Metcalf Agroterrorism Paper

Candace Metcalf Food Sociology Agroterrorism

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Agroterrorism for Food Sociology

By Candace Metcalf

Abstract

Terrorism has increasingly become important as a topic in a post 911 world

as terrorist seek more divisive methods to create terror, death, and

destruction. Recent terror groups have developed plans for such actions

according to recent reports in last half decade including Al Qaeda and ISIS.

By reviewing this information from a sociological perspective we can

understand the complexity of the food-inter-webs and connections of the

modern industrial food supply system and commodity chain in the

developed world and its relationship to a global food system and

commodity chain. The current paper consists of a literature review of

academic database reviewing information related to “intentional harm”,

“agroterrorism”, and “bioterrorism and food system”. Information selected

will attempt to answer the question “How is agroterrorism relevant to food

sociology?”

Key words: Agroterrorism, Bioterrorism, Food Sociology, Food systems,

Terrorism, Intentional Harm, Industrial Food System


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Food sociology covers a wide range of topics, however there is little to no information

regarding food security and safety in terms of intentional harm. This paper presents a literature

review from available sources on the topic from academic databases. Terms search in academic

data bases include “agroterrorism”, “”bioterrorism” and “food system”. Open google searches

were also performed using the same key terms, “agroterrorism”, and “bioterrorism and food

system”. The purpose of this paper is to examine the “intentional harm” and threat to the food

supply system sociologically. By using a review of literature and information that is as current

and relevant as possible. In order to answer the question, “How is agroterrorism relevant to food

sociology?”

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security and the FDA determined the latest threat

of terrorism would be poisoning of hotels and restaurants food supplies with sodium cyanide and

anthrax (Ketyian 2010). It was reported that Al Qaeda had plotted to use bioterrorism technology

introduced to the American food system in order to cause economic damage to the United States.

Bioterrorism is a rather frightening idea, but clearly it’s necessary to examine the relationship of

“intentional harm” to the food system. “Possible terrorist attacks on the U.S. food system, that is

the intentional creation of food insecurity” (Mooney and Hunt 2009). Intended harms can

transform into more than just food insecurity. Terrorist have inflicted harm on the United States

with many creative mechanics in the past. Often bypassing current safety measures and

technologies in place meant for "unintentional accidents." While agroterrorism has not received

much attention it is has been receiving more attention in a post 911 America. Agroterrorism is

the event that terroristic efforts are applied to disrupt the food systems which the food system(s)


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and commodity chain can be very complex. Agroterrorism falls under the umbrella of

bioterrorism. However, agroterrorism can include more than bioterrorism.

Bioterrorism is defined as,

A biological attack is the intentional release of a pathogen (disease

causing agent) or biotoxin (poisonous substance produced by a living

organism) against humans, plants, or animals. An attack against people

could be used to cause illness, death, fear, societal disruption, and

economic damage. An attack on agricultural plants and animals would

primarily cause economic damage, loss of confidence in the food supply,

and possible loss of life. It is useful to distinguish between two kinds of

biological agents: Transmissible agents that spread from person to person

(e.g., smallpox, Ebola) or animal to animal (e.g., foot and mouth

disease).Agents that may cause adverse effects in exposed individuals but

that do not make those individuals contagious to others (e.g., anthrax,

botulinum toxin)” (Department of Homeland Security 2015).

and

Agroterrorism is defined as the intentional introduction of animal or plant

pests or the cultivation or production of pathogenic bacteria, fungi,

parasites, protozoans, viruses, or their toxic products for the purposes of

causing poultry, livestock, crop, soil, or human disease, poisoning, or

death. This could occur through introducing pests intended to kill food

crops, spreading a virulent disease among confined feedlots where

animals are given high protein rations to prepare them for slaughter,

poisoning civil or agricultural water sources or food supplies, or using

food-borne pathogens to cause human disease (Foxell 2001).

