MEM Pre Read (1).pdf

Training Services of 44 © Petrofac 2012

Petrofac Major Emergency Management

Initial Response Training (Pre-Read)

Major Emergency Management (Initial Response)

Course

Pre-Read Notes




Contents

1. Course Information ............................................................. 3

2. Introduction to the Platform .................................................. 5

3. Station Bill ....................................................................... 6

4. Isometric View .................................................................. 7

5. Lifeboat Stations ................................................................ 8

6. Major Hazards Register ........................................................ 9

7. Appraisal Process ............................................................. 15

8. Emergency Types & Considerations ........................................ 19

9. Time Out Guidance ........................................................... 31

10. Time Out Pro Forma .......................................................... 33

11. Evacuation Pro Forma ........................................................ 35

12. Common Terms & Abbreviations ............................................ 37

13. Phonetic Alphabet ............................................................ 39

14. Notes ........................................................................... 41




Course Information Course Overview This course is designed to provide knowledge and experience in major emergency management. For delegates who have actual or potential prospects of command, the course provides the first stage in the process leading to formal competency assessment. It is OPITO-approved and is based on Petrofac Training Service’s generic offshore fixed platform, the ‘Linda B’. Information concerning the Linda B platform can be found in the remainder of this document. Course Content The programme focuses on:

Classroom lectures, case studies, discussions and desktop exercises on the essential elements and underlying principles of emergency management. An introduction to emergency management performance criteria. Practical scenarios, performed in a custom-built simulator. As well as acting as a member of the emergency team, or as an observer, each delegate has the opportunity of acting as the emergency manager on at least two occasions. Briefing and debriefing sessions with a final appraisal of readiness for formal assessment

Certification OPITO-approved certification and a Petrofac Training Services appraisal report will be issued on completion of the course.

Items to bring Photographic ID.




Introduction to the Platform The Linda ’B’ Platform is the standard generic model used by Petrofac Training Services and forms the simulation used in the Major Emergency Management Initial Response Course. Based upon a real platform in the North Sea, the Linda ‘B’ is a fixed installation located in an operating zone about 200 miles from the Scottish mainland. Situated in a busy field, the Linda ‘B’ is surrounded by neighbouring platforms pumping oil and gas to shore from risers located at the north east corner of the platform. There are 10 wells, 4 of which are subsea remote, and wells 5 & 6 are classified as sour wells. Drilling, Wireline services, oil & gas separation, crane operations etc. will all feature in the emergency simulations and the installation carries a compliment of 100 persons of varying trades to help achieve realism. Illustrations orientate the installation east and west with the Temporary Refuge located at the west end of the installation. This refuge houses the main muster points within the Accommodation/Living Quarters or ‘Q’ Module. A blast wall with a 1 hour safety rating protects this unit from the other modules and provides for the safety of personnel in the event of an emergency. Primary Muster Points are located on Level 2 of the Accommodation block in an area normally used for recreational activities. The Alternative Muster Points are located close to the Lifeboats at the west side of the platform and can protect personnel from some of the effects of weather but are outside the protection of the Temporary Refuge. The helideck is located on top of the Accommodation Module with the helifuel and chemical skid on the roof of module ‘G’. Lifeboat locations can be found later in this document but it should be noted that 4 boats, 1,2,3 + 6, can be found at the west side with boats 4 + 5 at the east. Sufficient capacity exists to evacuate all 100 persons on board in any 2 lifeboats should the need arise. Of the personnel on board, 77 are categorised as ‘non-essential’ and will muster at the Primary Muster Point (or Alternative Muster Point if required). The remaining 23 individuals are regarded as ‘Essential Personnel’ and muster as follows; Manager and Emergency Control Room Team 6 personnel – Emergency Control Room Permits 2 Personnel – Permit Office Incident Commander and Fire Team 10 personnel – Emergency Response Base, Level 1 Accommodation Module Medic and Medical Team 5 personnel – Sick Bay, Level 1 Accommodation Module Only the Medic is full time employed in the role while the other emergency personnel have other normal working roles and only form their teams when an emergency is declared.




The Emergency Control Room Roles are as follows; OIM/Emergency Manager (Has overall command of all personnel on the installation and within the 500 metre exclusion zone around the platform) Who leads;

Deputy OIM Control Room Operator

Muster Checker

Key Events Logger

Radio Operator

Under direction from OIM

controls ERT and Medical

team

Monitors process & makes PA

announcements

Liaises with Muster Points, records missing & casualties

Notes significant events and keeps main checklist

Communicates with ERRV,

Coastguard and air and sea

assets.




