VII. MARRIAGEB. REQUISITES

FABIAN PUGEDA,plaintiff-appellee,vs. RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS, assisted by her husband Angel Sanchez,CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband Victoriano Salvanera,GABRIEL TRIAS, minors ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA VINIEGRAand FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by guardian-ad-litem, Rafael Trias,TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA, assisted by her husband Ramon Portugal,defendants-appellants.G.R. No. L-16925March 31, 1962

The subject of this action, which was appealed from the Court of First Instance of Cavite, is certain lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate Administration known as lots Nos. 225, 226, 269, 311, 1803, 1814, 1816, 1832, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2282, 2284, 2378, 2412, 2282, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688, 2722, 3177 and 3178 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate located in General Trias, Cavite, a house of strong materials, a barn (camarin) also of strong materials, and a store also of strong materials in General Trias, Cavite and sets of household furniture. The plaintiff claims participation in the said properties on the ground that the same were acquired by him and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom plaintiff contracted marriage in January, 1916 and who died on February 11, 1934.The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias are the children of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda are children of the plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer.The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots Nos. 273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate with the following interest therein; 71% in lot No. 273, 82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff is the owner of one-half of the said interest in the lots above-mentioned; that upon the death of Maria C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-owners of said properties and defendants managed the properties in trust as co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties above described, acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and one-half thereof be given as share therein of plaintiff.The defendants surnamed Trias and Viniegra denied the claims of the plaintiff to the properties described in the complaint, or that said properties had been administered by the defendants in trust as co-owners with the plaintiff, and by way of special and affirmative defense they alleged that the properties subject of the complaint had been inherited by the defendants from their deceased father Mariano Trias and deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer and had been in possession and full enjoyment thereof for more than 10 years, peacefully, uninterruptedly, quietly and adversely under a claim of ownership to the exclusion of all others, and that plaintiff is estopped from claiming or asserting any rights or participation in the said properties. Defendants Trias also denied for lack of knowledge and belief the claim of plaintiff in his complaint that he was married to Maria C. Ferrer and that the marriage continued up to the death of the latter in 1934. They further presented a counterclaim against the plaintiff for the sum of P40,000, this amount being what was contributed by them in support of the candidacies of plaintiff when running for the office of provincial governor of Cavite. They also filed a counterclaim for 30 pieces of Spanish gold coins and P5,000 in cash amounting in value to the total sum of P50,000 and a counterclaim for P100,000 which is the value of four big parcels of land belonging to the defendants which the plaintiff had appropriated for his own use.The defendants Pugeda joined the plaintiff in the latter's claim that the properties mentioned in plaintiff's complaint were joint properties of the plaintiff and the defendants. They also allege that the properties had gone to the management and control of the defendants Trias who should be required to answer for the fruits and profits thereof during the administration by them of said properties. As cross-claim against their co-defendants, they allege that they are each entitled to one-eighth of the properties left by their mother as listed in the first ten paragraphs of the complaint, as well as a share of one-eighth each in lots Nos. 98, 2015 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate and in a parcel of land in Lingad, Litiit in Silang, Cavite and in 60 heads of cattle.Plaintiff denied the counterclaim of the defendants Trias and the defendants Trias, answering the cross-claim of their co-defendants Pugeda, denied all the allegations contained in the answer of the defendants Pugeda, and further alleged that the cross-claim is improper as the same should be the subject of probate proceedings, and the defendants Pugeda are estopped and barred by prescription from claiming any further right to the properties left by their deceased mother.There are two questions or issues raised in the present case. The first is the alleged existence of a marriage of Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The second is the claim of the plaintiff to various lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate under certificates of sale issued first in the name of Mariano Trias and later assigned to Maria C. Ferrer, but paid for in part during the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer. A third but minor issue is the claim for furniture alleged by plaintiff to have been bought by him and Maria C. Ferrer during the marriage, which plaintiff claims is in the possession of the defendants.On the first issue, the existence of marriage, plaintiff and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente testified that in the afternoon of January 5, 1916, on the eve of Epiphany or Three Kings, plaintiff and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of the Justice of the Peace, who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them; that accordingly Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two witnesses one of whom was Santiago Salazar and another Amado Prudente, deceased; that after the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a marriage contract, and after the witnesses had signed the same, he delivered one copy to the contracting parties and another to the President of the Sanitary Division, which officer was at that time the keeper of the records of the civil register. Plaintiff and his witnesses explained that no celebration of the marriage was held inspite of the prominence of the