Michael McDermott (1988). a Russellian Account of Belief Sentences

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Scots Philosophical Association

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A Russellian Account of Belief SentencesAuthor(s): Michael McDermottSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 151 (Apr., 1988), pp. 141-157Published by: on behalf of the and theOxford University Press Scots Philosophical Association

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2/18

The

hilosophicaluarterly

ol. 8 No.

151

ISSN 0031-8094

2.00

Vol.

38

No. 151

April

988

A

RUSSELLIAN

ACCOUNT

OF

BELIEF

SENTENCES

BY

MICHAEL

MCDERMOTT

I

Russell's

paradigm

was:

(1)

Othello

believes hatDesdemona

oves Cassio.

He saw

this1 s a relation etween our

hings

three

people

and

loving.

Not

only

do

the names Desdemona' and 'Cassio' have

purely

eferential

occurrence

n

the

content-sentence,

o

also does the

predicate

loves';

it

refers

o

loving.

The

4-place

belief-relation

ppealed

o

here

will

uffice or he

construal

of certain

ther

elief-ascriptions,

ut

not

many.

(2)

Othellobelieves

hat

Desdemona s

fair.

This doesnot ayofanyfour hingshat hefirstelieves hesecondbears

the

third o

the

fourth. o

follow

Russell,

we must see it as a

3-place

relation

etween

Othello,

Desdemona

and

fairness.

In

general,

we

need a

distinct elief-relationor

each distinct

orm f

content-sentence.

o be

precise,

et us

call a 'sentence

orm'what

you get

when

you

replace

ach name

nd

predicate

na sentence

y

variable.

hen

for ach

n-place

entence

orm

e need n+

-place

belief-relation,

hich

we

shall

write s

'B' followed

y

thesentence

orm

n

square

brackets.

his

is

to be thoughtf as a logically nstructuredredicate ymbol.

The sentence

orm

f Desdemona

is

fair',

or

xample,

s

'x

is

F',

or

better,

x

has

F'.

The

corresponding

-place

belief-relation

s

B[x

has

F]'.

The Russellian

nalysis

f

(2)

is:

1

B.

Russell,

The

Problems

f

Philosophy

London,

1912),

ch.

12.

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3/18

142

MICHAEL

McDERMOTT

(3)

B[x

has

F]

(Othello,

Desdemona,

fairness),

whichwe can read

as

Othello

believes

that Desdemona has fairness .

Similarly,

(4)

Ralph

believes hatOrtcutts a

spy,

says

that

Ralph,

Ortcutt nd

spyhood

tand

n

this ame relation:

(5)

B[x

has

F]

(Ralph,

Ortcutt,

pyhood).

A

sentence

ormwill n

general

ontain

uantifiers

nd

truth-functional

connectives,s well as individual nd

predicate

ariables.The sentence

form f Someone

s

fair',

or

nstance,

s

(Ex)

(x

has

F)',

with

ust

theone

free

variable

F'.

The

corresponding

elief-relation

s

2-place;

this is

'B[(Ex) (x

has

F)]',

the

relation f

believing-to-be-instantiated.

(6)

B[(Ex) (x

has

F)]

(Ralph, pyhood),

says

that

Ralph

stands

o

spyhood

n

this

relation.

The English entence

(7)

Ralph

believes

hat

omeone

s a

spy

is

commonly

elt o be

ambiguous,

nd

it is

a

virtue f the

Russellian

account

hat t

provides

wo

eparate

onstruals.

irst,

s a

simple

-place

predication

i.e.

(6)

above.

Second,

as the existential

uantification

f a

3-place predication:

(8)

(Ey)

B[x

has

F]

(Ralph,y, spyhood).

If

6)

is

true,

Ralph

believes

hat

here re

spies.

f

8)

is

true,

Ralph

tands

to

some

particular,

ut

unnamed,

ndividual

n

the relation

f

believing-

that-he-is-a-spy.

6)

and

(8)

involve distinct

elief-relations,

nd

are

logicallyndependent.

However,

6)

will

normally

e true

f

(8)

is,

given

minimal

ationality

n

Ralph's

part.)

There s commonlyelt o be

a

similarmbiguity

bout

belief-ascriptions

with

a

definite

escription

n

the

content-sentence,

nd

the

Russellian

account

handles hem

n

the same

way.

Take:

(9)

Ralph

believes

hat he

man n the

brown

hat s a

spy.



4/18

A

RUSSELLIAN

ACCOUNT OF

BELIEF

SENTENCES

143

This

may

be construed s:

(10)

B[x

has

F]

(Ralph,

the

man n

the

brown

hat,

spyhood)

or

as:

(11)

B[the

thing

whichhas

F

has

G]

(Ralph,

man-in-brown-hat-

hood,

spyhood).

The

terms f the belief-relation

n

(10)

are two men and

spyhood.

he

terms

of the differentelief-relation

n

(11)

are

Ralph

and two hoods.

Given

that he

man

n

the

brownhat s

Ortcutt,

4)

is

equivalent

o

(10),

but ndependentf (11).

Geach2

objected

o Russell's

multiplicity

f

belief-relations.

here are

infinitely any

entence

orms,

nd hence

nfinitely any

distinct elief-

relations.

But how could

anyone

come

to

master

our

psychological

vocabulary,

f t

contains

nfinitely

any

distinct

redicates?

The

difficulty

ay

be

overcome

y

a

slightly

eeper

analysis.

As a first

step,

we

can make the

sentence orm

tself term f the belief-relation.