Linda B Platform




Lifeboat Stations – Cellar Deck




Major Hazards Register

Major Hazard

Possible Causes

Potential Consequences

- restricted to initiating module - impairs escape ways to

muster points. - threatens integrity of TR

system.

Consult Procedure Number

Process Fires and Explosions

Module A

A

• Failure of discharge lines from oil meter booster pumps.

• Failure of LP flare scrubber or associated pipework.

• Release of oil/oily water and/or gas from production separators or associated pipework.

• Failure of pipework to B2 oil metering package.

• Condensate and gas release from pipework downstream of P2.

• Failure of T1 glycol absorber and associated dried gas line.

• If deluge does not operate during a jet fire personnel in module at risk.

• Module A jet fires could impair east lifeboats if directed downwards.

• If deluge does not operate a sustained jet fire could escalate to module B resulting in further escalation and TR impairment.

• Module A explosions have relatively low overpressures compared to other hazardous modules possibly due to the equipment layout, however would still cause extensive damage both inside the module and to adjacent modules.

• An explosion may damage the firepump room on the northern cantilever outside the module, however firepumps at other locations able to supply firewater.

• An explosion could damage flare boom and lines to the east of module A.

• Large pool fires in Module A can result in Co concentrations of 1000ppm and smoke at the helideck and accommodation module.

6.2

6.6

6.8

6.9




Major Hazard

Possible Causes



Module B

B

Failure of a production header.

Release of condensate and gas from NGL metering package and associated lines.

Failure of gas export line upstream of pig receiver.

Dropped object onto wellhead or flowline during well services operations.

If deluge does not operate during a jet fire personnel in module at risk.

If deluge does not operate a sustained jet fire could escalate to module C resulting in further escalation and TR impairment.

Module B explosions have the highest estimated peak overpressure of 0.74 bar for explosions on Linda B.

Preferential venting through module B/F hatch covers could result in severe damage to module F.

6.2

6.3

6.6

6.8

6.9

Module C

C

Release of water and then NGLs from water circulation line in NGL wash system.

Failure of pipework in gas sweetening plant resulting in loss of gas, condensate and DGA.

Release of condensate and DGA from NGL treatment plant.

Failure of DGA line resulting in loss of DGA followed by gas.

If deluge does not operate during a jet fire personnel in module at risk.

If deluge does not operate an intense jet fire could escalate of module D within 5 minutes.

An explosion in module C could impair firewall to module D leading to immediate TR impairment.

Firepumps P27A/B, each housed in a separate enclosure, are vulnerable to explosions, however firepumps at other locations able to supply firewater.

6.2

6.3

6.8

Module D

D

Loss of containment and fire of Texatherm stored in surge drum V28 This could arise following a jet fire in module C.

Although a fire in module D would impair TR, abandonment would not be required as structure will not be threatened.

As an escalated event, TR already impaired and platform evacuation required.

6.8




Major Hazard

Possible Causes



Module E

E

• Release of gas from gas compression and condensate recovery equipment.

• Failure of pipework resulting in release of sour gas.

• Release of fuel gas

• Release of condensate

• Escalation to neighbouring modules from either an explosion or a jet fire could lead to TR impairment.

6.2

6.3

6.9

Module F

F

• Failure of pipework associated with water skimmer, V20

• Release of oil/oily water and/or gas from sour crude separator V74 or associated pipework

• Low frequency of TR impairment due to jet fires

• Explosions ignited by a source at the south end would generate highest overpressures.

6.2

6.3

6.8

6.9

Module G

G

• Oil release from pipework associated with oil metering package or pipeline oil pumps.

• Failure of glycol regenerator or associated pipework resulting in release of glycol and gas.

• Pool fires result in high CO and smoke concentrations at accomm. and helideck.

• If deluge does not operate an intense jet fire could escalate to module H within 5 minutes.

• Module H liable to sustain serious damage from an explosion in module G, however relatively low frequency.

6.2

6.3

6.8

6.9

Utilities and Accommodation Fires

Module H

H

• Fuel or gas or fuel oil leak from Main Generation sets and water injection pump supplies.

• Lube oil release.

• Negligible potential for major hazard as High Pressure leaks can only occur with equipment running, these would shutdown on detection of supply faults. Low Pressure leaks do not have potential to cause a major hazard.

• Significant lube oil releases could only occur from the pressurised system. No thermal or smoke hazard with the potential to cause platform abandonment is considered credible.

6.8




Major Hazard

Possible Causes



Module M

M

• Fire and explosion

• Flammable gas cloud forming within shale shaker room or mud pits area emanating from enriched mud from wellbore

• Chemical incident

• Accident involving drilling chemicals stored within sack store

• An explosion might result in extensive damage to module M mess area.

