Middle Knowledge and Arminianism Are Compatible: A Response to Roger OlsonOctober 11, 2013, posted by Martin Glynn

This post was written by SEA member Adam Omelianchuk specifically for SEA

What exactly is the problem that Roger Olson has with Molinism? Answer: it collapses into determinism. But it isn’t clear what he means by “determinism.” His concept is ambiguous, and he seems to acknowledge this when he says, “if middle knowledge does not imply determinism, it does convey that [our] lives are predetermined.” So there seems to be two senses of what he means for something to be (pre)determined: one is with respect to being causally necessitated to act; the second is with respect to being fated to act according to some preordained plan. In Olson’s mind, the distinction makes no difference, because both senses are sufficient for what he finds problematic with middle knowledge: God is able to use it to render our actions certain. Once God does that, he says, “then determinism is at the door if not in the living room and that is inconsistent with Arminianism’s basic impulses.”

How should Molinists reply? First, they should deny that middle knowledge entails both causal determinism and theological fatalism. Second, they should argue that the property of being rendered certain is not problematic if the objects of God’s knowledge, that is, the propositions about what free creatures would do in various worlds, are grounded by what free creatures would do. Third, they should maintain that God’s use of middle knowledge is benevolent, because God is benevolent. Let us turn to the first matter.

Contrary to what notable theologians like Bruce Ware believe, it is not the case that middle knowledge is consistent with the standard view of freedom assumed by most Calvinists: compatibilism. Compatibilism is the idea that human freedom is compatible with determinism. That is to say, one’s actions can be free even if they are the outcome of a causal process that began before one was born. What is determinism? The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a memorable way of defining it: it is “the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future.” A Calvinist might modify this to say that God’s pre-creation decree, in conjunction with the laws of nature God ordains, entail every truth about the future. That is just what Calvinists mean by their appeal to God’s “absolute sovereignty” over all things. And this is not compatible with middle knowledge.

Why not? The answer lies in what “middle knowledge” is about, what sort of knowledge it is “in the middle” of: God’s natural knowledge and his free knowledge. God’s free knowledge consists of his knowledge of all truths about what will happen, and the logical “moment” when God has it comes “after” he decides to create the world. God’s natural knowledge consists of all possibilities, that is, all the truths about what could happen, and the logical “moment” when God has it comes “before” he decides to create. Middle knowledge lies between God’s natural and free knowledge: it is knowledge of all the truths about what would happen if God were to create the world Therefore, it is posterior to natural knowledge, but prior to free knowledge. That’s why it’s called “middle knowledge,” and this is what it is about: God’s knowledge of what people would freely do if God were to create a world that is feasible for him to create. We say “feasible” because there are possible worlds that God cannot actualize such as the ones where the Adam doesn’t fall or Peter doesn’t deny Christ; these are possible worlds, to be sure, but given the facts of the matter, Adam and Peter choose otherwise and so determine what sorts of worlds are available for creation. Bill Craig (2011) illustrates how it all looks this way:

The main point to remember is that the kind of freedom people have in this view is libertarian freedom—it is not compatibilistic. Truths about what people could do with compatibilistic freedom are part of God’s natural knowledge, because it is about what is possible within the constraints of God’s decree and the laws of nature he ordains. Middle knowledge presupposes contingent truths about what people would do with libertarian freedom; therefore, there is no middle knowledge if compatibilism is true. Theologians like Ware who argue otherwise are just confused about what middle knowledge entails.

But doesn’t middle knowledge entail theological fatalism? No. Fatalism is true only if one cannot do otherwise, but there is nothing in middle knowledge that implies that we cannot. I have written about the fatalistic argument elsewhere, but it will suffice to say that any argument for the incompatibility of God’s foreknowledge and libertarian freedom is such that, if one of them is true, then Arminianism is false. Interestingly enough, both Calvinists and Open Theists agree that God’s foreknowledge and libertarian freedom are incompatible. Since, this is contrary to the assumptions of Arminianism, Olson should agree that this line of attack is unjustified.

But didn’t God render the Fall certain by the use of his middle knowledge? If we mean by “rendering something certain” to establish the fact that some event will be the case (though not necessarily the case), and by “using middle knowledge to do so” we mean appealing to foreknowledge about which contingent events would occur if God were create our world, then the answer is ‘yes.’ What is supposed to follow from this? Olson makes his main point:

That use of middle knowledge, providentially to render the fall certain, necessarily implies a plan in the mind of God that makes the fall not only part of God’s consequent will but also part of his antecedent will. And, as everyone knows and agrees, the distinction between God’s consequent will and God’s antecedent will is crucial to Arminianism’s argument that God is not the author of sin and evil.

