Memory Strategy Development

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DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW, 17, 442–461 (1997)ARTICLE NO. DR970441

Memory Strategy Development: Lessons

from Longitudinal Research

Wolfgang Schneider and Beate Sodian

University of Wu rzburg, Germany

Most research in memory strategy development involves cross-sectional studies,with the implicit assumption that the patterns found in these studies are an accuratereflection of intraindividual changes over time. In this article, we review briefly

the development of rehearsal and organizational strategies based on cross-sectionalresearch and then review the findings from the few longitudinal studies assessingintraindividual change in these strategies, focusing on results from the Munich Lon-gitudinal Study (LOGIC). Although average, age-related patterns obtained from lon-gitudinal samples provide similar development functions as those obtained fromcross-sectional samples, there is much greater individual variability in strategy ac-quisition observed in the longitudinal data. This suggests that the canonical develop-ment patterns inferred from cross-sectional studies often obfuscate actual intraindi-vidual patterns. Longitudinal evidence also indicates that utilization deficiencies areobserved less frequently than assumed in cross-sectional research. © 1997 Academic

Press

Research in memory development has made enormous progress duringthe past three decades (cf. Kail, 1990; Schneider & Bjorklund, in press;Schneider & Pressley, 1997). As a consequence, our knowledge about devel-opmental differences in memory behavior (e.g., memory strategies) and itsrelationship to memory performance has increased considerably. Although

the evaluation of the state-of-the-art is generally positive, we believe thatone obvious problem with research on memory development in general andon memory strategies in particular is that it has been mainly based on cross-sectional studies. For instance, in the domain of memory strategy research,more than 99% of the relevant studies have focused on the assessment of (age-correlated) developmental differences between different age groups.Typically, research has concentrated on universal patterns of strategy devel-opment, thus neglecting intra-individual developmental changes over time

as well as interindividual differences in intraindividual changes.Because of such limitations, most contemporary models of memory strategy

Address reprint requests to Wolfgang Schneider, Department of Psychology, University of Wurzburg, Wittelsbacherplatz 1, D-97074 Wurzburg, FRG.

442

0273-2297/97 $25.00Copyright © 1997 by Academic Press

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MEMORY STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT 443

development appear idealistic. That is, the usual research plan that aims at com-paring aggregated, average strategyscoresacrossagegroups supports atendencyto overestimate the universality, intraindividual homogeneity, and interindi-vidual consistency of developmental courses (cf. Schneider & Weinert,1989,

for a more detailed discussion of this problem). According to this approach,strategy development is viewed as a regular, continuous sequence of changes incognitive competencies and related memory skills. Typically, deviations fromthis ideal sequence have been either ignored or treated as error variance.

In this paper, we focus on the (admittedly few) longitudinal studies onmemory strategy development, thus investigating the implicit assumption of most proponents of cross-sectional memory research that the cross-sectionalanalysis of group differences gives a good estimate of intraindividual

changes over time, and that the developmental course of strategy develop-ment derived from cross-sectional research is indeed representative of indi-vidual developmental patterns as identified in longitudinal designs. Needlessto say, if this assumption turns out to be true, there is no need for furtherlongitudinal studies on strategy development given that such studies are notonly expensive but also plagued with several practical, conceptual, and meth-odological problems (cf. Schneider, 1989, for more details on this issue).

Before describing the longitudinal evidence on memory strategy develop-ment, we briefly summarize the state of the art based on cross-sectional find-ings.

MEMORY STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCEFROM CROSS-SECTIONAL RESEARCH

Definition Problems

Although the term ‘‘memory strategy’’ has been discussed controversiallyin the past, most contemporary researchers accept a characterization of strate-gies as potentially conscious, deliberate, and controllable cognitive plansadopted to enhance performance in memory tasks (cf. Bjorklund, Muir-Broaddus, & Schneider, 1990; Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993; Pressley, For-rest-Pressley, Elliot-Faust, & Miller, 1985; Pressley & van Meter, 1993; Wa-ters & Andreassen, 1983). Such a ‘‘liberal’’ definition approach acknowl-edges the fact that the extent to which cognitive processing is effortful ismore a matter of degree, ranging from predominantly effortful to predomi-nantly automatic (cf. Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1990; Howe & O’Sullivan,1990). Accordingly, the strict distinction between automatic and controlledprocessing dominant in earlier approaches does not seem to make much senseanymore. There is no doubt, of course, that the liberal conceptualization isfairly imprecise, defining memory strategies as a ‘‘fuzzy set’’ of cognitiveactivities. The subsequent discussion of particular strategy examples will

show that such a broad, fuzzy conceptualization can be justified indeed.