contracting parties because plaintiff was then busy campaigning for the office of Member of the Provincial Board and Maria C. Ferrer was already on the family way.The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages in the municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in the month of January, 1916, which showed that no record of the alleged marriage existed therein; but this absence was explained by the Justice of the Peace that perhaps the person who kept the register forgot tomake an entry of the marriage in the registry.Other witnesses were introduced to the effect that after the marriage plaintiff lived in the house of Maria C. Ferrer, which was the house of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. Evidence was also submitted to the effect that the first issue was baptized on August 26, 1917 and the one who acted as sponsor was a sister-in-law of Maria C. Ferrer. The baptismal certificate submitted states that the baptized child was the issue of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The registry of said birth was also submitted and it states that the father is Fabian Pugeda and the mother is Maria C. Ferrer.It is also not denied that after the marriage, plaintiff cohabited with the deceased wife, as husband and wife, until the death of the latter, publicly and openly as husband and wife. Lastly, a document entitled "Project of Partition" (Exhibit 5-Trias) was signed by the parties defendants themselves. The document contains the following significant statement or admission: .WHEREAS the parties hereto are the only children and forced heirs of the said deceased: Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia, and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias y Ferrer, are the children of her first marriage with Mariano Trias, now deceased; and Teofilo and Virginia, both surnamed Pugeda y Ferrer,are the children of her second marriage with Fabian Pugeda...... That it is hereby agreed by and between the parties hereto that lots Nos. 3177 and 3178 known as the Buenavista property will be administered by one of the parties to be agreed upon and for said purpose they appoint MIGUEL F. TRIAS, and all earnings, rentals and income or profits shall be expended for the improvement and welfare of the said property and for the payment of all claims and accounts of our deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer, and for the maintenance and education of Teofilo and Virginia Pugeda y Ferrer.The judge who heard the evidence, after a review of he testimonial and documental evidence, arrived at the conclusion that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916, this conclusion being borne out not only by the chain of circumstances but also by the testimonies of the witnesses to the celebration of the marriage, who appeared to be truthful, as well as by the fact that plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer lived together as husband and wife for eighteen years (1916-1934) and there is a strong presumption that they were actually married.On the competency of the evidence submitted by plaintiff to prove the marriage we cite the following authority: .Art. 53. As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a certificate of the record in the civil register shall be admitted, unless such books have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the question arises in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind. (p. 27, Civil Code) .The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter wasin articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of said requisites. (Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1) .Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage. (55 C.J.S., p. 900).In our judgment the evidence submitted shows conclusively that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer, said marriage subsisting from 1916 until 1934, upon the death of the latter, and we affirm the finding of the trial court to that effect.On the second issue the evidence introduced at the trial shows that the lands subject of the action were formerly Friar Lands included in the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, province of Cavite, which were acquired under certificates of sale in the name of Mariano Trias in the year 1910 and later assigned to his widow Maria C. Ferrer in the year 1916. The different lots, the dates of their acquisition and assignment to said Maria C. Ferrer, widow are set forth in a table appended to this decision as Annex "A".On the basis of the facts about their acquisition and assignment Judge Lucero declared that the lots in question were conjugal properties of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and consequently decreed that 1/2 thereof, should be adjudicated to Mariano Trias, as the latter's share in the conjugal properties, to be divided among his 6 children at the rate of 1/6 each, and the other half to Maria C. Ferrer, as her share in the conjugal properties, to be assigned to her children by both marriages at the rate of 1/9 each and the balance of 1/9 to widower Fabian Pugeda in usufruct. From this judgment the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.When the case was before the Court of Appeals, the attorneys for the defendants presented a motion for new trial on the ground that they discovered copies of four documents namely Annexes "A", "B" "C," "D" and "E" Record on Appeal, pp. 108-117, (The last document is a copy of a court order issued by Judge Manuel V. Moran approving the project of partition in Case No. 860, Intestate estate of Mariano Trias) which if admitted might alter the decision. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Cavite for the consideration of said evidence.Upon the return of the case to the Court of First Instance, Judge Primitivo Gonzales who then presided the court, rendered a new decision. Judge Gonzales found that the total amount paid by Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer on the lots in question amounts to only P8,911.84, while the installments paid during the marriage of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer totaled P35,146.46. He also found that lots 3177 and 3178 were paid for during the marriage of Pugeda and Ferrer in the total sum of P16,557.32. Judge Gonzales therefore ruled that the two marriages should participate in the ownership of the lands, according to the actual contributions made by each marriage in the installments in payment of the lands. The dispositive part of the decision, now subject of the appeal, is as follows: .IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the Court hereby renders judgment: .1. That lots 2378, 225, 226, 269, 