• Chemical fire would result in large volumes of toxic smoke affecting sack store area.

• Chemical spill could result in contamination of sack store area.

• Incident in this area may require decontamination procedure for contaminated casualties.

6.2

6.3

6.6

6.8

6.9

Module Q

Q

• Galley and other accommodation fires

• Smoke and fire would affect the floor of occurrence, but not immediately affect the other floors. Alternative muster area may be required as muster points could be impaired.

6.1

Helideck

• Helicopter crash or refuelling accident leading to fire involving helifuel tanks on Module G roof

• Incident confined to helideck and module G roof. Unlikely to impair TR.

6.4

Helicopter Crash

Helideck

• Crash onto helideck • Incident likely to be restricted to helideck.

6.4

Other

• Crash onto other topsides module

• Potential for a major hydrocarbon release low as crash would be external to modules.

Blowout

S

• Loss of well control during drilling or workover operations

• Intersection of a producing well during drilling

• Dropped object onto Xmas tree during well services operations

• Heat radiation from potentially massive and prolonged jet flames.

• Un-ignited blowouts also constitute a major hazard because of the volume and quantity of gas released and threat of ignition. Precautionary evacuation of non-essential personnel likely.

6.2

6.3

6.6

6.8

6.9




Major Hazard

Possible Causes



Below topsides shutdown valves (in the air gap or at cellar deck level between sea level and the 26m level

• Release from flange or small bore fitting

• Escalation event from the process fire or explosion in module B

• Prolonged fire will threaten the TR system, structural integrity, adjacent risers and process equipment

• Explosions resulting form a delayed ignition would result in minimal over-pressure although ensuring fire likely to be prolonged

6.2

6.3

6.7

6.8

6.9

Pipeline Releases

Within the 500 meters safety zone

• Internal corrosion

• Impact from dropped load

• Pipeline releases are considered to have the potential to threaten the TR or cause fatalities.

Location of export line SSIVs away from platform is only potentially at risk from a rupture upstream of SSIVs. Inventory limited provided SSIV operates.

6.8

6.9

Outside modules B/F

• Release from either oil export (lines to/from pig launchers)

• No credible jet fire scenarios which could impair the TR are foreseen.

• Explosions less severe as unconfined and unlikely to cause TR impairments

6.2

6.3

6.8

6.9

Dropped Objects

Topside modules

• Dropped loads from either National or Ruston – Bucyrus cranes can only impact modules F or G or the drilling module

• These modules are highly redundant structures and there is only a minor risk of serious damage, although local facilities are feasible

6.8

Subsea Facilities

• Dropped crane load on export pipelines

• Short duration (<30 secs) gas plume. Atmospheric gas concentrations below LEL.

• Location of SSIVs away from platform means pipeline inventory down stream of SSIVs not exposed to dropped load hazards.

6.8




Major Hazard

Possible Causes Potential Consequences Consult Procedure Number

Ship Collisions

• Ship collisions includes all vessels impacts. Vessels include:-

• Powered passing vessels

• Drifting passing vessels

• Dedicated vessels (supply boats)

• Fishing boats, DSV and SBV

• Loss of structural integrity due to impact forces.

• Accidents leading to fires and explosions (riser ruptures).

• Pre-emptive evacuations of personnel possible in some instances if sufficient advance warning

6.5

6.9

Structural Failure

• Fires and explosions

• Ships collisions

• Dropped objects

• Material Failure

• Foundation Failure

• Flame impingement on critical structural members particularly from risers fires in the air gap.

• Corrosion or fatigue failure. Structure has low reserve strength capacity.

• Mud mound at jacket base prevents scour. Low probability of pile failure during storm conditions

6.9

Un-ignited Gas Releases

Cellar deck and air gap

• Riser release of

Flammable gas

• Riser release with a source concentration of H2S up to 7000 ppm.

• Following areas are potentially in range of a flammable gas from an un-ignited riser release:-

• Eastern TEMPSC

• Western TEMPSC (>20kg/s)

Lethal H2S concentrations are only feasible in the following areas for riser releases of 20kg/s and over:-

• Eastern TEMPSC

N&S walkways outside modules A, B & C

6.7

6.9

Outside Modules B & F on north face of platform

• Source concentration for H2S approx 7000 ppm

• Releases>20kg/s threaten north side of platform

6.2

6.3

6.8

Within module

• Releases of H2S at 20000ppm from stripping column in modules B and F

• Threat to personnel within module but typical hazardous diameters are the order of 2 to 5 meters. H2S detectable at low concentrations hence individuals should be able to react and escape

