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"SOME NEW INSIGHTS ON THEINTERINDUSTRY WAGE STRUCTURE FROM THE
GERMAN SOCIO ECONOMIC PANEL"
by
Michael BURDA*
N° 91/63/EP
* Associate Professor of Economics, INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance,Fontainebleau 77305 Cedex, France.
Printed at INSEAD,Fontainebleau, France
Some New Insights on the Interindustry Wage Structurefrom the German Socioeconomic Panel
Michael C. Burda*
July 1991
bieau France, and the Centre for Economic• INSEAD, F-77305 FontainePolicy Research. I amWirtschaftsforschung andgenerous hospitality, and
grateful to the Deutsches Institut furthe Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin forto Michael Funke, Johannes Schwarze,
David Soskice and Gert Wagner for dis;ussions and comments. RainerPischner's assistance with the German Socioeconomic Panel data setwas especially invaluable. This project was supported by INSEAD'sResearch Department and grants from the Alfred P. Sloan and FordFoundations.
Abstract
This paper investigates the interindustry wage structure in the1985 wave of the German Socioeconomic Panel. In addition to theusual controls, this survey contains detailed information on jobcharacteristics and work conditions. Interaction of industryaffiliation is significant with several individual attributes,especially job tenure; homogeneity of earnings equations acrossthese attributes is decisively rejected. The industry wagestructure is insignificant for workers with low job tenure. Theseresults are consistent with the interpretation of interindustrywage differentials as shared rents from industry or firm-specifichuman capital.
1. Introduction
This paper investigates the interindustry wage structure in
the 1985 wave of the German Socioeconomic Panel (Deutsches
Soziookonomisches Panel, hereafter SOEP), a representative
cross-section of West German households. In addition to the usual
controls, the 1985 survey contains several questions about
workplace characteristics and worker qualifications. With
responses to these questions it is possible to control for an
extended set of factors in "Mincer equations" relating earnings to
human capital and other individual characteristics. Inclusion of
such controls can explain between 8-107. of wage variation beyond
that explained in similar recent studies.
Besides improving control for influences of workplace
conditions and worker qualifications on pay, this paper
investigates the stability of the interindustry wage structure
across different groupings in the sample. To the extent that
Mincer-style earnings equations differ across characteristics and
these are correlated with industry, the estimated interindustry
wage structure may merely reflects omitted variable bias. It is
well-recognized that estimated coefficients are biased to the
extent that excluded regressors are correlated with included ones.
We pursue this issue one step further: could omitted,
industry-specific inte-actions explain some part of the estimated
interindustry wage structure?
Industry wage differentials in the SOEP are significantly
estimated in the full sample, but show some differences with those
-1-
estimated by Krueger and Summers (1988) in the US Current
Population Survey. We also find that earnings functions are
statistically different across sex, firm size, full versus
part-time, and especially job tenure groupings. Tests for
homogeneity of earnings equations across these groups are
decisively rejected. When the sample is reduced to full-time
workers with less than five years experience in their current job,
industry wage differentials vanish, whereas they remain
economically and statistically significant for workers with more
than five years tenure. These results, which analyze only a
fraction of all potential interactions, militate against
overinterpretation of industry wage differentials. They are more
consistent with workers and firms' sharing rents of industry or
firm-specific human capital, which accumulates only over time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature on the interindustry wage structure and its
interpretation. Section 3 elaborates one particular omitted
variables interpretation of the interindustry wage structure.
Section 4 describes the SOEP and its 1985 wave which includes
detailed information on job characteristics and worker attitudes,
and presents estimates the interindustry wage structure. Section 5
explores the robustness of wage structures across different
groupings of the working population. Section 6 offers an
interpretation of the results.
2. The Interindustry Wage Structure and its Interpretation:A Survey of the Literature
The fact that observationally similar workers with comparable
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skills and experience earn different wages in different industries
has puzzled economists for a long time.' In the postwar period,
labor economists around the world began to take particular notice
of the durability of this wage structure. 2 Lebergott (1947) showed
not only wages that wages were highly correlated across industries
in the US, Canada, the United Kingdom and Sweden, but also the
Soviet Union. These findings were later corroborated by Dunlop and
Rothbaum (1955) in international comparisons, and more recently by
Katz and Summers (1988).
The suspicion that the wage structure merely reflected
distribution of observable skills was dispelled by the pioneering
work of Krueger and Summers (1988), who employed survey data on
individual workers to identify and track the interindustry wage
structure, estimated as coefficients on industry affiliation dummy
variables in standard Mincer earnings equations. By projecting the
wage structure on a variety of measurable individual
characteristics including human capital proxies, they find a large
component of variance remains "explained" by industry affiliation.
The interindustry wage structure lends itself to several
1See Murphy and Topel (1987) for a particularly evocative
reference to the phenomenon by Adam Smith; for an early attempt at
a neoclassical justification, see John Bates Clark (1899). Thaler
(1988) provides a useful summary of recent explanations of the
interindustry wage structure.
2See Dunlop (1944), Lebergott (1947), Slichter (1950) and Cullen
(1956) for the United States; Turner (1952) and Buddy?nd Tolles
(1957) for the United Kingdom; Reynolds and Taft (1956) for
France; and Grumbach and Konig (1957) and Lampert (1968) for
Germany.
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economic interpretations. J.T. Dunlop (1944) and Sumner Slichter
(1950) linked wages to ability to pay, that is, the profitability
of the enterprise in question. Slichter (1950) wrote that "wages,
within a considerable range, reflect managerial discretion, that
where management can easily pay high wages they tend to do so, and
that where managements are barely breaking even, they tend to keep
wages down," p.88. This "ability to pay" view has been revived by
recent work of Blanchflower and Oswald (1989) and Nickell and
Wadhwani (1988). Alternatively, interindustry wage differences
could derive from job characteristics (compensating differentials)
or sorting on unobservable individual attributes. The first idea
thus explains why the mining industry in this view pays higher
wages than average, ceteris paribus, because miners work in dark
places underground, while forestry workers earn less because they
are outdoors. The second central idea says that the chemical
industry pays more than the textile industry because certain
unobservable characteristics are more valuable in that industry
and are remunerated in equilibrium by higher wages.
More recently, Katz (1986), Krueger and Summers (1988), and
Katz and Summers (1988) have attributed industry pay differences
to the broad heading of "efficiency wage considerations." In this
-view managers set pay in order to solve an optimizing problem.
Higher wages reduce job turnover (Pencavel 1972), spur worker
effort by increasing the cost of job loss (Shapiro and Stiglitz
1984), increase loyalt y and productivity (Akerlof 1984), and
improve the quality of job applicants (Weiss 1980). To these can
be added the "fair wage hypothesis" of Akerlof and Yellen (1990),
-4-
which stresses perceptions of fairness among workers. In addition,
Lindbeck and Snower's (1986) work can be interpreted as a type of
efficiency wage payment to prevent workers from disrupting the
production process.
Clearly, efficiency wages is not a single theory but rather a
mosaic of ideas, some of which are more neoclassical than others.
They share the common theme that firms set wages, and may find it
against their profit maximizing interests to reduce them in the
face of unemployment. To the extent that industries differ in the
optimal efficiency wage that firms pay, an interindustry wage
structure will arise.
3. Omitted Variable Bias and the Industry Wage Structure
The mere existence of significant coefficients on industry
dummy variables is not conclusive evidence of efficiency wages.
Estimated industry dummies may simply be a by-product of
unobserved differences in worker quality as well as other
characteristics which are correlated with particular industries.
Cross-section and panel data sets can only obtain a limited amount
of information about worker attributes. This can be seen in the
large amount of variance in earnings that remains unexplained by
measured variables such as age, experience, education, and other
identifiable attributes. 3
If verifiable characteristics unobservable to econometricians
are more valuable to industry x than to others, and if workers
3Katz and Summers (1°S°1 concede that some of this unexplainable
variance is correlated with the effect of controls on the
uncorrected interindustm age structure, suggesting that some of
the former may be indeed ..:nmeasurable quality.
