Marx v. General Revenue Corp. - Supreme Court of the United States

1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM 2012

Syllabus

NOTE Where it is feasible a syllabus (headnote) will be released as isbeing done in connection with this case at the time the opinion is issuedThe syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader See United States v Detroit Timber amp Lumber Co 200 U S 321 337

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MARX v GENERAL REVENUE CORP

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No 11ndash1175 Argued November 7 2012mdashDecided February 26 2013

Petitioner Marx filed suit alleging that General Revenue Corporation (GRC) violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by harassing and falsely threatening her in order to collect on a debtThe District Court ruled against Marx and awarded GRC costs pur-suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 54(d)(1) which gives district courts discretion to award costs to prevailing defendantsldquo[u]nless a federal statute provides otherwiserdquo Marx sought tovacate the award arguing that the courtrsquos discretion under Rule54(d)(1) was displaced by 15 U S C sect1692k(a)(3) which provides inpertinent part that ldquo[o]n a finding by the court that an action underthis section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harass-ment the court may award to the defendant attorneyrsquos fees reasona-ble in relation to the work expended and costsrdquo The District Court rejected Marxrsquos argument The Tenth Circuit affirmed in pertinentpart agreeing that costs are allowed under the Rule and concludingthat nothing in the statutersquos text history or purpose indicates that itwas meant to displace the Rule

Held Section sect1692k(a)(3) is not contrary to and thus does not dis-place a district courtrsquos discretion to award costs under Rule 54(d)(1)Pp 4ndash16

(a) Rule 54(d)(1) gives courts discretion to award costs to prevailing parties but this discretion can be displaced by a federal statute orFRCP that ldquoprovides otherwiserdquo ie is ldquocontraryrdquo to Rule 54(d)(1)Contrary to the argument of Marx and the United States as amicus language of the original 1937 version of the Rule does not suggest that any ldquoexpress provisionrdquo for costs should displace Rule 54(d)(1)regardless of whether it is contrary to the Rule Pp 4ndash7

(b) Section 1692k(a)(3)rsquos language and context demonstrate that

2 MARX v GENERAL REVENUE CORP

Syllabus

the provision is not contrary to Rule 54(d)(1) Pp 7ndash15(1) GRC argues that since sect1692k(a)(3) does not address whether

costs may be awarded in an FDCPA case brought in good faith itdoes not set forth a standard that is contrary to the Rule and there-fore does not displace the presumption that a court has discretion to award costs Marx and the United States concede that the statute does not expressly limit a courtrsquos discretion to award costs under theRule but argue that it does so by negative implication They claimthat unless sect1692k(a)(3) sets forth the exclusive basis on which to award costs the phrase ldquoand costsrdquo would be superfluous with Rule54(d)(1) And the United States also argues that sect1692k(a)(3)rsquos more specific cost statute displaces Rule 54(d)(1)rsquos more general rule Pp 7ndash9

(2) The argument of Marx and the United States depends criti-cally on whether sect1692k(a)(3)rsquos allowance of costs creates a negativeimplication that costs are unavailable in any other circumstancesThe expressio unius canon that they invoke does not apply ldquounless it is fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed possibilityand meant to say no to itrdquo Barnhart v Peabody Coal Co 537 U S 149 168 and can be overcome by ldquocontrary indications that adoptinga particular rule or statute was probably not meant to signal any ex-clusionrdquo United States v Vonn 535 U S 55 65 Here context indi-cates that Congress did not intend sect1692k(a)(3) to foreclose courtsfrom awarding costs under the Rule First under the American Rule each litigant generally pays his own attorneyrsquos fees but the Court has long recognized that federal courts have inherent power to award attorneyrsquos fees in a narrow set of circumstances eg when a party brings an action in bad faith The statute is thus best read as codify-ing a courtrsquos pre-existing authority to award both attorneyrsquos fees and costs Next sect1692k(a)(3)rsquos second sentence must be understood in light of its first which provides an award of attorneyrsquos fees and costsbut to prevailing plaintiffs By adding ldquoand costsrdquo to the second sen-tence Congress foreclosed the argument that defendants can only re-cover attorneyrsquos fees when plaintiffs bring an action in bad faith andremoved any doubt that defendants may recover costs as well as at-torneyrsquos fees in such cases Finally sect1692k(a)(3)rsquos language sharplycontrasts with that of other statutes in which Congress has placed conditions on awarding costs to prevailing defendants See eg 28 U S C sect1928 Pp 9ndash12

(3) Even assuming that their surplusage argument is correct the canon against surplusage is not absolute First the canon ldquoassists only where a competing interpretation gives effect to every clause and word of a statuterdquo Microsoft Corp v i4i Ltd Partnership 564 U S ___ ___ Here no interpretation of sect1692k(a)(3) gives effect to

3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)

Syllabus

every word Second redundancy is not unusual in statutes address-ing costs See eg 12 U S C sect2607(d)(5) Finally the canon is strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme Because sect1692k(a)(3) is not partof Rule 54(d)(1) the force of this canon is diminished Pp 13ndash14

(4) Lastly contrary to the United Statesrsquo claim that specific cost-shifting standards displace general ones the context of the statuteindicates that Congress was simply confirming the background pre-sumption that courts may award to defendants attorneyrsquos fees and costs when the plaintiff brings an action in bad faith Because Marx did not bring this suit in bad faith the specific provision is not appli-cable Pp 14ndash15

668 F 3d 1174 affirmed

THOMAS J delivered the opinion of the Court in which ROBERTS C J and SCALIA KENNEDY GINSBURG BREYER and ALITO JJ joined SOTOMAYOR J filed a dissenting opinion in which KAGAN J joined

_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in thepreliminary print of the United States Reports Readers are requested tonotify the Reporter of Decisions Supreme Court of the United States Wash-ington D C 20543 of any typographical or other formal errors in orderthat corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press


No 11ndash1175

OLIVEA MARX PETITIONER v GENERAL REVENUE CORPORATION

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

[February 26 2013]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) gives district

courts discretion to award costs to prevailing defendantsldquo[u]nless a federal statute provides otherwiserdquo The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) 91 Stat 881 15 U S C sect1692k(a)(3) provides that ldquo[o]n a finding bythe court that an action under this section was broughtin bad faith and for the purpose of harassment the courtmay award to the defendant attorneyrsquos fees reasonable inrelation to the work expended and costsrdquo This case pre-sents the question whether sect1692k(a)(3) ldquoprovides other-wiserdquo than Rule 54(d)(1) We conclude that sect1692k(a)(3) does not ldquoprovid[e] otherwiserdquo and thus a district courtmay award costs to prevailing defendants in FDCPA caseswithout finding that the plaintiff brought the case in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment

I Petitioner Olivea Marx defaulted on a student loan

guaranteed by EdFund a division of the California Stu-dent Aid Commission In September 2008 EdFund hired respondent General Revenue Corporation (GRC) to collect



the debt One month later Marx filed an FDCPA en-forcement action against GRC1 Marx alleged that GRC had violated the FDCPA by harassing her with phone calls several times a day and falsely threatening to garnish upto 50 of her wages and to take the money she owed directly from her bank account Shortly after the com-plaint was filed GRC made an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 to pay Marx $1500 plus reasonable attorneyrsquos fees and costs to settle any claims she had against it Marx did not respond to theoffer She subsequently amended her complaint to add a claim that GRC unlawfully sent a fax to her workplacethat requested information about her employment status

Following a 1-day bench trial the District Court foundthat Marx had failed to prove any violation of the FDCPA As the prevailing party GRC submitted a bill of costsseeking $777916 in witness fees witness travel expenses and deposition transcript fees The court disallowed sev-eral items of costs and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) ordered Marx to pay GRC $454303 Marx filed a motion to vacate the award of costs arguingthat the court lacked authority to award costs under Rules54(d)(1) and 68(d) because 15 U S C sect1692k(a)(3) sets forth the exclusive basis for awarding costs in FDCPA cases2 Section 1692k(a)(3) provides in relevant part ldquoOn

mdashmdashmdashmdashmdashmdash 1 The FDCPA is a consumer protection statute that prohibits certain

abusive deceptive and unfair debt collection practices See 15 U S C sect1692 The FDCPArsquos private-enforcement provision sect1692k authorizes any aggrieved person to recover damages from ldquoany debt collectorwho fails to comply with any provisionrdquo of the FDCPA sect1692k(a)

2 Under Rule 68(d) if a defendant makes a settlement offer and the plaintiff rejects it and later obtains a judgment that is less favorable than the one offered her the plaintiff must pay the costs incurred bythe defendant after the offer was made See Fed Rule Civ Proc 68(d)(ldquoIf the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorablethan the unaccepted offer the offeree must pay the costs incurred afterthe offer was maderdquo)

3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harass-ment the court may award to the defendant attorneyrsquosfees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costsrdquo Marx argued that because the court had not found thatshe brought the case in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment GRC was not entitled to costs The Dis-trict Court rejected Marxrsquos argument concluding that sect1692k(a)(3) does not displace a courtrsquos discretion to award costs under Rule 54(d)(1) and that costs should also be awarded under Rule 68(d)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed but agreed only with partof the District Courtrsquos reasoning In particular the courtdisagreed that costs were allowed under Rule 68(d) 668 F 3d 1174 1182 (2011) It explained that ldquoRule 68 appliesonly where the district court enters judgment in favor of a plaintiff rdquo for less than the amount of the settlement offerand not where the plaintiff loses outright Ibid (citing Delta Air Lines Inc v August 450 U S 346 352 (1981)) Because the District Court had not entered judgment in favor of Marx the court concluded that costs were not allowed under Rule 68(d) 668 F 3d at 1182 Neverthe-less the court found that costs were allowed under Rule 54(d)(1) which grants district courts discretion to award costs to prevailing parties unless a federal statute or theFederal Rules of Civil Procedure provide otherwise Id at 1178 1182 After describing the ldquovenerablerdquo presumptionthat prevailing parties are entitled to costs id at 1179 the court concluded that nothing in the text history orpurpose of sect1692k(a)(3) indicated that it was meant todisplace Rule 54(d)(1) id at 1178ndash1182 Judge Lucerodissented arguing that ldquo[t]he only sensible reading of [sect1692k(a)(3)] is that the district court may only award costs to a defendantrdquo upon finding that the action wasbrought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment and that to read it otherwise rendered the phrase ldquoand



costsrdquo superfluous Id at 1187 (emphasis in original) We granted certiorari 566 U S ___ (2012) to resolve a

conflict among the Circuits regarding whether a prevailing defendant in an FDCPA case may be awarded costs where the lawsuit was not brought in bad faith and for the pur-pose of harassment Compare 668 F 3d at 1182 (case below) with Rouse v Law Offices of Rory Clark 603 F 3d 699 701 (CA9 2010) We now affirm the judgment of the Tenth Circuit

II As in all statutory construction cases we ldquo lsquoassum[e]

that the ordinary meaning of [the statutory] language accurately expresses the legislative purposersquo rdquo Hardt v Re-liance Standard Life Ins Co 560 U S ___ ___ (2010) (slip op at 8) (quoting Gross v FBL Financial Services Inc 557 U S 167 175 (2009) (alteration in original)) In this case we must construe both Rule 54(d)(1) andsect1692k(a)(3) and assess the relationship between them

A Rule 54(d)(1) is straightforward It provides in relevant

part ldquoUnless a federal statute these rules or a court or-der provides otherwise costsmdashother than attorneyrsquos feesmdashshould be allowed to the prevailing partyrdquo

As the Tenth Circuit correctly recognized Rule 54(d)(1)codifies a venerable presumption that prevailing parties are entitled to costs3 Notwithstanding this presumption

mdashmdashmdashmdashmdashmdash 3 Prior to the adoption of the federal rules prevailing parties were

entitled to costs as of right in actions at law while courts had discretion to award costs in equity proceedings See Ex parte Peterson 253 U S 300 317ndash318 (1920) (ldquoWhile in equity proceedings the allowance and imposition of costs is unless controlled by statute or rule of court a matter of discretion it has been uniformly held that in actions at law the prevailing party is entitled to costs as of right except in those few cases where by express statutory provision or by established principles costs are deniedrdquo (citation omitted)) Mansfield C amp L M R Co v

5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the word ldquoshouldrdquo makes clear that the decision whether to award costs ultimately lies within the sound discretionof the district court See Taniguchi v Kan Pacific Saipan Ltd 566 U S ___ ___ (2012) (slip op at 4) (ldquoFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) gives courts the discretionto award costs to prevailing partiesrdquo) Rule 54(d)(1) alsomakes clear however that this discretion can be displaced by a federal statute or a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that ldquoprovides otherwiserdquo

A statute ldquoprovides otherwiserdquo than Rule 54(d)(1) if it isldquocontraryrdquo to the Rule See 10 J Moore Moorersquos Federal Practice sect54101[1][c] p 54ndash159 (3d ed 2012) (hereinafter 10 Moorersquos) Because the Rule grants district courts dis-cretion to award costs a statute is contrary to the Rule if it limits that discretion A statute may limit a courtrsquos discretion in several ways and it need not expressly statethat it is displacing Rule 54(d)(1) to do so For instance a statute providing that ldquoplaintiffs shall not be liable for costsrdquo is contrary to Rule 54(d)(1) because it precludes acourt from awarding costs to prevailing defendants See eg 7 U S C sect18(d)(1) (ldquoThe petitioner shall not be liablefor costs in the district courtrdquo) Similarly a statute provid-ing that plaintiffs may recover costs only under certainconditions is contrary to Rule 54(d) because it precludes acourt from awarding costs to prevailing plaintiffs when those conditions have not been satisfied See eg 28 U S C sect1928 (ldquo[N]o costs shall be included in such judg-ment unless the proper disclaimer has been filed in theUnited States Patent and Trademark Officerdquo)