444 SCHNEIDER AND SODIAN

Strategic Behaviors in Very Young Children

Our knowledge concerning the development of very young children’s stra-tegic competencies is still restricted. This is mainly due to the fact that early

research on ‘‘classic’’ strategies such as rehearsal, organization, and elabora-tion provided little evidence that intentional, strategic memorizing occurredbefore 6 years of age. In the traditional ‘‘modal memory’’ study model (seeBrown, Bransford, Ferrara, & Campione, 1983; Brown & DeLoache, 1978),young children were typically presented with memory tasks composed of unfamiliar materials that were presented in an unfamiliar context. In general,nonstrategic behaviors produced by preschoolers in such situations were thenused as a baseline against which the progress of older children could be

demonstrated. Not surprisingly, this ‘‘modal memory’’ study model lead toan underestimation of young children’s memory skills.

Recent research based on more sophisticated methodological approacheshas shown that toddlers and preschool children have more strategic compe-tence than was originally assumed. In order to elicit intentional memory be-havior in young children, it turned out to be important to (1) simplify thetasks as much as possible and (2) situate the experiment in a familiar context

(see Wellman, 1988, for a review).Research on intentional memory for location based on simple and mean-ingful tasks has shown that very young children can be strategic in specificsituations. For instance, children as young as 2 years of age showed signsof strategic behavior when told that they should try to remember the locationof an object hidden under a pillow (cf. DeLoache, Cassidy, & Brown, 1985).Similarly, 4- and 6-year-olds were able to effectively use retrieval cues ina hide-and-seek task that could be easily understood by the subjects (Schnei-

der & Sodian, 1988). Also, some recent studies exploring young children’suse of organizational strategies have demonstrated strategic-looking behav-iors in preschoolers during sort-recall and free-recall tasks (cf. Baker-Ward,Ornstein, & Holden, 1984; Lange, Guttentag, & Nida, 1990; Lange & Pierce,1992).

Taken together, recent research on young children’s strategic behaviorhas made it clear that rudimentary memory strategies can be observed whenpreschoolers prepare for recall. Strategic behaviors are especially obviouswhen children are studied in familiar surroundings and with familiar tasks.The assumption that there is a ‘‘five-to-seven’’ shift from nonstrategic tostrategic (coincidental with the onset of schooling) is no longer tenable. Pre-schoolers are more competent than was assumed a few years ago. However,we should not overinterpret these findings. As noted by Brown et al. (1983),young children’s memory activities tend to be fragile and are restricted tolimited domains. Sometimes the memory strategies chosen by preschoolers

are simply inappropriate for the task. Wellman (1988) referred to this as‘‘faulty’’ strategies, that is, strategies not suited to enhance performance.




Strategy development in school children. Most studies on school chil-dren’s memory behavior have explored the developmental course of strate-gies such as rehearsal, organization, and elaborative procedures, both visualand verbal (for reviews see Bjorklund, 1985, 1987; Ornstein & Naus, 1985;

Pressley, 1982; Schneider & Pressley, 1997). We will restrict the summaryto rehearsal and organization because the available longitudinal research hasfocused on these two strategies.

Rehearsal. The available cross-sectional evidence shows that spontane-ous rehearsal of to-be-learned materials is rare among preschool and kinder-garten children, but becomes increasingly common throughout the grade-school years. Obviously, the important developmental changes are in terms

of style rather than frequency of rehearsal (cf. Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993;Ornstein & Naus, 1985). That is, research has demonstrated that children’srehearsal changes during the course of the elementary school years, proceed-ing from relatively simple single-item techniques (passive rehearsal) to sub-stantially more complex multi-item rehearsal procedures (cumulative re-hearsal). The essential difference between the memorization processes of younger compared to older children are qualitative rather than quantitative.Research on rehearsal has also demonstrated that kindergarten children are

quite capable of rehearsing and can be instructed to do so with only minimaldemonstration and support by the experimenter. Once induced to rehearse,their recall rises to that of spontaneous rehearsers. Evidence for the strategy-recall linkage has been found in numerous training studies (e.g., Ghatala,Levin, Pressley, & Lodico, 1985; Paris, Newman, & McVey, 1982).

Organization. One of the most frequently studied encoding strategies isorganizing pictures or words into semantic categories. In sort-recall tasks,

children are typically given lists of items that can be categorized into seman-tic categories such as furniture, vehicles, and the like, with the items beingpresented randomly. Subjects are then told that their task will be to rememberas many items as possible later on, and that they can do with the items what-ever they want in order to facilitate learning and remembering. Followinga short study period, children are asked to recall the items. A nice featureof this task is that subjective organization during sorting and during recallcan be measured using the same kind of clustering index. In most studies,either the adjusted ratio clustering (ARC) measure (Roenker, Thompson, &Brown, 1971) or the ratio-of-repetition measure (Bousfield & Bousfield,1966) were used to assess the degree of organization. For both of these mea-sures, values close to 1 represent almost perfect organization of stimuli,whereas values close to 0 indicate random responding.