Here is his argument stated more formally:

1. God uses middle knowledge to render the Fall certain only if God has a plan that makes the Fall a part of his antecedent will (premise).

2. God uses middle knowledge to render the Fall certain (from Molinism).

3. Therefore, God has a plan that makes the Fall a part of his antecedent will (MP, 1, 2).

4. If God has a plan that makes the Fall a part of his antecedent will, then God is the author of evil (premise).

5. Therefore, God is the author of evil (MP 3, 4).

Of course [5] is an unacceptable result contrary to the assumptions of Arminianism. What to make of this argument? Certainly, it is deductively valid, but are all of its premises true? I think not. There is no good reason to believe premise [1] is true, and one good reason to believe it is false. With respect to the antecedent/consequent distinction, Molinists can affirm, along with other Arminians, that God desires unbroken fellowship with humans only if humans obey God. That is to say, there is no reason why a Molinist could not affirm that God’s antecedent will is for unbroken fellowship with us, but that he consequently wills our obedience to be a condition of that fellowship. Why couldn’t then God ordain a world where everyone obeys? Well, it is possible that there is no such world feasible for God to create, that is, human beings go wrong in every world where God desires a meaningful relationship with them. This is the heart of Alvin Plantinga’s famous Free-Will Defense, and even if we reject the particulars of Plantinga’s famous argument (the possibility of transworld depravity), it does not necessarily follow that the worlds in which God seeks to accomplish his goals, like building lasting relationships with his creatures, are all without sin. Therefore, Olson’s argument fails.

A concern: what grounds the fact of the matter concerning Adam and Eve’s decision to disobey?This was forcefully brought up by one of Olson’s readers who noted that the truth value of counterfactuals of creaturely freedoms must be explanatorily posterior to the creature’s free choices. As he remarks “this is a huge problem for Molinism because the providential usefulness of middle knowledge is predicated on its being explanatorily *prior* to actual creaturely choices.” What this means is that God knows a libertarian free choice of a creature only if the choice is determined by the creature; it cannot be the case that God knows it without the creature’s existence in an a priori fashion. Thus Molinism is internally inconsistent, and Olson couldn’t agree more.

I think this worry is unfounded. Molinists like Alfred Freddoso and Tom Flint have developed a response that preserves the a posteriority of God’s knowledge concerning the choices of free creatures that do not exist. Here is how it goes.

1. The statement “It will be the case that Adam and Eve decide to disobey God” is now grounded if and only if the statement “‘Adam and Eve decide to disobey God’ is now grounded” will be the case.

From (1) we can deduce that there was a time when God knew what Adam and Eve would do, and if God knows our days before we exist (Psalm 139:16), then God knows what Adam and Eve would do before they exist. Both Molinists and most anti-Molinists agree (save Open Theists). Now call the world we inhabit Alpha:

2. The statement “It would be the case that ‘Adam and Eve decide to disobey God (if God were to create Alpha)’” is now grounded if and only if the statement “‘Adam and Eve decide to disobey God’ is now grounded” would be the case (if God were to create Alpha).

From (2) we can deduce that God knows what Adam and Eve would do if he were to create Alpha (the world in which we now inhabit). But Molinists and anti-Molinists like Olson disagree! Why? If it is because knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom must be explanatorily posterior to actual creaturely free choices, then there is nothing in (2) that denies this. If Adam and Eve’s existence is required for their choices to be known, then how is it that from (1) we can deduce that there was a time when God knew what Adam and Eve would do before they were made? I suspect that we can’t, and that would help explain why Olson’s reader wrote what he wrote—he is an Open Theist afterall. But Arminius wasn’t and Arminians like Olson aren’t, so it seems that this critique from our Open Theist friend proves too much; if it is true, it undermines Arminianism altogether.

How, then, does God use middle knowledge for providential advantage? Take for example the case of the atonement. Let us cite Acts 2:23 and 4:27-28 (NIV) as the data of Scripture to be explained:

This man was handed over to you by God’s deliberate plan and foreknowledge; and you, with the help of wicked men, put him to death by nailing him to the cross. [...] Indeed Herod and Pontius Pilate met together with the Gentiles and the people of Israel in this city to conspire against [Y]our holy servant Jesus, whom [Y]ou anointed. They did what [Y]our power and will had decided beforehand should happen.

