MARINES AND HELICOPTERS - koreanwar2.org. . . the evolution of a set of principles governing the...

MARINES AND HELICOPTERS1946 - 1962

ByLieutenant Colonel Eugene W. Rawlins, USMC

Edited byMajor William J. Sambito, USMC

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIO N

HEADQUARTERS, U . S . MARINE CORP S

WASHINGTON, D . C .

1976

Library of Congress Card No . 76-60005 2

PCN 190 003069 00

FOREWORD

This history, which traces the development of helicopters in the Marine Corps from 1946 to 1962, offer sa tribute to the creative vision and planning of a handful of Marine officers who conceived of the vertica lassault concept in amphibious operations at a time when suitable aircraft to make it work did not exist . Thestory of the subsequent struggle to procure and develop those aircraft, to refine a doctrine for their employ-ment, and to familiarize the Marine Corps with their use is an interesting and vital part of modern Marin eCorps history. The documentary basis for this monograph was primarily the official records of the MarineCorps and Navy Department, but considerable use was made of interviews and correspondence with key

individuals involved in all phases of helicopter development .The author, Lieutenant Colonel Eugene W . Rawlins, received his Bachelor of Arts degree in histor y

from California State University at Fullerton . His experience in Marine Corps aviation includes tours i n

fighter, attack, transport, and helicopter aircraft . During a period of separation from the Marine Corps hewas employed by Sikorsky Aircraft as a production test pilot and later flew for San Francisco and Oaklan d

Helicopter Airlines . After returning to the Marine Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Rawlins served in Vietna mwith HMM—361 and -364 in 1963—1964. Three years later he returned to Vietnam for a tour with HMH—463 .In 1971 after an assignment as Commanding Officer, HMH—361 at Santa Ana, he came to the History an d

Museums Division where he remained until July 1973 .Comment copies of the manuscript were sent to many individuals involved with both the conceptua l

and operational aspects of Marine helicopter development . Major William J . Sambito incorporated thes e

comments and edited the manuscript for printing . Major Sambito earned his Bachelor of Arts degree i npsychology from Colby College, Maine, and is an experienced helicopter pilot who served with HMM—26 2

and -165 during the Vietnam War . After attending the Armed Forces Staff College in January 1975, h e

was assigned to the History and Museums Division.The History and Museums Division welcomes any comments on the narrative and additional informatio n

or illustrations which might enhance a future edition .

Reviewed and approved :

E . H. SIMMON S

31 December 1976

Brigadier General, U .S . Marine Corps (Retired )Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

iii

PREFACE

. . . the evolution of a set of principles governing the helicopter employmen tcannot wait for the perfection of the craft itself, but must proceed concurrentl ywith that development . . . .

COLONEL VICTOR H. KRULAK, USMC1948

During the early stages of helicopter development, when helicopters were able to lift just slightly mor ethan their own weight, the military services were eagerly seeking to obtain a variety of larger, more usefu lhelicopters . The youthful helicopter industry expressed optimism, although at times unrealistic, in it sability to meet the military requirements .

The development of the helicopter program within the Marine Corps was sparked by the foresight an dimagination of the officers of the period . While early helicopters provided stepping stones for an orderl yprogression of the program, the slowness of the technical advances and the periods of financial austerit yafter World War II and Korea prevented the Marine Corps from developing the vertical envelopmen tconcept as rapidly as desired . The program gained interest and momentum, however, as a result of th esuccess of helicopters in Korea . As Lieutenant General Gerald C . Thomas stated : "Indeed, the helicoptergave clear evidence, from its first tactical employment, that a major advance in combat was at hand ."

The division owes a special debt of gratitude to those who commented on the manuscript and provide dvaluable insight and assistance . Particularly helpful were the responses of General Vernon E . Megee ,USMC (Ret) ; Lieutenant Generals Edward A . Craig, USMC (Ret) and Victor H . Krulak, USMC (Ret) ;Major Generals Norman J . Anderson, USMC (Ret), George S . Bowman, Jr., USMC (Ret), Frank H .Lamson-Scribner, USMC (Ret), and Noah C . New, USMC ; Colonel George W. Herring, USMC (Ret) ;and Mr . Robert L. Sherrod.

Appreciation is also extended to the many government and military historians and archivists wh oassisted in the collection of the reference material . An additional note of gratitude is extended to Mr . Beni sM. Frank and Mr . Jack Shulimson of the Historical Branch for their help and encouragement .

The monograph was produced under the editorial direction of Mr. Henry I . Shaw, Jr ., Chief Historianof the History and Museums Division. The manuscript was typed and indexed by Miss Cathy Stoll an dprepared for publication by the Production Editor, Mr . Douglas Johnston . Most of the photographs used inthis monograph are official Department of Defense (Marine Corps) photographs from the History an dMuseums Division . Other photographs were provided by the U .S. Naval Historical Center, Kamen Aircraf tCorporation, and the U .S. National Archives .

‘‘.P

C e•? •4fe.0t.f.t.

WILLIAM J . SAMBITO

EUGENE W. RAWLIN SMajor, U.S. Marine Corps

Lieutenant Colonel, U .S. Marine Corps

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWOR D

PREFACE v

INTRODUCTION 1Early Helicopter Developments 1Initial Procurements And Designs 4HRP—1 Development 4HJP—1 Utility and Rescue Evaluation 7HTL—1 Trainer 7Designs For The Future 7Helicopter Applications 7Early Outlook 9

CHAPTER 1 . THE ADVENT 1 1The Quest For An Alternative 1 1A Helicopter Program For 1947 1 4Assault Helicopter Characteristics And Design Problems 1 5

CHAPTER 2 . CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT 1 9Commissioning And Operations Of HMX—1 1 9Initial Request For An Observation Helicopter 2 1Operation PACKARD II

24-------------------------------------------_______ _Publication Of The New Concept—PHIB 31 25Other Significant Demonstrations And Operations By HMX—1 26