Clearly, there are many biological, or other methods terrorist have to use, in order to

inflict terror. The two main occurrences are “accidental harm” or “intentional harm”. Most often

the food supply system may become disrupted due to “accidents” in the system (e.g., meat

contaminated with E-coli, loss of crops due to procedural failures). Intentional harm to food

systems for political means by terrorist (i.e., state actors, groups, individuals, or otherwise), is

not a new idea. Popular imagination of food being poisoned reflects the sinister example of


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leaders being poisoned throughout history? People poisoned by food throughout history includes

famous individuals, leaders, political figures, suspected spies, cult members, (e.g., Hitler). Even

Obama the President is rumored to have staff that inspects his meals (Hall 2013). This is a rather

normative practice in history for leaders both political economic leaders who could be quickly

assassinated by eating poisoned food or drink. There have been many examples of terrorism

linked to the food supply systems in different areas besides targeting leaders with poisoned food.

Terrorism by disrupting the food supply today is much more complex because the aim of terror is

the modern industrial food system and commodity chain.

Examples of Terrorism

The Romans historically destroyed arable land of enemies by sowing salting, in order to

cause economic destruction to the agricultural food system (Allan and Leitner 2006). British

troops destroyed arable lands used to grow wheat in the Mohawk Valley to damage their food

supplies. (Allan and Leitner 2006). In 1978 Palestinians working on a farm poisoned Oranges of

an Israeli farm that was tied to the global market (Allan and Leitner 2006). The oranges were

injected with mercury and sent to over 18 countries. The incident was an act of political

terrorism aimed at harming others as well as impacting the Israeli food economic system;

oranges accounted for one- tenth if the Israeli economy (Allan and Leitner 2006). There has

been many instances of reported state sanctioned destruction of Palestinian farmlands since the

creation of state of Israel (i.e., destruction of arable land, cutting down crops, burning crops,

bulldozing farm land). The US has received fruits poisoned with cyanide from Chile, in the past

(Allan and Leitner 2006). This caused a recall with high economic costs and diplomatic strife


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between the countries and significantly impacted the agricultural economy in Chile, many

farmers livelihoods were at stake at the expense of the incident at $210 million (Allan and

Leitner 2006; Turvey, Onyango, Hallman 2008). In 1984, there were 751 individuals poisoned

by a cult that dominated the population of a small town in Texas named Rajneesh with a strain of

salmonella that was placed in salad bars in the small town (Herriman 2014¹; Turvey, Onyango,

Hallman 2008). The cult also experimented with other known bioagents, typhoid, shigella, and

tularemia (Turvey, Onyango, Hallman 2008). Purina Mills of Ashville, Alabama was a target of

agroterrorism, which poisoned the water system killing 30 cows (Turvey, Onyango, Hallman

2008). In 1996, Shigella dysenteria was used to poison hospital food by a Japanese hospital

worker used to poison 13 other co-workers (Turvey, Onyango, Hallman 2008). Isolated

incidents are not the only occurrence’s that need to be worried about. Agroterrorism can also

disrupt already short supplies of food or water rations. The world has a shortage of clean

drinking water already. Only 2.5% of the global water supply that is drinkable and 0.5% that is

accessible (Crampton and Ragusa 2008). State agroterrorism in the cold war the Soviet Union

has developed agro-weapons protocols in order to poison food systems (e.g., ticks to transmit

foot-and-mouth disease, avian influenza, plant viruses, plant fungus), experimented with

rinderpest, African swine fever, bovine pleuropneumonia, ecthyma in sheep (Turvey, Onyango,

Hallman 2008). Biological weapons can be introduced at any stage of production,

environmentally, by animal, air, food, contamination, or by water. The U.S. Department of

Justice stated the largest threat of terrorism to the industrial livestock industry is Foot and Mouth

Disease (FMD), just one attack could cost tax payers $60 billion dollars (Gonzales, Schofield,

and Schmitt 2006). Including having to slaughter cows that are unsellable, their carcasses will

pile up polluting land, water, etc. These cows will be unable to produce milk. In 2014, ISIS


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laptops revealed they had a weapons manual on how to develop and use the bubonic plague by

injecting it into mice (Herriman 2014²). The plague is a zoonotic disease that can transfer from

animal to animal or from animal to humans (World Health Organization). RAND database only

has listed ten known incidences of known agroterrorism since 1968. There has been limited

reports of injury and no reported deaths (Turvey, Onyango, Hallman 2008). The list of items

used to sabotage the food chain includes cyanide, anthrax, ricin, nerve gas. There have been

seven instances where livestock was attacked by an agro-anti-GMO activist who was protesting

