Meaning of Leisure

7/25/2019 Meaning of Leisure

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Leisure Sciences, 22:93107, 2000

Copyright C 2000 Taylor & Francis

0149-0400/00 $12.00 + .00

Ways of Learning about Leisure Meanings

MICHAEL WATKINS

School of Leisure Studies

Grifth University

Nathan, Queensland, Australia

This article examines the epistemological claims made by four paradigms used to study

leisure meanings: behaviorism, cognitivism, individual constructivism, and social con-structivism.These paradigms represent diverse and contrasting theoretical explanationsof how individuals gain knowledge about and give meaning to the phenomenon of leisure

and of how these meanings differ and change. Analysis of each paradigm illustrates lim-itations in their capacity to explain how individuals learn about leisure and suggests the

need for alternative explanations. Arguments are advanced in favor of an experientialistparadigm characterized by a research specialization called phenomenography as an

additional and complementary theoretical approach to studying the multiple meaningsof leisure.

Keywords leisure meanings, leisure experiences, behaviorism, cognitivism, construc-

tivism, phenomenography

The purpose of this article is to frame the analysis of leisure meanings within the discourse

of learning theory and to answer three questions:

1. How do individuals gain knowledge about and form a meaning of leisure?

2. How do individuals form different meanings of leisure?

3. How do individuals change their meanings of leisure?

These questions are based on two assumptions: Individuals form a meaning of leisure

from knowledge learned about the phenomenon, and individuals have the capacity to learn

different leisure meanings. Given the validity of these assumptions, it may be inferred that

various accounts of leisure meanings reported in the literature correspond with different

theoretical explanations of how individuals learn about leisure.

How individuals learn is an epistemological question in which attention is directed

toward determining not only the nature and sources of knowledge but also the strengths

and weaknesses of particular ways of knowing. To this end, four theoretical paradigms of

learning are described in terms of their respective accounts of learning and then illustratedwith examples drawn from research on leisure meanings. These paradigms are referred to as

behaviorism, cognitivism, individual constructivism, and social constructivism (after Bower

& Hilgard, 1981; Bredo, 1993; Marton & Booth, 1997; Reynolds, Sinatra, & Jetton, 1996).

Received 25 July 1999; accepted 14 January 2000.

The author wishes to thank Ference Marton from the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, and Ray Hibbins

from Grifth University, Australia, for their insightful contributions during the preparation of the paper. A draft

version of the paper was presented at the Fourth Conference of the Australian and New Zealand Association for

Leisure Studies, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand, January, 1999.

Address correspondence to Michael Watkins, School of Leisure Studies, Grifth University, Nathan,Queensland 4111, Australia. E-mail: [email protected]

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94 M. Watkins

Particular reference is made to the viability of the epistemological assumptions or claims

each paradigm makes in relation to the acquisition of knowledge and to their accounts of

difference and change in knowledge. Thus, the central question guiding this review is How

do individuals learn their meanings of leisure?

To foreshadow the answer to this question, I contend that the four paradigms provide

only partial explanations of how people learn about leisure. This problem suggests the need

to consider alternative explanations, and, subsequently, I present an additional paradigm

of learning as a possible way forward. This paradigm is referred to as the experientialist

paradigm and is characterized by a research specialization called phenomenography.

The approach adopted in this article contrasts with previous reviews that have typically

focused on methodological aspects of studying leisure meanings(e.g., Burton, 1996; Ellis

& Witt, 1991; Harper, 1981; Hemingway; 1995, Howe, 1990; Mannell, 1980; Mannell &

Iso-Ahola, 1987). Although these reviews have made important and varying contributions

toward analyzing the epistemological assumptions of methods used to study leisure, thepresent review aims to complement and extend this work by analyzing the epistemological

claims of theories about how individuals learn to experience their meanings of leisure.

Given the a priori status of human experience over the methods used to study experience,

analysis of the formation of meanings as a learned experience represents a justied and as

yet unreported approach toward clarifying some of the denitional issues surrounding the

study of leisure.

In presenting the review, the readers attention is drawn to several limitations. First,

although the paradigms represent major theoretical differences among various explanations

of learning, they are in fact composed of several related theories that sometimes overlap withtheories forming other paradigms. For example, some aspects of behaviorism are included

in some cognitivist theories, and some aspects of cognitivism are present in some construc-

tivist theories(cf. Cobb, 1994; Overskeid, 1995). In this review, overlap is acknowledged

as evidence of the interrelatedness among paradigms and is dealt with by emphasizing

their essential differences while simultaneously viewing their existence as a coalition of

approaches that permit their respective epistemological foundations to be compared(after

Shaw, 1998).