Instead

of

construing

1),

for

instance,

s

a

4-place

relationbetween

Othello,Desdemona, ovingndCassio,wemay onstruetas a (different)

relation etween

hesefour

hings

nd

the

sentence orm

Rxy.

This leaves

us stillwith

nfinitely any

elief-relations,

f

varying

dicity,

ut there s

now

no morebar to unified

mastery

hanwith he

variable

dicity

f true

of'.

Adopting

arski's

trick,

we can

reduce

them ll to a

single

3-place

belief-relation,

etween a

believer,

sentence

form,

nd

a

sequence.

Alternatively,

e could make belief

relation etween

believer nd a

proposition,

nderstood s the ordered

pair

of

a sentenceform nd a

sequence.Eitherway, here s a singlebelief-relation.

The

availability

f

such

strategies

nswersGeach's

objection.

Having

seen

this,however,

propose

o

revert o the evel

of

Russell's

multiplicity

of

unanalysed

elief-relations.

Geach3

lso

disliked ussell's dea thatwe couldbe related

o

things

ike

loving

nd

spyhood

that

s,

to universals. o

meet

his

worry,

e need to

get

clear

on

just

what kind

of

universals he

objects

of belief

might

be

-

classes,

ttributes,

r what?What s

loving?

What

s this

hing

alled

spyhood?

I

suggest

hat

we take

hint

rom ur talkof

dispositions.

he

objects

f

some

dispositions

re universals.

f

you

are

allergic

o a certain

hemical,

2

P.

Geach,

Mental

Acts

London, 1957),

?

13.

3

bid.



5/18

144

MICHAEL McDERMOTT

say,

that

s not a relation o the

instances

f the chemical-

neither o

particular

nstances

f

t,

nor to the

big,

scatteredndividual

he

nstances

jointly

omprise.

or

there

may

be

no instances.

ndeed,

theymay

have

decidednot to makeanyof the chemical ecausehey new, n theoretical

grounds,

hat

people

were

allergic

o

it.

What

kind of

universals

re the

objects

of

dispositions?

ot classes.

There

might

e

two

chemicals

whichhave never

been

manufactured,

o

that he class of instances f each is the null

class,

and

yetyou only

be

allergic

o one.

Or

if

all red

things appened

o be hard

things,

nd

vice

versa,

you

could still e

allergic

o red

things

without

eing

llergic

o

hard

things,

s

long

as there ould e hard

things

which

were

not red. But

not

attributes,

ither.

f

you

are

allergic

o

water,

ou

are

allergic

o

H20,

even

though

water' nd 'H20' are not

ogically

quivalent.

he universals e

need are

kinds. he

identity

ondition orkinds s

not

simply

oextension,

and not

ogical quivalence;

t s coextension

y

aw

of nature. hat is

the

required dentity

ondition or he

objects

f

dispositions.

f

you

are

allergic

to

F's,

that s because there s a law

of

nature

onnecting ou

with 's.

If

t

is also a law

of

nature hat

ll F's are

G's

andvice

versa,

hen here s

a

lawof

nature

onnecting

ou

with

G's,

in

the same

way you

are

allergic

o G's.

My

answer

o

Geach, now,

s that ince talk f

relations

etween

eople

and universals ccurs nquiterespectable arts fscience, here an be no

harm

n

construing

elief-ascriptions

s

relating

eople

to universals f the

same

kind,

.e. kinds.

pyhood

s

a

kind,

1-place

kind;

oving

s a

2-place

kind.

Incidentally,

n this

view

oving

does notexist

only

f

instantiated.

You

can

be

allergic

o

oving,

r

stand

n

belief-relationso

it,

even

f

there

is none

actually oing

on

in

yourvicinity

or

anywhere.)

It

might

e

objected

hat

kinds,

o

construed,

on'tdo as

the

objects

f

belief,

ecause

you

can

believe,

or

nstance,

hat

yourglass

containswater

without elieving hat t containsH20, even thoughwater'and 'H20'

refer o the same

kind.The

objection

verlooks

he

ambiguity

f

(12)

S believes

his

glass

contains

H20.

'H20'

is a definite

escription:

t

means

something

ike the

compound

f

hydrogen

nd

oxygen

n

the ratio

2:1

by

volume'.

f

(12)

is construed s

relating

to

H20,

i.e. to

water,

t is indeed

equivalent

o:

(13)

S believes

his

glass

contains

water.

But there

s also

a construal f

(12)

on which t relatesS to

hydrogen,

oxygen

nd

a certain

ort f chemical

ompounding.

nd

you

can stand

n

a belief-relation

o

water

without

tanding

n

a belief-relationo all these



6/18

A

RUSSELLIAN

ACCOUNT OF

BELIEF

SENTENCES

145

other

hings.

he Russellian

ccount

f

12)

and

(13)

does not

mply

hat

(12)

mustbe true

f

13)

is.

To

summarise,

hen,

here

s

what shall call the

Russellian

ccount f

the ogicalform fbelief-ascriptions:

(i)

predicates

n

content-sentenceserve s names of

kinds;

(ii)

names,

whether

f

individuals

r

kinds,

are

purely

referential;

hey

occupy ositions

ccessible o

quantifiers,

nd

obey

he

standard

rinciples

of

instantiation,

eneralisation,

ubstitutivity

f

dentity,

nd so on.

II

Now

the

question

s,

Is this defensible ccount f

the

ogical

form f

thebelief

scriptions

e

actually

make?'The answer, think,s:

Partly,

ut

not

entirely.'

First,

plenty

of commonsense

psychological eneralisations

ontain

quantification

nto ontent-sentences

quantification

verboth

ndividuals

and kinds.For

example,

(14)

Ralph

knows

veryone's

usiness.