CHAPTER 3 . A REVITALIZED HELICOPTER PROGRAM 30The Marine Corps Board 30The Second Attempt To Procure A 3,000-Pound Payload Helicopter 3 1The First Six Months Of 1950 33Further Action By The Marine Corps Board 3 5Initial Interest In The Kaman Helicopter 3 7The Beginning In Retrospect 3 8

CHAPTER 4 . KOREAN WAR EXPANSION 40Plans For An Accelerated Helicopter Program 40Awarding Of The First Assault Transport Helicopter Contract 46Related Events To The Expanded Helicopter Program 47Tactics And Techniques Board Report Of 1951 48Activation Of The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing 5 21952 Aircraft Plans For The Future 5 4Peripheral Aspects Of The Period 5 7

CHAPTER 5 . SEEKING A NEW ORDER OF MOBILITY 59A Concept For Future Amphibious Operations 59Initial Determination Of The Marine Corps Helicopter Aircraft Requirements 59The Advanced Research Group 6 1Landing Force Bulletin Number 17 6 5The Smith Board 6 6A Reduced HR2S Program 6 8

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viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 6 . A PERIOD OF REEVALUATION—A MODERATE CAPABILITY 70HQMC Study Number 3--1956 70Marine Corps Aviation 5-Year Program, 1957–1962 72The Hogaboom Board Of 1956 73Forced Reduction 7 8Growth And Changes Under Austere Conditions 1956–1962 79Implementation Of The Hogaboom Board Recommendations 80

CHAPTER 7 . BEGINNING THE TRANSITION TO TURBINE-POWERED HELICOPTERS 8 2Selection Of The CH–46 8 2Choosing A Heavy Helicopter 8 3The Selection Of An Assault Support Helicopter 8 5The Essex Class Carrier As An Interim LPH 8 7One-Man Helicopters 8 9------------________The Flying Crane Helicopter 9 0Robot (Remotely Controlled) Helicopters 9 1VTOL Aircraft As They Pertain To Helicopters 9 2

NOTES 9 7

APPENDICES10 510610 7109110

A . AbbreviationsB. Helicopter Designations C . ChronologyD. Helicopter SpecificationsE . Helicopters On Hand 1947–1962

INDEX 11 3

INTRODUCTIO N

Early Helicopter Developments

The commissioning of Marine Helicopte rSquadron 1 (HMX–1) in 1947 at Quantico, Vir-ginia, is often cited as the official beginning ofrotary-winged aviation within the Marine Corps .Interest by the Marine Corps in the capabilitie sand potentialities of rotary-winged machines, how -ever, dates back some 15 years prior to the com-missioning of HMX–1 . It was in the early 1930 sthat the Marine Corps evaluated the Pitcairn OP– 1autogyro to determine its potential military value .Field tested in Nicaragua during 1932, the four -bladed, stubby-winged aircraft was found suit -able only for liaison purposes and medical evacua-tion of the lightly wounded . Considered by thosein Nicaragua as unsafe to fly when carrying loadsin excess of 200 pounds, the OP–1 soon dis-appeared from active Marine Corps inventory .Three years later the Marine Corps tested anothe rautogyro, the Kellett OP–2, a wingless versio nsimilar to the OP–1, and found it to be equall yunsatisfactory due to its small payload capability .The epitaph of the autogyro as a useful Marin eCorps rotor-winged aircraft was written in 193 6by Lieutenant Colonel Roy S . Geiger, an earl ypioneer in Marine aviation who had served as apilot in World War I and in the ground forcesin Nicaragua, the Philippines and China . In amemorandum for his brigade commander, Geige rsaid, in his position as Commanding Officer, Air -craft One, Fleet Marine Force, Quantico, Virginia ,in relation to the autogyro :

To date no type of autogyro has been demonstrate dwhich will carry a reasonable fuel supply and militaryload and at the same time retain its peculiar char-acteristics of taking off and landing in a restricte darea and hovering over a given spot . Until such tim eas this type aircraft can carry a satisfactory militar yload and retain its flying characteristics its use [by ]the Marine Corps is not recommended. )

Although the autogyro contributed substantiall yto rotary-wing development, a useful configurationof .a helicopter continued to elude designers andinventors. It was not until 1939 that Igor I .Sikorsky, a Russian-born aircraft designer an dbuilder, successfully test flew the first practical

The Pitcairn Autogyro was the first rotary-wingedMarine aircraft. Field tested in Nicaragua, it soon dis-appeared from the active inventory (Marine Corps Phot o515209) .

helicopter in the Western Hemisphere .* This wa sthe Vought-Sikorsky 300 (VS–300),** 2 a 28-foot, 3-bladed main rotor helicopter with an opencockpit and powered by a 4-cylinder, 75-horse-power engine .

The building of a rotary-winged machine and

* The world's first practical helicopter appeared i n1937 in Germany. This was the Focke-Achgeles 61a whichhad two main rotors mounted side-by-side on outrigger sextending from an airplane-type fuselage. The FA–61 ha dgood control ; it was once flown inside a 100-by-300-foo texhibition hall in Berlin by a woman pilot, Henn aReitsch.

* * In 1929 Sikorsky Aviation Corporation became asubsidiary of United Aircraft which in turn merged th eSikorsky and Chance Vought Divisions in 1939 to for mVought-Sikorsky. Still later, in 1942, Vought-Sikorsky wasseparated, with Chance Vought remaining in Stratford ,Connecticut, and Sikorsky Aircraft Division moving a shortdistance away to Bridgeport.

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2

MARINES AND HELICOPTERS 1946–1962

subsequent success with the VS–300 were not sur-prising in view of Igor I . Sikorsky 's previousexperimentation in the field . As early as 1910 ,while still in Europe, he had designed and built acoaxial helicopter with a 25-horsepower engin edriving two 16-foot contra-rotating rotors througha concentric shaft. Unfortunately, the machinecould lift only its own weight. Consequently, Si-korsky turned his talents to designing fixed-win gaircraft .