Importantly not all statutes that provide for costs arecontrary to Rule 54(d)(1) A statute providing that ldquothe court may award costs to the prevailing partyrdquo for exam-

mdashmdashmdashmdashmdashmdash

Swan 111 U S 379 387 (1884) (ldquo[B]y the long established practice anduniversally recognized rule of the common law in actions at law the prevailing party is entitled to recover a judgment for costs rdquo)



ple is not contrary to the Rule because it does not limit acourtrsquos discretion See 10 Moorersquos sect54101[1][c] at 54ndash159(ldquoA number of statutes state simply that the court mayaward costs in its discretion Such a provision is not con-trary to Rule 54(d)(1) and does not displace the courtrsquos discretion under the Rulerdquo)

Marx and the United States as amicus curiae suggestthat any statute that specifically provides for costs dis-places Rule 54(d)(1) regardless of whether it is contrary tothe Rule Brief for Petitioner 17 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11ndash12 (hereinafter Brief for United States) The United States relies on the original 1937version of Rule 54(d)(1) which provided ldquo lsquoExcept when express provision therefor is made either in a statute ofthe United States or in these rules costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court oth-erwise directsrsquo rdquo Id at 12 (quoting Rule) Though the Rules Committee updated the language of Rule 54(d)(1) in2007 the change was ldquostylistic onlyrdquo Advisory Commit-teersquos Notes 28 U S C App p 734 (2006 ed Supp V) Accordingly the United States asserts that any ldquoexpressprovisionrdquo for costs should displace Rule 54(d)(1)

We are not persuaded however that the original ver-sion of Rule 54(d) should be interpreted as Marx and the United States suggest The original language was meant to ensure that Rule 54(d) did not displace existing costsprovisions that were contrary to the Rule Under the priorlanguage statutes that simply permitted a court to awardcosts did not displace the Rule See 6 J Moore Moorersquos Federal Practice sect5471[1] p 54ndash304 (2d ed 1996)(ldquo[W]hen permissive language is used [in a statute regard-ing costs] the district court may pursuant to Rule 54(d)exercise a sound discretion relative to the allowance of costsrdquo) Rather statutes had to set forth a standard for awarding costs that was different from Rule 54(d)(1) in order to displace the Rule See Friedman v Ganassi 853

7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


F 2d 207 210 (CA3 1988) (holding that 15 U S C sect77k(e) is not an ldquoexpress provisionrdquo under Rule 54(d) because itdoes not provide an ldquoalternative standardrdquo for awarding taxable costs) The original version of Rule 54(d) is con-sistent with our conclusion that a statute must be contraryto Rule 54(d)(1) in order to displace it4

B We now turn to whether sect1692k(a)(3) is contrary to Rule

54(d)(1) The language of sect1692k(a)(3) and the context surrounding it persuade us that it is not

1 The second sentence of sect1692k(a)(3) provides ldquoOn a

finding by the court that an action under this section was

mdashmdashmdashmdashmdashmdash 4 The dissent provides no stable definition of ldquoprovides otherwiserdquo

First it argues that a statute ldquoprovides otherwiserdquo if it is ldquodifferentrdquofrom Rule 54(d)(1) Post at 2 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR J) That inter-pretation renders the Rule meaningless because every statute is ldquodifferentrdquo insofar as it is not an exact copy of the Rule Next it argues that a statute ldquoprovides otherwiserdquo if it is an ldquo lsquoexpress provisionrsquorelating to costsrdquo Post at 2ndash3 Under that view a statute providingthat ldquothe court may award costs to the prevailing partyrdquo would ldquoprovide otherwiserdquo We do not think such a statute provides otherwisemdashit provides ldquosame-wiserdquo and the treatise on which the dissent relies supports our view See 10 C Wright A Miller amp M Kane FederalPractice and Procedure sect2670 p 258 (3d ed 1998 and Supp 2012) (ldquo[Statutes that] are permissive in character are not inconsistentwith the discretion given the district court by Rule 54(d)rdquo) Finallythe dissent seems to implicitly accept that ldquootherwiserdquo means ldquoto thecontraryrdquo in the course of arguing that a doctorrsquos instruction to take medication ldquo lsquoin the morningrsquo rdquo would supersede an instruction on the medication label to ldquo lsquotake [it] twice a day unless otherwise directedrsquo rdquo because the patient would understand the doctorrsquos advice to mean that he should take the medicine ldquoonce a day each morningrdquo Post at 4 If the patient understands the doctor to mean ldquoonce a day each morningrdquo we agree that such advice would ldquoprovide otherwiserdquo because the doctorrsquos order would be ldquocontraryrdquo to the labelrsquos instruction For the reasons set forth in Part IIndashB however we are not convinced that sect1692k(a)(3) is ldquocontraryrdquo to Rule 54(d)(1)



brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment the court may award to the defendant attorneyrsquos fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costsrdquo5

GRC contends that the statute does not address whether costs may be awarded in this casemdashwhere the plaintiff brought the case in good faithmdashand thus it does not set forth a standard for awarding costs that is contrary toRule 54(d)(1) In its view Congress intended sect1692k(a)(3) to deter plaintiffs from bringing nuisance lawsuits It therefore expressly provided that when plaintiffs bring an action in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment thecourt may award attorneyrsquos fees and costs to the defend-ant The statute does address this type of casemdashie cases in which the plaintiff brings the action in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment But it is silent where bad faith and purpose of harassment are absent and silence does not displace the background rule that a court has discretion to award costs

Marx and the United States take the contrary viewThey concede that the language does not expressly limita courtrsquos discretion to award costs under Rule 54(d)(1)Brief for Petitioner 10 Brief for United States 19 but argue that it does so by negative implication Invoking the expressio unius canon of statutory construction theycontend that by specifying that a court may award attor-neyrsquos fees and costs when an action is brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment Congress intended topreclude a court from awarding fees and costs when bad faith and purpose of harassment are absent They furtherargue that unless sect1692k(a)(3) sets forth the exclusive mdashmdashmdashmdashmdashmdash

5 It is undisputed that GRC is not entitled to costs under sect1692k(a)(3)because the District Court did not find that Marx brought this action inbad faith But Rule 54(d)(1) independently authorizes district courts toaward costs to prevailing parties The question in this case is not whether costs are allowed under sect1692k(a)(3) but whether sect1692k(a)(3)precludes an award of costs under Rule 54(d)(1)

9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


basis on which a court may award costs the phrase ldquoand costsrdquo would be superfluous According to this argumentCongress would have had no reason to specify that a court may award costs when a plaintiff brings an action inbad faith if it could have nevertheless awarded costs under Rule 54(d)(1) Finally the United States argues thatsect1692k(a)(3) is a more specific cost statute that displacesRule 54(d)(1)rsquos more general rule

The context surrounding sect1692k(a)(3) persuades us thatGRCrsquos interpretation is correct