When do children acquire organizational strategies? Meanwhile severalstudies have confirmed the classic finding by Moely et al. (1969) that young

elementary school children do not spontaneously organize items accordingto semantic categories. Only the 10- to 11-year-old children in the Moely et




al. study organized at a level that was significantly greater than chance. Al-though subsequent cross-national research using similar item materials re-vealed systematic and reliable differences between American and Germanchildren (cf. Carr, Kurtz, Schneider, Turner, & Borkowski, 1989; Schneider,

Borkowski, Kurtz, & Kerwin, 1986), indicating that spontaneous strategyuse may be observed in somewhat younger elementary school children (i.e.,third graders) and seems to depend on characteristics of schooling, the gen-eral trend noted by Moely et al. was also confirmed in these and other morerecent studies (e.g., Hasselhorn, 1990, 1992).

Overall, the numerous studies on organizational strategies based on thesort-recall paradigm suggest that such strategies develop somewhat later thanthe more passive rehearsal strategies, and probably even a little later than

cumulative rehearsal (cf. Schneider & Pressley, 1997). This makes sensesince the discovery of semantic relations between items seems like a morecomplex and demanding process than rehearsal.

Typical Patterns of Memory Strategy Development

Based on the findings outlined above, is seems possible to identify typicalstages of strategy development during childhood and adolescence. Overall,

researchers assume that there is a developmental progression in competentstrategy use from the preschool to the elementary school years (cf. Brownet al., 1983; Flavell et al., 1993; Ornstein et al., 1988). Initially, the skillsnecessary to carry out memory strategies seem largely absent from the child’srepertoire. Young children exhibit a mediation deficiency in that their at-tempts to execute a strategy—either spontaneously or elicited—do not facili-tate recall. A transitional period is assumed for the early elementary schoolyears. Here, children tend to show a production deficiency: although they

do not produce a memory strategy spontaneously, they can be easilyprompted to do so, with strategy use leading to improved memory perfor-mance. During this transitional period, another problem called utilization

deficiency (cf. Miller, 1990) may be observed. According to Miller, a utiliza-tion deficiency occurs during the early phases of strategy acquisition whena child spontaneously produces an appropriate strategy but does not benefitfrom it (this definition was later extended by including some instances of strategy use as a result of training without corresponding improvements inperformance; see Bjorklund & Coyle, 1995). Although utilization deficien-cies have only recently been identified, evidence of their existence have beendocumented in many studies dealing with the development of memory strate-gies (cf. Bjorklund & Coyle, 1995; Hasselhorn, 1995; Kee, 1994; Miller &Seier, 1994, for discussions of the phenomenon). The last period begins inlate childhood and is characterized by reasonably mature and sophisticateduse of strategies which become increasingly ‘‘fine-tuned’’ during adoles-

cence and early adulthood.




Factors That Influence Strategy Development

From the very beginning on, research on memory strategy developmenthas tried to explain the fact that children exhibit production deficiencies.Accordingly, numerous studies have explored the issue why children who

are equipped with a strategy fail to produce it spontaneously. This researchlead to important insights into the importance of capacity constraints, knowl-edge components (e.g., semantic knowledge and metamemory), and motiva-tion for consistent strategy use. Since the early 1990s, it is widely acceptedthat sophisticated strategy use involves complex interactions with basic ca-pacities, meta-cognitive knowledge, the nonstrategic knowledge base, andmotivation (cf. Flavell et al. 1993; Folds, Footo, Guttentag, & Ornstein,

1990; Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider, 1989; Pressley, 1995). For the sakeof clarity, short illustrations demonstrating the impact of these critical task dimensions on strategy utilization will be given next.

The impact of capacity constraints. It seems rather trivial that a memoryskill must be fairly well developed in its own right before it can be effectivelyused as a strategic means to a memory goal. Findings from several recentstudies suggest that, with increasing age, children become capable of execut-

ing specific strategies in a manner that is less demanding of attentional andcapacity resources (for reviews, see Guttentag, 1989; Kee, 1994). For exam-ple, Guttentag (1984) used a dual-task procedure to show that active (cumu-lative) verbal rehearsal is rather effortful and challenging for young ele-mentary school children, causing too much mental effort to be employedspontaneously. In contrast, older school children do not seem to experienceproblems with performing the dual task of active item rehearsal and finger-tapping simultaneously, which indicates that using cumulative rehearsal does

not exceed their mental capacity constraints. It appears, then, that age dif-ferences in the resource demands of a strategy may be at least partially re-sponsible for age differences in strategy selection and efficiency (but seeBrainerd & Reyna, 1989, for a different interpretation).