The standard Calvinist interpretation of these passages is to explain away the “tension” between human freedom and God’s sovereignty with an appeal to compatibilism. On Molinism, it is by virtue of their middle knowledge that each member of Godhead knew what we would do if the Father sent the Son, and yet the Father sent him anyway so as to make it possible for us to share in the love and fellowship of the triune God. The “tension” between God’s sovereignty and our responsibility disappears in a way that it doesn’t on Calvinism, because on Calvinism it is utterly mysterious how we remain responsible (or even obstinate [Acts 7:29]), for our sins even though they are determined by events long before we were even born (for an extended argument along these lines, see McCall, 2012).

The way God uses middle knowledge for his providential advantage, then, is that in light of what he knows about what would happen with specific people in specific circumstances, God decides to create just those people and just those circumstances to freely carry out what God intends (for more see Craig’s essay in Jowers et al., 2011). This makes Olson worried. But why? He tells a story that is supposed to represent the problem:

Suppose I know one of my students so well that I know (beyond any possibility of being wrong) that if I suggest he read a certain book he will misunderstand the subject of our course and go on to fail it. Without the book, he would pass the course. I suggest he read the book. Why? Well, perhaps because I need someone to fail the course. I don’t grade on a curve and the dean is worried that I am not upholding academic standards. All my students pass with flying colors. My career is in jeopardy as is the academic credibility of the school. So I use my middle knowledge of the student’s dispositions and inclinations to bring it about infallibly that he fails the course. Nothing I did took away his free will. He read the book voluntarily (no external coercion was used, only inducement).

In the form of a rhetorical question, Olson says that it is obvious who is responsible for the student failing the course. What to make of this? The worry here is that God could do bad things with his middle knowledge. But there is an obvious response to this: God is not so cruel to be manipulative for malevolent ends, nor is he so foolish to rob us of our moral responsibility by making himself an object of moral blame. Yes, it’s true: if God abused his middle knowledge like this, he would not be good. But God is good, and the bare possibility of abuse (if that is possible for God!) does not negate the use.

To conclude, I think Olson’s objections against the compatibility of middle knowledge and Arminianism fail. But whatever we might think of his objections, we should embrace and take comfort in God’s providence over all things. While God’s omnipotence may be a cause for fear, there is a comfort to be found in a love so perfect that it drives out fear (1 John 4:18). It does not matter if God’s providence is “meticulous” (an ambiguous term to say the least); it matters whether his providence is loving. I suspect there is an aversion to “meticulous” providence because today’s Calvinists so readily underemphasize God’s universal love for all people; the idea that God might use it to give everyone “optimal grace” is foreign to the modern Christian (see Blanchette and Walls, 2013). Molinism can help subvert that. But there may be more to it than a tired debate between Calvinists and Arminians; we may not like the idea of God being in charge at all. In that case, it is worth echoing the Reformed philosopher Jamie Smith when he says, “How tragic that Christians are so captive to the spirit of the age that proclamation of God’s sovereignty is no longer heard as comfort” (from Twitter).

Response to Dr. Olson on Middle Knowledge

October 10, 2013, posted by Godismyjudge

Dr. Roger Olson has repeatedly publicly objected to the doctrine of middle knowledge.[1]   His basic objections are that middle knowledge amounts to determinism, makes God the author of sin and is a form of Calvinism rather than Arminianism.  This is a response to Dr. Olson’s two most recent blog posts criticizing middle knowledge (here and here).

Arminius and the Remonstrants on God’s Middle Knowledge

Dr. Olson argues that God’s having middle knowledge is fine, but His using middle knowledge amounts to determinism.  But what Dr. Olson suggests is equivalent to divine amnesia since to totally get rid of middle knowledge from God’s decision making; middle knowledge must not be part of God’s conscious thought.  Now perhaps Dr. Olson might say, God uses His middle knowledge in His decision making, but He just doesn’t give it much if any weight.  But this sounds like irrational or impulsive decision making and God is Wisdom personified.  So Dr. Olson leaves us guessing what he has in mind here.

