Master's Thesis - kucuris.ku.dk/ws/files/162169356/Understanding_climate...1.2 Thesis design and...
Transcript of Master's Thesis - kucuris.ku.dk/ws/files/162169356/Understanding_climate...1.2 Thesis design and...
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U N I V E R S I T Y O F C O P E N H A G E N
F A C U L T Y O F S C I E N C E
Master's Thesis
Tine Tolstrup
Understanding climate migration
- An analysis of political discourses and scientific disputes on linkages between climate change and migration in the UNFCCC negotiations
Supervisor: Ole Mertz
Submitted: 06/06/2016
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Front page photos: Flickr; IPCC; 350pacific.org; brookings.edu
Faculty Faculty of Science Department Department of Geosciences and Natural Resource Management Section Geography and Geoinformatics Author Tine Tolstrup Supervisor Ole Mertz Title / Subtitle Understanding climate migration / An analysis of political discourses and scientific disputes on linkages between climate change and migration in the UNFCCC negotiations Number of characters 159.375
ETCS points 30 ETCS
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Abstract
This thesis examines the emergence of the discussion on climate migration within the UNFCCC
and its connection to the scientific research in the field. While the academic research is found not
yet to be in agreement on the terminology and linkages between climate change and migration, the
political debate has emerged since COP16 in 2010. Structured with the methodology of a discourse
analysis the thesis assesses three different levels through an analysis of the negotiation texts,
followed by an analysis of the applied discourses and connection to scientific research and finally a
discussion of the wider implications of the UNFCCC negotiations.
The text analysis finds an increasing recognition of climate migration as a phenomenon in the
UNFCCC agreements. From the first official mentioning at COP16 the agreements have shifted
from an objective to enhance understanding of climate migration to a more action-oriented
objective to address and minimise climate migration in the COP21 agreement. However, from the
present state of the negotiations it is not yet clear which climate change events, types of mobility or
groups of people are considered in the UNFCCC discussions on climate migration. Hence, the
analysis of the discursive practice identifies that numerous diverging discourses promoted by
alliances of developing and developed countries are competing to define the approach to climate
migration in the UNFCCC. The current rivalry is found to be between the developing countries'
"refugee discourse" arguing for compensation schemes and new international treaties against the
developed countries' "conflict discourse" emphasising international security rather than
humanitarian consequences. From a discussion of the wider implications of the debate, it is
concluded that the UNFCCC's recognition of climate migration have brought new stakeholders into
the discussion and that these both have an important role but also might dilute an already diffuse
debate. Overall, the thesis finds the climate migration debate in the UNFCCC is at risk of being
taken hostage of interests of different stakeholders which can result in ineffective policies if a
stronger coupling to scientific research and a clearer understanding of the terminology is not
achieved.
Keywords: UNFCCC ♦ Climate change ♦ Migration ♦ Discourse analysis
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Table of content
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................ 1
Abbreviations ....................................................................................................................................... 4
List of figures and tables ...................................................................................................................... 5
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 6
1.1 Research question .................................................................................................................. 7
1.1.1 Sub questions ................................................................................................................. 7
1.2 Thesis design and structure ................................................................................................... 7
2 Background ............................................................................................................ 9
2.1 The context of climate change and migration ....................................................................... 9
2.2 The international frameworks and legislation ..................................................................... 11
2.2.1 Current legislation and protection of refugees and displaced persons ......................... 11
2.2.2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ............................... 13
3 Scientific research on climate change and migration ...................................... 15
3.1 The relation between climate change and migration ........................................................... 15
3.1.1 Types and terminology of climate migration ............................................................... 15
3.1.2 Correlations and causality ............................................................................................ 19
3.2 Political discourses and international climate change negotiations .................................... 20
3.2.1 Political approaches and discourses to climate-induced migration ............................. 20
3.2.2 The "alarmist" versus the "sceptics" perspective ......................................................... 23
3.2.3 Responsibility and negotiations in international climate politics ................................ 24
3.2.4 Theoretical suggestions for international frameworks to protect climate migrants ..... 25
4 Methodology ........................................................................................................ 28
4.1 Discourse analysis as a method of understanding climate migration .................................. 28
4.1.1 Overall theory and methodology of discourse analysis ............................................... 28
4.1.2 Political discourses ....................................................................................................... 29
4.1.3 Fairclough’s three dimensional model of discourse .................................................... 30
4.1.4 Application and limitations of the use of discourse analysis ....................................... 31
4.2 Scope and scale of the thesis ............................................................................................... 32
4.2.1 Delimitations of the thesis............................................................................................ 34
4.3 Assessment of stakeholders and sources ............................................................................. 34
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5 Text analysis of the climate migration discussion within the UNFCCC ....... 36
5.1 Climate migration discussions in the UNFCCC before COP16.......................................... 36
5.2 COP16: The Cancun Adaptation Framework (2010) .......................................................... 37
5.3 COP17: The Durban Platform (2011) ................................................................................. 39
5.4 COP18: The Doha Climate Gateway (2012) ....................................................................... 40
5.5 COP19: The Warsaw International Mechanism (2013) ...................................................... 42
5.6 COP20: The Lima Call for Climate Action (2014) ............................................................. 44
5.7 COP21: The Paris Agreement (2015) ................................................................................. 46
6 The discursive practice of the UNFCCC discussion ........................................ 50
6.1 The UNFCCC discourse and its relation to the basic discourses ........................................ 50
6.1.1 The "refugee discourse" ............................................................................................... 50
6.1.2 The "adaptation discourse" .......................................................................................... 51
6.1.3 The "conflict discourse" and international bias ........................................................... 51
6.1.4 The loss and damage agenda and "relocation discourse"............................................. 52
6.1.5 The current antagonism between the UNFCCC discourses ......................................... 54
6.2 The UNFCCC discourse and its relation to the scientific discussion .................................. 55
6.2.1 The role of the IPCC and scientific research ............................................................... 57
6.2.2 Dynamics between the UNFCCC discourse and academic research ........................... 58
7 Implications of the UNFCCC discussion on climate migration...................... 61
7.1 A political game of compensation and power relations? .................................................... 62
7.2 The UNFCCC discourse and transformation of the discursive order ................................. 64
7.2.1 New stakeholders entering the debate .......................................................................... 64
7.2.2 The role of non-state actors in the debate .................................................................... 65
7.3 Future discussions and cooperation on climate migration .................................................. 66
8 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 68
9 Literature ............................................................................................................. 71
10 Appendices ........................................................................................................... 81
Appendix 1: Progression of human mobility from COP13 to COP16 ........................................... 81
Appendix 2: Progression of Loss and Damage discussion from COP13 to COP20 ...................... 82
Appendix 3: Workplan of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage .............. 83
Appendix 4: Conceptualization and contextualization issues emerging from the literature .......... 84
Appendix 5: Conceptualization and contextualization issues not dealt with in the literature ........ 85
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Abbreviations
AOSIS Alliance of Small Islands States
AR4 The Fourth IPCC Assessment Report (2007)
AR5 The Fifth IPCC Assessment Report (2014)
COP Conference of Parties
G77 Group of 77
IDP’s Internally Displaced Persons
IOM International Organisation for Migration
IPCC The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LCA Long-Term Cooperation Action
LDC Least Developed Countries
SIDS The Pacific Small Island Developing States
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
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List of figures and tables
Figure 1: Estimated climate change impacts by region ..................................................................... 10
Figure 2: A complex interrelationship: Migration, environment, resources and development ......... 15
Figure 3: Three definitional scenarios of the climate-migrant debate ............................................... 23
Figure 4: Fairclough’s three dimensional model of discourse analysis ............................................. 31
Figure 5: Elaborated research design for discourse analysis ............................................................. 33
Figure 6: Research design of this thesis ............................................................................................. 33
Figure 7: Overview of the negotiation results on climate migration in the COP16-21 ..................... 49
file:///C:/Users/Tine%20Tolstrup/Documents/KU-Geografi/THESIS/Thesis_050616_v4.docx%23_Toc452923547file:///C:/Users/Tine%20Tolstrup/Documents/KU-Geografi/THESIS/Thesis_050616_v4.docx%23_Toc452923548file:///C:/Users/Tine%20Tolstrup/Documents/KU-Geografi/THESIS/Thesis_050616_v4.docx%23_Toc452923549file:///C:/Users/Tine%20Tolstrup/Documents/KU-Geografi/THESIS/Thesis_050616_v4.docx%23_Toc452923553
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1 Introduction
In recent years the notions of "climate refugees", "environmental migrants" or “people displaced by
climate change” have made media headlines in the coverage of the United Nations' annual climate
change negotiations. Estimates have been made that more than 200 million people will be forced to
flee over the next 30 years if climate change continues at current rates (Biermann and Boas 2010)
and humanitarian organisations have demanded rapid action for humanitarian aid and legislative
coverage for the people displaced by sea-level rise, extreme weather events and other climate
change impacts (Field et al. 2014). In addition, the recent migration debate in Europe has put further
focus on how climate change is threatening to exacerbate the current migration trends and can
potentially have destabilising effects in terms of regional or even international security (Karasapan
2015).
