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    Contention __ is Maritime Cooperation / Strait Talk

    Only Chinas recent rise in naval power and regional investment allows it to cooperate with the U.S.

    Navy to ensure world peace and economic stability as US naval power decreases.

    Doctor Daniel Whiteneck and Commander Bryan Clarkiprove that the current US maritime strategy is

    collapsing: budget cuts, decommissioned ships, and 4th-generation warfare mean its impossible for the

    Navy to continue policing the Indian and Pacific Oceans as it has in the past. The Central for Naval

    Analysisiiconfirms their assessment that were reaching a tipping point where we need to stay involved,

    but cant succeed alone. Major Desmond Lowiii explains that only the Thousand Ship Navy, a

    multilateral collaboration between hegemons sharing information as equals is up to the challenge. In

    his CRS report to congress, Ronald ORourkeivexplains that Chinas blue-water fleet has risen rapidly

    over the past year in a way thats poorly suited to challenge the US Navy but ideal for maintaining peace

    and stability in low-intensity peacetime missions further afield. Dr. Truvervobserves that Chinas rise

    allows the partnership between peers thats necessary to acquire and share the trust thats vital to

    protect the seas of a multilateral 21st century.

    Luft and Korinvi

    from the Institute for Analysis of Global Security point out that the most vulnerable area

    of the world is the Strait of Malacca in Chinas extended backyard, a 500-mile-long chokepoint narrow

    enough to be blocked by a single ship where 42% of the worlds pirate attacks happen. Every day, over

    600 freighters carrying a quarter of world trade pass through, including half of all Asian oil shipments,

    2/3 of natural gas shipments, all of Japans nuclear waste, and most of Chinas raw materials.

    Singapore's defense minister, Teo Chee Heanvii, has said that security along the strait is inadequate and

    that "no single state has the resources to deal effectively with this threat." Any disruption of shipping in

    the South China Sea would harm not only the economies of China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and

    Hong Kong, but that of the United States as well. To make matters worse, the FBI and CIAviii

    both agree

    that Al Qaeda has hijacked phantom ships which pretend to be different nationalities and could shut

    down the strait, indefinitely halting international trade for untold billions of dollars. Before his death,

    Osama BinLadenix ordered Al Qaeda to prioritize targeting the strait to collapse America and Europes

    economies. Mandelbaumx states that while US protection is necessary, it is woefully insufficient.

    Moorexi

    explains that the US needs another power to partner with given its inevitable budget cuts.

    (These cuts would be even more drastic if China didnt buy $1.74 trillion in US Treasury Bonds to offset

    recent military spending and slow the decline) Moore and Major Lowxii

    both agree on what criteria this

    partner needs to meet: They must be a regional power with a leadership role in ASEAN, a newfound

    commitment to policing the South China Sea, and a rising naval power capable of seeing itself as a peer

    to the US Navy. Low goes through Asian nations one by one, disqualifying each and every one except for

    China. In an era of global stress and managed American decline, the stakes have never been higher.

    Fortunately, as Richard Javad Haydarianxiii

    points out, Chinas political and naval rise happened just in

    time to preserve regional stability, global trade, and world peace.

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    US maritime strategy is collapsing nowbudget cuts and a weaker fleet is destroying US naval influence anddeterrence globallythe impact is global instabilityUS naval power is the proximate check on global conflictescalationWhiteneck and Clark, 11 [Commander Bryan Clark U.S. Navy (Retired) and Dr. Dan Whiteneck, Strategic Choicesat the Tipping Point, Proceedings Magazine - February 2011 Vol. 137/2/1,296,]In light of global economic and strategic realities, heres how the Navy of the future might look. American seapower is clearly coming to a crossroads. Demand for naval forces is rising as U.S. ground troopswithdraw from the Middle East and maritime competitions heat up in the Western Pacific andIndian oceans. Federal budgets are tightening while the Navy is becoming increasingly expensiveto build and maintain. With this widening gap between resources and demands, the UnitedStates may have to fundamentally change what it expects from sea power. Some missions orplatforms may be left behind to protect the nations most vital maritime capabilities. A newnational strategy may be needed to sustainably pursue Americas security interests.The challengefacing national leaders is whether this new direction will result from a series of ad hoc decisions or be guided bycareful assessment of what America will really need from its naval forces. From an international perspective, 2011 isa good time for just such a discussion. Twen ty years after its end, the Cold Wars coiled spring of superpower tension,alliance competition, and political brinksmanship has finally unwound. Since 1989, dozens of regional wars boiledover, freed by the removal of superpower rivalry and its threat of nuclear escalation. Transnational terrorists arose,empowered and enraged by the same economic and social forces that helped dismantle the Soviet Union. And theUnited States tried to take advantage of its fleeting unipolar moment to remake a part of th e world in its ownliberal democratic image. The dust is now clearing from these effects of the Soviet Unions demise, leaving Americawith an opportunity to make choices for the world ahead. The role of sea power is clearly one of those choices. TheCenter for Naval Analyses (CNA) Tipping Point study provides a framework to consider what the United Statesmight want from sea power in the futureand the limits on what its Navy will be able to deliver.1 Since World WarI, sea power for America has meant a global Navy. But federal budgets are flattening, and a legitimate concern iswhether the Fleet can continue to be global and provide needed sea power, or whether the Navy is nearing a tippingpoint after which it can no longer protect the nations interests. The CNA study explores that concern by consideringdifferent naval operating patterns in the context of tomorrows security challenges. It then evaluates how well theprojected size and mix of the Navy can meet the demands for ships and aircraft created by these operating patterns.At its heart, the study asks how we should plan to use the future Fleet. This question and its answers are notacademic. New ships or aircraft take 1020 years to design and build and will spend up to 50 years in service.Americas choices for sea power today will create constraints or opportunities for future Presidents and combatantcommanders. Sea Powers Growing Importanceand Risk The ability to protect and control the maritime commonsgives unparalleled influence and underpins global systems of trade and commerce. For a number of reasons, today we

    take this freedom for grantedbut that is changing. For example, the increasing effectiveness and reach of piracyand proliferation of long-range and sophisticated antiship weapons show us more emphasis on sea power will beneeded to continue protecting the commons. Meanwhile, sea power is becoming more important to American strategy.Over the next decade, the United States wants to reduce its footprint ashore in the Middle East while maintainingthe ability to attack terrorists in places like Yemen, deter adversaries such as Iran, and support new partners in Iraqand Afghanistan. And influencing outcomes in the Pacific and Indian oceans requires a credible naval capability todefend our forces and allies and project power against aggressors. Events over the past decade, however, didnt helpprepare the Navy for its rising importance, as U.S. attention and resources were devoted to the wars in Iraq andAfghanistan. During that time annual Navy budgets grew from $118$147 billion, but this largesse did not translateinto a larger or newer Fleet.2 It went instead to cover rising operating and personnel costs. Spending for operationsand maintenance increased by about 20 percent since 2000, in part because of growing global commitments to fight

    terrorism and support troops in the Middle East. Personnel costs rose over the past decade, even thoughthe Navy shrank by 15 percent. And while the procurement budget has stayed steady, the price ofeach new ship or aircraft is 3 to 10 times more than its predecessor.3 Today, the Navy cannotafford to buy 15 or more ships each year, as it did during the Reagan administration when halfwere large surface combatants or submarines.4 It can afford to buy about ten, and half of thoseare small combatants or support ships.5 As a result, the Feet is now at 286 ships, down from 344in 1998.6 The demands, though, have not eased. The Navy has maintained a little more than 100ships deployed overseas continuously since that time. With a shrinking Fleet, this means eachship works longer and harder with less-frequent maintenancea predictable result being todaysmuch-publicized problems in surface-ship condition.7 Another result is that the number of shipsunder way around the United States for homeland defense and training dropped from an average