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possessing these attributes were indifferent between working in
industry x and elsewhere, firms should offer higher wages to these
workers to attract them from other industries. In equilibrium one
would observe a premium for working in industry x as long as the
characteristics in question were not included as a right had side
variable. While Blackburn and Newmark (1988) show that
intelligence --as measured by IQ-- is not positively associated
with high wage industries, this does not rule out other forms of
unobservable heterogeneity, including such unquantifiable traits
as loyalty, perseverance, and carefulness, all of which are likely
to be important to an employer. To the extent that these
unobserved attributes are valued differently by different
industries, they will surface in estimated industry dummy
coefficients. 4
The point is more general than this. Suppose that each
employment relationship consists of a "match" of a worker and a
firm. Each firm operates in one of k=1,...,K industries, each of
which with a revenue function R K(x , y , t) where x is a list ofI J
worker attributes, y is a list of firm attributes, and t is the
time the match has existed. Few restrictions are imposed on the
derivatives of R except that aRK/at is positive for all K; that
4Following Griliches (1957) and Theil (1957), If the analyst
estimates the model y=X0+u where the true specification Is
y=X13-1-Zy+u, the OLS estimate of 33 is given by b = (X'X) l X'y = P +
(X' X) 1 X' (Zz+u), so Eb= 13 + P7, where P-a(X' X) -1X' Z is the matrix
of "auxiliary regression- coefficients of left-out variables Z on
the columns of X. The OLS estimator Is biased as long as the
elements of Z are correlated with the j columns of X, and the biasof the ith element b. is equal to Z cov( X. ,Z .
1 j 1 J j
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is, there is an element of firm specific human capital in the
production process. Workers have their own fallback or reservation
wage w • , which may be determined by outside offers or the level of
unemployment benefits. If the jth firm and ith worker set the wage
according to a simple Nash bargaining rule, we have
(1) w = ERK(X ,y ,t) + w*1/2
To the extent that R's differ across industries, so in principle
could the derivatives of R with respect to their arguments and
thus the estimated earnings function as well.
There are many reasons to believe that R might be different
across industries. It is hard to understand, a priori, why the
individual return to an additional year of schooling in the
chemical industry is equal to that in the personal services
sector. Moreover there may be interactions here, so that the
effect of characteristics may depend on other other variables,
such as tenure t.
The common response to this line of reasoning is that labor
should reallocate itself until these differences are eliminated
at the margin, as would be the case if labor mobility is perfect
across industries and R is characterized by decreasing return on
all margins. Yet there are many potential reasons why, even under
conditions of mobility, that industry dummies may be estimated
with significant coefficients where there is in fact no "industry
effect," but simply a misspecified wage equation.
One is the desirability of the particular industry to
particular workers. Women, because of an exogenously given option
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of childbearing, may prefer industries in which long cumulative
tenure or experience is unnecessary and work career interruptions
are possible. An increased willingness of women to be in this
group leads to lower bargained wages for them, vis-a-vis men. This
will lead to an "industry sex effect". To the extent that women
are actually concentrated in those industries, leaving out an
interaction term for women in a wage equation with industry
dummies will induce biased estimates of any industry effect.
Simply controlling for sex will not solve this problem.5
A second reason is discrimination. Suppose that certain
industries discriminate against women. For example the
construction industry is well-recognized as a male-dominated
industry. Suppose further, in contrast, that other industries do
not discriminate. If underpaid women are also underrepresented in
the construction industry, then a construction dummy in the
absence of a construction industry-sex interaction will be
estimated with with a wage premium.
A third reason is rent sharing. 6 Suppose that a certain match
modelled in equation (1) has existed for a long time, and that
aRK/at is positive. It may simply be the case that the firm does
not want to replace i s worker with some other; there is simply
5A similar example sir s es in the case of residents of foreign
nationality. Foreigners generally don't speak the language as well
as natives. These Individuals may prefer industries where
on-the-job communicate: n is less important, and be willing to
accept lower pay, I other things equal. For given employer's
preferences, a Nash 16 erg aMing outcome will lead to a lower wage
for foreigners in particular industry. Thus an "industry
effect" may be dete:-.e where it is really an nationality-industry
interaction, and outcome of a voluntary matching
process.
6This is stressed by Kat s• Summers (1989).
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too much value in the existing employment relationship. Thus
neither of the two parties are willing to allow third parties to
underbid, at least for some range of wages. To the extent that
different industries value this firm or industry specific capital
differently, aRK/at will vary across industries because there is
no arbitrage opportunity across this margin, and industry
dummey variables will simply pick up this effect in a misspecified
wage equation.
It is at least possible that the industry wage structure is
simply a series of omitted interactions with sex, race, and other
variables. To see this, consider the simple case in which the
unconditional industry wage effect is in fact zero, but each
industry i rewards binary attribute j, j=1...J differently by 71.1.
The expected value of the coefficient of an industry dummy i in an
otherwise correctly specified equation is approximately
Eb = E (fraction of individuals in industry i with attribute DT„i j Ii
This ''wastebasket effect" should be distinguished from that
suggested by Murphy and Topel (1987a,b), who stress voluntary
sorting by workers into industries on the basis of unobserved
ability and this sorting is highly correlated with that observed
for measurable skills. Curiously, this possibility has not been
raised in the heated debate over the industry wage structure.
4. The Interindustry Wage Structure of the SOEP
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The German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) is a representative
annual survey of roughly 6000 households in the Federal Republic
of Germany, involving more than 10,000 individuals. The SOEP
offers a unique alternative to already extensively investigated US
data sets. The design of the SOEP is similar to the Panel Survey
of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Survey of Income and Program
Partipation (SIPP) and as second mover to these panel studies has
improved on some aspects of the former, for example, by
interviewing all working individuals in a household. 7 Second, a
variety of information has been gathered about quality of the
workplace and workplace attitudes. In 1985 these included a set of
thirteen questions regarding the quality of the workplace and
worker attitudes. Furthermore the respondent was allowed to
distinguish between "somewhat agree" and "fully agree" to the
extent these characteristics were applicable. The attributes are
listed in Table 1.
Several of these questions in Table 1 are obvious proxies for
attributes described in the literature on earnings determination.
For example, the compensating differentials literature would
predict positive signs for questions 2, 6, 7, 12, and 13 and
possibly negative signs for 1, 3, 9, and 11. Question 5 is
directly related to one interpretation of the efficiency wage
hypothesis; workers who are supervised more should receive lower
wages, whereas the unsupervised will receive supra-normal wages to
deter shirking.
7For an excellent survey of the comparability of the SOEP and the
US Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIP?), see Witte(1990).
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There were 4599 individuals in the 1985 SOEP survey who
responded that they were working and reported their gross income
with complete data for all controls. Of these, 3422 were German
citizens and 1177 were foreigners. Of the grand total, 4030 were
working full time and of these, 2866 were of German nationality.8
Using these data, OLS regressions of log hourly gross earnings on
one-digit industry dummy variables were employed to obtain raw
estimates of the interindustry wage structure for all employed
individuals in the SOEP for hourly wages (gross of deductions and
withholding). The results are reported in the first column of
Table 2. Similar unreported results were obtained throughout this
paper for hourly compensation, which included employer bonuses,
but still excluded employee contributions to social insurance. The
control group was the no response group.
Following Krueger and Summers (1988), a Mincer wage equation
was estimated that included the following controls: education and
its square, age, experience, occupation dummies (10), regional
dummies (8), a sex dummy, a central city dummy, a unionization
dummy, an ever married dummy, interactions of sex with
ever-married, education, education squared, and a constant.
Because education variables cannot be compared, foreign citizens
are excluded. These results are presented in the second column of
8The distinction is important because key variables such as
schooling are not comparable across German nationals and residentsof foreign nationality.9Krueger and Summers actually controlled for education and its
square, 6 age dummies. 8 occupation dummies, 3 regional dummies, asex dummy, a central city dummy, a unionization dummy, an evermarried dummy, veteran status, interactions of sex with marriage,education squared, am: six wage brackets, and a constant (seeTable 1, p. 264).
9
Table 2.
Direct control for human capital and workplace conditions can
be enhanced in the SOEP as a result of several questions in the
1985 survey described above. The third column of Table 2 presents
estimates of the wage structure after adding to the
Krueger-Summers controls tenure on the current job,
experience-squared, training/qualification dummies (6), guild
membership, job characteristics (26), and dummies for
self-employed and civil servant status.
The last column of Table 2 displays the estimated industry
wage structure given a set of "preferred controls," which simply
drop from the extended controls the following interactions:
sex-marriage, sex-education, sex-education-squared, and sex-
experience. An F-test of the joint significance of estimated
coefficients on the industry dummy variables confirms the
existence of the interindustry wage structure. On the other hand,
the weighted standard deviation of the estimated coefficients
falls considerably. Furthermore the percentage of variance
explained by the equation rises by 8-107 vis-a-vis the KS
controls, suggesting that job quality can explain more variance in
the wage structure than otherwise thought.'°
The results in general confirm the hypothesis that the
interindustry wage structure in Germany is tighter than in the
United States, controlling for the same factors. These estimates
10Edln and Zettenberg (1989) recently Investigated the
interindustry wage structure using Swedish data with a detailed
set of controls and reached similar conclusions.