While the public debate is emerging and the concept of climate migrants appears to be
consolidating in the mass media, there are still many unresolved questions and unclear correlations
from an academic point of view. There is a strong ambiguity related to the notion of climate
migration which draws upon several different agendas and hence challenges the current legislative
systems, academic research and international structures (Faist and Schade 2013; Martin 2010). As
both climate change and migration dynamics are highly complex phenomena, the interlinkages
between the two are still being researched in order to detect or reject robust correlations and make
estimates on the extent and geographical scope of climate migration (Mayer 2015). Additionally,
many researchers have called for a clearer and more transparent debate than the one of "climate
refugees" which has reference to the current refugee legislation under which people affected by
climate change are not currently covered (Mayer 2013; Methmann and Oels 2015).
The United Nations has been engaged with environmental migration since the 1980's and more
recently the debate on climate-induced migration has emerged within the United Nations
Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC). The negotiations have progressed over the
past years but also created significant disagreements about international responsibilities and
revealed very contradicting approaches to climate migration among the different country alliances
(Ferris 2015; Warner 2012). Furthermore, it is interesting to examine this development as the role
of the UNFCCC is likely to influence how other agencies will address agendas and policies related
to climate migration in the future (Warner 2013).
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Without clear definitions and common understanding of the phenomenon of climate migration it has
been questioned whether the debate within the UNFCCC is sufficiently rooted in academic research
or rather a contest of promoting other political interests framed as climate migration (Mayer 2015).
As international policies and agreements are created on the basis of the UNFCCC negotiations of
climate migration it is important to clarify the content of the term "climate migration" and this
thesis aspires to assess the current state of the debate within the UNFCCC . Studies of the scientific
research has identified a gap on the issue of why some discourses are adopted in the political debate
despite limited empirical evidence or critical analysis (Upadhyay et al. 2014). Hence, this thesis will
contribute towards more clarity by assessing how different stakeholders have competed to influence
the meaning of climate migration. Additionally, imprecise and scientifically uninformed
terminology entails the risk of inappropriate governance and this thesis aims to qualify the debate
by clarifying how the debate in the UNFCCC has been related to the scientific disputes.
1.1 Research question
How have different discourses influenced the evolving debate on climate migration and how does a
political system such as the UNFCCC operate in the face of scientific uncertainty?
1.1.1 Sub questions
Which scientific relations can be identified between climate change and migration?
What are the different political discourses around climate migration?
How has climate migration been addressed in the negotiations of the UNFCCC and which
discourses are reflected in these developments?
How has scientific research been included in the UNFCCC discussions?
What role does the discussion within the UNFCCC have for the wider debate on climate
migration?
1.2 Thesis design and structure
To answer the research question and sub questions the thesis has been divided into 8 chapters.
Following this introduction chapter 2, Background, contextualises the introduction by giving a brief
outline of the state of the current debate and legislation on climate migration and provides a starting
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point for the following theoretical elaborations. Chapter 3, Scientific research on climate change
and migration, then provides the theoretical foundation of the thesis and presents the academic
research and discussions on the characteristics and coupling between climate change and migration.
Furthermore, the political discourses to climate migration are presented in this section as these will
act as reference points in the analysis to explore the approach of different stakeholders. Some basic
concepts of international climate change governance are also outlined to provide an understanding
of the UNFCC system and the frame of negotiations. Chapter 4, Methodology, includes the
scientific approach and analytic framework of the thesis which is based on the discourse analysis.
Methodological considerations are presented to explain how the discourse analysis supports the
thesis in answering the main research question as well as the limitations of this methodology are
reflected upon. The analytical framework of the discourse analysis consists of three levels; the text,
the discursive practice and the social practice which are covered in chapter 5, 6, and 7. Chapter 5,
Text analysis of the climate migration discussion within the UNFCCC, forms the first section of the
analysis and is structured as a document analysis of the negotiations from COP16 to COP21 and
assesses how the discussion on climate migration has developed. The following chapter 6, The
discursive practice of the UNFCCC discussion, builds upon these findings and analyse them in
relation to the different political discourses and the development of a common understanding of
climate migration. Additionally, the chapter reflects on whether the UNFCCC discussion has built
upon the scientific research as well as how the developments in the negotiations has influenced the
research. Chapter 7, Implications of the UNFCCC discussion on climate migration, looks beyond
the scope of the UN system and consider which implications the UNFCCC discussion and
discourses have had for the social practice e.g. the wider debate and future actions on climate
migration. Finally chapter 8, Conclusion, reflects upon the overall findings of the thesis on how the
UNFCCC discourse has developed and how it has related to the scientific discussions.
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2 Background
This section presents an outline of the climate migration projections as well as trends and estimates
presented in the general public debate. Furthermore, it provides an overview of the current
legislation relating to climate migration by presenting the coverage of relevant refugee conventions
and climate change treaties as well as give a brief introduction to the setup and principles of the
UNFCCC and COP meetings.
2.1 The context of climate change and migration
Already in 1990 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) made warnings that
climate change could lead to large flows of migration (Martin 2010). In the fifth and most recent
IPCC assessment report (AR5) from 2014 migration and displacement was directly addressed with
the overall statement that “climate change over the 21st century is projected to increase
displacement of people” (IPCC 2014b). This was stated with a “medium evidence” and “high
agreement”1 and the AR5 elaborates that migration patterns can be considered “[...] responses to
both extreme weather events and longer-term climate variability and change, and migration can
also be an effective adaptation strategy” (IPCC 2014b). The climate change induced events which
are generally considered to cause migration are sea level rise, drought and loss of freshwater
resources, extreme events such as cyclones and effects such as deterioration of natural environments
such as coral reefs or changing seasonality impacting livelihoods and food security (Warner 2013).