2 The argument of Marx and the United States depends

critically on whether sect1692k(a)(3)rsquos allowance of costscreates a negative implication that costs are unavailable in any other circumstances The force of any negativeimplication however depends on context We have long held that the expressio unius canon does not apply ldquounless it is fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to itrdquo Barnhart v Peabody Coal Co 537 U S 149 168 (2003) and that the canoncan be overcome by ldquocontrary indications that adopting aparticular rule or statute was probably not meant to signal any exclusionrdquo United States v Vonn 535 U S 55 65 (2002) In this case context persuades us that Congressdid not intend sect1692k(a)(3) to foreclose courts from award-ing costs under Rule 54(d)(1)

First the background presumptions governing attorneyrsquos fees and costs are a highly relevant contextual featureAs already explained under Rule 54(d)(1) a prevailing party is entitled to recover costs from the losing partyunless a federal statute the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-dure or a court order ldquoprovides otherwiserdquo The oppositepresumption exists with respect to attorneyrsquos fees Under the ldquobedrock principle known as the lsquo ldquoAmerican Rulerdquo rsquo rdquo ldquo[e]ach litigant pays his own attorneyrsquos fees win or lose



unless a statute or contract provides otherwiserdquo Hardt 560 U S at ___ (slip op at 9) (quoting Ruckelshaus v Sierra Club 463 U S 680 683 (1983)) Notwithstanding the American Rule however we have long recognized that federal courts have inherent power to award attorneyrsquos fees in a narrow set of circumstances including when aparty brings an action in bad faith See Chambers v NASCO Inc 501 U S 32 45ndash46 (1991) (explaining that a court has inherent power to award attorneyrsquos fees to a party whose litigation efforts directly benefit others tosanction the willful disobedience of a court order and to sanction a party who has acted in bad faith vexatiously wantonly or for oppressive reasons) Alyeska Pipeline Service Co v Wilderness Society 421 U S 240 257ndash259 (1975) (same)

It is undisputed that sect1692k(a)(3) leaves the back-ground rules for attorneyrsquos fees intact The statute pro-vides that when the plaintiff brings an action in bad faith the court may award attorneyrsquos fees to the defendant But as noted a court has inherent power to award feesbased on a litigantrsquos bad faith even without sect1692k(a)(3) See Chambers supra at 45ndash46 Because sect1692k(a)(3) codifies the background rule for attorneyrsquos fees it is dubi-ous to infer congressional intent to override the back-ground rule with respect to costs The statute is best read as codifying a courtrsquos pre-existing authority to award bothattorneyrsquos fees and costs6

Next the second sentence of sect1692k(a)(3) must be un-derstood in light of the sentence that precedes it7 The

mdashmdashmdashmdashmdashmdash 6 Indeed had Congress intended sect1692k(a)(3) to foreclose a courtrsquos

discretion to award costs it could not have chosen a more circuitous way to do so The statute sets forth the circumstances in which a court ldquomayrdquo award costs But under Marxrsquos and the United Statesrsquo view the only consequence of the statute is to set forth the circumstances inwhich it may not award costs

7 Section 1692k(a) provides

11 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


first sentence of sect1692k(a)(3) provides that defendantswho violate the FDCPA are liable for the plaintiff rsquos attor-neyrsquos fees and costs The second sentence of sect1692k(a)(3)similarly provides that plaintiffs who bring an action in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment may be liablefor the defendantrsquos fees and costs

If Congress had excluded ldquoand costsrdquo in the second sentence plaintiffs might have argued that the expression of costs in the first sentence and the exclusion of costs in the second meant that defendants could only recover attorneyrsquos fees when plaintiffs bring an action in bad faithBy adding ldquoand costsrdquo to the second sentence Congressforeclosed that argument thereby removing any doubt that defendants may recover costs as well as attorneyrsquosfees when plaintiffs bring suits in bad faith See Ali v Federal Bureau of Prisons 552 U S 214 226 (2008) (ex-plaining that a phrase is not superfluous if used to ldquore-move doubtrdquo about an issue) Fort Stewart Schools v FLRA 495 U S 641 646 (1990) (explaining that ldquotechni-cally unnecessaryrdquo examples may have been ldquoinserted out


ldquoExcept as otherwise provided by this section any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum ofmdash

ldquo(1) any actual damages sustained by such person as a result of suchfailure

ldquo(2)(A) in the case of any action by an individual such additionaldamages as the court may allow but not exceeding $1000 or

ldquo(B) in the case of a class action (i) such amount for each namedplaintiff as could be recovered under subparagraph (A) and (ii) suchamount as the court may allow for all other class members without regard to a minimum individual recovery not to exceed the lesser of $500000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector and

ldquo(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability the costs of the action together with a reasonable attorneyrsquos fee as determined by the court On a finding by the court that an actionunder this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment the court may award to the defendant attorneyrsquos fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costsrdquo



of an abundance of cautionrdquo) The fact that there might have been a negative implication that costs are precludeddepending on whether Congress included or excluded the phrase ldquoand costsrdquo weighs against giving effect to any implied limitation

Finally the language in sect1692k(a)(3) sharply contrastswith other statutes in which Congress has placed condi-tions on awarding costs to prevailing defendants See eg28 U S C sect1928 (ldquo[N]o costs shall be included in such judgment unless the proper disclaimer has been filed inthe United States Patent and Trademark Office prior tothe commencement of the actionrdquo (emphasis added)) 42 U S C sect1988(b) (ldquo[I]n any action brought against a judi-cial officer such officer shall not be held liable for any costs unless such action was clearly in excess of suchofficerrsquos jurisdictionrdquo (emphasis added))

Although Congress need not use explicit language tolimit a courtrsquos discretion under Rule 54(d)(1) its use ofexplicit language in other statutes cautions against infer-ring a limitation in sect1692k(a)(3) These statutes confirm that Congress knows how to limit a courtrsquos discretion under Rule 54(d)(1) when it so desires See Small v United States 544 U S 385 398 (2005) (THOMAS J dissent-ing) (explaining that ldquoCongressrsquo explicit use of [language] in other provisions shows that it specifies such restrictions when it wants to do sordquo) Had Congress intended the second sentence of sect1692k(a)(3) to displace Rule 54(d)(1)it could have easily done so by using the word ldquoonlyrdquo be-fore setting forth the condition ldquo[o]n a finding by the courtthat an action was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment rdquo8

mdashmdashmdashmdashmdashmdash 8 Marx also suggests that sect1692k(a)(3) is similar to the Pipeline

Safety Act 49 U S C sect60121(b) which provides ldquoThe court may awardcosts to a prevailing defendant when the action is unreasonable frivo-lous or meritlessrdquo We have never had occasion to interpret sect60121(b)and its interaction with Rule 54(d)(1)