Or, to spell tout,

(15) (x) (B) (If

x

is

a

B

then

Ralph

believes hat

x

is

a

B).

Since

positions ccupied by

bound variables re

purely

referential,

he

open

sentence

Ralph

believes hat

x

is a B' is

clearly

Russellian.

Second,

plenty

f

unquantified

elief-ascriptions

an be

obtained

by

instantiationrom uch

generalisations.

or

example,

(16)

If

Ortcutt

s

a

spy,

hen

Ralph

believes hat

Ortcutt

s

a

spy.

This is

naturally

nderstood s an instance

of

(15),

which means that

'Ralph

believes hatOrtcutts a

spy'

s Russellian the

occurrences f

both

'Ortcutt' nd

spy'

n

the content-sentencere

purely

eferential.

Thirdly,

however,

here are

other

belief-ascriptions

hich are not

Russellian,

ither ecause

they

ontainnames

believed

by

the

ascriber o

be vacuous;for xample,

(17)

Pierrebelieves hatSanta Claus

will

come,

or because

they

ontain

on-vacuous

amesnot ntended

o be

subject

o

substitutivity

f

identity;

or

xample,



7/18

146

MICHAEL

McDERMOTT

(18)

Tom believes hatCicero denouncedCatiline.

So we

cannot laimthat ll the

belief-ascriptions

f

commonsense alk

about hemind re Russellian. ut theres still n interestingeaker laim

which would

iketo defend:

ll

psychologicallyerspicuous

elief-ascriptions

are Russellian.

I shall

say

that a

belief-ascription

s

psychologically

perspicuous

f

it contains

nothing

which makes no

contribution

o the

explanation

f behaviour.

he claim

to

be defended s

that

only

purely

referentialccurrences

f names make

any

contribution

o

psychological

explanation.

Considerfirst

17).

This

might

e

offered s

part

of an

explanation

f

Pierre's

behaviour

t

Christmas-time

his

putting

p

a

stocking,

ay.

The

full

xplanation

ouldbe

something

ike:

(19)

Pierre

believes

hatSanta Claus

will

come.

Pierre

elieves

hat

f

Santa Claus

comes,

he

will

get

present

if

he

puts

up

a

stocking.

Pierre

wants

present.

This

provides

n

explanation

n

virtue

of the

following

ommonsense

psychologicaleneralisation:

(20)

(x)

(p)

(G)

(A) (If

x

believes

hat

p

and

x

believes hat

if

p

then

he

will

get

G

if

he does

A)

and

x

wants

G,

then

x

does

A).

That is to

say,

19)

and

(20)

jointlymply:

(21) Pierreputs up a stocking.

But now

imagine

psychology

f Pierre

n

which

very

ccurrence f

'Santa

Claus'

in content-sentences

s

replaced y

ome

arbitrary

ew

name,

say

Bernard

J.

Ortcutt'.

he

new

explanation

f

Pierre'sbehaviour

s:

(19')

Pierre

believes

hatOrtcutt ill

come.

Pierre

believes hat

f

Ortcutt

omes,

he

will

get

a

present

f

he putsup a stocking.

Pierre

wants

present.

Now

I

submit

hat his

s

ust

as

good

n

explanation

f

Pierre's ehaviour s

(19). (19')

and

(19)

yield xactly

he

same

predictions

f

behaviour,

nd

in

virtue

f the same

covering

eneralisation

20);

hence we have

as

much



8/18

A

RUSSELLIAN

ACCOUNT OF

BELIEF SENTENCES

147

reason,

by argument

o the

best

explanation',

o

accept

19')

as

(19).

It

might

e

objected

hat

19')

is not

a

good

explanation

ecause,

unlike

(19),

it

does not

form

art

f a

systematicxplanation

f

a

range

f

Pierre's

behaviour. or example, ierre'sbeliefs, escribed s beliefs boutSanta

Claus,

explain

certainutterances

f

the

words Pere

Noel';

but such

utterances ould

be

inexplicable

f

we

described is

beliefs

s

being

bout

Bernard

.

Ortcutt.

I

reply

hat

he

ascription

f Santa

Claus

beliefs an

only xplain

hese

utterances

f

they

nclude he belief

hat

anta Claus is called

Pere

Noel'.

But

the

parallel

Ortcutt

sychology

f

Pierrewill

n

that ase

say

that

ierre

believes

Ortcutt

s called Pere

Noel',

and hence

provide precisely

arallel

explanation

f

the utterances

n

question.

Ifthe Ortcuttxplanationf Pierre'sbehaviour s justas good,whydo

we

all

in

fact

refer

o

say

that

he

expects

anta Claus? The

reason,

take

it4,

s

thatwe would

express

eliefs

ike

Pierre's,

f

we

had

them,

y using

the words

Santa Claus'.

But

this

fact

bout us can

play

no

part

n

the

explanation

f Pierre's

ehaviour.

t is not

a

weakness

of

our Ortcutt

psychology

f

Pierre hat

t fails o

convey

hisfact.

Using

Santa

Claus'

in

the

ascription

f a

single

belief,

s

in

(17),

may

also

convey

hat

Pierrehas certain

urther

eliefswhichwe

would

express

by using Santa Claus' - thethings everyone nows boutSantaClaus.

But whenwe

explicitly

scribe

hese additional

eliefs,

s

in

(19),

at

that

stage

Santa

Claus' servesno

purpose

hat Ortcutt'will not.

The

function

f a

vacuousname

ike Santa Claus'

in

a full

sychological

explanation

s

to

signpost

certainconnectionsetween the

subject's

individual eliefs

and

desires).

