Marsalek Innovations and Temporality

133Jan Marlek: Innovations and Temporality: Re ections on Lvi-Strauss

Innovations and Temporality:Refl ections on Lvi-Strauss Cold Societies

and Our Warming Science

Jan Marlek

Problem

In this short essay, I would like to challenge the consensus underlying the present collection of texts about the tight relationship between innovation and social dynamics. Skeptics say, not without some reason, that to promote innova-tions is a tricky way of promoting consumer society, which was in the past so severely criticized that it can be nowadays hardly openly encouraged (with the notable exception of the Treasury, of course). Yet the proponents of innovations could answer back claiming that innovations are essential to our society because they make it move. Let me start with a thesis that seems perfectly innocuous; I take the liberty to borrow it from my colleague Ji Loudn:

The fact that knowledge, technology, and innovation play a crucial role in economic and social dynamics of society is obvious.1

My aim in this paper is to show that it is not obvious at all. Or, to be more precise, that innovation is not necessarily tied with the dynamics of society. For this purpose I will make use of anthropology, which has always been help-ful in this sort of critical enterprise. Instead of asking how innovations can be generated and spread, using anthropology will allow me to lay emphasis on the manner we treat innovations (in our practices and discourse). In doing so, I hope contribute to open a more sociological way of addressing the topic of innovations. The theoretical stance at the background of the present book will come out somehow impeached. For recompense, the eld of our investigations will gain in scope.

I will proceed in three steps. First, I will summarize Claude Lvi-Strauss dis-tinction between cold and hot societies. In my second step, I will tease the readers patience with a re ection on the mythical thought and its time-breaking

1 Loudn, J., Editorial, Theory of Science / Teorie vdy, Vol. 31, 2009, No. 34, p. 5.

134 Part II: Innovation in Societal Dynamics

function. What do these two subjects have to do with the topic of innovation and its presumably obvious role in social dynamics? Should this not be evident by then, I will make the connection explicit in my last, third section.

Claude Lvi-Strauss hot and cold societies

In 1959, Claude Lvi-Strauss was asked about the major di erence between the so-called primitive societies, investigated traditionally by anthropology, and our modern societies. His answer was peremptory:

I would say societies studied by ethnologists, compared to our large society, our large modern societies, are a little bit like cold societies opposed to hot societies, something like horologe compared with a steam engine. These cold societies produce extremely little disorder, that physicists call entropy, and they tend to preserve themselves in their initial state. Incidentally, it explains why they seem to us as socie-ties without history or without progress.2

If cold societies seem to us to be in a manner outside of time, modern socie-ties, on the other hand, are regarded as historical. Unlike primitive societies they do not resemble the horologe, which is a cold and inert mechanism. Rath-er, they resemble the steam engine based on the internal di erences of tempera-ture, on the di erences between their inner parts. According to Lvi-Strauss, this di erence between two types of mechanisms he uses as models explains our perception of these societies as far as their dynamics is concerned.

To compare societies to a machine, a mechanism, is in itself courageous. Not so much because of its dehumanizing e ect, but rather because the image is too old-fashioned, so old-fashioned that even the analogy with organism it was substituted by sounds nowadays as an archaism. We will shortly return to this conceptual remark later, now let us consider Lvi-Strauss general idea, which is usually partly neglected and partly misunderstood (at least Lvi-Strauss com-mentators always say that): The main di erence between primitive and modern societies, says Lvi-Strauss, has to do with their inner structures and with their temporality (these two features being connected). Or to say it better and here is an important nuance it has to do with their temporality as it is perceived by themselves.

2 My quotations come from video recording published by INA (www.ina.fr). The interview is tran-scribed and translated in English in Charbonnier, G. (ed.), Conversations with Claude Lvi-Strauss, translated by John and Doreen Weightman, Cape, London 1969.


