MECHANICAL DAMAGE: HOW BIG IS THE PROBLEM ? A … · ¾Accident occured during a planned pipeline...
Transcript of MECHANICAL DAMAGE: HOW BIG IS THE PROBLEM ? A … · ¾Accident occured during a planned pipeline...
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MECHANICAL DAMAGE: HOW BIG IS THE PROBLEM ?A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
Mechanical Damage Workshop: February 29th, March 1st, 2006
GAZ DE FRANCER&D DIVISION
February 28th, 2006
Dr. Murès ZAREA, Gas Facilities Development Manager
Gaz de France R&D Division
Chairman EPRG Design Committe
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1. How frequent is Mechanical Damage in Europe? Indications from the EGIG database
2. EPRG R&D contributions to handle this threat
3. Ghislenghien July 30, 2004 (prepared by J. Duhart)
4. Summary & Conclusions
GAZ DE FRANCER&D DIVISION
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1. How frequent is Mechanical Damage in Europe?Indications from the EGIG database
GAZ DE FRANCER&D DIVISION
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Mechanical Damage - How Big Is the Problem ?
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
What « metrics » to use for such a threat?
Risk = occurrence frequency x consequences
Consequences scale with the amount of released hydrocarbons
Occurrence of rare events is difficult to evaluate
Sufficiently large pipeline exposure (length x time) is needed in order to pool data, and provide reliable occurrence frequency figures
Incident data bases need also to be consistent in terms of technology and environment
Examples of Data bases : US DOT, EGIG, CONCAWE, ENSAD, etc.
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The 6th EGIG Report 1970 – 2004, December 2005
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
EGIG = European Gas Pipeline Incident Group
Started in 1982 with 6 gas transmission operators, now 12European major gas transmission system operators:
• DONG - Denmark• ENAGAS – Spain• FLUXYS – Belgium• GASUM – Finland• Gasunie – Netherlands• GRTgaz – France• E.ON Ruhrgas – Germany• SNAM Retegas – Italy• SWISSGAS – Switzerland• NATIONAL GRID – UK• RWE TRANSGAS – Czech Republic• TRANSGAS - Portugal
Website: www.EGIG.nl
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EGIG data base - Criteria for incident definition
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
Incident led to an unintentional gas release
Pipelines:• Onshore• Steel• Design pressure > 15 bar (218 psig)• Located outside fences of installations
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EGIG data base - Contents
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
Pipeline data – MAOP, D, t, grade, coating, depth of cover, age
Incident data:
• Leak size – Pinhole/crack, d < 2 cm (0.79"); Hole, 2 cm < d < D; Rupture, d > D• Cause – External interference, corrosion, Construction defect / material failure, Hot tap by error, Ground movement, Other / unknown• Ignition – occurred or not• Consequences• How it was detected – contractor, patrol, landowner, etc.• Free text for additional information
Additional information on causes, e.g.• External interference – activity causing the incident, equipment involved, installed protective measures
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The 6th EGIG Report 1970 – 2004, Definitions & …
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
Network length: 122 168 km, i.e. 75 912 miles
Exposure: length of a pipeline x exposed duration = > 2.77 million km x years, i.e. 1.72 106 miles x years
Failure frequency = Number of incidents / System exposure
To distinguish safety improvements, a moving average over the last 5 years is used
Step changes in length in 1975, 1991, 1998 and 2003 are due to new members joining
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The 6th EGIG Report - Network description
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
Most common pipelines are in the 5" to 16" range
D 18" account now for half the population, rather than a third in the ‘70
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The 6th EGIG Report - Network description
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
Most commonly used wall thickness 5 – 10 mm (0.197" to 0.394")
All wall thickness classes increase linearly, except 0 – 5 mm, constant since 2001
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The 6th EGIG Report – Primary Failure Frequencies
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
Annual number of incidents is variable, averaging yields an improvement trend
Failure frequency over the last 5 years is less than half that of the entire period (0.11 / 1000 miles.yr vs. 0.25 / 1000 miles.yr)
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The 6th EGIG Report – Primary Failure Frequencies
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
Confidence intervals are calculated assuming a Poisson distribution of incidents (classical distribution for « rare events »)The global failure frequency is decaying steadily since the mid ‘70Failure frequency 1970-2004 = 0.41/1000 km.yr, 95% confidence interval of 0.02Failure frequency 2000-2004 = 0.17/1000 km.yr, 95% confidence interval of 0.03
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The 6th EGIG Report – Distribution per Cause
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
External interference accounts for the largest part of incidents - 50 %
Corrosion & Construction defects / material failures: 15 – 17 %The three other causes are marginal, around 7 % and below
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The 6th EGIG Report – Distribution per Cause
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
Failure frequencies for all causes are decaying over the last two decades
External interference is the fastest decaying cause on average