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    of 60 in 1998 to 20 today. There is no more surge left in the Fleet. Combatant commanderrequests go unanswered more frequently, and each new material problem ripples through theschedules of dozens of ships as the Fleet scrambles to support the most urgent overseas demands.What Do We Want from a Global Navy? With the U.S. Navy at its operational limits and its core of destroyers,tactical aircraft, and submarines shrinking, each procurement decision significantly affects what the future Navycan accomplish. Providing direction to these investment choices requires an understanding of both what America

    will need from sea power, and what the country will be able to support. With the long lead time and multi-decadeservice lives of ships and aircraft, changing course in Fleet architecture in response to new demands will be verydifficult. This challenge will be exacerbated if options to buy different platforms are foreclosed by a lack ofindustrial capacity or procurement funds. To help explore the future demands for American sea power, the CNAstudy assumed America would need its Navy to remain globally influential. By analyzing historical global navies,the study translated this need into three main requirements: dominance, readiness, and influence. A dominant navalforce must be compared with its potential adversaries and challengers. For centuries, this meant the capability toexert sea control when and where needed, to sustain operations in these areas indefinitely, to support and influenceoperations on land, and to ensure freedom of movement for the nations military forces. A global navy is a readynavy. Both its deployed and surge forces are trained, manned, and adequately equipped. They are deployed globallyso they can be ready to quickly respond to crises. They also have the capacity to call in forces from other globaldeployments to areas of instability or to serve as a home fleet that can surge forward for major operations.Deployments by a global navy are routine for shows of force to deter and reassure or to express interest and resolve.Presence and readiness make global naval forces routine responders to humanitarian crises and disasters. A globalnavy is influential. It exerts international leadership in peacetime and in war. It provides a framework for coalition

    operations. It is a visible force for reassuring allies and partners that a global navys government is committed tothem and that it has resolved to place its military forces in harms way in their support. It is a force flexible enoughto exert influence at any point over the range of operations, from a show of force to deter a regional threat to theimposition of a blockade, or the use of naval power to project force and dominate an adversary. While a global navysmultimission ships, aircraft, and people are trained and equipped for major combat operations, most of the time theyexert influence through a range of less stressing activities such as exercises and maritime security operations. Aglobal navy performs those missions routinely to reassure allies, engage new partners, and tangibly express itsnations interest. Maritime forces have advantages over land and air forces in influencing events abroad because oftheir inherent flexibility, their visibility without heavy footprints ashore, their self-sustainability, and their routineinteractions with other maritime forces. A global navy is an instrument of a global power interested in politicalstability and economic activity around the world. The U.S. Version of a Global Navy For six decades the U.S. Navyhas translated the need for maritime dominance, readiness, and influence into the forward presence and combatcredibility of naval forces. Forward presence enhances Americas ability to promptly influence or respond to eventsabroad and visibly signals U.S. interests. The capabilities and characteristics of deployed naval forces provide a wide

    range of options to U.S. leaders for action in several dimensions of national power, not just military operations. Thecombat credibility of U.S. naval forces is a consistent element of maritime strategy as well. Credibility derives fromcapabilities such as surface and antisubmarine warfare from ships, submarines, and aircraft; precision strike fromthe sea; and sustained amphibious operations. The Navy enhances the credibility of these capabilities throughsuperior capacity, strategic and tactical mobility, kinetic and non-kinetic options, tailorable force packaging, long-term sustainability, defense in depth, and the ability to command and control across a range of operations andinternational partners. Forward presence and combat credibility are set in motion by the U.S. Navy through theongoing deployment of aircraft carriers and amphibious forces for influence ashore, surface ships and submarinesfor sea control, and aircraft and submarines for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Logistics ships and anetwork of overseas bases and access agreements allow these forces to be sustained indefinitely. Just as significant iswhere these forces are and in what numbers. Since the 1950s, global U.S. Navy presence has consisted of combatcapability in two hubs (the Western Pacific [WESTPAC] and the Mediterranean throughout the Cold War andWESTPAC and the North Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf since Desert Storm). Successive presidential administrationssaw these areas as home to long-standing U.S. political and economic interests, allies in need of reassurance, and

    adversaries and competitors to be deterred. To back up these forward-deployed forces, the Navy has maintained thecapacity and flexibility to surge additional forces from the continental United States and other parts of the globe toaddress emerging conflicts and crises. Independent deployers outside the two hubs have been used for engagementactivities and exercises in South America, Africa, and Europe. Since the Korean War, the Navy has ranged frommore than 1,000 to fewer than 300 ships, but the importance of forward presence and combat credibility to the Navysstrategy has been a constant. To be forward is to be ready, and to be combat-credible is to be dominant and able tocontrol escalation and de-escalation at any level of confrontation. The global reach and ambitions of the Navy alsohave never changedto be absent is to be without influence. How Will We Exert Sea Power in the Future? Thedeployment patterns of the CNA study represent ways in which navies have arrayed their fleets in the past andprovide a lens through which we can examine the security needs of the future. For the U.S. Navy, these deployment

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    models should be evaluated in terms of how well they address American security and national interests, whether theyare sustainable economically or politically, and whether they reflect the expectation future leaders will have aboutthe need for a global navy. The emerging environment includes a wide range of challenges. Strong states such asChina compete with America politically and could challenge the United States militarily. Regional aggressors suchas Iran or North Korea routinely threaten their neighbors and could become future U.S. adversaries. The war against

    Islamic radical terrorism will likely continue for years. Poorly governed areas and weak states willcontinue to sustain groups that threaten local and regional security. The global air, maritime,and cyber commons are under threat from capabilities such as proliferating antiship andsurface-to-air missiles, precision-guided mortars and rockets, modern submarines, computer-network attack, and electronic warfare. America will expect the Navy to exert maritimedominance and influence in the face of these challenges. This will include shows of force to deterregional challengers, ballistic-missile defense and exercises with allies and partners forreassurance, and maritime security to protect commerce. The Navy also will be expected toevacuate non-combatants from failing states, counter piracy and terrorism, and interdict orattack weapon proliferators. Allies will continue to look to the United States for training,partnership, and leadership of coalition operations, while the U.S. governmental agencies willwant the Navy to provide effective platforms for their initiatives. The Navys ability to meet thosedemands and expectations will be constrained in several ways, but most important, in the financial dimension.Discretionary federal budgets will have to shrinkunless revenues can substantially increaseto address growing

    deficits and non-discretionary social spending. This will limit the options for maintaining Fleet capacity oradjusting its mix toward the higher end of large surface combatants, fifth-generation fighters, and submarines. IsThere a Tipping Point? Obviously there is no exact point at which a navy ceases to be globally influential or atwhich it can no longer address the nations interests. But if history is any guide, we will know it when we see it. Inparticular, a global navy must continue to deter adversaries, stop aggression, and reassurealliesthe last requirement possibly being the most crucial. A global navy also must be able tofoster and maintain partnerships with other countries and protect the global commons fromdiffuse threats such as piracy or terrorism. These demands require a Fleet with credible combatcapability able to intervene at the locations where these interests intersect. When the U.S. Navycan no longer do so, it will indeed be at a tipping point.