Indeed, as these two aspects are concerned, i.e. the inner structure and the relation to historicity, we may tend to link them intuitively up. It is because a horologe, despite its living heart, is something motionless beside a steam engine gured as a speeding steam locomotive and this is the image I am sure my readers have hitherto in mind. In fact, the conceptual couple cold/hot provides no ground for that of immobility/motion; a steam engine is not necessarily a vehicle. What then is the di erence, from the point of view of their structure, or principle as we could better say, between a cold machine (as a horologe) and a hot one (as a steam engine)? Lvi-Strauss frequently uses the words or-der and entropy in his account of the di erence between cold and hot, whether speaking of machines or societies. As for the society itself, what is at stake are relationships between individuals. Cold societies produce little en-tropy, whereas increased entropy is something characteristic for hot societies. The word entropy here stands for disorder which means social con ict, po-litical ghts, social inequality, etc. Our societies, says Lvi-Strauss, use for their operation a di erence in potential being incarnated in di erent forms of social hierarchy, whether we call it slavery, serfdom or whether it means class division as we are considering things from such a distance and in such a panoramic perspective, this has no major importance. Contrary to what our rst impres-sion could be, Lvi-Strauss analysis has nothing to do with what Jean-Claude Passeron calls nostalgia of the dialectical logic which seeks the engine or the program of historical development in tensions, oppositions or con icts internal to social systems.3 Lvi-Strauss doesnt speak about social change. Instead, he looks at the functioning of society as a society. The word entropy, borrowed from physics where it is the title for the phenomenon of degradation of en-ergy, is used by him in order to suggest that modern societies might be very e ective, having at the same time, so to say, a very low e ciency. Modern so-cieties consume a huge part of energy they produce to conserve themselves as societies, i. e. to maintain their unity.

We can now appreciate why Lvi-Strauss preferred using the machine meta-phor rather than the organicist one (or some other) that would be certainly less astonishing. The nature of variability associated with organisms is di erent from that of variability associated with machines. We think Lvi-Strauss wished to avoid the concept of pathology, which would be misleading for his thought. In physics and mechanics, there is no room for the distinction between normal-ity and pathology. One could think that Lvi-Strauss preference of the mechani-cal analogy was for him a way of renouncing criticism. However, the opposite could be said without incoherence. An organism, as G. Canguilhem remarks, is endowed with a larger latitude of action than a machine. Machine, which is a

3 See Passeron, J.-C., Le raisonnement sociologique. Un espace non popprien de largumentation, Albin Michel, Paris 2006, p. 169.


product of calculation, veri es the calculation norms, rational norms of identi-ty, constancy and prevision, whereas organism acts according to empirism. Life is an experience, which means improvisation, taking advantage of occurrences; it is trying in all senses. Hence this massive and often overlooked fact that life tolerates monstrosity. There is no machine monster.4 In short, life is multiform, its variability is o the criticism; all forms of life are respectable. When Lvi-Strauss deserts organism as metaphor for society in favor of mechanistic rheto-ric, he sets up a base for social criticism, which is compatible with his culturally relativistic position. As living beings, societies resemble; as mechanisms, they can be judged according to the criterion of e ciency.

This clari cation of Lvi-Strauss thought on the conceptual couple cold/hot was necessary in order to spare ourselves of taking the epithet cold as the carrier of the idea of a-historicity, so to say, analytically from within. It needs to be said, nevertheless, that Lvi-Strauss didnt seem to be disappointed about the later eclipsing of the mechanicist origin of his concept though. If this feature is now attached to the cold society it is not on its account that the cold society is called cold. And if it makes things more complicated, it makes them also more interesting. How does it come that our societies, based on the di erences of potential, on inequalities, are also historical? We wont forget this question.

Whatever, cold societies, says Lvi-Strauss, tend to preserve themselves in their initial state and they seem (to us and to themselves) to be successful, at least to a certain extent. Not only do we call these societies primitive. They indeed aspire to keep a close relationship to their original state. Their ideal is the society their ancestors and gods have created at the beginning of times. The problem is, however, that even as they profess the ideal of an in nite persist-ence of the system resistant to external in uences, these primitive societies cant elude changes, events, and, lets say, innovation. Thus, as Lvi-Strauss af- rms, they fall into an illusion about themselves.