In 1919, six years after building the world's firs tsuccessful four-engine aircraft, Igor Sikorsky emi-grated from Russia and settled in Connecticu twhere he continued to pursue the manufacturin gof large land and seaplanes . Then, in 1938, h eagain turned his talent to the field of rotary-win gaircraft and began the most difficult constructio nof all helicopter designs—the single rotor . Whilehis past experiments had been with the coaxia lconfiguration, Sikorsky preferred the single liftin grotor with a small anti-torque tail rotor . He con -

sidered it to be the best rotor arrangement for ahelicopter rather than the more popular side-by-side or tandem lifting rotors .

Realizing the potential value of Sikorsky's newhelicopter, the U.S . Army Air Corps awarded acontract to Vought-Sikorsky * on 10 Januar y1941 for an experimental machine, the XR-4 ,which was to be built on an expanded scale of theVS–300 . Exactly one year later the first R–4 flewat the Sikorsky plant, with subsequent improvedversions, the R–5 and R–6, taking to the air i nAugust and October of 1943 .

Enlarged in size to suit a 450-horsepower engine ,the R–5 eventually proved to be the most success-ful of the three types . The R–4 and R–6 wer epowered by 175- and 245-horsepower engines, re-spectively. Later, the two-passenger R–5 (H02S–1 )was further redesigned to meet civilian and mili -

• The Air Corps was acting under a 1939 interservic eagreement which gave the Army the initial responsibilit yfor the development of all U . S . helicopters.

The robot OP—1 never got past the testing stage (National Archives Photo 80—G—215856) .

INTRODUCTION

3

tary requirements and became, in August 1946, th efirst helicopter to be sold to a commercial operator .This three-passenger version of the R–5, while re-taining its 450-horsepower engine, was designatedby Sikorsky as the S–51 and by the Navy in 1946as the HO3S–1 .

While Sikorsky was the first designer to build apractical helicopter, other American designers soo nproduced successful and useful rotary-wingedmachines . In 1943, Frank N . Piasecki, a Pennsyl-vania engineer, founded the P-V * Engineerin gForum at Sharon Hills, Pennsylvania . Piaseckistarted his company at age 21 with a wealth ofknowledge gained by working on various design sof autogyros while employed by the Platt-LePageAircraft Company in Eddystone, Pennsylvania . Hebuilt a small, 3-bladed, single-rotor helicopter, th ePV–2, which made its first flight in April 1943 .The 1,000-pound gross weight, single-place ma -chine was the first helicopter to incorporate cyclic

* Piasecki-Venzi . In 1946 the company 's name changedto Piasecki Helicopter Corporation, to Vertol AircraftCorporation in 1956, in 1960 to Vertol Division, Boein gCompany, and in 1972 to the Boeing Vertol Company ,a division of the Boeing Company .

control and to have dynamically balanced blades .Both of these features were major advancement sto the flight control system of a helicopter . Al -though the PV–2 was Piasecki's first helicopter toachieve flight, it was also the only single roto rdesign the company would build since advance ddesigns of other types were already on the com-pany's drawing boards .

A third helicopter manufacturer appeared o nthe scene in the early 1940s, the Bell Aircraft Cor-poration, of Buffalo, New York . An establishedfixed-wing aircraft manufacturer, Bell began heli-copter development early in 1942 in a garag elocated in Gardenville, New York . To the thou-sands of employees at the nearby fixed-wing plan tin Buffalo, the secret project was known only a s"Gyro Tests . " The goal was to develop and con-struct a two-place helicopter . Within the next threeyears the independently operating group had suc-cessfully developed three single rotor helicopters .The first aircraft, designated Bell Model 30-1, wa sa 1,300-pound, single-place, cigar-shaped craft withan open cockpit . The second machine, Model 30–2 ,was a two-place, closed-cockpit design, with th e

The Sikorsky H03S—1 became operational in 1946 (Marine Corps Photo 529985) .

4

MARINES AND HELICOPTERS 1946—1962

Lieutenant General Roy S . Geiger, an early aviatio npioneer (Marine Corps Photo 1 130 65) .

third configuration, Model 30—3, having a three -place capacity .

The Model 30 proved to be so successful tha tthe president, Larry D . Bell, who began his careerin 1912 with the Martin Aircraft Company ,approved production of a refined version of th ethird experimental machine . By 1946 Bell hadconstructed 10 helicopters of the new version anddesignated them as the Bell Model 47, one of whichwas issued a Type Certificate H—1 by the Civi lAeronautics Administration on 8 May 1946 . Thiswas the first commercial license to be issued to ahelicopter .

These three manufacturers (Bell, Piasecki, an dSikorsky) most directly influenced the develop-ment of both the Navy's and Marine Corps ' heli-copter programs. Other manufacturers, though,were actively engaged in experimental helicopte rdesign and construction . Few, however, would pro -duce a model suitable for military use, and thos enot until the next decade .

Initial Procurements and Design s

As one observer stated, "before Igor Sikorsk yflew the VS—300 there was no helicopter industry ;after he flew it, there was ." Without military pro-curement of helicopters, prompted by World War

II, it is doubtful that the industry as a whole wouldhave blossomed so rapidly . Navy procurements o fSikorsky helicopters followed closely those madeby the Army Air Forces, and in some instances ,joint procurement of the same machine was madeby the two services . Both the R—4 and R—6 model swere accepted by the Navy during World War II ,with a significant number of R—5s under contract.With the end of the war, however, the Navy can -celled production of the R—5 except for two air -craft. By the end of 1946, the total number o fhelicopters in Navy inventory was 20 : 7 R—4s(HNS), 9 R—6s (HOS), and 4 Sikorsky commer-cial Model S—51s (HO3S—1) .4 The four HO3S—l swere procured "off the shelf " in November andDecember of that year for use in the Antarctic o nOperation HIGHJUMP. This low inventory figur ewas only temporary as the manufacturers wer eeagerly working on improved models designed tomeet present and future military requirements .