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    South China Sea engagement solves relations and Chinese aggression in the long term.Richard Javad Heydarian, Foreign Policy in Focus contributor, The South China Sea ConundrumAnalysis,September 2011, http://www.eurasiareview.com/09092011-the-south-china-sea-conundrum-analysis/The dynamics of U.S.-China relations will largely shape future patterns of global governance. President Obama musthandle sensitive issues that involve Beijing very delicately, because any misstep could send shockwaves through theinternational system. Washington is already reliant on China on a number of key issues: resolution of major securitychallenges such as the Iranian nuclear program and North Korea; U.S. debt and financial stability; and establishing

    the foundation of a post-crisis global economic order. This is why the United States cant be too aggressive in itsapproach to two key regional issues: China-Taiwan relations, and the South China Sea conflict. The Chinese alreadytreat these issues as core interests, drawing red lines against any direct U.S. intervention.Beijing is neither irrational nor reckless. Washington must understand Beijings unique needsand challenges, and adopt a more nuanced policy position. Ultimately, China seeks stability as itrises within the current international order. The United States should avoid a self-fulfillingprophecy of confrontation with the worlds next preeminent power. If Washington plays its cardswell, it could avoid confrontation with China and further integrate China into an evolving andstable international system that reflects new geopolitical realities.In Will the Liberal Global Order Outlast America, John Ikenberry analyzes how the current international liberalorder provides a solid structure of payoffs, ultimately encouraging compliance and cooperation rather than great-power confrontation and hegemonic wars. In terms of carrots, the liberal international order provides a set ofrelatively stable, predictable, and transparent institutional mechanisms to facilitate trade, cooperation, and conflict

    resolution, especially among major powers. The cost of confronting or directly challenging the current order issimply too much: isolation, backlash from both emerging and established powers, trade disruption, and militaryconfrontation with an alliance of status-quo powers.

    But China stands out for its sheer size and rate of growth. In How to Think About China, Chinaexpert Joshua C. Ramo contends that, China is ambitious, to be sure, but it is too insecure to beaudacious yet. According to Ramo, the United States and China need to evolve together to serveeach others mutual needs.Chinas rapid ascent is creating considerable anxiety among the established powers. But the eraof Chinas easy growth may be approaching its end. In The Post-China World, Ruchir Sharma, aMorgan Stanley-based economist, argues that China, like Japan and other previously boomingeconomies, is entering a stage of economic maturity that will feature more modest rates ofgrowth. As a more normal rising economic giant, China might become a more mature andresponsible power whose primary goal is stability and steady growth. Still, it is natural to expectgreater assertiveness among emerging powers when it comes to their own regional affairs.The South China Sea conundrum could serve as blessing in disguise if it helps to strengthen the fundamentals ofASEAN and encourage a more responsible and stable relationship between the worlds most powerful countries, theUnited States and China.

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    Cooperation is the lynchpin of effective naval powerUS maritime cooperation is key to maintain control over thesea despite budget cutsMoore 10 [Charles C. Moore, Naval Aviator, Western Pacific Experience, has a Masters from the US Army WarCollege and Georgetown, currently commanding office at the Naval Air Station in Meridian. "Revitalizing theCooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 2007,http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/2011summer/Moore.pdf]Summary The Cooperative Strategy remains a relevant foundational strategy document. It clearly defines six core

    capabilities (ways) that the Navy will master to secure the end states of preventing wars and building partnerships.What it lacks is specification of the necessary force requirements (means) to achieve these end states and an outline

    of potential maritime adversaries and threat scenarios. By not defining these requirements, the Navy risks losingthe initiative because it doesnt clearly articulate the strategy environment to policy makers andthe public in order to create an essential base of support for a long-term shipbuilding plan in aperiod that is certain to see defense spending reductions. The approaching era of reduced defensespending is a global problem that can be mitigated in the maritime domain through close navy-to-navy coordination. Coordinating capabilities with our closest partners will mitigate shortfallsfor both sides, and will better define and justify US naval force requirements going forward.Defense spending will decrease, but the Navys operational tempo is certain to increase , especiallyas ground forces are reduced in the Middle East. The time for the Navy to act is now, lest it risk having these crucialdecisions being made by others.

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    Increased economic pressures and growing deficits mean hegemonic decline is inevitable budget cuts will force acollapse of unipolarityMandelbaum, 10 [Michael Mandelbaumis the Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at theJohns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, PhD from Harvard Foreign Affairs. May/June 2010,Overpowered?,]Whatever the quality of the analysis underlying it, however, Preble's vision of a more modest U.S. foreign policy,which Matlock and Gallarotti share, is destined to be adopted. The United States will do less, perhaps much less,

    beyond its borders in the next two decades than it has in the last two. This retrenchment will not come about becausethe views of the founders have gained currency among the wider U.S. public or as the result of the disappointmentsand failures of recent U.S. military interventions. The principal cause will be the fiscal condition of the UnitedStates. The country will bear the burden of a huge and growing national debt, from three principal sources: thechronic deficits from 2001 to 2008, the very high costs of coping with the financial crisis of 2008 and the recession itdramatically deepened, and, most important, the skyrocketing bill for Social Security and Medicare as the baby-boom generation becomes eligible for these entitlements. The Bush administration, it is worth noting, was directlyresponsible for the first of these sources, indirectly responsible for the second, and did nothing to reduce the costs ofthe third. Under the eyes of eternity, therefore, the greatest damage that the administration will be seen to haveinflicted on the United States' position in the world will come not from the Iraq war, about which so much ink hasbeen spilled (including in the three books under review), but rather from its profligate fiscal policies. There are fourways to address a deficit: by borrowing, by reducing spending, by raising taxes, and by printing money. Because thesecond and the third have proved politically impossible and the fourth would be economically ruinous, the UnitedStates has relied on the first. But it will not always be able to borrow all the money required to fill the gap between

    the government's expenditures and its revenues. At some point, taxes will have to rise and spending willhave to fall. Fewer resources will be available for all other programs, including foreign policy.In these circumstances, with Americans paying more to the government and receiving fewerbenefits from it, popular support for an expansive foreign policy will decline. The public willinsist more strongly than at any time since before World War II on using its dollars fordomestic, rather than international, purposes. It will not permit expensive military interventionsleading to state-building exercises, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq. It will not support thekind of humanitarian interventions, to rescue people under assault from their own governments,that the Clinton administration undertook in the 1990s in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.The nation's growing fiscal burden is also likely to put pressure on its most importantinternational missions -- its military presence, which helps keep the peace, in East Asia, Europe,and the Middle East, places where instability could seriously harm U.S. interests.The prospect of areduced U.S. presence around the world does not disturb Matlock, Gallarotti, or Preble. Each is confident that othercountries will step forward to fill any geopolitically perilous vacuum that a more modest U.S. foreign policy creates.With the passing of what they regard as the wantonly unilateralist Bush administration, all see great potential for

    more extensive international cooperation. All believe, that is, that other countries will risk lives andspend money in pursuit of goals they have in common with the United States. Perhaps eventuallythey will, but the first year of the presumably kinder, gentler, more multilateral Obamaadministration yielded little evidence of a willingness on the part of others to share the UnitedStates' global burdens. If, as Washington pulls back, others do not step forward, the world is alltoo likely to become both more disorderly and less prosperous. In that case, the verdict on thestate of the world in the year 2030 may differ sharply from the judgment these three books passon the last 20 years. Whereas their common theme is the dangers that arise when the UnitedStates has too much power, their successors two decades from now will be chronicling the evenworse -- perhaps far worse -- consequences of the United States' having too little of it.