Such an illusion costs nevertheless some e ort and cant be therefore seen as something negligible. Thus, even though the di erence between modern and primitive societies doesnt lay primarily in being de facto either historical or without history, some di erence remains. Namely, the relation entertained with historicity. If the historicity is in our culture readily assumed, interiorized, it is denied by the primitive man. Primitive societies have developed particu-lar skills preventing history to make irruption inside them the expression is Lvi-Strauss:

I have suggested elsewhere that the clumsy distinction between peoples without history and others could be fruitfully replaced by the distinc-

4 Canguilhem, G., La connaissance de la vie, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, Paris 2009, p. 152.


tion between what for convenience I called cold and hot societies: the former seeking through the institutions they gave themselves to annul the possible e ects of historical factors on their equilibrium and continu-ity in a quasi-automatic fashion; the latter resolutely internalizing the his-torical process and making it the moving power of their development.5

These words, which have been extracted from The Savage Mind exclude any

ambiguity. The di erence between cold and hot societies lies in the manner they handle historical factors and not in the existence (or absence) of these historical factors themselves. The misunderstanding is so regrettable that Lvi-Strauss later prefers deserting the distinction between societies without and with history that he declares clumsy. But there is more. The relation both types of societies have to historicity has its own social e cacy. When internal-izing historical process, our societies make it the moving power of their devel-opment. Reciprocally, Lvi-Strauss a rms that the procedures cold societies employ are more e cacious than some contemporary ethnologists are willing to admit, even if the real question is not what genuine results they obtain but rather by what lasting purpose they are guided, for their image of themselves is an essential part of their reality.6

The question of the social e cacy of this particular relation that cold soci-eties have to their historical process will be treated in more detail in the next sec-tion. But it is already su ciently clear that in their case innovation doesnt seem to play a crucial role in the social dynamics. Or, to be more precise, that within them innovations dont immediately turn into social change. The question nev-ertheless remains: How is it possible to stay unchanged despite the changes?

The destruction of time

Despite the changes they undergo, a rms Lvi-Strauss, primitive societies de-veloped particular skills in order to preserve their inner structure.7 This par-ticular wisdom which is peculiar to them consists mainly of their mythological thought. Along with rituals or kinship, that it permeates, mythology is an instru-ment for the destruction of time.

Yet speaking about time-destruction could be misguiding. It calls up a seem-ingly corny as well as useless question whether the time itself can or cannot be an-

5 Lvi-Strauss, C., The Savage Mind, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1966, pp. 233234.6 Ibid., p. 234.7 Of course the intentionality here expressed by the term in order to is to be understood in its weak sense.


nihilated. In fact Lvi-Strauss is rather clear about this. What is at stake is not the denying of the historical process but admitting it as a form without content.8 The time destroyed has to be gured as an empty time; to destroy it is to make it blank by denying the event, by disclaiming the change. And the best way to do that is to dissolve it. An example evoked by Michael E. Harking and borrowed from the domain of kinship will provide us a rsthand insight into this mecha-nism. As a gesture of resistance to demographic and structural changes, it seems that societies can add or delete a clan in order to maintain symmetry. In one instance, based loosely on ethnographic fact, Lvi-Strauss imagines a society that has three clans bear, eagle and turtle, representing earth, air and water losing population on to the point that bear clan becomes extinct. At this point, in order to maintain the tripartite nature of society, the turtle clan must be subdivided. Although the earth/air/water distinction is lost, it may be replicated in a lower level (in the opposition between grey and yellow turtle, in this example).9

Mythology is a powerful instrument of such an event-nullifying. It is gener-ally known that Lvi-Strauss began his career of an anthropologist by a remark-able work on the system of kinship he studied between 1935 and 1939 in Ama-zon rainforest in Brazil.10 Shortly after that, in the 1950s, he became interested in the mythologies of primitive societies, without abandoning the linguistic approach he already used in his earlier work.11 As we already said, according to Lvi-Strauss mythology is a powerful machine for destroying time. Before we look better at this thesis, at least a minimalist introduction to Lvi-Strauss ap-proach to myths is necessary.