HRP—1 Development

All the small Sikorsky helicopters and the Pia-secki PV—2 lacked the lifting capacity necessar yto perform a rescue mission involving the carryin gof more than one person, but more lifting abilit yand passenger space meant a larger helicopter .One method of obtaining a larger design, was totake a "proven" configuration and multiply it b y1 1/2 or 2 times its original size . At this time, how -ever, the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer )wanted to stay within the scope of existing com-ponent development and eliminate as . many un-known areas of design and construction as pos-sible.' Therefore, BuAer decided to approve th edesign of a helicopter with two smaller lift rotors ,each approximately 40 feet in diameter rather thanattempt construction of a larger rotor system (60to 70 feet in diameter) which was still in the earl ydesign stage . '

In May 1943, prior to the flight of the PV—2 ,Piasecki had discussed with BuAer a design for ahelicopter with two main rotors in tandem, oneforward and one aft .' The power plant would driv ethe two 37-foot diameter rotors through reductiongearing and shafting . It would carry a usefulload * of about 1,800 pounds,' by far the bes t

* Useful load is defined as the difference betweenthe empty weight of the aircraft and the overall gros s(maximum) weight at take-off. Useful load includes th eweight of the pilot, fuel, oil, any other special equipment ,and the payload . Payload, however, is quite variable. I tis not only a function of distance but also of many other

factors including altitude of operation, fuel load, tempera-ture, humidity, and wind conditions .

INTRODUCTION

5

lifting capability of any helicopter to that date .Piasecki's May 1943 proposal conformed some -

what to BuAer's desire, although there was con-siderable doubt as to whether a tandem machin ecould be made to fly—mainly because of the inter-ference of the air-flow to the rear rotor and th eproblem of longitudinal control . After almost ayear of negotiations and study, BuAer awardedPiasecki a contract in early 1944 for the tande mrotored machine, the XHRP–X . This was theNavy's first experimental helicopter, a design ar-rangement which never received serious attentio nby any of the leading helicopter manufacturer sexcept Piasecki .9

Development of the XHRP–X into a final designacceptable for Navy use was slow . The policy ofBuAer required the contractor to produce a full -sized flying model without Navy inspection o rinterference, with the idea that the contract wouldbe cancelled if the model did not prove success -

fu1 . 10 The plan also required the test aircraft ,XHRP–X, or " Dogship," to be flown by the con -tractor prior to commencing construction of th efirst production type HRP–1 .

The "flying banana, " as the HRP–1 was laternicknamed, and also referred to as the "saggingsausage, " was designed to be powered by a 600 -horsepower engine driving the two 41-foot rotors .With a full fuel load and a crew of two, it was t ocarry 900 pounds and cruise at 75 miles per hour .The cargo space could accommodate seats fo r10 passengers and would measure 14 feet longand 5 feet wide .

Within one year after receiving the contract ,Piasecki built and successfully flew the PV– 3(XHRP–X) . The March 1945 flight of the "Dog -ship" paved the way for design and constructionof the 6,400-pound gross weight HRP–1 . Unfor-tunately, the first production aircraft would not b e

The HRP—1 by Piasecki was also called the "flying banana" and became operational in 1948 (Marine Corps Phot oA-55644) .

6

MARINES AND HELICOPTERS 1946-1962

Marines disembark from HRP—1 during a demonstration at Quantico, Va ., on 30 November 1948 (Marine Corps Phot o528063 )

The HRP—2 replaced the HRP—1 and provided greater payload and higher speed (Marine Corps Photo 529983) .

INTRODUCTION

7

delivered to the Navy for almost two years afte rBuAer approved the contract .

The HJP—1 Utility and RescueEvaluation

Since the Army Air Forces was supporting th esingle main rotor configuration, the Navy turne dto other types of rotor arrangements, not bein gsold on any one design in particular . 1 ' In an effor tto obtain the best ship-based helicopter for spot-ting, rescue, and utility missions on board battle-ships and cruisers, the Navy, in 1946, contractedwith both Sikorsky and Piasecki for two heli-copters from each company. The competitive con -tract resulted in Piasecki developing the PD–1 4(XHJP–1) , the first overlapping tandem-rotor heli-copter, while Sikorsky entered the S–53 (XHJS–1) ,a design using many components of the R– 5(HO2S–1) . According to preliminary characteris-tics and design performance requirements, bothmachines were to be configured for a gross weightof less than 5,000 pounds including two passengers .

After comparative evaluation, the Navy selecte dthe Piasecki XHJP–1 over the Sikorsky XHJS–1 .One major reason for the selection of the XHJP– 1(later redesignated by the Navy as the HUP–1 )was that the Sikorsky model required a ballas tchange in order to accommodate a change in th eloading .' Sikorsky designed another helicopter t ocorrect the ballast problem but was too late forentry into the utility evaluation . The HUP–1 wasfinally developed for the Navy with a 600-horse-power engine and seats for four passengers . Thehelicopter was restricted to a gross weight o f6,000 pounds and an air speed of 104 knots .

The HTL—1 Trainer

With Piasecki's XHRP–1 in production and theXHJP–1 in the design stage, the Navy took furthe rsteps to acquire a suitable trainer and settled upo nthe Bell Model 47 . Late in 1946 Bell Aircraf tCorporation was awarded a contract for the firs tof a long series of Navy HTLs, a slightly modifie dversion of the Model 47 .