6.2

6.3




Appraisal Process The appraisal process derives from the assessment criteria developed in the aftermath of the Piper Alpha Inquiry, by a committee which consisted of representatives from the regulating and advisory bodies such as OPITO, Oil & Gas UK, the HSE, etc. and practising Emergency Managers from all areas of the industry. The Assessment Criteria have been reviewed twice since their inception in 1992 and now constitute a system of Major Emergency Management which is now accepted worldwide. OPITO Approved Major Emergencies Management Training will provide candidates with formal training in command, control, communications and stress related factors in the management of major emergencies. Evaluation of delegates will be by continuous observation during a minimum of two command centre simulations per delegate, at least one of which must be as the Emergency Manager, each based around a major incident chosen from the following:

(a) Type A – a major emergency that is readily controllable if managed appropriately.

(b) Type B – a major emergency which could escalate if not controlled. (c) Type C – a major emergency that the EM is unable to control leading

to a full evacuation of the facility.

You will also find yourself dealing with scenarios which will include a number of the following events;

• Injured personnel

• Multiple casualties

• Missing personnel

• Loss of containment

• Loss of communication

• Loss of evacuation, muster points or temporary refuge

• Stressed personnel

• Extreme weather conditions

• Loss of essential facilities

• Loss of key personnel

• Rapidly developing situation leading to information overload

• Evacuation of the facility

• Environmental concerns and effects

Following the training and evaluation the delegate will receive an OPITO Approved Major Emergency Management certificate and a written analysis of any gaps (see Appendix ‘H’ for an example Appraisal Form) that exist in the delegate’s current managerial knowledge and capabilities for commanding a major emergency. These gaps should be met by further training and workplace drills and exercises, at their company’s discretion.




The next stage – Formal Assessment Development of the candidate should continue on return to the workplace with a view to preparing for the next stage in the process. In order to gain formal OPITO approved qualification in Management of Major Emergencies the Emergency Manager must undertake a formal Assessment event. Candidates are assessed against six Elements. The first element relates to the concept of ‘Maintaining a State of Readiness’ and is a critical step in preparation for the assessment process. This element was introduced during the first review of the system. Its performance criteria aim to bring uniformity and conformity to pre and post assessment training and experience. It is now the responsibility of the candidate’s company to ensure his/her compliance with this element. The candidate should be present for assessment against Elements 2 to 6 with his/her Element 1 pro-forma completed and signed by their Asset Manager. The assessment process features events which will test the candidate’s ability to obtain information from a variety of appropriate sources, for example Central Control Room, Emergency Response Team Leader, Work Permits, Standby Vessel and very importantly, the Emergency Response Plan. He or she should make valid interpretations and take valid decisions re the Type and Location of the incident, Containment method(s), ERT deployment, Muster status, Plant status, availability of means of evacuation. The worst possible case and associated contingencies should be identified and fully understood. The Emergency Manager should plan both to mitigate the current situation and deal with the worst possible case. Consider evacuation, minimising risk to personnel and casualty handling. Review and update the plan regularly. Appropriate resources include Fixed Systems, Emergency Response Teams (ERT’s), Support Teams including Medical Support, Portable Equipment and assistance available at External Sources. Give actions due thought and initiate them as quickly as possible. Use a member of the management team to co-ordinate the ERT and complete a mental risk assessment prior to deploying response teams. Be authoritative, address personnel directly and be clear and concise. Display a confident demeanour throughout and be prepared to support a weak team member. Do not overload ‘willing horses’ and avoid instructing personnel to act beyond their experience and capabilities. Do not get involved in tactics as this is the job of the team members. Only move away from the command position if it is necessary to gather information or discuss tactics with individual team members. The Stress Presentation will provide methods of recognising and dealing with your own stress. The required actions to deal with others include repeating public address messages, delegating a team member to maintain contact with a trapped person or arranging for their replacement. Stressed individuals should be escorted from the site and monitored by trained personnel. Effective management will reduce the team’s stress levels.




The Emergency Manager should concentrate on;

Assessing the Situation

(a) Obtaining, evaluating and confirming information quickly from all appropriate sources.

(b) Confirming the emergency and initiating appropriate audible and visual alarms.

(c) Making valid interpretations and valid decisions about the type and location of the incident and the resources available.

(d) Reviewing the potential outcomes of the emergency and the possible response actions against the consequences and probabilities.

(e) Methods of maintaining an overview of the incident such as information boards that track:

• Actions taken

• Personnel movements

• Casualty/Missing persons

• Key events

• Physical resources

Taking Effective Action The Emergency Manager should be in a position to work towards;

(a) Developing, reviewing and updating a clear plan that is shared with others in the ECC; mitigating the current situation and dealing with the worst possible case.

