Memorandum Transfer of Ownership Feb16 A1107

8/3/2019 Memorandum Transfer of Ownership Feb16 A1107

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3itepubHc of tbe ~ b H t p p t t t e 9 ' Q:onuress of tbe flbilippine5

~ e n a t e P 1 ~ kl{!iHhre (}f H!: , ' , ~ " , d ' 1 f ~ SITTINGAS AN IMPEACHMENT COURT FEB 16 1\11 :07

IN THE MATTER OFTHE IMPEACHMENTOF RENATO C. CORONAAS CHIEF JUSTICE OFTHE SUPREME COURTOF THE PHILIPPINES.

REPRESENTATIVESNIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,JOSEPH EMILIO A.ABAYA, LORENZO R.TANADA HI, REYNALDOV. UMALI, ARLENE J.BAG-AO (othercomplainants comprising atleast one tlhird (1/3) of thetotal Members of the Houseof Repres(:ntatives as areindicated in the Complaint),

Complainants.

Case No. 002-2011

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MEMORANDUM(On Transfer of Ownership)

Chief Jm:tice Renato C. Corona ("CJ Corona"), by counsel, respectfullystates:

1. In compliance with this Honorable Court's directive, CJ Coronahumbly submits this memorandum on the following issues:


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(A) WHE'THER CJ CORONA BECAME 'THE OWNER OFTHE COLUMNS CONDOMINIUM UNIT (THE "COLUMNSUNIT") lJPON 'THE EXECU'TION OF 'THE DEED OF SALE ON 1OC'TOBER 2004, AND 'THE ISSUANCE OF THE CONDOMINIUMCER'TIFICA'TE OF 'TI'fLE NO. 85716 ON 3 NOVEMBER 2004, ORAT 'THE TIME HE AC'TUALLY ACCEPTED PHYSICALDELIVERY AND POSSESSION THEREOF; AND

(B) WHE'THER OR NOT CJ CORONA SHOULD STILLBE CONSIDERED 'THE OWNER OF 'THE MARIKINAPROPERTIES COVERED BY TeT NOS. N-97119 TO N-97125.'

2. This Memorandum aims to clarify discuss the delivery of propertyas a necessary dement for dete.rmining the moment of the transfer of ownership.There are 2 modes of delivery, namely: constructive and actual. In constructivedelivery, the property is deemed delivered to the buyer or transferee by symbolicmeans, such as the execution and giving of a deed of transfer or sale, or thegiving of keys. In actual delivery, the property is abandoned by the seller ortransferor and actually or physically put in the control of the seller or transferee.

3. As a preliminary matter, the factual and legal issuesturnon twoseeming contradictory situations. Firstly, the Certificate of Title No. 857162 overthe Columns condominium unit of CJ Corona was issued on 3 November 2004.The developer, Community Innovations, Inc., took the position that the unit was"deemed accepted." CJ Corona maintains the position that he became the fullowner of the Columns Unit only in 2009, when he took actual possession. CJCorona refused to accept delivery in order to preserve his right to pursue legalremedies against the developer for the repair of the defects and damage to theColumns Unit. For this reason, CJ Corona could not mention the Columns Unitin his SALN before 2010.

tExhs. "HH" to ''N]SL''2 Exh. '1J]."

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4. In contrast, a second and converse problem arises with respect tothe Marikina ptoperty transferred by Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 July 1990,executed by Mrs. Cristina R. Corona in favor of Demetrio C. Vicente (Mr.Vicente). The parties agreed that registration of the sale and transfer of titlewould be the responsibilty of Mr. Vicente, the buyer. After execution of a deedof sale and t a l ~ t n g actual, physical possession of the Marikina property by Mr.Vicente, he has not transferred the property to his name. As a result, all 7

relevant titles remain in the name of "Cristina R. Corona, married to Renato C.Corona." All the while, however, Mr. Vicente has been occupying the propertyand even paying the real property tax thereon. CJ Corona maintains that he is nolonger the owner of the property since delivery of ownership and possession toMr. Vicente are complete. CJ Corona, therefore, should not mention theMarikina property in his SALN.

