MARTHA - Jyväskylän yliopisto

29
17. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM Nussbaum defends a version of the capabilities approach to justice. This approach holds that justice is centrally concerned with making possible the realization of certain human functionings or capabiliiies. She dern onstrates how this approach can guide development policy lo ensure that women have equal capabilities with men. kid she argues that her ver sion of the capabilities approach can adequately answer the most serious charges made by relalivists against ethical universalism. Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings First published in Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum andJonathan (3/over (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 61—104. Human beings are not by nature kings, or nobles, or courtiers, or rich. All are born naked and poor. All are subject to the miseries of life, to frustrations, to ills, to needs, to pains of every kind. Finally all are condemned to death. That is what is really the human being; that is what no mortal can avoid. Begin, then, by studying what is the most inseparable from human nature, that which most constitutes humanness. —Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, Book IV Women, a majority of the world’s population, receive only a small share of developmental opportunities. They are often excluded from education or from the better jobs, from political systems or from adequate health care. ... In the countries for which relevant I I

Transcript of MARTHA - Jyväskylän yliopisto

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17.MA

RT

HA

C.

NU

SSBA

UM

Nussbaum

defendsa

versionofthe

capabilitiesapproach

tojustice.

This

approachholds

thatju

sticeis

centrallyconcerned

with

making

possiblethe

realizationof

certainhum

anfunctionings

orcapabiliiies.

She

dern

onstrateshow

thisapproach

canguide

development

policylo

ensurethat

wom

enhave

equalcapabilities

with

men.

kid

sheargues

thather

ver

sionofthe

capabilitiesapproach

canadequately

answer

them

ostserious

chargesm

adeby

relalivistsagainst

ethicaluniversalism

.

Hum

anC

apab

ilities,F

emale

Hum

anB

eings

Firstpublished

inW

omen,

Culture

andD

evelopment:

AStudy

ofH

uman

Capabilities,

ed. Martha

C.Nussbaum

andJonathan

(3/over(O

xford:O

xfordU

niversityPress,

1995),61—

104.

Hum

anbeings

arenot

bynature

kings,or

nobles,orcourtiers,or

rich.All

areborn

nakedand

poor.Allare

subjecttothe

miseries

oflife,to

frustrations,toills,to

needs,topains

ofeverykind.

Finallyall

arecondem

nedto

death.T

hatis

what

isreally

thehum

anbeing;

thatis

what

nom

ortalcan

avoid.Begin,then,by

studyingw

hatis

them

ostinseparable

fromhum

annature,thatw

hichm

ostconstitutes

humanness.

—Jean-Jacques

Rousseau,

Em

ile,B

ookIV

Wom

en,a

majority

ofthe

world’s

population,receive

onlya

small

shareof

developmental

opportunities.T

heyare

oftenexcluded

fromeducation

orfrom

thebetter

jobs,from

politicalsystem

sor

fromadequate

healthcare.

...

Inthe

countriesfor

which

relevant

II

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’--I-1

1_

ri-‘_

flJO

UflU

iVI

-‘1

t

dataare

available,the

female

human

development

indexis

only60

percentthat

ofm

ales.

—H

uman

Developm

entR

eport, 1993,U

nlied

Nations

Develop

mentProgram

me

Were

ourstate

apure

democracy

therew

ouldstill

beexcluded

fromour

deliberationsw

omen,

who,

toprevent

depravationof

morals

andam

biguityofissue,should

notm

ixprom

iscuouslyin

gatheringsof m

en.

—Thom

asJefferson

Being

aw

oman

isnotyeta

way

ofbeinga

human

being.

—C

atIjarineM

acKinnon

1.FE

MIN

ISM

AN

DC

OM

MO

NH

UM

AN

ITY

Begin

with

thehum

anbeing:w

iththe

capacitiesand

needsthatjoin

allhum

ans,acrossbarriers

ofgenderand

classand

raceand

nation.’T

oa

personconcerned

with

theequality

anddignity

ofwom

en,this

adviceshould

appearin

onew

ayprom

ising.Foritinstructs

usto

focuson

what

allhuman

beingsshare

ratherthan

onthe

privilegesand

achievements

ofadom

inantgroup, andon

needsand

basicfisnctions

ratherthan

onpow

eror

status.Wom

enhave

rarelybeen

kings, ornobles,or

courtiers,or

rich.Theyhave,

onthe

otherhand,

frequentlybeen

poorand

sickand

dead.B

utthis

startingpoint

will

beregarded

with

skepticismby

many

contemporary

feminists.

Forit

isall

tooobvious

thatthroughout

thehistory

ofpolitical

thought,both

Western

andnon-W

estern,such

allegedlyunbiased

generalconcepts

haveserved

invarious

ways

tobolsterm

aleprivilege

andto

marginalize

wom

en. Hum

anbeings

arenot

bornkings,ornobles, orcourtiers.T

heyare,orso

it seems,

2born

male

andfem

ale.The

nakednesson

which

Rousseau

placessuch

emphasis

revealsa

differencethat

istaken

byR

ousseauhim

selfto

imply

profounddifferences

incapability

andsocial

role.H

isrem

arksabout

human

natureare

theprelude

tohis

accountof

Emile’s

education.Sophie,

Emile’s

female

companion,w

illbesaid

tohave

adifferent“nature”

anda

differenteducation. Whether,as

here,wom

enare

heldto

bebearers

of

a different”nature”fromunm

arked“hum

annature,”orw

hetherthey

aresim

plysaid

tobe

degenerateand

substandardexem

plarsofthe

same

“nature,”the

resultisusually

thesam

e:ajudgm

entoffem

aleinferiority,

which

canth

enbe

usedto

justify

andstabilize

op

pressio

n.

3I

shallargue

nonethelessth

atw

eshould

infact

beginw

itha

con

ceptionofthe

human

beingand

human

functioningin

thinkingabout

wom

en’sequality

indeveloping

countries.Thisnotion

canbe

abused.It

canbe

developedin

agender-biased

way

Itcan

beunjustly

andprejudicially

applied.It

canbe

developedin

ways

thatneglect

relevantdifferences

among

wom

enofdifferentnationalities,classes,and

races.But

Ishallarguethat,articulated

ina

certainw

ay(and

Ishallbe

emphatically

distinguishingm

yapproach

fromothers

thatuse

anidea

of“hum

annature”)

itis

ourbest

startingpoint

forreflection.It

isour

bestroute

tostating

correctlyw

hatis

wrong

with

thesituations

thatconfronted

SalehaB

egumand

Metha

Bai,4

thebestbasis

forclaims

ofjusticeon

theirbehalf;and

onbehalfofthe

hugenum

bersof w

omen

inthe

world

who

arecurrently

beingdeprived

oftheirfill

“human

development.”

Inote

that theconceptofthe

human

beinghas

akeadybeen

centralto

much

ofthebestfem

inistandinternationalistthinking.C

onsider,forexam

ple,J.S. Mill’s

remarks

on“hum

anim

provement”

in7he

Subjectionof

Wom

en;Aniartya

Sen’suse

ofanotion

of “human

capability”to

confrontgender-based

inequalities;the

Sen-inspireduse

ofa

notionof

“human

development”

inthe

TINR

eporttodescribe

andcriticize

gender—based

inequalities; Susanivloller

Okin’s

proposalfora“humanistjustice”in

herrecentm

ajor work

offeministpoliticaltheory;C

atharineM

acKinnon’s

graphicdescription

ofwom

en’scurrentsituation,quoted

asm

yepigraph;

and,ofcourse, therole

thatvariousaccounts

of”human

rights,”oreven

“TheR

ightsof M

an,”have

playedin

claiming

justiceforw

omen.

5M

uchthe

same

canbe

saidm

oregenerally,

Ithink,

aboutinternationalist

thought.6

To

citejustone

example,I

takem

yproposalto

bethe

feminist

analogueofthe

proposalrecentlym

adeby

Ghanaian

philosopherKw

ame

Anthony

Appiah

when

hew

rote,“We

will only

solveour

problems

ifwe

seethem

ashum

anproblem

sarising

outof

aspecial

situation,and

we

shallnotsolvethem

ifwe

seethem

asAfrican

problems,generated

byour

beingsom

ehowunlike

others.”1

]VIyproposal

isfrankly

universalistand

“essentialist.”T

hatis,

itasks

usto

focuson

what

iscom

mon

toall

ratherthan

ondifferences

(although,as

we

shallsee,

itdoes

notneglect

these),and

tosee

some

capabilitiesand

fi.inctionsas

more

central,m

oreat

thecore

ofhum

an

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•4

life,thanothers.Its

primary

opponentson

thecontem

poraryscene

will

be“anti-essentialists”

ofvarious

types,thinkers

who

urgeus

tobegin

notwith

sameness

butw

ithdifference—

bothbetw

eenw

omen

andm

enand

acrossgroups

ofwom

en—.and

toseek

norms

definedrelatively

toa

local contextandlocally

heldbeliefs.8

‘Thisopposition

takesm

anyform

s,and

Ishall

beresponding

toseveral

distinctobjections

thatopponents

may

bringagainstm

yuniversalist

proposal.But

Ican

beginto

motivate

my

enterpriseby

tellingseveral

truestories

ofconversations

thathave

takenplace

atVID

ER

,inw

hichthe

relativistposition9

seemed

tohave

alarming

implications

forw

omen’s

lives.Ihave

insom

ecases

conflatedtw

oseparate

conversationsinto

one;otherw

isethings

happenedas

Idescribe

them.’°

1. Ata

conferenceon

“Value

andT

echnolo

g3”an

Am

ericanecono

mist w

hohas long

beena left-w

ingcritic

ofneoclassicaleconomics

deliversa

paper urgingthe

preservationoftraditionalw

aysoflife

ina

ruralareaofIndia,now

underthreatofcontamination

fromW

esterndevelopm

entprojects.A

sevidence

of theexcellence

ofthisruralw

ayoflife, he

pointsto

thefactthat, w

hereasw

eW

esternersexperience

asharp

splitbetween

thevalues

thatprevail

inthe

workplace

andthe

valuesthat

prevailin

thehom

e,here,

bycontrast,

thereexists

what

theeconom

istcalls

“theem

beddedw

ayoflife”;

thesam

evalues

obtainingin

bothplaces.H

isexam

ple:Justasin

thehom

ea

menstruating

wom

anis

thoughtto

pol

lutethe

kitchenand

thereforem

aynotenter

it, sotoo

inthe

workplace

am

enstruatingw

oman

istaken

topollute

theloom

andm

aynot

enterthe

roomw

hereloom

sare

kept.Am

artyaSen

objectsthatthis

example

isrepellent,rather

thanadm

irable:Surely

suchpractices

bothdegrade

thew

omen

inquestion

andinhibittheir

freedom.T

hefirsteconom

ist’scollaborator,

anelegant

Frenchanthropologist

(who

would,I

suspect,objectviolently

toa

puritycheck

atthe

seminar

roomdoor),replies

toSen.D

oesn’therealize

thatthereis,in

thesem

atters,noprivileged

placeto

stand?This, after

all,hasbeen

shown

byboth

Derrida

andFoucault.

Doesn’t

heknow

thathe

isneglecting

theotherness

ofIndianideas

bybringing

his‘W

esternessentialistvalues

intothe

picture?’2.

Thesam

eFrench

anthropologistnow

deliversher

paper.She

expressesregret

thatthe

introductionof

smallpox

vaccinationto

Indiaby

theB

ritisheradicated

thecultof Sittala

Devi,the

goddessto

whom

oneused

topray

inorder

toavert

smallpox.H

ere,shesays, is

anotherexam

pleofW

esternneglectofdifference.Som

eone(itm

ighthavebeen

me)

objectsthat

itis surelybetterto

behealthy

ratherthanill,to

liverather

thanto

die.’Theansw

er comes

back: Western

essentialist medicine

con

ceivesof things

interm

sofbinary

oppositions: lifeis

opposedto

death,

healthto

disease.’1

But if w

ecast

away

thisbinary

way

of thinking,we

will

beginto

comprehend

theotherness

of Indiantraditions.

At

thispoint

Eric

Hobsbaw

m,w

hohas

beenlistening

tothe

pro

ceedingsin

increasinglyuneasy

silence,rises

todeliver

ablistering

indictmentof the

traditionalismand

relativismthat prevailin

thisgroup.

He

listshistorical

examples

of ways

inw

hichappeals

totradition

have

beenused

tosupport

oppressionand

violence.13

His

final example

isthat

of National

Socialismin

Germ

any.Inthe

confusionthat ensues, m

ostof

therelativist

socialscientists—

aboveall those

fromfar

away, w

hodo

not

knoww

hoH

obsbawm

is—dem

andthat

hebe

askedto

leavethe

room.

‘Theradical A

merican

economist, disconcerted

bythis

apparent tension

between

hisrelativism

andhis

affiliationw

iththe

left, convincesthem

,

with

difficulty,tolet

Hobsbaw

mrem

ain.3.W

eshift now

toanother conference

two

yearslater,a

philosophi

cal conferenceorganized

byA

martya

Senand

me.’4

Senm

akesit clearthat

heholds

theperhaps

unsophisticatedview

thatlife

isopposed

todeath

ina

verybinary

way

andthat

suchbinary

oppositionscan

andshould

beused

indevelopm

ent analysis. His

paper’5

containsm

uchuniversalist

talkof hum

anfunctioning

andcapability; he

beginsto

speakof freedom

of choiceas

abasic

human

good.At

thispoint

heis

interruptedby

the

radicaleconom

ist ofmy

first story, who

insiststhat contem

poraryanthro

pologyhas

shown

thatnon-W

esternpeople

arenot

especiallyattached

tofreedom

ofchoice.

His

example:

Anew

bookon

Japanhas

shown

that Japanesem

ales, when

theyget

home

fromw

ork,do

notw

ishto

choosew

hatto

eatfor

dinner, what

tow

ear,and

soon.T

heyw

ishall

thesechoices

tobe

takenout

oftheir

handsby

theirw

ives. Aheated

exchangefollow

sabout w

hatthis

example

reallyshow

s. Ileave

it toyour

imaginations

toreconstruct

it. Inthe

end,the

confidenceof

theradical

economist

isunshaken:

Senand

Iare

bothvictim

sof

baduniversalist

thinking, who

fail torespect “difference.”

16

Here

we

seethe

relativist positionw

hoseinfluence

indevelopm

ent

studiesm

otivatedthe

work

that hasled

tothe

presentvolume

[Wom

en,

Cu/litre

andD

eve/opnzentl. The

phenomenon

isan

oddone. For

we

see

herehighly

intelligentpeople, people

deeplycom

mitted

tothe

goodof

wom

enand

men

indeveloping

countries,peoplew

hothink

ofth

em

selvesas

progressiveand

feminist

andantiracist,

peoplew

hocorrectly

arguethat the

concept of development is

anevaluative

concept requiring

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OB

AL

JUST

ICE

:SE

MIN

AL

ESSAY

Ss,rn

aL1a

.

normative

argum

ent

17

—effe

ctiv

ely

eschewing

normative

argument

and

takingup

positionsthat

converge,as

Hobsbaw

mcorrectly

saw, w

ith

thepositions

of reaction, oppression,and

sexism. U

nderthe

bannerof

theirfashionable

oppositionto

“essentialism”

march

ancientreligious

taboos,theluxury

ofthe

pampered

husband, educationaldeprivation,

unequalhealthcare,and

premature

death. (And

inm

yow

nuniversalist

Aristotelian

way, I

sayit

atthe

outset,Ido

holdthat

deathis

opposed

tolife

inthe

most

binaryw

ayim

aginable,and

freedomto

slavery,and

hungerto

adequatenutrition,

andignorance

toknow

ledge.N

ordo

I

believethat

itis

only,oreven

primarily, in

Western

thinkingthat

such

oppositionsare, and

shouldbe, im

portant.)T

herelativist

challengeto

auniversal

notionof

thehum

anbeing

andhum

anfunctioning

isnot

always

accompanied

byclear

andexplicit

philosophicalargum

ents.Thisis

especiallytrue

inthe

material

from

development

studiesto

which

Ihave

referred, where

thephilosophical

debateconcerning

relativismin

ethicsand

inscience

isnot confronted,

anduniversalism

issim

plydenounced

asthe

legacyofV

Vestern

con

ceptionsof “epistem

e’8

that arealleged

tobe

inleague

with

imperialism

andoppression)9

The

ideabehind

thisvolum

e[W

omen,

Culture

and

Developm

ent]as

aw

holew

asthat

tosort

outvarious

strandsin

the

philosophicaldebateon

thesequestions

would

beof the

first importance

inm

akingfurther

progresson

wom

en’sissues;

andthe

papersby

Alcott

[“Dem

ocracyand

Rationality:

AD

ialoguew

ithH

ilaryPutnam

,”pp.

225—34], B

enhabib[“C

ultural Com

plexity,Moral Interdependence,and

theG

lobalDialogical C

omm

unity,”pp.235—58], G

lover[“The

Research

Programm

eofD

evelopment

Ethics,”

pp.116—

39], andH

ilaryPutnam

[“Pragmatism

andM

oralO

bjectivity,”pp.

199—224]

carryout

various

aspectsof

thisantirelativist

project.Here,

then,Ishall

simply

setout

ratherschematically

andbriefly,for

thepurposes

of my

own

argument,

severalobjections

tothe

useof a

universalnotion

of human

functioning

indevelopm

entanalysisto

which

Ishall

laterrespond.

2. TH

EA

SSAU

LT

ON

UN

IVE

RS

AL

ISM

Many

criticsofuniversalism

inethics

arereally

criticsof m

etaphysical

realismw

hoassum

ethat

realismis

anecessary

basisfor

universalism.

Ishallargue

that thisassum

ptionis

false.By

metaphysical realism

Im

ean

theview

(comm

onlyheld

inboth

Western

andnon-W

esternphilosophi

caltraditions)

thatthere

issom

edeterm

inatew

aythe

world

is, apart

fromthe

interpretivew

orkingsof the

cognitivefaculties

oflivingbeings.

Farfromrequiring

technical metaphysics

forits

articulation,thisis

avery

natural way

toview

things, andis

infacta very

comm

ondaily-life

view, in

bothW

esternand

non-Western

traditions.We

didnot m

akethe

stars, the

earth, thetrees:T

heyare

whatthey

arethere

outsideof us, w

aitingto

be

known.A

ndour

activitiesof know

ingdo

notchange

what

theyare.

On

sucha view

,thew

aythe

human

beingessentially

anduniversally

isw

ill bepart ofthe

independent furnitureof the

universe, something

that canin

principlebe

seenand

studiedindependently

of anyexperi

enceof hum

anlife

andhum

anhistory. Frequently

it isheld

thatagod

orgods

havethis

sortof know

ledge,and

perhapssom

ew

isehum

ans

also.This

knowledge

isusually

understoodto

havenorm

ativeforce.T

he

heavenlyaccount

of who

we

areconstrains

whatw

em

aylegitim

ately

seekto

be.

2°It

isthis

conceptionof

inquiryinto

thenature

ofthe

human

thatthe

Marglins

areattacking

intheir

critiqueofw

hatthey

call Western

episteine.They

clearlybelieve

itto

bea

necessaryprop

to

anyethical

universalism.

Thecom

mon

objectionto

thissortof realism

is that suchextra-histori

cal andextra-experiential

metaphysical

truthsare

notin

fact available.

Sometim

esthis

is put skeptically:The

independent structurem

aystill be

there, but we

cannot reliablygrasp

it. Pvloreoften, today, doubtis

cast on

thecoherence

of thew

holerealist idea

that thereis

some

onedeterm

inate

structureto

thew

aythings

are, independent of allhuman

interpretation.

Thisis the

objectionthat nonphiosophers

tendto

associatew

ithJacques

Derrida’s

assaultonthe

“metaphysics

of presence,”2’

which

hetakes

tohave

dominated

theentirety

of theW

esternphilosophical tradition, and

with

Richard

Rorty’sclosely

relatedassaulton

theidea

that theknow

ingm

indis,

at itsbest,a “m

irror of nature.”22

But

it actuallyhas

afar longer

andm

ore

complicated

history, evenw

ithinW

esternphilosophy, beginning

atleast

asearly

asK

ant’sassault

ontranscendent m

etaphysics, andperhaps

far

earlier, insom

eofA

ristotle’scriticism

sofPlatonism

YA

similar debate

was

longfam

iliarin

classical Indianphilosophy, and

nodoubt

it hasfigured

inother philosophical traditions

as well.

24

Contem

poraryargum

entsabout

realismare

many

andcom

plex, involving, frequently, technical issuesin

the

philosophyof

scienceand

thephilosophy

of language.

Thedebate

aboutrealism

appearsto

befar

fromover.The

central

issuescontinue

tobe

debatedw

ithvigor

andsubtlety, and

aw

iderange

ofviews

iscurrently

onthe

table.On

theother hand,the

attackon

real

ismhas

beensufficiently

deepand

sufficientlysustained

thatit w

ould

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I‘Z

lbJ1

aflJU

3O

4flAIN

tUL

OIiX

MA

RT

HA

C. N

US

SB

AU

M•

503

appearstrategically

wise

foran

ethicaland

politicalview

thatseeks

broadsupport notto

relyon

thetruth

ofmetaphysical realism

,ifitcan

defenditself in

some

otherw

ay.If,then,alluniversalist

andhum

anistconceptions

inethics

arerequired

toregard

theuniversal

conceptionof the

human

beingas

partofthe

independentfurniture

ofthew

orld,unm

ediatedby

human

self-interpretationand

human

history,such

conceptionsdo

appearto

bein

some

difficulty,andthere

may

well

begood

reasonsto

tryto

dow

ithoutthem

.B

utuniversalism

doesnot

requiresuch

support.