(b) Taking appropriate actions as quickly as possible. (c) Using appropriate resources including fixed systems, medical support,

portable equipment and third party support. (d) Co-ordinating and directing emergency response teams taking into

account the risk of deploying personnel. (e) Implementing the correct level of emergency response i.e. ensuring

that the response is adequate to the emergency. (f) Applying procedures – ensuring they are being followed. (g) Moving events along but under control. (h) Applying emergency procedures that are safe and conform to current

health and safety legislation and company procedures. Delegate Authority

(a) Deciding which activities should be delegated in light of the circumstances at the time.

(b) Delegating activities to those assigned the duty as defined in the ERP; confirming understanding.

(c) Requesting assistance and action from others in a manner which promotes a positive response.

(d) Providing guidance for the team but not getting involved in the details.




Emergency Types & Considerations Introduction When an incident occurs the emergency manager’s senses will be highly active sending signals or cues into his or her mind. These cues, in the main, are made up of numerous verbal communications and visual images. If the manager is to cope, stay in control and formulate a plan of action he/she must have training to make sense of this data. The competent emergency manager must possess the ability to make rapid assessments of the information, discard that which is not relevant and act to quickly define the hazard the incident presents to personnel, plant and the environment. In some circumstances there may be missing information and the manager may have to call on his or her experience to fill in the gaps. With training, the Emergency Manager will start to recognise patterns within the data that will help him or her identify what type of incident is developing. With the incident type correctly identified, the corrective solution realised within the emergency response plan can be implemented to bring the event under control.

With instruction on what is accepted as the correct response to an identified hazard and by undergoing realistic simulated exercises, the manager will accumulate knowledge and experience of the associated patterns and appropriate responses in his/her long-term memory. During an emergency, when a pattern is recognised, the manager will intuitively recognise the correct response, thereby saving time by not having to concentrate on problem solving. This is known as recognition primed decision-making or RPD. This process should make decision making for the manager simpler, more efficient and less demanding. With RPD in place the mind will have spare capacity; capacity that can be used to plan ahead, resulting in a more pro-active management style. As mentioned above each hazard should have an appropriate emergency response plan. This plan should contain the actions that the Emergency Manager should consider and if appropriate, implement. These action points will be discussed during the workshop phase of the course.

Purpose The purpose of this presentation is to indentify the types of emergency that can occur; the potential for escalation and the resources that can be used to control and mitigate the emergency. The delegate shall also be shown how to take a strategic approach to emergency management




Outcomes The course will encourage you to consider major emergencies that can occur and in particular;

(a) Major emergency types and why safety regulations put the onus on the operators to run their facilities safely.

(b) The factors the emergency manager must consider within the incident – people, environment, plant, resources and support.

(c) The manager’s responsibility for non-essential and responding personnel both onsite and within specific distances of the incident.

(d) Evaluating the potential for escalation and the resources that will be required to deal with the evolving emergency.

(e) The possibility of a rapidly escalating situation that could deteriorate if not properly managed.

Incident Types The regulatory and advisory bodies have identified under broad headings the types of incidents that an emergency manager should be competent to handle. These are:-

� Well Control Incident

� Explosion & Fire

� Accommodation Fire

� Helicopter Incident

� Pipeline Incident

� Collision or Wave Damage leading to structural collapse

� Loss of Stability Within each type of incident there will be many contributing and peripheral factors that require to be addressed by the emergency manager. Let us consider one type of incident. An explosion has occurred in a process module. What factors should the manager consider? To conduct an accurate assessment of the facts he must adopt systematic methodology. One method is to group the considerations under the following key headings. People, Plant, Resources and Support.




People:

• Muster the installation personnel in a place of safety, within the Temporary Refuge (TR) or Alternative Muster

• Establish if there are any missing personnel?

• Implement Man Overboard Procedure

• Is there a threat to the TR and if so how much TIME does the manager have to implement a controlled, down manning of personnel or a full evacuation of the installation?

• Are escape routes, helideck and lifeboats compromised?

Plant:

• Has the process shutdown and if appropriate blown down and have all the systems functioned correctly?

• Have Drilling and or Well Services been made safe?

• Have the fire pumps and fire suppression systems activated?

• If appropriate, boundary cooling of surrounding modules should be considered

• Have all ignition sources been eliminated, hot work permits withdrawn etc?

• Have all isolations to the incident area been initiated?

• What was the source of the explosion?

• Has there been any inventory loss?

• Has there been any damage to critical structural members?

• Is there any potential for any further escalation, e.g development of gas clouds, fire or further explosions?

Resources:

• Has the ERRV carried out a sea search around the installation and reported back observations on the location and severity of the incident?