Since the 1980’s attempts have been made to quantify the number of “environmental refugees” and
later more specifically climate migrants. These studies vary in approach and definitions and the
majority of recent estimates range from around 150-250 million people by 2050 while the most
controversial projections with broad definitions estimate that up to one billion people might be
forced to migrate by 20502 (Biermann and Boas 2010; Faist and Schade 2013). Following these
large differences the IPCC underlines that there is generally a low degree of confidence in these
quantitative estimates given the complex, multi-causal nature of migration (IPCC 2014b). However,
1 The IPCC operates with a scale based on the degree of evidence and agreement. The evidence is based on its type, amount, quality
and consistency and evaluated as limited, medium or robust whereas the scientific agreement ranges between low, medium or high.
Furthermore, the confidence of a statement or estimate is evaluated as very low, low, medium, high or very high (Mastrandrea et al.
2010).
2 Estimate by the Christian Aid in 2007 covering both environmental and climate migrants and IDP's (Faist and Schade 2013).
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People affected each year by 2080's by storm surges with
sea-level rise of 38 cm
•Africa: 82 mio. South Mediterranean: 13 million West Africa: 36 million East Africa: 33 million
•Asia: 141 mio. South Asia: 98 million Southeast Asia: 43 million
•Latin America: N/A
•Small island states: 2,5 mio.
Estimated climate refugees due to sea-level rise by 2050
•Africa: Egypt: 12 mio. Nigeria: 6-11 mio.
•Asia: Bangaladesh: 26 mio. China: 73 mio. India: 20 mio.
•Latin America: N/A
•Small Island States: 1 mio.
People at risk of water stress by 2085 due to a temperature
increase of 2-3 degrees
•Africa: North Africa: 155-599 mio. South /East Africa: 15-529 mio. West Africa: 27-517 mio.
•Asia: South Asia: 39-812 mio. West Asia: 95-492 mio. Central Asia: 14-228 mio. East Asia: 41-1577 mio.
Estimates related to drought and water stress
•Africa: 14 African currently experience water stress. Expected to rise to 24 countries by 2030.
•Asia: Millions at risk due to the glacier melt in Himalayas. 50-60 percent of world population live in the lartger Himalaya-Hindu Kush region and could be affected.
•Latin America: Glacier melt in the Andes could cause water stress for 40 mio. by 2050.
•Small island states: Water availability could become too low during low rainfall season.
it is recognised that forced climate-induced migration is “[...] an emerging issue requiring more
scrutiny by governments in organizing development cooperation, and to be factored into
international policy making as well as international refugee policies” (Hewitson et al. 2014).
The climate change influenced events which cause migration is projected to disproportionally affect
the developing countries due to a combination of geographical conditions and socio-economic
factors which means that people living in these areas are generally more vulnerable and have a
lower capacity to prepared and adapt to such events (Hugo 2010; Warner et al. 2012). Here the risk
of displacement is higher due to a larger exposure to e.g. extreme weather events such as tropical
cyclones and flooding which are expected to cause climate migration (IPCC 2014b). An overview
of regional climate change impacts and estimates of displaced people as identified in different
studies can be found in figure 1. However, these numbers vary significant and include a risk of
double-counting people who will be affected by several climate change impacts which will initiate
migration (Laczko and Piguet 2014).
Climate migration is estimated “[...] to be mainly internal, with a smaller proportion taking place
between neighbouring countries, and even smaller numbers migrating long distances” (IOM 2009).
However, as a spin off effect the internal displacement of poor people might push international
migration by affecting the conditions of wealthier people in urban areas (Mayer 2013). Along with
the estimates of people who will migrate due to climate conditions, predictions have been made that
“[...] millions of people will be unable to move away from highly vulnerable places” (Foresight
Figure 1: Estimated climate change impacts by region (own illustration after Biermann and Boas 2010)
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2011). Hence, it is highlighted that households and individuals with more and diverse assets have
better possibilities to adapt as they can access a number of different strategies due to their assets and
social networks (Warner et al. 2012). This might result in a situation where the more resourceful
people migrate and the more vulnerable are seen to be left behind and unable to pursue migration as
a strategy to cope with climate change, the so-called “trapped populations” (Warner 2013). As such
it has been predicted that climate change is “[...] equally likely to make migration less possible as
more probable” (Foresight 2011).
Climate-induced migration can have both positive and negative implications. A rapid, unplanned
mass movement following a natural disaster will often be perceived as negative in terms of peoples
living standard and the same applies to the receiving communities which have to cope with
additional and vulnerable people requiring resources. On the other hand a voluntary migration to
reduce risk and add value to a new departure destination can increasingly be seen as a positive
process with potential (Martin 2010).
2.2 The international frameworks and legislation
Climate migration and displacement is only addressed very limited in current governance and
legislations systems on both national and international level (Martin 2010). This section will
describe how the current international frameworks and international refugee conventions cover
people fleeing or migrating due to climate change. Some of the fundamental principles of the
UNFCCC will also be presented to give an understanding of the negotiation context which will be
assessed in the analysis.
2.2.1 Current legislation and protection of refugees and displaced persons
While the debate of "climate refuges" have received increasing attention over the past years the
notion has no current legally foundation. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) is the focal institution within the UN system for protection of refugees and is centred
around the 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
(McLeman 2014). The Convention ensures basic rights for people who have been forced to leave
their country, such as the right to work, housing, public relief and the right of non-refoulement by
which people must not be returned to their country where they face serious threats to their life or
freedom (UNHCR 2011). In the terminology of the Geneva Convention the definition of "refugees"
is limited to individuals who are persecuted due to their "race, religion, nationality, membership of
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a particular social group or political opinion" (UNHCR 2011). With this focus on individuals
fleeing across borders because of political reasons the protection of people displaced by other
reason such as climate change is not currently covered within the Geneva Convention. Some
regional refugee conventions3 offer protection for refugees displaced by other reasons such as
"disruption of public order" which could include some climate change impacts (IASC 2008).
Furthermore, these conventions have a broader interpretation as they also include groups rather than
solely individuals (Kälin 2010).
In relation to the international refugee conventions the issue of statelessness has also been raised as
a potential consequence of the disappearance of small island states following sea-level rise (Cournil
2011). This presents several legislative issues amongst other because the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights includes a right to nationality which could potentially be threatened (McAdam
2010). Furthermore, the challenge of relocating entire nations while guaranteeing their basic rights
and avoid marginalisation provides a challenge (Kälin 2010). The UNHCR has a mandate to
address statelessness but it is not currently clear whether the international conventions would
recognise citizenships in the situation where a state had lost its territory completely (IASC 2008).
In addition to the cross-border mobility the migration or displacement happening within a country
also challenge the legislative frameworks. People affected by climate-induced migration who have
not moved beyond borders can potentially be categorised as “internally displaced persons” (IDP’s)
who are legally included in the UNHCR Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Koser 2011).
However, these principles are not legally binding and put the responsibility on the affected states
but do not specify any obligations of the international community or other states (Biermann and
Boas 2010) which is potentially a challenge in case of large flux of people migrating. The African
Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa
directly recognises that state parties must protect and assist IDP's who have been displaced due to
"natural or human-made disasters, including climate change" (Martin 2010). However, this is only
seen to cover a part of the potential climate change events that can lead to migration or
displacement as it does not include the slow-onset events. In the slow-onset climate change events
leading to migration and displacement it can be also difficult to distinguish between forced and
voluntary migration which additional challenges the current setup of protection. Overall, the global
governance of migration and displacement as a consequence of climate change is seem to be very
3 The 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 1984
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees.
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limited both in terms of international and national mobility and in order to cover climate migration
new interpretations are required (Methmann and Oels 2015). Furthermore, the current system
primarily put the responsibilities of protection on the individual state and leaves the international
role undefined in the case where a state is not able to protect people displaced by climate change
(Epiney 2010).