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    US strategic retrenchment is inevitable and Global naval cooperation is critical to manage itit allows us to manageglobal stability in a world without a global US presence and avoiding the flaws of offshore balancing by maintainingUS influenceHoffman, 08 [November 2008, From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century,Frank Hoffman is a retired Marine officer with 30 years of experience in policy development, strategy and forceanalysis, and consulting,]

    Our maritime forces have to be designed to support an overall grand strategy. Americas Cold War grand strategy ofcontainment was no longer needed after 1989, and a strategy best described as preponderance evolvedduring the Bush administration. The logic of preponderance required American policy makers toamass military power in order to dissuade other great powers from emerging or evencontemplating arming themselves to contest U.S. primacy. 4 9 This strategy has focused largelyon military power, and the unilateral application of force to maximize U.S. strategic freedom ofaction. Arguably, Americas primacy has been a source of stability that many have benefitedfrom. But in a world in which power is distributed more widely, with new players on the globalscene, where Americas preeminence is challenged in myriad ways, preserving or extendingpreponderance as an operative framework will be increasingly difficult. The world, in the words ofRobert Kagan, is becoming normal again. 50 As the tragedy of 9/11 showed, our traditional military might can becontested by new modes of warfare that bypass the Pentagons tanks, aircraft carriers, and stealth bombers. Chineseand Russian assertiveness on the global stageand the spiraling risks of nuclear proliferation from North Korea,Iran, and Pakistanindicate that nations can and will find ways of contesting American influence. Additionally,Americas strategic position, based upon its economic competitiveness and human and physical infrastructure, iseroding relative to others. 51 However, the need for leadership (and indeed a reluctant sheriff) is readily apparent.52 Some strategists have argued that America should stop trying to preserve the unipolar moment and embrace analternative grand strategy. Strategies of restraint and offshore balancing are offered. 53 These approaches focuson ensuring that America avoids entanglement in the internal or regional affairs of others. Instead of riskingoverstretch by the extensive costs of posturing military forces around the globe, offshore balancing focuses first onour own narrowly defined interests in our region. Other regions would be expected to provide for their own nationaland regional security commensurate with their interests. The major regional powers would police themselves.Advocates of this approach would withdraw from most, if not all, of Americas treaties and security obligations, an dlimit forward-based forces, which would permit a sizable reduction in U.S. military forces. The problem with thestrategies of restraint and balancing is that they overlook current geostrategic circumstances. Todays challenges andthe integrated globalized economy do not support the detached posture and cold calculations suggested by eitherapproach. Since 9/11 we have learned that small events and under-governed areas have big consequences. We have

    learned that geography and our oceans no longer protect us the way they once did. Due to the interdependentnetworks of financial, energy, and information systems, American interests in many areas are not trivial orsecondary, but crucial. Finally, history suggests that regions do not police themselves and that we cannot stand idly

    by while other regional powers satisfy their ambitions at our expense. As noted in a United Nations report,in todays world, a threat to one is a threat to all. Every State requires international cooperationto make it secure. 54 Balancing from a great distance does not generate internationalcooperation or develop the necessary capacity to maintain the sinews of international economicactivity. We need to recognize that Americas interests and future prosperity are interdependentlytied to others. So many of todays challenges are transnational in nature and cannot be metwithout the cooperation and efforts of others. Furthermore, so much of our success and securityis tied to reliable access to the global markets, commercial networks, trade routes, and cybercommunications that constitute todays global commons. 55 We need not act as if we own ordominate these commons, but we must actively ensure that access to them is reliably secure foreveryone. Thus more collective frameworks, which reflect shared interests and cooperativeapproaches, appear warranted today. Adapting the Maritime strategy and Naval Forces for anInterdependent World Our maritime forces should be adapted to support this more cooperativeapproach. Rather than balance from afar, we can help others help themselves and bind them toan international system and a set of rules that benefit all. Partners need not commit to onehegemon over another, but they should be able to commit to a rule set that maintains global orderand a mutually prosperous system of trade and commerce. Rather than standing back as free riders, alarger regional community of interest can be motivated to collaborate in the day-to-day maintenance of the basic

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    commons. With respect to maritime forces this means seeking multilateral combinations to deal with maritimesecurity, commerce, smuggling in narcotics and humans, criminal activity, and counterproliferation. Hopefully,when either natural or state-based challenges to the commons arise, the habits of cooperative support, coupled with a

    sense of common interest, will engender a greater collective response to threats to stability. Such an approachemphasizes cooperative concerts and flexible arrangements built around maritime partners tosupport mutual interests in maintaining order. Partners are not asked to support Americanhegemony as a transactional payment, but the international economic and maritime securitysystem itself. This indirect approach, which I call Off Shore Partnering, requires forwardengagement and regular, interactive dialogue and cooperation with all possible partners. OffShore Partnering requires earlier and proactive involvement at local levels, not detachment orreactive responses. It requires working with and through others over the direct or unilateralapplication of U.S. power. Local approaches to local and global problems are sought, not merelytransplanting U.S. templates to various regions. Furthermore, it does not assume U.S. operationalleadership in day-to-day activities. Finally, Off Shore Partnering provides for an inherentlyflexible posture while minimizing our political or military footprint. 56 Over time our forceposture must be retooled to maximize flexibility and adaptability. 57 We will accrue numerous benefitsfrom this shift in posture. Maintaining a flexible approach over fixed commitments avoids the counterbalancing soevident today, builds more positive relationships over intrusive obligations, and reduces the costs of fixed militarypresence to both our hosts and the American taxpayer. The adoption of a more indirect approach will increase our

    reliance on maritime assets as well as the Special Operations community. It will also allow us to adapt how we useour forces. This military posture and presence should be used more as a positive tool for proactive engagement overstatic positioning or belated crisis response. 58 A more expansive view of our posture is needed to secure long-termgoals of sustained stability, access to markets and resources, and secure access to the global commons to connect the

    two. 59 Thus, the United States will be more secure, and global stability better sustained, if America shiftsits maritime forces consistent with Off Shore Partnering on behalf of a sustainable grand strategy. Thisstrategy relies upon the global reach and capability of our maritime services to work with others topreserve and extend security via multilateral approaches. On balance, the Cooperative Seapower Strategyis very consistent with Off Shore Partnering. The new maritime strategy is long on globalizationsfragility, and the role of maritime forces in securing the seas from disorder and disruption. The benefitsthat the global community gains from our persistent forward maritime presence are manifestly clear, as isthe shared responsibility to maintain the global commons. The only distinction between the new maritimestrategy and Off Shore Partnering would be in the priorities of the missions required and the Ratherthan balance from afar, we can help others help themselves and bind them to an international system anda set of rules that benefit all.