This

linking

ill

be

accomplished

s

long

as

the

same

name

is

repeated

n

the content-sentences

f

the

separate

belief-ascriptions:

t does

not matter

what

name

is used.

Indeed a more

perspicuous ay oaccomplishhe inkingsby usingnonameatall,but a

bound variable. Given

a full

psychological

xplanation

which

uses a

vacuous

name,

more

perspicuous

xplanation

an

always

e

obtained

s

follows:

ake the content-sentences

f all

the

subject's

belief-ascriptions,

and

replace

ll

occurrences

fthevacuousname

by

variable;

onjoin,

nd

existentially uantify;

use

the result as the content-sentence f a

replacement

elief-ascription.

hus

Pierre,

or

xample,

s said

to

believe

4

Following

.

Stich,

From olk

Psychology

o

Cognitive

cience

Cambridge,

Mass.,

1983),

ch.5. I thinkhis s a goodaccount f de dicto'belief-ascriptions.tich,however,roposest

as an account f

all

belief-ascriptions

he does not

believe

n

anything

ike the

de re/de icto

ambiguity.

e would

say, pparently,

hat

ven:

Tom believes

youryacht

s

bigger

han t

is,

is to be

given

he same kindof

analysis

i.e.

as

(roughly):

Tom is

in

a believe tate

ike

he

one

which

would

ypically

ause me o

say

Your

yacht

is

bigger

han t is'.



9/18

148

MICHAEL

McDERMOTT

that heres

someone ho will

come,

who

will

eave a

present

f

there's

stocking,

ho is called

Pere

Noel',

and so

on. This Russellianbelief-

ascription rovides parallel,

but

perspicuous,

xplanation

f

Pierre's

behaviour.

I

should

perhaps point

out

that the

argument

ust

given

for the

eliminationf vacuous

names does not

pply

o

purely

eferentialames.

Consider he Russellian

elief-ascription:

(22)

Tom believes hatFido is

dangerous.

This

might

explain

Tom's

avoiding

Fido,

in

virtue

of

some such

commonsense

sychological eneralisation

s:

(23)

People

avoid

dogs they

elieveto be

dangerous.

Or,

spelt

out:

(24)

(x) (y)

(if

x

believes

hat

y

is

dangerous,

hen

x

avoids

y).

For (24) implies:

(25)

If Tom

believes

that Fido is

dangerous,

hen Tom

avoids

Fido.

A

psychology

f Tom which

replaced

all

occurrences

f

this

purely

referentialFido'

in

thecontent-sentencesf

belief-ascriptions,

y

Rover',

say,

would

be no

good

at

all;

(24)

does not

mply:

(26)

If

Tom believes

thatRover s

dangerous,

hen

Tom

avoids

Fido.

Where

a

purely

eferential ame

occurs n

a

content-sentence,

e can

describe causal relationsbetween

the belief and

the

object

in

the

environment hich

the name refers o. That is to

say,

the connection

betweenthe belief

and the

object

of belief can

be subsumed

under

a

covering eneralisation.

ut

there

re

no

causal relations etween eliefs

about Santa Claus and the actual

Santa

Claus.

That is

why

Santa Claus'

can be

eliminated

rom

he content-sentences

f

belief-ascriptions

ithout

loss,

whereas

Fido'

cannot.

If

we

now consider

non-vacuous ames

n

belief-ascriptions

orwhich

substitutivity

f

identity

ails,

the

argument

or their

mperspicuity

s



10/18

A RUSSELLIAN

ACCOUNT OF BELIEF

SENTENCES

149

basically

he same.

f

we

mean

18)

in

such a

way

that

t is not

equivalent

to:

(27) Tom believes hatTullydenouncedCatiline,

then

we cannot

hope

to subsumethe connection

etween

18)

and

the

actual

Cicero under

a

covering eneralisation.

or

example,

f

we

try

o

explain

18)

by saying

hatTom

was

present

t the

denunciation,

ppealing

to a

covering

eneralisation

ike:

(28) (x)

(y) (If

Tom is

present

when

x

denounces

y,

then Tom

comes to believethat

x

denounced

y),

we

explain

27)

as much

as

(18).

With

Cicero'

not

purely

eferential,

18)

can

still onnect

p

with ther

belief-ascriptions

ith

similar

non-purely

eferential

ccurrences,

or

example:

(29)

Tom believes hatCicero

was

called

Cicero';

Tom

believes

that

Cicero was not called

Tully';

and so

on.

But

these

onnections ill

all

be

preserved

f

we

just

say

(30)

Tom

believes

here s someonewho denounced

Catiline,

was

called

Cicero',

was

not called

Tully',

and so

on,

-

as

in

the Santa

Claus case.

If

we

wish to assert

18)

without lso

asserting

27),

it

is

because we

think hat Cicero' is the moreappropriate ame to use in expressing

belief

ikeTom's.

But

whenwe

spell

out the

features fTom's

total elief-

state

which make

'Cicero'

specially apt,

no

non-purely-referential

occurrences

re needed. We

can

just

say,

for

xample,

30),

or

perhaps:

(31)

Tom believes hatCicero

i.e.

Tully]

denounced

Catiline,

was

called

Cicero',

was

not called

Tully',

and

so on.

There is also a Russellian nterpretationf (18), which allows the

connection

etween

the belief and its

object

to be subsumed under

covering eneralisations.

18)

is

thus

ambiguous.