2.2.2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
As the central actor in this thesis the basic setup and main principles of the UNFCCC will be
presented in this section. The convention was established in 1994 as a result of the "Rio Earth
Summit" along with the conventions on biological diversity and desertification (UNFCCC 2016b).
As of today 197 countries have ratified the Convention with the main objective to prevent "[...]
dangerous human interference with the climate system" through a stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere (UNFCCC 2016b). As a UN framework convention the UNFCCC
can be considered an outline of principles and formal mechanisms for cooperation but the
operationalisation can only happen through the adoption of binding agreements.
In order to achieve the objective of the convention the Kyoto Protocol was agreed upon in 1997 at
the annual Conference of Parties (COP) meeting which outlined binding emissions reduction targets
until 2012 (McLeman 2014). A main principle of the Kyoto Protocol is the one of "common but
differentiated responsibilities" which builds upon the idea that a group industrialised countries with
historically higher emissions of greenhouse gasses should be obliged to have larger reduction
targets. This group is called the "Annex I" countries and comprises of members of the OECD in
1992, countries with economies in transitions, Russia and a number of Eastern European countries
(UNFCCC 2016d). Additionally, a group called the "Annex II" countries consisting of the Annex I
countries except the transitioning economies have made commitments to provide financial support
for developing countries to reduce their emissions (UNFCCC 2016d). While not all countries have
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, e.g. the United States, and many countries have not met their initial
reduction targets the Kyoto Protocol has formed the basis of the continuous negotiations. In 2012
the reduction targets were extended to also cover the period from 2013-20 and latest at COP21 in
2015 the parties agreed upon Intended National Determined Contributions as the new reduction
targets from 2020 (UNFCCC 2016b)
In addition to the mitigation efforts the UNFCCC is also engaged with adaptation measures. This
was outlined in Kyoto Protocol and have been elaborated at later COP meetings such as COP16 in
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2010 where it was agreed upon that adaptation should be given the same attention as mitigation
(McLeman 2014). To support this objective financial mechanisms have been established, such as
the Adaptation Fund which aims to support adaptation programs in developing countries and
minimise the negative effect of climate change (UNFCCC 2016b).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has a focal role in the UNFCCC
negotiations as the panel reviews and assesses scientific research and synthesises this in the so-
called Assessment Reports (AR) which form the basis of the UNFCCC negotiations (McLeman
2014). The IPCC is an independent body established under the UN Environmental Program and the
World Meteorological Organization and is divided into three working groups (WG) which assess
respectively the physical science, the impacts of climate change and the mitigation strategies
(McLeman 2014). The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice under the
UNFCCC supports the negotiations with updated scientific research and have mutual cooperation
with the IPCC in the sense that the UNFCCC both receives and requests information from the IPCC
and cooperate on shared interests (UNFCCC 2016b).
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Population Mobility
Environment Economic
Development and Social Change
Resources
3 Scientific research on climate change and migration
In this chapter the theoretical foundation of the analysis is presented with focus on the relation and
causality between climate change and migration as well as political approaches to the discourses of
“climate migration”. As the terminology of climate migration is yet relatively new and under
development, the different theoretic positions will be presented in order to clarify disagreements
and inconsistencies which have implications for governance. In addition to the scientific relation
and causality, different theories around political approaches to climate migration are presented to
support the analysis of the political negotiation process of the COP21. Further considerations on the
selection of theories as well as their strengths and weaknesses are elaborated in chapter 5 on
methodology.
3.1 The relation between climate change and migration
3.1.1 Types and terminology of climate migration
Migration is often described as a complex process with multiple causes and triggering factors
(Upadhyay et al. 2014). As seen in figure 2 both the resources and asset of people, the economic
development and social change in the community as well as the surrounding natural environment
are all interacting and contributing factors for the decision to migrate (Hugo 2010).
Figure 2: A complex interrelationship: Migration, environment, resources and development (own illustration after
Hugo 2010)
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Environmental induced migration has been described and discussed over the previous decades and
can generally be broken into a number of sub-categories; natural disasters4, cumulative changes
5,
involuntarily-caused and industrial accidents6, conflict and workforce
7 as well as development
projects8 (Hugo 2010). In the emerging literature climate change is primarily considered to affect
the migration caused by natural disasters and cumulative changes. Where natural disasters are
typically categorised as “sudden onset” events, the cumulative changes are “slow onset” events and
this distinction is an important factor in terms of climate-induced migration. Migration following
sudden onset events such as natural disasters is often seem to be large-scale but temporary while
slow onset events cause more gradual and permanent migration (Hugo 2010). While some sudden
onset events can be identified as the direct trigger of migration, it is often difficult to isolate the
importance of the environment or even more difficult climate change on migration compared to
other factors. In general climate change is often considered a threat multiplier exacerbating existing
vulnerabilities which implies that countries or regions with e.g. a low level of socio-economic
development are likely to be affected more severely than those having a higher capacity to absorb
shock and stresses (Piguet, Pecoud, and Guchteneire 2011).
The process of climate migration is often analysed in a continuum between “voluntary” and
“forced” movement which is often related to the nexus of “planned” and “spontaneous” (Martin
2010). The main characteristics of forced migration are a continued commitment to the origin
destination, no possibilities for preparation or bringing assets, a strong level of stress and few
connections at the new destination (Hugo 2010). By differentiating mobility based on the level of
voluntariness three categories has been developed by Renuad et al (2010):
“Environmentally motivated migrants” who make a choice to move based on a number of
factors, including environmental
“Environmentally forced migrants” who are forced to move due to environmental factors
but still have a choice in terms of the timing
“Environmental refugees” who cannot control neither the timing nor the actual moving
In an attempt to operationalise the notion of climate migration Kälin proposes classifications with
five scenarios which call upon different legal and policy response; sudden disasters, slow-onset
4 E.g. floods, earthquakes, landslides and hurricanes. 5 E.g. drought, land degradation, sea-level rise and water deficiency. 6 E.g. nuclear accidents and environmental pollution. 7 E.g. conflicts due to natural resources and intentional destruction of environment. 8 E.g. construction of dams, urbanisation and mining activities.
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environmental degradation, sinking small island states, high-risk zones and unrest seriously
disturbing public order (Kälin 2010). Such classification opens the possibility of specifying the
typical status and need for individuals and hence identify the relevant protection frameworks or lack
hereof.
While the classifications above primarily take point of departure in the cause or type of migration,
Biermann and Boas (2010) take additional steps towards a definition and identifies three parameters
that such one must address; the cause of migration, the type of migration and an appropriate
terminology. In their own attempt to create a more concise definition a number of restrictions9
relating to broader environmental migration are applied and through this limitation Biermann and
Boas define climate refugees as the “[...] victims of a set of three direct, largely undisputed climate
change impacts: sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity” (Biermann
and Boas 2010). In the assessment of which types of migration a new definition should entail the
degree of “voluntariness” of migration is excluded as a criteria of importance. Such distinguishing
between “voluntary climate migrants” and “forced climate refugees” is argued to be difficult to
apply in reality as it would create different levels of need for protection and support which would
not be supported by existing political and legal structures (Biermann and Boas 2010). In terms of
terminology Biermann and Boas prefer the term “refugees” to ensure that “ [...] the protection of
climate refugees will receive the legitimacy and urgency it deserves” (Biermann and Boas 2010).