311, 1808, 1804, 1816; 1832, 2264, 2265, 2282, 2284, 2412, 2682, 273, 2650, 2652, 2680, 2718, 2764 (21 lots) are conjugal assets of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer in the proportion of percentage and indicated in each individual lot;2. That lots 3177 and 3178, since all the installments for the same were fully paid during the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer are hereby declared conjugal of the couple Pugeda and Ferrer; and even some of the installments for these two lots were paid after the death of Maria C. Ferrer, they do not loss the character of conjugal property for payments were made from the crops thereof;3. That since Mariano Trias during his marriage to Maria C. Ferrer contributed in the payment for the installments of these 21 lots amounting to P8,911.84, half of which must be reimbursed in favor of the children or heirs of Mariano Trias to be paid from the mass of the hereditary estate of Maria C. Ferrer; the other half of P4,455.92 to be distributed among all the children or heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage to be deducted from the mass of her estate;4. That lots 2266, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688 and 2722 since all the installments for these six (6) lots were fully paid during marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, they are hereby declared to be conjugal between them one half of which must go to the children or heirs of Mariano Trias, the other half must equally go to the children or heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage;5. That Miguel Trias as administrator of all the properties which commenced after the death of his mother who died on February 11, 1934, must render an accounting of his administration within three (3) months time from the date this judgment has become final.6. That defendants Trias to pay the costs of this action. (Record on Appeal, pp. 154-156) .Against this ruling the appeal has come to this Court. Defendants-appellants claim that Judge Gonzales had no power or authority to change the decision of Judge Lucero, as it was not he but Judge Lucero himself, who had heard the evidence. They have also assigned before Us a set of errors which may be boiled down to the three main issues set forth above. As the issue of marriage has already been considered we will now pass to the second and more important question as to whether the land subject of the action may be considered conjugal properties of the first marriage or of the second or of both.A consideration of the legal nature and character of the acquisition of the various lots is necessary that the issues in the action may be justly determined.A study of the provisions of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120) discloses that the friar lands were purchased by the government for sale to actual occupants(actual settler and occupants at the time said land are acquired by the Government).(Paragraph 3 of Declaration of Purposes, Act 1120). The said act expressly declares that the landare not publicland in the sense in which this word is used in the Public Land Act, and their acquisition is not governed by the provisions of the Public Land Act (Par. IV, Declaration of Purposes, Id.) .The pertinent provisions of said Act No. 1120 are as follows: .Sec. 12. .... When the costs thereof shall have been thus ascertained, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as provided in this Act at the office of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, in gold coin of the United States or its equivalent in Philippine currency, and that upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act. ...Sec. 13. The acceptance by the settler and occupant of such certificate shall be considered as an agreement by him to pay the purchase price so fixed and in the installments and at the interest specified in the certificate, and he shall by such acceptance become a debtor to the Government in that amount together with all accrued interest. .... Provided however, That every settler and occupant who desires to purchase his holding must enter into the agreement to purchase such holding by accepting the said certificate and executing the said receipt whenever called on so to do by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, and a failure on the part of the settler and occupant to comply with this requirement shall be considered as a refusal to purchase, and he shall be ousted as above provided and thereafter his holding may be leased or sold as in case of unoccupied lands: ....Sec. 15. The Government hereby reserves the title to each and every parcel of land sold under the provisions of this Act until the full payment of all installments of purchase money and interest by the purchaser has been made, and any sale or incumbrance made by him shall be invalid as against the Government of the Philippine Islands and shall be in all respects subordinate to its prior claim.Sec. 16. In the event of the death of a holder of a certificate the issuance of which is provided for in section twelve hereof, prior to the execution of a deed by the Government to any purchaser, his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land stated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied with the requirements of law for the purchase of the same. In case a holder of a certificate dies before the giving of the deed and does not leave a widow, then the interest of the holder of the certificate shall descend and deed shall issue to the persons who under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken had the title been perfected before the death of the holder of the certificate, upon proof of the holders thus entitled of compliance with all the requirements of the certificate. In case the holder of the certificate shall have sold his interest in the land before having complied with all the conditions thereof, the purchaser from the holder of the certificate shall be entitled to all the rights of the holder of the certificate upon presenting his assignment to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for registration. (Vol. III, Public Laws, pp. 315-316).A study of the above quoted provisions clearly indicates that the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full. In the case at bar the sale certificates were made in favor of Mariano Trias, and upon his death they were assigned in accordance with Sec. 16, to his widow. But the law provides that when the buyer does not leave a widow, the rights and interests of the holder of the certificate of sale are left to the buyer's heirs in accordance with the laws of succession. In the case of the Director of Lands, et al. vs. Ricardo Rizal, et