The knowledge base. Since the late seventies, there has been accumulat-ing evidence that increases in children’s knowledge about the world, that is,their knowledge base, influences the ease of strategy utilization (for reviews,see Bjorklund, Muir-Broaddus, & Schneider, 1990; Chi & Ceci, 1987; Ra-binowitz & Kee, 1994; Schneider, 1993). Today, most memory researchersagree that a rich knowledge base should enable competent strategy use. Nu-merous developmental studies have shown substantial relationships betweenconceptual or semantic knowledge and strategy use. With increases in age,children learn more about their language, about specific concepts, and gener-ally about the world. There is no doubt that strategic processing is dependent

on the availability and accessibility of relevant knowledge. All in all, the




available evidence suggests that strategic effects of the knowledge base arenot restricted to semantic organization tasks but have been also observed forother memory paradigms (cf. Chi & Ceci, 1987; Hasselhorn, 1995; Rabino-witz & Chi, 1987). Thus the general conclusion is that an elaborated knowl-

edge base allows the effective use of memory strategies.

Metacognitive knowledge. Numerous studies have explored interactionsbetween metacognitive knowledge and memory strategies across a varietyof memory tasks (for reviews, see Bjorklund et al., 1990; Cavanaugh & Perl-mutter, 1982; Schneider & Pressley, 1989). Given that strategy use is princi-pally conscious and intentional, the expectation is that strategy usage shouldcovary with the ability to verbally describe and explain strategic behavior

(i.e., declarative metamemory). Theoretically, all children executing an orga-nizational strategy should also possess adequate declarative metacognitiveknowledge, but not necessarily vice versa (cf. Wimmer & Tornquist, 1980).This assumption has been tested in several studies that included metamemoryinterviews in order to assess children’s verbal judgments of strategy effec-tiveness (e.g., Hasselhorn, 1992; Schneider, 1986). As a main result, only theadvanced but not the younger elementary school children possess relevant

declarative knowledge, providing adequate justifications for their use of or-ganizational strategies.A second way that metacognitive knowledge guides efficient strategy use

is through its procedural component, that is, through monitoring and controlactivities that accompany memory tasks. The monitoring and regulation com-ponents of metacognition allow children to assess strategy effectiveness, andto modify strategies when faced with new task demands (cf. Ghatala, Levin,Pressley, & Lodico, 1985; Ghatala, Levin, Pressley, & Goodwin, 1986). The

work by Ghatala and colleagues provides a nice example of how young chil-dren’s continued use of strategies depends on them noting the effects of thestrategy, making the attribution that the effects were due to the use of thestrategy, and realizing that this is important information for future strategychoices. Thus research on the instruction of memory strategies has shownthat children’s metacognitive knowledge influences their performance onmemory tasks both as a function of their initial knowledge available beforeinstruction, and also through the metacognitive knowledge acquired duringinstruction (cf. Kurtz & Borkowski, 1984; Pressley & Van Meter, 1993).

Research on the significance of metacognitive knowledge for strategy de-velopment has so far primarily focused on the development of conscious

awareness of the usefulness of strategies and its impact on strategic behav-iors. Less attention has been given to the consequences of conceptual change

in children’s understanding of learning and remembering and its effects onstrategy use. Over the past 10 years, a large body of research in conceptual

development has accumulated on children’s developing understanding of the




mind (e.g., Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990, for reviews). Most of this researchhas focused on conceptual change in the preschool years. The findings indi-cate that by the age of about four years, children understand the relationbetween seeing and knowing and can distinguish between beliefs and reality.

Between the ages of about 4 and 6 or 7 years, children move from a simpleunderstanding of the relation between perception or communication andknowledge to a more sophisticated understanding of the role of inferentialprocesses in knowledge acquisition (Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Sodian, 1988).This move towards a more and more constructivist understanding of the hu-man mind seems to extend into the grade school years (Fabricius, Schwanen-flugel, Kyllonen, Barclay, & Denton, 1989). It appears that such changes inchildren’s understanding of mental processes should have consequences for

their strategic behaviors. However, to date, the relations between conceptualknowledge and strategy use have remained largely unexplored. We have ar-gued elsewhere that developmental changes in strategy use between pre-school and elementary school age (e.g., the shift from external memory strat-egies like visual inspection to conceptual ones like taxonomic organizationand cognitive cueing) should be related to developmental changes in chil-dren’s understanding of the mind (Sodian, 1990; Sodian & Schneider, 1990),

and the argument could be extended to developments in the elementaryschool years. However, so far we have only established parallel develop-ments. Hypotheses about relationships between conceptual development inchildren’s understanding of the mind and strategy use remain to be empiri-cally tested.

HOW VALID ARE GENERALIZATIONS FROMCROSS-SECTIONAL STUDIES? EVIDENCE

FROM LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH ONSTRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

Almost all our previous conclusions about memory strategy developmenthave been drawn on the basis of cross-sectional studies. Does it matter?

As noted above, the inferences concerning developmental changes in strat-egy utilization that can be drawn from existing cross-sectional research arelimited in several respects. Cross-sectional studies neither give informationon group stability over time nor indicate individual or differential stability

of developmental changes. Because these concepts may be unfamiliar to thereader, their significance will be briefly illustrated below.