The UN Environmental Programme introduced the notion of “environmental refugee” in 198510
and
the term of “climate refugees” has increasingly been reinforced as a discourse over the past years
(Biermann and Boas 2010; Faist and Schade 2013). However, some scholars and international
agencies such as the IOM and UNCHR warn against the use of “climate refugees” as this has no
legal foundation in the current systems and is therefore feared to undermine the existing refugee
conventions by widening and diluting the special title of “refugees” (IASC 2008; IOM 2015).
These categories also reveal the theoretical distinction between considering climate migration as
displacement versus as a more active adaptation strategy (Faist and Schade 2013; Hugo 2010).
Some scholars have argued for a reorientation of the debate on the climate-migration nexus and a
need to “[...] take the discussion to a new realm in capabilities for facing climate change” with a
9 The following incidents are not including in Boas and Biermann's definition of "climate refugees": 1. Climate change impacts
which have no or limited link with forced migration, such as heat waves. 2. Forced migration which is related to climate change
mitigation efforts, such as construction of dams to prevent flooding. 3. Migration related to general environmental degradation, such
as pollution. 4. Migration caused by indirect impacts of climate change, such as conflict over resources. (Biermann and Boas 2010). 10 The term "environmental refugee was defined by the UNEP as "[...] people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat,
temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized
their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life" (Biermann and Boas 2010).
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focus on affected people’s agency rather than vulnerabilities (Faist and Schade 2013). The literature
increasingly highlight the importance of migrants as active, resilient subjects rather than solely
perceiving climate-induced migration as vulnerability (Faist and Schade 2013; Laczko and Piguet
2014; Methmann and Oels 2015). Methmann and Oels argue that the debate on climate migration
during the 2000’s has been influenced by the emergence of the term “resilience” and has
increasingly shifted from “[...] a pathology to be prevented” to considering migration as a “[...]
rational strategy of adaptation to unavoidable levels of climate change” (Methmann and Oels
2015). The theoretical notion of voluntariness and agency is important in the debate as it can be
seen for decisive elements for the status of the affected people, their need for assistance and the
development of new governance and policy.
Another distinction in the academic debate is the one between internal and international migration.
As much of the public debate as well as academic research have been focused on the international
migration and its potential consequences for regional stability, some scholars have argued that a
bias towards international migration has arisen and that the impact and extent of the internal
migration have been overlooked (Koser 2011; Mayer 2013). This suggested disproportional focus
on international migration is attempted to be explained through three different scenarios. First, it is
argued that the international community considers international migration a larger threat than
internal migration. However, the critiques argue that the people who migrate internationally in
general have more resources and are more stable than the internal migrants or non-migrants (Mayer
2013). The second theory of the international bias is that internal migrants are currently covered
with better legislative protection through the IDP conventions than the international migrants and
hence more focus should be put on international migrations. However, this assumption is also
challenged by the claim that the protection of internal migrants is fully reliant on the specific state
which weakens the potential protection (Koser 2011; Mayer 2013). Thirdly, as a more structural
explanation of the international bias is that a skewed power relation between developed and
developing countries in the international negotiations implies that developed countries are more
active in setting the agenda of climate migrants and tend to drive this in the direction of their own
interest and concern (Koser 2011).
Overall, these theoretic distinctions between environmental and climate migration, forced or
voluntary migration, adaptation or displacement as well as international or internal migration
challenges the process of establishing clear correlations and furthermore creates numerous,
diverging approaches which have important implications for the academic and political debate.
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3.1.2 Correlations and causality
A general discussion in relation to theories on climate-induced migration is whether it is possible to
establish clear correlations and causalities given the multi-causal nature of migration. This
challenge is captured by the so-called “double uncertainty” which refers to the complex process of
migration coupled with the uncertainty in predicting and projecting climate change (Faist and
Schade 2013). With climate change being a heterogeneous process with numerous variables
resulting in different impacts and no uniform consequences, some scholars argue that direct cause-
effect linkages are nearly impossible to establish (Piguet, Pecoud, and Guchteneire 2011). Others
also point to the fact that current climate change projections have a relatively high level of
uncertainty on a local scale and that the non-linear nature of climate change makes it difficult to
make quantitative predictions for the future (Faist and Schade 2013).
Two main terms are highlighted in the argumentation of why establishing causality between
migration is challenging; cumulative causation and path-dependency (Faist and Schade 2013;
McLeman 2014). The cumulative causation11
implies that migration is constantly influenced by the
surrounding conditions and can be self-perpetuating regardless of its original drivers which makes it
almost impossible to identify an initial driver such as climate change (Faist and Schade 2013).
Furthermore, migration processes are seen to be “path dependent” meaning that new migration
flows tend to follow previous ones regardless of their cause which makes it difficult to distinguish
climate migration from other forms of migration (McLeman 2014).
With such challenges in mind some scholars argue that the attempt to study and establish causality
is arbitrary and hence suggest that the notion of climate migration should be abandoned as a
theoretical term (Nicholson 2014). Based on a literature review Mayer concludes that there is
empirical evidence that climate change will increase the number of migrants but at the same time
highlights the challenges and unnecessarily in separating the environmental and climatic factors
from the other drivers of migration (Mayer 2013). A critique of the on-going academic debate is
raised as this is claimed to be “self-justifying” in the sense that more research was constantly called
upon rather than qualifying the research and applying multidisciplinary approaches (Mayer 2013).
As such Mayer and other scholars12
argue that the notion is somewhat meaningless and that there
are no ethical or logical reasons to focus more on the protection of climate migrants compared to
11 Myrdals originial definition of cumulative causation: “[...] each act of migration alters the social context within which subsequent
migration decisions are made, thus increasing the likelihood of additional movement. Once the number of network connections in a
community reaches a critical threshold, migration becomes self-perpetuating.” 12 E.g. Betts 2013 and Nicholson 2014.
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other migrants or people affected by natural disasters without the possibility to migrate. Hence, he
considers climate migration as a new terminological invention which only serves a purpose in terms
of governance (Mayer 2013).
Concurrently, many scholars endorse the acknowledgement of a challenging causality but does not
consider this a reason to discard the term: “The complex role which climate-induced change plays in
the migration process does not diminish the claim for human rights protection. However, it poses
challenging circumstances for the design and application of such protection” (Zetter 2010).
3.2 Political discourses and international climate change negotiations
The scientific and theoretical research and discussions have significant implications in shaping the
political debate, especially in the case of a relatively new discussion such as the one on climate
migration. The following section is aimed at outlining different political discourses and conditions
in international negotiations which shape the debate around climate migration and will support the
analysis and understanding of the positions represented in the UNFCCC system and COP21
negotiations. This includes the different political approaches to the phenomenon itself, theory on the
framework and basic principles of the climate talks and potential theoretical solutions.
3.2.1 Political approaches and discourses to climate-induced migration
By recognising the diverging approaches to the linkages and implications of climate migration five
different political approaches to climate migration have been identified (Faist and Schade 2013) and
will serve as references to identify discourses in the UNFCCC debate. These cover a wide range
from apocalyptic to solution-oriented approaches and include the:
1. Ecosystem discourse which forms the basis of the other discourses by highlighting the
point that climate change will lead to deterioration of ecosystems which will make people
migrate and hence argue strongly for climate change mitigation to prevent this. The
underlying argument of the “environmental push” is also applied in the other discourses in
various degrees.
2. Conflict discourse which is dominated by scholars within peace and conflict studies and
security institutions. The focus is on climate change migration as a driver in terms of
territoriality and intra-state conflict and is considered as a threat to international security.
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3. Refugee discourse which increasingly focuses on human security and governance by
calling for review of international law and raises question of compensation and IDP’s and
people from disappearing small island states.