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are compared in Table 3. As in Krueger and Summers (1988), we find
that in unreported results on "near 2-digit classifications,"
durables goods manufacturing and chemicals are high wage
industries, whereas the trade sectors pay statistically
significant lower wages." On the other hand the personal services
sector in Germany and wholesale-retail trade seem to have changed
places, ie the former paying considerably better than the latter.
5. Testing for homogeneity in the earning equations
The possibility of heterogeneous earnings functions suggested
in Section 3 can be tested. 12 Two approaches are taken. First, a
Chow test of subsample stability can be performed. Significant
variability across estimated earnings functions, as detected by a
statistically significant F-statistic, would signal a potential
"wastebasket" function performed by industry dummies. Tests for
homogeneity of the wage equation were performed across the
following subgroupings: male versus female; full-time versus
part-time; small versus large firms; and fewer than 5 years versus
more than 5 years tenure at current job. The results are reported
in Table 4. The test results allow the rejection at very low
significance levels of the null that the wage equations are the
same across the two groups. These results can only serve as a
warning against potential interactions.
11For aggregate evidence on West German industry wage differentials
see Fels and Gundlach (199::
12Krueger and Summer s (1988) do not test for equality of
coefficients across subgrours in their tables.
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Despite the suggestive examples of the previous section,
there is no compelling reason to believe that these interactions
are correlated with industry grouping. 13 It is possible, of course,
to test directly for interaction effects for the groupings
analyzed above. Table 5 presents F-tests for exclusion
restrictions for interactions of industry with sex,
full-time/part-time, firm size, and job tenure (more or less than
5 year affiliation with present f irm ). For sex, tenure, and full
time/part time, the interaction effect is significant at the
0.0001 level. It is also noteworthy that for full-time male
employees of large firms with low current job tenure, the joint
statistical significance of the industry dummies is attenuated
significantly.
In general It seems that the industry wage structure is less
robust the finer the division applied to the data. This is
consistent with "wastebasket" interpretation of the industry
dummies. At the same time, the job quality variables remain
consistently significant. Results to this effect presented in
Table 6, especially with respect to tenure, suggest that the wage
structure might be fruitfully estimated on a narrower sample. In
Table 7 we present the interindustry wage structure for low (less
than 60 months) and high (more than 60 months) job tenure for
all employees. The confirms the suspicion that significant
interaction exists between industry and tenure in the wage
13Unfortunately there were insufficient observations to perform Chow
tests for each industry grouping.
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equation. While the interindustry wage structure is robust for
workers of long tenure, it is statistically insignificant for
workers with little experience within their current firm.
That interindustry wage differentials are exhibited only for
employees with extended tenure in a given enterprise, if robust
for other data sets in other countries, has important implications
for the interindustry wage structure. It seems to favor
interpretations stressing sharing of rents from industry or firm
specific human capital formation, both of which will be correlated
with tenure. 14 For example, it is reasonable that in-house
experience is more valuable in chemical and metal industries than
in trade or personal services, and as result apparently identical
workers in different industries are not the same. 15 If such human
capital has different productivity in different industries, then
it will pay for high productivity industries to attempt to bid for
this resource. As a state variable, job tenure cannot be simply
purchased, but rather created in a time intensive process. Here
the job turnover interpretation of the interindustry wage
structure is closest to our point here: to increase firm or
14It should be remarked that the continuous variable tenure
variable was invariably significant in the regression results,
corroborating findings el of LOwenbein (1989), Hubler and Gerlach
(1990) and Schwarze (1990).15
Slichter (1950) wrote: '..jobs and occupations which bear the
same name do note necessarily involve the same kinds of duties orthe same degree of responsibility. Machinists first-class in acandy factory do not necessarily need the same knowledge of the
trade as machinists first-class in an oil refinery. Loom fixers
may have essentially same duties in different mills, but the
skill required of them may vary greatly depending upon the kind
and quality of goods which ;he mill produces." (p.801
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industry specific human capital, firms invest by paying higher
wages and reducing the rate of attrition through quits into other
jobs. The key difference is that turnover reduction is a
determinant, rather than a byproduct of the process by which wages
are set.
The average tenure of workers in various industries in the
1985 SOEP is shown in Table 8. Chi-squared tables for distribution
of tenure (uncompleted spells) are also displayed in Table 9.
Both reveal striking differences across both one and two digit
industries. Clearly other things matter as well such as industry
history and changes in hiring policies over time. While some
industries indeed seem to possess workers of higher than average
tenure while others need less tenure, the pattern of tenure
concentration is less pronounced at the one-sector industry level.
On this interpretation, it need not be the case that high
wage industries necessarily have higher tenure profiles. When
tenure is created it will be impossible for the firm not to share
the rents with the worker, since such workers cannot be replaced
overnight. As a result the very indispensibility of workers will
contribute to the cost of tenure (firm specific human capital). It
is not implausible that firms in these industries move up their
demand curve for this "input." Thus, following the interpretation
of Katz and Summers (1989), this form of rent sharing shows up as
the interindustry wage structure.
This interpretation is consistent with other aspects of the
industry wage structure. Krueger and Summers (1988) found that
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involuntary industry changers in the CPS Displaced Workers Survey
sustained wage changes equivalent to those estimated in their
equations. This is consistent with the wage differential as the
rent from firm or industry-specific human capital formation; by
definition, firm-specific capital disappears when the worker
leaves the firm, and industry-specific capital is destroyed when a
worker exits the industry. 16 On the other hand, the specific human
capital explanation requires an extreme complementarity in the
production function. Secretaries in the textile or wood/paper/pulp
industries would require less firm or industry-specific training
than say in the chemical industry. Yet, there is no compelling
reason why this degree of complementarity should be constant
across industries. The results suggest that this avenue of
explaining the occupational wage structure should be explored, as
a possible alternative to the "fairness" or sociological
explanations popular in the literature.17
6. Concluding Remarks
As measured by the coefficients on industry dummy variables,
The SOEP data set exhibits a similar interindustry wage structure
as found in the US, albeit with tighter variance. 18 The addition of
16Our results are nct consistent with involuntary changers into
high wage industries receiving immediately higher wages. This
could be the case if workers received a wage that exceeeded the
opportunity cost of their labor in industries with high
productivity of firm-s: ecif ic human capital. Our suggest that
workers must first accumulate the necessary experience before
receiving tenure-related rents.
17See Akerlof (1982) and Al.::: ..?f and Yellen (1990).
18This confirms the aggregate ifindings of Burda and Sachs (1988).
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better controls for job quality, however, reduce significantly
this variability within margins estimation error. The results of
this investigation suggest that there are statistically
significant differences in wage equations across groupings, and
that industry interactions with- these groups are significant. This
raises the prospect that the industry wage structure is merely a
wastebasket for omitted interaction effects of various groupings
with industry.
Although we do not stress the result here, one version of
the efficiency wage hypothesis finds support in our results.
Estimated coefficients on "strict job supervision: fully agree"
(question 5 in Table 1) were always statistically significant and
negative in the regressions reported in this paper, ranging from
9-157. of the gross wage. On the other hand, by controlling for
this factor directly --based on individual's response to the
questioner rather than matching job attributes from other data
sets-- we reduce its plausibility as a the sole explanation of the
interindustry wage structure. The results, especially those with
respect to job tenure, are supportive of a shared-rent
interpretation of interindustry wage differentials, with rents
deriving from industry or firm-specific human capital which
accumulates only over time. The robustness of these rents over
time and space can be explained by that with which this human
capital is employed.
Perhaps the most durable conclusion of" the paper is that
simple earnings equations, which are reduced forms anyway, may not
be capably of capturing the rich economic processes that underly
wage determination. There is simply not enough information in
-18-
existing surveys. The sensitivity of the earnings equation to the
sample with which it is estimated should serve as a warning
against overinterpretation of industry wage differentials.
-19-
Table 1Job Quality Questions in the 1985 SOEP
1. Does your work involve variation in tasks?2. Is your work physically strenuous?3. Can you organize your work independently?4. Does your work vary with demand?5. Does your work involve strict supervision?6. Do you have to work variable shifts?7. Are you required to work nights regularly?8. Do you often have conflicts with your supervisors?9. Do you get along well with your colleagues on the job?10. Are you involved in decision making about the promotion andsalaries of others?11. Are you able to acquire skills on the job that will help youadvance in the future?12. Does your work involve usually bothersome or environmentallyhazardous conditions?13. Does your job involve a high degree of mental concentrationor nervous tension?