Second, the process of linking a particular study of leisure meanings to a particular

paradigm requires the reviewer to interpret the theoretical basis of the study and to thenallocate it to a relevant paradigm. In some cases, this is readily achieved where researchers

have identied the theoretical basis of their work. This process is limited in many cases,

however, given that much of the research on leisure meanings is either atheoretical or

theoretically ambiguous in nature. In these situations, my approach has been to make an

informed judgment about the theoretical orientation of a particular study, for example, by

analyzing the researchers vocabulary and by contrasting the purpose and results of the

study with similar and different studies.

A third limitation is that this review draws from Western intellectual traditions of

knowledge and as a result excludes non-Western ideas. Hultsman (1995) and Ibrahim (1982),

for example, have respectively offered Taoist and Islamic explanations and, in doing so,

have suggested how culturally divergent perspectives of leisure are based on different views

of intellectual thought. Although these and other explanations might provide a richer source

of comparison, their inclusion is beyond the scope of this article.

The Behaviorist Paradigm of Learning

Behaviorism can be traced to the ideas of empirical philosophers such as Locke (1690/1995)

and James Mill(1829) and to learning theories proposed by Thorndike (1931), Watson(1924), and Skinner(1957), among others. The common theme among these scholars is


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Learning about Leisure 95

that individuals acquire knowledge about a stimulus event through sensory experience

gained from external information sources(e.g., from family, friends, or the media)and by

associating the stimulus with a particular behavioral response. When behavior such as a

verbal response is repeatedly reinforced, it may become habitual to the point that the verbal

contents(i.e., the words)of the response infer meaning for the individual. Differences in

meaning are subsequently operationalized as variations in the content of verbal habits and

are attributed to different histories of reinforcement. Changes in meaning represent the

acquisition of a modied set of verbal habits that enable individuals to comply with the

demands of their environments.

Behaviorist theory has received limited empirical attention from leisure researchers,

with the most notable contributions being made by Mobily (1989) and Mobily and Bedford(1993). On the basis of Nobles (1952) theory of association, Mobily interpreted a meaning

of leisure as the habit strength of words semantically associated with or used as synonyms

for a given stimulus word (e.g., leisure, play, or work). Response words associated withleisureincluded fun, relaxing, sleeping, and TV, whereas workwas related to terms such

as hard, money, labor, and cleaning. Although not using the word leisure, a comparison

of elderly male and female respondents verbal meanings of the word playin Mobily and

Bedfords study indicated some minor but insignicant differences.

Although the strength of the behaviorist paradigm appears to be its ability to elaborate

the commonly held words used by individuals to denote leisure, behaviorist explanations

suffer from several weaknesses. Most important, the claim that meanings are acquired from

the environment and conditioned by external agents rejects the possibility that individuals

can learn through conscious thought or insight (Bredo, 1993). In effect, individuals areportrayed as passive and compliant recipients who simply absorb ideas obtained from

external sources and respond uncritically to them (Reynolds et al., 1996). This view therefore

contrasts with alternative conceptions such as that individuals are independent and free-

thinking agents capable of generating their own existentially relevant meanings of leisure.

Furthermore, the failure of behaviorism to attribute the formation of meanings to in-

dividuals cognitive capabilities raises the issue of whether behaviorism is capable of dis-

cerning anything other than broad and supercial differences in meanings. This issue is

highlighted by the fact that the paradigm cannot account for the semantic meanings of the

response words, nor for more deeply held psychological meanings(Bredo, 1993). Yet suchinformation may be necessary to distinguish subtle qualitative variations that can turn the

meaning of the word leisureinto an evocation of pleasure and power on the one hand or of

boredom and powerlessness on the other hand.

The contention that repeated and therefore stable histories of reinforcement are re-

quired to form verbal habits limits the capacity of the paradigm to explain how meanings

might change in anything other than a kind of slow evolutionary process, and only then as

determined by the inuence of external agents. Although this may be how change operates,

the idea of forming habits reduces the possibility that meanings can change in response to

immediate short-term situational inuences or that individuals are capable of knowing how

to dene novel or ambiguous situations. These situations might occur when individuals

move into a new social group or when leisure is seen to overlap with other aspects of life

such as in work and family situations.

Finally, the application of the paradigm is based on the assumption that stimulus words

are used in everyday language and shared by all members of the community. However,

a number of leisure scholars have pointed out that the word leisure does not appear in

everyday language(e.g., Anderson, 1975; Burden, 1997), whereas others have questioned

its appropriateness in relation to particular social groups such as women and some non-

Anglo subcultures(e.g., Chick, 1998; Wearing & Wearing, 1988). This assumption further

highlights limitations with using behaviorism to account for leisure meanings.