One interpretation problem not solvable by cross-sectional research is that,for instance, the age-related increase in clustering and recall observed incross-sectional studies could be either due to the fact that most children madeabout the same amount of progress within a given time interval, or that somechildren made enormous progress whereas most children remained at the

same level or even declined. The assessment of group stabilities over time




(i.e., test–retest correlations) helps in exploring this issue. That is, if effectsare based on similar strategy and recall improvements in almost all of thechildren of a given sample, overall group stability should be high.

Although test–retest correlations indicate group stability of memory be-

havior and performance at the aggregate level and thus enable us to test theassumption of homogeneity and consistency of group development implicitlystated in cross-sectional research, they do not allow inferences on stabilityor lability of performance over time on the individual level (cf. Asendorpf,1990; Schneider, 1989). This seems trivial given that stability of individualdifferences is described by a single correlation coefficient that only givesinformation about the ‘‘behavior’’ of the whole group under investigation.In order to explore intraindividual persistence over time, it is necessary to

estimate individual stabilities and their variance in a sample (i.e., differentialstability). Individual stability refers to the constancy of a relative position,that is, to the constancy of an individual’s standing relative to some referencegroup across age (cf. Bayley, 1949; Wohlwill, 1973). As a main result of this estimation procedure, stability coefficients are available for all subjects

of a given sample. The analysis of individual and differential stabilities isparticularly helpful when group stabilities (test–retest correlations) are found

to be low: it can answer the question whether such a finding is due to theinstability of some children (‘‘outliers’’) or is caused by overall low instabil-ity in the sample.

It thus seems obvious that generalizations from cross-sectional studies arenot trivially valid on the individual level. Theories of memory do, however,make claims about individual developmental paths. Thus, longitudinal stud-ies serve to evaluate generalizations from cross-sectional studies on the indi-vidual level. A prima facie reason to gather information on individual devel-

opmental paths is to estimate the magnitude of individual differences in ratesof development. Do most children progress at about the same pace or arethere large differences in speed of strategy acquisition? Speed of progressin strategy acquisition bears on theoretical accounts of memory developmentinsofar as phase models of memory development, e.g., the developmentalsequence of mediation deficiency, production deficiency, and mature strategyuse, as postulated by Flavell (1970) imply that there is discontinuity, ratherthan continuous improvement in strategy use. If there is large variation be-tween children in age of onset and speed of development, then cross-sectional data may obscure individual developmental paths, and only longi-tudinal data can provide the information necessary to evaluate phase modelsof strategy development.

A second, more specific reason to gather longitudinal data is that recenttheoretical accounts of strategy acquisition (e.g., Bjorklund & Coyle, 1995;Miller & Seier, 1994) claim that production deficiency is typically followed

by a phase of utilization deficiency, i.e., high levels of strategy use accompa-nied by poor levels of recall performance, and that efficiency in strategy use




is not an immediate consequence of strategic behaviors. The evidence for a‘‘utilization deficiency’’ that has been collected to date rests on cross-sectional data and on microgenetic (i.e., short-term) longitudinal studies. Itis unclear whether long-term changes in natural development, and short-term

improvements in microgenetic studies reflect the same developmental phe-nomena. Thus, long-term longitudinal data are necessary to test assumptionsabout a ‘‘utilization deficiency’’ in strategy development.

Accordingly, we cannot answer basic questions regarding strategy devel-opment without long-term longitudinal data. The available longitudinal evi-dence is summarized below.

Development of Rehearsal Strategies

In one of the few longitudinal studies of grade-school children’s memory,Kunzinger (1985) assessed 7-year-old children’s strategies in an overt re-hearsal task and retested them 2 years later. The impact of rehearsal fre-quency and rehearsal set size (i.e., the number of items rehearsed simulta-neously) on subsequent recall was assessed in both sessions. There was ageneral increase in rehearsal set size with development (from 1.7 to 2.6items). Rehearsal set size at the first measurement point was not related to

recall assessed at this measurement point, but predicted recall two years later.This surprising finding cannot be conceived of as a restricted-range correla-tion artifact because recall variability did not increase with age (it actuallydecreased with age in Kunzinger’s study).

Group stability assessed for the rehearsal and recall variables was ratherhigh (r ’s between .60 and .80). In order to assess individual stability, Kun-zinger used the ‘‘lability score’’ first introduced by Bayley (1949). To com-pute this score, the relative position of a given subject concerning his or her

performance on the rehearsal task was assessed separately for each of thetwo measurement points and converted into a z score. The lability score thusrepresents the degree of variability of the subject’s relative position acrossmeasurement points.