4. Adaptation discourse which consider climate migration less of a problem and more of an
active solution and adaptation in which people have capacity and agency. In this approach
focus is on the potential in an adaptation strategy where migration can generate remittances
and hence diversify livelihoods.
5. Relocation discourse which puts emphasis on the human suffering which cannot be
mitigated nor adapted to. Hence, preventive measures through planned relocation is seen as
the proactive solution to these challenges and are argued to be applicable for both small
island states, flood prone areas and vulnerable areas of overexploited ecosystems.
Such categorisations as developed by Faist and Schade (2013) can be used to understand the
underlying rational and interests behind different approaches. However, it is also important to
notice that all of the presented discourses subscribe to the fundamental premise of the
“environmental push” and the linkages between climate change and migration. Additionally, the
five discourses represent archetypes and most examples in the actual debate will be seen to apply
modified or merged versions of the five discourses.
In a broader sense, issues such as climate migration can be considered an issue to which the overall
political framing has important implications for the course of the debate (Vogler 2016). Hence, the
categorisations by Faist and Schade (2013) can be supplemented by a theory which outline the
discourses with more fundamental differences in their approach and highlight that “policy actors
use diverse discursive strategies in order to frame the issue in accordance with their perceptions
and with the constraints imposed by other actors” (Vlassopoulos 2013). To illustrate these different
discourses and their underlying assumptions and motivations three scenarios describing the relation
between cause, problem, consequences and solutions are put forward (also see figure 3):
1. Environmental migration as a multi-causal problem. This scenario considers a relatively
wide range of environmental drivers for the problem of migration and is therefore not
limited to climate-induced migration. As a result the proposed solutions in this approach are
similarly broad by pleading for sustainable development which is aimed to both protect the
environment to address the cause of the problem as well as the migrating people as the
problem. This approach has traditionally been dominated by environmental and
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humanitarian scholars and organisations and have by some been considered as influenced by
the alarmist discourse by applying pessimistic projections for future scenarios. The
discourse’s ability to include a different types of migrants has been highlighted as a strength
but this has also been seen to challenge policy making due to the broad and heterogeneous
definitions. (Vlassopoulos 2013)
2. Climate migration as a consequence. In this scenario the causes and problems are limited
to climate change and all other environmental factors are not considered. Hence, climate
migration is seen as a consequences and one which the international community is expected
to address due to the global nature of climate change. This shift to framing climate migration
as an international issue have increasingly activated international organisations such as
UNCHR within this discourse. Focus is put on the social vulnerability and solutions are
aimed at adaptation mechanisms through e.g. the UNFCCC system and the development
sector is seen as a key stakeholder in this approach. As such this “development-adaptation
discourse” considers migration as a failure to adapt and provide clear suggestions for policy
agendas in the international community. (Vlassopoulos 2013)
3. Climate migration as a solution. The final scenario has several common features with the
“relocation discourse” and climate migration is considered to be an active adaptation
strategy and solution to climate change. Focus is increasingly on the internal and planned
migration and overall this discourse is seen to be the least alarmist. Due to the recognition of
planned migration, organisations such as IOM and UNCHR maintain their legitimacy in this
discourse but national governments are increasingly seen as key stakeholders with the focus
on internal migration. This also reduces the discussions around responsibilities when
migration is perceived as a solution and not a negative consequences and the policy
suggestion for the scenario is therefore more on supporting national governments in
facilitating planned relocation than establishing new international legislation. However, this
approach is limited by the fact that the planned relocation cannot be applied to all climate
change migration situations but primarily those with a slow-onset nature such as drought
and sea level rise (Vlassopoulos 2013).
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Figure 3: Three definitional scenarios of the climate-migrant debate (own illustration after Vlassopoulos 2013)
Causes Problem Consequences Solutions
1. Different
environmental degradation
Environmental migration
Homeland loss
Impoverishment
Conflict
Sustainable development
Ad hoc convention
2. GHG emissions Climate change Drought, sea level
rise, etc.
Impoverishment
Climate migration
Mitigation and adaptation measures
3. GHG emissions Climate change Drought, sea level
rise, etc.
Impoverishment
Mitigation and adaptation measures
Planned migration
3.2.2 The "alarmist" versus the "sceptics" perspective
The different definitions and terminologies also represents a taxonomy of two positions in the
research on climate migration established by El-Hinnawi in 1985; “the alarmist” versus “the
sceptics” (Gemenne 2011; Martin 2010). The alarmists consider environment and climate change as
the main drivers of migration and stress migration to be a forced process with negative risk for
security both globally and locally (Gemenne 2011; Martin 2010). The sceptics increasingly
emphasise complexity and mix of factors influencing the decision of migration, question the link
between climate and migration and challenges the number of affected people set forward by the
alarmist (Martin 2010).
The alarmist perspective has traditionally been dominated by environmental scientist as well as
NGO’s and interest groups while the sceptics were primarily comprised of migration scholars
(Gemenne 2011). Around the most well-known scholars representing the alarmist perspective is
Myers (2002) who have made estimates of the climate-induced migration to reach 200 million
people which was criticised by sceptics as being speculative and questionable (Gemenne 2011;
Myers 2002). In the same way the research of scholars such as McAdam has been accused of being
“[...] influenced by a sensationalist conception of climate migration cultivated in the media but
denounced by empirical studies” (Mayer 2013).
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In their policy approach the alarmists are pointing at strengthening environmental and humanitarian
policies for protection, climate change mitigation efforts and increased adaptation funding while the
sceptics are favouring status quo and have a larger focus on migration policies and a generally
largely focus on the underlying vulnerabilities of migrants and non-migrants rather than the cause of
the migration (Gemenne 2011; Mayer 2013).
3.2.3 Responsibility and negotiations in international climate politics
Aside from political approaches to climate migration, the introduction of some basic principles and
theories of international climate negotiations is useful for the following analysis. Issues of ethics
and responsibility are typical in climate negotiations due to the disparities in green house gas
emissions as well as future consequences which are in general unequally distributed between
developed and developing countries (Penz 2010).
Three different narratives around responsibility around climate negotiations have been identified
and assign different importance to international engagement and responsibilities (Mayer 2015). The
“rights narrative” focuses on international solidarity and the need for protection of vulnerable
people. As such it calls for either expanding the existing refugee conventions to cover climate
migrants or create a new, separate legislative coverage of these people. The “responsibility
narrative” also argues for protection of climate migrants but take point of departure in the unequal
relationship between countries emitting large amounts of greenhouse gasses and countries affected
the worst by climate change. As this narrative is more focused on the relationship between countries
rather than the rights of affected individuals its response is centred around more overall “loss and
damage” mechanisms rather than specific governance of climate migration. The notion of "loss and
damage" covers the impacts of climate change impacts which cannot be avoided solely by
mitigation or adaptation, such as irrecoverable impacts of lost lives, habitats or repairable impacts
on materials (Roberts and Huq 2015). The third narrative on responsibilities is the “security
narrative” where climate migration is considered a security issues causing political instability
(Mayer 2015). Hence, seen from this narrative it is in the own interest of states to prevent and
address climate migration to reduce its potential negative impact on human security.