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96 M. Watkins

The Cognitivist Paradigm of Learning

Whereas behaviorists have claimed that knowledge is acquired from ideas obtained outside

the individual, cognitive learning theorists have claimed that knowledge is acquired from

within the mind(e.g., Bruner, 1960; Chomsky, 1957; Simon, 1957 ). Individuals then use

this knowledge to help them make sense of phenomena that they initially take as beingunstructured or undifferentiated(Bower & Hilgard, 1981). Although cognitivists conceptu-

alize knowledge in different ways(e.g., as personality dispositions, dimensions of contrast,

schemas, or rules), the contents of these mental representations are claimed to provide the

basis for determining the meanings of a phenomenon. According to Markova (1991), this

view is based on the rationalist philosophy of Plato and Descartes. Central to the ideas of

these philosophers is the claim that knowledge exists as an innate and eternal set of uni-

versal forms or essences in the mind of a person, in the environment (i.e., in the minds or

behaviors of other individuals), or in both. Differences in meaning can be realized in terms

of individuals possessing higher or lower amounts of a particular disposition or a more orless developed set of dimensions, schemas, or rules and appear to be related to variations

in individuals genetic characteristics. Changes in meaning represent the acquisition of a

more universally accepted representation and attaining new knowledge by learning to apply

the representation to recognize similar and dissimilar phenomena.

Leisure meanings research exemplifying the cognitivist approach includes Neulingers(1974) leisure paradigm, Iso-Aholas (1976, 1979) description of the inuence of personality

dispositions in forming leisure meanings, Mannells(1984)leisure as self-entertainment

concept, Weissinger and Iso-Aholas(1984) exposition of intrinsic motivation, and Ellis

and Witts(1986)Leisure Diagnostic Battery. Although it is somewhat harder to classify

the epistemological bases of empirical studies conducted by Pierce (1980); Unger and

Kernan (1983); Kleiber, Larson, and Csikszentmihalyi(1986); and Gunter(1987), these

authors respective characterizations of leisure appear consistent with the cognitivist goal

of locating a universal representation of leisure.

Iso-Aholas(1976, 1980)ideas are particularly relevant to consider as they provide an

extensive exposition of a cognitivist explanation of leisure meanings and reect the work

of many earlier and contemporary leisure scholars. In proposing a theoretical basis for the

denition of leisure, Iso-Ahola drew on the work of attribution theorists (e.g., H. Kelly, 1973)to suggest that individuals acquire knowledge about leisure on the basis of dispositional

characteristics that they attribute to their own behavior or observe in other individuals

behavior. Iso-Ahola(1980) also asserted that denitions of leisure situations are determined

by a number of common dimensions that hold true of people, situation and time (p. 186)

and, elsewhere, that some aspects of social behavior are universal and enduring(p. 20).

For Iso-Ahola and many other cognitive researchers, these dispositions or dimensions are

identied as perceived freedom of choice, intrinsic motivation, and perceived control or

competence (cf. Mannell & Kleiber, 1997). Thus, despite claiming to reject approaches

that aim to discover the generalizable and static characteristics of human behavior, andwhile emphasizing the dialectical and changing nature of human beings, the essence of the

cognitivists claim seems to be that leisure meanings are largely innate and xed.

By emphasizing the importance of the mind, cognitivism appears to offer a more

independent role for individuals with respect to learning about leisure meanings com-

pared with behaviorism. Moreover, the success with which cognitivist researchers appear

to have achieved consistency in terms of conceptualizing and operationalizing the common

determinants of leisure situations adds credibility to their theoretical explanation. While

acknowledging the signicant body of knowledge built on these contributions, cognitive

explanations of leisure meanings are subject to a number of criticisms.


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By claiming to have identied the common determinants of leisure, cognitivism of-

fers an explanation of the antecedents that causally determine situations to be recognized

as leisure. However, this is not the same as dening the conceptual meaning of leisure

experiences per se. Moreover, although cognitivism adopts the view that individuals can

subjectively determine the meaning of particular situations, Dreyfuss (1972)pointed out

that the paradigm presupposes a xed way of dening these situations at their base struc-

ture. Consequently, it is difcult to understand how individuals can acquire their own unique

representations or negotiate or redene the contents of their representations. Thus, like the

behaviorist, the cognitivists explanation is problematic because it too characterizes indi-

viduals as relatively compliant learners who take the meaning of leisure situations as being

initially dened.