• Evaluate when it will be safe to deploy ERTs

• Evaluate what safe systems of work ERTs will require to adopt

• Have medical teams prepared to receive casualties

Support:

• Evaluate the necessity for a MAYDAY transmission

• Request air and sea support

• Request medical support

• Request environmental support




Conclusion Emergencies can happen at any time without warning and the emergency manager and his team, if they are to cope competently, must be in a permanent state of readiness. The implementation of the appropriate Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is a core responsibility of the installation manager. This topic is the subject of the next chapter. Caution should be observed, however, as the emergency may have some unique features that were not identified when the ERP was initially developed. The competent manager will have prepared both his team and himself, by conducting drills and exercises thereby developing confidence in their emergency response ability and acquiring valuable knowledge and experience.




Fire in Accommodation / TR

1. Muster Point security (Alternative Muster). 2. Process Security – Shutdown, ESD and Blow-down. 3. TR conditions - Ventilation off

Electrical supplies off Fire and gas system information monitored Fuel supplies off for running generators in TR Fixed firefighting systems status: CO2, sprinklers.

4. ERT deployment to Forward Control Position upwind. 5. Medic to prepare hospital – set up triage if required. 6. Third parties contacted - ERRV

CRO/Radio Operator call lists Aircraft with medical support.

7. Helideck availability for relief aircraft. 8. Ventilate the TR to assist in search and rescue. 9. Consider precautionary downman.




Fire in Hazardous Area

1. Confirm type and location of fire.

2. Confirm GPA sounded – Integrity of the TR.

3. Confirm ESD and blow-down.

4. Process security - Confirm deluge operation is effective. Confirm blow-down is effective. Consider boundary cooling adjacent modules. Confirm electrical isolation.

5. Initial on scene conditions – Monitor using fire and gas system.

6. Inform ERRV - Confirm no persons in water Confirm status of fire.

7. ERT; hold deployment until safe to deploy.

8. Medic to prepare hospital; set up triage if required.

9. Later, on scene conditions – Confirm topsides depressurised Confirm fire diminished.

10. Deploy ERT when safe to upwind Forward Position.

11. Isolate deluge when advised by ERT leader.

12. Third parties contacted - ERRV CRO/Radio Operator call lists Aircraft with medical support.

13. Helideck availability for relief aircraft.

14. If fire is uncontrollable then see Evacuation by Sea plan.

15. Consider precautionary downman.




Gas Loss of Containment Process Area

1. Recall PTWs in affected area.

2. Send two technicians with gas detectors to investigate if safe to do so.

3. Confirm type and origin of gas leak.

4. Muster Point security (Integrity of TR).

5. Process security – Shut down, ESD and Blow-down if safe to blow down Shut down all prime movers Do not operate deluge.

6. Initial on scene conditions - Confirm electrical supplies isolated Monitor using fire and gas system.

7. Inform ERRV send up wind.



10. Later, on scene conditions - Confirm topsides depressurised Confirm dispersal of all gas.


12. Third parties contacted - ERRV CRO / Radio Operator call lists Aircraft with medical support.


14. If gas leak is uncontrollable then see Evacuation by Sea Plan.

15. Consider precautionary downman.




Helicopter Crash on the Helideck

1. Confirm helicopter crash.

2. Sound GPA – Confirm integrity of the TR.

3. Confirm ESD and blow-down.

4. Inform ERRV – confirm no persons in the water.

5. Process security - Consider precautionary deluge on fuel skid and chemical bund. Confirm fire pump operation. Confirm foam system on helideck activated.

6. ERT and medic to be deployed early to support the helideck fire team.

7. First aiders to prepare hospital – set up triage.

8. On scene conditions - Confirm protective foam blanket is laid. Confirm aircraft is secure on deck. Support ERT with competent personnel to secure aircraft

9. Third parties contacted - ERRV. CRO / Radio Operator call lists. Aircraft with medical support and winch facility

10. Winch down area availability for relief aircraft.

11. If fire is uncontrollable then see Evacuation by Sea plan.




Chemical Dropped Load

1. Confirm dropped load and establish – Location of the load, on platform/the standby vessel. Nature of the dropped load. COSHH data sheets.

2. Sound GPA – Confirm integrity of the TR.

3. Confirm PSD, ESD and blow-down if required.

4. Inform ERRV – confirm no persons in the water.

5. Contact supply vessel – Send to 500m zone. Confirm dropped load not on vessel. Confirm no casualties on supply vessel.

6. Process security - Operate deluge only when advised by the ERT Leader Confirm fire pump operation. Confirm process shut down.