Kunzinger found high levels of individual stability (i.e., a low labilityscore) for most memory variables. The particularly high level of individualstability for rehearsal set size indicated that those children who initiallyshowed larger set sizes maintained their position relative to the group 2 yearslater. Also, those children who utilized passive rehearsal strategies (i.e., one-word repetition) most frequently at the age of 7 were also the first to acquirethe cumulative rehearsal strategies at the age of 9. Although Kunzinger notedthat these findings should be interpreted cautiously because of the small sam-ple size ( N ϭ 18), there is more recent evidence confirming Kunzinger’sresults. Guttentag, Ornstein, and Siemens (1987) observed comparable longi-tudinal stability between 8 and 9 years of age.

Overall, these findings not only replicate the major results of cross-sectional research (cf. Ornstein et al., 1988), as far as mean developmental




gains from age 7 to age 9 are concerned, but also confirm the implicit as-sumption derived from cross-sectional research that almost all of the elemen-tary school children seem to progress at about the same pace.

Development of Location Strategies

Does this finding of high individual and group stability over time general-ize to other age groups and memory paradigms? We have studied the devel-opment of memory strategies, metamemory, and performance on variousmemory tasks longitudinally in a large sample of 180 children from age 4to 12 (within the Munich Longitudinal Study on the Genesis of IndividualCompetencies, LOGIC, Weinert & Schneider, 1986, in press). In the remain-der of this chapter, we focus on longitudinal findings derived from this study.

One of the measures included in the initial period of the LOGIC studywas the memory-for-location task used by Schneider and Sodian (1988). Thistask dealt with 4- and 6-year-old’s ability to use retrieval cues in a hide-and-seek task. One of the most important results of the cross-sectional studywas that substantial interrelationships between children’s metamemory (i.e.,their knowledge about the utility of retrieval cues), the way they hid theitems, the use of retrieval cues and memory performance could be found

even for the youngest children in the sample (i.e., the 4-year-olds). Schneiderand Sodian (1988) concluded from their findings that close links amongknowledge, strategies, and performance can be demonstrated for memorytasks with which young children are familiar.

In the longitudinal replication study (Schneider & Sodian, 1990), it wasshown that the basic pattern of results obtained in the cross-sectional studycould be replicated, even though the intercorrelations obtained for theLOGIC children at the ages of 4 and 6 were somewhat lower in magnitude.

However, one unexpected outcome of the replication study concerned groupstabilities over the 2-year period. The test-retest correlations varied between.01 (metamemory) and .24 (recall), indicating almost no stability over time.

One possible reason for this finding is that memory and metamemory datacannot be reliably assessed in preschool and kindergarten children. To con-trol for this possibility, we recruited an independent sample of 4-year-oldsand presented them with the hide-and-seek task twice within a 2-week inter-val. As short-term group stability was high for all variables (correlationsbetween .60 and .80), it is unlikely that low long-term stability is due tounreliable measurement. Rather, the instability over time found for this mem-ory task seems to indicate that children improved at different rates, therebyconsiderably changing their relative standing within their group between thetwo measurement points.

Overall, these findings do not support the conclusions derived from therehearsal task paradigm. Although both the group means and the intercorrela-

tions patterns found for the cross-sectional and longitudinal studies were




roughly comparable, the longitudinal results are not in accord with the as-sumption that most children progress at about the same pace.

Development of Organizational Strategies

A second major memory paradigm investigated in the LOGIC study con-cerned the development of organizational strategies and corresponding recalldevelopment (Schneider & Sodian, 1991; Sodian & Schneider, in press; seeSchneider & Weinert, 1995, for a fuller description of the memory and meta-memory variables used in the longitudinal study).

We gave children a classic sort-recall task, at the ages of 4, 6, 8, 10, and12 years. Conceptual organization of the items to-be-remembered (measuredby the Ratio-of-Repetition) was highly stable in individual children over a

short-term period of about 2 weeks. However, long-term stabilities of strat-egy use (test–retest correlations) were extremely low (around r ϭ .10). Onthe group level, we perfectly replicated the findings from previous cross-sectional studies: Strategy use (at encoding and retrieval) improved steadilywith age, and so did free recall, with increasing correlations between the twomeasures indicating that strategy use becomes functional for recall with age.However, the low long-term stabilities indicate that individual develop-

mental paths may not follow the course suggested by the group data. In fact,individual analyses showed that over 80% of the children ‘‘jumped’’ fromchance level (RR scores Ͻ .30) to near-perfection (at least 80% of the itemssorted conceptually) in the 2-year-interval between successive measurementpoints. Thus, the pattern of gradual improvement in strategy use as suggestedby the group data was extremely rare (only 8% of the children conformedto this pattern). Moreover, there was considerable variation in the age atwhich children first used the strategy. As many as 40% of the children

showed nearly perfect levels of conceptual organization at one of the firsttwo measurement points (ages 4 and 6); 24% discovered it at age 8, 21% atage 10, and 5% as late as age 12. Thus, some of the instability in strategicbehaviors can be explained by individual variation in the time of strategy‘‘discovery’’: children go from chance levels of conceptual organization toperfection, but they do so at different ages.

