsthatcoincidedwith hisownperceptionof intelligence.Anythingthatdidnotfitwasdismissedasprovocationordisinformation.Eventhoughsomeof thereportsflowingtohimwereamazinglyprecise,intheendStalinbelievedonlywhathewantedtobelieve.EarlyinJune1941theGermanAmbassador,theever-sympatheticvonSchulenburg,briefedthenewheadof theSovietInternationalAffairsDepartmentthat "I am going to tell you something that has never been donein diplomacy before...Germany'sstate secret number one isthat Hitler hastaken the decision tobegin war against youon22 June." Stalin's indignant response to the Politburo was that"Disinformationhasnowreachedambassadoriallevel!"Looking now at thesheer mass of intelligence presentedtotheRussians,itseemsincomprehensiblethatOperationBar-barossawouldhavetakenthembysurprise.Andyetitdid.StalinevenignoredthedetailedintelligenceonBarbarossafromRichardSorge,theNKGB'sprizedagentinJapan,tosuchanextentthattheCommunists'mosttrustworthyand53"Comrade Stalin Knows Best"accurate spy was reduced to weeping "Moscow doesn't believeme" in his mistress's arms. Stalin had rejected Sorge's warningof 19 May1941that nine German armies with150 divisionsweremassingagainsttheUSSR.StalinangrilydenouncedSorgeas"alittleshitwhohas justsethimself upwithsomegoodbusinessesinJapan".Stalin also chose to overlook news of Luftwaffe and panzerunitsrelocatingtoPoland,apersonalstatementbyHitlertohisallyPrincePaulof YugoslaviathathewouldinvadetheUSSRinmid-June,acopyof theoutlineBarbarossaopera-tionorderfromanagent,massiveGermanrailwaytraffictotheEast,GermanGeneralStaffrequestsforthousandsofcopiesof mapsoftheBalticStatesandthewesternUSSR,Wehrmacht defectors giving precise details of their targets andobjectives,andlastbutnotleast,on9June1941,precisedetailsof the instructions to Ambassador vonSchulenburg to"burnalldocuments"andpreparetoleaveMoscow.Thenumberanddetailof theSovietreportsreadlikeanintelli-genceofficer'sindicationsandwarningtextbookandcovereveryavailable intelligencesourceandagency.Someof thewarningswerepositivelybizarre.Thecaseofthe drunken professor is one of the more remarkable and readsmore likea film script than reality.At a diplomatic receptionon15May,ProfessorKarlBomer,theheadof DrGobbels'ForeignPressDepartment,"wavingaglass",announcedtotheastonishedthrongof diplomatsandjournaliststhat"hewouldsoonbeleavinghispostashe wasbeing promotedtobecomeGauleiterof theCrimeaaftertheinvasionof Russiaon 22 June." As Bomer was known to enjoy a good party andwas not