al., G.R. No. 2925 prom. December 29, 1950, this court thru Mr. Justice Montemayor held: .... All this clearly and inevitably leads to the conclusion that the purchaser, even before the payment of the full price and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance, is considered by the law as the actual owner of the lot purchased, under obligation to pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government being that of a mere lien holder or mortgagee.... In conclusion, we find and hold that in the sale of a Friar Lands lot or parcel under Act 1120, pending payment in full of the purchase price, altho the Government reserves title thereto, merely for its protection, the beneficial and equitable title is in the purchaser, and that any accretion received by the lot even before payment of the last installment belongs to the purchaser thereof.We also invite attention to the fact that a sale of friar lands is entirely different from a sale of public lands under the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the case of public lands, a person who desires to acquire must first apply for the parcel of land desired. Thereafter, the land is opened for bidding. If the land is awarded to an applicant or to a qualified bidder the successful bidder is given a right of entry to occupy the land and cultivate and improve it (Secs. 22-28, Commonwealth Act 141). It is only after satisfying the requirements of cultivation and improvement of 1/5 of the land that the applicant is given a sales patent (Sec. 30).In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes the owner upon issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor, subject only to cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon is not paid. In case of sale of public lands if the applicant dies and his widow remarries both she and the second husband are entitled to the land; the new husband has the same right as his wife. Such is not the case with friar lands. As indicated in Section 16 of Act 1120, if a holder of a certificate dies before the payment of the price in full, the sale certificate is assigned to the widow, but if the buyer does not leave a widow, the right to the friar lands is transmitted to his heirs at law.It is true that the evidence shows that of the various parcels of land now subject of the action none was paid for in full during the marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that payments in installments continued to be made even after the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916. But it is also true that even after said marriage the certificates of sale were assigned to Maria C. Ferrer and installments for the lots after said marriage continued in the name of Maria C. Ferrer; also all the amounts paid as installments for the lots were taken from the fruits of the properties themselves, according to the admission of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda himself, thus: .Mr. Viniegra:Q De los productos de pesos terrenos, durante la administracion por los demandados, recibia Vd. su participation?A No, seor.Q Nunca? .A Because I know there are obligations to be paid to the Bureau of Lands, and I have been informed that the obligations have been paid annually from the products of the land.Q Therefore, from the products of these lands - the proceeds - the obligations to the Bureau of Lands are being discounted from the said proceeds and after the remainder, as in palay, are equally divided, is that what you mean to say ? .A Perhaps they were following the practice that, from the products of the lands the obligations to the Bureau of Lands would be paid.Court: .Q Pero Vd. no ha recibido ninguna cantidad, o sea les darian alguna participation?A No seor, porque estaba en Manila, but they informed me that the obligations to the Bureau of Lands were being paid from the products of the lands.Mr. Viniegra: .Q You do not claim any participation in the remainder of the products after paying the Bureau of Lands? .A How would I ask for I knew they were still paying the obligations to the Bureau of Lands - that was until the Japanese time, and I knew some obligations were not paid, as a result of which the sales certificates of some big lots were cancelled.Court:Q Como se mantenia Vd.? .A Mi madre tenia la casa en Manila y ella recibia alguna renta. My mother helped me. (Session of November 20, 1951, before Judge A. G. Lucero, pp. 259-261, Matro.) (Brief for Defendants-Appellants, pp. 49-51).There is another reason why the above conclusion must be upheld in the case at bar, and that is the fact that in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Mariano Trias, which was instituted in August 1915, the inventory of the estate left by said deceased included the lots purchased from the Friar Lands Estates (Exh. 2, Trias) and the project of partition in said special proceedings submitted to the court as Exh. 3-Trias adjudicated 1/2 of said lands as the share of Mariano Trias in the conjugal properties, the other 1/2 being awarded to Maria C. Ferrer.The above considerations, factual and legal, lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the friar lands purchased as above described and paid for, had the character of conjugal properties of the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. But another compelling legal reason for this conclusion as against plaintiff, is the judicial pronouncement on said nature of the lands in question. In the year 1915, even before the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer took place, the latter was appointed administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Mariano Trias in Civil Case No. 860 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite (Exh. "1" Trias). An inventory of the estate left by the deceased Mariano Trias, dated January 15, 1929, was submitted by her and on April 10, 1929, the project of partition of the properties was submitted. The project includes the friar lands subject of the action, and in accordance with it one-half of the properties listed in the inventory was adjudicated to the deceased Mariano Trias as his share and the other half adjudicated to Maria C. Ferrer also as her share. The share of Mariano Trias was decreed in favor of his children and heirs. This project of partition was approved by Judge Manuel V. Moran in an order dated February 11, 1929, submitted to the Court of Appeals as Annex "E", pp. 114-115 of the record on appeal.The pendency of the above intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Mariano Trias must have been known to plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, who is a lawyer. It does not appear, and neither does he claim or allege, that he ever