13 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


3 As the above discussion suggests we also are not per-

suaded by Marxrsquos objection that our interpretation rendersthe phrase ldquoand costsrdquo superfluous As noted supra at 11 the phrase ldquoand costsrdquo would not be superfluous if Con-gress included it to remove doubt that defendants may recover costs when plaintiffs bring suits in bad faith But even assuming that our interpretation renders the phraseldquoand costsrdquo superfluous that would not alter our conclu-sion The canon against surplusage is not an absoluterule see Arlington Central School Dist Bd of Ed v Mur-phy 548 U S 291 299 n 1 (2006) (ldquoWhile it is generally presumed that statutes do not contain surplusage in-stances of surplusage are not unknownrdquo) Connecticut Nat Bank v Germain 503 U S 249 253 (1992) (ldquoRedundan-cies across statutes are not unusual events in drafting rdquo) and it has considerably less force in this case

First the canon against surplusage ldquoassists only wherea competing interpretation gives effect to every clause and word of a statuterdquo Microsoft Corp v i4i Ltd Partnership 564 U S ___ ___ (2011) (slip op at 12) (internal quota-tion marks omitted) But in this case no interpretation ofsect1692k(a)(3) gives effect to every word Both Marx and the United States admit that a court has inherent power to award attorneyrsquos fees to a defendant when the plaintiff brings an action in bad faith Because there was conse-quently no need for Congress to specify that courts have this power sect1692k(a)(3) is superfluous insofar as it ad-dresses attorneyrsquos fees In light of this redundancy we arenot overly concerned that the reference to costs may beredundant as well

Second redundancy is ldquohardly unusualrdquo in statutesaddressing costs See id at ___ (slip op at 13) Numer-ous statutes overlap with Rule 54(d)(1) See eg 12 U S C sect2607(d)(5) (ldquo[T]he court may award to the pre-vailing party the court costs of the actionrdquo) sect5565(b) (2006



ed Supp V) (ldquothe [Consumer Financial Protection] Bu-reau may recover its costs in connection with prosecut-ing such action if [it] is the prevailing party in the actionrdquo) 15 U S C sect6104(d) (2006 ed) (ldquoThe court may award costs of suit and reasonable fees for attorneys and expert witnesses to the prevailing partyrdquo) sect7706(f )(4) (ldquoIn the case of any successful action the court in its discretion may award the costs of the actionrdquo) sect7805(b)(3) (ldquo[T]he court may award to the prevailing party costsrdquo) sect8131(2) (2006 ed Supp V) (ldquoThe court may also in its discretion award costs and attorneys fees to the prevail-ing partyrdquo) 29 U S C sect431(c) (2006 ed) (ldquoThe court may in its discretion allow a reasonable attorneyrsquos fee to be paid by the defendant and costs of the actionrdquo) 42U S C sect3612(p) (ldquo[T]he court in its discretion may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorneyrsquos feeand costsrdquo) sect3613(c)(2) (ldquo[T]he court in its discretion may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorneyrsquos feeand costsrdquo) 47 U S C sect551(f)(2) (ldquo[T]he court may award other litigation costs reasonably incurredrdquo)

Finally the canon against surplusage is strongest whenan interpretation would render superfluous another partof the same statutory scheme Cf United States v Jica-rilla Apache Nation 564 U S ___ ___ (2011) (slip op at 22) (ldquo lsquoAs our cases have noted in the past we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactmentwhich renders superfluous another portion of that samelawrsquo rdquo (quoting Mackey v Lanier Collection Agency amp Service Inc 486 U S 825 837 (1988))) Because sect1692k(a)(3) is not part of Rule 54(d)(1) the force of thiscanon is diminished

4 Lastly the United States contends that sect1692k(a)(3)

ldquoestablishes explicit cost-shifting standards that displace Rule 54(d)(1)rsquos more general default standardrdquo Brief for

15 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


United States 17 see also EC Term of Years Trust v United States 550 U S 429 433 (2007) (ldquo lsquo[A] preciselydrawn detailed statute pre-empts more general reme-diesrsquo rdquo (quoting Brown v GSA 425 U S 820 834 (1976))) Were we to accept the argument that sect1692k(a)(3) has a negative implication this argument might be persuasiveBut the context of sect1692k(a)(3) indicates that Congresswas simply confirming the background rule that courtsmay award to defendants attorneyrsquos fees and costs whenthe plaintiff brings an action in bad faith The statute speaks to one type of casemdashthe case of the bad-faith andharassing plaintiff Because Marx did not bring this suit in bad faith this case does not ldquofal[l] within the ambit ofthe more specific provisionrdquo Brief for United States 13 see also RadLAX Gateway Hotel LLC v Amalgamated Bank 566 U S ___ ___ (2012) (slip op at 9) (ldquoWhen the conduct at issue falls within the scope of both provisionsthe specific presumptively governs rdquo (emphasis in origi-nal))9 Accordingly this canon is inapplicable

III Because we conclude that the second sentence of

sect1692k(a)(3) is not contrary to Rule 54(d)(1) and thus mdashmdashmdashmdashmdashmdash

9 Marx the United States and GRC also spar over the purpose ofsect1692k(a)(3) Brief for Petitioner 14ndash16 Brief for United States 21ndash28 Reply Brief 11ndash14 Brief for Respondent 30ndash43 Marx and the United States contend that Congress intended to limit a courtrsquos discretion toaward costs to prevailing defendants because FDCPA plaintiffs are often poor and may be deterred from challenging unlawful debt collec-tion practices by the possibility of being held liable for the defendantrsquos costs This purposive argument cannot overcome the language and context of sect1692k(a)(3) but even if it could we find it unpersuasiveRule 54(d)(1) does not require courts to award costs to prevailing defendants District courts may appropriately consider an FDCPAplaintiffrsquos indigency in deciding whether to award costs See Badillo v Central Steel amp Wire Co 717 F 2d 1160 1165 (CA7 1983) (ldquo[I]t iswithin the discretion of the district court to consider a plaintiffrsquos indi-gency in denying costs under Rule 54(d)rdquo)



does not displace a district courtrsquos discretion to awardcosts under the Rule we need not address GRCrsquos alterna-tive argument that costs were required under Rule 68

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed

It is so ordered

_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)

SOTOMAYOR J dissenting


No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joinsdissenting

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) is a default standard that grants district courts discretion to award litigation costs to a prevailing party This default how-ever gives way when a federal statute includes a costs provision that ldquoprovides otherwiserdquo The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) 91 Stat 874 15 U S C sect1692 et seq contains a costs provision sect1692k(a)(3) and itldquoprovides otherwiserdquo That is apparent from the statutersquos plain language which limits a courtrsquos discretion to award costs to prevailing defendants to cases ldquobrought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassmentrdquo In reaching theopposite conclusion the Court ignores the plain meaning of both the FDCPA and Rule 54(d)(1) and renders thestatutory language at issue in this case meaningless I respectfully dissent

I The majority correctly recognizes see ante at 4 the

fundamental principle of statutory construction that we begin ldquowith the language of the statute itselfrdquo United States v Ron Pair Enterprises Inc 489 U S 235 241 (1989) Ingalls Shipbuilding Inc v Director Office of Workersrsquo Compensation Programs 519 U S 248 255



