MFR NARA- T7- FAA- Flynn Cathal- 9-9-03- 00552

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j51MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview with Rear Admiral Cathal "Irish" Flynn, USN (ret)

Type of Event: Interview

Date: September 9, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Lisa Sullivan and reviewed by Commission participants

Team Number: 7

Location: 9-11 Commission Office, GSA building

Participants - Non-Commission: Rear Admiral Cathal "Irish" Flynn, USN (ret), formerCivil Aviation Security for the Federal Aviation Administration

Participants - Commission: Sam Brinkley, Bill Johnstone, John Raidt, and Lisa Sullivan

Background

(Unc) Admiral Flynn served in the United States Navy for 30 years. Following hisretirement from the Navy in 1990, Adm. Flynn joined Science Applications InternationalCorporation (SAIC). From 1993 through 2000 he served as Associate Administrator of

Civil Aviation Security (ACS 1). Admiral Flynn spoke to the state of the civil aviationsystem as it was on September 11,2001, and how security and intelligence wereintegrated over the course of his tenure at FAA. He testified that FAA AdministratorHinson shared his view that aviation security was "crucial" to the FAA's mission.

ACS and NSC

(Unc) To start, Flynn asserted that the Commission should not underestimate theinfluence and impact the National Security Council staff (particularly the NationalSecurity Council's former counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke) had on Flynn's work inaviation security at FAA. Flynn immediately went on to substantiate his assertion in

citing a 1995 meeting at which Richard Clarke was present when Flynn urged theintelligence community to provide FAA with more intelligence affecting civil aviation inorder to step-up security at airports.

(Unc) Additionally, Flynn represented the FAA at meetings of the National SecurityCouncil's Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) that pertained to civil aviationsecurity. FAA did not attend CSG meetings regularly.

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ACS and Central Intelligence,/

this point, Flynn discussed two meetings he held with FAA Administrator DavidHinson and two Directors of Central Intelligence circa 1995. Flynn reported that ameeting was less than satisfactory, with one of the Directors displaying a

"condescending" view toward civil aviation security needs. One of the DCI's is reportedto have said, "You have those machines (EDS machines), why don't you put them inplaces like Miami and you are done." Flynn told them of his concern that threats to civilaviation were not being adequately communicated. More specifically, he named Newark,New Jersey and Detroit, Michigan as places where he had received indications ofpossible problems with Middle Eastern populations in those areas. Flynn thought moreresources were needed to fund aviation security measures and to direct intelligence.Administrator Hinson and Flynn sought permission from DCI to go to the Hill with theirconcerns and to ask for more money for civil aviation security intelligence. S-60 wassupportive of Flynn's efforts but the DCI was not supportive of going to the Hill,indicating that that they had "plenty" of such intelligence .

.1SSlj'His assessment of the CIA at the working level was "excellent". He reported thatthe agency was consistently helpful, provided a lot of "grainy" information, and helped tosanitize the intelligence reports for the industry. This was mostly a CTC function, andFlynn believed eTC was "smart and had a pretty good, grainy appreciation" of civilaviation intelligence needs. Information provided b CIA roduced results and led theFAA to in Fl nn's words

~ Given the generally high quality of the CIA's work product for the FAA, Flynnreportedly had a much better appreciation of what was going on in Beirut than in Detroit,even through there were a "hell of a lot more flights out of a Detroit," and (as he said

before) there were significant Muslim populations located there. He said the threat athome was perceived as present but low while overseas the threat was present and high.

Gore Commission

(Une) Flynn then discussed the Gore Commission. He deemed their treatment of threatsto civil aviation to be "cursory" and their treatment of terrorism to be "lackadaisical."The members failed to realize their priority in threat analysis should be Middle Easternterrorists. Flynn indicated the Commission dwelled on fallout from the Oklahoma Citybombing. Flynn believed that incident did not demonstrate a threat to aviation, or privateindustry for that matter.

ACS and FBI

(Une) In another instance, Flynn reported that staff of the Senate Select IntelligenceCommittee asked the FAA, the DCI and the FBI for a briefing on threat indicationsregarding civil aviation. Despite the fewindications the FBI had received (o f an

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individual who tried to get a job with airport access at LAX, for instance), the answerthey supplied the congressional staff with was no; they were not aware of any significantterrorist threats to the aviation industry. O'Neil was the head terrorism guy at FBI.Blitzer was his Deputy at the FBI. Based on his interaction with the two DCIs and Louis

. Freeh, Flynn characterized their attitude toward the FAA as "condescending." They werenot receptive to the idea that more needed to be done in the area.of intelligence for civilaviation security.