Discussion

THE TRANSFER OFOWNERSHII:I OVER THECOLUMNS UNIT SHOULDBE RECKONED AT THETIME TH1E PHYSICALDELIVERY THEREOF WASACCEPTED UY CJ CORONA.

5. Complainants attempt to show that the ownership of the ColumnsUnit was transEerred to CJ Corona at the time that the Deed of Absolute Sale3

over said prope:rty was executed on 1 October 2004, or at the latest, when theCondominium Certificate of Ticle No. 857164 was issued on 3 November 2004.

3 Exh. ''PPP.''4 Exh. "JJJ."

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Hence, according to complainants, since ownership of the Columns Unit wassupposedly transferred in 2004 through symbolic delivery, it should have beenreported in CJ Corona's 2004 SALN,5 and not in his 2010 SALN.6

6. Complainants' sole reliance on the concept of symbolic deliveryismistaken. In Cebu Winland Development Corporation v. Ong Siao Hua/the SupremeCourt held thatsymbolic (or presumptive) delivery by the execution of a public

insttumentcan be negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possessionof the land sold, vii}

The resolution of the issue at bar necessitates a scrutiny of the conceptof "delivety" in the context of the Law on Sales or as used in Article 1543 ofthe Civil Code. Under the Civil Code, the vendor is bound to transfer theownership of an d deliver the thing which is the object of the sale. Thepertinent provisions of the Civil Code on the obligation of the vendor todeliver the object of the sale provide:

ARTICLE 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer theownership of and deliver, as well as warrant the thing which is the object ofthe sale. (1461a)ARTICLE 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired bythe vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the waysspecified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying anagreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.

(n)ARTICLE 1497. The thing sold shall be understood asdelivered, when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee.

(1462a)ARTICLE 1498. When the sale is made through a publicinstrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of thething which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does

no t appear or cannot clearly be inferred.XXX ] {

7. Under the Civil Code, ownership does not pass by merestipulation but only by delivery. Manresa explains, "the delivery of thething * * signifies that title has passed from IDe seller to IDe5 Exhs. "D" to "D-1."6 Exhs. "M" to "M-l."7G.R. No. 173215, 21 May 2009.

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buyer." Accordling to Tolentino, the purpose of delivery is not only forthe enjoyment of the thing but also a mode of acquiring dominion anddetermines the transmission of ownership, the birth of the real right. Thedelivery under any of the forms provided by Articles 1497 to 1505 of theCivil Code signifies that the transmission of ownership from vendor tovendee has tal,en place. 8

8. Article 1497 above contemplates what is known as real oractual delivery, when the thing sold is placed in the control and possessionof the vendee. Article 1498, on the one hand, refers to symbolic deliveryby the execution of a public instrument. I t should be noted, however,that Article 1498 does not say that the execution of the deed provides aconclusive presumption of the delivery of possession. It confines itself toproviding that the execution thereof is equivalent to delivery, whichmeans that the presumption therein can be rebutted by means of clear andconvincing evidence. Thus, the presumptive delivery by the execution ofa public instrument can be negated by the failure of the vendee to takeactual possession of the land sold.9

9. "Delivery" as used in the Law on Sales refers to the transferof two things: (1) possession and (2) ownership. This is the rationalebehind the doctrine that presumptive delivery via execution of a publicinstrument is negated when the vendee actually fails to obtain materialpossession of the land subject of the sale. In the same vein, if the buyer is8[d.'ld.

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placed in actual possession of the property, but by agreement of theparties, ownership of the same is retained by the seller until the price is

fully paid, the mere transfer of the possession of the property subject ofthe sale is not the "delivery" contemplated in the Law on Sales or as usedin Article 1543 of the Civil Code.1O

10. A well-respected authority in Civil law has also stated that:

It :is further necessary that the act be coupled with the intention ofdelivering the thing. For instance, where the keys to the place where the thingis deposited are delivered to the vendee in order that he may examine it, butnot with the intention of making delivery, or where the titles of ownership ofincorporeal property are placed in the possession of the vendee for his studyor inspection, but not with the intent of making the tradition, it cannot be saidthat there has been a constructive delivery. The act without the intention isinsufficient. For the same reason, any act, althongh no t provided in thesearticles, but accompanied by evident intention of the vendor to deliver or ofthe vendee: to receive the thing, will be considered as constituting tradition. Itis the intention which is essential.!!