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The 6th EGIG Report – Distribution per Cause
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
External interference shows four periods on the 5 years moving average plot: initial fast decay until ’77, one decade of stabilization, followed by a decade of significant decrease, and again stabilization since ’98 at a third of the value of the preceding plateau
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The 6th EGIG Report – Relation Cause – Damage Size
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
Larger leaks (holes & ruptures) are mainly due to external interference, which is also the most frequent cause (50 % of incidents)External interference activities causing most incidents are: excavators’ digging
(39%), drainage works (8 %), public works (8 %), activities related to agriculture (8 %)
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The 6th EGIG Report – Relation Failures – Diameter
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
Small diameter pipelines are more vulnerable than larger diameter pipelinesThey can be more easily hooked up, and have thinner walls
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The 6th EGIG Report – Relation Failures – Cover
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
A 21 % decrease in incident frequency can be achieved through deeper burial
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The 6th EGIG Report – Relation Consequence – Thickness
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
While the 5 – 10 mm thickness is the most widely used class (> 40 %), it is the 0 – 5 mm class that is the most vulnerableA thicker pipe provides therefore a protection against external interference
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The 6th EGIG Report – Incident detection
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
The public is closest to pipelines on a year-long basis, so it is the prime detector Patrols are efficient, second best
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The 6th EGIG Report – Ignition probability
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
In the period 1970 – 2004, only 4.1 % of the EGIG reported releases ignitedData base provides a link between size of leak and ignition probabilitiesRuptures of large diameter pipelines have the highest likelihood of leading
to an ignited release, but they are also very rare events
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The 2003 CONCAWE Report – Oil Pipelines
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
Covers 36 422 km (22 632 miles) onshore oil pipelines from 65 European companies& other bodies, followed since 1971, and monitors spills, their causes, consequences and clean-up costs, ILI inspection
Spills frequency: • 0.27 spills / 1000 km.yr (0.17 / 1000 mi.yr) in 2003 vs. • 0.53 spills / 1000 km.yr (0.33 / 1000 mi.yr) long-term average over 1971 - 2003
Causes:• Third party actions • Natural hazard• Corrosion• Operational• Mechanical
Third party actions 1st cause
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2. EPRG R&D contributions to handle this threat
GAZ DE FRANCER&D DIVISION
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EPRG – European Pipeline Research Group
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
Established since 35 years
Uniquely combines 10 European gas transmission operators and 10 European Pipeline manufacturers
Performs R&D in the area of steel transmission pipelines, in order to improve their safety and quality
Three committees : Materials, Corrosion, Design
Organizes together with PRCI and APIA a Joint Technical Meeting every two years, in order to improve information exchange between research communities in this specific area
Example publications: recommendations for fracture arrest, weld defects, mechanical damage, etc.
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EPRG Methods to assess resistance of pipelines to Mechanical Damage
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
R&D effort lasted for more than a decade, and was concluded by a set of two papers published in 3R International, 12/1999 (Roovers, Zarea et al.)
Underlying models are based on mechanics or semi-empirical models and are validated by experimental results; their application range is explicitly indicated
Part 1 : Assessing the remaining burst and fatigue strength of part-wall mechanical damage defects:
• Gouges• Dents• Dent and gouge combinations
Part 2 : Assessing pipeline resistance to mechanical damage:• Puncture resistance• Aggression capacities of excavators
These results are used in everyday operating practice in Europe
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EPRG – Work went on in the MD arena, e. g.:
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
Hooking of pipelines
Behavior of gouges in low toughness pipes, complementary to PRCI work on corrosion defects on low toughness pipes
Update the burst strength model for dent and gouge combinations to incorporate nowadays improved knowledge of this complex problem – and decrease the scatter of the model
There is an opportunity to coordinate with PRCI work on this subject
EPRG contractors work also for PRCI: Advantica, CSM, Gaz de France R&D Division, …
PRCI contractors work also for EPRG: C-FER, …
Five operator companies are members of both organizations – they can contribute to specific collaboration projects
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3. Accident on HP gas transmission pipeline in Ghislenghien July 30, 2004 (Belgium)
GAZ DE FRANCER&D DIVISION
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Main information
Accident occured during a planned pipeline maintenance shutdown, resultingin pressure increase above the value at which the damage was inflicted.