In addition to the approaches to international responsibility, the own interest of states have also
been studied in relation to the relative level of climate change impact and socio-economic position
in the negotiations. Climate migration does not only affect developing countries because of their
geographical position but also due to a structural vulnerability where these countries do not have the
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same capacity to adapt as developed countries (Faist and Schade 2013). Some even argue that the
socio-economic status of countries will be more determining for the impacts than the actual
magnitude of climate change (Vogler 2016). These differentiated impacts and vulnerabilities to
climate change can also be perceived to cause different interests in the negotiations. In this view the
"[...] climate change issue and its associated interests are framed quite differently across countries"
(Schroeder, Boykoff, and Spiers 2012). Overall, economic interests are seen to weigh heavier than
the altruistic interest of a stable climate but this is naturally also divergent between countries and as
an example the costs of climate change impacts for small island states are seemed to be significantly
higher than for developed countries (Vogler 2016). However, economic interests cannot be singled
out as the only driver for countries' negotiation strategies as states also have non-economic interests
in terms of security and are receptive to advocacy from non-state actors and the scientific research
(Mayer 2015). In the theory of climate diplomacy, individual states will often join or compromise
their interests in alliances to obtain a stronger positions, especially in the case of developing
countries which are often seen to have smaller delegations as well as less financial and technical
capacity for the negotiations (Vogler 2016). In global climate negotiations these alliances have been
conceptualised in the "North-South" relation capturing the most frequent divide (Hernandez 2014)
which can also be related to the UNFCCC principle of "shared but differentiated responsibilities".
However, these alliances are dynamic according to topic as well as the overall power balance in the
international climate negotiations (Vogler 2016). Additionally, the non-state actors are also seen to
be influential actors and can contribute to a more diverse debate assuming that the international
negotiation setup allow them access (Nasiritousi and Linnér 2014). Studies have shown that the
UNFCCC are among some of the most open negotiations in terms of access for non-state actors
which reflects a generally strong public participation and tradition in the field of environmental
issues (Nasiritousi and Linnér 2014).
3.2.4 Theoretical suggestions for international frameworks to protect climate migrants
From the different terminology and approaches presented above it is clear that there is no obvious
“solution” to the challenges posed by climate migration. While some representatives from the
alarmist perspective as well as environmental, conflict and refugee discourse argue for widespread
policy reforms and development, sceptics increasingly favour more of a status quo (Mayer 2015).
Yet, even the scholars who remain critical towards the notion and discourse around climate
migrants still consider it “[...] a concept that may trigger a first step towards fairer international
cooperation” and recognises that climate change is “[...] affecting a large array of human activities,
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climate change governance needs to expand beyond, in particular in situ adaptation” (Mayer
2015). However, agreements on expanding governance still leaves much room for interpretation as
the possibilities vary between addressing the cause by mitigating climate change, addressing the
effect by reducing risk created by climate change or addressing the consequences by protecting
people displaced by the effects of climate change (Kälin 2010).
Several scholars suggest “sui generis regimes” which plead for unique interpretations of existing
laws or establishment of independent structures which are aimed at recognising and protecting
climate migrates (Biermann and Boas 2010; Cournil 2011). Overall, these can be divided into three
options; a new international treaty on environmental refugees and IDP’s, protection specifically for
climate refugees and finally regional agreements (Cournil 2011). The regional agreements would
primarily be aimed at small island states with bilateral agreements on reception of potentially
stateless people (Cournil 2011). The regional setup is favoured in order to spread the
responsibilities and burdens of the receiving countries as well as the generally smoother
administrative process compared to international agreements (Cournil 2011).
In relation to specific protection of climate migrants Biermann and Boas argues that their five
principles13
can be realised in a new international treaty on “climate refugees” but suggest a new
protocol14
in the UNFCCC system to reduce the negotiation period and draw on existing agreed
principles, such as the “common but differentiated responsibilities” (Biermann and Boas 2010). It is
argued that such protocol would avoid an adjustment of the Geneva Convention and that the
protocol being under the UNFCCC system would benefit with political attention and favourable
setup in the cooperation with IPCC which could ensure access to updated research (Biermann and
Boas 2010). However, while specific protection of climate refugees could initiate debate and action
on legislation, the opposite could also apply where some reluctant states would try to delay and drag
the process to avoid such establishment (Cournil 2011).
Mayer argue that the creation of new treaties would have little practical implication and would not
solve the challenge of distinguish climate migrants from other types of migrants (Mayer 2015).
Others argue that the biggest focus should be on strengthening or creating policies which support
the handling of internal migration within the affected countries rather than on international
13 1. The Principle of Planned Re-location and Resettlement 2. The Principle of Resettlement Instead of Temporary Asylum 3. The
Principle of Collective Rights for Local Populations 4. The Principle of International Assistance for Domestic Measures 5. The
Principle of International Burden-Sharing (Biermann and Boas 2010). 14 "Protocol on Recognition, Protection and Resettlement of Climate Refugees" (Biermann and Boas 2010)
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migration (Martin 2010). As such it is questioned whether international law has a role to play in the
question of climate migrants as such treaties will only be implemented by the ratifying countries.
Instead, it is suggested to develop and expand of “soft law” instruments and focus on “[...]
institutional governance as a possible element to promote international cooperation with regard to
climate migration and other forms of migration” (Mayer 2015). These instruments should be aimed
at international assistance for capacity building in order to support the affected countries to protect
climate migrants. The establishment of a international agency, and preferably UN agency, is also
suggested to supplement the UNHCR’s narrow focus on political migration and to provide a more
neutral and including approach than the IOM (Mayer 2015).
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4 Methodology
This chapter aims to give an insight into the methodological considerations on the structure and
research design of the thesis. As the overall structure and relation between the individual chapters
have already been introduced, this chapter will focus on how the different theories and
methodologies have been operationalised in order to answer the research question. This includes a
presentation of the main methodology of discourse analysis, argumentation for the selection of
sources and key documents and more general reflections on the scale, scope and limitations of the
thesis.
4.1 Discourse analysis as a method of understanding climate migration
In order to answer the research question and examine the UNFCCC application of scientific
research and approach to climate migration, the analysis will be guided and structured around the
main principles and ideas from the discourse analysis methodology. The discourse analysis will
enable the identification of the underlying and potentially different discourses around climate
migration in the UNFCCC regime and examine how the concept has developed and how it relates to
various political agendas as well as to the scientific research in the field.
4.1.1 Overall theory and methodology of discourse analysis
In this thesis the notion of a discourse will be defined as “[...] a certain way to speak about or
understand the world (or a segment of the world)”15
(Jørgensen and Phillips 2008). A discourse is
constructed through a constant process of positive linkage to certain values and phenomena and
separated from others which gives meaning to the discourse (Hansen 2006).
The theory and methodology of discourse analysis have predominately been applied within the
social sciences as a way to analyse the relations and interactions between various discourses and
social and cultural changes. Hence, discourse analysis is seen to be both a theory and methodology
and several different directions covering both linguistic, history and political science have
developed within the overall umbrella term since the 1980’s (Jørgensen and Phillips 2008).
Common features of the main approaches in discourse analysis are their origin in social
constructivism and aim to undertake critical research in order to explore and expose power relation
15 Own translation from (Jørgensen and Phillips 2008) p. 5
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which influence the dominating discourses (Jørgensen and Phillips 2008). In general, the discourse
analytical methods all take point of departure in structuralism which highlights how language and
terminology shape representations of reality and how terms can have different meanings in different
discourses (Jørgensen and Phillips 2008). While the discourse analysis origins from the social
sciences it can also serve its purpose in relation to natural science as "it is a key goal of discourse
analysis to show how [...] facts are dependent upon a particular discursive framing of the issue in
question and that this framing has political effects" (Hansen 2006). Hence, the discourse analysis
will serve this specific thesis by disclosing how different stakeholders have attempted and competed
to influence the meaning of the notion of climate migration and how this has related to the research.