7. ERT to be deployed when prepared for any chemical emergency.

8. Medic to prepare hospital; set up triage.

9. Inform Musters/Medic that Crane Operator may be stressed.

10. On scene conditions - Confirm correct method of containment/treatment is used. Support ERT with competent personnel to secure load.

11. Third parties contacted - ERRV and supply vessel. CRO/Radio Operator call lists. Aircraft with medical support.

12. Refer to Pollution Plan if chemicals are not contained.

13. Secure crane and quarantine for investigation.




Ship Collision

1. Confirm available data on rogue vessel.

2. Sound GPA – Muster in TR.

3. Contact ERRV who will confirm - Marine data. Plot of rogue vessel. Provide CPA and time to CPA.

4. Consider Plant status?

5. Third parties contacted - CRO/Radio Operator call lists. Aircraft for precautionary down-man.

6. Do not deploy ERT if not required.

7. Confirm availability of helideck for precautionary down-man.

8. Confirm Marine data CPA and time to CPA.

9. Confirm Evacuation by Air Plan if sufficient time exists.

10. Initiate Evacuation by Sea Plan if insufficient time to evacuate by air.

11. Confirm availability of TEMPSCs and coxswain.

12. Obtain Rendezvous Point (RVP) data and send Mayday signal.

13. Load and launch non-essential personnel lifeboats in sequence.

14. Level 0 shutdown, Hand over On Scene Command.

15. Load and launch essential personnel TEMPSC sail to RVP.




Gas Riser Loss of Containment

1. Recall PTWs in affected area.

2. Send two technicians with gas detectors to investigate if safe to do so.

3. Confirm type and origin of gas leak.

4. Muster Point security (Integrity of TR).

5. Process security - Shut Down, ESD and if safe to blow down. Shut down all prime movers. Do not operate deluge.

6. Initial on scene conditions - Confirm electrical supplies isolated Monitor using fire and gas system.

7. Inform ERRV and send up wind.



10. Later, on scene conditions - Confirm topsides depressurised Confirm dispersal of all gas.


12. Third parties contacted - ERRV. CRO/Radio Operator call lists. Aircraft with medical support.


14. If gas leak is uncontrollable then see Evacuation by Sea plan.

15. Consider precautionary down man.




Well Control Incident

1. Contact Drilling Supervisor and establish the facts and what measures are

being introduced to control the situation. 2. If contact is lost with the Drill Floor and the situation warrants action,

initiate the Well Control Procedure.

3. Sound GPA and muster all non-essential personnel within the TR.

4. Hold ERT in TR.

5. Medic to prepare Sickbay.

6. Evaluate the safety of Drilling Personnel on the Drill floor based on the current situation.

7. Stop all Hot Work.

8. Initiate electrical isolations outwith the Drill Floor.

9. Start Fire Pumps and Emergency Generator.

10. Shutdown, and if safe to do so, the Plant.

11. Notify the ERRV to start surface search and give a visual report.

12. Instruct any Supply Vessel to withdraw from 500m zone.

Contact third Parties: - Coastguard to mobilise resources.

Inform Duty Manager on-shore. Instruct Flight & Marine Log to mobilise resources. Inform Installations in the vicinity that you require assistance.

13. Consider precautionary down man of non-essential personnel.

14. Consider boundary cooling.

If conditions continue to deteriorate, recall all Drilling Personnel to the TR and implement the Installation Evacuation Procedure.




Time Out Guidance Document

RULES OF TIME OUT

PRIOR TO TIME OUT COMMENCING

1. Assess the situation and formulate your plan before calling for a Time Out.

2. Give adequate warning to your team before Time Out commences to allow them to close down communication links. Give approximately 30 seconds warning.

3. Don’t trust your memory – make a list of your action points.

4. Aim for a maximum time scale of two minutes.

DURING TIME OUT

1. Ensure full attention of all team members.

2. Maintain the discipline of the Time Out structure:-

- Call Time Out.

- Situation description.

- Potential/escalation path.

- Plan.

- Delegation of task.

- Confirm understanding.

- End Time Out.

3. Emergency calls or escalation events must be given priority by the manager if they occur during the Time Out.

Remember:

A Time Out is for you to brief your team, not for the team to brief you.




• Call “Time Out” – Ensure Full Attention

• State present situation

• State potential

• State plan

• Delegate Tasks

Check the understanding / Have I missed anything? End the Time-Out.

PEOPLE

PLANT

RESPONSE

SUPPORT

DOIM

CRO

RADIO OP

MUSTERS

KEY EVENTS

PEOPLE

PLANT




Evacuation Checklist

1 Call Evacuation Time-Out

2 Situation Situation is no longer controllable because:

3 Plan Declare plan to evacuate by lifeboat.

4 Delegation Tasks

Deputy O.I.M Withdraw all Emergency Response

Personnel to PAPA Muster Point

Radio Op Inform E.R.R.V of our intention to evacuate, and

inform them of any casualties or missing persons

Send “Mayday”.