GMO's according to Rand (Turvey, Onyango, Hallman 2008). Restaurants appear

approximately 300 times; farm appears 58 times and grocery 21 times to be targeted (Turvey,

Onyango, Hallman 2008). Moreover, in history, there has been examples of destruction to food

and water systems to gain an upper hand in the form of poisoning water wells, crops, and

harming livestock. The theme is not new. However, the modern food system possesses a

challenge to the old phenomenon.

Intentional Harm

Terrorism “intentional harm” to the food system can happen in many forms, and in many

sectors. The system is currently built for unintended harm. Intentional harm like unintended

harm, can destroy the argo-environment, directly, indirectly, in the food chain, or can be done on

a global scale that impacts the global supply chain, including local and/or happen to harm world

economic markets, to destroy relationships between countries, in order to impact food

dependency, impact food security/safety, to terrorize livelihoods of those in the global economic

chain whose livelihoods are affected, etc. Of course, agroterrorism take place at any point in the


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agribusiness production phase before leaving the farm gate and at any stage of the supply chain

system between the farm gate and point of distribution. The farm-gate is all levels of production

in the agricultural system before being transferred to another actor in the supply chain, be it a

manufacturer, food processor, retailers, warehouses, customers, a secondary source (e.g.,

feedlots). Of course in the case of agroterrorism, it can significantly impact the market and the

prices of products involved. The consequences of such happening can result in death,

malnutrition, starvation, fear, harm to the environment, loss of arable land, global food system

relationships (e.g., food aid), and dramatic price increases. Moreover, another interesting fact

agroterrorism could give birth to more strategic agroterrorism such as attacking global producers

of the U.S. global food system to impact U.S. strategic political and/or economic relationships,

policies or plans (Allan and Leitner 2006). This could lead to devastating effects on diplomatic

relationships. Furthermore, GMO technologies lead by agroterrorism agents may result in

complications concerning larger crops such as key crops in the industrial farm-gate in the U.S. or

glonal chain such (i.e., corn, soy, and wheat), by targeting those species.

In the Cold War and WWII it became evident the complexity of biological weapons that

could be used against the US. However, the most common threats of agroterrorism have been an

anti-GMO activist and those actors’ spectators, who drive food price speculations that can

increase market costs (Mooney and Hunt 2009). Moreover, the most likely occurrences of threat

will be biological in nature. The efforts will be more complicated due to the stratified food

system away from large urban areas where larger populations reside there for it is highly unlikely

for other forms of terrorism to occur (Allan and Leitner 2006). It is more complex because the

food system has many working parts that are interlocking. It is thought that Zoonotic infectious

diseases will comprise of 75% of all new infectious diseases (Department of Homeland


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Security). According to the CDC six out of ten infectious diseases are spread by zoonotic

diseases from humans by animals (CDC).

In the overarching scheme of terrorism, many believe that terrorist will strike in an urban

area that is densely populated. However, ISIS, Al Qaeda, and others have strategically looked at

the most complex inter-web of food systems to be more strategic. Most people think of random

shooters or suicide bombers. “80% of pathogens used in bioterrorism come from animals”

(World Organization for Animal Health). “60% human infections evolve from animal

pathogens” (World Organization for Animal Health). “75% of emerging human infection

diseases have animal disease origins” (World Organization for Animal Health). American

consumers of which 47.9% believes that if there is an agroterrorist attack against the food

system, it will likely come from a state vs. a non-state actor. 25.5% of American consumer’s

think an attack will come from a non-state actor, and 15.4% believe it would come from

domestic terrorist (Turvey, Onyango, Hallman 2008). 31.5 % believe an attack on water systems

were likely, and 21.5% believe an attack on the food system is likely, 47.9% of Americans

believe that the food supply system is a hard target (Turvey, Onyango, Hallman 2008). Studies

on water security in Australia show 65% believed that terrorist could affect the safety of

Australian drinking water (Crampton and Ragusa 2008).