The cognitivist paradigm also fails to explain where representations acquire their initial

semantic status. Put another way, if individuals obtain undifferentiated sense data in relation

to a situation and then use an already acquired internal representation to confer meaningto that situation, then from where do the contents of the representation derive their original

meaning? The basis of the cognitivist position suggests that the derivation of leisure dimen-

sions emanates from phylogenetic coding, either through direct inheritance or through the

absorption of ideas from other individuals and from there into the genes as naturally selected

dispositions. Although this may be a valid claim, the explanation highlights the cognitivists

propensity for ignoring the potential structuring inuences of immediate personal and so-

cial contexts on meanings. Furthermore, the claim also suggests that meanings might have

transhistorical properties that are independent of ongoing and broader cultural changes, a

point that is disputed by those who contend that meanings are socially conditioned andhistorically situated (e.g., Hemingway, 1995; Rojek,1995).

If the claim that meanings are genetically determined is taken seriously, then the cogni-

tivist explanation of differences in meaning implies that denitions of leisure situations are

largely invariant across human experience. More precisely, cognitivism can only logically

account for differences in numerical or quantitative terms, such as how much of a situation is

perceived to be like or unlike leisure or that members of one subgroup have higher or lower

levels of a particular disposition compared with another subgroup. The problem with this

explanation is that it offers a narrow conceptualization of difference by excluding the pos-

sibility that people can hold multiple representations of the same situation or that differentrepresentations might be described as being qualitatively dissimilar (cf. Freysinger, 1995).

To change the meaning of a given situation (e.g., from leisure to nonleisure), an individ-

ual would need to select an appropriate representation in order to come to a decision about

the denition of that situation. How then do individuals know how to retrieve and apply

the correct representation? Some scholars have pointed out that conceptualizing knowledge

as a mental representation implies the need for a representation to handle the selection of

representations of a situation(e.g., Reynolds et al., 1996; Costall & Still, 1991 ). However,

this further implies the need for a representation to handle the representation that handles

the selection of representations of situations, and so on, ad innitum. This idea ultimately

leads to the questionable proposition that humans come equipped with a homunculus, or a

small human in the head, and that this entity operates the selection of an appropriate repre-

sentation in much the same way as computers mindlessly process information according to

preestablished operating instructions.

The Individual Constructivist Paradigm of Learning

In comparison with behaviorism and cognitivism, individual constructivism proposes that

knowledge is not passively acquired from the outside world or implanted as an a priori


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98 M. Watkins

representation in the mind but is constructed by the minds ability to actively explore and

develop its own meaningful accounts of phenomena. The source of knowledge is gener-

ated from individuals previous and concurrent interactions with their social and physical

environments and through their ability to reason about and symbolically transform these

interactions into personally constructed interpretations. Knowledge of a phenomenon is

subsequently represented as a conceptual or symbolic interpretation that conveys mean-

ing for the individual. Differences in meaning are characterized as different interpretations

of the same phenomenon and are related to variations in individuals conceptual abilities.

Changes in meaning are understood as the ability to develop more complex interpretations

that t with individuals changing needs.

The major theoretical contributions to this paradigm are found in Piagets (1983) genetic

epistemology, von Glasersfelds (1995)radical constructivism, the Mead-Blumer theory of

symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969; Mead, 1934), and George Kellys(1963)personal

construct theory. The philosophical basis of the paradigm has been attributed to ideas ofHegel(Markova, 1991). It is worth mentioning some of Hegels key ideas as they help

to elaborate the individual constructivist paradigm, or what is sometimes called cognitive

constructivism, and to distinguish the paradigm from the traditional version of cognitivism

presented earlier.

Both the Platonic-Cartesian and Hegelian frameworks are based on the idea of uni-

versals, although universals are theoretically treated in quite different ways. As described

in the cognitivist paradigm, universals are static and eternal entities, generalizable across

individuals, and serve as the basis for determining the meanings of a phenomenon. In com-

parison, Hegel described universals as dynamic entities that are a product of interactionsbetween individuals; they can be both individually and collectively distributed, and they

correspond with the direct conceptual denitions of a phenomenon. From this latter per-

spective, individuals learn about a phenomenon by comparing it to other phenomena, and

there is no end point to development because they can learn new knowledge and consider

the phenomenon from other conceptual perspectives. Thus, whereas the Platonic-Cartesian

framework emphasizes learning as the process of discovering or recollecting eternal forms

of knowledge that are ontologically independent of the learner, the Hegelian view stresses

the development and agency of learners who ontologically evolve with changing forms of

knowledge that they themselves can create(Markova, 1991).Empirical support for an individual constructivist interpretation of leisure meanings

appears in studies by Brook(1993); Lee, Datillo, and Howard(1994); Roadburg(1983);

Samdahl(1992); and Shaw(1985). For example, Shaw postulated the denition of leisure

as a mentalistic or subjective phenomenon that arises out of interaction and to be a function

of individuals capacities to symbolically transform or modify their interpretations of these

interactions. Shaw also asserted that meanings possess a dynamic quality for individuals in

that they can be redened, but they may also be shared and represent a stable conguration

for both an individual and groups within a society. The results of Shaws study demonstrated

that perceived choice, intrinsic motivation, enjoyment, relaxation, and lack of evaluation

were important dimensions dening leisure situations. Subgroup comparisons based on

the family structure, age, employment, and occupational status of the study respondents

indicated a high level of shared meaning.