Cicero'

may

be

purely

referential,

r

it

may

convey

that that name is

specially

pt

for the

expression

f Tom's

belief.

t

seems

to me that

he terms de

re'

and de

dicto'

nicely capture

these two

interpretations.

n the Russellian



11/18

150

MICHAEL

McDERMOTT

interpretation,

18)

tellsus

something

bout

the man

Cicero;

on the

other

it tells us

something

bout the name 'Cicero'.

(In

contrast o

(18),

ascriptions

ike

17)

and

(19)

have

only

de dicto

nterpretation.)

Let me remindyou,however, hat the ambiguityf (9) (or of (7)),

discussed

arlier,

s not

de re/de icto

mbiguity.

oth he

nterpretations

given

or

9)

saw

t as

being

of the Russellian

ogical

form,

hich s to

say,

de

re: forboth

10)

and

(11)

relate

Tom

to

the

respective bjects

of

his

beliefs,

nderwhatever

escription.

Our de re/de icto

distinctions thus

not

the same as

the

ordinary

transparent/opaque

istinction,

hich

hinges solely

on whether

ingular

terms

ccupy urely

eferential

osition;

9)

is

transparent

n one

of

these

de re

construals,

paque

on

the

other

for

f

a

speaker

means

11)

when

he

asserts

9),

he

may

till

deny

4)).

De dicto

scriptions,

owever,

re

always

opaque.

And

opaque ascriptionsontainingnly

roper

ames

no

definite

descriptions)

re

always

e

dicto.

There is a

widespread

elief5

hat he belief-

and

desire-)

ascriptions

which

occur

n

psychological

xplanations

re

typically

paque.

Consider:

(32) Oedipus

wants o

marry

ocasta.

This may erve o explain:

(33) Oedipus

courts

Jocasta,

but,

t is

held,

only

f

32)

is construed s

opaque,

i.e. de

dicto.

t

is

held,

apparently,

hatthere s some commonsense

sychological eneralisation

which

mplies

32)

=

(33),

with

32)

de dicto. wish had some dea

what

this

generalisation

ould be.

It

is,

of

course,

a

generalisation

f

commonsensesychologyhatmengenerallyourt hewomen heywant o

marry,

.e.:

(34) (x) (y) (If

x

wants

o

marry

,

then

x

courts

y).

But,

because of the

quantification

nto the

content-sentence,

his

only

implies

32)

=

(33)

if

32)

is

construed e

re.

The

view

criticise ere

s

supported y

a

popular

ccount

f the truth

conditions f dereascriptions.t is held that he de dicto eading f 32) is

'psychologically

tronger'

han the

de re

one

-

it

tells us more about the

character f the mental auses of behaviour'.

n a de

dicto

onstrual,

32)

tells

us

how

Oedipus 'represents

o

himself' he

object

of his

desire.

5

E.g. J.

Fodor,

Methodological

olipsism

onsidered s a

research

trategy

n

cognitive

psychology',

he

Behavioral

nd Brain

Sciences

(1980),

pp.

63-109.



12/18

A

RUSSELLIAN

ACCOUNTOF BELIEF

SENTENCES

151

Whereas n the

de re

onstrual

32)

tellsus

merely

hat

ocasta

s the

object

of his

desire

under ome

escription'

we are

not told

whichone.

A

sort

of causal

requirement

s often

ncorporated

nto this

popular

account. tmaybe said,for nstance,hat 32) is truede reonly fOedipus

wantsto

marry

ocasta

under a

representation

hose

occurrence

n

this

mental tate

s

a

direct

r

ndirect

onsequence

fhis

perception

f

Jocasta.

Whether

r not

it includes such a

causal

requirement,

he

popular

account

mplies

hat e

re

scriptions

re

psychologically

ninformative.

or

example,

t makes

t normal

for

subjects

o

have

blatantlyontradictory

beliefs nd

desires.

Howeverwell

based in

perception

s

Oedipus's

use of

'Jocasta',

o

also is

his use of

my

mother'.

ince he

certainly

esiresde

dicto

ot

o

marry

is

mother,

t

would

follow

n such

views

hat:

(35)

Oedipus

wantsnot o

marry ocasta,

is as

truede

re s

(32).

Since he

certainly

elieves e dicto

hatJocasta

s

not

his

mother,

twould

imilarly

ollow hat

he

believes

e re hat

ocasta

s not

Jocasta.

t is

hardto

see how

a

psychology

ncluding

scriptions

ike

these

could

explain

ehaviour.

here

are

no

psychological

eneralisations

elling

us how men

behave

towardswomen

hey

elieve o be

non-self-identical.

And however sychologyaysmen behave towardswomentheywant to

marry,

t

says hey

ehave

n

different

ays

owards omen

hey

want

not o

marry.

I

would

urge,

however,

differentccount

f

the truth

onditions f de

re belief- nd

desire-ascriptions

a functionalist

ccount,

pplied directly

to

de

re

scriptions.sychological

erms

et

heir

meaning

rom

heir ole n

a folk

heory.

he

2-place

relational erm

wants-to-marry',

or

nstance,

refers o

that ctual

psychological

elation

which

omes

nearest

and

near

enough)to realising he role accordedto wanting-to-marryn the folk

theory. edipus's

relation o

Jocasta

ountsas

wanting-to-marry

f,

and

only

f,

t

has the

right

inds

f causes and effects. n this

ccount,

airs

like

32)

and

(35)

cannot othbe true.

Whichone is

true

s

determined

y

the over-all

djustment

f

psychological

heory

o behavioural

acts:

given

Oedipus's

behaviour

owards

ocasta,

which

ystem

f belief-

nd desire-

ascriptions

onforms

est to our

background sychological

eneralisations?

During

the

courtship hase,

the

answer

ppears

to

be

(32).