appeared in said proceedings to claim participation in the properties subject of the proceedings. His failure to intervene in the proceedings to claim that the friar lands or some of them belonged to himself and his wife Maria C. Ferrer, shows a conviction on his part that the said friar lands actually belonged to the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that he had no interest therein. The project of partition was approved as late as 1929, by which time plaintiff and defendant had already been married for a period of 13 years. Plaintiff's failure to assert any claim to the properties in the said intestate proceedings during its pendency now bars him absolutely from asserting the claim that he now pretends to have to said properties.We will now proceed to consider plaintiff's claim that the lands in question had, through the joint effort of himself and his wife, increased in productivity from 900 cavans to 2,400 cavans of rice because of the introduction therein of improvements such as a system of irrigation for the lands. If, as admitted by plaintiff himself, the installments remaining unpaid were taken from the produce or the yield of the said lands and if it be taken into account that one-half of said lands already belonged to the children of the first marriage, to whom the lands were adjudicated in the settlement of the estate of their father, the deceased Mariano C. Trias, the only portion of the products or produce of the lands in which plaintiff could claim any participation is the one-half share therein produced from the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer. How much of said produce belonging to Maria C. Ferrer was actually used in the improvement of the lands is not shown, but the fact that plaintiff was engaged in continuous political campaigns, ever since his marriage in 1916 (he had devoted most of his time while married to Maria C. Ferrer to politics), portions of the products of the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer must have been used in these political campaigns as well as in meeting the expenses of the conjugal partnership. The value of the useful improvements introduced on the lands, joint properties of Maria C. Ferrer and her children, was not proved in court by plaintiff. Hence the provisions of Article 1404 of the old Civil Code, to the effect that useful expenditures for the benefit of the separate properties of one of the spouses are partnership properties, cannot be applied. But even if such useful improvements had been proved, the statute of limitations bars plaintiff' action to recover his share therein because Maria C. Ferrer died in 1934, whereas the present action was instituted by plaintiff only in the year 1948. After the death of Maria C. Ferrer, plaintiff came to Manila, took a second wife, and was not heard from for 14 years, that is, until he instituted this action in 1948. His claim for the improvements, if any, is therefore also barred.1wph1.tThe above ruling, that the action to demand his share in the value of the improvements in the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer is barred, is also applicable to the claim of the plaintiff herein for the construction alleged to have been made and the furniture supposedly bought by him and his spouse Maria C. Ferrer, and which had the character of conjugal partnership property of said spouses. In the year 1935, defendants herein presented a project of partition to plaintiff for his signature (the project of partition is dated March, 1935 and is mark Exhibit "5"-Trias). In this project of partition of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, mention is made of the participation of the plaintiff's children with the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, but no mention is made therein of any participation that plaintiff had or could have as usufruct or otherwise, or in any building or improvement. This deed of partition was shown to plaintif but the latter did not sign it.The express omission of the name of plaintiff here in the above deed of partition as one of the heirs of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer was enough notice to plaintiff that defendants had intended to deprive him of any share or participation in the properties left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, even of the usufruct that the law assigns to him. But in spite of his knowledge of this fact no action was taken by him until February, 1948 when plaintiff demanded his share in the properties and later brought this action.The period of around 13 years therefore elapsed before plaintiff instituted this action. Consequently, whatever rights he may have had to any portion of the estate left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, as a usufructuary or otherwise, must be deemed to have prescribed. As a consequence, we find that the order of Judge Lucero granting to the plaintiff herein one-ninth share in the estate of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer in usufruct should be set aside and the objection to the grant of such share to plaintiff on the ground of prescription is sustained.Having disposed of the claims of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, we will now proceed to consider the cross-claim of his children, namely, Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda. Judge Lucero decreed that the properties left by the deceased Maria C. Pugeda, be divided among her children, including the two cross-claimants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda, and decreed one-ninth of the properties of the said deceased Maria C. Ferrer to each of these two children of hers with the plaintiff and assigning also to the plaintiff one-ninth share in the said estate left by her in usufruct.In view of our finding that the claim of the plaintiff to any share in the estate of his wife Maria C. Ferrer is already barred by the statute of limitations, the decree entered by Judge Lucero declaring that her properties be divided into nine parts, one part belonging to each heir and one to plaintiff in usufruct, is hereby modified, by eliminating the share in usufruct of the plaintiff therein and increasing the share of each of her heirs to one-eighth.FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed, and the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio C. Lucero, presiding, decreeing the division of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer among her eight children and plaintiff, is hereby modified in the sense that all of her properties be divided among her eight children at the rate of one-eight per child. As thus modified, the judgment of Judge Lucero is hereby affirmed. Without costs.