By focusing on the individuals role in making his or her own existentially relevant

meanings, individual constructivism suggests a tenable theoretical account of the formation

of meanings if one subscribes to the primacy of human agency over external or innately

determined sources of knowledge. Some critics,however, have pointed out that if knowledge

of a phenomenon is a product of an individuals unique interpretation, then how is it possible

for one individual to truly know what another individual means when engaged in the act


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of communication(e.g., Gergen, 1995; Hardy & Taylor, 1997)? As suggested by Schwandt(1994), the logical extension of this idea is that meanings are solipsistic constructions

belonging only to the individual constructor and cannot be intersubjectively shared (cf.

Glancy, 1993, for a counterexample to this argument).

Relying on sociodemographic comparisons to determine differences in meaning as

used in individual constructivist accounts of leisure is epistemologically inconsistent if

one accepts the claim that individuals interpret and make sense out of their own unique

experiences. Rojeks(1995, p. 104)statement that we cannot assume that all car workers

and waitresses see the world in the same way and Burtons (1996)caution against the

overuse of sociodemographic indices in leisure research highlight the nature of this problem

for individual constructivist explanations.

Additionally, some scholars(e.g., Gergen, 1995; Ogborn, 1997)have contended that

individual constructivism promotes the relativist position of democratizing different mean-

ings such that one individuals meanings are viewed as as good as any other and providesno basis for being able to critically compare different meanings(Schwandt, 1994). On this

point, it is timely to recall the advice of the Greek philosopher Socrates in his deliberations

on the matter of relativism. According to Socrates, relativist views are intellectually intol-

erable because they lead to a confusion of thought and are morally reprehensible because

they provide no sense of direction as to what constitutes acceptable or useful ways to think

about, in this context, the meanings of leisure(cited in Guthrie, 1956).

In regard to changes in meaning, individual constructivism claims that individuals

continually redene their denitions. However, the claim does not appear to be supported by

empiricalstudies of leisure meanings, which in fact suggest a high degree of shared meaning.Marton and Booth(1997)argued that the problem is highlighted by the paradigms failure

to show how individuals learn to develop more complex meanings while still operating

with less developed meanings, if, as has been suggested, individuals do not have access to

others constructions in the rst place.

The Social Constructivist Paradigm of Learning

Social constructivists emphasize the making of knowledge by communities of individuals

rather by individuals, as claimed by individual constructivists. Knowledge is viewed asa collaborative intersubjective construction and is appropriated by individuals from the

socially organized practices of the group in which they participate(Cobb, 1994). Thus,

knowledge or meaning is embedded in participatory forms of social practice and is subject

to the structuring inuences of historical processes and sociocultural beliefs that surround

these practices. Differences in meaning are subsequently held to represent variations in

social practice and reect different normative beliefs held by different groups. Changes in

meaning are associated with evolving social practices and indicate individuals increasing

enculturation in these practices.

Scholars contributing to this paradigm include situated learning theorists(e.g., Lave

& Wenger, 1991; Vygotsky, 1978), social constructionists(e.g., Gergen, 1995), feminist

scholars (e.g., Gilligan, 1982), and sociocultural scholars of varying theoretical persuasions(e.g., Berger & Luckman, 1966; Foucault, 1974; Habermas, 1971). Schegloff(1991)iden-

tied Durkheims notion of the collective conscience as providing an important source

of philosophical inspiration for this paradigm. This idea posits that social groups have cog-

nitive properties that differ from those of its individual members and that these properties

act to bind members together and reinforce social order.

Leisure scholars including Clarke and Critcher (1985), Hamilton-Smith (1991),

Henderson(1994), John Kelly (1983, 1994), and Rojek(1995)have argued for the socially


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100 M. Watkins

constructed nature of leisure meanings. J. Kellys (1994, p. 91) assertion that leisure actors

have learned systems of meanings that reect the dominant ideologies that serve class inter-

ests is indicative of this approach. Studies of leisure meanings framed within this paradigm

elaborate on the function of broader cultural processes(e.g., capitalism)and describe how

these processes historically situate meanings (e.g., within an ideology of consumption).