4.1.2 Political discourses
Phenomena are seen to be under constant development as stakeholders attempt to influence the
content and meaning by promoting different discourses and articulate policies to solve the problems
(Hansen 2006; Jørgensen and Phillips 2008). Such power struggles are captured within the notion of
antagonism and hegemony which refers to respectively the conflict between different discourses and
the process where one discourse overcomes competing discourses and becomes dominating and
widely accepted (Jørgensen and Phillips 2008). Concurrently with power struggles between
competing discourses, this is also seen to underpin more fundamental relations between social
groups or countries as in the case within the UNFCCC.
For the analysis of political discourses Hansen highlights the fact that the construction of discourses
should always be considered in relation to the spatial, temporal and ethical context surrounding it
(Hansen 2006). This is highly relevant in the analysis of a migration discourse within the UNFCCC
system as both time scale, geographical extent and responsibilities are key discussion points and
where other political agendas and societal processes exerts influence on the development of the
discourse.
Following the approach of Hansen to political discourses, a number of basis discourses need to be
identified before analysing a specific field (Hansen 2006). These guide the analysis and
identification of discourses as the basic discourses provide a systematic frame of the analysis. As
such the five different discourses16
presented in the theory chapter might not be the most frequently
used discourses but they represents the different ideal types and main argumentation which is then
modified in the construction of a UNFCCC discourse.
16 The environmental, conflict, refugee, adaptation and relocation discourse.
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4.1.3 Fairclough’s three dimensional model of discourse
In addition to the basic principles and ideas of discourse theory, the analysis will also be supported
by the analysis structure developed by Norman Fairclough. Fairclough’s model of discourse is
based on a text oriented analysis and supplement by a social analysis of the specific context to gain
understanding of the interrelation between the text and surrounding social and political processes
(Fairclough 1992). Based on this, Fairclough’s model is based on three dimensions which build
upon each other (see figure 4):
1. Text. A fundamental idea in Fairclough’s approach is that the form and terminology of a
text are influenced by social factors and equally shape the discourse. Hence, an analysis of
the language is the point of departure in order to understand the discourse and its relation to
larger societal issues. In this thesis two terms are especially central to the analysis; modality
and transitivity. The modality describes the impact of a text by assessing the degree of
certainty or reservation which is assigned to the argumentation17
. The transitivity indicates
the relation between specific events or processes and stakeholders and is important to assess
in order to analyse how the text aims to portray the situation18
(Jørgensen and Phillips
2008). In this thesis the text analysis is especially relevant to analyse how the issue around
“climate migration” is phrased and framed with the significant scientific disputes around
terminology in mind. At the same time a repetitive text analysis of different UNFCCC
statements will make it possible to identify whether there has been a shift in the discursive
construction of the terminology around climate migration.
2. Discursive practice. Where the text analysis centres around a description of the form and
organisation of the text, the analysis of the discursive practice is more focused on the
processes of text production, distribution and consumption by interpreting the meaning of
the text and its relation to existing discourses (Fairclough 1992, 2008). The analysis of the
text production includes both an assessment of the different stakeholders influencing the
composition as well as the intertextuality of a text which describes the degree to which a text
draws on existing texts and discourses (Fairclough 2008; Jørgensen and Phillips 2008). The
intertextuality can both be explicit by directly referencing other texts or statements or
indirectly by linking to existing conceptual approaches (Hansen 2006). In this thesis the
17 The modality of a text can be identified by analysing the use of e.g. category modality, modal adverbs (e.g. "probably") or hedge
words (e.g. "such" or "maybe"). All these words influence the impact and strength of an argument or text and are important for how
the text influences the discourse and larger societal context. (Fairclough 1992; Jørgensen and Phillips 2008). 18 The transitivity describes the process of assigning more importance to either the events or stakeholders the text can either increase
the focus on the event itself or contrary on the responsibility and role of the stakeholder.
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analysis of the discursive practice will support the understanding of how the UNFCCC
approach is produced and whether it draws upon scientific or political discourses on climate
migration.
3. Social practice. The analysis of the social practice contextualises the discursive practice by
considering the text in relation to the wider societal perspective and determining whether it
reproduces or transforms the discursive order (Fairclough 2008; Jørgensen and Phillips
2008). The discursive order is defined as the sum of the discourses within a specific field,
such as climate migration. However, Fairclough also argues that the social practice cannot
solely be explained through discourse theory and hence it is necessary to apply additional
theory which can explain the dynamics of the field which is being analysed (Fairclough
1992). In this thesis the analysis of the social practice will aim to explain linkages between
the UNFCCC discourse and the wider debate on climate migration.
Figure 4: Fairclough’s three dimensional model of discourse analysis (own illustration after Fairclough 1992)
4.1.4 Application and limitations of the use of discourse analysis
As the discourse analysis operates as both a theory and methodology it is generally accepted to
apply and combine specific selections of the whole framework rather than strictly following the
methodologies (Jensen 2008). Fairclough’s three dimensional model contains many additional
linguistic tools for text analysis which have deliberately been omitted from this thesis as such
Text Description of written/spoken text, language,types and categories
Discursive practice Interpretation of meaning and processes of production of text
Social practice Explanation of context and implications for the social practice
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information would not assist in answering the research questions. Instead Fairclough's model will
be complemented the approach developed by Hansen (2006) to identify some of the more overall
societal discourses.
An important note when applying discourse analysis is the bias of researcher. As such one will
always be part of discourses and some therefore argue that it is impossible to assess discourses from
a neutral point of view (Jørgensen and Phillips 2008). As described the discourse analysis is seen to
be ideological by assuming uneven power relations between actors and having a bias towards the
suppressed groups (Jørgensen and Phillips 2008). Hence, the critical discourse analysis is naturally
normative and as a result of this it should be kept in mind that there can be a tendency of the
discourse analysis to favour a change towards more equal power relations created by the discourse
(van Dijk 1993).
Another point of interest is the application of a methodology from the social science on a field that
is partly within natural science. However, the discourse analysis support the understanding of how
descriptive natural science is used in a more normative, societal discussion such as one of the
UNFCCC. As such this coupling of natural science with a more political science methodology is in
line with the basic ideas of the discipline of geography aiming to understand the relation between
natural and social sciences.
4.2 Scope and scale of the thesis
According to Hansen the research design of a discourse analysis should be delimited by selection of
four dimensions; the intertextual model, number of selves (the number of stakeholders assessed),
number of events and temporal perspective (see figure 5 and 6 for this specific thesis). The temporal
perspective is limited from the time the discourse emerges in the UNFCCC system around 2007 and
until present. This also implies that the number of events is defined from COP16 to COP21 and
considered as a chronology related both by issue and time. The intertexual model is chosen to
analyse both the official discourse and the wider political debate but the scientific discourses will
also be included as reference. The "number of selves" often relate to analysing discussions between
states and in this case the main agent is the UNFCCC but this will necessarily have to be analysed
by comparison between several actors to identify the competing discourses between countries and
alliances.
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Figure 5: Elaborated research design for discourse analysis (own illustration after Hansen 2006)
Figure 6: Research design of this thesis
Study
Temporal perspective:
1. One moment
2. Comparative moments
3. Historical development
Number of Selves:
1. Single
2. Comparison around events or issues
3. Discursive encounter
Intertextual models:
1. Official discourses
2. Wider political debate
3A. Cultural representations
3B. Marginal political discourses
Number of events:
1. One
2. Multiple- related by issue
3. Multiple- related by time
Climate migration
discourse in the UNFCCC
Temporal perspective:
Historical development
Number of Selves:
1. UNFCCC
(+Specific countries)
In