Lvi-Strauss started afresh. His theoretical background induced him to come back to the question of what the myth actually is. According to him, not particu-lar narrations but their corpus within which particular stories have the status of variants is that what a myth should be in fact called. For Lvi-Strauss it is possible to move between di erent particular narrations, from one story to another, provided that certain principles of transformation are respected. Thus di erent variants of the same myth can be seen as reducible and their elements as complementary. The myth itself is based on the manipulation of some few logical structures of oppositions and inversions.

The striking thing about the myths recounted by Brazilian Indians is their apparent lack of logic. Their elements seem to come and go without any ap-

8 Lvi-Strauss, C., The Savage Mind, op. cit., p. 235.9 Harkin, M. E., Lvi-Strauss and History, in: B. Wiseman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Lvi-Strauss, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009, pp. 3958.10 Lvi-Strauss C., Les structures lmentaires de la parent, Mouton, Paris La Haye 1981.11 This linguistic turn in anthropology is su ciently known to be presented here in details, for a concise introduction see Lvi-Strauss, C., Structural Analysis in Linguistics and in Anthropology, in: Lvi-Strauss, C., Structural Anthropology, Basic Books, New York 1963, pp. 3154.


parent order, as if things, humans and animals were dropped randomly in. Not only do we tend to nd the relationships among them fantastic, more often they appear to us senseless. Lvi-Strauss helps us to understand them using his structural method. Nevertheless, he does not provide us with understanding of the sense of these myths. Levi-Strauss understands the myth as an instrument of sense. Without having sense in itself, myth is a matrix of the worlds intelligi-bility. This is why Lvi-Strauss can say that the myth, similar in this to a musi-cal work, is a language which transcends the level of articulated language.12 In myth, human mind manifests itself as a problem resolution.13 Mythical thought deals with problems, with all that could disturb the order established. And innovations clearly fall in this category. The myth annihilates time as it links the present to a heroic and founding past. When it is accompanied by the ritual, in which ancestors are supposed to participate, the past is evoked and recalled. As Lvi-Strauss puts it, the past is conceived as a timeless model rather than as a stage in the historical process and if the before and the after havent been com-pletely suppressed, their sole signi cance lies in re ecting each other.14

The gurra ancestor hunts, kills, and eats bandicoots; and his sons are always engaged upon the same quest (...) In [these] myths we see the na-tive at his daily task of hunting, shing, gathering vegetable food, cook-ing, and fashioning his implements. All occupations originated with the totemic ancestors; and here, too, the native follows the tradition blind-ly: he clings to the primitive weapons used by his forefathers, and no thought of improving them ever enters his mind.15

But mythology is also an instrument of time destruction as it deals with his-torical events from the point of view of their logical function. This is di erent to the manner we deal with historical events inasmuch as modern societies insert

12 Lvi-Strauss, C., The Raw and the Cooked. Mythologiques, Vol. I, translated by John and Doreen Weightman, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1983, pp. 1516: ...myth and music share of both being languages which, in their di erent ways, transcend articulate expression, while at the same time like articulate speech, but unlike painting requiring a temporal dimension in which to unfold. But this relation to time is of a rather special nature: it is as if music and mythology needed time only in order to deny it. Both, indeed, are instruments for the obliteration of time. For the analogy between myth and musical work, see Fulka, J., Lvi-Strauss, Schae er, Wagner: hudebn struktura mtu, Teorie vdy / Theory of Science, Vol. 31, 2009, No. 1, pp. 119140. More speci -cally about the misunderstanding between structural anthropology and the contemporary music see Nicolaset, D., Keck, F., Claude Lvi-Strauss et la musique. Dissonances dans le structuralisme, Revue dHistoire des Sciences sociales, Vol. 14 , 2006, No. 1, pp. 101136.13 See Keck, F., Claude Lvi-Strauss, une introduction, Pocket La Dcouverte, Paris 2005, p. 137. 14 Lvi-Strauss, C., The Savage Mind, op. cit., p. 235.15 T. G. H. Strehlow quoted by Claude Lvi-Strauss in The Savage Mind, op. cit., p. 235.