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    Disengagement causes great power nuclear conflict and security breakdowns.Monteiro 2012Nuno M., Assistant professor of Political Science at Yale University, Unrest Assured, International Security, Vol.36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 940, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Unrest_Assured.pdfIn sum, disengagement opens the door to regional competition, leading to wars involving both minor and majorpowers. If incomplete, disengagement will also result in wars involving the unipole, similar to the ones described inthe previous two sections. The United States has not pursued a strategy of global disengagement since the end of the

    Cold War in 1989. Scholars therefore have no empirical record against which to test the conflict-producingmechanisms resulting from a disengagement strategy. Foreign policy analysts, however, have written about thepotentially devastating effects of a disengaged United States. Stephen Rosen argues that U.S. disengagement wouldlead to nuclear proliferation and arms races in Asia and the Middle East. He concludes that the alternatives toAmerican empire would be even less appealing. Fareed Zakaria writes that disengagement would produce a world inwhich problems fester and the buck is endlessly passed, until problems explode. Similarly, MichaelMandelbaum writes that U.S. disengagement would deprive the international system of one of its principal safetyfeatures, which keeps countries from smashing into each other. Niall Ferguson calls this situation apolarity anddescribes an anarchic new Dark Age; an era of . . . civilizations retreat into a few fortified enclaves. Robert Lieber,with more detail but no less gloom-and-doom, describes the potential consequences of U.S. disengagement as follows:In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weaponswhich theyhave the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not onlybetween India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly thePhilippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competition among the major

    countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars,eventually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees,economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable. U.S. policymakers understand this logic,too. American forces are stationed around the world following what JosefJoffe calls the pacifier logic, according towhich only the presence of forces external to the region can stave off acute security competition, which couldeventually lead to conflict. This logic underpins U.S. security guarantees in Asia (to Japan, South Korea, andTaiwan) as well as in Europe and the Middle East.

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    Terrorist organizations and SE Asian pirates want to attack the Strait of Malacca now, doing so would cause globaloil shocks, trade collapse, Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and US economic collapseLuft and Korin 4 [Gal, Exec Dir, Institute for Analysis of Global Security and Anne, Dir, Policy and StrategicPlanning, IAGS] Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec Terrorism goes to Sea,http://www.jmhinternational.com/news/news/selectednews/files/2004/20041201_20041101_ForeignAffairs_TerrorismGoesToSea.pdf

    Pirates and Islamist terrorist groups have long operated in the same areas, including the Arabian Sea, the SouthChina Sea, and in waters off the coast of western Africa. Now, in the face of massive international efforts to freezetheir finances, terrorist groups have come to view piracy as a potentially rich source of funding. This appeal isparticularly apparent in the Strait of Malacca, the 500-mile corridor separating Indonesia and Malaysia, where 42percent of pirate attacks took place in 2003. According to Indonesia's state intelligence agency, detained seniormembers of Jemaah Islamiyah, the al Qaeda-linked Indonesian terrorist group, have admitted that the group hasconsidered launching attacks on Malacca shipping. And uniformed members of the Free Aceh Movement, anIndonesian separatist group that is also one of the most radical Islamist movements in the world, have beenhijacking vessels and taking their crews hostage at an increasing rate. The protracted ransom negotiations yieldconsiderable sums-the going rate is approximately $100,000 per ship-later used to procure weapons for sustainedoperations against the Indonesian government. In some cases, the Free Aceh Movement has demanded the release of

    members detained by the government in exchange for hostages. The string of maritime attacks perpetratedin recent years demonstrates that terror has indeed gone to sea. In January 2000, al Qaedaattempted to ram a boat loaded with explosives into the USS The Sullivans in Yemen. (Theattack failed only because the boat sank under the weight of its lethal payload.) After this initialfailure, al Qaeda suicide bombers in a speedboat packed with explosives blew a hole in the USSCole, killing 17 sailors, in October 2000. In October 2002, an explosives-laden boat hit the Frenchoil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen. In February 2004, the southern Philippines-basedAbu Sayyaf claimed responsibility for an explosion on a large ferry that killed at least 100people. And according to FBI Director Robert Mueller, "any number of attacks on ships havebeen thwarted." In June 2002, for example, the Moroccan government arrested a group of alQaeda operatives suspected of plotting raids on British and U.S. tankers passing through theStrait of Gibraltar.Terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Jemaah Islamiyah, the Popular Front for theLiberation of Palestine-General Command, and Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers have long sought to develop a maritime

    capability. Intelligence agencies estimate that al Qaeda and its affiliates now own dozens ofphantom ships-hijacked vessels that have been repainted and renamed and operate under falsedocumentation, manned by crews with fake passports and forged competency certificates.Security experts have long warned that terrorists might try to ram a ship loaded with explosivecargo, perhaps even a weapon of mass destruction, into a major port or terminal. Such an attackcould bring international trade to a halt, inflicting multi-billion-dollar damage on the worldeconomy.BLACK GOLD Following the attack on the Limburg, Osama bin Laden released an audio tapewarning of attacks on economic targets in the West: "By God, the youths of God are preparing foryou things that would fill your hearts with terror and target your economic lifeline until youstop your oppression and aggression." It is no secret that one of the most effective ways forterrorists to disrupt the global economy is to attack oil supplies-in the words of al Qaedaspokesmen, "the provision line and the feeding artery of the life of the crusader nation." Withglobal oil consumption at 80 million barrels per day and spare production capacity graduallyeroding, the oil market has little wiggle room. As a result, supply disruptions can have adevastating impact on oil prices-as terrorists well know.U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham hasrepeatedly warned that "terrorists are looking for opportunities to impact the world economy" by targeting energyinfrastructure. In recent years, terrorists have targeted pipelines, refineries, pumping stations, and tankers in someof the world's most important energy reservoirs, including Iraq, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. In fact, sinceSeptember 11, 2001, strikes on oil targets have become almost routine. In October 2001, Tamil Tiger separatistscarried out a coordinated suicide attack by five boats on an oil tanker off northern Sri Lanka. Oil facilities inNigeria, the United States' fifth-largest oil supplier, have undergone numerous attacks. In Colombia, leftist rebels