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Table 2. The SOEP Interindustry Wage Structure (1-digit)
(standard errors in parentheses)
NO K-S EXTENDED PREFERREDIndustry CONTROLS CONTROLS CONTROLS CONTROLS
Agriculture -0.29 -0.19 -0.14 -0.17(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Mining 0.413 0.253 0.112 0.099(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Manufacturing 0.121 0.068 0.028 0.023(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 0.03
Construction 0.088 0.022 0.035 0.028(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Wholesale/Retail Trade -0.20 -0.12 -0.12 -0.14(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Transport/Communication 0.104 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Finance/Insurance 0.242 0.115 0.101 0.086(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Other Services 0.114 0.000 -0.01 -0.01(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Unweighted std dev 0.211 0.130 0.091 0.093Adjustedt 0.198 0.102 0.051 0.054Weighted std dev 0.113 0.065 0.056 0.058Adjustedt 0.086 0.051 0.039 0.043F-test for industry
dummies16.33* 5.057* 4.155* 4.345*
R-squared 0.027 0.399 0.489 0.475Sample size 4598 3342 3342 3342
Dependent variable: log of hourly earnings excl. fringesReference Group: unclassified
tAdjusted for estimation error*F-statistic significant at the 0.0001 level
K-S controls: after Krueger and Summers (1988): education
square, age, experience, occupation dummies (10), regional
(8), sex dummy, central city dummy, unionization
and its
dummies
dummy,
ever married dummy, interactions of sex
education, education squared, and a constant
264). Extended controls: K-S controls plus
squared, training dummies (6), guild
characteristics (26), self-employed
dummy,
Preferred controls: extended controls except
with ever-married,
(see Table 1, p.
tenure, experience
membership, job
civil servant.
the interactions
sex-marriage, sex-education, sex-education-squared, and sex-
experience.
-21-
Table 3. SOEP and CPS Interindustry Wage Structures Compared(1-digit)
Industry
SOEPK-S PREFERREDCONTROLS CONTROLS
CPSKRUEGER-SUMMERSt
Agriculture -0.19 -0.17(0.11) (0.11)
Mining 0.253 0.099 0.222(0.16) (0.15) (0.75)
Manufacturing 0.068 0.023 0.091(0.03) 0.03 0.03
Construction 0.022 0.028 0.108(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Wholesale/Retail Trade -0.12 -0.14 -0.11(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Transport/Communication -0.02 -0.07 0.145(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Finance/Insurance 0.115 0.086 0.055(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Other Services 0.000 -0.01 -0.078(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Weighted std dev 0.065 0.058 n.r.Adjusted 0.051 0.043 0.094F-test for industry 5.057* 4.345• n.r.
dummies (p<.000001)
R-squared 0.399 0.475 n.r.Sample size 3342 3342 3342
tlndustry wage equation differentials estimated by Krueger and
Summers (1988) in the May 1984 US Current Population Survey.
Classifications not exactly comparable across countries.
-22-
Table 4F-tests for Homogeneity of Slope Coefficients in Wage Equations
Grouping SSR
uF:chow(72,3198)
Men v Women 613.8 7.938Full-time v Part-time 593.7 9.683Firmsize>20 v <20 employees 692.8 2.033Tenure?.-60months v <60 months 658.0 4.457
Total SSR restricted (pooled sample): 724.9758
Hourly wages, employed Germans, n=3342
-23-
Table 5. F-tests for Industry Interactions
Hourly wages, preferred controls, German citizens, full sample n=3342
All employeesIndustry interacted with: F-statistic (8,3239) (MB009)
Constant (Industry dummy) 8.0956 (p<.0001)Sex 4.0408 (p<.0001)Full-time 8.4793 (p<.0001)Firmsize>20 2.8051 (p=.0067)Tenure>60 4.8507 (p<.0001)
All full time employeesIndustry interacted with:
(MB010)F-statistic (8,2771)
Constant (Industry dummy) 4.1039 (p<.0001)Sex 3.6503 (p=.0003)Firmsize>20 3.0873 (p=.0032)Tenure>60 4.8365 (p<.0001)
Male full-time employeesIndustry interacted with: F-statistic (8,1911)
Constant (Industry dummy) 3.9971 (p<.0001)Firmsize>20 2.1431 (p=.0363)Tenure>60 4.1991 (p<.0001)
Male full-time employees, FIRMSIZE>20Industry interacted with: F-statistic (8,1518)
Constant (Industry dummy) 3.7626 (p=.0002)Tenure>60 4.1429 (p<.0001)
Male full-time employees, FIRMSIZE>20, TENURE<60and with less than 60 months job tenureIndustry interacted with: F-statistic (8,396)
Constant (Industry dummy) 2.2715 (p=.0220)
(MB11)
(MB12)
(MB014)
-24-
Table 6. F-tests for Industry and Job Quality DummyVariables on Different Subsamples
Hourly wages, preferred controls, German citizens
Sample
All employees n=3342, no interactions
F-statistic
Industry dummies F(8,3269)=4.3449 (p<.0001)Job Quality dummies F(26,3269)=5.7977 (p<.0001)
All employees n=3342, with interactions*Industry dummies F(8,3239)=8.0956 (p<.0001)Job Quality dummies F(26,3239)=5.7173 (p<.0001)
All full-time employees, with interactions•Industry dummies F(8,2771)=4.1039 (p<.0001)Job Quality dummies F(26,2771)=7.1844 (p<.0001)
Male full-time employees, with interactions•Industry dummies F(8,1911)=3.9971 (p<.0001)Job Quality dummies F(26,1911)=5.2794 (p<.0001)
Male full-time employees, FIRMSIZE>20, with interactions*Industry dummies F(8,1518)=3.7626 (p=.0002)Job Quality dummies F(26,1518)=4.0130 (p<.0001)
Male full-time employees, FIRMSIZE>20, TENURE<60Industry dummies F(8,396)=2.2715 (p=.0220)Job Quality dummies F(26,396)=3.0437 (p<.0001)
All full-time male employees, TENURE<60Industry dummies F(8,578)=2.0564 (p=.0382)Job Quality dummies F(26,578)=4.0496 (p<.0001)
All male employees, TENURE<60Industry dummies F(8,617)=0.9611 (p=.4655)Job Quality dummies F(26,617)=3.228 (p<.0001)
All employees, TENURE<60Industry dummies F(8,1193)=1.1558 (p=.3229)Job Quality dummies F(26,1193)=3.9861 (p<.0001)
Controls are the same as in previous tables.
*When admissible: industry x sex, industry x fulltime, industry xfirmsize>20, firm tenure<60.
-25-
Table 7.SOEP Interindustry Wage Structure By Employment Tenure,
1-Digit industries, preferred Controls, all German employees(standard errors in parentheses)
IndustryTenure
<60 months >60 months
Agriculture -0.18 -0.09(0.18) (0.13)
Mining 0.390 0.034(0.38) (0.15)
Manufacturing -0.01 0.060(0.06) (0.04)
Construction 0.051 0.065(0.07) (0.05)
Wholesale/Retail Trade -0.12 -0.15(0.07) (0.05)
Transport/Communication -0.07 -0.01(0.09) (0.05)
Finance/Insurance -0.02 0.146(0.09) (0.06)
Other Services -0.06 0.026(0.06) (0.04)
Unweighted std err 0.164 0.090Adjusted* 0.024 0.037Weighted std err 0.054 0.071Adjusted* n.c. 0.055F-test for industry
dummies 1.18 4.730p=0.3076 p<.0001
R-squared 0.485 0.445Sample size 1279 2062
-26-
Table 8. Mean Tenure (incomplete spells)by Industry (months)
Sector (number of individuals) 19Mean"2-digit"
-1 Unclassified (205) 128.40 Insufficient info (32) 18.81 Agriculture/Forestry (36) 159.8
Std(Mean)
7.25.7
26.92 Fishing (2) 59.5 51.53 Energy and Water (34) 156.4 24.74 Mining (10) 176.5 43.95 Chemicals (95) 144.1 12.16 Plastics (34) 134.1 20.07 Stone Clay and Glass (38) 170.1 21.98 Primary Metals (188) 136.3 8.59 Machine tools (213) 141.3 8.810 Machinery, elec/prec (153) 112.8 8.611 Wood, paper, printing (93) 114.3 11.312 Apparel (83) 138.4 14.013 Food, Drink and Tobacco (111) 112.7 9.814 Construction: HAUPT (150) 119.3 9.015 Construction: HILFS (80) 109.5 13.316 Wholesale Trade (85) 98.8 11.117 Brokering (4) 105.5 32.518 Retail Trade (240) 94.7 6.019 Federal Railroad (44) 252.7 18.920 Federal Post (67) 194.0 15.721 Other comm and transport (77) 113.9 12.022 Banking (89) 124.9 10.123 Insurance (44) 118.9 16.224 Eating and drinking (56) 91.8 14.325 Personal Services (21) 54.7 17.526 Building maintenence, garb (15) 113.5 32.427 Education (246) 125.7 6.328 Medical services (164) 100.8 8.429 Legal professions (81) 78.9 9.330 Other services (9) 67.4 27.831 Churches, clubs (102) 79.9 7.232 Private Household (7) 61.4 23.533 Government/Admin (338) 149.3 6.134 Social Insurance (44) 150.6 19.736 incorrect answers (55) 112.8 13.7
Average Tenure, n=3422 123.7
19 Industry 35 "other nonclassified branch" contained one
observation who had worked at the company for 324 months.