In any event, Arminius said God both has and uses middle knowledge.  In Arminius’s response to Perkins, he says:

God issues decrees based on what He knows via middle knowledge and He would not make those decrees had the creature in God’s middle knowledge acted differently (p. 283)[2];

Contra Supra-lapsarianism, God could not have decreed to glorify Himself through the salvation of sinners without first considering man as fallen (via middle knowledge) (p. 295-296);

God’s permission is defined as His being unwilling to hinder an event He foresees would occur without His hindering it – yet we cannot conclude from this that God willed the permitted event (p. 287);

God has middle knowledge about whatever He permits (p. 394); God can prevent our actions by knowing how we would respond to various

persuasions and providing them (p. 423); God’s prevention is successful, not because of His power, but because of His

middle knowledge (p. 425); God does not harden sinners unless He knows via middle knowledge that the

person will not respond to warnings (p. 329); God decided to prolong Hezekiah’s life and to spare Nineveh, because He

knew they would repent (p. 342-343); God knows who will freely assent to His grace (p. 481).

This all is just from Arminius’ Review of Perkins.  Middle knowledge is foundational to Arminius’s thought rather than being a foreign body. Indeed, one wonders just how Dr. Olson defines Arminianism.  Arminius taught middle knowledge.  So did Episcopius (Works of Simon Episcopius. Page 303); Grotius (Opera p. 351-354); Corvinus (Against Peter Moulin, page 73 Chapter 5, Section 5); Vorstius (Tractatus theologicus de Deo. Page 47) and Grevinchovius, Dissertatio theological du duabus questionibus – cited in Turretin.  Institutes.  Volume 1 page 213).  One would be hard pressed to find any original Remonstrant who didn’t teach middle knowledge, so to say middle

knowledge is a foreign body to “Classic Arminianism” is to not allow history to define “Classical Arminianism”.

Does God use Middle Knowledge for Evil?

Dr. Olson contests that middle knowledge undermines the classic Arminian distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will.[3]  The antecedent/consequent will distinction is a fancy way of saying there’s a difference between what God wants you to do and what God wants to do about what you have done.  For example, when commenting on Matthew 23:37-39, Arminius said by God’s antecedent will, He wanted to gather the children of Jerusalem to Him, but by His consequent will, after He was rejected, He judged Jerusalem. (p.463) As Limborich pointed out, the antecedent/consequent will distinction is basically a conditional decree.[4]  Thus God provides man with significant freedom in that God ends up acting differently than He would have acted, had His creation chosen otherwise.

Theologians sometimes explain God’s use of middle knowledge in ways that do undermine the antecedent/consequent will distinction.  For example, Thomas Flint said God unconditionally elects some for salvation and then consults His middle knowledge to find a way to save only His elect.[5]   I call this “Supra-lapsarian Molinism”, because God decides the ends first and then decides on the way to get there.  This is highly inconsistent with Arminianism and the antecedent/consequent will distinction[6].  So the real question is not if God uses middle knowledge, but rather how He uses it.

To avoid this problem, Arminius explained the order of decrees as logically progressing forward in time (as opposed to supra-lapsarianism, which start from the end of time and works backwards against time).  By God’s antecedent will, God desired that Adam not sin.  But given God knew Adam would sin; God consequently decreed: that Christ be the foundation of salvation, and that faith be the condition for salvation, and to provide prevenient grace to enable us to believe.  By God’s antecedent will, God desires all men to believe and be saved, but given God knows who would believe and be saved, God consequently decrees to save those who would believe.

This provides the global view but Arminius followed this line of reasoning in more detailed matters as well.  By God’s antecedent will, God desires Pharaoh to repent.  But given God knows Pharaoh has not repented and would not repent, God consequently wills to harden Pharaoh.  Consider how Un-Arminian the reverse would be – if God first decides to harden Pharaoh without considering Pharaoh’s obstinacy.  Had Arminian-Molinists reversed this order, we would be guilty of the error Olson supposes.  But God does not do such things, not because He lacks knowledge but because He is good and loves all mankind and desires to communicate His goodness to all mankind.

Does Middle Knowledge Amount to Determinism?

Dr. Olson objects to God using middle knowledge “to render certain that every creature does what they do by creating them and placing them in circumstances where he knows they will “freely” do something”.  So does Arminius. The word ‘certain’ can either mean “free from doubt” or it can mean “fixed and determined” (dictionary.com entry).    Using “fixed and determined” as a definition, Arminius objected to the idea that future

events are certain – because he rejected determinism.  But given the definition of “free from doubt”, Arminius says God’s foreknowledge is certain – because God foreknows all things.  Dr. Olson seems to be equivocating these two definitions of certain.