Designs for the Future

As early as the summer of 1944, the Navy hadawarded a contract to the McDonnell Aircraft

Corporation, St . Louis, Missouri, for the world ' sfirst twin-engine helicopter to operate in the10,000-pound gross weight class and to provide"greater insight into the problems of helicopterdesign ." Variations of rotor diameter, roto-engin egear ratio, and control sensitivity were possible i nthe large helicopter . The Navy-designated XHJD–1 ,which first flew in August 1944, cruised over 10 0miles per hour and carried a useful load of morethan 3,000 pounds . The two 46-foot rotors whichturned in opposite directions were arranged side-by-side and were powered by two 450-horsepowe rengines .

At the same time, another experimental model ,the Piasecki-designed PV–15 (XH–16), was alsobeing developed for the Army Air Forces as along-range transport and rescue aircraft . This heli-copter was to have a direct influence on theprogress of the Marine Corps' forthcoming heli-copter program . It appealed to all services becaus eit had a gross weight of 46,000 pounds and a use-ful load capability of 14,000 pounds or 40 passen-gers . The tandem design XH–16, with two en-gines driving the two 82-foot diameter rotors, wa sthe largest helicopter in the world . AIthough de-velopment of this gigantic helicopter was startedby Piasecki in 1946, almost concurrent with th eHJP–1, its first flight would not occur until morethan seven years Iater .

Helicopter Application s

During the early part of World War II, theNavy Department initially visualized the helicopte ras an aid in combating German submarines whichwere seriously menacing United States and Allie dshipping . Original plans called for the helicopters ,piloted by Coast Guard flyers, to accompany oceanconvoys and operate as scout aircraft from plat -forms constructed on the merchant ships ." TheNavy accepted delivery of its first helicopter, th eR–4 (HNX–1) , on 16 October 1943 and assignedit to the United States Coast Guard, Coast Guar dAir Station, Floyd Bennett Field, Brooklyn, Ne wYork. Testing of the helicopter 's suitability as anantisubmarine weapon began the following month .At first, the HNS–1 appeared promising, but opensea shipboard trials in January 1944 showed th ehelicopter to be too difficult to handle and theoperation was deemed too hazardous with the pres-ent state of the helicopter 's development . 14

During the course of the trials, the Chief o fNaval Operations (CNO) approved, on 18 Decem-

8


The extended rotor idea of the McDonnell XHJD—1 never proved workable as the aircraft was unstable (Nationa lArchives Photo 80—G—395920) .

ber 1943, the Coast Guard Air Station at Floy dBennett as a helicopter training base and assigne dthe Coast Guard the entire helicopter program . *The training portion was to be "under the super -vision of the CNO ' s Aviation Training Division ,Op-33, " and the development program remaine dunder the Bureau of Aeronautics . 1 5

Helicopter operations continued at Floyd Ben -nett Field until March 1946 with the Coast Guar dtraining its own pilots as well as Navy and Civi lAeronautics Administration personnel . A numberof British pilots were also trained at the fiel dduring this period .

During the latter years of World War II, a fewSikorsky helicopters were used by the Navy in autility role on board ships for shuttling very ligh tloads between ships, from ships to shore stations ,and occasionally for rescue work. Most operation sthough were confined to evaluating the helicopte rat Floyd Bennett for possible future militar yapplication .

"` On 1 November 1941, the United States Coas tGuard by Executive Order 8929 was transferred from th eTreasury Department to the Navy, where it operatedduring World War II as an integral part until 1 Januar y1946 .

After the war, the Navy ' s first operational heli-copter unit was formed for participation in th eBikini atomic bomb tests in July 1946. FourHOS—ls (R—6s) transferred personnel, recoveredfilm records, and performed other utility missions .

Two months prior to the Bikini tests, a helicopte rdevelopment program had been initiated by th eNavy on 16 May 1946, 16 when the CNO directedthe commissioning of Helicopter Developmen tSquadron Three (VX—3) . In his letter, the CNOstated that the Secretary of the Navy had approve da development program to provide for compre-hensive service trials and experimentation wit hexisting types of helicopters ." On 1 July, VX—3was officially commissioned at Floyd Bennett Field .By this time, the Coast Guard had moved its heli-copter operations from Floyd Bennett to ElizabethCity, North Carolina .

Assigned as operations officer of the Navy's ne wdevelopment squadron was World War II fighte rpilot and Navy Cross v.inner, Marine MajorArmond H. DeLalio . 18 Two years previously ,Major DeLalio had received helicopter flight in-struction from the Coast Guard 19 at Floyd Bennettand on 8 August 1946 he became the first Marine

INTRODUCTION

9

to be designated as a naval helicopter pilot." "- 0When VX–3 moved to Naval Air Station, Lake-hurst, New Jersey, in September, Major DeLali oremained as operations officer of the squadron .

At Lakehurst, the unit functioned as the Navy ' ssole activity for helicopter training and develop-ment until its decommissioning in early 1948 .During that short period, however, VX–3 becam ewell known to future Marine helicopter pilots fo rit was through its training program, under th esupervision of Major DeLalio,** " that man yof the Marine Corps ' pioneer helicopter pilots wer eintroduced to the controls of a helicopter .

Early Outlook

Throughout this early period, rotary-wing manu-facturers were enthusiastic about producing ma -chines of larger gross weights than those alread ydesigned or flying . Igor I . Sikorsky, for example,gave his views on improvement of future helicopte rdesigns and capabilities :

The largest commercially successful helicopterbuilt up to now [1946] has a gross weight of 5,000

'' Major DeLalio is listed number 16 on the chrono-logical list of qualified helicopter pilots with the date o fqualification as 8 August 1946.

