Marked-up Rev 1 to Allegation Investigation Repts 4-83-A ... · Due to the findings in Mercury...

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4# R6Mistotd 1 FiftAt W . ' - 06/06/84 Is , SSER Task: Allegations A-02, A-208, A-274 Reference: 4-83-A-48/2; 4-84-A-06/96; 4-84-A-06/156 Characterization: The allegation is that QC inspectors from the Mercury Construction Company were not properly certified for their positions. Assessment of Allegation: The implied significance of this allegation is that QC inspectors with the Mercury Construction Company may have been incorrectly certified because they lacked the required education and experience. The safety significance is that unqualified OC inspectors may have inspected safety-related systems, thereby rendering verification of the quality of these systems indeterminant. The original licensing commitment for QC inspector qualifications by LP&L as stated in the PSAR was to the " green book" ANSI N45.2.6, 1973. The NRC task force staff determined that LP&L's commitments, as required in NRC Generic Letter 81-01, are inadequate in that they have committed to ANSI N45.2.6, 1978, and Regulatory Guide 1.58, Revision 1, for Operations only. The commit- ment to these standards was never imposed by LP&L on the site contractors for the construction phase of Waterford Unit 3. Due to the findings in Mercury Company the scope of the review was expanded to other contractors. This issue was addressed by) reviews of the Mercury, Tompkins-Beckwith (T-B), and GE0 Testing (ANST/TC-1A QC inspection qualification procedures, ANSI N45.2.6, 1973, along with certification and resume packages. NRC reviewed inspector certifications for 37 of the 100 Mercury QC inspectors, includint certifications for all Level III personnel. Twelve inspector certifications were found questionable due to insufficient education or experience. The certification records of 38 T-B QC inspectors were selected at random and reviewed. Thirteen inspector certifications were found questionable due to insufficient education or experience. The T-B certification procedure was determined to be inadequate when compared to the standards referenced in NRC Generic Letter 81-01. The certification records of 40 GE0 Construction Testing NDE inspectors also were selected at random and reviewed to GE0 Procedures and ASNT/TC-1A. All were found to be acceptable. This allegation has implied safety significance and will adversely affect fuel load. It is also indicative of a generic site problem for inspector certification. The full scope of the problem cannot be determined until the equipment and systems can be re-inspected by qualified inspectors. I e5100103S3Op00 02 PDR ADOCK O PDR E _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

Transcript of Marked-up Rev 1 to Allegation Investigation Repts 4-83-A ... · Due to the findings in Mercury...

Page 1: Marked-up Rev 1 to Allegation Investigation Repts 4-83-A ... · Due to the findings in Mercury Company the scope of the review was expanded to other contractors. This issue was addressed

4# R6Mistotd 1FiftAt W .' -

06/06/84Is,

SSER

Task: Allegations A-02, A-208, A-274

Reference: 4-83-A-48/2; 4-84-A-06/96; 4-84-A-06/156

Characterization: The allegation is that QC inspectors from the MercuryConstruction Company were not properly certified for their positions.

Assessment of Allegation: The implied significance of this allegation isthat QC inspectors with the Mercury Construction Company may have beenincorrectly certified because they lacked the required education andexperience. The safety significance is that unqualified OC inspectors mayhave inspected safety-related systems, thereby rendering verification of thequality of these systems indeterminant.

The original licensing commitment for QC inspector qualifications by LP&L asstated in the PSAR was to the " green book" ANSI N45.2.6, 1973. The NRCtask force staff determined that LP&L's commitments, as required in NRC GenericLetter 81-01, are inadequate in that they have committed to ANSI N45.2.6,1978, and Regulatory Guide 1.58, Revision 1, for Operations only. The commit-ment to these standards was never imposed by LP&L on the site contractors forthe construction phase of Waterford Unit 3.

Due to the findings in Mercury Company the scope of the review was expandedto other contractors.

This issue was addressed by) reviews of the Mercury, Tompkins-Beckwith (T-B),and GE0 Testing (ANST/TC-1A QC inspection qualification procedures, ANSIN45.2.6, 1973, along with certification and resume packages.

NRC reviewed inspector certifications for 37 of the 100 Mercury QC inspectors,includint certifications for all Level III personnel. Twelve inspectorcertifications were found questionable due to insufficient education orexperience.

The certification records of 38 T-B QC inspectors were selected at random andreviewed. Thirteen inspector certifications were found questionable due toinsufficient education or experience. The T-B certification procedure wasdetermined to be inadequate when compared to the standards referenced in NRCGeneric Letter 81-01.