On thisdirect unctionalistccount, here s no reason o believe hat e

re

ascriptions

re

necessarily

ninformative,

r thatwe need

opaque

or de

dicto

scriptions

n

psychological

xplanation.

Let me summarise.

urely

eferential

ccurrences f names

n

content-

sentences re

psychologically

erspicuous

ecause

they

nable

the causal

links

between

belief

and the

objects

of

belief

to be subsumed

under



13/18

152

MICHAEL McDERMOTT

covering eneralisations.

on-purely-referential

ccurrences

f

names,

on

the other

hand,

play

no essential

ole in

psychological

xplanation.

heir

elimination,

n favour f

existentially

uantified

ariables,

s

thus

to be

commendedngrounds fpsychologicalerspicuity.his is inaddition,f

course,

to

the obvious

virtues f adherence

o standard

uantificational

logic.

The

belief-ascriptions

f

a decent

cientific

sychology

an

be,

and

therefore

hould

be,

always

f the

Russellian

ogical

form.

III

Next

I

want to

argue

thatthe

psychological

erspicuity

f

our

belief-

ascriptions

an be increased

ypursuing

he

process

of

eliminating

ames

even further;ertain ncreases n the explanatory owerof psychology

require

the

replacement

f

purely

referential

ames

by

existentially

quantified

ariables.

The role

n

psychological

xplanation

f

purely

eferentialames

n

the

content-sentences

f

belief-ascriptions,

e

saw,

is to enable the causal

links between

belief and the

objects

of

belief to

be

subsumed under

covering

generalisations.

ow,

psychological eneralisations

bout

the

connections etween

belief and the

environmental

bjects

of belief

are

always iable to be falsified y failures f recognition. alph,we may

sweepingly

ay,

lways

omes to believe

that omeone

s a

spy,

f he

sees

him

acting

n

a certain

uspicious

manner:

(36) (x) (If

Ralph

sees

x

acting

n a

suspicious

manner,

hen

Ralph

comes

to

believe hat

x

is a

spy).

But this

must be understood

s

subject

to

possible

counterexamples

n

cases whereRalphfails orecogniseheperson nquestion.fRalphsees

Ortcutt

cting

n a

suspicious

manner,

ut

does notrealise

hat t s Ortcutt

he is

seeing,

his

firm

elief

n

Ortcutt's

oyalty

ill

naturally

e

unaffected.

Similarly,

o

generalisations

bout

how

Ralph

behaves

owards

eople

he

believes o

be

loyal

will

predict

is

behaviour owards

rtcutt n occasions

when

Ralph

fails o

recognise

im.

It

might

be

objected

that we

can

get

generalisations

hich are not

vulnerable

o

counterexamples

f this

kind

by simply

ncluding mong

he

subject'sbeliefshis beliefs bout

the

identity

f

the

person

n

question.

Can't we

say:

(37)

(x) (If Ralph

sees

x

acting

n a

suspicious

manner,

nd

Ralph

believes

hat

x

is

x,

then

Ralph

comes

to

believe

that

x is

a

spy)?



14/18

A

RUSSELLIAN

ACCOUNT OF

BELIEF SENTENCES

153

No,

this

s

absurd;

Ralph's

failure o

recognise

rtcutt

as

not due

to

any

doubts bout Ortcutt's

elf-identity.

ur talk bout failures nd successes

of

recognition

oes often ook ike the attributionf

dentity

eliefs,

ut

believe his ppearance o be misleading.

f

mydogmistakes ouforme,

might ay

He

thinks

ou

are me'.

But this s

notto

ascribe belief

hatwe

are

one.

I

would

not

say

He thinks am

you',

or 'He thinks

ou

are

identical o me'.

Let us

agree,

hen,

hat

generalisations

bout the connections

etween

belief

nd its

environmental

bjects

are

always

iable

to

counterexamples

through

ailureto

recognise

the

object

of belief. Since such

failure

sometimes

appens,

we would

ike an

explanation

f t. Since it is

always

possible,

we would

ike

an

explanation

f successful

ecognition,

oo.

What

I want o argue s that psychologyhichproperlyxplains uccessful r

unsuccessful

ecognition

f an

object

will not

ascribebeliefs

ontaining

name of that

object.

Suppose Ralph

shareshis

secrets

with

Ortcutt,

elieving

im

o be

loyal.

Our initial

xplanation

s:

(38)

Ralph

believes

hatOrtcutts

loyal;

(39) (x)

(If

Ralph

believes

that

x

is

loyal,

hen

Ralph

shares his

secretswithx);

hence:

(40)

Ralph

shareshis secrets

with

Ortcutt.

But

sometimes

alph

fails o

recognise

Ortcutt,

nd refuseshis

requests

for

information. orse

still,

Ralph

sometimes

mistakes he

disguised

IvanovforOrtcutt,nd shareshis secretswith vanov.Why?

Perhaps

Ralph

recognises

Ortcutt

y

his visual

appearance.

Usually

Ortcutt

resents ppearance

A,

and then

Ralph

shares his

secretswith

Ortcutt.When Ortcutt oes not

present

ppearance

A,

Ralph

does not

sharehis secretswithOrtcutt.When vanov

resents

ppearance

A,

Ralph

shareshis secrets

with

vanov.What

this

means,

submit,

s that

he real

object

of

Ralph's

behaviour

s not

Ortcutt,

ut

appearance

A.

What

tands

in

need of

psychologicalxplanation

s

not

40)

but:

(41)

Ralph

shares his secrets

with

nyone

who

presents ppear-

ance

A.