25

Foruniversal

ideasof

thehum

ando

arisew

ithinhistory

andfrom

human

experience,and

theycan

groundthem

selvesin

experience.Indeed,

if, asthe

criticsof realism

allege,we

arealw

aysdealing

with

ourow

ninterpre

tationsanyhow

,theym

ustacknow

ledgethat

universalconceptions

ofthe

human

areprom

inentand

pervasiveam

ongsuch

interpretations,hardly

tobe

relegatedto

thedustbin

ofm

etaphysicalhistory

alongw

ithrare

andrecondite

philosophicalentities

suchas

thePlatonic

forms. A

sA

ristotleso

simply

putsit,“O

nem

ayobserve

inone’s

travels

todistant

countriesthe

feelingsof recognition

andaffiliation

thatlink

everyhum

anbeing

toevery

otherhum

anb

eing

.”26

Or,as

Kw

ame

Anthony

Appiah

eloquentlytells

thestory

of hisbiculturalchildhood,

achild

who

visitsone

setof

grandparentsin

Ghana

andanother

inrural

England, w

hohas

aL

ebaneseuncle

andw

holater,

asan

adult,has

niecesand

nephews

fromm

orethan

sevendifferent nations, com

esto

noticenot

unbridgeablealien

“otherness,”buta

greatdealof human

comm

onality,and

comes

tosee

thew

orldas

a“netw

orkof

pointsof

affinity.”2

7Pursuing

thoseaffinities,one

may

accept theconclusions

ofthe

criticsof

realismw

hilestill

believingthat

auniversal

conceptionofthe

human

beingis

bothavailable

toethics

anda

valuablestarting

point. Ishallbe

proposinga

versionof such

anaccount,attem

ptingto

identil5’a

groupof

especiallycentral

andbasic

human

functionsthat

groundthese

affinities.B

utsuchan

experientialandhistorical universalism

25

isstillvulner

ableto

some,

ifnot

all,of

theobjections

standardlybrought

againstuniversalism

.I

thereforeneed

tointroduce

thoseobjections, and

laterto

testm

yaccount

againstthem

.

Theopposition

chargesthat

anyattem

ptto

pickout

some

elements

ofhuman

lifeas

more

fundamental

thanothers, even

without

appealto

atranshistorical

reality,is

boundto

beinsufficiently

respectfulof

actualhistorical

andcultural

differences.People,

itis

claimed,

understandhum

anlife

andhum

annessin

widely

different ways:

andany

attempt

toproduce

alist

ofthe

most

fundamental

propertiesand

functionsofhum

anbeings

isbound

toenshrine

certainu

nd

erstandings

ofthe

human

andto

demote

others. Usually,the

objectorcontinues,

thistakes

theform

ofenshrining

theunderstanding

ofa

dominant group

attheexpense

of minority

understandings.This

typeof

objectionis

frequentlym

adeby

feminists

andcan

claimsupport

fromm

anyhistorical

examples, in

which

thehum

anhas

indeedbeen

definedby

focusingon

thecharacteristics

ofm

ales, asm

anifestedin

thedefiner’s

culture.It

isfar

fromclearw

hatthis

objectionshow

s.Inparticular

it isfar

fromclear

thatit

supportsthe

ideathat

we

oughtto

baseour

ethicalnorm

s, instead, onthe

current preferencesand

theself—

conceptionsof

peoplew

hoare

livingw

hatthe

objectorherself

claims

tobe

livesof

deprivationand

oppression.29

But

itdoesshow

at least thatthe

projectof choosing

onepicture

of thehum

anover another

isfraught w

ithdif

ficult

politicalas

well

asphilosophical.

2.2

.N

EG

LE

CT

OF

Au

To

No

J’w

Adifferent

objectionis

presentedby

liberalopponents

ofuniver—

salism;

my

relativistopponents,

theM

arglins,endorse

itas

well.

(Many

suchobjectors,

thoughnot,

Ibelieve,

theM

arglins,are

themselves

willing

togive

auniversal

accountof

thehum

anin

atleast

some

ways,

holdingfreedom

ofchoice

tobe

everywhere

ofcentral

importance.)

The

objectionis

thatby

determining

inadvance

what

elements

ofhum

anlife

havem

ostim

portance,the

universalistproject

failsto

respectthe

rightof

peopleto

choosea

planof

lifeaccording

totheir

own

lights,determ

iningw

hatis

centraland

what

isno

t.30

This

way

ofproceeding

is“im

perialistic.”Such

evaluativechoices

must be

leftto

eachcitizen. For

thisreason,

politicsm

ustrefuse

itselfa

determinate

theoryofthe

human

beingand

thehum

angood.

2.1.N

EG

LE

CT

OF

HIS

TO

RIC

AL

AN

DC

UL

TU

RA

LD

IFF

ER

EN

CE

S

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J

Ifwe

operatew

itha

determinate

conceptionofthe

human

beingthatis

meant to

havesom

enorm

ativem

oraland

politicalforce,we

mustalso,

inapplying

it, askw

hichbeings

we

shalltake

tofall under

theconcept.

And

herethe

objectornotes

that,alltooeasily—

evenifthe

conceptionitself

isequitably

andcom

prehensivelydesigned—

thepow

erlesscan

beexcluded.A

ristotlehim

self;it

ispointed

out,heldthatw

omen

andslaves

were

nothill-fledged

human

beings;and

sincehis

politicsw

erebased

onhis

viewof hum

anfunctioning,the

failureofthese

beings(in

hisview

)to

exhibitthedesired

mode

offunctioningcontributed

totheir

politicalexclusionand

oppression.It

is,onceagain,hard

toknow

what

thisobjection

issupposed

toshow

.In

particular,it

ishard

toknow

how,if

atall,

itis

supposedto

showthatw

ew

ouldbe

betteroffw

ithoutsuch

determinate

universalconcepts.For

itcouldbe

plausiblyargued

thatitw

ouldhave

beeneven

easierto

excludew

omen

andslaves

ona

whim

ifonedid

nothavesuch

aconcept

tocontend

with.Indeed,this

isw

hatIshallbe

arguing.31

On

theother

hand,itdoes

showthatw

eneed

tothink

notonlyaboutg

etting

theconceptrightbutalso

aboutgettingthe

rightbeingsadm

ittedunder

theconcept.

Each

of theseobjections

hassom

em

erit.Many

universalconcep

tionsof

thehum

anbeing

havebeen

insularin

anarrogant

way,

andneglectfulofdifferences

among

culturesand

ways

of life.Some

havebeen

neglectfulofchoice

andautonom

y.And

many

havebeen

prejudiciallyapplied.

But

noneof

thisshow

sthat

allsuch

conceptionsm

ustfallin

oneorm

oreofthese

ways.B

utatthispointI

needto

advancea

definiteexam

pleof such

aconception,in

orderbothto

displayits

merits

andto

arguethat

it canin

factanswer

thesecharges.

3.AC

ON

CE

PT

ION

OF

TH

EH

UM

AN

BE

ING

:TH

EC

EN

TR

AL

HU

MA

J’JC

AP

AB

ILIT

IES

Here,then,is

asketch

foran

accountofthem

ostimportantfunctions

andcapabilities

ofthe

human

being,interm

sofw

hichhum

anlife

isdefined.The

basicidea

isthatw

eask

ourselves,“What

arethe

characteristic

activities32

of thehum

anbeing?

What

doesthe

human

beingdo,

characteristically,assuch—m

dnot,say, as

am

emberofaparticulargroup,

ora

particularlocal

comm

unity?”To

putit

anotherw

ay,what

arethe

forms

ofactivity,ofdoingand

being,thatconstitutethe

human

formof

lifeand

distinguishit from

otheractual or im

aginableform

sof life, such

asthe

livesof anim

alsand

plants, or,onthe

other hand, of imm

ortal gods

as imagined

inm

ythsand

legends(w

hichfrequently

haveprecisely

the

functionof delim

itingthe

human)?

33

We

canget at

thisquestion

betterif w

eapproach

itviatw

osom

e

what

more

concretequestions

that we

oftenreally

askourselves.

First

isa

questionabout

personalcontinuity

We

askourselves

what

changes

or transitionsare

compatible

with

thecontinued

existenceof that being

asa

mem

berof

thehum

ankind,

andw

hatare

not.(Since

continued

speciesidentity

seems

tobe

atleast

necessaryfor

continuedpersonal

identity, thisis

alsoa

questionabout

thenecessary

conditionsfor co

n

tinuingas

oneand

thesam

eindividual.)

Some

functionscan

failtobe

present without threatening

our sensethat w

estill have

ahum

anbeing

onour

hands; theabsence

of othersseem

sto

signaltheend

of ahum

an

life.Thisquestion

isasked

regularly,when

we

attempt to

make

medical

definitionsof

deathin

asituation

inw

hichsom

eof

thefunctions

of

lifepersist,

orto

decide, forothers

or(thinking

ahead)for

ourselves,

whether

acertain

level of illnessor im

pairment m

eansthe

endof the

life

of thebeing

inquestion?’

Theother question

isa question

about kindinclusion. W

erecognize

otherhum

ansas

human

acrossm

anydifferences

of time

andplace, of

customand

appearance.K

wam

eA

nthonyA

ppiahw

ritesabout

the

experienceof

seeinghis

heterogeneousnieces

andnephew

splaying

together, andthe

term“the

human

fiiture”nanirallyoccursto

him

.35

IVIuch

thoughw

em

aylove

our dogsand

cats, we

recognizesuch

scenesas crucially

different fromscenes

of achild

playingw

itha

dogor cat. O

nw

hat dow

e

basethese

recognitions?‘N

eoften

tell ourselvesstories,on

theother hand,

aboutanthropomorphic

creatures who

donotget classified

ashum

an,on

account of some

featureof their

formof life

andfunctioning.O

nw

hat

dow

ebase

theseexclusions?

Inshort, w

hat dow

ebelieve

mustbe

there,if

we

aregoing

toacknow

ledgethat a

givenlife

ishum

an?36

Thisinquiry

proceedsby

examining

aw

idevariety

of self-interpreta

tionsof hum

anbeings

inm

anytim

esand

places. Especiallyvaluable

are

myths

andstories

thatsituate

thehum

anbeing

insom

ew

ayin

the

universe, between

the“beasts”

onthe

onehand

andthe

“gods”on

the

other;stories

thatask

what

it isto

liveas

abeing

with

certainabilities

thatset

itapart

fromthe

restof the

world

ofnature

andw

ith, onthe

otherhand, certain

limits

that derivefrom

mem

bershipin

thew

orldof

nature.The

ideais

that peoplein

man)’ different societies

sharea

general

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outlineofsuch

aconception.T

hisisnotsurprising,since

theydo

recognizeone

anotheras

mem

bersof

thesam

especies,37

marry

oneanother,have

childrentogether,

andso

forth—and

indeeddo

tellone

anothersuch

stories,without

much

difficultyof

translation.This

convergencegives

ussom

ereason

foroptim

ism,that

ifwe

proceedin

thisw

ay,usingour

imaginations,

we

will

havein

theend

atheory

thatis

notthe

mere

projectionoflocalpreferences,butis

fullyinternational

anda

basisfor

cross-culturalattunem

ent.Severalim

portantmethodologicalpoints

mustnow

beem

phasized:

1.T

heprocedure

throughw

hichthis

accountof

thehum

anis

derivedis

neitherahistoricalnora

priori.Itisan

attemptto

setdown

averygeneralrecord

ofbroadlyshared

experiencesof

human

beingsw

ithinhistory.

Arelated

pointcan

bem

adeabout

theresults

ofthe

inquiry:they

donot

claimto

beahistorical

ora

prioritruth,

but,rather,

anespecially

deepand

continuoussortofexperiential

andhistorical

truth.

2.O

nthe

otherhand,

theguiding

questionsof

theinquiry

directitto

crossnationaland

temporalb

ound

aries,looking

forfeatures

thatground

recognitionsof

humanness

acrossthese

boundaries.T

husw

ecan

expectthat

itsresults

willem

bodyw

hatis

continuousrather

thanrapidly

changing,internationalratherthanlocal.

3.T

heaccount is

neithera

biologicalaccountnoram

etaphysicalaccount.(Forthese

reasonsIhave

avoidedusing

theterm

“human

nature,”w

hichis

usuallyassociated

with

attempts

todescribe

thehum

anbeing

eitherfromthe

pointofview

ofanallegedly

value-freescience

orfrom

thepointofview

ofnormative,often

theological,m

etaphysics.)Theinquiry

paysattention

tobio

log

butas

itfigures

inand

shapeshum

anexperience.

Itis

anevaluative

and,ina

broadsense,ethicalinquiry.It

asksus

toevaluate

components

oflives,askingw

hichones

areso

important

thatw

ew

ouldnot

calla

lifehum

anw

ithoutthem.T

heresultofthis

inquiryis,then,notalist

ofvalue-neutralfacts,buta

normative

conception.3

8

4.T

heaccount

ism

eantto

beboth

tentativeand

open-ended. W

eallow

explicitlyfor

thepossibility

thatw

ew

illlearn

fromour

encountersw

ithother

human

societiesto

recognizethings

aboutourselves

thatw

ehad

not seenbefore,or

evento

changein

certainw

ays,according

more

importance

tosom

ethingw

ehad

thoughtm

oreperipheral.

(We

may

alsoshift

toreach

apolitical

consensus.)

5.‘The

accountis

notintended

todeny

thatthe

items

it

enumerates

areto

some

extent differentlyconstructed

bydifferent societies. It

claims

onlythatin

theseareas

thereis

considerablecontinuity

andoverlap, sufficient

toground

aw

orkingpolitical

consensus.3

9

6.A

lthoughthe

account appealsto

consensusin

thisw

ay,it should

beunderstood

thattheconsensus

isacceptable

onlyif

itisreached

byreasonable

procedures, where

thenotion

of reasonablenesshas

normative

conten

t.4°

Inthis

way

itisdifferentfrom

consensusas

mere

overlap.41

7.The

listis heterogeneous: forit containsboth

limits

againstw

hichw

epress

andcapabilities

throughw

hichw

easpire.

‘Thisis

not surprising, sincew

ebegan

fromthe

intuitiveidea

ofacreature

who

isbothcapable

andneedy.

8.The

concept “human

being,” asthis

viewunderstands

it,

isin

onew

aylike

theconcept “person”as used

elsewhere

inm

oralphilosophy:

thatis,

itis

anorm

ativeethical

concept.O

nthe

otherhand,

becauseof

itslink

with

anem

piricalstudy

ofa

species-specificform

oflife,

andw

ithw

hatis

most

centralin

sucha

formof

life,it

may

provem

oredifficult

tow

ithholdfrom

certainbeings

inan

arbitraryw

ay(see

Section7

below).T

hism

aycom

mend

itto

feminists:

forthe

label“person”

hasfrequently

beenw

ithheldfrom

wom

en,w

ithoutsubstantial

argum

ent.

42

Here

then,asa

first approximation, is

astory

about what

seems

to

bepart

of anylife

we

will

countas

ahum

anlife:

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9

3.1.L

EV

EL

ON

EO

FT

HE

CO

NcE

PT

ION

OF

TH

EH

uiw

cB

EIN

G:

TH

ESH

APE

OF

TH

EH

uiswc

FoiuwO

FL

IFE

3.1.1.Mortality

All

human

beingsface

deathand,

aftera

certainage,know

thatthey

faceit.’This

factshapesm

oreor

lessevery

otherelem

entofhum

anlife.

Moreover,allhum

anbeings

havean

aversionto

death.Although

inm

anycircum

stancesdeath

will

bepreferred

tothe

availablealternatives,

thedeath

ofaloved

one,orthe

prospectofone’s

own

death,isan

occasionfor

griefandlorfear.Ifw

eencountered

anim

mortal

anthropomorphic

being,ora

mortalbeing

who

showed

noaversion

todeath

andno

tendency

atalltoavoid

death,we

would

judge,inboth

ofthesecases,that

theform

oflifew

asso

differentfromour

own

thatthe

beingcould

notbe

acknowledged

ashum

an.

3.1.2.The

Hum

anB

ody

We

liveall

ourlives

inbodies

ofacertain

sort,whose

possibilitiesand

vulnerabilitiesdo

notas

suchbelong

toone

human

societyrather

thananother.T

hesebodies,sim

ilarfar

more

thandissim

ilar(given

theenorm

ousrange

ofpossibilities)

areour

homes,

soto

speak,opening

certainoptions

anddenying

others,giving

uscertain

needsand

alsocertain

possibilitiesfor

excellence.Thethct

thatany

givenhum

anbeing

might

havelived

anywhere

andbelonged

toany

cultureis

agreatpart

ofwhat

groundsour

mutual

recognitions;this

fact,inturn,has

agreat

dealto

dow

iththe

generalhumanness

ofthebody,its

greatdistinctnessfrom

otherbodies.The

experienceofthe

bodyis

culturallyshaped,to

besure;

theim

portancew

eascribe

toits

variousfunctions

isalso

culturallyshaped.B

utthebody

itself,notculturally

variantin

itsnutritional

andother

relatedrequirem

ents,setslim

itson

whatcan

beexperienced

andvalued,ensuring

agreat

dealofoverlap.

There

ism

uchdisagreem

ent,ofcourse,abouthowm

uchofhum

anexperience

isrootedin

thebody.H

erereligion

andm

etaphysicsenterthe

picturein

anontrivialw

ay.Therefore,inkeeping

with

thenonm

etaphysical

characterofthe

list,Ishall

includeat

thispoint

onlythose

featuresthatw

ouldbe

agreedto

bebodily

evenby

determined

dualists.The

more

controversialfeatures,suchas

thinking,perceiving,andem

otion,Ishall

discussseparately,taking

nostand

onthe

questionofdualism

.

1.H

ungerand

thirst:the

needforfoodand

drink.A

llhum

anbeings

needfood

anddrink

inorder

tolive;allhave

comparable,though

varying,

nutritionalrequirem

ents.B

eingin

oneculture

ratherthan

anotherdoes

notm

akeone

metabolize

fooddifferently.Furtherm

ore,allhuman

beingshave

appetitesthatare

indicesofneed.A

ppetitiveexperience

isto

some

extentculturallyshaped;butw

eare

notsurprisedto

discoverm

uchsim

ilarityand

overlap.Moreover,hum

anbeings

ingeneraldo

notwish

tobe

hungryorthirsty

(thoughofcourse

theym

ightchooseto

fastforsome

reason). Ifwe

discoveredsom

eonew

horeally

didnotexperience

hungerand

thirstat all,or,experiencing

them,really

didnot

careabouteating

anddrinking,w

ew

ouldjudge

thatthiscreature

was

(inA

ristotle’swords)

“farfrombeing

ahum

anbeing.”

2.N

eedforshelter.A

recurrentthem

ein

myths

ofhum

annessis

thenakedness

ofthehum

anbeing,its

relativeunprotectedness

inthe

animalw

orld, itssusceptibility

toheat,cold,and

theravages

oftheele

ments. Stories

thatexplorethe

differencebetw

eenour

needsand

thoseof

flurryor

scalyor

othenviseprotected

creaturesrem

indus

howfar

ourlife

isconstituted

bythe

needto

findprotection

throughclothing

andhousing.3. Sexualdesire.T

houghlessurgentas

aneed

thanthe

needsforfood,

drink,and

shelter(in

thesense

thatone

canlive

without

itssatisfac

tion),sexual

needand

desireare

featuresof

more

orless

everyhum

anlife,at

leastbeyond

acertain

age.Itis,and

hasall

alongbeen,

am

ostim

portantbasis

forthe

recognitionof

othersdifferent

fromourselves

ashum

anbeings.

4.Mobility.

Hum

anbeings

are,asthe

olddefinition

goes,featherless

bipeds—that

is,creaturesw

hoseform

oflifeis

inpart

constitutedby

theability

tom

ovefrom

placeto

placein

acertain

characteristicw

ay,not

onlythrough

theaid

oftools

thatthey

havem

ade,but

with

theirvery

own

bodies.H

uman

beingslike

moving

aboutand

dislikebeing

deprivedof

mobility.A

nanthropom

orphicbeing

who,w

ithoutdisability,

chosenever

tom

ovefrom

birthto

deathw

ouldbe

hardto

viewas

human.

Experiences

ofpainand

pleasureare

comm

onto

allhuman

life(though,

onceagain,

boththeir

expressionand,

tosom

eextent,

theexperience

itselfm

aybe

culturallyshaped).

Moreover,

theaversion

topain

asa

3.1.3.C

apacityforPleasure

andP

ain

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AT

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UTV

I•511

fundamentalevilis

aprimitive

and,itappears,unlearnedpartofbeing

ahum

ananim

al.Asociety

whose

mem

bersaltogetherlacked

thataversionw

ouldsurely

bejudged

tobe

beyondthe

boundsofhum

anness.

3.1.4.C

ognitiveC

apability:P

erceiving,Imagining,T

hinking

Allhum

anbeings

havesense-perception,the

abilityto

imagine,and

theability

tothink,m

akingdistinctions

and“reaching

outforunderstand

ing

.”4

3A

ndthese

abilitiesare

regardedas

ofcentralimportance.Itis

anopen

questionw

hatsortsofaccidents

orim

pediments

toindividuals

inthese

areasw

illbesufficientfor

usto

judgethat

thelife

inquestion

isnot

reallyhum

anany

longer.But

itis

safeto

saythat

ifwe

imagine

agroup

ofbeingsw

hosem

embers

totallylack

sense-perception,ortotally

lackim

agination,ortotally

lackreasoning

andthinking,w

eare

notin

anyofthese

easesim

agininga

groupofhum

anbeings,no

matterw

hatthey

looklike.

3.1.5.Early

Infan

tDevelopm

ent

All

human

beingsbegin

ashungry

babies,aw

areof

theirow

nhelp

lessness,experiencingtheir

alternatingcloseness

toand

distancefrom

that,andthose,on

whom

theydepend.This

comm

onstructure

toearly

lif&

4—w

hic

his

clearlyshaped

inm

anydifferentw

aysby

differentsocialarrangem

ents—gives

riseto

agreatdealofoverlapping

experiencethat

iscentral

inthe

formation

ofdesires,andofcom

plexem

otionssuch

asgrief,love,

andanger.T

his,in

turn,is

am

ajorsource

ofour

abilityto

recognizeourselves

inthe

emotional

experiencesof

thosew

hoselives

arevery

differentin

otherrespects

fromour

own.Ifw

eencountered

agroup

ofapparenthumans

andthen

discoveredthatthey

neverhadbeen

babiesand

hadnever,in

consequence,hadthose

experiencesofextrem

edependency;

need,and

affection,we

would,I

think,have

toconclude

thattheirform

oflifew

assufficiently

differentfromour

own

thatthey

couldnotbe

consideredpart

ofthesam

ekind.