-27-
CHISQ: p=42.819 0.0000.2190.1240.0021.3650.7380.4491.3091.2592.4521.4310.3561.0430.1480.2946.206
0.6400.7240.9680.2430.3900.5030.2530.2620.1170.2320.5510.3070.7010.5880.013
Table 9. ChiSquare 2X2 Contingency Tests,Concentration of Tenured Workers by industry
1-digit:
TENURE60 BY AGR
1251 16
2054 22 CHISQ: 0.289 (P=.591)TENURE60 BY MIN
1265 2
2068 8 CHISQ; 0.243 (p=.243)TENURE60 BY MAN
905 362
1430 646 CHISQ; 2.422 (p=.120)TENURE60 BY CON
1166 101
1947 129 CHISQ; 3.794 (p=.051)TENURE60 BY WRT
1118 149
1896 180 CHISQ; 8.464 (p=.004)TENURE60 BY TPU
1208 59
1913 163 CHISQ; 12.955 (p<.001)TENURE60 BY FIR
1220 47
1990 86 CHISQ; 0.386 (p=.532)TENURE60 BY SER
854 413
1409 667 CHISQ; 0.079 (p=.779)
"2-digit"
TENURE60 BY:0 Insufficient info1 Agriculture/Forestry2 Fishing3 Energy and Water4 Mining5 Chemicals6 Plastics7 Stone Clay and Glass8 Primary Metals9 Machine tools10 Machinery, elec and prec11 Wood, paper, and printing12 Apparel13 Food, Drink and Tobacco14 Construction: HAUPT15 Construction: HILFS
-28-
Table 9. ChiSquare 2X2 Contingency Tests,Concentration of Tenured Workers by industry
(continued)
16 Wholesale Trade 3.108 0.07817 Brokering 0.283 0.59518 Retail Trade 5.538 0.01919 Federal Railroad 13.34 0.00020 Federal Post 11.608 0.00121 Other comm and transp 0.002 0.96522 Banking 1.611 0.20423 Insurance 0.528 0.46724 Eating and drinking 7.375 0.00725 Personal Services 20.528 0.00026 Building maintenence, garb 3.127 0.07727 Education 3.777 0.05228 Medical services 7.73 0.00529 Legal professions 6.865 0.00930 Other services 3.173 0.07531 Churches, clubs 4.595 0.03232 Private Household 3.35 0.06733 Government/Admin 28.477 0.00034 Social Insurance 1.314 0.25236 incorrect answers 0.002 0.965
-29-
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88/12 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS "Business firms and managers in the 21stcentury", February 1988
88/13 Manfred KETS DE VRIES "Alexithymia in organizational life: theorganization man revisited", February 1988.
88/14 Alain NOEL "The interpretation of strategies: a study ofthe impact of CEOs on thecorporation", March 1988.
S8/15 Anil DEOLALIKAR and "The production of and returns fromLars-Hendrik ROLLER industrial innovation: an econometric
analysis for a developing country", December1987.
88/16 Gabriel HAWAWINI "Market efficiency and equity pricing:international evidence and implications forglobal investing", March 1988.
88/17 Michael BURDA "Monopolistic competition, costs ofadjustment and the behavior of Europeanemployment", September 1987.
88/18 Michael BURDA "Reflections on "Wait Unemployment" inEurope", November 1987, revised February1988.
88/19 M.J. LAWRENCE and "Individual bias in judgements ofSpyros MAKRIDAKIS confidence", March 1988.
88/20 Jean DERMINE,Damien NEVEN and
"Portfolio selection by mutual funds, anequilibrium model", March 1988.
J.F. THISSE
88/21 James TEBOUL "De-industrialize service for quality", March1988 (88/03 Revised).
88/22 Lars-Hendrik ROLLER "Proper Quadratic Functions with anApplication to AT&T", May 1987 (RevisedMarch 1988).
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Michael LAWRENCE and
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88/03 James TEBOUL "De-industrialize service for quality", January1988.
88/04 Susan SCHNEIDER "National vs. corporate culture: implicationsfor human resource management". January1988.
88/05 Charles WYPLOSZ "The swinging dollar: is Europe out of
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88/06 Reinhard ANGELMAR "I,es minks dans les canaux de
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RR/40 Josef LAKONISHOK and "Anomalous price behavior aroundTheo VERMAELEN repurchase tender offers", August 1988.
88/41 Charles WYPLOSZ "Assymetry in the EMS: intentional orsystemic?", August 1988.
RR/42 Paul EVANS "Organizathmal development in thetransnational enterprise", June 1988.
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"Whatever happened to the philosopher-king: the leader's addiction to power,September 1988.
"Strategic choice of flexible productiontechnologies and welfare implications",October 1988
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"Size-sorted portfolios and the violation ofthe random walk hypothesis: Additionalempirical evidence and implication for testsof asset pricing models", June 1988.
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"Coordinating manufacturing and businessstrategies: I", February 1989.
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89/21
Arnoud de MEYER and
Kasra FERDOWS
89/22
Manfred KETS DE VRIES
and Sydney PERZOW
/19/23 Robert KORAJCZYK and
Claude VIALLET
89/24 Martin KILDUFF and
Mitchel ABOLAFIA
"The impostor syndrome: a disquietingphenomenon in organizational life", February
1989.
"Product innovation: a tool for competitiveadvantage", March 1989.
"Evaluating a firm's product innovationperformance", March 1989.
"Combining related and sparse data in linearregression models", February 1989.
"Changement organisationnel et r6alitesculturelles: coutrastes franco-amtricains",March 1989.
"Information asymmetry, market failure andjoint-ventures: theory and evidence",March 1989.
"Combining related and sparse data in linearregression models", Revised March 1989.
"A rational random behavior model ofchoke", Revised March 1989.
"Influence of manufacturing improvementprogrammes on performance", April 1989.
"What is the role of character inpsychoanalysis?" April 1989.
"Equity risk prenaia and the pricing offoreign exchange risk" April 1989.
"The social destruction of reality:Organisational conflict as social drama"zApril 1989.
89/25 Roger BETANCOURT andDavid GAUTSCHI
89/26 Charles BEAN,Edmond MALINVAUD,Peter BERNHOLZ,Francesco GIAVAllIand Charles WYPLOSZ
89/27 David KRACKHARDT andMartin KILDUFF
89/28 Martin KILDUFF
89/29 Robert GOGEL andJean-Claude LARRECHE
89/30 Lars-Hendrik ROLLERand Mihkel M.TOMBAK
89/31 Michael C. BURDA andStefan GERLACH
89/32 Peter HAUG andTawfik JELASSI
89/33 Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE
89/34 Sumantra GHOSHAL andNittin NOHRIA
89/35 Jean DERMINE andPierre HILLION
"Two essential characteristics of retailmarkets and their economic consequences"March 1989.
"Macroeconomic policies for 1992: thetransition and after". April 1989.
"Friendship patterns and culturalattributions: the control of organizationaldiversity", April 1989.
"The interpersonal structure of decisionmaking: a social comparison approach toorganizational choice", Revised April 1989.
"The battlefield for 1992: product strengthand geographic coverage", May 1989.
"Competition and Investment in FlexibleTechnologies", May 1989.
"Intertemporal prices and the US tradebalance in durable goods", July 1989.
"Application and evaluation of a multi-criteria decision support system for thedynamic selection of U.S. manufacturinglocations', May 1989.
"Design flexibility in monopsonicticindustries", May 1989.
"Requisite variety versus shared values:managing corporate-division relationships inthe M-Form organisation", May 1989.
"Deposit rate ceilings and the market valueof banks: The case of France 1971-1981",May 1989.