ACS and FAA leadership

(Unc) The FAA Administrator at the time, David Hinson, recognized the differencebetween safety and security and agreed intelligence was "crucial" to security.Domestically and internationally, U.S. carriers were everywhere. Flynn felt that hisposition required that he have. a firm grasp of what was going on everywhere in theworld. Underscoring this statement, he asserted that "if a high quality terrorist got to the

airport, it was going to be very difficult to stop him or her."

(Unc) When asked about his relationship with Administrator Jane Garvey, Flynn said thatshe would ask how he was doing, for his input, from time to time. He believed that shewas "engaged" in security issues. Whenever a security directive or important EmergencyAmendment was issued, he would brief the Administrator.

ACS and Congress

(Unc) When asked about congressional interest, Flynn noted that Representative JimOberstar from Minnesota was particularly active on the issue, and promoted enhanced

aviation security measures given the terrorist threat in a 1995 letter he wrote to thePresident and Vice President. Flynn did not recall that Oberstar ever received a responsefrom the White House. With Oberstar's assistance, Flynn attempted to increase thebaseline budget for the FAA and step-up efforts undertaken by Security Directors. Thecumbersome and lengthy FAA rulemaking process led them to attempt to reconstitute thePan Am 103 Commission in non-crisis mode. Furthermore, he said he wanted "to avoidhaving to chisel out improvements in the "unyielding granite" of the regulatoryprocess,

Domestic Threats

(.S5f)in turning to the domestic side, Flynn said Blitzer and the FBI would not giveregular reports and would only inform the FAA when it had specific information.According to Flynn, Blitzer told others he had asked for "raw" intelligence. Flynn deniedthis, and indicated to the Commission that he had asked for basic information of potentialthreats from groups in the United States, where they were located, what their basic levelof sophistication was, what was going on, how they were organized. At this point, Flynnalluded to the distinction between CIA and FBI attributed to the differences betweencriminal investigations and intelligence gathering,with "intelligence jammeduncomfortably into" the operations of the FBI. He reiterated that those covering thedomestic side had "precious little to say" to the FAA. When the FAA sent over a liaison



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to the FBI after the TWA 800, there was little improvement in the flow of usefulinformation.

(Unc) Flynn testified that at that time (late 1995) there was a belief within FAA thatdomestic security needed to be "stepped up." The necessary improvements would beexpensive, and in addition to the aforementioned problems with the rulemaking process, .there was a feeling that Congress would resist (for example; via restrictive appropriationsriders).

(Unc) At that point, the FAA determined to form a Baseline Working Group (BWG). Itwas formally convened on the day of the TWA 800 incident and was therefore almostimmediately caught up in the "crisis mode" response to that event. Though the BWGrecommended more funding, some of the Commissioners from the Gore Commission"pushed back" to keep the level at $100 million after it was discovered that TWA 800had not been the result of terrorist action. By the following year (1998) neither OMB nor

the Congress supported any further increases in funding.

(Unc) With a budget of $100 million, there were only so many EDS machines FAA couldpurchase at $1million a piece. The additional costs of installing and finding suitablelocations for them were obstacles for the program. Flynn said that an effective domesticprogram for checked bags would require 2,000 machines.

ACS Rulemaking

(Unc) Flynn used the Emergency Authority of the Federal Aviation Administration Act topush through security directives that circumvented the rulemaking process which could

take years topass a rule. The problem with this solutionwas that security directives weretemporary. Only rules carried the force of permanency, and the airlines were able to waitout the rulemaking process, usually to their advantage.

ACS/ ACI Intelligence

Flynn received a daily intelligence brief produced by Pat McDonnell's office(ACI). There was a "SCIF" on site where he would go to read the most sensitiveintelligence reports. He periodically met with the intelligence analysts to discussintelligence flow. ACI kept files on threats around the world, also on individuals and theirhistories. As part of his job, he briefed the FAA Administrator on the current threatlevels. He did not have much interaction with the Secretary of Transportation or othersenior members of the Administration. FAA was a consumer, a customer of theintelligence community. It never had a "collection" mission. It assessed the intelligenceit was provided, but did not gather such information. The intelligence the agencyreceived in the 1990s was tailored to situations in which U.S. civil airplanes might flyover areas of conflict.