3.1.6.PracticalR

eason

Allhum

anbeings

participate(or

tryto)

inthe

planningand

managing

oftheirow

nlives,asking

andansw

eringquestions

aboutwhat

isgood

andhow

oneshould

live.Moreover,they

wish

toenacttheir

thoughtin

theirlives—

tobe

ableto

chooseand

evaluate,andto

functionaccord

ingly.Thisgeneral

capabilityhas

many

concreteform

s,and

isrelated

incom

plexw

aysto

theother

capabilities,emotional,im

aginative,andintellectual.B

uta

beingw

hoaltogether

lacksthis

would

notbe

likelyto

beregarded

asfilly

human,in

anysociety;

3.1.7.Affiliation

with

OtherH

u,nanB

eings

All

human

beingsrecognize

andfeel

some

senseof

affiliationand

concernfor

otherhum

anbeings.M

oreover,we

valuethe

formof

lifethat

isconstituted

bythese

recognitionsand

affiliations.We

livew

ithand

inrelation

toothers,and

regarda

lifenot

livedin

affiliationw

ithothers

tobe

alife

notworth

theliving.(H

ereI

would

reallyw

ish,with

Aristotle,to

spellthingsoutfhrther.W

edefine

ourselvesin

terms

ofatleasttw

otypes

ofaffiliation:intimate

family

andlorpersonal

relations,and

socialor

civicrelations.)

3.1.8. Relatedness

toO

therSpecies

andto

Nature

Hum

anbeings

recognizethat

theyare

notthe

onlyliving

thingsin

theirw

orld:that

theyare

animals

livingalongside

otheranim

als,andalso

alongsideplants,in

auniverse

that,asa

complex

interlockingorder,

bothsupports

andlim

itsthem

.We

aredependent

uponthat

orderin

countlessw

ays;and

we

alsosense

that we

owe

thatorder

some

respectand

concern,howeverm

uchw

em

aydifferabout exactly

whatw

eow

e,tow

hom,and

onw

hatbasis.Again,a

creaturew

hotreated

animals

exactlylike

stonesand

couldnotbe

broughtto

seeany

differencew

ouldp

rob

ablybe

regardedas

toostrange

tobe

human.

Sotoo

would

acreature

who

didnot

inany

way

respondto

thenaturalw

orld.

Hum

anlife

wherever

itislived,m

akesroom

forrecreationand

laughter.The

forms

playtakes

areenorm

ouslyvaried—andyetw

erecognize

otherhum

ans,across

culturalbarriers,

asthe

animals

who

laugh.L

aughterand

playare

frequentlyam

ongthe

deepestand

alsothe

firstmodes

ofourm

utualrecognition. Inabilityto

playorlaugh

istaken,correctly,as

asign

ofdeepdisturbance

ina

child;Witproves

permanentw

ew

illdoubtw

hetherthe

childis

capableof

leadinga

fullyhum

anlife.

An

entire

3.1.9.Hum

orandP

lay

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societythat

lackedthis

abilityw

ouldseem

tous

bothterribly

strangeand

terriblyfrightening.

3.1.10.S

eparateness

How

everm

uchw

elive

with

andfor

others, we

are,eachof us,“one

innum

ber,”45

proceedingon

aseparate

paththrough

thew

orldfrom

birthto

death.E

achperson

feelsonly

hisor

herow

npain

andnot

anyoneelse’s.E

achperson

diesw

ithoutentailinglogical])’

thedeath

of anyoneelse.‘W

henone

personw

alksacross

theroom

,noother

personfollow

sautom

atically’vVhen

we

count thenum

berofhum

anbeings

ina

room,

we

haveno

difficultyfiguring

outwhere

onebegins

andthe

otherends.

‘Theseobvious

factsneed

stating, sincethey

might have

beenothenvise.

We

shouldbear

themin

mind

when

we

heartalk

aboutthe

absenceof

individualismin

certainsocieties.

Even

them

ostintense

forms

ofhum

aninteraction,

forexam

plesexual

experience,are

experiencesof

responsiveness,not

offrision.

Iffusion

ism

adethe

goal,the

resultis

boundto

bedisappointm

ent.

3.1.11.S

trongS

eparateness

Because

ofseparateness,

eachhum

anlife

has,so

tospeak,

itsow

npeculiar

contextand

surroundings—objects,places, a

history,particular

friendships, locations, sexualties—

thatare

notexactly

thesam

eas

thoseofanyone

else, andin

terms

ofwhich

theperson

tosom

eextent

identifiesherself. T

houghsocieties

varya

greatdeal

inthe

degreeand

typeofstrong

separatenessthat

theyperm

itand

foster,thereis

nolife

yet known

that reallydoes

(asPlato

wished)

failtouse

thew

ords“m

ine”and

“notm

ine”in

some

personaland

nonsharedw

ay. What

Iuse,live

in,respondto, Iuse, live

in,respondto

fromm

yow

nseparate

existence.A

ndon

thew

hole, human

beingsrecognize

oneanother

asbeings

who

wish

tohave

atleast some

separatenessof context,a

littlespace

tom

ovearound

in, some

specialitem

sto

useor

love.‘Ibis

isa

working

list.Itis

putout

togenerate

debate.Ithas

doneso

andw

illcontinue

todo

so, andit w

illberevised

accordingly.A

sI

havesaid, the

listis

composed

oftwo

differentsorts

of items;

limits

andcapabilities.

As

faras

capabilitiesgo,

tocall

themparts

ofhum

annessis

tom

akea

verybasic

sortof

evaluation.It

isto

saythat

alife

without

thisitem

would

betoo

lacking, tooim

poverished,tobe

human

atall.

Obviously,

then,it

couldnot

bea

goodhum

anlife.

So

thislist of capabilities

isa

ground-flooror

minim

alconception

ofthe

good. (Inthe

sensethat

itdoes

not hillydeterm

inethe

choiceofa

way

oflife,but

simply

regulatesthe

parameters

ofwhat

canbe

chosen,it

plays, however,

therole

traditionallyplayed

inliberal

politicaltheory

bya

conceptionofthe

righ

t.)46

With

thelim

its,things

arem

orecom

plicated.In

selectingthe

limits

forattention, w

ehave, once

again,m

adea

basicsort

ofevalua

tion,saying

thatthese

thingsare

soim

portantthat

lifew

ouldnot

behum

anw

ithoutthem

.B

utw

hatw

ehave

saidis

thathum

anlife, in

itsgeneral

form, consists

ofthe

awareness

ofthese

limits

plusa

struggleagainst

them.

Hum

ansdo

notw

ishto

behungry,

tofeel

pain,to

die.(Separateness

ishighly

complex,

botha

limit

anda

capability. Much

thesam

eis

trueof

many

ofthe

limits

implied

bythe

shapeand

thecapacities

of thebody.)

On

theother

hand, we

cannotassum

ethat

thecorrect

evaluativeconclusion

todraw

isthat

we

shouldtry

ashard

aspossible

toget

ridofthe

limit

altogether. Itis

characteristicof hum

an

lifeto

preferrecurrent hunger

pluseating

toa

lifew

ithneither

hunger

noreating

toprefer

sexualdesire

andits

satisfactionto

alife

with

neitherdesire

norsatisfaction.

Even

where

deathis

concerned,the

desirefor

imm

ortality, which

many

human

beingscertainly

have, isa

peculiardesire:

Forit

isnot

clearthat

thew

ishto

loseone’s

finitudecom

pletelyis

adesire

thatone

cancoherently

entertainfor

oneself orfor

someone

oneloves.It

seems

tobe

aw

ishfor

atransition

toa

way

of lifeso

wholly

different, with

suchdifferent values

andends, that

it

seems

thatthe

identityofthe

individual will

notbe

preserved. Sothe

evaluativeconclusion,in

mapping

outaground-floor

conceptionofthe

good(saving

what

functioningis

necessaryfor

alife

tobe

human)

will

haveto

beexpressed

with

much

caution, clearly,interm

sof w

hat would

bea

humanly

goodw

ayof countering

thelim

itation.

4.T

HE

TW

OT

HR

ES

HO

LD

S

Things

nowgetvery

complicated. For w

ew

anttodescribe

two

distinctthresholds:

athreshold

ofcapability

tofunction

beneathw

hicha

life

will

beso

impoverished

thatit

will

notbe

human

atall;

anda

some

what higher

threshold, beneathw

hichthose

characteristicfunctions

are

availablein

sucha

reducedw

aythat,

thoughw

em

ayjudge

theform

oflifea

human

one,we

will

notthink

ita

goodhum

anlife. T

helatter

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’SlS

thresholdis

theone

thatw

illeventually

concernus

when

we

turnto

publicpolicy:

forwe

don’t wantsocieties

tom

aketheir

citizenscapable

ofthebare

minim

um.M

yview

holds,with

Aristotle,thata

goodpoliti

calarrangem

entis

one“in

accordancew

ithw

hichanyone

whatsoever

might

dow

elland

livea

flourishinglife.”47

‘Theseare

clearly,inm

anyareas,tw

odistinct

thresholds,requiringdistinct

levelsof

resourceand

opportunity.O

nem

aybe

alivew

ithoutbeing

wellnourished.A

sM

arxobserved,one

may

beable

touse

one’ssenses

without

beingable

touse

themin

afully

human

wa

And

yetthere

isneed

forcautionhere.Forin

many

casesthe

move

fromhum

anlife

togood

human

lifeis

suppliedby

thecitizen’s

own

powers

ofchoiceand

self—definition,in

sucha

way

thatonce

societyplaces

themabove

thefirstthreshold,m

ovingabove

thesecond

ism

oreorless

upto

them.

Thisis

especiallylikely

tobe

so,Ithink,in

areassuch

asafluliation

andpracticalreasoning,w

herein

many

casesonce

socialinstitutionsperm

itachild

tocross

thefirstthreshold

itsow

nchoices

will be

centralinraising

itabove

thesecond.(‘This

isnot

always

so,however:

forcertain

socialconditions,for

example

certainm

indlessform

soflabor

or,we

may

add,traditionalhierarchicalgender

relations,may

impede

theflourishing

ofaffiliation

andpracticalreason,w

hilenot

stamping

itoutentirely.)

On

theother

hand,it

isclear

thatw

herebodily

healthand

nutrition,for

example,are

concerned,thereis

aconsiderable

differencebetw

eenthe

two

thresholds,and

adifference

thatis

standardlym

adeby

resourcesover

which

individualsdo

nothave

fullcontrol.It

would

thenbe

theconcern

ofquality-of-life

assessment

toask

whether

allcitizens

arecapable,

notjustof

thebare

minim

um,but

ofgood/jfr

inthese

areas.C

learlythere

isa

continuumhere.N

orw

illit

inpractice

beat

alleasy

tosay

where

theupper

threshold,especially,shouldbe

located.I

shallnot

saym

uchabout

thefirst

threshold,butshall

illustrateit

bya

fewexam

ples.What

isan

existencethat

isso

impoverished

thatit

cannotproperlybe

calleda

human

life?H

erew

eshould

count,Ibelieve,

many

forms

ofexistencethat

takeplace

attheend

ofahum

anllfe—

allthose

inw

hichthe

beingthatsurvives

hasirretrievably

lostsensationand

consciousness(in

whatis

calleda “perm

anentvegetativecondition”);and

also,Iwould

hold,some

thatfallshortofthis,butin

which

thecapacity

torecognize

lovedones,to

thinkand

toreason,has

irreversiblydecayed

beyonda

certainpoint.I w

ouldinclude

theextrem

eabsence

ofabilityto

engagein

practicalreasoning

thatis

oftenthe

outcome

ofthenotorious

frontallobotomy.Iw

ouldalso

includean

absenceofm

obilityso

severethat

itmakes

speech,asw

ellasm

ovementfrom

placeto

place,impossible.

Itfollow

sfrom

thisthat

certainseverely

damaged

infantsare

nothum

anever, even

if bornfrom

two

human

parents:again,those

with

globalandtotal sensory

incapacityand/or no

consciousnessor thought;

also,Ithink, those

with

noability

atalltorecognize

orrelate

toothers.

(Thisof course

tellsus

nothingaboutw

hat we

owe

themm

orallyit just

separatesthat

questionfrom

moral

questionsabout hum

anbein

gs.)

48

Again, w

enotice

theevaluative

characterof these

thresholdjudg—

ments.T

hefactthata

personw

hohas

lost herarm

scannotplay

apiano

doesnot

make

usjudge

thatshe

nolonger

livesa

human

life;had

shelost

thecapacity

tothink

andrem

ember,or

toform

affectionaterela

tionships,it w

ouldhave

beena

differentm

atter.IV

Ianysuch

disastersare

notto

beblam

edon

socialarrangem

ents,and

inthose

casesthe

first thresholdhas

nopolitical im

plications. But

many

are, where

badnutrition

andhealth

careenter in.T

herole

ofsocietyis

even

more

evidentif we

thinkofa

more

controversialgroup

offirst—

thresholdcases, in

which

thenonhum

anoutcom

ew

asenvironm

entallycaused: the

rarecases

ofchildrenw

hohave

grown

upoutside

ahum

ancom

munity, or

ina

severelydysfunctional

home,

andutterly

lacklan

guageand

reason,orlack

social abilitiesin

anextrem

eand

irreversiblewayc

We

canfocus

thepolitical question

more

productively, however, if

we

nowturn

fromthe

questionof

mere

human

lifeto

thequestion

ofgood

life,thelevelw

ew

ouldreally

liketo

seea

human

beingattain.

Here,

asthe

nextlevel

ofthe

conceptionof

thehum

anbeing,

Ishallnow

specif5i certainbasic

functional capabilitiesat w

hichsocieties

shouldaim

fortheir

citizens, andw

hichquality

oflife

measurem

entsshould

measure. In

otherw

ords, thisw

illbe

anaccount

ofthesecond

threshold—although

insom

eareas

itm

aycoincide,

forthe

reasonsI

havegiven,w

iththe

firstO

nceone

iscapable

ofhum

anfunctioning

inthis

areaone

isalso

capable, with

some

furthereffort

andcare,

ofgood

functioning. I introducethis

listasa

listof capabilitiesto

function,rather

thanof actual flinctionings, since

Ishall argue

that capability,notactual

functioning,should

bethe

goalof public

policc

4.1

.L

EV

EL

2O

FT

HE

C0

NC

EF

rION

OF

TH

EH

urw

iNB

EIN

G:

BA

SIC

Huw

’F

UN

CT

ION

AL

CA

PA

BIL

ITIE

S

1.B

eingable

tolive

tothe

endofa

human

lifeof norm

allen

gth

,49

notdying

prematurely, or

beforeone’s

lifeis

soreduced

asto

benot w

orthliving.

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.Jb

bM

b

______A

YU

UL

fldt..

4LJOO

DEtLJLV

1•

3L1

2.B

eingable

tohave

goodhealth;to

beadequately

nour

ished

;5

0to

haveadequate

shelter;

51

havingopportuni

tiesfor

sexualsatisfaction,

andfor

choicein

matters

ofreproduction;5

2being

ableto

move

fromplace

toplace.

3.B

eingable

toavoid

unnecessaryand

nonben

eficial

pain,so

faras

possible,and

tohave

pleasurableexperiences.

4.B

eingable

touse

thesenses;being

ableto

imagine,to

think,andto

reason—and

todo

thesethings

ina

way

informed

andcultivated

byan

adequateeducation,

including,but

byno

means

limited

to,literacy

andbasic

mathem

aticaland

scientifictrain

ing

.53

Being

ableto

useim

aginationand

thoughtin

connectionw

ithexperiencing

andproducing

spirituallyenriching

materials

andevents

ofone’s

own

choice;religious,

literary,musical,and

soforth.Ibelieve

thattheprotec

tionof

thiscapability

requiresnot

onlythe

provisionof

education,butalso

legalguarantees

offreedom

ofexpression

with

respectto

bothpolitical

andartistic

speech,andoffreedom

ofreligiousexercise.

5.B

eingable

tohave

attachments

tothings

andpersons

outsideourselves;

tolove

thosew

holove

andcare

forus,

togrieve

attheir

absence;in

general,to

love,to

grieve,toexperience

longingand

gratitu

de.

54

Support

ingthis

capabilitym

eanssupporting

forms

ofhuman

associationthat

canbe

shown

tobe

crucialin

theirdevelopm

ent.5

5

6.B

eingable

toform

aconception

ofthe

goodand

toengage

incritical

reflectionabout

theplanning

ofone’s

own

life.Thisincludes,today,being

ableto

seekem

ployment

outsidethe

home

andto

participatein

politicallife.

7.B

eingable

tolive

forand

toothers,to

recognizeand

showconcern

forother

human

beings,to

engagein

variousform

sofsocialinteraction;to

beable

toim

aginethe

situationof

anotherand

tohave

compassion

forthat

situation;to

havethe

capabilityfor

bothjustice

andfriendship.Protecting

thiscapability

means,once

again,protecting

institutionsthat

constitutesuch

forms

ofaffiliation,and

alsoprotecting

thefreedom

sof assem

blyand

politicalspeech.

8.B

eingable

tolive

with

concernfor

andin

relationto

animals,plants,and

thew

orldofnature.

9.B

eingable

tolaugh,

toplay,

toenjoy

recreationalactivities.

10.B

eingable

tolive

one’sow

nlife

andnobody

else’s.‘This

means

havingcertain

guaranteesof noninterfer

encew

ithcertain

choicesthat

areespecially

personaland

definitiveof

sellhood,such

aschoices

regardingm

arriage,childbearing,sexual

expression,speech,andem

ployment.

lOa.

Being

ableto

liveone’s

own

lifein

one’sow

nsurround

ingsand

context.Thism

eansguarantees

offreedomof

associationand

offreedom

fromunw

arrantedsearch

andseizure;

italsom

eansa

certainsortof guarantee

ofthe

integrityofpersonalproperty,though

thisguarantee

may

belim

itedin

variousw

aysby

thedem

andsofsocial

equality,andis

always

upfor

negotiationin

connectionw

iththe

interpretationof

theother

capabilities,since

personalproperty,

unlikepersonal

liberty,is

atool

ofhum

anfunctioning

ratherthan

anend

initself.

My

claimis

thata

lifethat

lacksany

oneof

thesecapabilities, no

matter

what

elseit

has,will

fallshort

of beinga

goodhum

anlife.

Soit

would

bereasonable

totake

thesethings

asa

focusfor

concern,inassessing

thequality

oflife

ina

countryand

askingabout

therole

ofpublic

policyin

meeting

human

needs.Thelist

iscertainly

general—and

thisis

deliberate,in

orderto

leaveroom

forplural

specificationand

alsofor

furthernegotiation.

But

Iclaim

thatit

does,rather

likea

setof

constitutionalguarantees,

offerreal

guidancein

theongoing

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’LU

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JVIIL

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1X

b.

.

historicalprocess

offurtherrefinem

entandspecification,and

farm

oreaccurate

guidancethan

thatoffered

bythe

focuson

utility, oreven

onresources.

Afew

comm

entsare

inorder

abouttherelationship

ofthisversion

ofthe

listto

otherversions

Ihave

publishedpreviously.

First,taking

some

lessonsfrom

theH

uman

Developm

entR

eport,it

isconsiderably

more

specificabout m

atterssuch

aseducation

andw

ork,soas

togive

thedevelopm

enttheorist

something

concreteto

measure.

Second,it

isfar

more

explicitlyconcerned

with

guaranteesofpersonal liberty

of expression, reproductive

choice, andreligion.56

Thisw

asnot

onlycalled

forin

general, butcalledforth

bythe

attemptto

articulatethe

specificrequisites

ofequal female

capability

5Third,

inaccordance

with

itscom

mitm

enttothe

distinctionbetw

eenends

andm

eans, it understands“property

rights”as

instrumentalto

otherhum

ancapabi1ities,5

andtherefore

toa

certainextent, as

upfor

negotiationin

general socialplanning.

Thelist

is, emphatically,a

list of separatecom

ponents.We

cannotsatisfy

theneed

forone

ofthem

bygiving

alarger

amount

ofanother.

All

areofcentral

importance

andall

aredistinct

inquality.’This

limits

thetrade-offs

thatit

will

bereasonable

tom

ake,and

thuslim

itsthe

applicabilityof quantitative

cost-benefitanalysis.At the

same

time,the

items

onthe

listarerelated

toone

anotherin

many

complex

ways. For

example

ourcharacteristic

mode

ofnutrition,

unlikethat

ofsponges,

requiresm

ovingfrom

hereto

there.A

ndw

edo

whatever

we

doas

separatebeings,tracing

distinctpaths

throughspace

andtim

e.Notice

thatreproductive

choicesinvolve

bothsexual

capabilityand

issuesof

separateness,andbind

thetw

otogether

ina

deepand

complex

way.

Afurther

comm

entis

inorder, concerning

therelationship

of thisthreshold

list toan

accountof human

equalityA

comm

itmentto

brin

ging

allhum

anbeings

acrossa

certainthreshold

of capabilityto

chooserepresents

acertain

sortofcomm

itment

toequality:

forthe

viewtreats

all personsas

equal bearersof hum

anclaim

s, nom

atterwhere

theyare

startingfrom

interm

sof circum

stances,specialtalents,w

ealth,gender,or

race. On

theother

hand,Ihave

saidnothing

sofar

abouthow

oneshould

regardinequalities

thatpersistoncethe

thresholdlevelhas

beenattained

forall persons.T

osom

eextentI

feelthis

would

beprem

ature,since

thethreshold

levelhas

sorarely

beenattained

forthe

complete

capabilityset. O

nthe

otherhand, one

canim

aginea

situation—perhaps

itcould

bethat

ofthe

USA

orJapan,

givencertain

largechanges

inhealth

supporthere, oreducationaldistribution

there, thatwould

meet

thresholdconditions

andstillexhibit inequalities

of attainmentbetw

een

thegenders

orthe

races. We

havetw

ochoices

here: eitherto

arguethat

thissituation

actuallycontains

capabilityfailure

afterall;

orto

grantthat

thecapability

viewneeds

tobe

supplemented

byan

independenttheory

of equality. I amnotyet certain

whatIw

anttosay

aboutthis, butI am

inclinedto

thefirst alternative, since

I thinkthat gender

inequality

ofthe

sortone

seesin

aprosperous

nationdoes

nonetheLesspush

thesubordinated

racialor

gendergroup

beneathan

acceptablethreshold

ofautonomy, dignity

andem

otional wellbeing. Indeed, subordination

isitselfa

kindof capability

failure, afailure

toattain

complete

person-

hood.So

Iam

inclinedto

saythat,

properlyfleshed

out,the

secondthreshold

would

beincom

patiblew

ithsystem

aticsubordination

of onegroup

toanother.