Moreover, they tend to focus on specic examples of social practices (e.g., power rela-

tionships among groups of individuals)in order to demonstrate how meanings are used to

promote or resist sexism, ageism, or racism within these groups.

Empirical support for social constructivist explanations of leisure meanings exists

in studies by Freysinger (1995), Rapoport and Rapoport (1975), and Wearing (1990).

Freysingers study exemplies the general tenets of the paradigm by locating leisure mean-

ings within the socially constructed arena of age and gender and in practices of afliation(e.g., interacting with others) and agency(self-determining forms of experience). Although

Freysinger adopted the explicit stance of recognizing the existence of individual differencesin meaning, the study described a single multidimensional model that depicted the common-

ality of leisure across the study sample. This depiction described leisure as an experience

of change that was freely chosen and that provided feelings of relaxation, enjoyment, and

rejuvenation.

Although the social constructivist paradigm has made important advances in under-

standing the historical and sociocultural qualities of leisure meanings, the paradigm has

been subject to a number of criticisms. For example, individual meanings tend to disappear

in favor of collective meanings, which, as Bredo(1993)suggested, fails to acknowledge

that individuals can have meaning-making experiences in multiple and often conictingcommunities. Ogborn(1997)contended that this problem is reinforced by the paradigms

emphasis on the social making of meanings and its tendency to understate individual mod-

eling, nding or interpreting metaphors of gaining knowledge. Although a collective may

experience a change in the meaning of social practice, the claim that change occurs in

a structuring process of normative beliefs assumes each individual sees these inuences

and responds to them in the same way as do others. This raises the idea of social deter-

minism, a position that theoretically parallels the behaviorists contention that meaning is

environmentally determined.

Problems with the Coalition of Paradigms

Although the respective paradigms provide different and competing explanations of how

people learn about leisure, when viewed as a coalition of approaches each paradigm con-

tributes a viable and important explanation for some particular aspect of meaning that is

unaccounted for by other paradigms. Thus, behaviorism produces linguistic accounts of the

everyday words used to denote leisure, and cognitivism identies the common and under-

lying dispositional tendencies that cause situations to be represented as leisure. Individualconstructivism, on the other hand, emphasizes individuals conceptual interpretations of the

meaning of these situations, whereas social constructivism suggests how these meanings

are historically and socioculturally structured. To rephrase Shaws(1998)contention, it is

as if the coalition of paradigms serves as the background against which each respective

paradigm can be foregrounded and understood in terms of its specic contribution.

However, treating the paradigms as a coalition of approaches highlights four com-

mon problems that appear to be fundamentally linked to resolving questions about leisure

meanings. First, the nature of knowledge or the units of description conceptualized by each

paradigm(i.e., as verbal habits, mental representations, conceptual interpretations, or socialpractices) do not focus on the phenomenon of leisure as experienced by individuals. Instead,


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they focus on the researchers prescriptive theorizing about how people might experience

leisure, for example, as forming habits, mental representations, and so on (cf. Sylvester,

1987). The extent to which one or another unit of description can be claimed as being

any more or less viable is overshadowed by the absence of a theoretical explanation of

learning about leisure that takes the individuals life world experience as the primary unit

of description.

Second, the coalition of paradigms is based on an outmoded dualistic conception of

the individualworld relationship as indicated by their explanations as to the source of

knowledge about leisure meanings(cf. Burton, 1996; Searle, 1992 ). Both cognitivism and

individual constructivism are similar in that they claim knowledge is acquired from within

the individuals mind and thus they downplay the inuence of the social world. Behaviorism

and social constructivism do the opposite by claiming that knowledge is gained from the

outside world, and subsequently they downplay the role of individuals mental processes.

The implication of this view is that once individuals and the world are seen to exist astwo separate realities, they cannot be philosophically reunited (Marton & Booth, 1997).

Thus, the two dominant traditions in leisure meanings researchthat leisure is subjectively

determined or, alternatively, that leisure is socially constructedcommit their respective

proponents to maintaining a philosophical dilemma that has remained unanswered since

Socrates rst grappled with the issue in theMenosome 2,500 years ago.

Third, although differences in meaning are theoretically attributed to variations in

reinforcement histories, genetic inheritances, conceptual abilities, or normative beliefs,

the subsumption of these factors to individuals sociodemographic status maintains the

questionable proposition that all members of a particular subgroup share the same meaningsof leisure. However, not only do sociodemographic variables turn out to be somewhat

insensitive to predicting interindividual difference in meanings (e.g., Donald & Havighurst,

1959; Iso-Ahola, 1979; Kleiber, Caldwell, & Shaw, 1993; Shaw, 1985; Unger & Kernan,

1983), but they also fail to illuminate intraindividual differences.