The certification records of 40 GE0 Construction Testing NDE inspectors alsowere selected at random and reviewed to GE0 Procedures and ASNT/TC-1A. Allwere found to be acceptable.

This allegation has implied safety significance and will adversely affect fuelload. It is also indicative of a generic site problem for inspectorcertification. The full scope of the problem cannot be determined until theequipment and systems can be re-inspected by qualified inspectors.

I

e5100103S3Op00 02PDR ADOCK O PDRE

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FPotentialViolations: Inspectors may have been incorrectly certified because,_ .--

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J[nsufficient education or a lack of previous experience.

Actions Required: Prior to fuel load, LP&L shall: (1) verify the professionalcredentials of 100% of the past and present site QA/QC personnel, including

unqualified, and (3)gers, (2) reinspect the work performed by inspectors foundsupervisors and mana

verify the proper certification of the remaining siteQA/QC personnel to ANSI N45.2.6,1973.

References:

.1. ' Mercury Procedure, " Qualification of Inspection, Examination and TestPersonnel," Rev. October 31, 1982.

2. ANSI N45.2.6, 1978.

3. Certification and resume data.

4. American Society for Non-destructive Testing Recommended Practice,ASNT/TC-IA.

Prepared by: R. Westberg Date

Reviewed by: Team Leader Date

Reviewed by: Site Team Leader (s) Date

Approved by: Task Management Date.

,

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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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Page 4: Marked-up Rev 1 to Allegation Investigation Repts 4-83-A ... · Due to the findings in Mercury Company the scope of the review was expanded to other contractors. This issue was addressed

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HttAt Rt'*'M .dg; ... , *" 06/06/84|.

SSER

Task: Allegations A-02, A-208, A-274 -

Reference: 4-83-A-48/2; 4-84-A-06/96; 4-84-A-06/156

Characterization: The allegation is that QC inspectors from the MercuryConstruction Company were not properly certified for their positions.

Assessment of Allegation: The implied significance of this allegation isthat QC inspectors with the Mercury Construction Company may have beenincorrectly certified because they lacked the required education andexperience. The safety significance is that unqualified OC inspectors nayhave inspected safety-related systems, thereby rendering verification of thequality of these systems indetenninant.

h'TheoriginallicensingcommitmentforQCinspectorqualificationsbyLP&Lasth4 f stated in the PSAR was to the " green book" ANSI N45.2.6, 1973. The NRC1 / task force staff determined that LP&L's comitments, as required in NRC Genericcib i Letter 81-01, are . inadequate in that they have committed to ANSI N45.2.6,

1, ff ) 1978, and Regulato'ry Guide 1.58, Revision 1, for erations only. The commit-MV 1 ment to these standards was never imposed by LP8

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k. the construction Sib scue RowGd d OM1 g & ale kphase of Waterford Unit,3. ttw&xta Lt4 QhuAiu{a ctuGR:Lym %C JX

pI [p'2 Due to the findings In hercury Company,tNe scope'of the review was expandedMp,

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to other contractors.

.This issue was addressed by) reviews of the Mercury, Tompkins-Beckwith (T-B),h)and GE0 Testing (ANST/TC-1A QC inspection qualification procedures, ANSI cN45.2.6, 1973, abag wMh certification and resume packages. 7r** AM mf

NfNRC reviewed inspector certifications for 37 of the 100 Mercury QC inspectors,[c d-including certifications for all Level III personnel. Twelve inspector

certifications were found questionable due to insufficient education or 7 3 H.

experience. u%c'., em\an d le UAMn &c WE a W18 Mabe+ c( k>

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#The certificatgn,fn hispector certifications were found questionable due torg ords of 38 T-B QC inspectors were selected at random andreviewed. TM9thinsufficient education or exrerience. The T-B certification procedure was -

determined to be inadequate when compared to-the-standards-referenced-in-NRC jGeneric 4etter-81-01v Ib G M46 2-(>n,IT73

of > x* # _4The certification records of 40 GE0 Construction Testing NDE inspectors also

were selected at random and reviewed to GEO Procedures and ASNT/TC-1A. All -

were found to be acceptable.Ch '[

This allegation has implied safety significance and Ki>1.1, adversely affect fuel r,,load. It is also indicative of a generic site problem for inspector 'b hcertification. The full scope of the problem cannot be determined until the S7equipment and systems can-berre-inspected by qualified inspectors. $ .7 $% )( h 041av.7 y>g

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fPotential Violations: Inspectors may have been incorrectly certified becaus 4

pnsufficient education or a lack of previous experience.