Food System

The food supply system in the United States is a modern industrial force tied to the

global political economy with many inter-web actors. The food supply system was not designed


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to prevent intentional harm. However, measures have been taken to reduce unintentional harm in

the processing of food. The food system has farmers that are dealing with outside suppliers for

fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, herbicides, they have staff that is engaging with farm materials, then

there are logistics, transportation suppliers, food processors, manufacturers, warehousing, food

distributors, retailers, and food preparation in restaurant's (Carolan 2012). The farm-gate means

any production before leaving a farm. Food and agriculture infrastructure makes up six percent

of the U.S. GDP worth more than a trillion dollars per year and employees one in eight

American’s (Federation of American Scientist). There are around 2 million farms and total

167,000 other forums on the supply chain in which the food moves through until it gets to a

consumer, this includes distributors, processers, and warehouses (Federation of American

Scientist). The food chain also has a global commodity chain that also interlinks the same

elements on a global scale. This also includes a global commodities network in which is tied to

political food economy (Carolan 2012). Many global components' food commodity chains are

linked to many outside forces beyond American policy provisions for regulatory and safety

practices.

Food Sociology

The notion of agroterrorism can be viewed by Goffman’s keying theory, where the

discourse of the situation takes on many frames (Mooney and Hunt 2009). Key frames have

been used to understand different periods of different time eras as well to show the keying

relevant at various stages in the evolution of the food system. In these frames, one can see the

various sides of arguments in the discourse in institutional practices (Mooney and Hunt 2009).


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While food security is a high priority food safety has been on the spectrum of low priority. In a

post 911 world with increasing concern with strategic terroristic efforts to damage and harm US

institutions including citizens, it is evident that there need to be some measures to protect the US

food supply systems. A key is an argument between actors in a framework. The key is the

specific duologues. Goffman’s keying theory is appropriate in this process because the Food

System is tied to the political, economic system and strategic political relationships (Mooney and

Hunt 2009). The food system is linked to the political and economic sections of political

discourse of food security. So measures, frames, and narratives interplay in an interrelated web

making the subject more complex. Frames take place in the discourse of different positions,

Part of Food

System

Actors

(2016-2017)

Context/Situation Arguments/Complication “Key”

Global Food

Market

Brazil

Government,

US Policy, US

private industry

Food

security for

brazil

farmers

#livelihoods

Trade

deal/strategic

interest.

GDP

contribution/

Cost

Rough relationship between the U.S.

and Brazil.

They want to cut ties due to policy x

and y.

The loss of this product will cause

#300 farmers to lose jobs.

Brazil refuses to insure argo-saftey-at

risk of agrterrorism due to political

views of locals.

CAFO’s Private industry

actors, US

FDA, USDA,

Consumers,

CDC

Infectious

Disease

Inspections

Policy

Procedures

# employed

Livelihoods

GDP value/

Costs

Worth $60 Billion if cattle are

contaminated with Foot and Mouth

Disease cattle will be slaughtered and

corpses have no place.

The CDC says that a case is likely 1

in 10 cases of FMD.

USDA states private industry should

police them self.

Problem X, Y, Z.

Can cause starvation or impact the

livehoods of 2,000 food workers.

CDC argument-We are unprepared

for attacks.

Private industry argument

Examples of frames:


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views, or arguments. Just like political discourse in food politics, political economy, food

system history, the notion of food safety becomes a contentious issue that exposes vulnerabilities

and limitations (Mooney and Hunt 2009). However, keying theory supposes that the different

frames can assert as a bridging mechanism between the two to solve the problem.

Policy structures that deal with issues of foods security are viewed as flat frames,

“unidimensional” one dimensional or simple frames and frames dealing with agroterrorism is

seen as sharp “complex." The idea of intentional harm moves the flat frame from casual

occurrence to a sharp frame concerned with threat bringing more attention to the issue. The

notion of interagency cooperation also a frame in such a complex web of social infrastructure

that can create conflict and overlap between agencies (e.g., FDA or USDA) (Mooney and Hunt

2009). To make matters more complex it goes beyond public health, its private corporations,

along with many different states involved as actors in farm-gate U.S. Now that this is a

contentious issue, just in framing in the US context food system, however, it is also a global

system with a global farm gate. The global farm gate is tied to markets and other food systems

due to import, exports, policy, and global interagency efforts (e.g., World Bank, UN). The notion

of using Goffman's frames is to navigate the complex food-web discourse and understanding the

level of important frames and understanding the bridges that can be developed between each

frame (Mooney and Hunt 2009).