5.T

HE

RO

LE

OF

TH

EC

ON

CE

PT

ION

IND

EV

EL

OP

ME

NT

PO

LIC

Y

My

claimis

thatw

eurgently

needa

conceptionof

thehum

anbeing

andhum

anfunctioning

inpublic

policy. Ifwe

tryto

dow

ithoutthis

sortof guidancew

henw

eask

howgoods,resources, and

opportunities

shouldbe

distributed,w

ereject

guidancethat

is,Ithink,

superiorto

thatoffered

byany

oftheother

guidescurrently

available.1

shallfocus

hereon

thearea

ofmost

concernto

ourproject:

the

assessment

ofthe

qualityof life

ina

developingcountry, w

ithspecial

attentionto

thelives

ofw

omen.

Forthe

time

being,I

shalltake

the

nation-stateas

my

basicunit,

andthe

questionI

shallask

is,“How

is

thenation

doing,with

respectto

thequality

of lifeof

itscitizens?”

Inother

words,

Ishall

beasking

thesort

ofquestion

askedby

theU

NH

uman

Developm

ent Report. I

shallnotpropose

ageneral

theoryabout

howthe

needsrevealed

bysuch

anassessm

ent shouldbe

met: w

hether

bycentralized

government

planning,for

example,

orthrough

asys

temof

incentives,and

whether

throughdirect

subsidiesor

through

theprovision

ofopportunities

forem

ployment.

Nor

shallI

askw

hat

responsibilitiesricher

nationshave

topoorer

nations,inensuring

that

theneeds

ofall human

beingsare

met

thew

orldover. T

hatis

anurgent

question,andit m

ustatalater

datebe

confronted. Fornow

, however, I

shall focuson

thecorrect understanding

of thegoal, w

hereeach

separate

nationis

concerned.T

hebasic

claimIw

ishto

make—

concurringw

ithA

martya

Sen—is

thatthe

centralgoal

ofpublic

planningshould

bethe

capabilitiesof

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citizensto

performvarious

important

functions.The

questionsthat

shouldbe

askedw

henassessing

qualityof

lifein

acountry

are(and

ofcourse

thisis

acentral

partof

assessingthe

qualityof

itspolitical

arrangements)

“How

well have

thepeople

ofthecountry

beenenabled

toperform

thecentral

human

functions?”and,“H

avethey

beenput

ina

positionofm

erehum

ansubsistence

with

respecttothe

functions,orhave

theybeen

enabledto

livew

ell?”In

otherwords,w

eask

where

thepeople

are,with

respecttothe

secondlist.A

ndw

efocus

ongetting

asm

anypeople

aspossible

abovethe

secondthreshold, w

ithrespect

tothe

interlockingsetofcapabilities

enumerated

bythat

list.5

9N

aturally,the

determination

ofwhether

certainindividuals

andgroups

areacross

thethreshold

isonly

asprecise

am

atteras

thedeterm

inationof

thethreshold;

andI

haveleft

thingsdeliberately

somew

hatopen-ended

atthis

point,in

keepingw

iththe

proceduresof

theH

uman

Develop—

inent Report,believing

thatthe

bestway

tow

orktow

arda

more

precisedeterm

inationis

toallow

thecom

munity

ofnationsto

hamm

eritout

afteran

extendedcom

parativeinquiry,ofthe

sortthereportm

akespos

sible.Again,w

ew

illhave

toansw

ervarious

questionsabout

thecosts

we

arew

illingto

payto

getallcitizensabove

thethreshold,as

opposedto

leavinga

small

number

belowand

allowing

therest

aconsiderably

above-thresholdlife

quality.Here

my

claimis

thatcapabffity-equality

inthe

senseofm

ovingall

abovethe

threshold,shouldbe

takenas

thecentralgoal. A

swith

Raw

ls’sdifference

principle,sohere:Inequalities

indistribution

abovethe

thresholdshould

betolerated

onlyifthey

move

more

peopleacross

it;

6°once

allareacross,societies

areto

agreatextent

freeto

choosethe

othergoals

thatthey

wish

topursue.

The

basicintuition

fromw

hichthe

capabilityapproach

starts,inthe

political arena,isthat

human

capabilitiesexerta

moral

claimthat

theyshould

bedeveloped.H

uman

beingsare

creaturessuch

that,providedw

iththe

right educationalandm

aterialsupport,theycan

become

fullycapable

ofthe

major

human

functions,cancross

thefirst

andsecond

thresholds.’Thatis,they

arecreatures

with

certainlow

er—levelcapabili

ties(w

hichI

haveelsew

herecalled

“basiccapabilities”)61

toperform

thefunctions

inquestion.W

henthese

capabilitiesare

deprivedof the

nourishment

thatw

ouldtransform

theminto

thehigh-level

capabilities

thatfigure

onm

ylist,they

arefruitless,cut

off,insom

ew

aybut

ashadow

ofthem

selves.They

arelike

actorsw

honeverget

togo

onthe

stage,ora

musicalscore

thatisneverperform

ed.Theirvery

beingm

akesforw

ardreference

tofunctioning.T

husiffunctioning

neverarrives

on

thescene,

theyare

hardlyeven

what

theyare.T

hism

aysound

likea

metaphysicalidea,and

ina

senseit

is(in

thatit

isan

ideadiscussed

inA

ristotle’sM

etaphysics).B

utthat

doesnot

mean

thatit

isnot

abasic

andpervasive

empirical

idea,an

ideathat

underwrites

many

ofour

dailypractices

andjudgm

entsin

many

times

andplaces. I

claimthat

justas

we

holdthat

achild

who

diesbefore

gettingto

maturity

hasdied

especiallytragically—

forher

activitiesofgrow

thand

preparationfor

adult activitynow

havelosttheir

point—so

toow

ithcapability

andfunctioning

more

generally:W

ebelieve

thatcertain

basicand

centralhum

anendow

ments

havea

claimto

beassisted

indeveloping,and

exertthatclaim

onothers,and

especially,as Aristotle

saw,on

government.W

eshall

seethe

work

thisconsideration

cando

inargum

entsforw

omen’s

equality.Ithink

itis

theunderlying

basis,inthe

Western

philosophicaltradition, for

many

notionsof hum

anrights.I

suggest, then,thatinthinking

ofpolitical

planningw

ebegin

fromthis

notion,thinking

ofthe

basiccapabilities

ofhuman

beingsas

needsfor

functioning,which

giverise

tocorrelated

politicalduties.

There

is,then, anem

piricalbasisfor

thedeterm

inationthat

acer

tainbeing

isone

ofthe

onesto

which

ournorm

ativeconception

andits

associatedduties

applies. Itis

thegap

between

potentialhum

annessand

itsfullrealization

that exertsa

moralclaim

.Ifthew

orkerdescribedby

Marx

asnot

capableof

atruly

human

useof

hissen

ses6

2had

reallybeen

anonhum

ananim

al,thefactthat he

was

givena

formof life

suitedto

suchan

animal w

ouldnotbe

atragedy. Ifw

omen

were

reallyturtles,

thefact

thatbeing

aw

oman

isnot

yeta

way

ofbeinga

human

beingw

ouldnotbe,as

itis, anoutrage.T

hereis,of course,enorm

ouspotential

forabuse

indeterm

iningw

hohas

thesebasic

capabilities.The

historyof

IQtesting

isjust

onechapter

inan

inglorioussaga

ofprejudiced

capability-testingthat

goesback

atleast

tothe

Noble

Lie

ofPlato’s

Republic.T

hereforew

eshould,

Ithink,

proceedas

ifevery

offspringoftw

ohum

anparents

hasthe

basiccapabilities,unless

anduntil

longexperience

with

theindividual

hasconvinced

usthat

damage

tothat

individual’scondition

isso

greatthat

itcould

neverin

anyw

ayarrive

atthe

highercapability

level.T

hepolitical and

economic

applicationofthis

approachis

evidentin

avariety

ofareas.Am

artyaSen

hasdeveloped

anum

berofits

con

creteim

plicationsin

theareas

ofwelfare

anddevelopm

enteconomics,

andhas

focusedparticularly

onits

applicationto

theassessm

entof

wom

en’squality

oflife.

63

With

hisadvice,the

UN

Hum

anD

evelopment

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AkJU

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tSS

AY

b-—

-

Reports

havebegun

togather

information

andto

ranknations

inaccor

dancew

iththe

typeofplural-valued

capability-focusedm

easuringthe

approachsuggests.In

aclosely

relatedstudy,lftelthar

Hossein

hasused

theapproach

togive

anaccountofpoverty

ascapability

failure.64In

de

pendently,avery

similar

approachhas

beendeveloped

byFinnish

andSw

edishsocial

scientists,aboveall

Erik

Allardtand

RobertE

rikso

n.

65

Wishing

todevelop

ways

ofgathering

information

abouthow

theirpeople

aredoing

thatw

ouldbe

more

sensitiveand

informationafly

complete

thanpolls

basedon

ideasof

utility,they

worked

outlists

ofthe

basichum

ancapabilities

forfunctioning

andthen

examined

theperform

anceof

variousgroups

inthe

population—above

allw

omen

andm

inorities—in

theseterm

s,thusanticipating

theprocedures

oftheH

uman

Developm

entReport,w

hichdevotes

agreat dealofattention

togender

differences,urban-ruraldifferences,and

soforth.

‘The“capabilities

approach”hasclear

advantagesover

othercurrent

approachesto

quality-of--lifeassessm

ent.A

ssessment

thatuses

GN

Pper

capitaas

itssole

measure

fallsto

concernitselfw

iththe

distributionofresource

andthus

cangive

highm

arksto

countriesw

ithenorm

ousinequalities.N

ordoesthis

approachexam

ineotherhum

angoods

thatarenot

reliablycorrelated

with

thepresence

ofresources:infant

mortalit)ç

forexam

ple,oraccess

toeducation,or

thequality

ofracialand

genderrelations,or

thepresence

orabsence

ofpoliticalfreedom

s.TheH

uman

Developm

entReportfor

1993inform

sus,for

example,

thatthe

United

Arab

Em

irateshas

realG

NP

percapita

of$16,753—

tenth-highestin

thew

orld,higher,

forexam

ple,than

Norw

ayor

Australia—

while

overall,inthe

aggregationof

allthe

indicatorsof life

qualityit

ranksonly

sixty-seventhin

thew

orld(outof 173

nationsm

easured).Itsadult

literacyrate

is55%

,far

lower

thanany

ofthe

60countries

generallyahead

ofit,and

alsothan

many

generallybelow

it.(B

othN

orway

andA

ustraliahave

adultliteracyof99%

.)Them

aternalmortality

rateof130

per100,000

livebirths

iscomparatively

high.Theproportion

ofwom

enprogressing

beyondsecondary

educationisvery

low, and

only6%

ofthelaborforce

is female

(asopposed,forexam

ple,to42%

inSeychelles,35%

inB

razil,43%

inC

hina,47%

inV

ietnam,

26%in

India,and

20%in

Nigeria).In

fact,inall the

world

onlyA

lgeria(496)

hasa

lowerpropor

tionof fem

alesin

thelabor

force,onlyIraq

(6%)

tiesit,and

onlyQ

atar(7%

),Saudi

Arabia

(7%),

Libya

(9%),Jordan

(10%),

Pakistan(11%

),B

angladesh(7%

),and

Afghanistan

(8%)

come

close.E

videncelinks

female

wage-earning

outsidethe

home

stronglyto

female

healthcare

andlife-expectancy.66

And

infact, w

efind

thatthe

ratiooffem

alesto

males

inthe

United

Arab

Em

iratesis

theam

azing48:100,low

est inall

thew

orld. Ifthis

isdiscounted

asem

ployment related, w

em

aypursue

theother

countriesin

ourlow

externalem

ployment

comparison

class.

Theratio

offemales

tom

alesin

nationsin

which

thereis

noreason

to

supposesexual

discrimination

innourishm

entand

healthcare

is,Sen

hasshow

n,about

106:100in

Europe

andN

orthA

merica—

or,if

we

focusonly

onthe

developingw

orld,taking

sub-SaharanA

fricaas

our

“norm,”

102:100.InO

jtariris

60:100, inSaudi A

rabia84, in

Libya

91,

inJordan

95,inPakistan

92, inB

angladesh94,in

Afghanistan

94.

These

aresom

eof

thenum

bersthat

we

startnoticing

ifwe

focus

oncapabilities

andfunctioning

ratherthan

simply

onG

NP. T

heyare

essentialto

theunderstanding

ofhow

wom

enare

doing.In

fact,they

arethe

numbers

fromw

hichSen’s

graphicstatistics

regarding“m

issing

wom

en”em

erge.(The

number

of“m

issingw

omen”

isthe

number

of

extraw

omen

who

would

bein

agiven

countryif

thatcountry

hadthe

same

sexratio

assub-Saharan

Africa.)

‘Theystrongly

supportM

artha

Chen’s

argument

thatthe

rightto

work

isa

right basicto

thelives

of

wom

ennot

onlyin

itself, butfor

itsim

pact onother

basiccapabilities

andfunctionings. Saleha

Begum

’sem

ployment led

tobetter

nutritional

andhealth

statusfor herselfand,indeed, her children

andfam

ily. Metha

Bai

may

soonbecom

eone

ofthe

statisticsfrom

which

thenum

berof

missing

wom

enis

made.

Would

otheravailable

approacheshave

donethe

jobas

well?

The

comm

onapproach

that measures

qualityoflife

interm

sof utility—

poll

ingpeople

concerningthe

satisfactionof their preferences—

would

have

missed

theobvious

factthat

desiresand

sukjectivepreferences

arenot

always

reliableindicators

ofw

hata

personreally

needs.Preferences,

asA

martya

Sen’sw

orkhas

repeatedlyshow

n,are

highlym

alleable.67

Therich

andpam

peredeasily

become

accustomed

totheir

luxury,and

vieww

ithpain

andfrustration

alife

inw

hichthey

aretreated

justlike

everyoneelse. IV

Ialesare

aspecial

caseof

this:W

edo

notneed

togo

abroadto

knowthat

males

frequentlyresent

asituation

inw

hichthey

areasked

toshare

childcare

anddom

esticresponsibilities

onan

equal

basis.68

Thepoor

anddeprived

frequentlyadjust their

expectationsand

aspirationsto

thelow

level of lifethey

haveknow

n. Thus

theym

aynot

demand

more

education, betterhealth

care. Like

thew

omen

described

inSen’s

accountof

healthsurveys

inIndia,

theym

aynot

evenknow

what

it isto

feel healthy.69

Like

therural B

angladeshi wom

enso

vividly

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describedin

Martha

Chen’s

AQ

uietRevolution,70

theym

aynot

evenknow

what

itm

eansto

havethe

advantagesof

education.W

em

ayim

aginethat

many

wom

enin

thecountries

Ihave

men,tioned

would

notfight,as

SelehaB

egumdid,for

participationin

thew

orkforce;nor

would

theybe

aware

ofthehigh

correlationbetw

eenw

orkoutside

thehom

eand

otheradvantages.A

sSen

argues,theym

ayhave

fullyin

ternalized

theideas

behindthe

traditionalsystem

ofdiscrim

ination,andm

ayview

theirdeprivation

as“natural.”T

husif w

erely

onutility

asour

measure

oflife

quality,we

most

oftenw

illget

resultsthat

supportthe

statusquo

andoppose

radicalchan

ge.

7’If

thesecriticism

sapply

toapproaches

thatfocus

onutility

ingeneral,they

applyall the

more

pointedlyto

thesortoflocal-tradition

relativismespoused

bythe

Ivlarglins,in

which

them

easureofquality

oflifew

illbethe

satisfactionofa

certaingroup

ofpreferences,namely

thetraditionalones

ofagiven

culture.Indeed,it is

illuminating

toco

nsider

howclose,in

itsrenunciation

ofcritical normative

argument,the

Marglin

approachis

tothe

prevailingeconom

icapproaches

ofwhich

itpresentsitselfas

aradicalcritique.A

preference—based

approachthat

givespriority

tothe

preferencesof

traditionalculture

islikely

tobe

especiallysubversive

ofthequality

of lifeof w

omen

who

havebeen

onthe

whole

badlytreated

byprevailing

traditionalnorm

s.And

onecan

seethis

clearlyin

theM

arglins’own

examples. Form

enstruationtaboos

impose

severerestrictions

onw

omen’s

power

toform

aplan

oflifeand

toexecute

theplan

theyhave

chosen.They

arem

embers

ofthe

same

family

oftraditional

attitudesabout

wom

enand

thew

orkplacethat

made

itdifficult

forSaleha

Begum

tosupport

herselfandher

family,

thatm

akeit

impossible

forM

ethaB

aito

sustainthe

basicfunctions

oflife.A

ndthe

Japanesehusband

who

allegedlyrenounces

freedomof

choiceactually

enhancesit,

inthe

ways

thatm

atter,by

askingthe

wom

anto

lookafterthe

boringdetails

oflife.One

cansym

pathizew

ithm

anyof

theM

arglins’goals—

respectfor

diversity,desire

topreserve

aspectsof traditional

lifethat

appearto

berich

inspiritualand

artisticvalue—

without agreeing

thatextreme

relativismofthe

sorttheyendorse

isthe

bestway

topursue

theseconcerns.

As

forliberal

approachesthat

aimat

equalityin

thedistribution

ofcertainbasic

resources,thesehave

relatedproblem

s,sincethese,too,

refuseto

takea

standon

theends

tow

hichthe

resourcesare

mean

s.72

Wealth

andincom

eare

notgoodin

theirow

nright;

theyare

goodonly

insofarasthey

promote

human

functioning. Second,human

beingshave

widely

varyingneeds

forresources,and

anyadequate

definitionofw

hois“better

off’and“w

orseoff”

mustreflectthat

fact.7

3W

omen

who

havetraditionally

notbeen

educated,forexam

ple,may

well

requirem

oreof

therelevant

resourcesto

attainthe

same

capabilitylevel:thatis

why,in

thecase

discussedby

Martha

Chen,

theB

angladeshR

uralA

dvancem

entCom

mittee

createda

specialfemale

literacyprogram

,ratherthan

aprogram

thatdistributed

equalresources

toall.T

hird,by

definingbeing

“well-off”in

terms

ofpossessionsalone,the

liberalfailsto

godeep

enoughin

imagining

theim

pediments

tofunctioning

thatare

actuallypresent

inm

anylives—

intheir

conditionsof

laboror

exclusionfrom

labor,for

example,

intheir

frequentlyunequal

family

responsibilities,in

theobstacles

toself-realization

imposed

bytraditional

norms

andvalues.74

Thestories

ofSalehaB

egumand

Metha

Baiare

vividexam

plesofsuch

unequalobstacles.No

right-to-work

effort,andno

expenditureofresources

inthat

connection,were

necessaryin

orderto

make

men

capableofw

orkingin

thefields

inB

angladesh.No

male

ofMetha

Bai’scaste

would

haveto

overcome

threatsof

physicalviolence

inorder

togo

outofthe

houseto

work

forlife-sustaining

food.

6.A

NS

WE

RIN

GT

HE

OB

JEC

TIO

NS

:H

UM

AN

FU

NC

TIO

NIN

GA

ND

PL

UR

AL

ISM

Ihavecom

mended

thehum

an-functionview

bycontrastto

itsrivals

onthe

developmentscene.B

utIm

ustnowtry

toshow

howitcan

answer

theobjections

Idescribed

earlier.C

oncerningneglect

ofhistoricalandculturald

ren

ce,

Ican

beginby

insistingthat

thisnorm

ativeconception

ofhum

ancapability

andfunctioning

isgeneral,andin

asense

vague,forpreciselythis

reason.Thelistclaim

sto

haveidentified

ina

verygeneralw

aycom

ponentsthatare

fundamental

toany

human

life.But

itallow

sin

itsvery

designfor

thepossibility

ofm

ultiplespecifications

ofeach

ofthe

components.This

isso

inseveral

differentways.

First,the

constitutivecircum

stancesof

human

life,while

broadlyshared,

arethem

selvesrealized

indifferent

forms

indifferentsocieties.’The

fearofdeath,the

loveofpla)

relationships

offriendship,andaffiliation

with

others,eventhe

experienceofthe

bodilyappetites

neverturn

upin

simply

thevague

andgeneralform

inw

hichw

ehave

introducedthem

there,but always

insom

especific

andhistorically

richcultural

realization,w

hichcan

profoundlyshape

notonly

theconceptions

usedby

thecitizens

inthese

areas,butalso

their

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HA

C.N

US

SB

A!JM

•527

experiencesthem

selves.N

onetheless,we

dohave

inthese

areasofour

comm

onhum

anitysufficientoverlap

tosustain

ageneral conversation,

focusingon

ourcom

mon

problems

andprospects.A

ndsom

etimes

thecom

mon

conversationw

illperm

itus

tocriticize

some

conceptionsof

thegrounding

experiencesthem

selves,as

atodds

with

otherthings

human

beingsw

antto

doand

tobe.

When

we

arechoosing

aconception

ofgood

functioningw

ithrespectto

thesecircum

stances,we

canexpectan

evengreater

degreeof

pluralityto

become

evident. Here

theapproach

wants

toretain

pluralityin

two

significantlydifferent

ways:

what

Im

aycall

thew

ayof plural

specj/ication,andw

hatI

may

callthe

way

oflocalspecj/ication.Plural

specificationm

eansw

hatits

name

implies.