11. As ruled by the Supreme Court in a number of cases, "(n)owhere inthe Civil Code, however, does it provide that execution of a deed of sale is aconclusive presumption of delivery of possession. The Code merely said that theexecution shall be equivalent to delivery. The presumption can be rebutted byclear and convincing: evidence. Presumptive delivery can be negated by thefailure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold."12

12. In other words, even if there has been complete documentationand registtation of the sale or transfer, delivery is not deemed complete, and itnegated if there: is proof that the buyer did not take actual possession of the101d.!! V TOLENTINO, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 55 (1992).12Ten FortY Realty and Development Corp. v. Marina Ct7It, G.R. No. 151212, 10 September 2003; Santos v.Santos, et ah, G.R. No. 133895,2 October 2001.

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property. It is only when both documentation and registration, coupled withplacing the buyer in actual, physical control of the property, is there completionof delivery.

13. Delivery has been described as a composite act, a thing in whichboth parties must join and the minds of both parties concur. It is an act bywhich one partV parts with the title to and the possession of the property, and

the other acquires the right to and the possession of the same. In its naturalsense, delivery means something in addition to the delivery of property or title; itmeans transfer of possession. In the Law on Sales, delivery may be either actualor constructive, but both forms of delivery contemplate "the absolute giving upof the control and custody of the property on the part of the vendor, and theassumption of the same by the vendee. ,13

14. In the case of Santos v. Santos, et al.,14 it was further explained that if,notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have theenjoyment and material tenancy nor make use of it himself or through another inhis name, then delivery has not been effected, v i ~ :

On the second issue, is a sale through a public instrument tantamountto delivery of the thing sold? Petitioner in her memorandum invokes Article1477 of the Civil Code which provides that ownership of the thing sold istransferred to the vendee upon its actual or constructive delivery. Article 1498,in turn, provides that when the sale is made through a public instrument, itsexecution .is equivalent to the delivery of the thing subject of the contract.Petitioner avers that applying said provisions to the case, Salvador became theowner of the subject property by virtue of the two deeds of sale executed inhis favor.

***

13EquatonalRcalty Development, Inc. v. M'fYjair Theater, Inc., G.R. No. 133879,21 November 2001.14Santos v. Santos, et a,(, G.R. No. 133895,2 October 2001.

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In Danguilan vs. lAC, 168 SCRA 22, 32 (1988), we held that for theexecution of a public instrument to effect tradition, the purchaser must beplaced in wntrol of the thing sold. When there is no impediment to preventthe thing sold from converting to tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will ofthe vendo:t, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument issufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, th epurchaset: cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy nor makeuse of it l ~ i m s e l f or through another in his name, then delivery has notbeen effected.

As found by both the trial and appellate courts and amply supportedby the evidence on record, Salvador was never placed in control of theproperty. The original sellers retained their control and possession. Therefore,there was no real transfer of ownership. (Emphasis supplied)

15. The Supreme Court emphasized the need to show that the vendorintended to absolutely deliver control and custody of the property, and that itwas likewise the: intention of the vendee to accept such delivery, thus:

Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquiresonly upon delivery of the thing to him "in any of the ways specified in articles1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that thepossession is transferted from the vendor to the vendee." This right istransferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or delivery. Non nudispactissed traditiOn'o dominia remm traniferantur. And there is said to be delivery if andwhen the thing sold "is placed in the control and possession of the vendee."Thus, it has been held that while the execution of a public instrument of sale isrecognized by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, suchconstructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, is deemednegated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.

