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The Forgotten Air Force: French Air Doctrine in the 1930s - Net
Assessment - Book Review
Phillip S. Meilinger
he Forgotten Air Force! French Air "octrine in the #$%0s y Anthony
'hristopher 'ain. S(ithsonian )nstitution Press
*http!++www.sipress.si.edu, -0 /inth Street /, Suite 1%00,
ashington, ".'. 20030$0, 2002, 214 pages, 5%1.$ *hardco6er.
he rapid collapse of France in #$1033the country fell in si7 wee8s to
9er(an assault33was a tre(endous shoc8 to (ost of the world. A nu(er
of post(orte(s ha6e tried to deter(ine the precise reasons for France:s
defeat. /ow, Anthony 'hristopher 'ain, an Air Force lieutenant colonel
recently appointed editor of Air and Space Power Journal, has e7a(ined
the French air force and the role it played in the deacle. 'ain does this y
re6iewing the Ar(ee de l:Air in the interwar period, concluding that French
air(en were uffeted y a succession of political uphea6als and the
(achinations of a resentful and co6etous ar(y and na6y. As a result, the
air(en adopted a policy of ;reacti6e defense;33that is, they ac8nowledged
the defensi6e and war3weary (ood of the French politicians and ar(y,
therey consciously adopting a path that would fit air policy into these
defensi6e (odes. his pro6ed unwise.
he French air force was the world:s largest and (ost powerful when
orld ar ) ended in #$#4. Although not a separate ser6ice, it
nonetheless en<oyed a certain prestige for its e7cellent perfor(ance
during the war. hings soon deteriorated, howe6er. "e(oili=ation hit the
air ar( particularly hard, partly ecause the ar(y officers in charge ga6e
preference in funding to ground forces and euip(ent. )n addition, French
politicians reflected the (ood of the people, who were increasingly fearful
of and pessi(istic aout a 9er(an resurgence. "efense policy, readily
supported y the ar(y, increasingly focused on a defensi6e stance in the
east. he Maginot ?ine would stand as an i(pregnale and concrete
trench when the 9er(ans returned. Air theory, which in France stressed
the offensi6e and re6olutionary nature of strategic air attac8 *as it did in
@ritain, the nited States, and )taly, was distinctly unwelco(e in such a
passi6e en6iron(ent. B6en when the air force eca(e a separate ser6ice
in #$%%, air(en thoug ht it wise to focus on supporting ground forces.
)ronically, war would show that they did not handle that (ission
particularly well either.
 
'ain argues that Pierre 'ot, air (inister for (uch of the #$%0s, reali=ed
the danger of such a stance and atte(pted to correct it through a
6igorous effort at doctrine for(ulation, reorgani=ation of the aircraft
industry, (ore realistic war ga(es and e7ercises, and a roust training
estalish(ent. nfortunately, his efforts went for naught. As war
approached, the ar(y tightened its grip on the airforce, and y #$10
ground co((anders again controlled all air assets. 'ot:s efforts at
refor(ing the French a6iation industry (et with a si(ilar fate. B6en in the
face of a loo(ing 9er(an threat, co(panies could not e induced to
strea(line and (oderni=e. hen the 9er(an tidal wa6e hit in May #$10,
the aircraft a6ailale were too few and too slow. hus, France in #$10
ser6es as the classic e7a(ple of how ad strategy and policy decisions
can ha6e catastrophic results.
)n truth, the challenges faced y the French air force etween the world
wars were not uniue. )n oth @ritain and the nited States, udget cuts
too8 a se6ere toll on the air ar(s. )n @ritain, for e7a(ple, the Coyal Air
Force *CAF recei6ed on a6erage a (ere # percent of the defense
udget, and in the nited States, the Air 'orps had an e6en s(aller
share. Si(ilarly, the CAF found itself constantly under attac8 fro( the
ar(y and na6y which sought to disestalish the CAF as a separate ser6ice
and ta8e ac8 the airplanes they had lost in #$#4. )n the nited States, of 
course, the Ar(y fir(ly controlled its Air 'orps and uashed ail tal8 of a
separate ser6ice. )n addition, @ritain33and to a far lesser e7tent, the
nited States33had to (eet the needs of i(perial defense with a series of
go6ern(ents far (ore interested in disar(a(ent than rear(a(ent. Det,
the CAF and Air 'orps (anaged to articulate a doctrine of strategic
airpower that would see the( through the war. hat happened in FranceE
'ain does not tell us the French air force:s share of the defense udget
etween the wars or e6en its aircraft and personnel strength. /or do we
learn what role the Staff 'ollege and ar 'ollege played in educating *as
opposed to training students for future war. e are nonetheless left with
the clear i(pression that the French air force suffered fro( a re(ar8ale
lac8 of effecti6e and forceful leaders during the interwar period. he oo8
(a8es no (ention of do(inant co((anders li8e ugh renchardG rale3
rousers li8e @illy Mitchell, who put ser6ice ao6e selfG or e6en the type of
dri6en and creati6e officers at the CAF Staff 'ollege and the Air 'orps
actical School, who for(ulated a doctrine of strategic o(ing33despite
what the other ser6ices and politicians said aout that (ethod of war.
hen French ar(y generals (ade de(ands, air leaders folded. 'ain
concludes that the leaders of the French air force were not decadent,
traitorous, or stupid. Perhaps not, ut neither do they appear to ha6e
een selfless , 6isionary, or rilliant.
he Forgotten Air Force is a good oo8 with so(e 6ery i(portant lessons.
he French air force went fro( first to last in a re(ar8aly short period of 
ti(e. ?eadership33(ore accurately, the lac8 of it33pro6ed instru(ental in
 
culti6ating the types of leaders and thin8ers who will ensure our readiness
for future conflict.
'HPDC)9 2001 9ale 9roup