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Hijacking and Knives

(SSI) Hijackings weren't a priority during his tenure as ACI because there were very fewof them. The protocol in the case of a hijacking was to appease the hijacker and divertthe plane. They didn't consider suicide hijacking a credible threat. The possible use ofknives in a hijacking raises the question of how one would prevent such an event fromhappening, given the inability of the security equipment to detect such weapons.Furthermore, pre-September 11, 2001 it was believed to be implausible hijackers(unlikely to be suicidal) would use knives given the technology available at that time. Itwas impossible to prevent someone from getting a knife on the plane. The prohibiteditems list for airliners reflected items that were deemed "menacing" (presenting a clearand obvious threat). That distinction represents the difference between a box cutter asmall knife (a tool) and a switchblade (menacing).

Dual Mandate

(Unc) Flynn indicated that he thought the so-called "dual mandate" did not affect him inhis role as head of civil aviation security. 'The first he heard of it was in 1996, and he wasnot hampered by service or customer satisfaction issues: However, he was aware that his"job was to secure aviation while it was operating."

(Unc) Flynn did not know what sort of relationship the airlines had with Congress. Interms of getting FAA security directives implemented and adhered to at the airports, hisjob required working relationships with the security directors (SDs) at each airport. Theyoften had backgrounds in the military, FBI, or other law enforcement, and had their owninformation networks outside of the FAA's control. The SDs were often skeptical of the .

FAA's role, and the sources of its information. In particular, their discussions with FBIsources often left them "less than convinced" of the FAA's threat claims. Many of theSecurity Directors came from the law enforcement community. They would check on thethreat claims by the FAA and their former colleague's would discount the threat whichhurt the FAA's credibility. The CEOs of the airlines did not take increased securityseriously, and resisted expensive implementations. His office's relations with the airlineswas "hard all the time." Possibly because of the sanitized nature of the threat informationthey were given, the airlines did not appreciate the need to increase security. Flynn saidthe airlines considered civil penalties for infraction/violations of FAA directives as "acost of doing business." Going public would have been one way for the FAA to get theairlines to sit up and take notice of its security regulations, but doing so would have, in

some respects, been drawing a roadmap for the terrorist.

(Unc) Flynn said many of the CEO's treated security as ajoke. Flynn recounted a 1994meeting with CEO Crandall of American Airlines in which Crandall discounted thedomestic threat because there had been no domestic hijackings since the system wasimproved in the early 1990s: "Give us a reason to do it (increase security) and we will."Flynn believed that in response to specific events like the Bojinka plot, the airlines did soand "were terrific." In general, according to Flynn, there was always a difference in the


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airlines reactions to the requested security actions internationally versus domestically,with greater receptivity to the former.

(Unc) Flynn indicated thatthe airlines approach to security varied widely. He citedTower Airlines, which ultimately went broke, as a carrier which approached security veryseriously and used that as a selling point to customers. He also singled out UnitedAirlines under Soliday for its conscientious approach to security.

(Unc) Flynn discussed the tension between the FAA's oversight role and its need toimbue the security structure with the appropriate degree of randomness and mystery.

(Unc) Flynn described the FAA rulemaking process as "hideous and deliberately slow."He pointed out that at least going back to .1990, aviation security laws specified that FAAactions were to be done through the rulemaking process. In some of those statutes, likethe one concerning EDS deployment, there was language to keep the FAA from takingsecurity-related actions. OMB also would push back on cost-effectiveness grounds, withits resistance to checked baggage screening requirements given as the example.

ACS Defense vectors

Intelligence

~Flynn said that the granular nature and frequency of the intell... ""-"_ ..... -.. received from CIA on overseas threats was an asset to the s stem.

spite of Flynn's repeated requests for more information from the Bureau and other lawenforcement agencies. Flynn characterized the information on domestic threats as"wooly."

Prescreening

Checkpoint Screening

($;J5Flynn believes that whi1e the quality of the x-ray machines has improved,afford able, effective techno logy is n ot th ere. Fly nn also raised the issue of screener

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complacency (the human fac to r). He conceded tha t iden tify ing IEDs is hard , no matte rh ow alert o r tra in ed th e screen er.As fo r n eed ed im pro vem en ts, h e c ite d fu ll d eplo ym en tof TIP, improved tra in ing o f the screeners and superv isors, and a career track tha t a ims ath av in g ind iv id ua ls do screening fo r tw o to th ree years o nly (com parab le to the Israe lis"sy stem o f a irport secu rity for Tel Aviv).