PEDRO V. VILAR,petitioner-appellant,vs. GAUDENCIO V. PARAISO,respondent-appellant.G.R. No. L-8014March 14, 1955In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were among the candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. after the canvass was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso garnered 1,509, and as a result the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly elected with a plurality of 41 votes. However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was then a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the presentquo warrantoproceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be declared null and void. He also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent Paraiso.Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951, that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951, and that even if respondent was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be declared elected to take his place.After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of mayor, being an ecclesiastic, and, consequently, it declared his proclamation as mayor null and void, but refrained from declaring petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so. from this election both parties have appealed, respondent from that portion finding him ineligible, and petitioner from that portion holding he cannot be declared elected as mayor for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so.The case was originally taken to the Court of Appeals. However, as the latter court found that while petitioner raises in his brief only questions of law respondent raises both questions of law and fact, and both appeals are indivisible in that they pertain to only one case, that court resolved to certify it to this Court pursuant to the provisions of sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, upon the theory that one of the appeals is exclusively cognizable by the Supreme Court.The only issue before us is whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, or whether he actually resigned as minister before the date of the elections, and his resignation duly accepted, as claimed, thereby removing his disability. As may be noted, this is a question of fact the determination of which much depends upon the credibility and weight of the evidence of both parties.The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent was ordained as minister of the Evangelical Church of the Philippines in 1944 and as such was given license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries; that since 1944 up to 1950 he acted as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously and without interruption and has been renewing his license to solemnize marriages as prescribed by the regulations of the Bureau of Public Libraries; that on April 19, 1950, respondent transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, having been assigned to work in the same place and chapel during the years 1944-1950; that on April 7, 1951, respondent applied for, and was issued, a license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries as minister of the new church up to the end of April, 1952; that said license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of the united church nor respondent has requested for its cancellation; and that respondent has been publicly known as minister of the United Church of Christ, but he has not attached to his certificate of candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as minister.The evidence for the respondent, on the other hand, tends to show that while he was formerly a minister of the United of Christ in the Philippines, he, however, filed his resignation as such minister on August 21, 1951, because of his desire to engage in politics; that said resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951; that respondent turned over his chapel and his office to the elder members of his religious order on August 21, 1951, and since then he considered himself separated from his order and in fact he has refrained ever since from conducting any religious services pertaining to that order.Which of these versions is correct?After careful examining the evidence of record, and after weighing its credibility and probative value, we have not found any reason for deviating from the finding of the trial court that respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which he belonged and that the resignation he claims to have filed months before the date of the elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office. Indeed, if respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the religious organization to which he belonged for the purpose of launching his candidacy why did he not resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries.1The importance of resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is necessary for the protection of the public. This is specially so with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the official in charge of such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to do. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office.It is true that respondent attempted to substantiate his claim by submitting as evidence certain documents purporting to show the alleged resignation and its acceptance by the cabinet of his church at a meeting held on August 27, 1951, but, considering said documents in the light of the shortcomings we have pointed out above, one cannot help but brand them as self-serving or as documents merely prepared to serve the political designs of respondent in an attempt to obviate his disqualification under the law. And this feeling appears strengthened if we examine the so-called minute book wherein, according to witness Jose Agpalo, are entered the minutes of all the meeting of the church, because upon an examination thereof one would at once get the impression that it was prepared haphazardly and not with such seriousness and solemnity that should characterize the religious activities of a well established religious order. As the trial court aptly remarked "All these lead the court to believe with the petitioner, that the supposed resignation and acceptance were made at a later date to cure the ineligibility of the respondent." We are therefore constrained to hold that respondent is disqualified to hold the office of mayor as found by the trial court.As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible, petitioner can be declared elected, having obtained second place in the elections, our answer is simple: this Court has already declared that this cannot be done in the absence of an express provision authorizing such declaration. Our law not only does not contain any such provision but apparently seems to prohibit it. This is what we said in at least two cases where we laid down a ruling which is decisive of the present case.. . . . In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. (Nuvalvs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645.)Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known as the Revised Election Code, does not provide that if the contestee is declared ineligible the contestant will be proclaimed. Indeed it may be gathered that the law contemplates no such result, because it permits the filing of the contest byanyregistered candidate irrespective of whether the latter occupied the next highest place or the lowest in the election returns. (Llamosovs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil., 489, 47 Off. Gaz., [No. 2] p. 727.)Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390.April 11, 2002]MERCEDITA MATA ARAES,petitioner,vs.JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO,respondent.Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Lawviaa sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void.Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction.A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.We agree.Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.The case at bar is not without precedent. InNavarro vs. Domagtoy,[1]respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.[2](Emphasis supplied.)In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance ofthe law.We further held that:The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.[3]In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. InPeople vs. Lara,[4]we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.[5]Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.[6]WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.