For Arminius, it does not follow that, given God’s “creating them and placing them in circumstances where he knows they will “freely” do something” that God has “rendered that event certain”.  Rather, God has no doubt that the event will happen.  Arminius carefully distinguished between a certain or logically necessary conclusion to a syllogism and causal necessity.  Arminius understood that given God foreknows an event, that event will happen and the opposite will not happen.  (James Arminius. Works of James Arminius. 1875 London Edition. Examination of Gomarus on Predestination. Volume 3. p 547-549)  One might see a contradiction in Arminius’ views if they mix certainty with necessity, which apparently is what Olson has done.

Dr. Olson quotes a guess commenter on his blog who argues if God knows, say “you would accept the manager job if offered” then, you “couldn’t act so as to bring about its falsity”.  I have little doubt this commenter is an open theist, since such an objection works just as well against Dr. Olson’s simple foreknowledge view as it does against middle knowledge.  But that aside, following Occham, we can act in such a way that if we did, God’s middle knowledge would have been different.  Libertarian freedom is defined in causal terms.  It’s about what agents can do and our ability to cause events.  Thus libertarian freedom is the ability to choose something or not given all the causal forces influencing use.  So while libertarian freedom requires the ability to cause alternative events; it does not require the ability to change future tense propositions from true to false or undefined to false.  It’s enough to have the ability to cause an alternative event, such that if you do cause it, predictions about that event would be true.

Book Illustration

As we have seen, Dr. Olson’s objections to middle knowledge come under two distinct headings: 1) God would use middle knowledge in immoral ways and 2) the philosophical objection that any use of middle knowledge would amount to determinism.  Let’s take Dr. Olson’s example of a Professor recommending a book to a student, while knowing the student will misunderstand the book and fail.  Ironically, this example illustrates Dr. Olson’s two main misrepresentations of middle knowledge. First, people do not choose to misunderstand things so Olson substitutes determinism for libertarian freedom.  Second, the Professor’s goal was both selfish and set prior to his decision to recommend the book. He wants to flunk someone and his knowledge is just a means to that end.  But this is like supra-lapsarian Molinism and God’s love and goodness to His creation are the reasons He doesn’t do this. Arminian-Molinism is more like a professor recommending a book because it’s the best way for all his student to pass and he wants them all to pass. But with sorrow, he knows that even if he recommends the book, some will not pass anyways, because they would choose not to study.  Can we blame the Professor?

Conclusion

My primary objection to Dr. Olson’s position is that the bible simply teaches God knows what we would choose in various settings (Exodus 3:19, 1 Kings 11:2-9, 1 Samuel 23:6-10, Ezekiel 3:6-7, Matthew 11:21-23, Matthew 23:27-32, 1 Corinthians

2:8) .  Secondarily, I am concerned that so called simple foreknowledge is providentially useless and therefore unable to account for the biblical texts on God’s providence (Genesis 50:20, Proverbs 16:9, Acts 4:28, Ephesians 1:11).[7]  The concern is Christians holding Dr. Olson’s position will read their bibles, find things that don’t fit, and end up troubled and primed for Calvinists to come swoop them up.

The reality is Calvinism, Molinism and Open Theism are philosophically robust systems and simple foreknowledge is not.  For example, one can go to Amazon.com and buy dozens of resources on Calvinism, Molinism or Open Theism.  Good luck finding resources on simple foreknowledge.   One wonders if the simple foreknowledge position is under-articulated because it’s just not a well thought through position and it cannot stand up to criticism.  It’s perfectly OK and in some cases applaudable to simply say “I don’t know” but please don’t use ignorance as a sort of one way glass to hide behind and criticize others without subjecting your own position to scrutiny.

Middle knowledge vs. simple foreknowledge is one of the many lively “in house” Arminian debates.  But to some extent, I think Dr. Olson is putting in house Arminian business out on the street, by publicly attacking middle knowledge.  Never-the-less I am very grateful Dr. Olson says “I’m certainly not going to say that one cannot be an Arminian and a Molinist” and such comments give me hope that Arminian-Molinsits and Arminian-NonMolinists can work together even without full agreement.