89/36 Martin KILDUFF
89/37 Manfred KETS DE VRIES
89/38 Manfred KETS DE VRIES
89/39 Robert KORAJCZYK andClaude VIALLET
89/40 Balaji CHAKRAVARTHY
89/41 B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNEand Nathalie DIERKENS
89/42 Robert ANSON andTawfik JELASSI
89/43 Michael BURDA
89/44 Balaji CHAKRAVARTHYand Peter LORANGE
89/45 Rob WEITZ and
Arnoud DE MEYER
89/46 Marcel CORSTJENS,Carmen MATUTES andDamien NEVEN
89/47 Manfred KETS DE VRIESand Christine MEAD
89/48 Damien NEVEN andLars-Hendrik ROLLER
"A dispositional approach to social networks:the case of organizational choice", May 1989.
"The organisational fool: balancing aleader's hubris", May 1989.
"The CFA blues", June 1989.
"An empirical investigation of internationalsuet pricing", (Revised June 1989).
"Management systems for innovation andproductivity", June 1989.
"The strategic supply of precisions", June1989.
"A development framework for computer-supported conflict resolution", July 1989.
"A note on firing costs and severance benefit,in equilibrium unemployment", June 1989.
"Strategic adaptation in multi-businessfirms", June 1989.
"Managing expert systems: a framework andease study", June 1989.
"Entry Encouragement", July 1989.
"The global dimension in leadership andorganization: issues and controversies", April1989.
"European integration and trade flows",August 1989.
89/49 Jean DERMINE "Home country control and mutual
recognition", July 1989. 89/62 Amoud DE MEYER
(TM)
89/50 Jean DERMINE "The specialization of financial institutions,
the EEC model", August 1989. 89/63 Enver YUCESAN and
(TM) Lee SCHRUBEN
89/51 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS "Sliding simulation: a new approach to time
series forecasting". July 1989. 89/64 Enver YUCESAN and
(TM) Lee SCHRUBEN
89/52 Arnoud DE MEYER "Shortening development cycle times: a
manufacturer's perspective", August 1989. 89/65 Soumitra DUTTA and
89/53 Spyms MAKRIDAKIS "Why combining works?", July 1989.
(TM,
AC, FIN)
Piero BONISSONE
89/54 S. BALAKRISHNAN "Organisation costs and a theory of joint 89/66 B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE
and Mitchell KOZA ventures", September 1989. (TM,EP)
89/55 H. SCHUTTE "Euro-Japanese cooperation in information 89/67 Peter BOSSAERTS and
technology", September 1989. (FIN) Pierre HILLION
89/56 Wilfried VANHONACKER
and Lydia PRICE
"On the practical usefulness of meta-analysis
results", September 1989.
1990
89/57 Taekwnn KIM,
Lars-Hendrik ROLLER
and Mihkel TOMBAK
"Market growth and the diffusion of
multiproduct technologies", September 1989. 90/01
TM/EP/AC
B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE
89/58 Lars-Hendrik ROLLER "Strategic aspects of flexible production 90/02 Michael BURDA
(EP,TM) and Mihkel TOMBAK technologies", October 1989. EP
89/59
(OR)
Manfred KETS DE VRIES,
Daphne ZEVADI,
Alain NOEL and
"Locus of control and entrepreneurship: a
three-country comparative study", October
1989.
90/03
TM
Amoud DE MEYER
Mihkel TOMBAK
89/60 Enver YUCESAN and "Simulation graphs for design and analysis of 90/04 Gabriel HAWAWINI and
(TM) Lee SCHRUBEN discrete event simulation models", October FIN/EP Eric RAJENDRA
1989.
89/61 Susan SCHNEIDER and "Interpreting and responding to strategic 90/05 Gabriel HAWAWINI and
(All) Arnoud DE MEYER issues: The impact of national culture",
October 1989.
FIN/EP Bertrand JACQUILLAT
"Technology strategy and international R&D
operations", October 1989.
"Equivalence of simulations: A graph
approach", November 1989.
"Complexity of simulation models: A graph
theoretic approach", November 1989.
"MARS: A mergers and acquisitions
reasoning system", November 1989.
"On the regulation of procurement bids",
November 1989.
"Market microstructure effects ofgovennnent intervention in the foreign
exchange market", December 1989.
"Unavoidable Mechanisms", January 1990.
"Monopolistic Competition, Costs ofAdjustment, and the Behaviour of European
Manufacturing Employment", January 1990.
"Management of Communication in
International Research and Development",
January 1990.
"The Transformation of the European
Financial Services Industry: From
Fragmentation to Integration", January 1990.
"European Equity Markets: Toward 1992
and Beyond", January 1990.
90/06 Gabriel HAWAWINI and "Integration of European Equity Markets:FIN/EP Eric RAJENDRA Implications of Structural Change for Key
Market Participants to and Beyond 1992",January 1990.
90/17
FIN
Nathalie DIERKENS Information Asymmetry and Equity Issues",Revised January 1990.
90/18 Wilfried VANHONACKER "Managerial Decision Rules and the90/07 Gabriel HAWAWINI "Stock Market Anomalies and the Pricing of MKT Estimation of Dynamic Sales ResponseFIN/EP Equity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange",
January 1990.
Models", Revised January 1990.
90/19 Beth JONES and "The Effect of Computer Intervention and90/08
TM/EP
Tawfik JELASSI and
B. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE
"Modelling with MCDSS: What aboutEthics?", January 1990.
TM Tawfik JELASSI Task Structure on Bargaining Outcome",February 1990.
90/09 Alberto GIOVANNINI "Capital Controls and Internal' a Trade 90/20 Tawfik JELASSI, "An Introduction to Group Decision andEP/FIN and Jae WON PARK Finance", January 1990. TM Gregory KERSTEN and Negotiation Support", February 1990.
Stanley ZIONTS
90/10 Joyce BRYER and "The Impact of Language Theories on DSSTM Tawfik JELASSI Dialog", January 1990. 90/21 Roy SMITH and "Reconfiguration of the Global Securities
FIN Ingo WALTER Industry in the 1990's", February 1990.
90/11 Enver YUCESAN "An Overview of Frequency DomainTM Methodology for Simulation Sensitivity 90/22 Ingo WALTER "European Financial Integration and Its
Analysis", January 1990. FIN Implications for the United States", February
1990.
90/12 Michael BURDA "Structural Change, Unemployment Benefitsand Iligh Unemployment: A U.S.-European 90/23 Damien NEVEN "EEC Integration towards 1992: SomeComparison", January 1990. EP/SM Distributional Aspects", Revised December
1989
90/13 Soumitra DUTTA and "Approximate Reasoning about TemporalTM Shashi SHEKHAR Constraints in Real Time Planning and 90/24 Lars Tyge NIELSEN "Positive Prices in CAPM", January 1990.
Search", January 1990. FIN/EP
90/14
TM
Albert ANGEHRN and
Hans-Jakob LOTH!
"Visual Interactive Modelling and IntelligentDSS: Putting Theory Into Practice", January
90/25FIN/EP
Lars Tyge NIELSEN "Existence of Equilibrium in CAPM",January 1990.
1990.
90/26 Charles KADUSHIN and "Why networking Fails: Double Binds and90/15
TM
Arnoud DE MEYER,
Dirk DESCHOOLMEESTER,
Rudy MOENAERT and
"The Internal Technological Renewal of aBusiness Unit with a Mature Technology",January 1990.
011/BP Michael BRIMM the Limitations of Shadow Networks",February 1990.
Jan BARBE 90/27 Abbas FOROUGHI and "NSS Solutions to Major NegotiationTM Tawfik JELASSI Stumbling Blocks", February 1990.
90/16 Richard LEVICH and "Tax-Driven Regulatory Drag: EuropeanFIN Ingo WALTER Financial Centers in the 1990's", January 90/28 Arnoud DE MEYER "The Manufacturing Contribution to
1990. TM Innovation", February 1990.
90/40 Manfred KETS DE VRIES "Leaden on the Couch: The case of Roberto90/29 Nathalie DIERKENS "A Discussion of Correct Measures of OR Cal vi", April 1990.FIN/AC Information Asymmetry", January 1990.
90/30 Lars Tyge NIELSEN "The Expected Utility of Portfolios of90/41FIN/EP
Gabriel HAWAWINI,Itzhak SWARY and
"Capital Market Reaction to theAnnouncement of Interstate Banking
FIN/EP Assets", March 1990. lk HWAN JANG Legislation", March 1990.
90/31 David GAUTSCHI and "What Determines U.S. Retail Margins?", 90/42 Joel STECKEL and "Cross-Validating Regression Models inMKT/EP Roger BETANCOURT February 1990. MKT Wilfried VANHONACKER Marketing Research", (Revised April 1990).