Publicpolicy,

while

usinga

determinate

conceptionof

thegood

ata

highlevel

ofgenerality,leaves

agreat

dealoflatitude

forcitizens

tospecify

eachof

thecom

ponentsm

oreconcretely,and

with

much

variety,inaccordance

with

localtraditions,or

individualtastes. IV

Ianyconcrete

forms

oflife,in

many

differentplaces

andcircum

stances,display

functioningin

accordancew

ithall

them

ajorcapabilities.

As

forlocal specification:Good

publicreasoning,Ibelieve

andhave

argued,isalw

aysdone, w

henw

elldone,w

itha

richsensitivity

tothe

concretecontext,to

thecharacters

oftheagents

andtheirsocialsituation.

Thism

eansthat

inaddition

tothe

pluralismI

havejust

described,theA

ristotelianneeds

toconsider

adifferentsortofplural

specificationof

thegood.For

sometim

esw

hatisa

goodw

ayofprom

otingeducation

inone

partofthe

world

will be

completely

ineffectualin

another.Forms

ofaffiliationthat

flourishin

onecom

munity

may

proveim

possibleto

sustainin

another.In

suchcases,

theA

ristotelianm

ustaim

atsom

econcrete

specificationof

thegeneral

listthat

suits,and

developsout

of,the

localconditions. This

will

always

most

reasonablybe

donein

aparticipatory

dialogue75

with

thosew

hoare

most

deeplyim

mersed

inthose

conditions.For

thoughA

ristotelianismdoes

nothesitate

tocriticize

traditionw

heretradition

perpetratesinjustice

oroppression,

italso

doesnot

believein

sayinganything

atallw

ithoutrich

andfull

information,

gatherednot

som

uchfrom

detachedstudy

asfrom

thevoices

ofthose

who

livethe

ways

oflife

inquestion.

Martha

Chen’s

work,

bothhere

andin

herbook,

givesan

excellentexam

pleof

howsuch

sensitivityto

thelocal

may

becom

binedw

itha

convictionthat

thecentral

valueson

thelist

arew

orthpursuing

evenw

hentradition

hasnot

endorsedthem

.

Theliberalcharges

thecapability

approachw

ithneglectofautonom

y,arguing

thatany

suchdeterm

inateconception

removes

fromthe

citizens

thechance

tom

aketheirow

nchoices

aboutthegood

life.Thisis

acom

plicatedissue:

Threepoints

canbe

stressed.First,the

listisa

listofcapabilities,nota

listofactualfunctions,preciselybecause

theconcep

tionis

designedto

leaveroom

forchoice.G

overnmentis

notdirected

topush

citizensinto

actingin

certainvalued

ways;instead,

itisdirected

tom

akesure

thatall

human

beingshave

thenecessary

resourcesand

conditionsfor

actingin

thosew

ays.Itleaves

thechoice

upto

them.A

personw

ithplenty

offood

canalw

ayschoose

tofast.A

personw

hohas

beengiven

thecapability

forsexual

expressioncan

always

choosecelibacyT

heperson

who

hasaccess

tosubsidized

educationcan

always

decideto

dosom

ethingelse

instead.B

ym

akingopportunities

available, governm

entenhances,and

doesnot

remove,ch

oice.

76

Itw

illnot

always

beeasy

tosay

atwhatpointsom

eoneis

reallycapable

of making

achoice,especially

inareas

where

thereare

severetraditionalobstacles

tofunctioning.Som

etimes

ourbest

strategym

ayw

ellbe

tolook

atactual

functioningand

infer negativecapability

(tentatively)from

itsabsence.7

7B

utthe

conceptualdistinction

remains

veryim

portant.Second,this

respectforchoiceisbuiltdeeply

intothe

listitself,inthe

architectonicrole

it givesto

practicalreasoning.One

ofthem

ost centralcapabilities

promoted

bythe

conceptionw

illbe

thecapability

of choiceitself.78

We

shouldnote

thatthem

ajorliberalviewin

thisarea

(that ofjohnR

awls)

agreesw

ithour

approachin

justthis

area.ForR

awls

insiststhat

satisfactionsthatare

nottheoutgrow

thofone’svery

own

choiceshave

nom

oralworth;and

heconceives

ofthetw

om

oralpowers

(analogousto

ourpractical

reasoning), andofsociability

(correspondingto

ouraffiliation)

asbuiltintothe

definitionofthe

partiesin

theoriginalposition, and

thusas

necessaryconstraints

onany

outcome

theyw

illselect.7

9Finally,the

capabilityview

insiststhatchoice

isnotpure

spontaneity

flourishingindependent

ofm

aterialand

socialconditions.

Ifone

caresaboutautonom

)then

onem

ustcareaboutthe

restoftheform

oflife

thatsupports

it, andthe

materialconditions

thatenableone

tolive

thatform

of life.Thus

theapproach

claims

thatits

own

comprehensive

concernw

ithflourishing

acrossall

areasoflife

isa

betterw

ayofp

rom

otingchoice

thanis

theliberal’s

narrower

concernw

ithspontaneity

alone,which

sometim

estolerates

situationsin

which

individualsare

inother

ways

cutofffrom

thefully

human

useoftheir

faculties.I

turnnow

tothe

objectionabout

application;it

raisesespecially

delicatequestions

where

wom

enare

concerned.

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M•529

7.W

HO

GE

TS

INC

LU

DE

D?

WO

ME

NA

SH

UM

AN

BE

ING

S

Ina

noww

eU—

known

remark,

which

Icite

hereas

anepigraph,

thefem

inistlaw

yerC

atharineIvlacK

innonclaim

edthat

“beinga

wom

anis

notyet

aw

ayof

beinga

human

being.”8°

Thism

eans,I

think,that

most

traditionalw

aysof

categorizingand

valuingw

omen

havenot

accordedthem

fillm

embership

inthe

human

species, asthatspecies

isgenerally

defined. MacK

innonis

nodoubtthinking

inparticular

ofthefrequent

denialsto

wom

enof

therational

naturethat

istaken

tobe

acentral

part of what

itisto

behum

an.Itis

soberingto

remind

oneselfthat quite

afew

leadingphilosophers, including

Aristotle

andR

ousseau,the

“fathers”(certainly

notm

others)of

my

idea, diddeny

wom

enfull

mem

bershipin

human

functioningas

theyunderstood

thatnotion. If

thisis

so, onem

ightw

ellask,

ofwhat

useis

itreally

toidentil5’

aset

ofcentral

human

capabilities?For

thebasic

(lower—

level)capacity

todevelop

thesecan

always

bedenied

tow

omen, even

bythose

who

granttheir

centrality.Does

thisproblem

showthat

thehum

anfunction

ideais

eitherhopelessly

inleague

with

patriarchyor, atbest, im

potentas

atool for justice?

Ibelieve

thatit

doesnot.

Forif

we

examine

thehistory

ofthese

denialsw

esee,

Ibelieve,

thegreat

power

ofthe

conceptionof

thehum

anas

asource

ofm

oralclaim

s. Acknow

ledgingthe

otherperson

asa

mem

berof

thevery

same

kindw

ouldhave

generateda

senseof

affiliationand

aset

ofm

oraland

educationalduties. T

hatis

why,

tothose

benton

shoringup

theirow

npow

er,the

stratagemof

splittingthe

otheroff from

one’sow

nspecies

seems

sourgent

andso

seductive.B

uttodeny

humanness

tobeings

with

whom

onelives

inconversation

andinteraction

isa

fragilesort

of self—deceptive

stratagem,vulnerable

tosustained

andconsistent reflection, and

alsoto

experiencesthat

cutthrough

self-deceptiverationalization.8’

Any

moral

conceptioncan

bew

ithheld,out

ofam

bitionor

hatredor

shame.

But

theconception

ofthe

human

being,spelled

out,as

here,in

aroughly

determinate

way,

interm

sof circum

stancesof life

andfunctions

inthese

circumstances,

seems

much

harderto

withhold

thanother

conceptionsthat

havebeen

made

thebasis

forethics—

”rationalbeing,”

forexam

ple, or(as

Ihave

suggested)“person.”

To

illustratethis

point, Inow

turnto

theearliest argum

ent known

tom

ein

theW

esternphilosophical

traditionthat

usesa

conceptionof

thehum

anbeing

forfeminist ends. It

isnot the

first feminist argum

ent

inthe

Western

tradition: ForPlato’sR

epublicprecedes

(andinfluences)

itY2

But

Plato’sarg

um

entin

favorof equaleducationforw

omen

isheavily

qualifiedby

hiselitism

with

respectto

allfunctions

forall

human

beings;thus

it isable

togenerate

onlyelitistconclusions

form

alesand

females

alike.Platonic

justiceis

notthe

“humanistjustice”

ofSusan

Okin’s

powerfiil

phrase. Theargum

entI

havein

mind

is, instead,the

firstargum

entof

theR

oman

Stoicthinker

IvlusoniusR

ufusin

hisbrief

treatise“T

hatW

omen

Too

ShouldD

oPhilosophy,”

written

inthe

firstcen

tury

Ad).

83

Thisarg

um

entis

allthem

oreinteresting

inthat

it,in

effect,uses

Aristotelian

conceptsto

correctA

ristotle’sm

istakeabout

wom

en—show

ing,I

think,that

anA

ristotelianw

hois

bothinternally

consistentand

honestabout

theevidence

cannotavoid

theegalitarian

normative

conclusionthat w

omen, as

much

asm

en, shouldreceive

ahigher

education(for

thatis

ineffect w

hatis

meantby

doingphilosophy).84

‘Theargum

enthasa

tacitprem

ise.Itis

that—atleast w

ithrespect

tocertain

centralfunctions

ofthe

human

being—the

presencein

acreature

ofa

basic(untrained,

lower-level)

capabilityto

performthe

functionsin

question,given

suitablesupport

andeducation,

exertsa

claimon

societythat

thosecapabilities

shouldbe

developedto

thepoint

atwhich

theperson

isfully

capableof choosing

thefunctions

inquestion.T

hisprem

iseneeded

noargum

entinthe

philosophicalcultureofC

reco-Rom

anantiquity

sincethat m

oral claimis

more

orlesstaken

tobe

implicit

inthe

notionof

capabilityitself.

Ihave

triedto

giveit

intuitivesupport in

theargum

entof thispaper.

Theargum

entitselfnowfollow

sw

itha

trulyradicalsim

plicity.Itssecond

premise

consistsofan

appealtothe

experienceof the

imaginary

recalcitrantm

aleinterlocutor.W

omen,

heis

askedto

concedeon

thebasis

of experience,doin

facthavethe

basiccapabilities

toperform

aw

idevariety

ofthem

ostimportant

human

fiinctions.They

havethe

fivesenses. T

heyhave

thesam

enum

berof

bodilyparts,

implying

similar

functionalpossibilities

inthatsphere.T

heyhave

theability

toth

ink

andreason,justas

males

do. And, finally,they

haveresponsiveness

toethical

distinctions,making

(whether

well

orbadly)

distinctionsbetw

eenthe

goodand

thebad. Som

etim

eis

thenspent establishing

athird

premise:

that“higher

education”of

thesort

offeredby

theStoic

idealofliberal

education,isnecessary

forthefulldevelopm

entoftheperceptual, in

tellectual,and

moral

capabilities.Conclusion:

Wom

en, likem

en,should

havethis

education.

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531

Thepuzzle,forus,is

thesecond

premise.W

hydoes

theinterlocutor

acceptit?

‘Ne

seefrom

thesurrounding

materialthatthe

interlocutorisa

husbandw

hointeracts

with

hisw

ifein

anum

berofareas

oflifethatare

explicitlyenum

erated:planningand

managing

ahousehold

(where

sheis

theone

who

manages

most

ofthedaily

business);havingand

raisingchildren

(where

heobserves,orim

agines,herin

labor,enduringrisk

andpain

forthe

sakeofthe

family

and,later,caringfor

andeducating

thechild);

havingsexual

relationsw

ithhim

,andrefusing

tohave

sexw

ithothers;having

arealfriendship

with

him,based

oncom

mon

contemporary

ideasof”sharing

lifetogether”;8

5deciding

howto

treatthepeople

aroundher;being

fair,forexample,to

thehousehold

staffiand,finally,confrontingallthe

dangersand

them

oralambiguities

ofthepolitics

offirstcenturyA

.D.R

ome—

refusingto

capitulate,hesays,to

theunjust

demands

ofatyrant.In

allof

theseoperations

oflife,the

argument

seems

tobe,

hetacitly

acknowledges,in

factstronglyrelies

upon,hisw

ife’scapability

toengage

inpracticalreasoning

andethicaldistinction

making.Indeed,he

isdepicted

assom

eonew

how

ouldlike

thesethings

donew

ell—for

hew

antshis

wife

notto

reasonbadly

when

politicallife

getstough,or

totreatthe

servantsw

ithcruelty, or

tobotch

theeducation

ofthechildren.

Soin

hisdaily

lifehe

acknowledges

her humanity,her

possessionofthe

basic(low

er-level)capabilities

forfully

human

functioning. How

,then,M

usoniusreasonably

askshim

,canhe

consistentlydeny

herwhat w

ouldbe

necessaryin

orderto

developand

fhlflllthathumanity?

Ihis,Ibelieve,isan

impressively

radicalargument.A

nditled

to(or

reflected)a

socialsituation

thatm

arkeda

highpoint

forw

omen

inthe

Western

traditionforthousands

ofyearssince

andto

com

e.86

We

donot

needto

showthatthe

views

ofMusonius

onw

omen

were

perfectinall

respects;inm

anyw

aysthey

were

not.Buthis

argumentshow

s,Ibelieve,the

powerofa

universalconceptionofthe

human

beingin

claims

ofjustice

forwom

en.Fortheinterlocutor

mighthave

refusedto

acknowledge

thathisw

ifew

asa

“person”:Itwas

tosom

eextent

upto

himto

definethatratherrefined

andelusive

concept.He

couldnotfailto

acknowledge

thatshew

asa

human

being,with

thebasic

capabilityforthe

functionsin

question.Forhe

hadacknow

ledgedthatalready,in

hisdaily

life.

8. WO

ME

NA

ND

ME

N:T

WO

NO

RM

SO

RO

NE

?

But

shouldthere

bea

singlenorm

ofhuman

functioning?It

hasoften

beenargued,

inboth

non-Western

andW

esterntraditions,that

there

shouldbe

two

differentstandardsofhum

anfunctioning

andcapability

correspondingto

thedifferent“natures”ofthe

male

andthe

female.U

sually

theseoverlap

inthe

areasofbodily

health,mobility,and

perception,but

differsharply

inthe

areasofpractical

reasonand

affiliation.Most

comm

only,citizenship,publicactivity,and

fullpractical

autonomy

areassigned

tom

ales,carefor

home

andfam

ilyto

females.W

em

ustnow

confrontthe

claims

ofthisposition.

Thosew

horecognize

separatespheres

offunctioningform

alesand

females

havetaken

uptw

oim

portantly-differentpositions,w

hichw

eneed

tobe

careflilto

distinguish.Thefirst,w

hichI

shallcall

PositionA

,assignsto

bothm

alesand

females

thesam

egeneral

normative

listoffunctions,butsuggests

thatmales

andfem

alesshould

exercisethese

functionsin

differentspheresoflife.The

second,which

IshallcallP

osition

B,insiststhatthe

listoffunctions,evenata

highlevelofgenerality,

shouldbe

different.(ItisB

ratherthan

Athatis

usuallyassociated

with

theclaim

thatm

alesand

females

havedifferent“natures”.)

PositionA

iscom

patiblew

itha

seriousinterest

inequality

andin

genderjustice.For

what

itsays,after

all, isthat

males

andfem

aleshave

thesam

ebasic

needsfor

capabilitydevelopm

entand

shouldget

what

theyneed.It

isdeterm

inedto

ensurethatboth

getto

thehigher

(developed)levelofcapability

with

respecttoallthe

centralfunctions.Itsim

plyholds

thatthiscan

(andperhaps

should)be

donein

separatespheres.Itis

akind

ofgender-basedlocalspecification.A

is,afterall,theposition

ofMusonius,w

hoholds

thatthem

ajorfunctionsofaffiliation

andpracticalreason

may

beexercised

bythe

wom

anin

them

anagement

ofthehom

eand

bythe

man

inthe

publicsphere.8

7It

evidentlyseem

sto

himconvenient,given

wom

en’schildbearing

role,thatthe

customary

divisionsof

dutiesshould

notbe

overturned,andhe

believesthat

allthem

ajorcapabilities

canflourish

ineither

sphere.Isthis

anym

oreproblem

aticthan

tosay

thathuman

functioningin

Indiacan,and

evenshould,take

adifferent

concreteform

fromfunctioning

inE

ngland?The

difficultyis,how

ever,thatoncew

ehave

recognizedthe

extentto

which

genderdivisions

havebeen

sociallyconstructed

inm

orallyarbitrary

andinjurious

ways,

andonce

we

insist,instead,

onusing

comm

onhum

anityas

ourm

oraland

politicalbasis,itis

difficulttosee

what

goodargum

entsthere

arefor

PositionA

,which

justhappens

tom

aintainin

placedivisions

thathaveoften

provenoppressive

tow

omen.

What

couldsuch

arguments

be?I

havem

entionedbiologicaldifferences.B

uthowm

uchseparation

offunctionis

reallysuggested

byw

omen’s

childbearing,especiallytoday?

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US

SE

AU

M•

5331

Even

inthe

fourthcentury

n.c.,Platow

asable

tosee

thatthesituation

ofmales

andfem

alesis

notverydifferent from

thesituation

ofmale

andfem

alehunting

dogs:Thefem

aleneeds

aperiod

ofrestforchildbearingand

nursing,but

thisin

now

ayrequires,

oreven

suggests,a

lifelongdifferentiation

offunctions.

Advances

inthe

controlof

reproductionare

making

thisless

andless

plausible. And

itshould

beevident

toall

thatthedisability

imposed

bychildbearing

forthe

mem

berof thelabor

forceis

toa

largeexientconstructed, above

allbythe

absenceofsupport

forchild

care,bothfrom

thepublic

sphereand

fromem

ployers. Other

bodilydifferences

thathave

standardlybeen

mentioned—

forexam

ple,differences

inbodily

strengththathave

oftenbeen

heldto

imply

adif

ferentiationof functions—

areincreasingly

beingfound

tobe

basedon

badscientific

argum

ent,

88

andare

alsoless

andless

plausibleas

basesfor

functionaldifferentiation.M

ilitaryfunctions,for

example,depend

lessand

lessupon

bodilystrength

andm

oreand

more

oneducation.

Therecognition

of thisby

theU

SC

ongressin

itsrecentequalization

ofm

ilitaryroles

simply

grantsw

hatshould

longago

havebeen

obvious.O

nem

ightalsopointto

contingent socialfacts.Societiesare

alreadydivided

alonggender

lines.Soifw

eare

goingto

move

toa

situationin

which

wom

enw

illbe

capableof

exercisingall

them

ajorfunctions,

it

villbe

prudentto

developthe

resourcesof

thatgender-divided

structure,

seekinggreater

independenceand

flililllment

forw

omen

within

it,ratherthan

tryingto

breakitup.T

his, Ithink,isw

hatisreally

goingon

inM

usonius.A

sa

Greek-speaking

philosopherin

Nero’s

Rom

e,he

hasn’tthe

ghostofa

chanceofm

akinginstitutional

changesofthe

sortrecomm

endedin

Stoicview

softhe

idealcityin

which

males

andfem

alesw

ereto

befully

equalcitizensw

ithno

distinctionofspheres

andeven

nodistinction

ofclo

thin

g!

89

He

doeshave

ahope

ofconvincing

individual husbandsto

allowtheirw

ivesaccess

toeducation,so

hedoes

whathe

can.Much

thesam

eis

truein

Martha

Chen’sA

Quiet R

evolution.

Neither

Chen

norher

colleaguesproposed

tojettison

allgender

divisions;vithin

thevillage.Instead,they

found“fem

alejobs”

that were

somew

hatm

oredignified

andim

portantthan

theold

jobs, jobsthat

lookedcontinuous

with

traditionalfem

alew

orkbut

were

outsidethe

home

andbrought

inw

ages.Frequently

thisis

aprudent

strategyin

bringingabout

realsocial

change.As

Martha

Chen

shows,the

“revolution”in

wom

en’squality

oflife

neverw

ouldhave

takenplace

butfor

thecaution

ofthe

wom

en,w

hoat

eachstage

gavethe

men

ofthe

villagereason

tobelieve

that

thetransform

ationsw

erenot

overwhelm

inglythreatening

andw

eregood

forthe

well-being

ofthe

entiregroup.

On

theother

hand,such

pragmatic

decisionsin

theface

ofrecalcitrant

realitiesdo

nottell

ushow

thingsought

tobe.T

ohold

thata

gender-dividedtw

o-spheresresultis

anacceptable

specificationofthe

normis

deeplyproblem

atic.For

veryoften

thetraditionally

female

normis

sociallydevalued,and

thetraditionally

male

functionspow

erfullyconnected

with

important

advantages.InM

usonius’sR

ome,a

husbandcan

beboth

acitizen

anda

householdm

anager;a

wife

doesnot

havethe

choiceto

bea

citizen.In

Metha

Bai’s

contemporary

India,the

confinement

ofw

omen

tothe

domestic

spherecuts

themoff

fromthe

choiceto

earna

living,a

powerful

determinant

ofoverall

capabilitystatus.