If

Ralph

hares

his

secretswithOrtcutt n a

particular

ccasion,

hat s

not

something

which needs

any

further

sychologicalxplanation.

t is

just



15/18

154

MICHAEL

McDERMOTT

because of

the

(non-psychological)

act that

Ortcutt

s

the

person

presentingppearance

A on that

occasion.

The same conclusionwould seem

to followwhatever

haracteristics

Ralphuses to identifyrtcutt;hepsychologicalartof an explanationf

his behaviour eeds

to

be an

explanation

f his

behaviour owards

nyone

who

possesses

hose haracteristics.

ut

now,

f

what

needs to be

explained

is

not

something

bout

Ortcutt

n

particular,

ow can

beliefs boutOrtcutt

in

particular layanypart

n

the

explanation?

ou

might ry

aying

hat:

(42)

Ralph

believes

hatOrtcutts

the

onlyperson

of

appearance

A,

and is

loyal,

-that's the

explanation

f (41). But,I submit,

ou

would

get

an

equally

plausible

xplanation

f

you

substituted

ny

ther amefor

Ortcutt',

ven

vacuous name.

f

Ralph

believed hat

anta Claus was the

onlyperson

of

appearance

A,

and was

loyal,

would not thatstill

ead

him

to share

his

secretswith

eople

of

appearance

A?

What

makes

Ralph

behave hat

way

s

not thathe stands

n

any

belief-relationo

Ortcutt r to

Santa

Claus,

but

just

that:

(43) Ralphbelievesthere s someonewho is theonlypersonof

appearance

A,

and who is

loyal.

If

42)

explains alph's

behaviour owards

eople

presenting

ppearance

A,

(43)

provides precisely

arallel

xplanation.

(38)

related

Ralph

to a

man;

(43)

relateshim to an

appearance,

.e.

a

kind.

'Appearance

A'

is short

or n

expression

hichweuse to

pick

out

a

certain

appearance.

(43)

does not

imply

that

Ralph

picks

out

that

appearancenthe ameway.)The covering eneralisationeededtogetus

from

43)

to

(41)

-

or

from

42)

to

(41)

-

is a

generalisation

ver

appearances,

ot

men:

(44)

(F)

(If

Ralph

believes hat

here s someonewho

is the

only

person

of

appearance

,

and who s

loyal,

hen

Ralph

shares

his

secretswith

nyone

f

appearance

).

As

long

as we

uncriticallyccept

thatwhatneeds

explaining

s

(40),

then

Ortcutt s an

appropriate

object

of belief. There

is a

plausible

generalisation

oncerning

eliefs

bout

people

to

get

us from

38)

to

(40),

namely

39).

But

when we

appreciate

hat the real

object

of

Ralph's

behaviours

not

manbut

an

appearance,

e need

correspondingly

o

take



16/18

A

RUSSELLIAN

ACCOUNT OF

BELIEF

SENTENCES

155

the

appearance

s the

object

f

belief,

nd

quantify

ver

ppearances

n

the

relevant

overing

eneralisation.

The

argument

eems to be

quite

general.

he

psychologicalart

of the

explanationfRalph'stotal nteraction ithOrtcutt eed nevermention

Ortcutt.

f

you

have an

explanation

which does ascribe

beliefs

about

Ortcutt,

hen ake

ll

the content-sentences

ontaining

Ortcutt',

eplace

t

by

a variable

hroughout,

onjoin

nd

existentially

uantify;

hat

s

the

only

belief

you

need ascribe to

Ralph.

You

will still

get

a

precisely arallel

explanation.

Given

that we can

explain

behaviour

without

eferring

o

particular

eople

in the

content-sentencesf

belief-ascriptions,

onsider-

ationsof

economy

nd

perspicuityay

we

should

o so.

The course

urged

here for

purely

eferential

ames s the same as that

urged arlier or acuousnames.But the cases are notentirelyarallel.n

eliminating

acuous names we lose

nothing,

rom he

point

of view of

psychologicalxplanation.

ut

in

eliminating

urely

eferentialames the

theoretical

ainmay

e at

a

practical

ost.

n

practice,

ailure f

recognition

is

fairly

are;

that

s

to

say,

we can

usually

make

successful

redictions

using

generalisations

ike

39),

and

particularscriptions

ike

38).

Whereas

to

apply

a

generalisation

ike

(44)

to

predictRalph's

behaviour owards

Ortcutt,

we would

have to

specify

he characteristics

y

which

Ralph

recognisedOrtcutt,nd knowthatOrtcuttwas actually hepersonwith

those

characteristics.

n

practice, system

f

psychological

xplanation

ascribing

eliefs boutnamed

ndividualss

pretty

fficient.ut the

deeper

explanations,

nown

r

unknown,

ill not ascribe uch beliefs.

I

have talked

n

this section

of the

replacement

f

names,

ut

the

argument

pplies

lso to definite

escriptions

n

purely

eferential

osition.

If

reference

o Ortcutt

y way

of Ortcutt'will

disappear

n

the

deepest

psychological

xplanations,

he same

goes

forreference

o

Ortcutt

y way

of the man n thebrownhat' (as in (10); not tobe confusedwith 11)).

I

have

argued

for a

redescription

f

subjects'

beliefswhich

replaces

reference o individuals

by

reference o

kinds. But elimination f

individual-names

s

in

general

neither

ufficientor

necessary

or

he kind

of

explanatoryains

we

have

been

talking

bout.