16. In the present proceedings, prosecution witness,Nerissa Josef,testified and confirmed that there was no actual acceptance by CJ Corona of theColumns Unit, and that it was only "deemed accepted" on 7 June 2008-aunilateral act of the -developer Community Innovations, IncYMs. Josef alsoadmitted that there were issues concerning the Columns Unit as there was a

need for re-inspection,16

thus negating any delivery or transfer of ownership since

15 Please see Exh. "PPP-4," which is also marked as Exh. "45."16 Please see Exh. "48."

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CJ Corona did not have the enjoyment and material tenancy nor make use of theColumns Unit himself or through another in his name.

17. The record therefore shows that complainants have not proventhat CJ Corona was mistaken in declaring his ownership of the Columns Unit inhis 2010 SALN because as of this time, complainants have failed to show whenCJ Corona actually and intention:ally accepted delivery of said Unit.

THE MARIKINAPROPERTIES17 NEED NOTBE REPORTED IN CJCORONA'S SALNS FROM2002 TO 2010 SINCE THEOWNERSHIl' THEREOFWAS TRANSFERRED IN1990.

18. As mentioned above, in Equatorial Realry Development, Inc. v. M'!YjairTheater, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquiresonly upon delivery of the thing to him "in any of the ways specified in articles1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that thepossession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee." This right istransferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or delivery. Nonnudispactimdtraditionedominia1"l1rumtransferantur. And there is said to be delivery i fand when the thing sold "is placed in the control and possession of thevendee." . . .

19. During the proceedings held on 3 February 2012, it was shown thata Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 July 1990 was executed by Mrs. Cristina RCorona in favolc of Demetrio C. Vicente ("Mr. Vicente") covering the Marikinaproperties. Evidence will likewise be presented and offered to show that

17 Exhs. " ! I f f ' to ~ ' N 1 ' . J ,"Memorandum on Transfer ofOwnership

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possession oveJt said properties was already transferred to Mr. Vicente, and thathe has been exercising his ownership rights on said properties, since 1990.

20. The non-registration of the Marikina properties in the name of Mr.Vicente does not adversely affect the legal position of CJ Corona. Unlike thecircumstances surrounding the Columns Unit, the express provisions of the CivilCode and applicable jurisprudence, as cited above, recognize the transfer of

ownership over the Marikina properties from Mrs. Corona to M1:. Vicente byvirtue of a contract and actual delivery by Mrs. Corona of possession of theprQperties to Mr. Vicente, who accepted such delivery. Consequently, Mr.Vicente has titLe to these properties because after execution of the Deed ofAbsolute Sale/a Mrs. Corona also delivered actual possession thereof to MrVicente, who unqualifiedly accepted delivery and possession of the properties."

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona respectfully prays thatthis Honorable Impeachment Court consider the above memorandum in itsresolution ofArticle II of the "Verified" Complaint of Impeachment.

ChiefJustice Renato C. Corona further prays for such other relief as maybe just and equitable in the premises.

Mahti for Pasay City, 15 February 2012.

18 Exh. "54" and "54_A.>1Memorandum on Transfer ofOwnershipPage 10 ofll


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Respectfully submitted:Counsel for ChlefJustice Renato C. Corona.

JUSTICE SERAFIN R. CUEVAS (RET.)PTR No .2643828,January 4, 2011, Makati

IBP No. 846915 issued January 6, 2011, Manila IRoll no. 3814 MCLE-exempt

]OSEM. II IPTR No. 0038311; 1/09/12; Mahti City

IBP LRN 02570 August 20, 2001 (Lifetime)Roll of Attorneys No. 37065MCLE Exemption No. 1-000176

DENNIS P. MANALOPTR No. 2666920; 5 J anUM? 2011, Makati CityIBP No. 839371.; 3 January 2011, Makati CityRoll No. 40950, 12 Api"il1996

MCLE Compliance No. III-0009471, 26 Aptil2010

Copies furnished:

House of RepJ:esentativesBatasan ComplexBatasan Hills, Quezon City

Senators of t h f ~ Republic of the PhilippinesGS1S BuildingMacapagal HighwayPasay City

Memoralldum on Trallifer ofOwnership

Memorandum Transfer of Ownership Feb16 A1107

Documents

Transcript of Memorandum Transfer of Ownership Feb16 A1107