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    have blown so many holes in the 480-mile Ca-o Lim -- n-Cove-as pipeline that it has become known as "the flute."And in Iraq, more than 150 attacks on the country's 4,000-mile pipeline system have hindered the effort to resumeoil production, denying Iraqis funds necessary for the reconstruction effort. In April 2004, suicide bombers in threeboats blew themselves up in and around the Basra terminal zone, one of the most heavily guarded facilities of itskind in the world. Particularly vulnerable to oil terrorism is Saudi Arabia, which holds a quarter of the globe's oilreserves and, as the world's leading exporter, accounts for one-tenth of daily oil production. Al Qaeda is well awarethat a successful attack on one of the kingdom's major oil facilities would rattle the world and send oil prices

    through the ceiling. In the summer of 2002, a group of Saudis was arrested for plotting to sabotage the world's largestoffshore oil-loading facility, Ras Tanura, through which up to a third of Saudi oil flows. More recently, in May2004, jihadist gunmen opened fire on foreign workers in Yanbu, Saudi Arabia's petrochemical complex on the RedSea, killing five foreign nationals. Later in the same month, Islamic extremists seized and killed 22 foreign oilworkers in the Saudi city of Khobar. All of these attacks caused major disruptions in the oil market and a spike in

    insurance premiums, bringing oil prices to their highest level since 1990. Whereas land targets are relativelywell protected, the super-extended energy umbilical cord that extends by sea to connect the Westand the Asian economies with the Middle East is more vulnerable than ever. Sixty percent of theworld's oil is shipped by approximately 4,000 slow and cumbersome tankers. These vessels havelittle protection, and when attacked, they have nowhere to hide.(Except on Russian and Israeli ships,the only weapons crewmembers have today to ward off attackers are high-powered fire hoses and spotlights.) If a

    single tanker were attacked on the high seas, the impact on the energy market would be marginal. But geographyforces the tankers to pass through strategic chokepoints, many of which are located in areaswhere terrorists with maritime capabilities are active. These channels-major points ofvulnerability for the world economy-are so narrow at points that a single burning supertankerand its spreading oil slick could block the route for other vessels. Were terrorist pirates to hijacka large bulk carrier or oil tanker, sail it into one of the chokepoints, and scuttle it to block thesea-lane, the consequences for the global economy would be severe: a spike in oil prices, anincrease in the cost of shipping due to the need to use alternate routes, congestion in sea-lanesand ports, more expensive maritime insurance, and probable environmental disaster. Worse yetwould be several such attacks happening simultaneously in multiple locations worldwide . TheStrait of Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, is only 1.5 miles wide at its narrowest point.Roughly 15 million barrels of oil are shipped through it daily. Between 1984 and 1987, when tankers were frequentlyattacked in the strait, shipping in the gulf dropped by 25 percent, causing the United States to intervene militarily.Since then, the strait has been relatively safe, but the war on terrorism has brought new threats. In his 2003 State ofthe Union address, President George W. Bush revealed that U.S. forces had already prevented terrorist attacks onships there. Bab el Mandeb, the entrance to the Red Sea and a conduit for 3.3 million barrels per day, also is only 1.5miles wide at its narrowest point. The Bosporus, linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, is less than a mile widein some areas; ten percent of the 50,000 ships that pass through it each year are tankers carrying Russian and

    Caspian oil. According to the IMB, however, the most dangerous passage of all is the Strait of Malacca.Every day, a quarter of world trade, including half of all sea shipments of oil bound for easternAsia and two-thirds of global shipments of liquefied natural gas, passes through this strait.Roughly 600 freighters loaded with everything from Japanese nuclear waste bound forreprocessing facilities in Europe to raw materials for China's booming economy traverse thischokepoint daily. Roughly half of all piracy attacks today occur in Southeast Asia, mostly inIndonesian waters. Singapore's defense minister, Teo Chee Hean, has said that security along thestrait is "not adequate" and that "no single state has the resources to deal effectively with thisthreat." Any disruption of shipping in the South China Sea would harm not only the economiesof China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, but that of the United States as well.

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    The barrier to the Thousand Ship Navy has been parity and sovereignty concerns. US cooperation with a risingChinese Navy is the only solution.Low 2008Desmond, Major in the Singapore Navy and Staff Officer in the Naval Plans Dept., Global Maritime Partnershipand the Prospects for Malacca Straits Security, Pointer v34 no2,http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2008/v34n2/feature4.htmlWhile the climate for regional cooperation appears favourable, gaining acceptance of the GMP concept among

    prospective regional partners is an uphill task. Critics cite that one of the biggest obstacles is the perception that thisUS-led initiative serves more to secure its homeland than improving global maritime security. They point to the lackof support for PSI46 and RMSI47 as one of the imperatives for the GMP, and that the GMP amounts to "PSI byother means". Proponents of the GMP carefully point out that unlike PSI and RMSI, this concept is benign in

    nature and that respect for national sovereignty is high . In building the needed relationships, a keychallenge will be designing a maritime network that will match activities with regional andlocal interests, as well as the capabilities of various nations. Given the strong objections bycoastal states towards direct external involvement in maritime security affairs, the application ofsoft power by extending financial aid, access to technology and training is an attractivealternative with better mileage in generating goodwill while allaying sovereignty concerns. Suchmeasures would serve to improve the coastal states' capabilities for law enforcement at sea and inprotecting the safety of navigation and environment of the Malacca Straits. Some ongoingdevelopments bear this out. Following the lifting of an arms embargo in 2004 and resumption of full military ties,

    the US is seeking to expand military cooperation with Indonesia in counter-terrorism, law enforcement, information

    exchange and personnel exchange.48 Opportunities also lie in supporting a burden-sharingarrangement for the upkeep of the Malacca Straits. The majority of vessels using the straits donot call at any of the straits states' ports and thus the coastal states do not receive any directbenefit from their passage. Yet Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore bear the burden in providingfor the safety of navigation, as well as the consequences arising from accidents. So far, Japan hasbeen the main donor, having voluntarily contributed more than US$150 million since the 1960s.The Nippon Foundation has estimated that approximately US$300 million would be needed toupkeep navigational equipment over the next decade in the already congested straits.49 Concretecommitments by the US would help advance the initiative by encouraging other major user statessuch as China, India and South Korea to participate. The US can also continue to engage the regionwithout increasing its footprint by supporting regional multi-track diplomatic mechanisms such as the ARF (Track

    one) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)50 (Track two), as well as promotingleadership among regional users with direct stakes in the security of the sea lanes, namely China, India and Japan,and by supporting local maritime security initiatives. These confidence and security building efforts will pave theway for the GMP concept to take root and assuage regional concerns over US hegemony. With more than 90% of theworld's trade shipped by sea on some 96,000 ships (of 100 gross tons or more)51, there is enormous potential formerchant marines to complement and extend the intelligence and information gathering capabilities of nations andnavies. Furthermore, shipping and port industry participation is vital for the successful implementation of otheroverlapping initiatives like the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code)52 and the ContainerSecurity Initiative (CSI).53 In order to convince the shipping industry to voluntarily share information on vessellocations (usually considered proprietary), cargo and crew manifests, and suspicious activity, the GMP concept willneed to address information management and security issues, and explore providing incentives to the industry withbreaks on Automatic Identification System (AIS) costs, government-industry cost sharing associated with newsecurity measures, and expedition in cargo inspection processes for compliant vessels. A further step towardsimproving regulation of the global commons could be re-crafting international law by amending international

    conventions, such as UNCLOS, to eradicate "corporate veils" arising from the use of flags-of-convenience andovercome legal issues associated with the boarding and seizure of suspicious merchant vessels on the high seas. A keyenabler of the GMP concept is maritime domain awareness (MDA), defined as "the knowledge of anything at seathat affects a nation's security, safety, economics or its environment".54 It envisions a system where informationfrom extensive sources is collected, fused into a common operating picture (COP) and shared with users withappropriate access, so as to generate actionable intelligence for response(s) by appropriate forces or agencies.Achieving MDA as envisioned will require a tailored approach to address regional sensitivities and complementexisting capabilities and systems. In the Malacca Straits, some level of information sharing has existed since 1998through the Mandatory Ship Reporting System (STRAITREP).55 Implemented by Indonesia, Malaysia andSingapore, its main purpose is for navigation safety and marine environmental protection. More recently, Singapore