them in a chain of other historical events that help in their interpretation. In mythical thought, an event represents basically a logical instability that it tries to domesticate:

The mythical thought aspires to give sense to an event, in order to re-store its integral memory on some timeless level. The mythical thought perceives an event as a threat, because, analogous to a machine, it tends to maintain the order of its structure against the disorder that an event introduces.16

The mythical thought isnt a problem resolution in the sense that a myth would be constructed in reaction of disturbing events. Rather it could be said that the already existing myth captures events, assumes them, and in doing so it relegates them to the creative and in some ways undi erentiated epoch of ancestors. At the same time, if not rst of all, the myth attributes them their place in the logical world. As we have said above the myth hasnt got sense, it is an instrument of sense. The true sense of the myths bororo and g (in the The Raw and the Cooked) isnt the explication of the introduction of the practice of cooking aliments, despite the fact that it is their main narrative motif. The myths express reciprocally each other; they have no ultimate signi but aspire somewhat higher as they are patterns of all sense.17

Techniques of invisibility

Lvi-Strauss idea of time-destruction (or of the consciousness of it) didnt es-cape criticism. Does the resistance against social change really stop time or does it rather entail a repetition of the identical, carried notwithstanding by a linear temporality?18 Our perspective in this essay was, however, di erent. It is less temporality as a form, but rather its content, which can be, as we have observed with Lvi-Strauss, cancelled. And this is what provides the non-evident angle to our approach to innovations that is our ultimate concern.

16 Keck, F., Claude Lvi-Strauss, une introduction, op. cit., p. 145.17 In The Raw and the Cooked, Lvi-Strauss suggests that the ultimate sense of the myth, if there is some, is that of human mind. We think that Franois Andr Isambert was right when wondering, in his review of the book, whether such a sense is the one we thought about when raising the ques-tion. We dont share however Isamberts skepticism about the gain of intelligibility that Lvi-Strauss theory of myth produces. See Isambert, F. A., Lvi-Strauss Claude, Mythologiques, Le cru et le cuit, Revue franaise de sociologie, 1996, No. 63, pp. 392394. 18 The positions of some of these critics (and rst of all that of Alfred Gell) are displayed in ubrt, J., Claude Lvi-Strauss a problm tzv. synchronickho asu, Teorie vdy / Theory of Science, Vol. 31, 2009, No. 1, pp. 4964.


We have seen that innovation doesnt necessary mean (social) change; in-novation without change is conceivable. Of course, the thesis we quoted at the beginning of our re ection isnt hereby invalidated. It deserves neverthe-less interpretation. In social dynamics, the important role of innovation may be obvious. Yet what is not obvious is that innovation directly leads to social dynamics. Between innovation and (social) change there is room for our mind and our practice. In other words, alongside the question of how the innovation is produced and its production encouraged, how the innovation spreads, what are its consequences, there is room for asking how that is also by what means it is assumed (or not) by our collective mind. The innovation culture is not only about producing innovations, but also about accepting (or refusing) them with more or less visibility.

This thesis opens, as we believe, large possibilities to the sociology of innova-tion. Michael E. Harkin is certainly right when noting that it would be surpris-ing if [the] desire for changelessness [observed in cold societies] did not exist in all societies, albeit in di erent forms.19 After all Lvi-Strauss distinction is a product of re ning, real societies always combine the two distinguished postures. But what are these di erent forms of the e ort our societies pursue in order to stop the time?20 What are our techniques of time-destruction? And which features of our societies are protected in this manner?