(1997) Caminetti v United States 242 U S 470 485 (1917) We presume that Congress ldquomeans in a statute what it says thererdquo Connecticut Nat Bank v Germain 503 U S 249 254 (1992) and ldquowhere the statutersquos language is plain the sole function of the courts is toenforce it according to its termsrdquo Ron Pair 489 U S at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted) This basic tenet is the appropriate starting point for interpreting both Rule54(d)(1) and sect1692k(a)(3) After invoking this principlehowever the majority casts it aside entirely in interpret-ing the statute and the Rule

A Rule 54(d)(1) states as relevant here that ldquo[u]nless a

federal statute provides otherwise costsmdashother than attorneyrsquos feesmdashshould be allowed to the prevailing partyrdquo The first question is what it means for a statuteto ldquoprovid[e] otherwiserdquo than Rule 54(d)(1)

Because the phrase ldquoprovides otherwiserdquo is not definedin the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure we look to its ordinary meaning Asgrow Seed Co v Winterboer 513 U S 179 187 (1995) In common usage to ldquoprovide oth-erwiserdquo means to ldquomake a stipulationrdquo that is ldquodiffer-en[t]rdquo Websterrsquos Third New International Dictionary 1598 1827 (2002) (Websterrsquos Third) (defining ldquoproviderdquo and ldquootherwiserdquo respectively) see Random House Diction-ary of the English Language 1372 1556 (2d ed 1987) (Random House) (ldquoto arrange for or stipulaterdquo ldquo[i]n another mannerrdquo) 10 Oxford English Dictionary 984 (2d ed 1989) (Oxford Dictionary) 12 id at 713 (ldquoto stipulaterdquo ldquo[i]nanother way in a different mannerrdquo) This reading of the plain text is confirmed by the original 1937 codifica-tion of the Rule which made clear that any ldquoexpress pro-visionrdquo relating to costs in a statute is sufficient to displace

3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the default1

Accordingly to displace Rule 54(d)(1) a federal statuteneed only address costs in a way different from but not necessarily inconsistent with the default2 The reason is straightforward If Congress has enacted a provision withrespect to costs in a statute there is no longer any need for the default so it gives way This design of the Rule issensible because many statutes contain specific costsprovisions 10 Moorersquos Federal Practice sect54101[1][c] p 54ndash160 (3d ed 2012) (noting that such statutes ldquoare far too numerous to list comprehensivelyrdquo) Rule 54(d)(1) istherefore consistent with the canon of statutory interpre-tation that ldquoa precisely drawn detailed statute pre-emptsmore general remediesrdquo Hinck v United States 550 U S 501 506 (2007) Crawford Fitting Co v J T Gibbons Inc 482 U S 437 445 (1987) United States v Erika Inc 456 U S 201 208 (1982)

While purporting to interpret the ldquoordinary meaningrdquo ofRule 54(d)(1) ante at 4 the majority immediately aban-dons the ordinary meaning The majority concludes that astatute provides otherwise for purposes of Rule 54(d)(1) only if it is ldquocontraryrdquo to the default Ante at 5 But the

mdashmdashmdashmdashmdashmdash 1 The original codification of the Rule provided that ldquo[e]xcept when

express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directsrdquo Ante at 6 (quotingthe Rule emphasis added internal quotation marks omitted) The language in the Rule was later revised to its current form in 2007 butas the majority acknowledges the Rules Committee indicated the changes were ldquo lsquostylistic onlyrsquo rdquo Ibid (quoting Advisory CommitteersquosNotes 28 U S C App p 734 (2006 ed Supp V))

2 See 10 C Wright A Miller amp M Kane Federal Practice and Proce-dure sect2665 p 200 (3d ed 1998 and Supp 2012) (hereinafter Wright ampMiller) (Rule 54 ldquoprovides that ordinarily the prevailing party shall beallowed costs other than attorneyrsquos fees unless some other provisionfor costs is made by a federal statute or the civil rulesrdquo (emphasis added))



majority does not cite even a single dictionary definition in support of that reading despite the oft-cited principlethat a definition widely reflected in dictionaries generallygoverns over other possible meanings3 Lacking any dic-tionary support for its interpretation the majority relies instead upon a treatise published nearly 60 years after the Rulersquos adoption See ante 6ndash7 (citing 6 J Moore MoorersquosFederal Practice p 54ndash304 (2d ed 1996))

ldquoOtherwiserdquo means ldquodifferentrdquo Websterrsquos Third 1518 see supra at 2ndash3 The majorityrsquos preferred term of artldquocontraryrdquo sets a higher bar it signifies ldquothe oppositerdquoor ldquoa proposition fact or condition incompatible with an- otherrdquo Websterrsquos Third 495 (emphasis added) See also American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language399 (5th ed 2011) (ldquoOpposed as in character or purposerdquo)3 Oxford Dictionary 844 (ldquoOpposed in nature or tendencydiametrically different extremely unlikerdquo) Random House 442 (ldquo[O]pposite in nature or character diametrically or mutually opposedrdquo)

Indeed the majorityrsquos reading does not square with theeveryday meaning of ldquootherwiserdquo Consider for example a medication labeled with the instruction ldquotake twice a dayunless otherwise directedrdquo If a doctor advises her patientto take the medicine ldquoin the morningrdquo the patient wouldunderstand her to mean that he should take the medicine once a day each morning Although the instruction totake the medication in the morning is not incompatible with taking it twice a daymdashit could be taken in the even-ing as wellmdashan ordinary English speaker would interpretldquootherwiserdquo to mean that the doctorrsquos more specific in-mdashmdashmdashmdashmdashmdash

3 See eg MCI Telecommunications Corp v American Telephone amp Telegraph Co 512 U S 218 225 (1994) (opinion for the Court by SCALIA J) (rejecting the argument that an alternative definition should control the meaning of ldquomodifyrdquo where ldquo[v]irtually every dictionary we are aware of says that lsquoto modifyrsquo means to change moderately or in minor fashionrdquo)

5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


structions entirely supersede what is printed on the bottleRule 54(d)(1) is just the same Its default is supplanted whenever Congress provides more specific instructions not only when they are diametrically opposed to it

B 1

Thus the straightforward question in this case is whether sect1692k(a)(3) implements a ldquodifferentrdquo standardwith respect to costs than Rule 54(d)(1) and so ldquoprovidesotherwiserdquo As relevant sect1692k(a)(3) states ldquoOn a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment the courtmay award to the defendant attorneyrsquos fees reasonable inrelation to the work expended and costsrdquo

It is readily apparent that this provision is different from the default of Rule 54(d)(1) In sect1692k(a)(3) Con-gress described with specificity a single circumstance in which costs may be awarded Far from merely restating adistrict courtrsquos discretion to award costs this provisionimposes a prerequisite to the exercise of that discretion a finding by the court that an action was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment

Because the text is plain there is no need to proceed any further Even so relevant canons of statutory inter-pretation lend added support to reading sect1692k(a)(3) ashaving a negative implication That reading accords with the expressio unius exclusio alterius canon which in-structs that when Congress includes one possibility in a statute it excludes another by implication See Chevron U S A Inc v Echazabal 536 U S 73 80ndash81 (2002)This rule reinforces what the text makes clear By limit-ing a courtrsquos discretion to award costs to cases brought inbad faith or for the purpose of harassment Congress



foreclosed the award of costs in other circumstances4

Petitionerrsquos interpretation of the statute is also strongly favored by the rule that statutes should be read to avoid superfluity Under this ldquomost basic of interpretative canons lsquo ldquo[a] statute should be constructed so thateffect is given to all of its provisions so that no part will beinoperative or superfluous void or insignificantrdquo rsquo rdquo Corley v United States 556 U S 303 314 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v Winn 542 U S 88 101 (2004)) Respondentrsquos readingas it mostly acknowledges renders the entire sentence meaningless because it reiterates powers that federal courts already possess with respect to both costs and attorneyrsquos fees See Brief for Respondent 22ndash24

The majority rejects this argument citing the rule thatthis canon ldquo lsquoassists only where a competing interpretationgives effect to every clause and word of a statutersquo rdquo Ante at 13 (quoting Microsoft Corp v i4i Ltd Partnership 564 U S ___ ___ (2011) (slip op at 12)) In its view neither of the available interpretations can eliminate superfluitybecause the attorneyrsquos fees provision is redundant under any reading Ante at 13 But the canon against super-fluity surely counsels against an interpretation that rendersthe entire provision at issue superfluous when a compet-ing interpretation would at least render part of the provi-sion meaningful Nor does the majorityrsquos observation thatredundancy is ldquo lsquohardly unusualrsquo rdquo ante at 14 in provi-sions relating to costs make the canon inapplicable While

mdashmdashmdashmdashmdashmdash 4 The majority suggests that this canon does not apply to sect1692k(a)(3)

because it only aids where ldquo lsquoit is fair to suppose that Congress consid-ered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to itrsquo rdquo Ante at 9 (quoting Barnhart v Peabody Coal Co 537 U S 149 168 (2003)) The best evidence of congressional intent however is the statutory text that Congress enacted West Virginia Univ Hospitals Inc v Casey 499 U S 83 98 (1991) And here the plain language of sect1692k(a)(3)makes it clear that Congress meant to foreclose other possible mean-ings See supra at 5

7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


Congress sometimes drafts redundant language with respect to costs Congress did not do so in sect1692(a)(3)5

Instead it drafted specific language that permits a court to award costs only on the satisfaction of a condition

Interpreting sect1692k(1)(3) as having a negative implica-tion is consistent with our construction of another statute that includes similar language In Cooper Industries Inc v Aviall Services Inc 543 U S 157 166 (2004) (opinion for the Court by THOMAS J) we considered a provision inthe Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensa-tion and Liability Act of 1980 42 U S C sect9613(f)(1) thatprovided ldquo[a]ny person may seek contribution during any civil action under section 9606 of this titlerdquo (em-phasis added) We rejected the argument that the word ldquomayrdquo indicated that ldquoduring a civil actionrdquo was one butnot the exclusive circumstance in which the right of con-tribution was available 543 U S at 166 We instead adopted the natural reading of the text holding that apartyrsquos ability to seek contribution was limited by the phrase ldquoduring any civil actionrdquo and that contribution was only available while a lawsuit is pending Ibid The same logic applies here because sect1692k(a)(3) imposes a closely analogous condition on a courtrsquos discretion to award costs

2 The first sentence of sect1692k(a)(3) underscores that

Congress implemented a different rule than Rule 54(d)(1)That sentence provides that a debt collector who violates the FDCPA is ldquoliable tordquo a prevailing plaintiff for ldquothe

mdashmdashmdashmdashmdashmdash 5 See eg 15 U S C sect 6104(d) (Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud

and Abuse Prevention Act) (ldquoThe court may award costs of suit andreasonable fees for attorneys and expert witnesses to the prevailing partyrdquo) 42 U S C sect3613(c)(2) (Fair Housing Act) (ldquoIn a civil action the court in its discretion may allow the prevailing party a reason-able attorneyrsquos fee and costsrdquo) see also 28 U S C sect1332(b) (failure to recover jurisdictional amount)



costs of the action together with a reasonable attorneyrsquos fee as determined by the courtrdquo This sentence makes a losing defendant always liable for the ldquocosts of the actionrdquo which is a clear departure from the Rule 54(d)(1) discre-tionary default Cf Taniguchi v Kan Pacific Saipan Ltd 566 U S ___ ___ (2012) (slip op at 4) Because Congress deviated from Rule 54(d)(1) in the first sentence ofsect1692k(a)(3) the most reasonable reading is that thesentence that immediately follows which states the rulefor prevailing defendants takes a similar path

The majority believes that its reading of the costs provi-sion follows from the first sentence as well but for a dif-ferent reason Ante at 11ndash12 It suggests that if Congresshad not included costs in the second sentence a plaintiff might have been able to argue that the inclusion of costs in the first sentence and the exclusion of costs in the second indicated that defendants could recover only feeswhen an action is brought in bad faith The majority thenspeculates that Congress included costs in the secondsentence to foreclose that argument

The text of the previous sentence makes plain howeverthat the second sentence departs from the Rule 54(d)(1)default and the majority offers no evidence in support of its supposition that Congress intended a different mean-ing6 Moreover I see no basis for invoking potential con-mdashmdashmdashmdashmdashmdash

6 The majority does not explain why its speculation about legislative intent is more persuasive than the Solicitor Generalrsquos view that sad-dling potential plaintiffs with costs would undermine the FDCPArsquos ldquo lsquocalibrated schemersquo rdquo of enforcement Brief for United States as Ami-cus Curiae 10 (quoting Jerman v Carlisle McNellie Rini Kramer amp Ulrich L P A 559 U S 573 ___ (2010) (slip op at 29)) Under the Solicitor Generalrsquos interpretation because the recoveries in these cases are not certain to be large consumers may be deterred from bringing FDCPA claims if they are faced with the risk of paying costs See Brief for United States 21ndash28 This outcome would thwart Congressrsquos expectation that the FDCPA was to be primarily enforced by consum-ers Ibid

9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


fusion or indulging in speculation to explain away the words Congress chose Ante at 11ndash12 Some Members of the majority have expressed doubt about the relevance oflegislative history claiming that relying upon it is analo-gous to ldquoentering a crowded cocktail party and looking for onersquos friendsrdquo Conroy v Aniskoff 507 U S 511 519 (1993) (SCALIA J concurring in judgment) But speculat-ing whole cloth about congressional intent as the majoritydoes is surely more problematic The majority is savedthe trouble of having to look for its friends at the party itsimply invites them