Airport Access

I I: I To combat all of these\ areas o f vu lnerab ility , Flynn said tha t state and loca l au tho rities need to ge t involved .

Cargo

e sal It w ou require researc an eve opment gran ts toIn an e ectrve screeningdev ice . In th e m ean tim e, prov id in g the airlines sub sid ies to n ot carry qu estio nab le carg ois th e b es t a lte rn ativ e.

Red Teams

Flynn sa id tha t red team testing w as made "easy" because it w ou ld help the FA A toob ta in a civ il pena lty ag ainst the a irlin e if th e failu re w ere o bviou s and glarin g. F ly nnstressed the usefu lness of c iv il pena lties as an en fo rcem ent h ammer.

W ith respect to th e red uc tio n of civ il pen alties ag ain st a ir carrie rs , Flyn n said th osenego tiations w ere conducted counsel and counsel and that he had no ro le.

~ Flynn repo rted that he had to w ork to save the Federal A ir Marsha ls Program in1993-1994 over the opposition of the FBI and the DOD.

NORADruSAF

,~ He repo rted tha t there w as no rou tin ized practice w ith NORAD, nor w as there anI estab lished line of commun ication w ith the military during his time at FA A. He d id say


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~ 5) A ddress, through a national plan , the th rea t o f shou lder-fired missilesJe /a.....- -"'I9/11 Closed by Statute

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that the air traffic con tro llers, many of w hom are from the air fo rce , may have hadestab lished re la tions w ith USAF .

. Observations and Recommendations

(Unc) Flynn believes that fo r civ il av iation secu rity to be effec tive there has to be a highprobab ility of detec ting IEDs and po tential terro rists w ith in a sys tem manag ing a h ighvo lume of air traffic , people , in terac ting elements, and also the h igh v isib ility of thesystem 's opera tions . W ithout increased spending on opera tions , the av iation industryw ou ld never get there . Today, investmen t is far below what is necessary . The UnitedStates, w hich ow ns 40 percen t o f the w orld 's av ia tion , spends $18 b illion a year,compared to the Israe lis , w ho spend $10 b illion a year a t Tel A viv alone.

(Unc) He questioned the governmen t and the A merican pub lic 's commitmen t to susta inspending fo r avia tion security over "the long hau l." That is the only w ay to break thereactive pattern o f the av ia tion secu rity system. Flynn believes that more congressionalhearings on av ia tion secu rity shou ld be closed in order to be as fo rth righ t and d irect aspossib le on the realities o f the system w ithout revealing such to the public a t large .

(Unc) W ith respect to September 11,2001, Flynn sta ted , "w e 're no t go ing to be able tostop the pros" (referring to terro rists ). Rather, the civ il av ia tion secu rity sys tem can makethem do "extraordinary th ings" to try to defeat the sys tem, and such actions shou ld bev isib le to the in te lligence community . He believes that the Septemberu" h ija ckers d idin fac t do "extrao rd inary things" w hich w ere seen by the in te lligence community .

(Une) Flynn w as asked fo r h is recommendations fo r improv ing the cu rren t c iv il av ia tionsecu rity system and he responded w ith the follow ing :

1) "Throw money" at techno logy and research and development. He reported that Rando investment in av ia tion secu rity has actually gone dow n since September 11th and is"w ay below w hereit needs to be ."

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6) Address the chemical threat (biological threat not as likely for civil aviation because oftime factor).

(Unc) Flynn urged the Commission to avoid retroactivity/ perfect hindsight in itsconclusions. He added "we are not telling people it is dangerous to fly." He stated thatthe Commission's willingness to say so would be a test of its integrity. He believes suchfailures have vitiated previous efforts to enhance security. He believes the public needs tobe told how to protect itself (for example; that no checked bags would be permitted whenat the orange alert level).

Flynn agreed that it would be important for Congress to hold more closed hearings sothey could fully understand the threat, and that the Commission could give impetus tothis effort.

MFR NARA- T7- FAA- Flynn Cathal- 9-9-03- 00552

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