Contact ERRV and establish RVPs for lifeboats

Muster Co-ordinator Send coxswains to check lifeboats and access routes.

Instruct all personnel to don survival suits/lifejackets.

Move all personnel down to boats, and reconcile

numbers.

5 Confirm understanding

6 OIM – Make P.A – Announce “ Evacuation Decision ” to all personnel

7 OIM – Initiate PAPA (Prepare to Evacuate platform alarm)

8 OIM – Await confirmation of numbers for all personnel at lifeboats

9 OIM - Instruct Coxswain’s to “load” all lifeboats

10 OIM - Instruct Coxswains to launch lifeboats in sequence of readiness

11 OIM – Make final P.A for any missing persons, (if necessary)

12 OIM – Final telephone call to Company House

13 OIM - Hand over command to ERRV

14 OIM – Inform ERRV that the command team are now leaving the installation

15 OIM – Self and team go to Lifeboat, collecting any documentation

16 OIM – Initiate Level Zero (0) shutdown at lifeboat




Common Terms & Abbreviations

BEACH HOME BASE - HEAD OFFICE ONSHORE

BLEVE BOILING LIQUID EXPANDING VAPOUR EXPLOSION

BOP BLOW-OUT PREVENTER

BOSIET BASIC OFFSHORE INDUCTION & EMERGENCY TRAINING

CAA CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY (UNITED KINGDOM)

CPA CLOSEST POINT OF APPROACH

CRO CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR

ECC EMERGENCY COMMAND CENTRE

ERC EMERGENCY RESPONSE CENTRE

ERP EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN

ERT EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM/FIRE TEAM

ERTL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM LEADER

ERRV / SBV EMERGENCY RESPONSE & RESCUE VESSEL / STAND BY VESSEL

ESD EMERGENCY SHUT-DOWN

ESDV EMERGENCY SHUT-DOWN -VALVE

FCP FORWARD CONTROL POINT

FRC FAST RESCUE CRAFT / GEMINI / ZODIAC

FWV FLOW WING VALVE

GPA / GA GENERAL (PLATFORM) ALARM

HDA HELI-DECK ASSISTANT

HLO HELICOPTER LANDING OFFICER

HSE HEALTH & SAFETY EXECUTIVE (UNITED KINGDOM)

IC/OSC INCIDENT CONTROLLER/ON-SCENE COMMANDER SEE ALSO ERTL

IMS INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

LEL LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT

LMGV LOWER MASTER GATE VALVE

MAYDAY INTERNATIONAL DISTRESS CALL SOS- (fr. Come help me)

MCA MARITIME COASTGUARD AGENCY

MOB MAN OVERBOARD

OIM OFFSHORE INSTALLATION MANAGER

OPITO OFFSHORE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY TRAINING ORGANISATION

PA PUBLIC ADDRESS - TANNOY

PAPA / PEPA PREPARE TO ABANDON(EVACUATE)PLATFORM

PAN-PAN DECLARING A STATE OF URGENCY

PAX PASSENGERS

POB PERSONS/PERSONNEL ON BOARD

PPE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

PTW PERMIT TO WORK

RO RADIO OPERATOR

RPE RESPONSIBLE PERSON (ELECTRICAL)

RVP RENDEZVOUS POINT

SSSV SUB-SURFACE/SEA SAFETY VALVE

TANNOY PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM

TEMPSC TOTALLY ENCLOSED MOTOR PROPELLED SURVIVAL CRAFT

TR TEMPORARY REFUGE / ACCOMMODATION

TRIAGE CASUALTY CLEARING/PRIORITISING AREA

UKDCC UNITED KINGDOM DISPATCHING CO-ORDINATION CENTRE

UK O&G UK OIL AND GAS

UMGV UPPER MASTER GATE VALVE




PHONETIC ALPHABET

A ALPHA

B BRAVO

C CHARLIE

D DELTA

E ECHO

F FOXTROT

G GOLF

H HOTEL

I INDIA

J JULIET

K KILO

L LIMA

M MIKE

N NOVEMBER

O OSCAR

P PAPA

Q QUEBEC

R ROMEO

S SIERRA

T TANGO

U UNIFORM

V VICTOR

W WHISKY

X X-RAY

Y YANKEE

Z ZULU




Notes

MEM Pre Read (1).pdf

Documents

Transcript of MEM Pre Read (1).pdf