Actions Required: Prior to fuel load, LP&L shall: (1) verify the professionalcredentials of 100% of the past and present site QA/QC personnel, includingsupervisors and managers, (2) reinspect the work performed by inspectors foundunqualified, and (3) verify the proper certification o the remaining site

3QA/QC personnel to ANSI N45.2.6,,

l'1/f [ bhAReferences:

1. Mercury Procedure, " Qualification of Inspection, Examination and TestPersonnel," Rev. October 31, 1982.

2. ANSI N45.2.6, 1978. ') /\ N S1 IJ 46,2,6, l'f Td .3. Certification and resume data.

~

4. American Society for Non-destructive. Testing Recommended Practice,ASNT/TC-1A.

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-

Prepared by: R. Westberg Date,

Reviewed by: Team Leader Date

-

Reviewed by: Site Team Leader (s) Date

~.

Approved by: Task Management Date

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. ..

---

06/06/84---

SSER

,

Task: Allegations A-02, A-208, A-274 -

Reference: 4-83-A-48/2; 4-84-A-06/96; 4-84-A-06/156

Characterization: The allegation is that QC inspectors from the MercuryConstruction Company were not properly certified for their positions.

Assessment of Allegation: The implied significance of this allegation isthat QC inspectors with the Mercury Construction Company may have beenincorrectly certif.ed because they lacked the required education andexperience. The safety significance is that unqualified OC inspectors may

| have inspected safety-related systems, thereby rendering verification of the' quality of these systems indeterminant.|

|- The original licensing commitment for QC inspector qualifications by LP&L as| stated in the PSAR was to the " green book" ANSI N45.2.6, 1973. The NRC! task force staff determined that LP&L's commitments, as required in NRC Generic

Letter 81-01, are jnadequate in that they have committed to ANSI N45.2.6,/ 1978, and Regulato'ry. Guide 1.58, Revision.1, for .0perations only. The commit-'

ment t5'these standards was never imposed by LP&L on the site contractors forthe construction phase of Waterford Unit 3. ~

Due to the findings in Mercury Company the scope'of the review was expandedto other contractors.

This issue was addressed by reviews of the Mercury, Tompkins-Beckwith (T-B),and GEO Testing (ANST/TC-1A) QC inspection qualification procedures, ANSIN45.2.6, 1973, along with certification and resume packages.

NRC reviewed inspector certifications for 37 of the 100 Mercury QC inspectors,including certifications for all Level III personnel. Twelve inspectorcertifications were found questionable due to insufficient education orexperience.

The certification records of 38 T-B QC inspectors were selected at random andreviewed. Thirteen inspector certifications were found questionable due toinsufficient education or experience. The T-B certification procedure wasdetermined to be inadequate when compared to the standards referenced in NRCGeneric Letter 81-01. -

The certification records of 40 GE0 Construction Testing NDE inspectors alsowere selected at random and reviewed to GEO Procedures and ASNT/TC-1A. Allwere found to be acceptable.

This allegation has implied safety significance and will adversely affect fuel4

load. It is also indicative of a generic site problem for inspectorcertification. The full scope of the problem cannot be determined until theequipment and systems can be re-inspected by qualified inspectors.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

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- . . .- .. . - . - _ - .-. . _. . _ .. _ . - _- . .

%,* ;

-2-.

Potential Violations: Inspectors may have been incorrectly certified because[}__.insufficient education or a lack of pr evious experience.

,,,

Actions Required: Prior to fuel load, LP&L shall: (1) verify the professionalcredentials of 100% of the past and present site QA/QC personnel, includingsupervisors and managers, (2) reinspect the work performed by inspectors foundunqualified, and (3) verify the proper certification of the remaining siteQA/QC personnel to ANSI N45.2.6,1973.

References:

I 1. Mercury Procedure, " Qualification of Inspection, Examination and TestPersonnel " Rev. October 31, 1982.

2. ANSI N45.2.6, 1978.

3. Certification and resume data.

4. American Soci"ety for Non-destructive. Testing Recommended Practice, 1

ASNT/TC-1A.,-

--

I

I Prepared by: R. Westberg Date-

|

.

|

t

Reviewed by: Team Leader Date

i .

|

! Reviewed by: Site Team Leader (s) Date

| Approved by: Task Management Date|

|

,

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