First,

eliefs

bout

named

individuals,

uch as

Ortcutt,

ay

e

plausibly

edescribeds beliefs bout

kind of whichthat

ndividuals the

only

member-

n

this case

the kind

named

by

the

verb

to

ortcutt'.

nstead

of

(38)

we would have:

(45)

Ralph

believes

hat

here s

someonewho

s

the

only

rtcutter,

and

who is

loyal.

But

this

way

of

eliminating

ames

of individuals

ermits

no better



17/18

156

MICHAEL

McDERMOTT

explanation

f

Ralph's

behaviour.

he

problem

ust

becomes,

how

does

he

recognise

rtcutting?

Second,

the reasons we

have

been

looking

t for

the elimination

f

purelyreferential ames also apply to certainkind-names.We can

recognise

r fail o

recognise

inds,

s

well as

individuals,

nd

can some-

times

explain

hese successes and failures.

uppose

we

know

how

Tom

recognises

ogs,

or

xample.

I

don'tmeanhowhe

recognises

ido as

Fido,

but

how he

recognises

ido

as a

dog-how

he

recognises

oghood.)

We

know,

that

s,

that his behaviour owards

dogs

can

be

more

accurately

described s behaviour owards

hings

which

ossess

certain

haracteristics

-

the

characteristics

hich,

s

we

might

put

it,

he believes

ust

dogs

possess.

Then a

more

perspicuous

xplanation

f

thebehaviour ill

scribe

beliefs

only

about these characteristics,ot about

doghood.

Just

as

references

o

Ortcutt

n the content-sentencesf

Ralph's

beliefswere

replaced

by

an existential

uantifier

ver

men,

o will

dog'

in

the content-

sentences

f

Tom's

beliefsbe

replacedby

an

existential

uantifier

ver

kinds.

Rather han

aying

om believes

here's

dog

on the

tucker-box,

our

deeper psychology

ill

say

he

believes

here s a

kind

of animal

with

such-and-such

eatures,

nd one of

them

s on

the tucker-box.

But

now

he

followingifficulty

onfrontss.

If

all referenceso

objects

f

belief-whetherndividualsrkinds are tobe eliminatedromhe ontent-

sentences f

a

decent

sychology,

hat

an

go

in

these ontent-sentences?

The

answer s

that ur

argument

oes

not

require

he elimination

f

all

reference o individuals

r

kinds,

ut

only

f

reference

o individuals nd

kindswhich re

recognised y

means

of

something

lse,

n

psychologically

explicable ays.

A

subject

may ecognise ogs

by

heir

hape,

olour

tc.And

he

may

detect

hapes

nd colours

successfully

r

unsuccessfully)

ygetting

visual

timuli.

ut there s

nothing y

means

of

whichhe detects

is

visual

stimuli.o the rgumentoes not top sascribingeliefs bout hem.Sucha

belief-ascription

a Russellian

elief-ascription

relates he believer

o

a

stimulus ind.ttherefore

mplies

he xistence f

hat

ind. utof ourse

you

can believe hat

stimulation

f

a

given

indwill

hortly

ccur

or even s

occurring,

erhaps

withouthat

articular

timulus vent

xisting.

do

not

claim hatwe have

ncorrigible

nowledge

four

stimuli.)

Similarly,

n

the

output

ide,

we

can

sometimes

xplain

ow

we

recognise,

orfail

o

recognise,

hekinds owhich

ur

wn ctions

elong.

A

man

may

ake

himselfobemakingjokebecausehebelieves hat isutteringertain ords

constitutes

he

making

f a

joke;

and

perhaps

sychology

ould

explain

he

utterancef hewords s the ntended ffect

f ertain

muscle

movements,

r

nerve

irings;

ut,

f

hese re

psychologically

asic

ctions,

he

rgument

an

allow

reference

o such kinds

f

thing

n

thecontent-sentences

f

a

decent

psychology.



18/18

A

RUSSELLIAN ACCOUNT OF BELIEF

SENTENCES 157

My

conclusion

s

that eferences

o

any

hings

nd kinds

xcept

kinds f

psychological

nput

and

output

re

theoretically

uperfluous.

magine

a

catalogue

of

Ralph's

beliefs

which

contains

references

n

the

content-

sentences o Ortcutt,oghood,oking nd the ike;suppose tsufficiently

comprehensive

o

fullyxplain

is

uccessfulnd unsuccessful

ecognition

f

these

hings

it ncludes isbeliefs bout he onnectionetween rtcuttnd

certain

isual

timuli,

or

xample;

hen more

erspicuous sychology

anbe

obtained

y

eplacing

ll

referring

xpressions,xcept

hose

eferring

o

nput

and

output

kinds,

y existentially

ound variables. his more

economical

belief

scription

ill

xplain

what tands

n need

of

psychological

xplanation,

namely,

he

behaviouralelations etween

nput

nd

output

it

s

rrelevant

o

psychology

hat

given

kind

of

nput

s

caused

on

this

occasion

by

vanov

ratherhan

Ortcutt,

rthat

Ralph's

output

onstitutes

gaffe

atherhan

joke).

What

Ralph

really

elieves s a

fully

amsified

heory

f his

environ-

ment,

with

he observational'

erms

f

he

heory eferring

o his own

nputs

and

outputs.

And this

s a

Russellian

elief-ascription:

t

says

that

Ralph

stands

n

a certain

sychological

elationo thekindsmentioned.6'7

Universityf

ydney

6

I

defend his

position

n

Narrow

ontent',

ustralasian

ournal

f

Philosophy

4

(1986).

7I

am

grateful

o M. Devitt nd

S. Stich

for

helpful

riticism.

Michael McDermott (1988). a Russellian Account of Belief Sentences

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Transcript of Michael McDermott (1988). a Russellian Account of Belief Sentences