So far, the findings on individual developmental paths are consistent withtheorizing on strategy development: There appears to be more individualvariation in the time of strategy discovery than one would have expected,but the patterns of ‘‘leaps’’ from chance level to perfection fit nicely withthe conceptualization of memory strategies as insightful behaviors.

However, contraryto expectation,childrendid notalways maintainthe orga-nizational strategy once they had discovered it. As many as 47% of the totalsample showed a U-shaped pattern of strategy acquisition. Two thirds of thesechildren discovered the strategy at preschool age, lost itsubsequently and redis-

covered it at the ages of 10 or 12 years, and one-third discovered it at age 8




andrediscoveredit atage 12.Thus,‘‘strategy loss’’ was dramatic among‘‘earlydiscoverers’’: 70% of those children who showed high conceptual clusteringat the ages of 4 and/or 6 years did not keep it up subsequently.

Consistent with previous findings (see above), the present study shows

that even preschool children can use conceptual organization in memorytasks when task demands are supportive. Cross-sectional studies have failedto provide evidence on the relation between such early and later ‘‘strategic’’behaviors. The high incidence of U-shaped developmental curves suggeststhat early and later organizational ‘‘strategies’’ may be behaviorally similar,but conceptually unrelated. Two sources of evidence support this assump-tion: First, there was a (moderate) link between metamemory and the courseof strategy acquisition, indicating that children who show U-shaped develop-

mental curves may at first have employed a seemingly strategic behaviorwithout understanding the rationale for its use. Second, performance gainsin free recall were not well predicted by strategy gains in preschool age, butwere very well predicted by such gains in elementary school. These findingssuggest that early organizational behaviors, although seemingly strategic, arenot driven by the same metaconceptual insights and may therefore not beas efficient as later, very similar, behaviors.

As was mentioned above, it has been proposed that the developmentalcourse of strategy acquisition in children is best described as a sequence of production deficiency—utilization deficiency—mature strategy use, wherea utilization deficiency ‘‘occurs when a child spontaneously produces anappropriate strategy but accrues no benefit from it for recall or less benefitthan does an equally strategic older child. In some cases, producing the strat-egy may even decrease recall temporarily (Miller & Seier, 1994). Our longi-tudinal data suggest that inefficient use of a strategy may not always be

followed by mature and efficient strategy use. Rather, an organizational be-havior may first be used inefficiently, then be given up, and later on be ‘‘re-discovered,’’ driven by more mature metacognitive insight, and be used moreefficiently.

How do longitudinal data bear on the concept of utilization deficiency?So far, utilization deficiencies have been mainly inferred from microgeneticlongitudinal studies, showing that strategy discovery may be followed by abrief period of stagnation or even decline in recall development. However,it is unclear whether such short-term processes of strategy acquisition reflectthe same developmental phenomena as long-term real world strategy devel-opment. Cross-sectional studies indicate that younger children tend not tobenefit as much from memory strategies as older ones even if they use thestrategy perfectly. However, cross-sectional designs do not allow us to com-pare the performance gains in strategy users with those in nonusers and strat-egy discoverers. It appears that the finding that children who use a strategy

perfectly at two successive measurement points perform better in free recallon the second than on the first measurement point does not per se warrant




TABLE 1Mean Increase in Recall Performance (Percent) between Two Successive Measurement

Points, Depending on Strategy Use

T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2

Age RR Ͻ .60 RR Ͻ .60 RR Ͻ .60 RR Ͼ .60 RR Ͼ .60 RR Ͼ .60 RR Ͼ .60 RR Ͻ .60

4/6 29,1 24,8 15,1 21,15(41,2) (43,9) (61,4) (51,9)

6/ 8 Ϫ26,9 Ϫ12,25 Ϫ1,7 Ϫ26,68(69,2) (70,7) (68,9) (69,1)

8/10 4,8 20,95 5,78 Ϫ5,25(39,2) (45,1) (63,1) (57,2)

10/12 10,22 27,9 9,5 Ϫ13,0

(49,6) (46,6) (68,1) (66,1)

the conclusion that the younger children were utilization deficient. Such aconclusion would be warranted, however, if these children’s performancegains were higher than those of children who discovered the strategy between

the two measurement points in question or if performance gains in nonusersequaled performance gains in strategy discoverers.Inspection of our longitudinal data showed clear evidence for a utilization

deficiency only in preschoolers. Between the ages of 4 and 6 years, strategists(high strategy use at both measurement points) gained on average 15.1 per-cent in recall performance, strategy discoverers gained 24.8%, nonstrategistsgained 29.1%, and strategy losers gained 21.2% (see Table 1).