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    and Indonesia established a joint sea surveillance system in 2005 called Project SURPIC to share a common real-time picture of the Singapore Strait.56 Given the political sensitivities highlighted earlier, a supportive yet non-intrusive approach is needed to improve the littoral states' technical and operational surveillance capabilities andinformation sharing capabilities while recognising their rights over the straits. Interoperability is a main factor insuccessful information sharing, requiring common procedures, communication systems and protocols. The USCENTRIX (Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange) system is a possible solution already inoperation among multinational naval forces. Cost-sharing measures or technical assistance grants would make such

    systems more affordable for resource-strapped states. In mid 2006, the US pledged to help Indonesia develop a coastalradar system to monitor the Malacca Straits, similar to a system in operation along the Malaysian coast.57 A moreimportant factor is transparency and ensuring that all authorised users have equal access to information.Undoubtedly, this would limit information sharing to unclassified data in the beginning. However, it could progressto include intelligence information in the same way confidential credit card information is shared worldwide, butclosely protected, by the banking industry. Conclusion The strategic trends in the geo-political environment inSoutheast Asia, with particular regard to the Malacca Straits, indicate a general readiness for increased cooperationin maritime security which points towards fairly good prospects for an initiative like the GMP. However, actualisingthe concept as envisioned by its designers will require substantial effort to work out the practical operativemechanics. For the US, gaining the acceptance and commitment of littoral states without provoking regionalsensitivities lies in a non-intrusive yet supporting approach towards locally bred and led initiatives through theapplication of its soft power. Beyond this, realising the Thousand Ship Navy is a matter of time.

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    Cooperation creates global partnerships over naval security that allows the US and China to jointly address issues inAsian waters.Truver, 11 [Dr. Scott C. Truver is Director, National Security Programs, Gryphon Technologies, Greenbelt,Maryland. In addition to his support to national security and defence organisations in government and industry, hesupports the US Navys MDA programmes in research , analysis and engagement efforts. Edward Feege of GryphonsNational Security group assisted in the research for this overview. On the Other Side of the Hill? Global

    Partnerships for Maritime Domain AwarenessThe View from the United States, by NMCO on NOVEMBER 9,2011, http://www.mda.gov/2011/11/09/on-the-other-side-of-the-hill/]

    A GLOBAL FOCUS IS NEEDED, TOO From the US perspective, relationships that have worked domestically alsomust be applied internationally. As former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead repeatedlyemphasised: Personal trust is indispensible to partnerships at home and abroad trust cannot be surged. The USMDA community of interests is based on tile understanding that a global perspective based on trust is needed toensure that we can detect and deal with threats that originate in or take advantage of the vastness of the oceans. Onlythrough collaboration and cooperation will we be able to ensure that these global threats and challenges can be dealtwith as far from our shores as possible. To deal with these threats and challenges, world Navies and Coast Guardsrequire accurate and timely information on what is occurring in their maritime areas of operations. In regional andglobal perspectives, a shared awareness of activities within the maritime domain is key to mutual success. MDA thusis critical for success against all threats in maritime regions, anywhere. Information sharing is thus a key focus of

    the USNs efforts to build trust and strengthen MDA partnerships. There are two aspects of these MDApartnerships, Titley said. First, we need partnerships to enable access and build on localknowledge of the maritime environment, to know whats going on in coastal states EEZ andterritorial seas, in ports and harbours, and in ships and cargoes. The MDA supply chain hasgreater reach than the coastal/littoral environment and extends to internal waters and evenlandlocked states, where threats to our security, which use the seas as means of conveyance, canoriginate. Second, he noted, these MDA partnerships serve as an entry point for broaderrelationships that can enhance security across the board. We have common interests and weconfront common threats and challenges. We can expand and improve shared capacity andcapabilities to defeat common threats and challenges and safeguard common interests.Acquiring and sharing information and intelligence with a broad array of global maritimepartners sustains cooperation and builds the trust required to ensure the safety, security andeconomic vitality of all who hold membership within global maritime community of interest, hesaid. The trust is not built over night, but through sustained collaboration and securitycooperation measures and processes, such as the Maritime Safety and Security InformationSystem[MSSIS]. MSSIS is a freely shared, unclassified, near real-time data collection and distribution network.Its member countries share data from Automatic Identification Systems CAIS), coastal radar, and other maritime-related systems. MSSIS promotes multilateral collaboration and data sharing among international participants, witha primary goal of increasing maritime security and safety (see figure 3). International efforts [also] includeparticipation in exercises like TRIDENT WARRIOR II, Titley added. We partnered with the United Kingdomand France to successfully share maritime information using internationally agreed upon National InformationExchange Model-Maritime [NIEM-M] common data standards and models. NIEM is a joint Department ofJustice/Department of Homeland Security programme started in 2005, created to promote standardisation ofinformation exchange for cross-jurisdictional inforn1ation sharing. NIEM provides the tools used across DRS forenabling interoperability at the data layer within and across systems supporting information sharing, whilepreserving investments in current technology and optimising new technology development. Another example is theGlobal Maritime Partnership Game held in October 2010 at the US Naval War College. Senior-level representativesfrom more than 40 nations attended, mostly from Navies and Coast Guards. But, other representatives were fromagencies that are considered key contributors to MDA, e.g., customs and border security, port authorities, fisheriesenforcement, and search and rescue organisations. In fact, Titley underscored, every nation with a coastline and awillingness to share information can play important roles in local, regional and global maritime security. Everycoastal state comes to the table with assets that can make important contributions to security. These dont have to beaircraft carrier strike groups. The issue of classified or sensitive data continues to be a concern. Within constraints,however, the USN intends to share as widely as possible accurate and timely information to shape our and ourpartners ability to protect important interests in the maritime domain. Most countries, including the United States,require additional assets to increase and sustain presence for maritime security. Increasingly, this means active andenergetic engagement in regional and global partnerships. Partnerships reduce requirements spread responsibilities,

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    and give small nations equal status. MDA is an organising principle for world Navies and coast guards. It brings usall to a common table. And, there appears to be a growing need to link these and other partnerships together intoregional and global systems, as illustrated figure 4. Effective MDA will be the keystone of cooperative US andinternational efforts to counter maritime threats through regional and global partnerships, according to Titley.Because certain risks and interests are common, facilitation of regional maritime partnerships occurs with fullrecognition and acceptance that our allies and partner nations may not share all of our goals, but well find commonpurpose in countering transnational threats and securing peaceful use of the maritime commons.