Responses

Currently the federal government utilizes interagency security efforts to protect the food

system, including inspections, with a committee called the Federal Agent Inspect Program that

inspects the different providers in the process of food production from the farm-gate to the


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customer. The industry was designed for unintentional harms originally. The interagency

collaborations include the Infrastructure Protection Program with DHS, US Department of

Transportation, Federal Bureau of Investigations, DHS Science and Technology Directorate, US

Department of Army Inspector General's Technical Inspections Division, and the Department of

Veterans Affairs Office of Research Oversight (US Department of Agriculture 2014). Each

interagency is tasked with inspections at different sites and parts of the food system. Such as the

Department of Transportation is tasked with vehicle safety and road inspections. The U.S.

Department of Justice looks at issues of food security and terrorism from the angle of law

enforcement. In response to agroterrorism the Department of Homeland Security is building a

new National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility to be located in Manhattan, Kansas to research,

develop interventions, and protect the food system, this facility will be finished being built as of

2022 (Department of Homeland Security). There is also inter-global-agency taking place with

international bodies that have an interest in the international food system (e.g., UN, NATO,

World Health Organization, and World Organization for Animal Health).

Rand has also conducted some research to test interagency cooperation in the event of

zoonotic diseases linked to bioterrorism used for agroterrorism. That has resulted in identifying

the complexity and best practices in interagency efforts in a situation that would require actions.

The research was conducted on an interagency state level that showed the most important key

factors in response are building communication, interoperability, defining priority groups for

public health services, surge capacity and the use of volunteers (Jackson, Buehler, Cole, et al.

2006). The research used Hurricane Katrina or a disaster as its basis for protocol however the

research showed best practices it still needs to be repeated with regional and state units in the

process. However, the research would need to be repeated in other settings. Many of the


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agricultural dimensions are in different areas and regions and likely have other problematic

issues that will arise. Including this would need to include a global food chain component and

actors.

DISCUSSION

Agroterrorism is a relatively old idea but is a complicated matter with new modern flair.

It has just in the last decade became an issue of concern due to the rise of terrorism in the United

State and the World. While the old methods was more targeted the modern industrial food

commodity chain has many important features that can be targeted for political and economic

damages. There has been little research or information studied regarding intentional harm or

agroterrorism in sociology. While the use of framing can help, there are many other sociological

theories relevant to be research related to this topic (e.g., conflict theory, political economy,

social structural, structural functionalist, etc.). Symbolic interaction is rooted in the framing

theory and can show the interplay between the actors, the context, and the dialogues. This is

useful in understanding the dynamics in each frame and where there could be complications.

However, this basic review shows that the potential of harms should not be overlooked in

importance to the food system, food security, and food safety in a global market. A terrorist

could target political relationships via the food system to damage relationships, hurt livelihoods

in the global farm gate, can harm water availability, amongst causing fear, possible death to

individuals, animals, or damage to arable lands. By using Goffman's keying theory of frames of

the complex context of dialogue can help to bridge the notions of importance. As well to help

identify new or emerging problems. The federal government has taken steps to better


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understanding this issue further and likely in a few decades have more research and information

related to the topic. As of now, research is rather limited to opinion and perceptions.

Finally this paper presented information that shows that the relationship to agroterrorism

is just as complicated as the food system. However, sociologist should look into more depth

using the sociological imagination when reviewing this topic. Certainly a wide range of research

could be conducted regarding intentional harm. Such as governments tracking the food economy,

food system, food actors, they could track incidence of accidents and develop criteria for

potential intentional harm situations. As well measures taken by government actors appears to be

taking the matter more seriously. There is not only lives at risk, but the possibility of harm to

animal, lands, economic bodies, that could have long term consequences.


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