Thus, strategy discovery was not functional for recall performance and

performance gains in young strategy users, given that both nonstrategistsand strategy losers showed similar increases in memory performance. Thispattern was clearly different from the developmental patterns in the olderchildren. Among the ages of 6 and 8, 8 and 10, and 10 and 12 years, strategydiscoverers clearly had the highest performance gains (between 20 and 30%between two successive measurement points), and strategists’ performancegains roughly equaled nonstrategists’ (between 5 and 10% recall perfor-mance gains in nonusers as well as users, indicating a constant nonstrategicfactor contributing to recall improvement). Thus, as predicted from cross-sectional studies, older children who used an organizational strategy outper-formed younger children who showed the same level of strategy use, butthey only outperformed them by about the same percentage that older non-strategy users outperformed younger nonstrategists. Children who discov-ered a strategy between two successive measurement points had performancegains that quadrupled those of both nonstrategists and strategists. These find-

ings suggest that there is less evidence for a utilization deficiency in elemen-tary school children than was previously thought. However, there is clear




TABLE 2Percentage of Subjects Who Showed a Production Deficiency, Utilization Deficiency,

Overefficient, and Efficient Strategy Use

Age pattern 4 years 6 years 8 years 10 years 12 years

Production deficiency 58 48 48 30 10Utilization deficiency 4 12 5 4 5Overefficiency 19 12 7 2 1Efficient use 20 28 40 65 85

evidence for a failure to utilize an organizational strategy in preschool chil-dren, even when these children showed almost perfect levels of sorting.

Converging evidence comes from a cross-sectional analysis of the effi-ciency of strategy use at each measurement point. According to the relationbetween conceptual organization at encoding (RR-scores), and recall perfor-mance, we distinguished between four groups of children: (1) Children whoused the conceptual organization strategy efficiently, that is, who had aboveaverage scores in sorting, as well as in recall performance; (2) children whowere production deficient, i.e., who had low clustering scores (RR Ͻ .60)

and were below average in recall; (3) utilization deficient subjects, i.e., chil-dren with RR-scores above .60, whose recall scores were lower than thoseof children with RR-scores below .60; and (4) overefficient children, i.e.,subjects with RR-scores below .60 who recalled more than the mean recallof subjects with RR-scores above .60.

Table 2 shows that at all ages only a small minority of children wereutilization deficient by such criteria. Consistent with previous findings, theproportion of efficient strategy users increased with age, and the proportion

of production deficient children declined. Taken together, these findings sheddoubt on the persuasiveness of the phenomenon of utilization deficiency.

Even though our findings are consistent with those of previous cross-sectional studies in indicating that older children gain more from strategyuse than younger children, they indicate that a utilization deficiency in a strictsense of the word, i.e., a failure to gain from strategy use, occurs only rarelyin grade school children. These findings suggest that conclusions on the mag-nitude of utilization deficiencies in strategy development drawn from micro-genetic longitudinal studies, may not be readily applicable to long-term strat-egy development.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We argued in the introduction that longitudinal data on strategy develop-ment are necessary to gain evidence on individual developmental paths. Infact, our data show that generalizations about the developmental course of

strategy acquisition that were drawn on the basis of cross-sectional data mayobscure individual developmental paths. Moreover, the longitudinal evi-




dence suggests that the developmental story based on cross-sectional andshort-term longitudinal data may not be entirely correct. When individualpatterns of gains and losses in memory performance following strategy ac-quisition are inspected, deficient strategy utilization appears to be a much

rarer phenomenon than was previously thought.Although the need for longitudinal studies has been emphasized in many

studies dealing with memory development, there have been some caveatsregarding potential methodological problems. In particular, the claim thatthe greater variability found in longitudinal studies is the true developmentalpicture has been questioned in the past. For instance, it has been argued thefact that the number of subjects and replications in longitudinal research areusually far smaller than in cross-sectional research should increase measure-

ment error, yielding higher sample estimates of population variance. If thisis true, one should expect greater variability in longitudinal designs than incross-sectional designs.

Although this problem may occur in some longitudinal studies, it doesnot seem to apply to the LOGIC data. First of all, the sample size was suffi-ciently large (almost 200 children). Second, and even more importantly, itcan be shown that recall variability found for the longitudinal recall data

corresponds very closely to that found in other cross-sectional researchbased on a large sample and using the same sort-recall task (Knopf, Korkel,Schneider, & Weinert, 1988). Interestingly, recall variability in the longitudi-nal sample decreased with time (see Kunzinger, 1985, for a similar finding),whereas it slightly increased in the case of the cross-sectional data. Appar-ently, the measurement problem described above does not play a role in thepresent case.

Nonetheless, it seems only fair to state that the longitudinal evidence on

memory strategy development is still scarce. The analyses presented in thispaper are based on a single study of one classic memory task. Future researchis necessary to test for the generality of the present conclusions.

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Received: September 11, 1996; revised: January 30, 1997

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