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    Beijing is developing and organizing the new 2012 version of the blue-water PLAN to protect shipping in the YellowSea, South China Sea, and East China Sea.Ronald ORourke, [CRS specialist in Naval Affairs] 12/10/2012China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy CapabilitiesBackground and Issues for Congresshttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdfin addition to domestic security/homeland defense, [Chinas military and navy] have twomajor layers:

    1. China has already developed, and continues to develop rapidly, potent high-end navy andanti-Navy capabilities. Like their other military counterparts, they are focused almostentirely on contested areas close to home.2. It is also developing low-end capabilities. They are relevant primarily for low-intensitypeacetime missions in areas further afield.These two very different dynamics should not be conflated.The second area has attracted headlines recently. China is in the process of developing alimited out-of-area operational capability to extend political influence and protect vitaleconomic interests and PRC citizens working abroad in volatile parts of Africa and otherregions. In essence, China seeks the bonus of being able to show the flag outside East Asiawithout the onus of assuming the cost and political liabilities of building a truly global high end naval capability.But while selected PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels make history by calling on ports in the BlackSea and Mediterranean to include first-ever visits to Israel and Bulgaria, the majority (likethe rest of Chinas armed forces) are focused on areas closer to homeprimarily still contested territorial and

    maritime claims in the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas....Given Beijings substantial focus on issues unlikely to be resolved anytime soon, it is hardlysurprising that there are no reliable indications at this time that China desires a truly-globalblue water navy akin to that of the U.S. today, or which the Soviet Union maintained forsome time, albeit at the eventual cost of strategic overextension. China does seeks [sic] todevelop a blue water navy in the years to comebut one that is more regional thanglobal in nature. Chinese strategists term this a regional [blue-water] defensive andoffensive-type... navy.......we believe Beijing is building a navy to handle a high-intensity conflict close to homewhere it can be supported by its large fleet of conventionally-powered submarines and shore based missiles andaircraft. Vessels such as Chinas soon-to-be-commissioned aircraft carrierand Type 071 amphibious assault ships could be helpful in certain limited conflict scenariosagainst far-less-capable opponentsparticularly in the South China Sea. Yet these large butlimited capital ships most likely use will be for handling missions geared toward:1. The regional mission of showing the flag in disputed areas and attempting to deterpotential adversaries;2. Handling non-traditional security missions both in the East Asian/Western Pacific andIndian Ocean regions such as suppression of piracy, protecting/evacuating Chinese citizenstrapped abroad by violence, and disaster response; as well as3. Making diplomatically-oriented cruises such as the recent visits to Black Sea ports, whichare aimed at showing the flag and showing foreign and domestic audiences that China isbecoming a truly global power.By contrast, there is currently little evidence that China is building a blue water capability toconfront a modern navy like the U.S beyond the PLANs East/Southeast Asian home-regionwaters. Beijing is accruing a limited expeditionary capability, but is not preparing to gohead-to-head with U.S. carrier battle groups outside of East Asia and the Western Pacific.

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    Overviews / extensions

    Extend the Low evidence. Only a rising regional power with a newfound commitment to policing the

    South China Sea can pick up the U.S. Navys slack and protect global trade, peace, and Americas other

    interests. Japan cant because of its constitution. Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore dont have strong

    enough navies. Only China is suited to this necessity.

    Even if the USA could still act alone, a lack of collaboration would doom the effort according to Yales

    Montieroxiv because isolationism and disengagement both cause even more conflict.

    Before the rise, China was unable to cooperate. During the rise, China started to develop the ability, but

    lacked the will and, fortunately, the need, since the US Navy was still safe from budget cuts. Now that

    China has risen to the occasion, its able to make an otherwise turbulent transition to a multipolar world

    survivable without the looming specters of terrorism, piracy, and economic collapse.

    During a shift to multipolar restructuring China has managed to slow the US withdrawal with treasury

    bonds and accelerate their rise to the point that they can fill an otherwise fatal power vacuum that

    would have made all of Americas other interests unsustainable.

    To evaluate this contention, compare a world with a risen Chine with a world where China never rose to

    naval, political, and economic prominence. In the world the Con/Neg claims would be better, the US

    Navy would have declined even faster, (no treasury bonds), and the Navy would fight a losing, unilateral

    battle to try and police Malacca until terrorists overwhelmed the most dangerous waterways on Earth.

    In a world where China meets Low and Moores criteria, however, global conflict is averted and global

    trade is preserved because China is able to help both their own and the USAs most crucial interests in a

    way no other nation could.

    To paraphrase Einstein, we dont know whether the ensuing third world war would be fought with

    ICBMs, cyber-warfare, or experimental nanoweapons, but the fourth world war would be fought with

    sticks and rocks.

    iUS maritime strategy is collapsing now budget cuts and a weaker fleet are destroying US naval influence and

    deterrence. US naval power is the proximate check on global conflict escalation; its absence means global instabilityCommander Bryan Clark U.S. Navy (Retired) and Dr. Dan Whiteneck, Strategic Choices at the Tipping Point,Proceedings Magazine - February 2011 Vol. 137/2/1,296,http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-02

    iiSee [i]

    http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-02http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-02http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-02
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    iii

    The barrier to the Thousand Ship Navy has been parity and sovereignty concerns. US cooperation with a risingChinese Navy is the only solution.Desmond Low, [ Major in the Singapore Navy and Staff Officer in the Naval Plans Dept], Global Maritime Partnershipand the Prospects for Malacca Straits Security Pointer 2008 vol34#2,http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2008/v34n2/feature4.html

    iv

    Beijing is developing and organizing the new 2012 version of the blue-water PLAN to protect shipping in the YellowSea, South China Sea, and East China Sea.Ronald ORourke, [CRS specialist in Naval Affairs] 12/10/2012China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy CapabilitiesBackground and Issues for Congresshttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf

    vCooperation creates global partnerships over naval security that allows the US and China to jointly address issues

    in Asian waters.Dr. Scott C. Truver, [Director, National Security Programs, Gryphon Technologies] On the Other Side of the Hill?Global Partnerships for Maritime Domain AwarenessThe View from the United States, by NMCO on 11/ 9/ 2011,http://www.mda.gov/2011/11/09/on-the-other-side-of-the-hill/

    viTerrorist organizations and SE Asian pirates want to attack the Strait of Malacca now, doing so would cause global

    oil shocks, trade collapse, Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and US economic collapseLuft and Korin 4 [Gal, Exec Dir, Institute for Analysis of Global Security and Anne, Dir, Policy and Strategic Planning,

    IAGS] Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec Terrorism goes to Sea,http://www.jmhinternational.com/news/news/selectednews/files/2004/20041201_20041101_ForeignAffairs_TerrorismGoesToSea.pdf

    viiSee [vi]

    viiiSee [vi]

    ixYep, still [vi]

    xIncreased economic pressures and growing deficits mean hegemonic decline is inevitable; budget cuts will force a

    collapse of unipolarity

    Michael Mandelbaum, [Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins School of

    Advanced International Studies, PhD from Harvard] Overpowered? Foreign Affairs. May/June 2010

    http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66223/michael-mandelbaum/overpowered

    xiCooperation is the lynchpin of effective naval power US maritime cooperation key to maintain control over the

    sea despite budget cuts

    Charles C. Moore, [Naval Aviator, Western Pacific Experience, has a Masters from the US Army War College and

    Georgetown, currently commanding office at the Naval Air Station in Meridian.] "Revitalizing the Cooperative

    Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 2007,

    http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/2011summer/Moore.pdf

    xiiSee [iii] and [xi]

    xiii

    South China Sea engagement solves relations and Chinese aggression in the long term.Richard Javad Heydarian, Foreign Policy in Focus contributor, The South China Sea Conundrum Analysis,

    September 2011,http://www.eurasiareview.com/09092011-the-south-china-sea-conundrum-analysis/

    xivDisengagement causes great power nuclear conflict and security breakdowns.

    Nuno M. Monteiro, [Assistant professor of Political Science at Yale University] Unrest Assured, International

    Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 940,http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Unrest_Assured.pdf

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