ROSALIA MARTINEZ,plaintiff-appellant,vs. ANGEL TAN,defendant-appellee. G.R. No. L-4904February 5, 1909The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.There was received in evidence at the trial what is called anexpediente de matrimonio civil.It is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same day, signed by the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states the presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the persons who signed it where actually present in the office of the justice on the same day named; that they ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in what they had there asked for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following this is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of September, 1907, in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of the peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the parties were legally married on the day named. The evidence in support of that decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she signed. Second. The evidence of the defendant, who testifies that he and said plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named, together with the witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the document above mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named witnesses, who testifies that the plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before the justice at the time named and did sign the document referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace, who testified that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses above-named, and the justice of the peace were all present in the office of the justice of the peace at the time mentioned.The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never appeared before the justice of the peace and never was married to the defendant. She admits that she signed the document in question, but says that she signed it in her own home, without reading it, and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case, but which we think, when properly considered, is not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married brother and was there for about two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left the house except in her company. But she admitted on cross-examination that she herself went to school every morning and that on one occasion the plaintiff had gone to church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its force when the testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says that at the request of the defendant on the day named, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a Chinese named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother; that she asked the mother of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to her own house for the purpose of examining some dress patterns; that the mother gave her consent and the two rights left the store, but instead of going to the house of the witness they went directly to the office of the justice of the peace where the ceremony took place; that after the ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that the mother was approaching, and that they thereupon hurriedly left the office of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother later found them.The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the justice of the peace, who died after the ceremony was performed and before the trial, and certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of the witnesses for the defendant.The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the appellant in his brief. It appears that during her first examination she was seized with an hysterical attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was adjourned to a future day and was completed in her house where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her collapse was due to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely in stating the office of the justice of the peace was at the time in the municipal building, when, in fact, it was in a private house. We do not think that the record justifies the claim of the appellant. The statement as to the location of the office of the justice of the peace was afterwards corrected by the witness and we are satisfied that she told the facts substantially as they occurred.There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the plaintiff was not telling the truth when she said she did not appear before the justice of the peace. This evidence consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims were all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the others was proven. No. 9 is as follows:ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very angry and if he be informed that we have been married civilly, I am sure that he will turn me out of the house.Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not remain here.Yours, ROSAL.Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning of the 25th of September, is as follows:Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because my sister in law will not let me go there; if it suits you, I believe that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese store, because I don't like to go without Pacita.The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should know anything about it.Yours, ROSAL.It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in the afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also undated, but was evidently written after the marriage before the justice of the peace. It is as follows:Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by and by, at about 9 or 10, when you see that the tide is high because my brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose of loading lumber.Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate the marriage at this time, because I don't like her to know to-day that we have been at the court-house, inasmuch as she told me this morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and that we must not cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist on being married I must do it right.Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what he wishes.Yours, ROSAL.Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows:Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the steamerRosa, for the purpose of asking my father's permission for our marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall do what we deem proper, and, if he does not wish us to marry without his permission, you must request his consent.Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married; my brother ill treatment is a matter of no importance, as every thing may be carried out, with patience.It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamerRosaas indicated in this letter, and that the plaintiff was on the same boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she had no communication with the defendant during the voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc, after consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of procuring the cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named.It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage. General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the justice of the peace said nothing until after the document was signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married." The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so states before the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion amounted to a legal marriage.The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations contained in the complaint. Among these allegations was a statement that the parties had obtain previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The defendant was afterwards allowed to amend his answer so that it was a denial of the allegations of the complaint except that relating to the condition in regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of this amendment. After the trial had commenced the defendant was again allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an admission of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which related to the consent of the parents. It will be seen that this second amendment destroyed completely the first amendment and the defendants lawyer stated that what he intended to allege in his first amendment, but by reason of the haste with which the first amendment was drawn he had unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of what he had intended to state. After argument the court allowed the second amendment. We are satisfied that in this allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see how the plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She proceeded with the trial of the case without asking for a continuance.The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his guardianad litem, Pedro Madridejo,plaintiff-appellee,vs. GONZALO DE LEON, ET AL.,defendants-appellants.G.R. No. L-32473 October 6, 1930