[1] Olson. Arminian Theology. P 196 and Against Calvinism.  P 183-186

[2] All page numbers from Works of James Arminius. Volume 3 1853 Edition

[3] Arminius explains that God’s antecedent will (His will for us logically prior to our will) is a velity or mild desire rather than a final decision or mental resolution.   God does not employee His omnipotence to accomplish His antecedent will.  Yet it still reveals God’s character and intentions.

[4] Philip van Limborch “A Compleat System, or Body of Divinity, both Speculative and Practical” p. 71

[5]  Flint, Thomas.  Divine Providence The Molinist Account.  Principle of Predilection. p. 117.  Flint is following Fransisco Suarez and Robert Bellarmine’s Congruism – see New Advent Catholic Encylopedia entry on Congruism.

[6] In Molinism, unlike Compatible Determinism, God cannot make you do something.  He cannot decree things contrary to what He knows you would choose.  So on Supra-Lapsarian Molinism, what if God elects some who would not repent?  So Supra-Lapsarian Molinism is fundamentally inconsistent with William Lane Craig’s theory of trans-world damnation, wherein the lost are lost in ever feasible world.

[7] The typical argument is that simple foreknowledge is logically “too late” to change the foreknown event.  This is sometimes illustrated by the so called Grandfather Paradox in which someone goes back in time and kills his own Grandfather.

Molinism, Calvinism, and I CorinthiansOctober 10, 2012, posted by Martin Glynn

I just finished Dr. Olson’s book Against Calvinism (It is really difficult to find time to read when you have a one year old). In appendix 1, Dr. Olson goes over several attempts by Calvinists to protect God’s character despite their theology. One particular argument caught my eye: the use of middle knowledge.Roger Olson explains:

Molinism… is the belief that God possesses “middle knowledge” — knowledge of what any creature would do freely in any possible set of circumstances. The creature may possess libertarian freedom — freedom not compatible with determinism and able to do other than it does — but God knows what he or she wold do with that ability in an conceivable situation. [Roger Olson, Against Calvinism, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2011), 184]

Molinism wasn’t originally conceived to support Calvinism, but Semi-Augustinianism (which is similar to Arminianism). However, some Calvinists have attempted to use it nonetheless. Again Olson explains:

In order to assure that the sin God wants to happen does happen without him being its direct cause or responsible for it (in a guilty sense), God simply places the creature in a situation where he knows the creature will develop a controlling motive of his own accord and act sinfully out of it. [Ibid]

None of this is new to me. Olson does a very good job of explaining why this concept doesn’t work (essentially no matter how much space you put between the cause and the effect, if the cause makes the effect definite, it is culpable). Still, as I was reading this I remembered this verse:

No temptation has overtaken you that is not common to man. God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your ability, but with the temptation he will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it. -1 Corinthians 10:13

This is exactly the opposite of what a Molinist Calvinist claims. According to Scripture, God will never tempt you beyond what you are capable of resisting. According to the Molinist Calvinist, God determines the limits of what you are capable of resisting, and then intentionally tempts you in that exact way, when that sin would be for His glory of course.

I wonder how regular Calvinism would deal with this verse as well. The very fact God always provides a way of escape strongly implies, if not describes, the concept of contrary choice (i.e. libertarian free will): the capacity to have done other than what you actually do. If God forces you to sin (and yes Calvinists, I said “force”. Just own it), then how does He also give you a way out? I don’t think it makes sense.

Roger Olson, “Are Arminian Theology and Middle Knowledge Compatible?”October 8, 2013, posted by SEA

[This post was taken from here, where comments can be made.]

One of the most basic impulses of Arminianism is that God is not the author of sin and evil—even indirectly. On this virtually everyone knowledgeable about Arminian theology agrees. Divine determinism, the belief that God directly or indirectly determines all that happens according to a predetermined plan, was rejected by Arminius and has been rejected by all Arminians since him. I have demonstrated that in Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities and Against Calvinism. Arminian theology and divine determinism are like oil and water; they cannot mix. And the reason they cannot mix is because of the Arminian Grundmotif which is God’s goodness. If divine determinism is true, the fall and all its consequences, including eternal hell, are part of God’s plan and made necessary by God even if only indirectly.