0 * Lieutenant Colonel DeLalio was killed in 1952 a tthe Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland . A sa test pilot, he was attempting to test the thrust augmenta-tion of a 1000-pound jet-assisted take-off (JATO) rocke tattached to an H04S--1 helicopter when the rocket cam edetached from its mount and caused the helicopter t obecome uncontrollable .

to 6,000 pounds . Helicopters with a gross weight o f10,000 to 20,000 pounds can well be produced in theimmediate future, on the basis of information alread yavailable and along any of the configurations tha thave already been tested . This gross weight coul dundoubtedly be doubled within the next five to te nyears . There is no doubt that still larger helicopterscould be produced in the more remote future . 2 2

Sikorsky 's predictions for the immediate futur ewere overly optimistic, but it was this type o foptimism that enticed the services, not only durin gthe immediate postwar period but later, in th e1 .950s and 1960s, to contract for rotary-winge daircraft with performance characteristics consid-erably beyond the state-of-the-art . Yet, optimism o nthe part of the manufacturers was further bolstere dby the eagerness of the services to obtain a variet yof larger, more useful helicopters . Unfortunately ,helicopters produced for the military in the lat e1940s were far from an acceptable service aircraf t—all Army and Navy test reports declared themachines to be unsatisfactory for load carryingpurposes . 23 The HNX–1 (R–4) and HOS–1 (R–6 )required the aid of ground effect " or a good win dbefore hovering was possible at the designed gros sweight .' However, these early aircraft, limited a sthey were, proved to be the true stepping stones inan orderly, but slow, helicopter developmenta lprogram .

1 Ground effect, or ground cushion, is experiencedwhen the helicopter is hovering within a height from theground equal to or less than its rotor diameter . The maxi -mum lifting capability of the helicopter is derived whe nhovering closest to the ground .

CHAPTER 1

THE ADVENT

The Quest For An Alternative

After the disappointing performance of the auto -gyro during the 1930s, Marine Corps interest i nrotary-winged aircraft was not fully revived unti l1943 . During that year Marine officers from Divi-sion of Aviation (DivAvn), Headquarters MarineCorps (HQMC) sat as members of a joint Navy-Coast Guard-Marine Corps board to discuss for-mation of a program for the use of Sikorsky R–4and R–6 helicopters. It was not until June 1946,however, that the first official action to institute aMarine Corps helicopter program began when Gen-eral Alexander A . Vandegrift, Commandant of theMarine Corps (CMC), established a billet for on eofficer and three enlisted men within his head-quarters .' Although there was no mention in hi sletter to the CNO of forming a developmenta lhelicopter squadron as the Navy had done, Genera l

General Alexander A . Vandegrift, 18th Commandan t(Marine Corps Photo A413197) .

Vandegrift did state that the Marine Corps wa sparticularly interested in the evaluation of thehelicopter and requested that his staff be kept in -formed as to its application .

Nothing significant was accomplished by theCommandant 's newly established program untilSeptember of that year when Lieutenant GeneralRoy S. Geiger, Commanding General, Fleet Marin eForces, Pacific (CGFMFPac) viewed the atomi cbomb tests at Bikini Lagoon as the Commandant 'spersonal representative. During World War II ,General Geiger had commanded the III Amphibi-ous Corps which took part in operations o nBougainville, Guam, Peleliu, and Okinawa . He alsobecame the first Marine to command a force onthe army level when he led the Tenth Army to asuccessful conclusion of the Okinawa operation .In his report of 21 August, he expressed to th eCommandant his opinion concerning the effect sthe atomic bomb might have on Marine Corpsdoctrine during the post-World War II period .General Geiger stated that "since our probabl efuture enemy will be in possession of this weap-on, it is my opinion that a complete review an dstudy of our concept of amphibious operation swill have to be made . " General Geiger went on tosay, "It is quite evident that a small number ofatomic bombs could destroy an expeditionary forc eas now organized, embarked, and landed . . . Icannot visualize another landing such as wasexecuted at Normandy or Okinawa ." In his finalparagraph he urged the Commandant to "considerthis a very serious and urgent matter [and thatthe Marine Corps] use its most competent officer sin finding a solution to develop the technique o fconducting amphibious operations in the Atomi cAge . "

The Commandant acted swiftly by referrin gGeneral Geiger 's letter to a special board compose dof three major generals : Lemuel C . Shepherd, Jr . ,Oliver P . Smith, and Field Harris . General Shep-herd had commanded the 1st Provisional MarineBrigade at Guam and the 6th Marine Division o nOkinawa and in China . General Smith had been

11

12 MARINES AND HELICOPTERS 1946—1962

then on duty at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico ,Virginia and like the generals on the Comman-dant's board, had held responsible assignment sduring World War II and were well qualified t oundertake their new task . Colonel Twining hadserved as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, of th e1st Marine Division during the Guadalcanal cam-paign and later in the Solomons as Assistant Chiefof Staff, G-3, I Marine Amphibious Corps . Colone lDyer, a naval aviator, saw duty in the Pacific asoperations officer of the Strategic Air Force ,Pacific Ocean Areas, as Chief of Staff to theCommander, Air, Northern Solomons, and finall yas commanding officer of Marine Aircraft Grou p61 in the Philippines . Having taken part in th edefense of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 a sCompany Commander, Marine Barracks, Lieu -tenant Colonel Shaw saw combat as commandin gofficer of the 6th Pioneer Battalion, 6th MarineDivision on Okinawa and later served as Assistan tChief of Staff, G-4, of the same division a tTsingtao, China .

General Lemuel C . Shepherd, Jr ., 20th Commandan t(Marine Corps Photo A46471) .

the Assistant Division Commander of the 1s tMarine Division in the Peleliu campaign and hadserved as Deputy Chief of Staff with the Tent hArmy for the joint Army-Marine Corps Okinaw aoperation . General Harris served as Chief of Staffto the Commander, Aircraft, at Guadalcanal ; asCommander, Aircraft, Northern Solomons ; andas the Director of Marine Aviation . The Com-mandant's instructions to this special board,stressed that "general principles must be deter -mined in order to orient the effort of the MarineCorps away from the last war and toward thenext ." The final paragraph gave specific instruc-tions as to what the board was to accomplish :

. . . the Special Board . . . is directed to propose ,after thorough research and deliberation, the broa dconcepts and principles which the Marine Corp sshould follow, and the major steps which it shoul dtake, to fit it to wage successful amphibious warfar eat some future date . . . ?