This is a rehearsing of the appeal taken by the defendants, Gonzalo de Leon et al. from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna holding as follows:Wherefore, the court finds that Melecio Madridejo is Domingo de Leon's next of kin, and hereby orders the defendants in case No. 5258 to restore and deliver the ownership and possession of the property described in the complaints filed in the aforesaid case, to Melecio Madridejo, without cost. So ordered.In support of their appeal the defendants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court, to wit:1. The lower court erred in holding that the marriage between Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez is valid.2. The lower court also erred in declaring that solely because of the subsequent marriage of his parents, the appellee Melecio Madridejo, a natural child, was legitimated.3. The lower court lastly erred in not rendering judgment in favor of the defendants and appellants.The relevant facts necessary for the decision of all the questions of fact and of law raised herein are as follows:Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo (Exhibit B). On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the father (Exhibit 2). On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish priest of Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died on the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May, 1928.With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriagein articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.Touching the second assignment of error, there has been no attempt to deny that Melecio Madridejo, the plaintiff-appellee, is the natural son of the Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, The only question to be decided is whether the subsequent marriage of his parents legitimated him.Article 121 of the Civil Code provides:Art. 121. Children shall be considered as legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof.According to this legal provision, in order that a subsequent marriage may be effective as a legitimation, the natural children born out of wedlock must have been acknowledged by the parents either before or after its celebration. The Civil Code has established two kinds of acknowledgment: voluntary and compulsary. Article 131 provides for the voluntary acknowledgment by the father or mother as follows:Art. 131. The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document.Article 135 provides for the compulsary acknowledgment by the father, thus:Art. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the defendant father, justified by the conduct of the father himself of that of his family.3. In cases of rape, seduction, or abduction, the provisions of the Penal Code with regard to the acknowledgment of the issue, shall be observed.Article 136 providing for the compulsory acknowledgment by the mother, reads:Art. 136. The mother may be compelled to acknowlegde her natural child:1. When the child is, with respect to the mother, included in any of the cases mentioned in the next preceding article.2. When the fact of the birth and the identity of the child are fully proven.Let us see whether the plaintiff-appellee, Melecio Madridejo, has been acknowledged by his parents Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, under any of the provisions above quoted.To begin with the father, no document has been adduced to show that he has voluntarily acknowledged Melecio Madridejo as his son, except the registry certificate of birth, Exhibit B. This, of course, is not the record of birth mentioned in the law, for it lacks the requisites of article 48 of the Law of Civil Registry. It, no doubt, is a public instrument, but it has neither been executed nor signed by Pedro Madridejo, and contains no statement by which he acknowledges Melecio Madridejo to be his son. Although as Pedro Madridejo testified, he furnished the municipal secretary of Siniloan with necessary data for recording the birth of Melecio Madridejo, and although said official inscribed the data thus given in the civil registry of births, this is not sufficient to bring it under the legal provision regarding acknowledgment by a public document.As to the mother, it does not appear that Flaviana Perez supplied the data set forth in the civil registry of births, Exhibit B, or in the baptismal register, where of Exhibit 2 is a certificate, and which constitutes final proof only of the baptism, and not of the kinship or parentage of the person baptized (Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil., 350). Furthermore, church registers of baptism are no longer considered public documents (United States vs. Evangelista, 29 Phil., 215).Melecio Madridejo, then, was not voluntarily acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo or Flaviana Perez, either before or after their marriage.1awph!l.netDid Pedro Madridejo acknowledge Melecio Madridejo as his son, by compulsion?The compulsory acknowledgment by the father established in article 135 of the Civil Code, and by the mother according to article 136, requires that the natural child take judicial action against the father or mother, or against the persons setting themselves up as the heirs of both, for the purpose of compelling them to acknowledge him as a natural son through a judgment of the court.In the instant action brought by Melecio Madridejo not only has he not demanded to be acknowledged as a natural child, which is the condition precedent to establishing his legitimation by the subsequent marriage and his right to the estate of his uterine brother, Domingo de Leon, but he has not even impleaded either his father Pedro Madridejo, or the heirs of his mother, Flaviana Perez, in order that the court might have authority to make a valid and effective pronouncement of his being a natural child, and to compel them to acknowledge him as such.The plaintiff-appellee alleges that the second paragraph of the defendants' answer amounts to an admission that he is indeed Flaviana Perez's son, and relieves him of the burden of proving that his mother acknowledged him as a son before her marriage. Such an admission would have been affective if the present action had been brought for the purpose of compelling Flaviana Perez or her heirs to acknowledge the appellee as her son.In view of the foregoing, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said marriage did not legitimate him.Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, the complaint dismissed, and the defendants absolved with costs against the appellee without prejudice to any right he may have to establish or compel his acknowledgment as the natural son of Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez. So ordered.

[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329.March 8, 2001]HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO,petitioner, vs.JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan,respondent.

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.[1]Four children were born out of that marriage.[2]On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.[3]When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.[4]According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy.He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed.Complainant answered in the affirmative.For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment.He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits[5]of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction.In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore.Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.We find merit in the complaint.Article 34 of the Family Code provides:No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time ofmarriage;4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar.It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.[7]In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage.And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial.Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a casethe marriage bonds are not severed.Elsewise stated,legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry.This holds true all the more when the separation is merelyde facto, as in the case at bar.Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years.Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who arelegally capacitatedto marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license.It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to judges,[8]who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.[9]And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[10]ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,with theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.SO ORDERED.ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR.,petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG,respondent.NcmmisG.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death.[1]Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.[2]Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.Scnc mThis petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.[3]However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.[4]The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[5]A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6]the absence of which renders the marriagevoid ab initiopursuant to Article 80(3)[7]in relation to Article 58.[8]The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.[9]This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution."[10]Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State.[11]This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"[12]and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,[14]referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.[15]To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.Sdaa misoThere is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."[16]The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during t