In a now famous and much discussed article in Sixteenth Century Journal (XXVII:2 [1996]: 337-352) Dutch theologian Eef Dekker asked “Was Arminius a Molinist?” and answered in the affirmative. (Molinism is, of course, synonymous with belief in middle knowledge.) Several leading Arminius scholars have agreed. Reformed theologian Richard Muller agreed in God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius (Baker, 1991). (He came to the same conclusion as Dekker before him.) Dutch theologian William den Boer agrees in God’s Twofold Love: The Theology of Jacob Arminius (1559-1609) (Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2010). Now, in two recent studies of Arminius’s theology three American theologians agree. (I will be responding to their two books at a professional conference in November, so I’m going to decline to name them or address their arguments directly for now.)

So it would seem a consensus is developing that Arminius himself was a “Protestant Molinist” and may have actually introduced Molinism, middle knowledge, into Protestant theology. (Molina was himself a Catholic contemporary of Arminius.) However, other Arminius scholars are not so sure. One of the most scholarly and exhaustive studies of Arminius’s theology is William G. Witt’s Notre Dame doctoral dissertation which I used extensively in Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities. Witt argued that Arminius mentioned but did not use middle knowledge. Another Arminius scholar who agrees with Witt is F. Stuart Clarke, author of The Ground of Election: Jacob Arminius’ Doctrine of the Work and Person of Christ (Paternoster, 2006).

Without doubt one can find references to middle knowledge in Arminius’s writings. The question is whether he relied on middle knowledge to reconcile God’s foreknowledge with free will (and there is no doubt he believed in libertarian free will) and whether he used middle knowledge to explain God’s sovereignty in providentially governing the whole universe including creatures’ free decisions and actions.

Dekker argues that, in using middle knowledge, Arminius unwittingly fell into determinism. Den Boer admits that even if Arminius’s use of middle knowledge did not imply determinism, it raised some serious questions for Arminius’s consistency—especially in the practical realm. That is, even if middle knowledge does not imply determinism, it does convey the impression, at least to the untutored, that their lives are predetermined.

I have argued here before that believing in God’s middle knowledge, that knowledge whereby God knows not only what will happen but would happen, not only what free creatures will do but what they would do freely in any possible situation, set of circumstances, is not in and of itself inconsistent with Arminianism’s basic impulses which have to do with God’s goodness (his “twofold love”). However, I have argued, and continue to maintain, once one believes that God uses middle knowledge to render certain that every creature does what they do by creating them and placing them in circumstances where he knows they will “freely” do something, then determinism is at the door if not in the living room and that is inconsistent with Arminianism’s basic impulses. It makes God the author of sin and evil even if only inadvertently.

In order to test this we must go back to the first disobedience—Adam’s and Eve’s fall. The question is not whether God knew they would disobey but whether God rendered their act of disobedience certain.

Advocates of middle knowledge usually rely on a distinction between “certain” or “infallible” and “necessary,” with only the latter making God the author of sin and evil. The argument is that God’s use of middle knowledge to render the fall certain, even infallibly (it could not have not happened given God’s foreknowledge of what Adam and Eve would do and his creation of them and placing them in that situation) does not render the fall necessary.

I tend to think that’s a distinction without a difference.

That use of middle knowledge, providentially to render the fall certain, necessarily implies a plan in the mind of God that makes the fall not only part of God’s consequent will but also part of his antecedent will. And, as everyone knows and agrees, the

distinction between God’s consequent will and God’s antecedent will is crucial to Arminianism’s argument that God is not the author of sin and evil.

Why else would God use his middle knowledge providentially? And why would he use it at all if not for the purpose of meticulous providence?

Many Calvinists have used Molinism, middle knowledge, to “explain” predestination and reprobation in order to get God “off the hook,” so to speak, as not the author of sin and evil. I think, for example, of Millard Erickson and Bruce Ware—two evangelical Calvinists who use middle knowledge as the “key” to reconciling God’s sovereignty and human free will. However, they at least admit that their view of free will is compatibilism—that free will is compatible with determinism. In other words, if my argument is correct, they “get it”—middle knowledge used by God for providential advantage requires a compatibilist view of free will.

To the best of my knowledge no Arminian claims to believe in compatibilist; all embrace libertarian free will.

But, to me, at least, libertarian free will means “ability to do otherwise than one does.”

Now, admittedly, Arminian believers in middle knowledge, including those who believe God uses middle knowledge to render creatures’ decisions and actions certain according to a plan, claim to believe that creatures who sin do so with libertarian freedom. In other words, they could do otherwise. Well, at least Adam and Eve could have done otherwise than disobey God. (The picture gets more complicated for their posterity under the effects of the fall.) But could they have?