90/32 Srinivasan BALAK- "Information Asymmetry, Adverse Selection 90/43 Robert KORAJCZYK and "Equity Risk Premia and the Pricing ofSM RISHNAN and
Mitchell KOZAand Joint-Ventures: Theory and Evidence",Revised, January 1990.
Claude VIALLET Foreign Exchange Risk", May 1990.
90/33 Caren SIEHL, "The Role of Rites of Integration in Service 90/44 Gilles AMADO, "Organisational Change and CulturalOR David BOWEN and Delivery", March 1990. OR Claude FAUCHEUX and Realities: Franco-American Contrasts", April
Christine PEARSON Andre LAURENT 1990.
90/45 Soumitra DUTTA and "Integrating Case Based and Rule Based90/34FIN/EP
Jean DERMINE "The Gains from European RankingIntegration, a Can for a Pro-Active
TM Piero BONISSONE Reasoning: The Possibilistic Connection",May 1990.
Competition Policy", April 1990.90/46 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS "Exponential Smoothing: The Effect of
90/35 Jae Won PARK "Changing Uncertainty and the Time- TM and Michele HIBON Initial Values and Less Functions on Post-Varying Risk Pretnia in the Term Structureof Nominal Interest Rates", December 19118,Revised March 1990. 90/47 Lydia PRICE and
Sample Forecasting Accuracy".
"Improper Sampling in NaturalMKT Wilfried VANHONACKER Experiments: Limitations on the Use of
90/36 Arnoud DE MEYER "An Empirical Investigation of Meta-Analysis Results in BayesianTM Manufacturing Strategies in European Updating", Revised May 1990.
Industry", April 1990.90/48 Jae WON PARK "The Information in the Term Structure of
90/37TM/OR/SM
William CATS-BARIL "Executive Information Systems: Developingan Approach to Open the Potsibles", April
EP Interest Rates: Out-of-Sample ForecastingPerformance", June 1990.
1990.90/49 Soumitra DUTTA "Approximate Reasoning by Analogy to
90/38 Wilfried VANHONACKER "Managerial Decision Behaviour and the TM Answer Null Queries", June 1990.MKT Estimation of Dynamic Sales Response
Models", (Revised February 1990). 90/50 Daniel COHEN and "Price and Trade Effects of Exchange RatesEP Charles WYPLOSZ Fluctuations and die Design of Policy
90/39TM
Louis LE BLANC andTawlik JELASSI
"An Evaluation and Selection Methodologyfor Expert System Shells", May 1990.
Coordination", April 1990.
90/51 Michael BURDA and "Gross Labour Market Flows in Europe: 90/63 Sumantra GHOSHAL and "Organising Competitor Analysis Systems",EP Charles WYPLOSZ Some Stylized Facts", June 1990. SM Eleanor WESTNEY August 1990
90/52 Lars Tyge NIELSEN "The Utility of Infinite Menus", June 1990. 90/64 Sumantra GHOSHAL "Internal Differentiation and CorporateFIN SM Performance: Case of the Multinational
Corporation", August 199090/53 Michael Burda "The Consequences of German EconomicEP and Monetary Union", June 1990. 90/65 Charles WYPLOSZ "A Note on the Real Exchange Rate Effect of
EP German Unification", August 199090/54 Damien NEVEN and "European Financial Regulation: A
EP Colin MEYER Framework for Policy Analysis", (Revised 90/66 Soumitra DUTTA and "Computer Support for Strategic and TacticalMay 1990). TIM/SE/FIN Piero BONISSONE Planning in Mergers and Acquisitions",
September 199090/55 Michael BURDA and "Intertemporal Prices and the US Trade
El' Stefan GERLACH Balance", (Revised July 1990). 90/67 Soumitra DUTTA and "Integrating Prior Cases and Expert Knowledge In
90/56 Damien NEVEN and "The Structure and Determinants ants of East-West
TM/SE/FIN Piero BONISSONE • Mergers and Acquisitions Reasoning System",
September 1990EP Lars-Hendrik ROLLER Trade: A Preliminary Analysis of the
Manufacturing Sector", July 1990 90/68 Soumitra DUTTA "A Framework ind Methodology for Enhancing theTM/SE Business Impact of Artificial Intelligence
90/57 Lars Tyge NIELSEN Common Knowledge of a Multivariate Aggregate Applications", September 1990FIN/EP/ Statistic", July 1990
TM 90/69 Soumitra DUTTA "A Model for Temporal Reasoning in MedicalTM Expert Systems", September 1990
90/58 Lars Type NIELSEN "Common Knowledge of Price and Expected CostFIN/EP/TM in an Oligopolistic Market", August 1990 90/70
TM
Albert ANGEHRN "'Triple C': A Visual Interactive MCDSS",
September 199090/59 Jean DERMINE and "Economies of Scale and
FIN Lars-Hendrik ROLLER Scope in the French Mutual Funds (SICAV) 90/71 Philip PARKER end "Competitive Effects in Diffusion Models: AnIndustry", August 1990 MKT Hubert GATIGNON Empirical Analysis", September 1990
90/60 Pen 1Z and "An Interactive Group Decision Aid for 90172 Enver YUCESAN "Analysis of Marko, Chains Using SimulationTM Tawfik JELASSI Multiohjective Problems: An Empirical TM Graph Models", October 1990
Assessment", September 1990
90/61
TM
Pankaj CHANDRA and
Mihkel TOMBAK"Models for the Evlauation of Manufacturing
flexibility", August 1990
90/73
TM
Arnoud DE MEYER and
Kasra FERDOWS
"Removing the Barriers in Manufacturing",
October 1990
90/62 Damien NEVEN and "Public Policy Towards TV Broadcasting in the 90/74 Sumantra GHOSHAL and "Requisite Complexity: Organising Headquarters-EP Menno VAN DUK Netherlands", August 1990 SM Nitin NOHRIA Subsidiary Relations in MNCs", October 1990
90/75MKT
Roger BETANCOURT andDavid GAUTSCHI
Me Outputs of Retail Activities: Concepts,Measuremest and Evidence', October 1990
90/37FIN/EP
Lan Tyge NIELSEN 'Existence of Equilibrium in CAPM: FurtherResults', December 1990
90/76 WiIfried VANHONACKER •Masegerial Decision Behaviour and the Estimation 90/113 Susan C. SCHNEIDER and 'audios in Organisational Analysis: Who'sMKT of Dynamic Sales Response Models',
Revised October 1990On/MKT Reinhard ANGELMAR Minding the Store?* Revised. December 1990
90/89 Manfred F.R. KETS DE VRIES Ms CEO Who Coati'. Talk Straight and Other90/77 Warned VANHONACKER "Takes the Kuck Scheme of Sales Response la 011 Tale feu lhe Board Room,* December 1990MKT Advernsisg: An Auregatios-Independest
Ardocorrelano. Test", October 1990 90/90 Philip PARKER *Peke Elasticity Dynamics ever the AdoptionMKT Likcyde: An Empirical Study,* December 1990
90/73 Michael BURDA and "Eschew Rate Dynamics and CurrencyEr
90/79
Stefan GERLACH
Anil GABA
Unification: The Ostmark - DM Rote',October 1990
misferesces with as Unknown Noise Level in aTM Bernoulli Process", October 1990
90/80 Anil GABA and 'Usk( Survey Data in Inferences about PurchaseTM Robert WINKLER Bekaviourm , October 1990 1991
9041 Tawilik lELASSI 'Du Prised as Fakir: mks et Orientations desTM Spews Isteractifs d'Aide h In Minos,'
October 199091/017744/S111
Luk VAN WASSENHOVE,Leonard FORTUIN and
*Operational Research Can Do More for ManagersThan They Meld;
Paul VAN BEEK January 19919042 Charles WYPLOSZ 'Monetary Union and rural Policy Discipline.'Er November 1990 91/02
TM/S7I4Luk VAN WASSENHOVE,Leonard FORTUIN and
'Operational Research and Environment,'January 1991
90/83 Nathalie DIERKENS and misfortunes Asymmetry and Corporate Paul VAN BEEKFIN/7M Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE Communication: Results of a Pilot Study,
November 1990 91/03 Pekka HIETALA and 'An Implicit Dividend Increase is Rights Issues:FIN Timo LOYITYNIEMI Theory aged Evidence,' January 1991
90/84 Philip M. PARKER *The Effect of Advertising nu Price sad Quality:MKT The Optometric Industry Revisited,• 91/04 Lars Tyge NIELSEN •Two-rml Severalties. Factor Structure and
December 1990 FIN Robustness.' January 1991
90/35 Avijit GHOSH and 'Optimal r...kis and Location in Competitive 91/05 Susan SCHNEIDER •Marsogimg Beasedaries is Organisations;MKT Vika. T1BREWALA Markets; November 1990 OB January 1991