Inshort,

“separatebut equal”

assignments

usuallyserve

theends

ofadom

inantgroupand

perpetuatethe

oppressionof

thepow

erless.9°

This

pointneeds

particularattention

inthinking

aboutdivisions

oflabor

within

thefam

ily.It

seems

perfectlyreasonable

thatin

anyhousehold

thereshould

bea

divisionof

labor,even

along-standing

one,w

ithsom

em

embers

gaininggreater

skillsat

onetask,

some

atanother.It

would

alreadybe

greatprogress,vis—

à—vis

thecurrent

stateofthings

inall know

ncountries,if dom

esticduties

were

equallydivided

bytim

eand

effort.B

uteven

inthat

utopiansituation,

assignment

oftasks

alongtraditional gender-divided

linesm

aybe

suspect, onaccount

ofits

possibleassociation

with

lackof

respectand

seW—

respect. Ifall

andonly

girlsare

taughttocook, for

example,this

doesnot

seemto

bea

morally

neutralcase

offunctional

specialization(like

teachingone

childthe

piano,anotherthe

clarinet);for

itreinforcesstereotypes

thatare

associated, historically,with

thedenialto

wom

enof citizenship

andautonom

y.I

concludethat

thereare

nogood

arguments

forposition

A,and

thateven

theprudent

useof

Ain

promoting

gradualsocial

changeshould

beview

edw

ithcaution,and

with

aconstant

awareness

ofmore

genuinelyequal

norms.

Iturn

nowto

PositionB, w

hichhas

beeninfluentially

defendedby

many

philosophers,includingR

ousseauand

some

ofhiscontem

poraryfollow

ers.9

8T

hisposition

may

becriticized

ina

numberof differentw

ays.First,w

eshould

insistthat,insofaras

itrestson

theclaim

thatthereare

two

differentsets

ofbasic

capabilities,this

claimhas

notbeen

borneout

byany

responsiblescientific

evidence.As

Anne

Fausto-Sterling’sM

ythsof

Gender

repeatedlyshow

s,experim

entsthat

allegedlyshow

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ESSAY

SM

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.NU

SSBA

UM

535

stronggenderdivisions

inbasic

(untrained)abilities

arefullofscientific

flaws;

theseflaw

srem

oved,thecase

forsuch

differencesis

altogetherinconclusive.

Second,we

shouldnote

thatevenw

hatisclaim

edw

ithoutsubstantiation

inthis

bodyof

scientificm

aterialusually

doesnot

amount

toa

differencein

what

Ihave

beencalling

thecentral

basiccapabilities.

What

isalleged

isusually

adifferential

statisticaldistribution

ofsome

specificcapacity

fora

highlevel

ofexcellence,

notfor

crossingthe

threshold,andexcellence

insom

every

narrowly

definedfunction

(say,geom

etricalability),

ratherthan

inone

ofour

large-scalecapabilities

suchas

thecapability

toperform

practicalreasoning(w

hichm

ay,recall,be

donein

anum

berofdifferentways,in

accordancew

iththe

particulartastes

andabilities

ofthe

individual).So:

Even

iftheclaim

were

true,it

would

notbe

aclaim

aboutcapabilities

inour

capacioussense;

nor,since

itisa

statisticalclaim,w

ouldithave

anyim

plicationsfor

thew

aysin

which

individualsshould

betreated.

Sothe

politicalconsequences

ofsuchgender

differencesin

ourschem

eofthings,even

hadthey

beenestablished,w

ouldbe

nil.Finally,w

em

ustalsonote

thatitis

inprinciple

nexttoim

possible,rightnow

,todo

thesortofresearch

thatwould

berequired

ifsuchdif

ferencesw

ereeverto

beconvincingly

established.Forithasbeen

shown

thatright

now,

frombirth

on,babiesof

thetw

osexes

aredifferently

treatedby

parentsand

otheradults,in

accordancew

iththe

perceptionoftheir

externalgenitalia.They

arehandled

differently,spokento

differently,given

differenttoys.Their

emotions

arelabeled

differently—thus

acrying

infanttends

tobe

labeled“angry”

iftheobserver

believesitto

bea

boy,and“frightened”

iftheobserver

believesit

tobe

agirl.

92

Thism

eansthatin

thepresentgender-divided

stateofthings

we

cannotgetbeneath

culturereliably

enoughto

getthenecessary

evidenceaboutbasic

capabilities.Ithink

thissupports

theconclusion

Idefended

earlier:Thepotential

forerror

andabuse

incapability

testingis

sogreat

thatw

eshould

proceedas

ifeveryindividual

hasthe

basiccapabilities.

Butw

ecan

alsocriticize

PositionB

ina

differentway.For

Ibelievethat

itcan

alsobe

shown

thatthe

differentiatedconceptions

ofm

aleand

female

functioningcharacteristically

putforward

byB

areinternally

inadequate,andfail

togive

usviable

norms

ofhuman

flourishing.9

3W

hatdow

eusually

find,inthe

versionsofB

thatourphilosophicaltradition

bequeathsto

us?(R

ousseau’sview

isan

instructiveexam

ple.)W

ehave,

onthe

onehand,

males

who

are“autonom

ous,”capable

of

practicalreasoning,

independentand

self-sufficient,allegedly

goodat

politicaldeliberation.These

males

arebroughtup

nottodevelop

strongem

otionsoflove

andfeelings

ofdeepneed

thatare

associatedw

iththe

awareness

ofone’sow

nlack

ofself-sufficiency.Forthis

reasonthey

arenot

well

equippedto

carefor

theneeds

oftheir

family

mem

bers,or,

perhaps,evento

noticethose

needs.On

theotherhand,w

ehave

females

suchas

Rousseau’s

Sophie,broughtupto

lackautonom

yand

self-respect,illequipped

torely

onher

own

practicalreasoning,dependentonm

ales,focused

onpleasing

others,goodatcaring

forothers.Is

eitherofthese

viableas

acom

pletelife

fora

human

being?Itw

ouldseem

not.The

internaltensionsin

Rousseau’s

accountarea

goodplace

tobegin

seeingthis;they

havebeen

welldescribed

bySusan

0kmand

JaneR

olandM

artin.R

ousseau,inE

rnile,placestrem

endousem

phasison

compassion

asa

basicsocialm

otivation.He

understandscom

passionto

requirefellow

feeling,and

akeen

responsivenessto

thesufferings

ofothers.And

yet,inpreparing

Em

ileforautonom

ouscitizen

ship,inthe

endhe

shortchangesthese

emotionalfunctions,allocating

caringand

responsivenessto

thefem

alesphere

alone.Itappears

likelythat

Em

ilew

illbe

notonly

anincom

pleteperson

butalso

adefective

citizen,even

bythe

standardsof

citizenshiprecognized

byR

ousseauhim

self.W

ithSophie,things

againgo

badly.Taught

tocare

forothers,but

nottaught

thather

lifeis

herow

nto

plan,shelives

underthe

sway

ofexternal

influencesand

lacksself-governm

ent.A

sR

ousseauhim

selfshow

s,inhis

fascinatingnarrative

oftheend

ofherlife,she

comes

toa

badend

thoughherlack

ofjudgment. Ivloreover—

asM

usoniusalready

arguedto

hisR

oman

husband,defendingequalfunctioning—

sheproves

tobe

abad

partnerand

deficientin

love.Forlove,as

we

come

tosee,

requiresjudgm

ent andconstancy

ifitis

tobe

trulydeep

andtruly

per

ceptive.So

eachof

themfails

tolive

acom

pletehum

anlife;

andeach

fails,too, toexem

plif5rfullyand

well

thevery

functionsforw

hichthey

were

beingtrained,

sincethose

functionsrequire

supportfrom

otherfunctions

forw

hichthey

were

nottrained.The

textleadsits

thought

fulreaderto

theconclusion

thatthe

capabilitiesthathave

traditionallym

arkedthe

separatem

aleand

female

spheresare

notseparable

fromone

anotherw

ithouta

gravefunctional

loss.They

supportand

educateone

another.Sosociety

cannotstrive

forcom

pletenessby

simply

add

ingone

sphereto

theother.It

muststrive

todevelop

ineach

andevery

personthe

fullrange

ofhuman

capabilities.

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MA

RT

HA

C,

NU

SS

BA

UM

•537

This

more

inclusivenotion

ofhum

anfunctioning

admits

tragicconffict.For

itinsistson

theseparate

valueand

theirreplaceable

imp

or

tanceof

arich

pluralityof

functions.A

ndthe

world

doesnot

always

guaranteethatindividuals

willnotbe

facedw

ithpainfulchoices

among

thesefunctions,in

which,in

ordertopursue

oneofthem

wellthey

must

neglectothers

(andthus,

inm

anycases,

subvertthe

oneas

well).B

utthis

shows

onceagain,lbelieve,the

tremendous

importance

ofkeepingsom

esuch

listofthecentralfunctions

beforeus

aswe

assessthe

qualityoflife

inthe

countriesofthe

world

andstrive

toraise

it.Form

anysuch

tragedies—like

many

casesof

simple

capabilityfailure—

resultfrom

unjustand

unreflectivesocial

arrangements.O

necan

imagine,and

tryto

construct,asociety

inw

hichthe

tragicchoices

thatfacedE

mile

andSophie

would

notbenecessar

inw

hichboth

males

andfem

alescould

learnboth

tolove

andto

reason.B

einga

wom

anis

indeednot

yeta

way

ofbeing

ahum

anbeing.

Wom

enin

much

ofthew

orldlack

supportforthe

mostcentralhum

anfunctions,and

thisdenialofsupportis

frequentlycaused

bytheirbeing

wom

en.Butw

omen,unlike

rocksand

plantsand

evendogs

andhorses,

arehum

anbeings,have

thepotentialto

become

capableofthese

human

functions,givensufficientnutrition,education,and

othersupport.T

hatisw

hytheirunequalfailure

incapability

isa

problemofjustice.Itis

upto

usto

solvethis

problem.I

claimthata

conceptionofhum

anfunctioning

givesus

valuableassistance

asw

eundertake

thista

sk.

94

NO

TE

S

[Note

addedby

authorin

2007:]T

hispaper

representsan

earlyand

ratherprim

itivestage

ofm

ythinking

abouthum

ancapabilities.

More

developedversions

arefound

inm

ybooks

Wom

enand

Hum

anD

evelopment:

YheC

apa

bilitiesA

pproach(C

ambridge

University

Press,2000),and

FrontiersofJustice:

Disability,

Nationality,

SpeciesM

embership

(Harvard

University

Press,2006).

Am

ongthe

important

developments

inthe

view,the

most

important

are:(1)

my

endorsementofaform

ofRaw

lsian“politicalliberalism

,”insuch

a way

thatthe

capabilitieslistis

introducednot

asa

comprehensive

viewofa

flourishing

life,butonly

asthe

sourcefor

politicalprinciplesthat

canpotentially

beendorsed

asthe

basisfor

adecent

comm

onlife

bypeople

who

sharedifferent

comprehensive

doctrinesofthe

good;(2)an

accountofpoliticaljustificationand

ofthe

relationshipbetw

eenm

yview

andview

sin

boththe

Utilitarian

andsocial-contracttraditions;

(3)an

accountoftherole

ofanotion

ofhuman

equalityin

thecapability

approach,inw

hichsom

ecapabilities

arethoughtto

bedistributed

adequatelyonly

iftheyare

distributedequally

(e.g.,freedomof

religion,therightto

vote,therightto

education),whereasothers

(e.g.,theright

tosuitable

housing)are

takento

bedistributed

adequatelyonce

anam

plesocial

minim

umis attained;

(4)am

ajorrevisionin

thenotion

of“basiccapabilities,”

with

theresult

thatbeing

bornof

two

human

parentsis

sufficientfor

beinga

beareroffully

equalhum

andignity, w

ithonly

afew

exceptions,suchas

theperson

ina

permanent

vegetativestate

andthe

anencephalicchild;

inother

words,so

longas

some

kindofintentionalfocusing

andstriving

ispresent,the

person, however

severelydisabled,has

entitlements

frillyequal

tothose

oftheso-called

“normal”

person;(5)

anaccount

ofpolitical

implem

entation,w

hichm

akesitclearthat

thecapabilities

list isa

basisforinternational discussion

andpersuasion

only, butthat

implem

entationis

thejob

ofgovernments

chosenby

andaccountable

tothe

people, exceptin

extreme

casesof genocide

andother

traditionallyrecognized

occasionsfor

humanitarian

intervention.1.The

argument

ofthis

paperis

closelyrelated

tothat

ofseveral

otherpapers

of mine,to

which

Ishallrefer frequently

inw

hatfollows: “N

ature,Func

tion,andC

apability,”O

xfordStudies

inA

ncient Philosophy,suppl.vol.1(1988):

145—84; “N

on-Relative

Virtues:

An

Aristotelian

Approach,”

Midw

estStudies

inPhilosophy

13(1988):

32—53,and,in

anexpanded

version,inlvi.N

ussbaumand

A.

Sen,eds.,

TheQ

ualityofL

Jè(O

xford:C

larendonPress,

1993),pp.

242—76; “A

ristotelianSocial

Dem

ocracj4”in

R.B

.Douglass,

G.M

ara,andH

.R

ichardson,eds.,

Liberalismand

theG

ood(N

ewY

ork:R

outledge,1990),

pp.203—

52;“Aristotle

onH

uman

Nature

andthe

Foundations

ofEthics,”

inW

orld,M

ind,and

Ethics:E

ssayson

thePhilosophy

ofBernard

Wiiia,ns,ed. R.H

arrisonandj.A

lthameds. (C

ambridge:

Cam

bridgeU

niversityPress,1995); “H

uman

Functioning

andSocial

Justice:In

Defense

ofA

ristotelianE

ssentialism,”

Political Theory20(1992):

202—46.

2. Bythis

Imean

that thedifference

inexternal genitalia

figuresin

sociallife

asit

isinterpreted

byhum

ancultures;

thusw

eare

neverdealing

simply

with

factsgiven

atbirth, but

always

with

what

hasbeen

made

ofthem(see

below, section

8for

discussionofthe

roleofculture

inbiological claim

sabout

male/fem

aledifferences).Thus,even

thecom

mon

distinctionbetw

een“gender,”

a culturalconcept,and“sex,”the

allegedlypure

biologicalconcept,isinadequateto

capturethe

depthofcultural interpretation

inpresenting

eventhe

biological“facts”

tohum

anbeings,from

thevery

startofa

child’slife.See

Anne

Fau

stoSterling,

Myths

ofG

ender(2nd

ed.,N

ewY

ork:Basic

Books,

1992).I

havediscussed

theseissues

furtherin

“Constructing

Love, D

esire,andC

are,”in

D.

Estlund

andlvi.N

ussbaum,eds.,Sex, Preference,and

Family:E

ssayson

Law

andN

ature(N

ewY

orlcO

xfordU

niversityPress,

1997),pp.

17—43,and

inm

ySex

andSocialJustice

(New

Yorlc

Oxford

University

Press,1999),

pp

.253

—275.

3.Fora

historicalargumentalong

theselines

fromthe

historyofW

estern

scientificthought,

seeT

homas

Laqueur,

Making

Sex(B

erkeleyand

Los

Page 23: MARTHA - Jyväskylän yliopisto

538•G

LQ

$A

LJL

JbiiC

:SF1Y

IINA

LS

SA

Th

MA

RT

HA

C.N

USSB

AU

M• 539

Angeles:

University

ofC

aliforniaPress,

1989).T

hepapers

inthis

volume

[Wom

en,C

ultureand

Developm

ent]by

Am

artyaSen

[“Gender

Inequalityand

Theories

ofJustice,”259—

73], Xiaorong

Li

[“Gender

Inequalityin

China

andC

ulturalR

elativism,”

407—25], and

Roop

Rekha

Verm

a[“F

emin

init

3sE

quality,and

Personhood,”433—

43]show

thatthe

useof ideas

ofnatureto

conveya

falsesense

ofappropriateness, “justil5’ing”

unjustpractices,is

byno

means

confinedto

theW

esterntradition.

4.SeeM

arthaChen’s

“AM

atterofSurvival: W

omen’s

Rightto

Em

ploym

entinIndia

andB

angladesh,”inW

omen,

Culture

andDevelopm

ent:AStudy

ofH

u,nanC

’apabilities,ed. Martha

C.

Nussbaum

andJonathan

Glover

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press,1995), 37-57.

5.J.S.M

ill,The

SubjectionofW

omen

(Indianapolis:B

obbsM

errill,1988);

Am

arrvaSen,“G

enderand

Cooperative

Conflicts,”

inI.T

inker,ed., PersistentInequalities

(New

York:O

xfordU

niversityPress,1990);“G

enderInequalityand

Theories

ofJustice”in

IVom

en, Culture

andD

evelopment,p

p.

259-7

3,

and“M

oreT

han100

Million

Wom

enA

reM

issing,”N

ewY

orkR

eviewofBooks;

Hum

anD

evelopmentR

eport,1993,

forthe

United

Nations

Developm

entP

rogramm

e(U

ND

P)

(New

York

andO

xford:O

xfordU

niversityPress,1993); Susan

Moller

Okin,Justire,

Gender,

andthe

Family

(New

York:

Basic

Books,

1989),see

my

reviewof

0km

,“Justice

forW

omen,”

New

York

Review

of Books

(October

1992);C

atharineM

acKinnon,

remark

citedby

Richard

Rorty

in“Fem

inismand

Pragm

atism,”M

ithiganQ

uarterlyR

eview30(1989):

263. MacK

innonhas

sinceacknow

ledgedthe

remark.

6.F

ora

compelling

argument

linkingfem

inismand

internationalism,

seeO

noraO

’Neill,

“Justice,G

ender,and

InternationalB

oundaries,”in

M.

Nussbaum

andA

.Sen,

eds.,The

Quality

ofLtfe, p

p.

3O3—23.

7. Kw

ame

Anthony

Appiah,In

My

Fatherc1-b

use:Africa

inthe

Philosophyof C

ulture(N

ewY

orkand

Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press,1992),pp.

136.8.

On

theother

hand,it

isclosely

relatedto

Kantian

approachesusing

theuniversal

notionof personhood.

See,forexam

ple, Onora

O’N

eill,“Justice,G

ender,andInternational

Boundaries,”w

ithm

ycom

mentary

(324—35).In

thepresent

volume

[iVom

en,C

ultureand

Developm

ent],see

thepapers

ofO

noraO

’Neill

[“Justice, Capabilities, and

Vulnerabilities,”

140—52],R

uthA

nnaP

ut

nam[“W

hyN

ota

Fem

inistT

heoryofJustice?”

298—331],

andR

oopR

ekhaV

erma

[“Femininit)s

Eq

uaIit

andP

ersonhood,”433—

43].B

elowI

shallbe

making

some

criticisms

ofthe

conceptof“person”

infem

inistargum

ent,and

relatedcriticism

sof

liberalK

antianapproaches

(onw

hichsee

alsoA

SD

andm

yreview

of0km

).B

utthese

differencesare

subtleand

takeplace

againsta

backgroundof

substantialagreem

ent.See

alsoD

avidC

rocker,“Functioning

andC

apabili.T

heF

oundationof Sen’s

andN

ussbaum’s

Developm

entE

thics,”PoliticalTheory

20(1992):584ff

9.By

relativism,I

mean

theview

thatthe

onlyavailable

criterionofad

judication

issom

elocalgroup

orindividual.T

husrelativism

,asI

understandit,

isa

genusofw

hichthe

brandofreliance

onindividuals’subjective

preferencesfrequently

endorsedin

neoclassicaleconom

icsis

onespecies.

(Econom

ists,of

course,are

relativistonly

aboutvalue,

notabout

what

theyconstrue

asthe

domain

ofscientific“fact.”) T

hisaffinity

willlaterbe

relevanttom

ycom

ments

onthe

Marglin

project.My

opponentsalso

frequentlyem

ploythe

term“post-

modernist”

tocharacterize

theirposition:T

hisis

avaguer

term,

associatedin

avery

generalw

ayw

iththe

repudiationof

bothm

etaphysicalrealism

(tobe

definedbelow

)and

universalism.

10.Much

ofthem

aterialdescribed

inthese

examples

isnow

publishedin

Dom

inatingK

nowledge:D

evelopment,

‘ulture,and

Resistance,ed.F.A

. Ivlarglinand

S.A.M

arglin(O

xford:C

larendonPress,

1990).The

issueof “em

beddedness”and

menstruation

tahoosis

discussedin

S.A.M

arglin,”LosingT

ouch:The

Cultural

Conditions

ofWorker

Accom

modation

andR

esistance,”pp. 217—82,

andrelated

issuesare

discussedinS

.A.M

arglin,“Tow

ardthe

Decolonization

ofthe

Mind,”

1—28.O

nSittala

Dcvi,see

F.A.M

arglin,“Smallpox

inTw

oSystem

sofK

nowledge,”

102—44;

andfor

relatedargum

entssee

Ashis

Nandy

andShiv

Visvanathan,“M

odernM

edicineand

ItsN

on-Modern

Critics,”

144—84.

11.ForSen’s

own

accountofthe

pluralityand

internaldiversity

of Indianvalues,one

thatstrongly

emphasizes

thepresence

ofa

rationalistand

criticalstrand

inIndian

traditions,seeM

.N

ussbaumand

A.

Sen,”lnternal

Criticism

andIndian

Relativist T

raditions,”in

M.

Krausz,ed.,R

elativism(N

otreD

ame,

IN:

Notre

Dam

eU

niversityPress,

1989)—a

paperoriginally

presentedat

thesam

eM

IlDE

Rconference

andrefused

publicationby

theM

arglinsin

itsproceedings;

and“India

andthe

West,”N

ewR

epublic(7

June1993).

12.S.A

.Marglin,

in“T

oward

theD

ecolonization,”22—

23,suggeststhat

binarythinking

ispeculiarly

Western.B

utsuchoppositions

arepervasive

inall

traditionsw

ithw

hichI

haveany

acquaintance:in

theU

panishads,forexam

ple(seethe

epigraphto

“Hum

anF

unctioning”),inC

onfucianthought

(see, again,the

epigraphto

“Hum

anFunctioning”),in

Ibothought

(see,form

anyexam

ples,C

hinuaA

chebe’sThings

FallApart

[London:

William

Heinem

ann,1958]).

Critics

ofsuch

oppositionshave

notexplained

howone

canspeak

coherentlyw

ithoutbouncing

offone

thingagainst

another.I

believethat

Aristotle

was

righttohold

thatto

sayanything

atallonem

ustruleoutsom

ething,atthevery

leastthecontradictory

of what

oneputs

forward.T

heargum

entsof N

ietzsche,w

hichare

frequentlyput

forward

asif

theyunderm

ineall

binaryoppositions,

actuallym

akefar

more

subtleand

concretepoints

aboutthe

originsof certain

oppositions,andthe

interestsserved

bythem

.13.