The fourth and nal problem concerns the ability of the paradigms to account for

changes in meaning. The primary concern lies in the fact that different forms of knowl-

edge represented by the paradigms(i.e., as habits, dispositions, interpretations, or social

practices)can be difcult to change. Moreover, if individuals meanings are sociodemo-

graphically related, then this logically implies that individuals would have to change theirsociodemographic status in order to change their meanings of leisure. Although individ-

uals do experience change in their personal and social circumstances, the capacity of the

paradigms to describe the dynamics of change is particularly problematic.

In summary, if the descriptions of the paradigms are accepted as a reasonable summation

of their fundamental epistemological claims, limitations associated with these paradigms

indicate the need for additional explanations that address four areas. These are theoreticalex-

planations of leisure meanings that (a) incorporate an experientialist perspective, (b) adopt a

nondualist view of the individualworld relationship, (c) are sensitive to individual and col-

lective differences, and(d)are responsive to capturing the dynamics of change in meaning.

The Potential Contribution of an Experientialist Paradigm

In response to perceived limitations with existing theoretical accounts of learning, phe-

nomenography has been advocated as an alternative approach to explain learning(Marton,

1981, 1986, 1996; Marton & Svensson, 1979). Phenomenography was initially developed as

a research specialization for mapping the qualitatively different ways that people experience

the meaning of aspects of their world. More recent developments have seen the approach

extended to incorporate a theoretical account of learning(cf. Marton & Booth, 1997 )thatis consistent with what is referred to in this article as the experientialist paradigm.


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102 M. Watkins

According to this paradigm, knowledge is viewed as an experience of the relationship

formed between an individual and some aspect of his or her world (e.g., the phenomenon

of leisure). The relationship is internal in the sense that it is established or constituted in

the individuals awareness as an individualworld relationship and conveys meaning for

the individual. Philosophers such as A. N. Whitehead (1929)and Birch(1995)used the

terminternal relationto describe this relationship and claimed that when individuals take

account of the relationship they have direct access to the feelings experienced in relation to

that aspect; that is, they experience an internal relation. Internal relations can therefore be

considered as the basic units of awareness or, in Whiteheads language, as actual occasions

of experience.

The source of an individuals knowledge or experience of a phenomenon is gained

through participating in the constitution of situations in which the phenomenon is present.

This suggests that knowledge is acquired as Heidegger (1962) proposed, through being

in the world, in which case individuals not only experience their own understandings ofa phenomenon as argued by the cognitivists and individual constructivists, but also share

others understandings as contended by the behaviorists and social constructivists. However,

this is theoretically different from claiming that individuals discover an independent reality

or construct a private reality within their own self or that they adopt behaviors or appropriate

practicesfrom an already established world. Consequently,the experientialistparadigm does

not address how knowledge is gained from within the mind or how knowledge is gained

from the world, but rather posits the existence of internal relations as part of the individuals

ongoing constitution of the world. By understanding the individual and the world as being

internally related, the paradigm adopts a nondualist perspective of there being one world, theworld as it is experienced by individuals. Free from dualism, the experientialist paradigm

focuses on how individualworld relations differ and change(Marton, 1996).

In describing the nature of consciousness, Gurwitsch(1964, p. 4)advanced the idea

that the object of attention or that which engrosses the mind of the experiencing subject

stands to the fore of, and is embedded in, a background of contextual factors. These factors

may alter over time and provide the object with its particular qualitative character. Accord-

ing to this idea, differences in awareness are understood as contextually related shifts in

the gureground relationship. The experientialist paradigm draws on this idea to represent

different meanings of a phenomenon as different ways of experiencing the individualworldrelationship and of reecting variations in both the content and the structure of the rela-

tionship at a particular point in time. The content of the relationship refers to the aspects

or parts focal in the individuals awareness of the phenomenon. Although individuals are

not consciously aware of the different parts, they are argued to be aware of the wholelike

quality of the experience that is formed by the parts. Thus, the content of the relationship

translates into the literal meaning of the phenomenon; that is, what the phenomenon means

to the individual. The structure of the relationship describes how the parts are understood,

how the parts are related or temporally organized in awareness, and how the phenomenon

is differentiated from its background context and from other phenomena(Svensson,as cited

in Marton, 1986). This aspect of the relationship, then, refers to how the meaning is expe-

rienced or understood by the individual. By adding a structural component to the content

of experience, the experientialist paradigm provides a theoretical framework in which to

situate empirical descriptions of qualitative differences in individualworld relationships,

both within the same individual and between different individuals. Such an approach is

therefore argued to be sensitive to describing variations and to reduce the need to rely on

sociodemographic variables as the primary method for determining differences in meaning.