Defect failure resulted in a leak, producing a gas cloud, that caught fire after transition to rupture
Defects were introduced by a subcontracted soil stabilizing work needed to build an access road to a new parking lot, for the new Diamant Boart factory
The operator had reviewed the yard with the contractor
Depth of cover was reduced due to ground leveling
Operation of a soil stabilizing equipment does not give any view of what happens beneath the soil surface
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Pipeline DN 1000 – 40"Wall Thickness 12.7 mm – 0.5"Piece 11 m – 36 ft longWeighs about 6 tons
Defect n°1
Defect n°2Residual thickness 4 mm – 0.16"
Defect n°3
Defects on piece of broken pipe
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Defect n°3
Defect n°2
Defect n°1
Defects on piece of broken pipe
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Defect n°1
Close-up of Defect n° 1
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Close-ups of Defect n° 2
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Close-up of Defect n° 3
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Example of soil stabilizing equipement for road construction
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Site map: factories and pipeline
J.S.Packaging
ParkingDiamantBoart
STIERNON
Fast
Track
40" Pipeline
Rupture
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The crater
DN900
DN1000
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The crater
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The crater
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J.S Packaging
DiamantBoart
Highway
Aerial view of the area from the south
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Aerial view of the area from the south west
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Aerial view of the area from the south east
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Aerial view of the area from the north east
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East entrance to Diamant Boart
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Wheat field to the east of Diamant Boart
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East entrance to Diamant Boart
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Aerial view of Diamant Boart from south east
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Construction crane
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North west entrance to Diamant Boart parking
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Diamant Boart parking seen from north west
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Aerial view of JS Packaging from north west
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JS Packaging seen from north west
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Deformation of building structure @ 150 m to south east of crater
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Burnt down vehicles (not localized)
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Burnt down vehicles (not localized)
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Damaged vehicle : molten plastics and blisteredpaint (@ 160 m – 524 ft towards north east)
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Damaged vehicle : molten plastics (@ 400 m – 1312 ft towards west)
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Damaged vehicle : molten plastics (@ 400 m – 1312ft towards west)
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Burnt vegetation
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Gas plume seen from 10 km to the north (withcondensation in the atmosphere)
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Gas plume seen from the south (with condensation in the atmosphere)
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Flame
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Flame seen from south
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Flame seen from north west on highway
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Flame seen from the south
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Flame seen from the south
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Flame seen from the south
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Flame seen from the south
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Flame seen from the north
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Flame seen from the south east
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Reduced flame seen from highway
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First aid
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First aid
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First aid
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U37 marker post (south east of crater)
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Valve station (not localized)
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Inspection of pipeline (DN 900 – 36"or DN1000 - 40")
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Analysis of accident effets
Effects of overpressure
Effects of thermal radiation
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Observed effects due to overpressure phenomena
Effects on people : 3 persons projected at 200 m – 656 ft to the east of the crater
Effects on buildings : damaged concrete structure of Diamant Boart factory
Projections of objects on several hundreds of meters (pipe segment found at 150 m – 492 ft)
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Overpressure phenomena
Overpressure due to pipeline rupture• Several bars within meters, very close to rupture• Quick attenuation with distance
Overpressure due to gas ignition
• GDF Risk assessment package « Persée » calculations : 33 mbar (0.48 psi) maximum, 20 mbar (0.29 psi) @ 392m and 10 mbar (0.145 psi) @ 888 m
• Limited consequences
First phenomenon dominated
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Thermal radiation effects observed
Effects on people :
• 22 persons present at the Diamant Boart site when the rupture occured, within 200m, died. (Out of 22, 3 were projected & 6 passed away later due to their injuries)
• About 130 persons injured by severe burns
Effects on structures :
• Two factories burnt• Metallic structure deformed on nearby building • Several cars burnt within 150 m – 492 ft• Vehicle plastics meltdown within 400 m – 1312 ft
Burnt vegetation within 250m – 820 ft
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4. Summary & Conclusions
GAZ DE FRANCER&D DIVISION
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Summary & conclusions
GAZ DE FRANCE R&D DIVISION
« Metrics » provided by existing incident data bases on HP pipelines, although perfectible, are of great practical value to assess the different « dimensions » of such a complex problem
Good news are that HP pipelines are globally safe, and that in addition, the overall failure frequency has steadily decreased since the ’70, but further progress can be achieved
While mechanical damage is the most important single cause of leaks in HP pipelines, it has consistently and significantly decreased over the last three decades, and for gas pipelines, more than any other cause
This fact shows a continuous and effective commitment from gas transmission operators to deal with this subject
A thorough understanding of the wide and complex nature of this subject is necessary to go on improving even further the current status, and structured field feed-back (statistics and case-studies) as well as R&D, new technology, and improved communication are complementary means to achieve this goal