90/36 Olivier CADOT and 'Prudence and Success in Politics, November 1990 91/06 Manfred KETS DE VRIES, •Usderskieding the Leader-Strategy leterface:EP/TM Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE On Danny MILLER and Application of the Strategic Relationship Interview
Alain NOEL Method,* January 1990 (19111, revised April 1990)
91/07 Olivier CADOT "Lending to Insolvent Countries: A ParadoxicalEl' Story," January 1991 91/19
MKT
Vikas TIBREWALA and "An Aggregate Test of Purchase Regularity",Bruce BUCHANAN March 1991
91/08 Charles WYPLOSZ "Post-Reform East and West: CapitalEP Accumulation and the Labour Mobility 91/20 Darius SABAVALA and "Monitoring Short-Run Changes in Purchasing
Constraint," January 1991 MKT Vikas TIBREWALA Behaviour", March 1991
91/09 Spyros MA KRIDAKIS "What can we Learn from Failure?", February 1991 91/21 Summitry GHOSHAL, "Intermit Comnsmica6on within MNCa: TheTM SM Harry KORINE and Influence of Formal Structure Versus Integrative
Gabriel SZULANSK1 Processes", April 199191/10 Luc Van WASSENHOVE and "Integrating Scheduling with Hatching andTM C. N. POTTS Lot-Fazing: A Review of Algorithms and 91/22 David GOOD, "EC Integration and the Structure of the Franco-
Complexity", February 1991 EP Lars-Hendrik ROLLER and American Airline Industries: Implications forRobin SICKLES Efficiency and Welfare", April 1991
91/11 Luc VAN WASSENHOVE et al. "Multi-Item Lotsizing in Capacitated Multi-StageTM Serial Systems", February 1991 91/23 Spyros MAKRIDAKIS and "Exponential Smoothing: The Effect of Initial
TM Michele HIBON Values and Lon Functions on Post-Sample91/12 Albert ANGEHRN "Interpretative Computer Intelligence: A Link Forecasting Accuracy", April 1991 (Revision ofTM between Users, ModeLs and Methods in DSS",
February 1991
90/46)
91/24 Louis LE BLANC and "An Empirical Assessment of Choice Models for91/13EP
Michael BURDA "Labor and Product Markets in Czechoslovakia andthe Ex-GDR: A Twin Study", February 1991
TM Tawfik JELASSI Software Evaluation and Selection", May 1991
91/25 Luk N. VAN WASSENHOVE and "Trade-Offal What Trade-Offs?" April 199191/14 Roger BETANCOURT and "The Output of Retail Activities: French SM/TM Charles J. CORBETTMKT David GAUTSCHI Evidence", February 1991
91/26 Luk N. VAN WASSENHOVE and "Single Machine Scheduling to Minimize Total Late
91/15OB
Manfred F.R. KETS DE VRIES "Exploding the Myth about Rational Organisationsand Executives", March 1991
TM C.N. POTTS Work", April 1991
91/27 Nathalie DIERKENS "A Discussion of Correct Measures of Information
91/16 Arnoud DE MEYER and "Factories of the Future: Executive Summary of FIN Asymmetry: The Example of Myers and Mapes
TM Kasre FERDOWS et.al. the 1990 International Manufacturing FuturesSurvey", March 1991
Model or the Importance of the Asset Structure ofthe Firm", May 1991
91/17 Dirk CATTRYSSE, "Heuristics for the Discrete Lotsizing: and 91/28 Philip M. PARKER "A Note on: 'Advertising and the Price and Quality
TM Roelof KUIK,
Marc SALOMON and
Scheduling Problem with Setup Times", March 1991 MKT of Optometric Services', June 1991
Luk VAN WASSENHOVE 91/29 Tawfik JELASSI and "An Empirical Study of an Interactive, Session-
TM Abbas FOROUGHI Oriented Computerised Negotiation Support System
91/18 C.N. POTTS and "Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling a Single (NSS)", June 1991
7M Luk VAN WASSENHOVE Machine to Minimize Total Late Work",March 1991
91/30 Wilfried R. VANHONACKER and "Using Meta-Analysis Results in Bayesian Updating:MKT Lydia I. PRICE The Empty Cell Problem", June 1991 91/43 Sumantra GHOSHAL and "Building Transnational Capabilities: The
SM Christopher BARTLETT Management Challenge", September 199191/31 Reno! KABIR and "Insider Trading Restrictions and the StockFIN Theo VERMAELEN Market", June 1991 91/44 Sumantra GHOSHAL and "Distributed Innovation it the 'Differentiated
SM Nitin NOHRIA Network' Multinational", September 199191/32 Susan C. SCHNEIDER "Organisational Sememaking: 1992", June 1991OR 91/45 Philip M. PARKER "'llae Effect of Advetiising on Price and Quality:
MKT An Empirical Study of Eye Examinations, Sweet91/33 Michael C. BURDA and "German Trade Unions after Unification - Third Lemons and Self-Deceivers", September 1991EP Michael FUNKE Degree Wage Discriminating Monopolists?",
lune 1991 91/46 Philip M. PARKER "Pricing Strategies in Markets with Dynamic
91/34 lean DERMINE "The BIS Proposal for the Measurement of InterestMKT Elasticities", October 1991
FIN Rate Risk, Some Pitfalls", lune (991 91/47 Philip M. PARKER "A Study of Price Elasticity Dynamics UsingMKT Parsimonious Replacement/Multiple Purchase
91/35FIN
Jean DERMINE "The Regulation of Financial Services in the EC,Centralization or National Autonomy?" lune 1991
Diffusion Models", October 1991
91/48 H. Landis GABEL and "Managerial Incentives and Environmental91/36 Albert ANGEHRN "Supporting Multicriteria Decision Making: New EP/TM Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE Compliance", October 1991TM Perspectives and New Systems", August 1991
91/49 Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE "The First-Order Appfeach to Multi-Task91/37 Ingo WALTER and "The Introduction of Universal Banking in Canada: TM Principsi-Agest Problems", October 1991EP Hugh THOMAS An Event Study", August 1991
91/50 Luk VAN WASSENHOVE and "Row Green is Your Manufacturing Strategy?'91/38 Ingo WALTER and "National and Global Competitiveness of New York SM/TM Charles CORBETT October 1991EP Anthony SAUNDERS City as • Financial Center", August 1991
91/51 Philip M. PARKER "Choosing Amass Diffusion Models: Some91/39EP
Ingo WALTER andAnthony SAUNDERS
"Reconfiguration of Banking and Capital Marketsin Eastern Europe", August 1991
MKT Empirical Guidelines", October 1991
91/52 Michael BURDA and "Human Capital, Investment and Migration in an91/40TM
Luk VAN WASSENHOVE,Dirk CATTRYSSE end
"A Set Partitioning Heuristic for the GeneralizedAssignment Problem", August 1991
Charles WYPLOSZ Integrated Europe", October 1991
Marc SALOMON 91/53 Michael BURDA and "Labour Mobility and German Integration: SomeCharles WYPLOSZ Vignettes", October 1991
91/41TM
Luk VAN WASSENHOVE,M.Y. KOVALYOU and
"A Fully Polynomial Approximation Scheme forScheduling a Single Machine to Minimize Total 91/54 Albert ANGEHRN "Stimulus Agents: An Alternative Framework for
C.N. POTTS Weighted Late Work", August 1991 TM Computer-Aided Decision Making", October 1991
91142 Rob R. WEITZ and "Solving A Multi-Criteria Allocation Problem:TM Tawfik IELASSI A Decision Support System Approach",
August 1991
91/55 Robin HOGARTH,
EP/SM Claude MICHAUD,
Yves DOZ and
Ludo VAN DER HEYDEN
"Longevity of Business Finns: A Four-Stage
Framework for Analysis", November 1991
91/56 Bernard SINCLAIR-DESGAGNE "Aspirations and Economic Development",
TM/EP November 1991
91/57 Lydia 1. PRICE "The Indirect Effects of Negative Information on
MKT Attitude Change", November 1991
91/58 Manfred F. R. KM'S DE VRIES "Leaders Who Go Crazy", November 1991
OB
91/59 Paul A. L. EVANS
OB
91/60 Xavier DE GROOTE
TM
91161 Arnoud DE MEYER
TM
91/62 Philip PARKER and
MKT Hubert GATIGNON
"Management Development as Glue Technology",
November 1991
"Flexibility and Marketing/Manufacturing
Coordination", November 1991 (revised)
"Product Development in the Textile Machinery
Industry", November 1991
"Specifying Competitive Effects in Diffusion
Models: An Empirical Analysis", November 1991