General Shepherd's special board was staffedwith a Secretariat of three officers—Colonel Merril lB . Twining, Colonel Edward C . Dyer, and Lieu -tenant Colonel Samuel R . Shaw.' All three wer e

The name of Lieutenant Colonel Clair W . Shisler

appears as the original third member of the Secretaria t

with Lieutenant Colonel Shaw assigned as his replacemen t

when Lieutenant Colonel Shisler became ill . Shaw signed

Brigadier General Oliver P. Smith (Marine Corps Phot o94702) .

the Secretariat's report as the third member after Colonel sTwining and Dyer.

THE ADVENT

1 3

Brigadier General Edward C. Dyer (Marine Corps PhotoA401815) .

The three-member Secretariat agreed that themass destructive capability of the atomic bomb an dthe vulnerability of a massed amphibious landin gforce made dispersion a necessity—but only at therisk of defeat through slow and piecemeal com-mitment of forces ashore . In order to disperse th elanding force sufficiently and still, equally im-portant, have a reconcentration of forces at th epoint of contact with the enemy, a new mode ofassault was needed as a supplement to the existin gamphibious landing craft .

To solve this problem, the committee considere da variety of means to achieve a rapid buildup ofassault forces ashore including transport aircraft ,gliders, and parachutists. Transport aircraftwould require prepared airfields which, in mos tcases, would not be available within the objectiv earea . Gliders likewise required a clear and flat are ain which to land and discharge troops . Assault byemploying parachutists was discarded because o fthe difficulty in maintaining unit integrity . The us eof troop and cargo carrying submarines appearedto offer a better solution than any of the airbornemethods previously mentioned . The Secretariat alsoconsidered the employment of the helicopter which ,appearing to be superior in its characteristics toall other assault vehicles, offered a practical mean sof overcoming the effects of dispersion while con -

currently reducing exposure of the amphibiou stask force . The Secretariat members knew that th eperformance of the helicopter was discouraging ,but the relative primitive state of helicopter de-velopment did not deter their enthusiasm for it sapplication .

Before committing themselves to the employmen tof the helicopter as a vehicle for a new method o fassault, the Secretariat acquainted themselves first -hand with the capabilities of the helicopter . Colone lDyer visited Sikorsky Aircraft Company and dis-cussed with Mr . Sikorsky the Secretariat 's concept .Colonel Dyer stated that the Marine Corps wasthinking along the lines of lifting 5,000 pounds b yhelicopter, with Mr. Sikorsky replying that th eplan "was a magnificent idea and that there wa sno problem, that we [Sikorsky] can do that now,this is within our present knowledge . We can buildan airplane [helicopter] that will carry 5,00 0pounds . We can build an airplane that will carr ymuch more than that . We know how to do it . Takemy word for it." 6 After receiving the rather opti-mistic report from Mr. Sikorsky, Colonels Dyerand Twining visited the Piasecki Aircraft Corpora-tion on 14 November 1946 where Mr . Piaseck iagain expressed his opinion that there was "noproblem" ' in constructing a helicopter capable o flifting a 5,000-pound payload .

After their return to Quantico, the members o fthe Secretariat corresponded frequently with thetwo helicopter manufacturers . 8 Sikorsky Aircraf tpresented its developmental ideas and Piaseck ipointed out the possibilities of the 10-passenge rHRP–1 transport, and the giant 40-passenge rXH–16 rescue and transport helicopter as ampleevidence of its capability to fulfill the requirement sof the Marine Corps for an assault transport heli-copter. Colonel Dyer related that the helicopter :

. . . seemed to be our source of action, but w e

didn't do much . It sort of died . We went off on other

[related] projects, until one day [Lieutenant Colonel ]

Marion [E . .I Carl,* a test pilot at Patuxent, flew a

helicopter to Marine Corps Schools to demonstrat e

it to the students . I'll never forget—he hoisted [Lieu -

tenant Colonel Victor H .] Brute Krulak on a hois t

and pulled him off the ground about 15 feet and

pulled him into the cockpit . Twining and I werestanding by the window and watching, and I said ,`Bill, lets go with this thing [helicopter] and qui t

fooling around . ' He said `Okay . . . so he wrote th etheory . . . principles . . . background . . . reason-ing . . . and I wrote a program . 9

Lieutenant Colonel Marion E. Carl was a Worl dWar II ace with 18 Japanese planes to his credit . He wa son duty at NAS, Patuxent River, Maryland, where as atest pilot, he had taught himself to fly a helicopter.

14

MARINES AND HELICOPTERS 1946–196 2

The idea of using large assault transport sea -planes also received considerable attention by th eSecretariat—a sort of "flying LST . " But like th ehelicopter, a seaplane of the size needed for carry-ing troops and their equipment was not in exist-ence . The Secretariat, nevertheless, concluded tha ta mixture of these large flying boats and heli-copters would be the most promising combination ,with the helicopter appearing to be the real "an-swer to the amphibious prayer ." i o

In early December 1946, the study had pro-gressed to the point where the principal recom-mendations could be foreseen and the Secretaria tsent their report to the Special Board for approval .The Special Board submitted to the Commandan ton 16 December an advanced report, recommend-ing that " two parallel programs be initiated whichwould provide for the development of both thetransport seaplane and a transport helicopter . "Organization of a Marine helicopter experimenta lsquadron was also recommended at the "earlies tpractical date for the training of pilots and me-chanics and for the practical development of heli -copter tactics and techniques for a ship-to-shor eoperation ." Finally, it was suggested that th e"Marine Corps Schools be directed to submit atentative doctrine for helicopter employment ." "

General Vandegrift concurred with the board ' srecommendations and on 19 December 1946, onlythree days after the report arrived at HQMC, itwas endorsed and sent to the Marine Corps School s(MCS) with a statement by General Vandegrif tdirecting that steps be taken to implement th edevelopment programs outlined therein .

