Mfr Nara- t5- Ins- Cates Veronica- 5-25-04- 00137

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    Veronica CatesMay 25, 2004Background.1990 joined INS under Office of Intelligence. IN 1997, did 2 year detail tto FBI CT(INT'l treerorism analaytical unit). was a relatively new unit to bring analysts from

    . other agencies to work on CT issues.In 1998, the position I was in was moved to the NSU at INS, for reportingresponsibilities. Now I worked for investigations, not intel, at INS.In mid 1999, Cadman asked me jto return to dhquaters to work for him. At that time, theint'I terrorism unit at FBI reorg again and uncertain what was going to happen with the,detailees, and so Cadman pulled the position back.At NSU, intel research specialist. Then promoted to an immigration officer position.(B/w an intel research and law enforcement.) Since I couldn't qualify to an 1811position.As of9/11, worked there in that capacitiy. Stayed there until Feb. 2003 when DHStookover and went to Homeland Security Operation Center for ICE, and since working atlA, and a desk officer, and now a senior watch officer. 'During 2001, at NSU: Cadman, two special agents (Rocky ConcepcionJ .. _~~~ ...and a vacancy. If Cadman not around. Rocky running that. 3 special gents at FBI hdqtrsunder Cadman) would go to Rocky,or if important, Dan reachable That didn't happen often. / .:July 5, 2001.On July 5 itself How learned about it: Rick Savini, in Intel Office, director ofoperations, special agent, came to our office and said there was going to be a meeting atthe WH and nobody available to go from intel, and could somebody here go. Dan .Cadman wasn't available. SCI clearances were necessary. Lrecall Rick said it was aphone call from the WH, something to do with terrorism. I asked, "what do they want toknow?" I thought they wanted us to give a briefing, and the WH was going togive the briefing. By process of elimination, I went. I thought Rocky should go. Markdidn't have the SCI approved yet. Rocky went as well. Rkk didn't say he talked about itto anybody else. He didn't ask me to get back to him afterwards to relate contents. Ididn't tell Cadman about it. He was not available to go.:/:/I had never been to a WH meeting before, or provided ,~/briefing. I was too far down thetotem pole. ,:,:

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    Had to have been in the afternoon, because when I came back I prepared a memo, briefedCadman that afternoon in person.at the office. prepared them on a classified system onADNET system, and there should be one in the file as well. Under WH or NSC filefolder. One pager.

    The meeting takes place in situation room off the command center, downstairs in theWest Wing. This was the first time I was ever there.Other attendees. We were the first to arrive. Rick Colon from Customs. Somebodyfrom Coast Guard, USSS. Don't recall FBI. CIA was there, in way of Cofer Black.Roger Cressi, Dick Clarke's #1, and Richard Clarke. Don't recall whether FAA there.There were people sitting behind me, don't know who they were. Maybe a total of 15.Verbal presentation by Cofer Black, he spoke for a lot of the meeting, which lasted anhour. No powerpoint. NO notes handed out.I took notes during the meeting. Once I prepared the memo from the notes, I shreddedthe notes.Meeting opened with Dick Clarke saying calling us together so the CIA could give us abriefing on what they were considering to be a very near term attack on US interests.Cofer Black said that this was unusual for him to give this level of briefing to agenciesnot necessarily part of the intel community, meaning us. What he had to share with us:no further dissemination outside the room. No press releases, no bulletins. Because sosensitive and concerned about sources.He had a powerpoint hardcopy he was using as notes to talk from. He said that a lot ofintel reporting that was coming out and a near term attack on US interests, and it wasthere belief and an opinion that the attack would probably be overseas, probably in SA ormaybe Europe, but couldn't discount that it could happen here. He thought theperpaetrators would be using European passports. Possibly coming via the northernborder (didn't mention the Mexican border). What theywere tabling was what could bedone with this information by Customs and INS. Black, I don't recall, said who thethreat was from.With limited information about a general threat, we couldn't do much with thatinformation, and we told Cofer that, and that information would have to be at an LESclassification for us to put out anything.Security alerts didn't get prepared by us; intel did.Richard Clarke asked if intel shops, or NSU, if there had been any reports from the fieldafunusual activity.: To our knowledge, there hadn't been. We wouldn't have gotten thatinfo anyway, wouldn't have gone to our office. That info came in a trickle, with norhyme or reason.

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    Don't recall discussion with other agencies.Rick Colon had mentioned that there was already some type of alert along the northernborder, but I didn't know what he was referring to. wasn't any type of joint alert. Butit didn't pertain to this threat, but something before it.Dick Clarke asked us, if we learned of any unusual activity a the borders, to advice himor Cressi. Didn't ask us to get back with CIA, although we already had a relationshipwith CTC with two agents there. Two agents at CTC, Al DiPlacidi and don't know other.He primarily spoke to Rocky. Reported to Intel Office, run by Landsman.Blake wanted no bulletins to border.When I got back, I called Cressi and asked him if they could get info in format for thefield, we'd like to send it to the field. My own initiative.Rocky and I discussed nothing on the way back. When we got back to office, both of ussaid, specific information, there was little we could do. Ifwe could get somethingreleaseable that we could use, then we asked Cressi for more.I return to Eye Street. Write memo. Cadman still not back. Call Cressi. do nothingelse. I was told no distribution. Never said make sure you tell the commissioner. Rockydidn't take notes or write up a memo.Don't recall any political appointees at the meeting. Just were meetings. Rockyalso said his first WH meeting.Nothing else happens. Later that afternoon, Cadman got back. I told him I needed to talkto him right away, and I had the memo prepared. I gave him the memo, and briefed onthe meeting for 10-15 minutes.Cadman responded that he was pretty concerned at what was discussed and thoughtwithout more details, our hands were tied. Cadman didn't tell me to do anything, but hetook the memo and walked out. I classified it secret.Cadman never mentioned the meeting again. wasn't my position to ask, so I didn'tsuggest he relate the info higher and don't know what he did with it.Never heard from the WH again, or Cofer Black's organization.Never spoke to any other attendees again.Landsman and Savini never asked what had gone down at the meeting.

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    Cofer Black, during the meeting, was very intense, almost upset about what he wastelling us, more so than seen him in the past. Clarke said the president was briefed onthis.I felt helpless walking out of the meeting. That's why I called Cressi. Cofer said it wasgoing to be massive and simultaneous, bigger than anything we'd seen before. Theythought it was going to be overseas against US interests, but possible here. They did askus what we were capable of doing. There was a mideastern context to it, Europeanpassport.No discussion of "hair on fire" or sources of information.Too vague for a security alert. (But she didn't work in security alert office, which wasintel.)If Savini had wanted to know more, I would have referred him to Cadman or Rocky.I believe Cadman took it forward, but I don't know.