SeeE

.H

obsbawm

andI

Ranger,

eds.,The

Inventionof

Tradition

(Cam

bridge:Cam

bridgeU

niversityPress,1983).Inhis

New

Republic

piece, Senm

akesa

similar

argument

about contemporary

India:The

‘Western

constructionofIndia

asm

ysticaland“other”

servesthe

purposesofthe

fundamentalist

BJE

who

arebusy

refashioninghistory

toserve

theends

oftheirow

npolitical pow

er.A

neloquent

critiqueof the

whole

notionofthe

“other,”and

oftheassociated

Page 24: MARTHA - Jyväskylän yliopisto

“nativism,”

where

Africa

isconcerned,

canbe

foundin

Appiah

(aboven.

7),especially

inthe

essays“T

hePostcolonial

andthe

Postm

odern,”pp.

137—57

and“T

opologiesofN

ativism,”pp. 47—

72.14.T

heproceedings

ofthis

conferenceare

nowpublished

asN

ussbaumand

Sen,eds.,

TheQ

ualityofL

ffe(n.1

above).15.“C

apabilityand

Well-B

eing,”in

Nussbaum

andSen,pp. 30—

53.16.M

arglinhas

sincepublished

thispointin

“Tow

ardthe

Decolonization.”

His

referenceis

toT

akeoD

oi,The

Anatom

yofflependence

(ToI’o:

Kedansho,

1971).On

wom

enand

men

injapan,seeH

uman

Developm

ent Report,

1993,p.26: “Japan,despite

some

ofthe

world’s

highestlevels

ofhum

andevelopm

ent,still

hasm

arkedinequalities

inachievem

entbetw

eenm

enand

wom

en. The

1993hum

andevelopm

ent indexputsJapan

first.But w

henthe

HD

Iis

adjustedfor

genderdisparity, Japan

slipsto

number

17....W

omen’s

averageearnings

areonly

51percent

thoseof m

en,andw

omen

arelargely

excludedfrom

deci

sion-making

positions....T

heirrepresentation

iseven

lower

inthe

politicalsphere....In

legalrights

ingeneral,Japan’s

patrilinealsociety

isonly

graduallychanging

tooffer

wom

engreater

recognitionand

independence.Japannow

haspolitical

andnon-governm

entalorganizations

pressingfor

changeT

hequestion

offreedom

ofchoice

isthus

onthe

agendain

Japanin

alarge

way,

preciselyon

accountof

thesort

ofunequal

functioningvividly

illustratedin

Marglin’s

example, w

herem

enialfunctions

areperform

edby

wom

en, inorder

thatm

enm

aybe

freeto

performtheir

managerial

andpolitical

functions.17.

SeeS. A

. IVlarglin,“T

oward

theD

ecolonization.”18.See

S.A.

Marglin,

“Losing

Touch.”I

putthe

termin

quotesto

indi

catethat

Iam

alludingto

v1arglin’suse

ofthe

term,

notto

theconcept

asI

understandit.

19.SeeS.A

.Marglin, “T

oward

theD

ecolonization”and

“Losing

Touch.”

Similar

claims

arecom

mon

infem

inist argument. For

example, in

TheF

eminist

Theoryofthe

State(C

ambridge,iv[A

: Harvard

University

Press,1989), Catharine

IviacKinnon

arguesthat “objectivity”

astraditionally

conceivedin

theW

esternepistem

ologicaltradition

iscausally

linkedto

theobjectification

andabuse

ofw

omen.T

hisline

ofargum

entis

effectivelycriticized

inL

ouisevI.

Antony,

“Quine

asFem

inist:The

Radical

Import

of Naturalized

Epistem

ologu”inL

.M

.A

ntonyand

C.W

irt,eds.,A

Min

dofO

necO

wn:F

eminist E

ssayson

Reason

andO

bjectivity(B

oulder,C

C:

Westview

Press,1992),

pp.185—

225.See

alsothe

detailedexam

inationof

MacK

innon’sargum

entin

thesam

evolum

eby

SallyH

asLanger,

in“O

nB

eingO

bjectiveand

Being

Objectified,”

85—125.

MacK

innon’sfundam

entalcontributions

inthe

areasof

sexualharassm

entand

pornographydo

notdepend

onthis

analysis, andare

actuallyunderm

inedby

it.The

coreofher

thoughtactually

revealsa

strongcom

mitm

entto

atype

ofethicaluniversalism

,as

my

epigraphindicates.

See,in

theA

ntonyvolum

e,the

persuasiveanalysis

byL

izR

appaport,“G

eneralizingG

ender:R

easonand

Essence

inthe

Legal

Thought

ofC

atharineM

acKinnon,”

pp.127—

43.

Alcoff’s

contributionin

thepresent

volume

[“Dem

ocracyand

Rationality:

AD

ialoguew

ithH

ilaryPutnam

”in

IVom

en,C

ultureand

Develop‘nent, pp.225—

34]continues

thedebate

aboutfem

inismand

reason;and

seealso

L.

Alcoff

andE

.Potter,

eds.,F

eminist

Epistem

ologies(N

ewY

ork:R

outledge,1993).

Fora

healthyskepticism

aboutthe

roleof“anti—

essentialism”

within

feminism

,see

SeylaB

enhabib, “Feminism

andthe

Qiestion

ofP

ostmodernism

,”in

Situ

ating

theSe(f

Gender,

Com

munity,

andPostm

odernis,nin

Contem

poraryE

thics(N

ewY

ork:R

outledge,1992),pp.

203—42;

SabinaL

ovibond,“Feminism

andP

ostmodernism

,”N

ewL

eftR

eview178

(Novem

ber—D

ecember

1989):5—

28;V

allSvloghadam

,“Against

Eurocentrism

andN

ativism,”

Socialismand

Denzoc—racy

(fall/winter

1989):81—

104;M

oghadam,

Gender,D

evelopment,

andPolicy:

Thw

ardE

quityand

Em

powerm

ent,UN

U/W

IDE

RR

esearchfor

Action

series(N

ovember

1990).20.

For

anaccount

ofthis

sortof

normative

argument,

seeA

lasdairM

aclntyre,After

Virtue

(Note

Dam

e, IN:

Note

Dam

eU

niversityPress, 1989).

21

.J.Derrida,

Of G

ramm

atology,trans. U.

Spivak(B

altimore:Johns

Ho

pkins

University

Press,1976).T

heterm

ism

eantto

suggestthe

ideathat

realityis

simply

“there”and

thatknow

ledgeconsists

inbeing

“present”to

it, without

anyinterfering

barrieror

mediation.

22.R.R

orty,Philosophyan

dth

eMirro

rofN

ature

(Princeton,N

J:Princeton

University

Press,1979).

23.See,

forexam

ple,G

.E

.L

.O

wen,

‘Tithenai

taPhainom

ena”,inLogic,

Science,and

Dialectic

(London:

Duckw

orth,1986),

andM

.N

ussbaum,

TheF

ragilityo

fGoodness: L

uckan

dE

thicsin

Creek

Tragedy

andP

hilosop/iv(C

am-

bridge:C

ambridge

University

Press,1986).

Seealso

Hliary

Putnarn,A

ristotleafter

iVittgenstein,L

indlayL

ecture,University

ofK

ansas,1991.

24.See

theillum

inatingdiscussion

inB.

K.

Matilal,

Perception(O

xford:C

larendonPress,

1985). Itis

worth

notingthat

thisfundam

entalwork

isnot

citedanyw

herein

Marglin

andM

arglin,although

Matilal

was

presentat

theconference

anddelivered

apaper

criticalof

thefvlarglins’

characterizationof

Indiantraditions.

This

paperw

asdropped

fromthe

volume.

Ivlatilalalso

describedthe

implications

oftherealism

debateforIndian

ethicalthought:see

“Ethical

Relativism

andthe

Confrontation

ofCultures,”in

Krausz,ed.,R

elativis,,z

(Notre

Dam

e,IN:

Notre

Dam

eU

niversityPress,

1989),pp. 339—62.

25.There

isa

longerversion

ofm

ycriticism

ofcontem

poran’attacks

onuniversalism

in“H

uman

Functioning.”

Seealso

“Skepticismabout

PracticalR

easonin

Literature

andthe

Law

,”H

arvard

Law

Review

107(1994):

714—44.

Inboth

ofthesepapers

Istudy

thesurprising

convergencebetw

een“left”

and“right”

inthe

critiqueof

normative

argument,

the“postniodern”

positionsof

many

thinkerson

theleft

proving,often,

difficultto

distinguishfrom

claims

about thearbitrariness

ofevaluationin

neoclassicaleconomics. In

Barbara

Her

rnsteinSm

ith’sC

ontingenciesof

Value

(Durham

,N

C:

Duke

University

Press,l988),w

eeven

seea

fusionofthe

two

positions,apostm

odernismconcluding

Page 25: MARTHA - Jyväskylän yliopisto

iz’t

•j ua

i ss,t:t1vut4nL

.tir

IVIA

RTH

AC

. NU

SSBA

U?vl

•543

that,in

theabsence

oftranscendent

standards,w

eshould

understandvalue

judgments

asattem

ptsto

maxim

izeexpected

utility.26.A

nstotle,N

icomachean

Ethics V

III.I, I15

5a

21—22.1

discussthis

passagein

“Aristotle

onH

uman

Nature”

and“N

on-Relative

Virtues.”

27. K.A

.Appiah, l#

My

FatheriH

ouse,pp. vii—viii:“Ifm

ysisters

andI w

ere‘children

oftwo

worlds’,no

onebothered

totell

usthis; w

elived

inone

world,

intw

o‘extended’

families

dividedby

severalthousand

miles

andan

allegedlyinsuperable

culturaldistance

thatnever,

sofar

asI

canrecall,puzzled

orp

er

plexedus

much.”

Appiah’s

argument

doesnot

inany

senseneglect

distinctivefeatures

ofconcretehistories;indeed,one

of itspurposes

isto

demonstrate

howvaried, w

henconcretely

seen,historiesreally

are.But

hisargum

ent,like

mine,

seeksa

subtlebalance

between

perceptionof the

particularand

recognitionof

thecom

mon.In

hisessay”T

hePostcolonialand

thePostm

odern”(pp.

137—57),

Appiah

shows

thatit

isall

toooften

thefocus

on“otherness”

thatproduces

alack

ofconcrete

engagement

with

individuallives.

Speaking

ofthe

sculpture“Y

orubaM

anw

ithB

icycle”that

appearson

thecover

ofthe

book,A

ppiahcom

ments;

“The

Man

with

aB

icycleis

producedby

someone

who

doesnot

carethat

thebicycle

isthe

white

man’s

invention—it

isnot

theteto

beO

therto

theY

orubaS

elfit

isthere

becausesom

eonecared

forits

solidity;it is

therebecause

itw

illtake

usfurther

thanour

feet will

takeus....”

(157).28.In

thiscategoryç

asclosely

relatedto

my

own

view, I

would

placethe

“internal—realist”

conceptionof

Hilary

Putnam

articulatedin

Reason,

Truth,

andH

istory(C

ambridge: C

ambridge

University

Press, 1981),ElheM

anyFacesof

Realism

(La

Salle:O

penC

ourtP

ublishing, 1987),andR

ealismw

itha

Hum

anFace

(Cam

bridge,IVIA

:Harvard

University

Press,1990);and

alsothe

views

ofC

harlesT

aylor,for example,in

Sourcesofthe

Se(fTheM

akingofM

odernIdentity

(Cam

btidge,IVIA

:Harvard

University

Press, 1989),and“E

xplanationand

Prac

ticalR

eason,”in

Nussbaum

andSen,

eds.,The

Quality

ofLjfe,pp. 208—

31.29.

Inthis

senseI

amthoroughly

inagreem

entw

ithSusan

Okin’s

replyto

thecharge

of“substitutionalism”

thathas

beenm

adeagainst

herbook, and

inagreem

entw

ithboth

0kmand

Ruth

Anna

Putnam

thatit

isa

mistake

toconceive

ofthe

moral

pointof

viewas

constitutedby

theactual

voicesof

alldisadvantaged

parties;see

Okin’s

“Inequalitiesbetw

eenthe

Sexesin

Different

Cultural

Contexts,”

pp.274—

97and

Putnam’s

“Why

Not

aF

eminist

Theory

of Justice?”pp.

298—331

inW

omen,

C’ulture

andD

evelopment.

Seem

yfurther

comm

entsbelow

,Section

5.30.C

anthe

Marglins

consistentlym

akethis

objectionw

hileholding

thatfreedom

ofchoiceis

justa

parochialW

esternvalue?

Itw

ouldappear

not;on

theother

hand,F.A. M

arglin(here

differing, Ibelieve,fromS.A

.Marglin)

alsoheld

inoral

remarks

deliveredat

the1986

conferencethat

logicalconsistency

issim

plya

parochialWestern

value.31.

The

politicsof

thehistory

of‘W

esternphilosophy

havebeen

inter

pretedthis

way, w

ithm

uchplausibility

thoughperhaps

insufficienthistorical

argumentation,by

Noam

Chom

skin

Cartesian

Lingiustics

(New

Yorlc

Harper

&R

ow, 1966). C

homsky

arguesthat

Cartesian

rationalism,w

ithits

insistenceon

innateessences,w

aspolitically

more

progressive, more

hostileto

slavefl’ andim

perialism,

thanem

piricism,

with

itsinsistence

that

peoplew

ereju

stw

hat

experiencehad

made

of them. M

yanalysis

of Stoicfem

inistargum

ent(below

Section7)

bearsthis

out.32.T

heuse

ofthisterm

doesnot im

plythat

thefunctions

allinvolvedoing

something

especially“active.”

(Seehere

Sen,“Capability

andW

ell-Being,”

inThe

Quality

of Life,pp.30—

53.)In

Aristotelian

terms, and

inm

ine,beinghealth)

reflecting, beingpleased, are

all “activities.”33.

For

furtherdiscussion

ofthis

point,and

examples,

see“A

ristotleon

Hum

anN

ature.”34.

Ibid.discusses

thetreatm

entof

thispoint

incontem

porarym

edi

calethics.

Could

onecease

tobe

one’sindividual

self without

ceasingto

be

human?

This

isruled

out,Ithink,

inA

ristotle’sconception, but

ispossible

in

some

otherm

etaphysicalconceptions.

But

thesort

ofcase

thatw

ouldm

ostforcefully

raisethis

possibilityis

northe

sortinvolving

illnessor

impairm

ent,but

insteadthe

sortinvolving

personalityor

mem

orychange;

andI

shallnot

attempt

todeal w

ithsuch

caseshere.

35. Appiah, In

My

FathercH

ouse,p. viii.36. In

“Aristotle

onH

uman

Nature,”

thereis

am

oreextended

accountof

thisprocedure

andhow

itjustifies.37.

This

ofcourse

isnot

incompatible

with

callingcertain

groupsnon

human

orsubhum

anfor

political purposes.But

suchdenials

areusually

either

transparent propagandaor

forms

ofself-deception,which

canbe

unmasked

by

criticalargum

ent.See

belowfor

acase

involvingw

omen;

andfor

anextensive

analysisof the

psychologyof such

self-deception, andits

unmasking, see

Raoul

Hilberg,

TheD

estructionofthe

European

Jews,

abridgededition

(New

York:

Holm

es&

Meier,

1985),pp. 274—93.

38.In

orderto

make

thisclear, I

speakof

itas

aconception

ofthe

good,

ata

verym

inimal

andgeneral

level.The

phraseI

haveelsew

hereused

is“the

thickvague

theoryofthe

good.”The

term“thick”

contraststhis

account, inits

comprehensiveness, w

ithR

awls’s

“thin”theory

of thegood, w

hichis

designedto

avoideven

partialcom

prehensiveness.39.

On

thissee

especially“N

on—R

elativeV

irtues.”40.1

havediscussed

my

own

views

aboutpractical

rationalityelsew

here,particularly

in“T

heD

iscernment

ofPerception,”

inL

ovecK

notsledge(N

ew

York:

Oxford

University

Press, 1990). Arelated

account, which

Iadm

ireand

toa

largeextent

agreew

ith,is

givenby

Henry

Richardson

inPracticalD

elib—eration

aboutF

inalE

nds(C

ambridge

University

Press,1994).

Richardson’s

accountis

closelyrelated,

asw

ell,to

thepragm

atistconception

supportedby

Hilary

Putnam

inhis

“Pragmatism

andM

oralO

bjectivity”in

Wom

en,C

ulture

andD

evelopment,pp.

199—224.

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IJM‘545

Should

theconception

ofreasonableness

bedefined

with

referenceto

democratic

procedures,as

SeylaB

enhabibhas

recomm

ended?I

seethe

attractions

ofthisproposal,butI

havenot

followed

it.First

of all,itseem

stom

ethat

democratic

proceduresas

theyactuafly

aredo

notalw

aysem

bodyreasonable

ness;so

todescribe

what

makes

adem

ocraticprocedure

reasonablew

evill

haveto

havea

notionof the

reasonablethat

isto

atleast

some

extentindependent

ofthenotion

of democracy.Second,to

builddem

ocracyinto

theground

levelof

theconception

ofthe

human

fromthe

startprevents

usfrom

raisinglater

onthe

questionof w

hatpolitical

arrangement

will

bestsecure

tocitizens

thelist

ofhum

ancapabilities,in

aw

idevariety

ofcircum

stances.It

may

turnout

thatthe

answer

will

always

be“dem

ocracy.”B

uteven

then,I

thinkit

will

rareLybe

just

democracy

(ancientA

thenianor

New

England

town-m

eetingstyle).

No

modern

democratic

stateis

apure

democracy,

andit

shouldat

thispoint

remain

anopen

questionas

tow

hatrole

shouldbe

playedby

relativelyundem

ocraticinstitutions

suchas

theU

SSuprem

eC

ourtin

promoting

thecapabilities

of citizens.41.F

orR

awis’s

useof

anotion

ofconsensus,

seeR

awis,“T

heIdea

ofan

Overlapping

Consensus,”

Oxford

JournalofL

egalStudies

7(1987),

andnow

PoliticalL

iberalism(N

ewY

ork:C

olumbia

University

Press,1993).

Raw

ls’snotion

ofconsensus

appearsam

biguousbetw

eenthe

two

notionsI

identi&here.

See,onthis,the

exchangebetw

eenJoshua

Cohen

andJean

Ham

ptonin

TheIdeaofD

emocracy

(New

York: O

xfordU

niversityPress,1992).C

ohenargues

thatR

awls

needs,and

canconsistently

defend,the

weaker

“overlap”reading

Ham

ptonargues

that,whatever

RawLs

intends,theplausibility

ofhisargum

entrests

onhis

optingfor

thenorm

ativereading.I

concurw

ithH

ampton.

42.To

citeonly

afew

recent examples

with

seriouspractical

consequences:in

theU

nitedStates

inthe

lS9Os,

theS

upreme

Court,

denyinga

Virginia

wom

an’sappeal

againsta

lawforbidding

wom

ento

practicelaw

,judgedthat

itwas

upto

thestate

Supreme

Court“to

determine

whether

thew

ord‘person”’

inthe

statuteon

which

thew

oman

basedher

appeal“is

confinedto

males.”

(InreL

ockwood,154

US

116, discussedin

0k

m,

Wom

en,p.

251

andn.10,and

seeSunstein’s

‘Gender,

Caste,

andL

aw”

inW

omen,

Culture

andDevelopm

ent,

pp.332—

59.)In

Massachusetts

in1932,

wom

enw

eredenied

eligibilityfor

juryservice,

althoughthe

lawstated

that“every

personqualified

tovote”

was

eligible.T

hestate

Supreme

Court

wrote:

“No

intentionto

includew

omen

canbe

deducedfrom

theom

issionof

thew

ord‘m

ale”(Com

monw

ealth‘a.

Welosky,276

Mass.

398,curt.denied,284U

S684

[1932]),discussedin

0k

m,

kT’,nen,p.

25I

andn.11.Such

readingsno

doubtreflect

faithfullyenough

theview

sthat

theF

oundershad

aboutthe

term“person”

when

theyused

itin

theC

onstitution:See

my

Jeffersonepigraph.A

lthoughthis

construalofthe

termdoes

notprevailtoday

inA

merican

itslegacy

isw

ithus

incountless

more

informal

ways.

43.Aristotle,M

etaphysics1.1.

44.1discuss

thisissue

inm

uchm

oredetail

inL

ecture3

ofmy

1993G

ifford

Lectures,U

niversityof

Edinburgh,in

chapter4

ofU

pheavalsof Thought:

TheIntelligence

ofEm

otions(N

ewY

ork:C

ambridge

University

Press,2001).

45. Aristotle, ubiquitously

inthe

accountsof substance.

46.O

nthese

issues,seefurther

in“A

ristotelianSocial

Dem

ocracy.”47. A

ristotle,PoliticsV

III:see

“Nature, F

unction,and

Capability”

48.Itm

aysupport

what Jam

esR

achelscalls

“moral

individualism”

(Crc

atedfromA

nimals

[Oxford

andN

ewY

orlcO

xfordU

niversityPress,

1990]),in

which

ourm

oralobligations

flowfrom

theendow

ments

ofthe

individualcreature

with

whom

we

aredealing, rather

thanfrom

itsspecies,and

ourgoal

shouldbe

toprom

ote—or

atleast

notto

impede—

theform

offlourishing

ofw

hichthe

beingis

basicallycapable.

On

thisview

suchan

infantshould

getthe

same

treatment

thatw

ew

ouldgive

toan

animal

ofsim

ilarendow

ment.

But w

em

ayalso

decideto

givethe

factthat

itisan

offspringof hum

anssom

em

oral weight;

nothingI

havesaid

hererules

thatout.