At this point, it is timely to ask if the individual world relationships constituted in

awareness are relative to the knowledge of individuals such that there can exist an innite


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number of ways of experiencing a phenomenon, or whether such relationships are per-

haps limited in number? The experientialist paradigm proposes that the number of ways

of knowing about a phenomenon is potentially inexhaustible due to individuals ongoing

constitution of the world, no matter how little or how much, from birth until death. However,

the capacity of individuals to know about a phenomenon is also limited by two pragmatic

conditions. The rst is that individuals are constrained in their ability to be focally aware of

all the possible ways of experiencing a phenomenon. Indeed, if individuals were aware of

all there is to know about a phenomenon, then meaning would logically cease to exist as it

is rendered from there being different ways of understanding the phenomenon. The second

reason is that individuals share common social contexts and can therefore be expected to

constitute similar experiences of phenomena that emerge from these contexts. Thus, the two

seemingly contradictory conditions, difference and commonality in experience, are argued

to restrict knowledge about phenomena to a limited but not nite number of meanings.

Given that meanings are limited, the experientialist paradigm makes the further claimthat different experiences of these meanings can be understood as an interrelated and logi-

cally ordered continuum of experience. The justication for positing the interrelated nature

of experience is based on the contention that different combinations of the same constituent

parts appear in different experiences of the phenomenon (Marton, 1996). However, this

does not mean that all individuals are capable of sharing exactly the same experiences.

In other words, individuals within a given population cannot be expected to share a web

of common meanings(cf. Hemingway, 1995), but, more accurately, they can be expected

to share an experiential eld of differentially constituted meanings. As argued by Marton

and Booth(1997), this means that experiences can be ordered according to the increasingcomplexity with which different ways of experiencing the phenomenon can be dened as

subsets of more or less inclusive or complex ways of being aware of the phenomenon. More

complex experiences accord with the ability to simultaneously discern and hold in aware-

ness more parts or more ways of experiencing the phenomenon. In contrast, less complex

experiences are partial representations in which fewer parts or fewer ways of experienc-

ing the phenomenon are discerned in awareness. However, the ordering of experience on

a continuum implies more than simply determining the degree of complexity apparent in

particular experiences. It also implies making value judgments about the relative worth of

experience and stating what it is about complex experiences that make them more desir-able than less complex experiences. Such judgments cannot rely on objective propositions

of truthfulness, but need to be argued for using criteria that are relevant to the subjective

context of the particular situation.

Subsequently, in response to questions about how individuals learn their meanings of

leisure, the experientialist paradigm claims that learning occurs when individuals experience

change in the content and structure of the internal relations formed between themselves and

the phenomenon of leisure. Learning so described means that individuals have developed a

capability for being able to hold more aspects of leisure or more ways of experiencing leisure

in their awareness than they were capable of at some previous point in time. When viewed

from this perspective, different ways of experiencing leisure correspond with changes in

individuals ways of seeing the individualworld relationship. Inasmuch as these changes

are seen by individuals against the background of their life worlds, changes in the meaning

of leisure are held to be reective of, and responsive to, changes in individuals life worlds

in general. These changes may also be understood as layers of experience that indicate

increasingly complex ways of experiencing leisure. Consequently, an empirical investiga-

tion of leisure meanings framed by the experientialist paradigm would seek to identify and

describe a limited number of experiences. These descriptions would aim to dene the mean-

ings of the parts that form the experiences, illustrate the arrangement of parts in differing


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104 M. Watkins

patterns of temporal awareness, depict differing relations between leisure and other aspects

of life, and demonstrate how leisure experiences are interrelated and ordered according to

their complexity.

ConclusionIn conclusion, the experientialist explanation of gaining knowledge about and giving mean-

ing to leisure allows us to view individuals as bearers of different experiences rather than

as behaviorist impersonators, bearers of mental representations, or individual or social ac-

tors as implied by each of the previously described paradigms. By focusing on the content

and structure of experience, the experientialist paradigm draws from and complements the

cognitivists and individual constructivists concern with the inner content of experience,

as well as the behaviorists and social constructivists concern with the outer structuring

of experience. However, it does so in a way that avoids separating people from the phe-

nomenon and the context within which they and the phenomenon are situated. Finally, the

experientialist paradigm complements the existing coalition of approach by providing an

approach to generating descriptions of difference and change in leisure meanings that can

be compared and contrasted in terms of their complexity of experience.

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