II Reduced to its essence the majorityrsquos analysis turns on

reading sect1692k(a)(3) in the context of what it calls the ldquovenerable presumptionrdquo that prevailing parties are enti-tled to costs See ante at 4 Even if it were appropriate toconsider a background presumption rather than readingthe plain text at issue the majorityrsquos characterization of the presumption is at best incomplete

First the Courtrsquos suggestion that the presumptionregarding costs is a ldquovenerablerdquo one in American law is an overstatement Ibid It is true as the majority points outthat prior to the federal rules ldquoprevailing parties were entitled to costs as of right in actions at law while courtshad discretion to award costs in equity proceedingsrdquo Ante at 4 n 3 see Wright amp Miller sect2665 at 199 But the doctrine governing costs at law carved out an importantexception for statutory provisions that set forth a differ-ent rule7 Where there was such a statute courts would

mdashmdashmdashmdashmdashmdash 7 See Ex parte Peterson 253 U S 300 318 (1920) (ldquo[I]n actions at law

the prevailing party is entitled to costs as of right except in those few cases where by express statutory provision or established principles costs are deniedrdquo (emphasis added)) see also United States v Tread-well 15 F 532 534 (SDNY 1883) (ldquo[T]he prevailing party shall beentitled to costs in all cases unless otherwise expressly provided by lawrdquo



simply apply it In its assessment of the background princi-ples underlying its approach the majority glosses over the longstanding expectation that Congress often enacts dif-ferent rules with respect to costs and when it does these rules govern

Second Rule 54(d)(1) embraces this long-recognized exception because it specifies that a statute can displace its default rule To repeat Rule 54(d)(1) merely enacts a default standard that applies unless among other thingsa statute or rule ldquoprovides otherwiserdquo Here for the rea-sons explained Congress enacted exactly such a statuteThat is clear from the text because sect1692k(a)(3) condi-tions the award of costs on the satisfaction of a condition and because the previous sentence of the same provision breaks from the default

The plain text of Rule 54(d)(1) and sect1692k(a)(3) dictates

the result in this case Accordingly I would reverse the Tenth Circuit and hold that sect1692k(a)(3) ldquoprovides other-wiserdquo than Rule 54(d)(1) such that a district court cannot award costs to a prevailing defendant in an FDCPA actionexcept upon a showing that the action was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment I respectfully dissent


(emphasis added internal quotation marks omitted)) Payne Costs inCommon Law Actions in the Federal Courts 21 Va L Rev 397 430 (1934) (ldquoBy reason of the numerous changes in the acts of Congressrespecting costs many of the older cases are not now safe precedents Care should be exercised therefore to make an intelligent use of thecases decided prior to the enactment of various statutesrdquo)


Syllabus

the provision is not contrary to Rule 54(d)(1) Pp 7ndash15(1) GRC argues that since sect1692k(a)(3) does not address whether

costs may be awarded in an FDCPA case brought in good faith itdoes not set forth a standard that is contrary to the Rule and there-fore does not displace the presumption that a court has discretion to award costs Marx and the United States concede that the statute does not expressly limit a courtrsquos discretion to award costs under theRule but argue that it does so by negative implication They claimthat unless sect1692k(a)(3) sets forth the exclusive basis on which to award costs the phrase ldquoand costsrdquo would be superfluous with Rule54(d)(1) And the United States also argues that sect1692k(a)(3)rsquos more specific cost statute displaces Rule 54(d)(1)rsquos more general rule Pp 7ndash9

(2) The argument of Marx and the United States depends criti-cally on whether sect1692k(a)(3)rsquos allowance of costs creates a negativeimplication that costs are unavailable in any other circumstancesThe expressio unius canon that they invoke does not apply ldquounless it is fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed possibilityand meant to say no to itrdquo Barnhart v Peabody Coal Co 537 U S 149 168 and can be overcome by ldquocontrary indications that adoptinga particular rule or statute was probably not meant to signal any ex-clusionrdquo United States v Vonn 535 U S 55 65 Here context indi-cates that Congress did not intend sect1692k(a)(3) to foreclose courtsfrom awarding costs under the Rule First under the American Rule each litigant generally pays his own attorneyrsquos fees but the Court has long recognized that federal courts have inherent power to award attorneyrsquos fees in a narrow set of circumstances eg when a party brings an action in bad faith The statute is thus best read as codify-ing a courtrsquos pre-existing authority to award both attorneyrsquos fees and costs Next sect1692k(a)(3)rsquos second sentence must be understood in light of its first which provides an award of attorneyrsquos fees and costsbut to prevailing plaintiffs By adding ldquoand costsrdquo to the second sen-tence Congress foreclosed the argument that defendants can only re-cover attorneyrsquos fees when plaintiffs bring an action in bad faith andremoved any doubt that defendants may recover costs as well as at-torneyrsquos fees in such cases Finally sect1692k(a)(3)rsquos language sharplycontrasts with that of other statutes in which Congress has placed conditions on awarding costs to prevailing defendants See eg 28 U S C sect1928 Pp 9ndash12

(3) Even assuming that their surplusage argument is correct the canon against surplusage is not absolute First the canon ldquoassists only where a competing interpretation gives effect to every clause and word of a statuterdquo Microsoft Corp v i4i Ltd Partnership 564 U S ___ ___ Here no interpretation of sect1692k(a)(3) gives effect to

3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)

Syllabus





_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)




No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]












3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)












7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















11 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)

















13 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)












15 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)










It is so ordered

_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]











3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the default1












5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



B 1











7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)
















3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)

Syllabus





_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)




No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]












3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)












7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















11 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)

















13 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)












15 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)










It is so ordered

_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]











3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the default1












5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



B 1











7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)
















_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)




No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]












3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)












7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















11 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)

















13 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)












15 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)










It is so ordered

_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]











3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the default1












5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



B 1











7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)























3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)












7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















11 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)

















13 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)












15 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)










It is so ordered

_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]











3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the default1












5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



B 1











7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



























5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)












7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















11 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)

















13 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)












15 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)










It is so ordered

_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]











3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the default1












5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



B 1











7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)





















7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















11 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)

















13 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)












15 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)










It is so ordered

_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]











3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the default1












5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



B 1











7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)






















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















11 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)

















13 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)












15 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)










It is so ordered

_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]











3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the default1












5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



B 1











7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)
























11 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)

















13 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)












15 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)










It is so ordered

_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]











3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the default1












5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



B 1











7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)























13 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)












15 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)










It is so ordered

_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]











3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the default1












5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



B 1











7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)






















15 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)










It is so ordered

_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]











3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the default1












5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



B 1











7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)




















It is so ordered

_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]











3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the default1












5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



B 1











7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)
















_________________

_________________

1 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



No 11ndash1175



[February 26 2013]











3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the default1












5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



B 1











7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)






















3 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)


the default1












5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



B 1











7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)






















5 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)



B 1











7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)























7 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)






















9 Cite as 568 U S ____ (2013)
















Marx v. General Revenue Corp. - Supreme Court of the United States

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Transcript of Marx v. General Revenue Corp. - Supreme Court of the United States