49.A

lthough“norm

aLlength”

isclearly

relativeto

currenthum

anp

os

sibilitiesand

may

need, forpractical

purposes,tobe

tosom

eextent

reLativized

tolocal

conditions,itseem

sim

portantto

thinkof it—

atleast

ata

giventim

ein

history—in

universaland

comparative

terms,

asthe

Hum

anD

evelopment

Report

does,to

giverise

tocom

plaintin

acountry

thathas

donew

ellw

ithsom

eindicators

oflifequality

butbadlyon

lifeexpectancy.A

ndalthough

some

degreeof

relativitym

aybe

putdow

nto

thedifferential

geneticpossibilities

ofdifferent

groups(the

“missing

wom

en”statistics,

forexam

ple,allow

thaton

theaverage

wom

enlive

somew

hatlonger

thanm

en),it

isalso

important

notto

concludeprem

aturelythat

inequalitiesbetw

eengroups—

forexam

ple,the

growing

inequalitiesin

lifeexpectancy

between

blacksand

whites

inthe

USA

—are

simply

geneticvariation,

notconnected

with

socialinjustice.

50.‘The

precisespecification

ofthese

healthrights

isnot

eas%but

thew

orkcurrently

beingdone

onthem

indrafting

newconstitutions

inS

outhA

fricaand

Eastern

Europe

givesreason

forhope

thatthe

combination

ofa

generalspecification

ofsuch

aright

with

atradition

ofjudicialinterpretation

will

yieldsom

ethingpracticable.

Itshould

benoticed

thatI

speakof

health,notjust

healthcare:

andhealth

itselfinteractsin

complex

ways

with

housing,w

itheducation, w

ithdignity.

Both

healthand

nutritionare

controversialasto

whether

therelevant

levelshould

bespecified

universally,or

relativelyto

thelocal com

munity

andits

traditions:for

example, is

lowheight

associatedw

ithnutritional

practicesto

be

thoughtof

as“stunting,”

oras

felicitousadaptation

tocircum

stancesof scarcity?

Foran

excellent summ

aryofthis

debate,seeS.R

.O

smani, ed.,N

utritionand

Poverty,W

IDE

Rseries

(Oxford:

Clarendon

Press,1990), especially

thefollow

ingpapers:

onthe

relativistside,T

.N

.Srinivasan,

“Undernutrition:C

oncepts, Measurem

ents,andPolicy

Implic

atio

ns,”

97

—120;

onthe

universalistside,C.G

opalan,”Undernutrition:M

easurement and

Imp

llcations,”

17—48; for

acom

pellingadjudication

of thedebate,com

ingout

onthe

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. NU

SS

BA

UM

‘547

universalistside,

seeO

smani,

“On

Some

Controversies

inthe

Measurem

entof

Undernutrition,”

121—61.

51.There

isa

growing

literatureon

theim

portanceof

shelterfor

health:e.g.,that

theprovision

ofadequatehousing

isthe

singlelargest

determinant

ofhealth

statusfor

HIV

—infected

persons.Housing

rightsare

increasinglycom

ingto

beconstitutionalized,atleastin

anegative

form—

givingsquatters

groundsfor

appeal,for

example,against

alandlord

who

would

bulldozetheir

shanties.O

nthis

asa

constitutionalright,seeproposed

Articles

11,12,and17

oftheSouth

African

Constitution,

ina

draftput

forward

bythe

AN

Ccom

mittee,

adviserA

lbieSachs,w

herethis

isgiven

asan

example

ofajusticiable

housingright.

52.I

shallnot

elaboratehere

onw

hatI

thinkprom

otingthis

capabilityrequires,since

thereis

aW

IDE

Rprojectand

conferencedevoted

tothis

topic.53.

Agood

example

ofan

educationright

thatI

would

supportis

givenin

theA

NC

South

African

Constitution

draft,Article

11:“E

ducationshall

befree

andcom

pulsoryup

tothe

ageof

sixteen,andprovision

shallbe

made

forfacilitating

accessto

secondar

vocationaland

tertiaryeducation

onan

equalbasis

forall.E

ducationshallbe

directedtow

ardthe

development

ofthehum

anpersonality

anda

senseof personal

dignity,and

shallaim

atstren

gth

eningrespect

forhum

anrights

andfundam

entalfreedom

sand

promoting

understanding,toleranceand

friendshipam

ongstSouth

Africans

andbetw

eennations.”T

hepublic

(orotherw

iseneed-blind)

provisionof

highereducation

wil]

haveto

berelative

tolocalpossibilities,but

itisatleast

clearthat

theU

SAlags

farbehind

most

othercountries

ofcomparable

wealth

inthis

area.54.

On

theem

otionsas

basichum

ancapabilities,

see,in

additionto

my

“Em

otionsand

V/om

en’sC

apabilities,”in

iVom

en,C

ultureand

Developm

ent,pp.

360—95,

my

1993G

iffordL

ectures,U

pheavalsofT

hought:The

IntelligenceofE

motions

(Cam

bridge:C

ambridge

University

Press,2001),and

my

Hiding

fromH

umanity:D

isgust,Sham

e,andtheL

aw(P

rinceton:P

rincetonU

niversityP

ress,2004).My

omission

ofangerfrom

thislistofbasic

emotionalcapabilities

revealsan

ambivalence

aboutits

rolethat

Idiscuss

atlength,both

inG

iffordL

ectures3

and10, and

inThe

TherapyofD

esire:Theoryand

Practicein

Hellenistic

Ethics

(Princeton, N

J: Princeton

University

Press,1994),chs.7,11,and12.See

also“E

quityand

Mercy,”

Philosophyand

PublicA

ffairs(spring

1993).55.

Inm

y1993

Gifford

Lectures,

Ispell

outw

hatI

thinkthis

entailsw

here“the

family”

isconcerned.O

nthe

whole,I

amin

agreementw

ithSusan

0kmthat

some

formofintim

atefam

ilylove

isofcrucial

importance

inchild

development,but

thatthis

neednot

bethe

traditionalW

esternnuclear

family.

Ialsoagree

with

0kmthat

theim

portanteducationalrole

ofthefam

ilym

akesitall

them

orecrucial

thatthe

family

shouldbe

aninstitution

characterizedby

justice,as

well

aslove.

SeeO

kin,Justice,G

ender,and

theFam

ily.56.“A

ristotelianSocialD

emocracy”said

thatalistofsuch

libertiesneeded

tobe

addedto

theA

ristotelianschem

e,but

itdid

notinclude

themin

theaccount

ofcapabilitiesitself

These

issuesare

furtherdeveloped

ina

WID

ER

projectand

conferenceon

reproductiverights

andw

omen’s

capabilities.57.

Forreproductive

choiceas

anequality

issue,see

Sunstein’s“G

ender,C

aste, andLaw

’”in

Wim

en,C

ultureandD

evelopment,pp. 332—

59, andalso

his“G

ender, Reproduction, and

Law

”presentedat the

conferenceon

reproductiverights

andw

omen’s

capabilitiesat W

IDE

Rin

1993.58.

On

thissee

also“A

ristotelianSocial

Dem

ocracy.”59.W

ithSen, I

holdthat

thecapability

setshould

betreated

asan

inter

lockingw

hole: form

ycom

ments

onhis

arguments,see

“Nature, F

unction, andC

apability.”Tensions

will

frequentlyarise

among

mem

bersof

thelist,

andI

shallcom

ment

onsom

eof

thosebelow

.B

utit

shouldbe

clearby

nowthat

thearchitectonic

roleof

practicalreasoning

imposes

strictlim

itson

thesort

ofcurb

onpersonal

autonomy

thatw

illbe

toleratedfor

thesake

ofincreasednutritional w

ell-being, etc.60.

Chris

Bobonich

“InternalR

ealism, H

uman

Nature,

andD

istributivejustice:

AR

esponseto

IvlarthaN

ussbaum,”

Modern

Philology(l\’Iay

1993),supplem

ent,74—

92, worries

thatthis

will

impose

enormous

sacrifices.B

utI

thinkthat

thisis

becausehe

hasnot

imagined

thingsin

detail,nor

thoughtabout

my

claimthat

oncepeople

havew

hatthey

basicallyneed,

theycan

getallsorts

of othergood

thingsthrough

theirow

nefforts. IfI

haveenough

foodto

bew

ellnourished,

more

foodw

illjustrot

onthe

shelfor

make

me

fat.If

my

basichealth

needsare

met, itseem

sright

thatI

shouldnotbe

ableto

claimexpensive

unnecessaryluxuries

(say,cosm

eticsurgery)

atthe

publicexpense

solong

aseven

oneperson

inm

ycountry

isw

ithoutsupport

forbasic

needs.A

ndso

forth.O

nem

usttake

seriouslythe

Aristotelian

idea, which

isbasic

toboth

Sen’sand

my

programs, that

resourcesare

justtools

forhinctioning

andhave

alim

itgiven

byw

hatis

neededfor

that6anctioning.

Above

thatlim

it,they

arejust

aheap

ofsm

Wofno

valuein

themselves.

61.See

“Nature, F

unction,and

Capability,”

with

referenceto

Aristotle.

62.M

arx,E

conomic

andPhilosophical

!vlanuscriptsof

1844,discussed

in“N

ature, Function,

Capability”

and“A

ristotleon

Hum

anN

ature.”63.

Seeespecially

Sen’s“G

enderInequality

andT

heoriesofJustice,”

inIV

omen,

Culture

andD

evelopment,

pp.259—

73;also

“More

Than

100M

illionW

omen

Are

Missing,”N

ewY

orkR

eviewofB

ooks37

(1990):61—

66.64.

Iftekha.rH

ossein,“Povertyas

Capability

Failure,”P

h.D.

dissertationin

Econom

ics,H

elsinkiU

niversity,1990.

65.See

Allardt, “H

aving,L

oving,B

eing:A

nA

lternativeto

theSw

edishM

odelof

Welfare

Research,”

andE

rikson,“D

escriptionsof

Inequality:T

heSw

edishA

pproachto

Welfare

Research,”

inN

ussbaumand

Sen,The

Quality

ofLift,

pp.88—

94and

67—84.

66.See

Sen, “More

Than

100M

illionW

omen.”

67.Sec

alsoJon

Elster,

SourG

rapes(C

ambridge:

Cam

bridgeU

niversityPress, 1983);

Cass

R. S

unstein,”Preferences

andPolitics,”

Philosophyand

Public

Affairs

20(1991):

3—34.

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68.PãiviSetala,ProfessorofW

omen’s

Studiesatthe

University

ofHelsinki,

informs

me

thatrecent

studiesshow

thateven

inFinland,only

40percent

ofthe

housework

isdone

bym

ales.This,in

thesecond

nationin

thew

orld(after

New

Zealand,

in1906)

togive

females

thevote,

anation

ascom

mitted

tosex

equalityas

anyin

thew

orld.\1Ve

canassum

ethat

thesituation

iscausally

relatedto

male

preferences.69.

On

thedisparity

between

externallyobserved

healthstatus

andself-

reportsof

satisfactionabout

health,see

Sen,C

omm

oditiesand

Capabilities

(Am

sterdam:

North-H

olland,1985).

70.IvIartha

Chen,

AQ

uietR

evolution:W

omen

inT

ransitionin

Rural

Bangladesh

(Cam

bridge, MA

:S

chenkman,

1983).Idescribe

thisaccount

ofarural

wom

en’sliteracy

project,andits

large-scaleim

pacton

wom

en’squality

oflife,in

“Non-R

elativeV

irtues,””Aristotelian

SocialDem

ocracy,”and“H

uman

Functioning

andSocial Justice.”

71.T

hisis

acriticism

ofeconom

icutilitarianism

,not

ofsophisticated

philosophicalform

sof

utilitarianismthat

buildin

means

tofilter

orcorrect

preferences.Nonetheless,the

human-functioning

approachw

ouldstillobject

tothe

roleplayed

bythe

comm

ensurabilityofvalues

inutilitarianism

,and

tothe

relatedsuggestion

thatfor

anytw

odistinct

endsw

ecan,w

ithoutloss

ofw

hatis

relevantfor

choice,im

aginetrade-offs

inpurely

quantitativeterm

s.F

urthermore,m

ostforms

ofutilitarianismare

comm

ittedto

aggregatingu

tilities

acrosslives,and

thusto

neglectingseparateness,w

hichI

havedefended

asfundam

ental.Ihave

addressedsom

eofthese

questionselsew

here,forexam

ple,in

“The

Discernm

entof Perception”

inLove’s

Know

ledge,andin

“The

Literary

Imagination

inPublic

Life,”

New

Literary

History

(fall1993).

Sen’sw

orkhas

addressedthem

ingreater

detail.I

thereforeleave

themto

oneside

forthe

purposesofthe

presentinquiry.

72.Foradetailed

considerationofthese

approaches,see“A

ristotelianSocial

Dem

ocracy,”“H

uman

Functioning,”w

ithreferences

torelated

arguments

ofSen.“A

ristotelianSocial

Dem

ocracy”contains

adetailed

accountof

therela

tionshipbetw

eenR

awls’s

resourcismand

my

project,w

hichis

aparticularly

subtleone.

Raw

isis

willing

totake

astand

oncertain

items:T

husliberty

andthe

socialconditionsof self-respectfigure

onhis

listof”primary

goods,”asw

ellas

wealth

andincom

e.O

nthe

otherhand,

hehas

repeatedlydenied

thathis

indexofprim

arygoods

could,orshould,be

replacedby

anindex

offunctio

nings

asin

theH

uman

Develop

inentReport.

73.This

isthe

centralpoint

repeatedlym

adeby

Senagainst

Raw

ls;for

anoverview

,see

“Capability

andW

ell-Being”

inThe

Quality

ofLfri,

with

references.74.In

Raw

ls’sliberalism

theproblem

iseven

more

acute,sincethe

partiesw

hoare

eitherwell

ornotw

elloffare

“headsof households,t’

usuallytaken

tobe

male,w

hoare

allegedto

deliberateon

behalfoftheinterests

oftheirfam

ilym

embers.B

utwom

encannot

infactrely

onthe

altruismofm

alesto

guarantee

theireconom

icsecurity,

oreven

survival.In

additionto

Sen’sw

orkon

thisissue, see

SusanM

ollerO

kin,Justice,G

ender,and

theFam

ily.inm

yreview

of0km

,I

offerthis

asa

reasonfor

OW

nto

bem

orecritical

ofresource-based

liberalismthan

sheis.

75.M

arthaC

henand

herfellow

development

workers,

inthe

projectdescribed

mA

Quiet R

evolution,were

indebtedin

theirpractice

toPaolo

Freire’snotion

of “participatorydialogue.”

76.Sen

hasstressed

thisthroughout

hisw

ritingon

thetopic.

For

anoverview

,see“C

apabilityand

Well-B

eing.”77.T

hisis

thestrategy

usedby

Erikson’s

Swedish

team,

when

studyinginequalities

inpolitical participation:see

“Descriptions

of Inequality.”The

pointw

asw

ellm

adeby

Bernard

William

sin

hisresponse

toSen’s

Tanner

Lectures

[theone

deliveredM

ay22,

1979is

reprintedherein

61—81]:

seeW

illiams,

“The

Standard

of Living:

Interestsand

Capabilities,”

in0.

Haw

thorn,ed.,The

Standard

ofLiving

(Cam

bridge:C

ambridge

University

Press,1987).T

ogive

justone

example

of theissue,w

ew

illneed

toask

tow

hatextent

laws

regulat

ingabortion,

sodomy

laws,

theabsence

ofcivil

rightslaw

s,etc.,

restrictthe

capabilityfor

sexual expressionofw

omen

andhom

osexualsin

agiven

society.T

hegay

Am

ericanm

ilitaryofficer

who

choosescelibacy

forfear

of losinghis

jobhas

not,in

therelevant

sense,beengiven

acapability

of choosing.78.

Secalso

Sen,C

omm

oditiesand

Capabilities.

79.The

relevanttextual

referencesare

gatheredand

discussedin

“Aristo

telianSocial

Dem

ocracy.”80.T

herem

arkw

ascited

byR

ichardR

ortyin

“Feminist and

Pragm

atism,”

Michigan

Quarterly

Review

30(1989):

231;it

hassince

beenconfirm

edand

repeatedby

IvlacKinnon

herself.81.

Seen.37

aboveon

Raoul

Hilberg’s

account,in

TheD

estructionofthe

European

Jews, of the

Nazi

deviceof categorizingJew

sas

animals

orinanim

ateobjects,and

thevulnerability

ofthat

stratagemto

“breakthroughs,”in

which

them

echanisms

ofdenial

were

caughtoffguard.

82.T

hem

ostcom

prehensiveand

incisiveaccount

ofPlato’s

arguments

aboutw

omen

isnow

inS

tephenH

alliwell,

Plato: Republic,

Book

V(W

arminster:A

risand

Phillips,1992), Introduction

andcom

mentary

tothe

relevantpassages.

Seealso

0km

,W

omen

inW

esternPolitical Thought.

83. For Musonius’s

collectedw

orks,seethe

editionby

0.

Hense

(Leipzig:

Teubner

Library,

1905).O

therw

orksw

ithradical

conclusionsfor

wom

en’sissues

include“Should

Boys

andG

irlsH

avethe

Same

Education?”

(answering

yesto

thatquestion);

“ShouldO

neR

aiseA

llthe

Children

Who

Are

Born?”

(arguingagainst

infanticide,aparticular

threatto

female

offspring);“O

nthe

Goal

ofMarriage”

(arguingagainst the

sexual doublestandard

andin

favorof

equalsexual

fidelityfor

bothsexes;

arguingas

well

againstthe

comm

onview

thatfem

aleslaves

were

availablefor

sexualuse).

84.Stoicsare

ofcoursehighly

critical ofmuch

that passesforhigher

educa

Page 29: MARTHA - Jyväskylän yliopisto

‘UL

UH

AL

JUS

TIC

E:

SE

MIN

AL

ESSA

YS

MA

RT

HA

C. N

USSB

AU

M551

tion,holdingthat

thetraditional

“liberalstudies”

arenot

“liberal”in

theright

way, that

is,donot

truly“free”

them

indto

takecharge

of itsow

nreasoning.

SeeSeneca, ]lvloralE

pistle,p.

88.85.

SeeM

usonius,“O

nthe

Coal

ofIvlarriage.”

Similar

conceptionsare

defendedby

Senecaand

Plutarch.

On

thisshift

inthinking

abourthe

marital

relationship,seethe

usefuldiscussion

inFoucault,

J-IistoryofSexuality, vol.111,

trans.R.H

urley(N

ewY

ork:P

antheon,1985).

86.O

nthe

way

inw

hichC

hristianitydisrupted

theem

ergingfem

inistconsensus,

seeC

.E

. lvi.de

Ste.C

roix,The

Class

Strugglein

theA

ncientG

reekW

orld(L

ondon:D

uckworth,

1987).87.See

thelastsection

of “ThatW

omen

Too,”w

herehe

answers

them

aleinterlocutor’s

imaginary

objectionrhat

educatedw

omen

will

spendtoo

much

time

sittingaround

andtalking,

andneglect

theirpractical

duties,by

tellinghim

thatthe

verysam

eissue

arisesfor

him:

He

toohas

practicalduties

thatm

ayseem

lessinteresting

thantalking

aboutideas,

andhe

tooshould

make

surethat

hedoesn’tneglect

them.It

is,Ithink,because

IVlusonius

hasa

prettylow

viewof

thew

orth0f

male

publiclife

thathe

caneasily

viewthat

sphereas

equivalentand

equalto

thefem

alesphere.

88.See

Anne

Fausto-S

terling,Myths

of Gender.

89.For

theevidence,

seeM

alcolmSchofield,

TheStoic

Ideaofthe

City

(Cam

bridge:C

ambridge

University

Press,1992).

90.Is

theN

igeriansiW

ationdepicted

inN

zegwu’s

paperan

exception?W

ecan

agreew

ithher

thatthe

traditionalsystem

inw

hichw

omen

con

trolledcertain

vitalagricultural

functions,and

men

others,w

assom

ewhat

better,in

capabilityterm

s,than

thesystem

ofconfinem

entto

thedom

esticsphere

imposed

byB

ritishcolonialism

,w

ithoutbeing

altogethersure

thatthe

traditionalsystem

was

morally

acceptable.This

would

dependon

acloser

scrutinyof

thew

holesystem

offlinctionings

andcapabilities,

asaffected

bygender

divisions.Iam

noexpert

inIbo

culture,clearly;butthe

traditionalIbo

families

depictedin

Chinua

Achebe’s

novels,forexam

ple,donot

seemto

me

tom

anifestfullgender

equalityin

capab

ilit3c

Okonkw

o(in

ThingsF

allApart)

candecide

tobeat

hisw

ife;she

cannotchoose

tobeat

himin

return,oreven

tostop

him,

inall

butthe

most

egregiousof

cases.O

konkwo

canchoose

totake

anotherw

ife;no

wife

ofhiscan

chooseanother

hushand.The

reasonw

hyO

konkwo

keepsw

ishingthat

Ezinm

ahad

beena

boyrather

thana

girlis

thathe

perceivesthat,being

agirl,she

isdebarred

fromm

anyfunctions

forw

hichshe

seems

well

suited.H

isfear

ofbeing

seenas

a“w

oman”

is,by

contrast,a

fearof capability

failure.91.O

nR

ousseau,see0km

,W

omen,and

JaneR

olandIviartin,R

eclaiming

aC

onversation(N

ewH

aven:Yale

University

Press,1985).On

some

relatedcontem

poraryargum

ents,forexam

plethose

of Allan

Bloom

,seeO

kin,Justke,ch.1.

92.On

allthis,see

Fausto-S

terling.93.

Here

Iam

inagreem

entw

iththe

generalline

ofargum

entin

0km,

Wom

en,and

Martin,

Reclaim

ing,and

with

therelated

arguments

inN

ancy

Chodorow

’sThe

Rep

roductionofiviothering, w

hichI

discussin

my

otherchapter

[“Em

otionsand

vvomen’s

Capabilities,”

in14’o,nen,

Culture

andD

evelopnent,

pp. 360—95].

94.I

amgrateful

toall

them

embers

ofour

meeting

forvaluable

com

ments,

andespecially

toA

martya

Senfor

valuablediscussions

andto

David

Crocker,Jonathan

Clover, C

assS

unstein, andSusan

Wolffor

helpful written

comm

ents. Iam

alsograteful

toC

hrisB

obonich, David

Estlund,

andH

enryR

ichardsonfor

comm

entson

relatedearlier

work.


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