In fact, such a research eld is in some respects very familiar to sociology, which is traditionally occupied with social rigidity (sociology of education, with its focus on school institution displayed as an agent of social reproduction is a good example of this category of sociological research21). Our re ection about cold societies suggests nevertheless a shift in the sociologists research design. It invites him to focus less on these parts of social body which are hostile to any change, but to actual changes which are by the society denied. The paradox of such a program consists in its focus on changes that society seeks to keep out of our regards. Not the changes it hides, but the techniques of hiding are what we are inviting sociologists to focus on.

19 Harkin infers this hypothesis, quite unnecessarily, from Lvi-Strauss insistence on a cognitive universalism. See Harkin, M. E., Lvi-Strauss and History, op. cit., p. 47.20 Michel Foucaults observation of what he calls heterotopias are of great interest in this context: ...the huts of Djerba are in a sense relatives of libraries and museums, for the rediscovery of Polyne-sian life abolishes time; yet the experience is just as much the rediscovery of time, it is as if the entire history of humanity reaching back to its origin were accessible in a sort of immediate knowledge. (Foucault, M., Des espaces autres, in: Dits et crits II, 19761988, ditions Gallimard, Paris 2001, p. 1579. The translation is from Jay Miskowiec).21 The di used education proper to archaic societies or to groups of traditional societies where the script is missing would also be the principle of cultural continuity, supposed to be stronger, more conservative and more self-reproducing. But it would be in fact to give too much credence, as the force of the tradition is concerned, to what the tradition says about itself. (Passeron, J.-C., Le raisonnement sociologique, op. cit., p. 181)


The question of the relation between the inner structure of societies and the way they deal with historical process we have seen that this issue was outlined in Lvi-Strauss rst formulation of the cold/hot societies distinction is worthy to be refreshed. The access to innovation is, there is no doubt, socially conditioned. But could the cult of innovation which is characteristic in our modern societies, be consequently said to be (co)responsible for their structura-tion? Only empirical studies can bring to us some elements of response.

As a sort of a prologue to any empirical work we may examine the chastity of the research instruments we used in our book. Havent we chosen our sub-ject matter with a rm conviction about the crucial role of innovation in so-cial dynamics? We should ask ourselves if we are epistemologically su ciently equipped to assure that our research program, before it ful lls its heuristic func-tion, wont turn into an instrument for warming our society.

Bibliography

Canguilhem, G., La connaissance de la vie, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, Paris 2009

Charbonnier, G. (ed.), Conversations with Claude Lvi-Strauss, Cape, London 1969

Foucault, M., Des espaces autres, in: Dits et crits II, 19761988, ditions Gallimard, Paris 2001

Fulka, J., Lvi-Strauss, Schae er, Wagner: hudebn struktura mtu, Teorie vdy / Theory of Science, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2009

Harkin, M. E., Lvi-Strauss and History, in B. Wiseman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Lvi-Strauss, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009

Isambert, F. A., Lvi-Strauss Claude, Mythologiques, Le cru et le cuit, Revue franaise de sociologie, No. 63, 1996

Keck, F., Claude Lvi-Strauss, une introduction, Pocket La Dcouverte, Paris 2005

Loudn, J., Editorial, Theory of Science / Teorie vdy, Vol. 31, 2009, No. 34Lvi-Strauss, C., The Raw and the Cooked. Mythologiques, Volume One, The

University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1983Lvi-Strauss, C., The Savage Mind, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

1966


Lvi-Strauss, C., Les structures lmentaires de la parent, Mouton, Paris La Haye 1981.

Lvi-Strauss, C., Structural Analysis in Linguistics and in Anthropology, in: Lvi-Strauss, C., Structural Anthropology, Basic Books, New York 1963

Nicolaset, D., Keck, F., Claude Lvi-Strauss et la musique. Dissonances dans le structuralisme, Revue dHistoire des Sciences sociales, Vol. 14, 2006, No. 1

Passeron, J.-C., Le raisonnement sociologique, Un espace non popprien de largumentation, Albin Michel, Paris 2006

ubrt, J., Claude Lvi-Strauss a problm tzv. synchronickho asu, Teorie vdy / Theory of Science, Vol. 31, 2009, No. 1


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Marsalek Innovations and Temporality

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