If middle knowledge is true and God uses it for providential advantage, as Richard Muller says, offering inducements to creatures that God knows they will follow given their dispositions and inclinations, then God is not only “in control” but “actually controlling” everything including Adam’s and Eve’s disobedience. They could not have done otherwise even if they did it “freely.” That is the very essence of compatibilism!

Let’s use an illustration. Suppose I know one of my students so well that I know(beyond any possibility of being wrong) that if I suggest he read a certain book he will misunderstand the subject of our course and go on to fail it. Without the book, he would pass the course. I suggest he read the book. Why? Well, perhaps because I need someone to fail the course. I don’t grade on a curve and the dean is worried that I am not upholding academic standards. All my students pass with flying colors. My career is in jeopardy as is the academic credibility of the school. So I use my middle knowledge of the student’s dispositions and inclinations to bring it about infallibly that he fails the course. Nothing I did took away his free will. He read the book voluntarily (no external coercion was used, only inducement). (Note: None of that would happen; it’s purely hypothetical.)

Now, who is really responsible for, the “author of,” the student failing the course?

And can it fairly be said that by rendering his failure certain, using my middle knowledge, I did not make it necessary?

Now, there’s no point in appealing to God’s freedom to do whatever he wants to do. This is a debate among Arminians and Arminians, following Arminius, are not nominalists. We all agree that God is essentially good by nature and cannot simply do anything capable of being put into words. No informed Arminian would say “Whatever God does is automatically good, just because God does it, period.” So that objection to my scenario isn’t relevant to this context—a debate among Arminians.

I tend to agree with Eef Dekker, against several leading Arminius scholars, that ifArminius used middle knowledge to explain God’s sovereignty, then he unwittingly contradicted himself. He contradicted his own most basic principle which is that God is by no means the author of sin and evil. He unwittingly fell into determinism at that point and should not have relied on middle knowledge. Why he did, if he did, is a separate question. I think reasonable answers can be imagined (having to do with his desire to build bridges between himself and his critics).

So what does this mean for Arminians? I’m certainly not going to say that one cannot be an Arminian and a Molinist. What I will say is that, in my opinion, Molinism is a foreign body in Arminianism even if Arminius himself used it! If he did, it was a foreign body in his own theology in the sense that it conflicted with his own basic belief commitments about God’s goodness, God not being in any sense the author of sin and evil, and creatures’ free wills (especially in disobedience).

No one should be surprised if a theologian falls into contradiction with himself at times—especially if he (or she) writes much over a very long period of time. I’m a historical theologian and have studied the theologies of virtually every major Christian theologian from Irenaeus to Pannenberg (and beyond). In every case I find some tension, some element of conflict within the theologian’s own system.

Besides, being Arminian does not require absolute agreement with Arminius. If that were the case, he would have been the only Arminian (and maybe not even he would be!).

Why Some Arminians Believe Molinism Is IncoherentOctober 9, 2013, posted by SEA

[This post was taken from here, where comments can be made, and was originally a comment onthis Roger Olson post.]

Very nice essay, Roger. You’ve put your finger on a key internal tension within Molinism.

While Molinism is *officially* committed to a libertarian view of creaturely freedom (and thus soft determinists like Ware are *not* Molinists, even if they co-opt the label), such a view of freedom requires that middle knowledge counterfactuals of actual creatures be explanatorily *posterior* to actual creaturely free choices. Thus, if Adam and Eve are free (in the libertarian sense) to eat or not eat the forbidden fruit, then it must not be fixed *independently* of their actual choices that IF they were to be placed in such-and-such circumstances that they would eat the forbidden fruit. For it the truth of that conditional were independently fixed, then they would have no say about whether it is true, and so couldn’t act so as to bring about its falsity. This means that they couldn’t do otherwise than eat the fruit in those circumstances, which in turn means that they weren’t free in a libertarian sense, contrary to hypothesis. Hence, the truth values of middle knowledge counterfactuals must be explanatorily *posterior* to actual creaturely free choices. But this is a huge problem for Molinism because the providential usefulness of middle knowledge is predicated on its being explanatorily *prior* to actual creaturely choices. That’s the only way it can inform God’s creative decree. So Molinism is internally inconsistent. Its alleged reconciliation of creaturely libertarian freedom and meticulous divine providence depends on both affirming and denying that the truth values of middle knowledge counterfactuals are explanatorily *posterior* to actual creaturely free choices.