Concurrently, General Vandegrift sent a lette rto the CNO with the Special Board 's report as anenclosure . His letter was the first in a long serie sof correspondence between the two services on thesubject of future amphibious operations and wa sthe first service document known to propose theuse of helicopters as a tactical vehicle for the trans -portation of combat troops from a naval vessel to alanding area ashore . General Vandegrift briefl ydefined the Marine Corps' plan for what late rbecame known as the Vertical Assault Concept fo rAmphibious Operations and the premises uponwhich it was based . "Carrier-based transporthelicopters, " the Commandant stated :

. . . offer all the advantages of the conventional air -borne operation but few of the disadvantages . Theycan be operated from aircraft carriers now in existenc ewith cover and preparatory fires on landing area sprovided by their aircraft from the same force .''-

General Vandegrift continued :

With a relatively unlimited choice of landing areas ,troops can be landed in combat formations and unde rfull control of the flanks or rear of a hostile position .The helicopte r ' s speed makes transport dispersion a tsea a matter of no disadvantage and introduces atime-space factor that will avoid presenting at any on etime a remunerative atomic target . It should be note dalso that transport helicopters offer a means for rapi devacuation of casualties, for the movement of supplie sdirectly from ship to dump and for subsequent move-ment of troops and supplies in continuing operation sashore . 1 3

A Helicopter Program for 1947

In order to give the new program its initialimpetus, the Commandant recommended to th eCNO that implementation begin immediately o nthe two programs recommended in the SpecialBoard's report . He also urged that the correspond-ing development of tactics, techniques, and or-ganization be given the same consideration sothat all areas would be developed concurrently .

The Bureau of Aeronautics was tasked by Unite dStates Naval Regulations for the design, develop-ment, testing, procurement, and production o fMarine Corps Aircraft . Therefore, in aircraftrelated matters the Commandant had to submit hi srecommendations to the CNO for his approval .

A series of five recommendations were made t othe CNO for the helicopter program in 1947 an dthree for the following year . During 1947, theCommandant recommended that the MarineCorps organize one developmental aircraft squad-ron equipped with 12 helicopters of the first avail -able type, with the second recommendation tha tthe Marine Corps study the employment of heli-copters in amphibious operations, and the thir dthat it establish the military characteristics of suchan aircraft. He also recommended that the Nav ybegin procuring 48 HRP–1 helicopters for deliver yto the Marine Corps in 1948, the Navy accelerat ethe development of transport helicopters, and th eNavy and Marine Corps conduct a token ship-to-shore operation by helicopter at the earlies tpracticable date. The plan for 1948 containe drecommendations to organize one additional de-velopmental helicopter squadron, for the Navy toinitiate procurement of a suitable transport heli-copter for delivery in 1949 and 1950, and finally ,that the Navy and Marine Corps conduct a small-scale ship-to-shore exercise employing helicoptersduring fleet maneuvers .

Overall approval of the Commandant 's progra mwas not immediately forthcoming as various de-

THE ADVENT

1 5

partments within the office of the CNO were re-quired to comment upon the new proposals . Therecommendations by General Vandegrift wer econsidered, in general, to be sound and prac-tical although certain phases of the time scheduleappeared to be optimistic . On 17 March the CNO' sAir Planning Group determined that it was " im-practicable to set aside funds in the budget year s1947 and 1948 for the procurement of helicoptersfor the Marine Corps" ; however, it was agreed t o" include requirements for Marine Corps heli-copters in the 1949 budget . " The group "approvedtentatively that Piasecki helicopters (HRPs) wouldbe furnished to the Marine Corps for developmen tof techniques and tactics for employment of suc haircraft" and to "permit familiarization of Marin epilots with the Piasecki helicopter by sending themto VX–3 at Lakehurst for helicopter training . " 1 4"Formation of a helicopter developmental squad-ron and initial design studies of a large transpor ttype helicopter" were approved with "procure-ment of an assault transport helicopter to be de -pendent upon results of the developmental squad-ron 's evaluation" of the new technique .'

The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, RearAdmiral Harold B . Sallada, commented primaril yon the technical aspects of the plan . He mentionedthat various helicopter designs were under develop-ment and due to a lack of established requirement sthere was no large transport helicopter included inthe Navy ' s program . Development of a large heli-copter by the Army Air Forces, the XH-16, wasbeing followed closely by his bureau . An assaulthelicopter could be developed, upon receipt of th erequired characteristics, commensurate with th eassigned priority and budgetary considerations .The speed of the program would depend not onl yon the funds available, but also on the unprove nability of design personnel in the new field ; there-fore, no assurance was given that an acceptabl emilitary requirement could be met by any specifie ddate . "The procurement of 48 additional HRP– 1helicopters for delivery in 1948," the letter read ,"would involve the expenditure of approximatel y$11,000,000. These funds can only be obtaine dby reducing or eliminating aircraft procuremen tprograms now planned ." 16

Assault Helicopter Characteristic sand Design Problems

Meanwhile, at Marine Corps Schools, the Com-mittee of the Academic Board headed by ColonelRobert E . Hogaboom submitted its first report on

10 March 1947 on the desired characteristics fo ran assault transport helicopter in response to th eCommandant 's directive of 19 December . Colone lHogaboom had taken part in combat durin gWorld War II on such Central Pacific islands asMakin, Kwajalein, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, and Iw oJima. During the Saipan and Tinian operations h eserved as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, NorthernTroops and Landing Force, and later, on Iwo Jima ,he was Chief of Staff, 3d Marine Division . En-titled "Military Requirements of Helicopter fo rShip-to-Shore Movement of Troops and Cargo, "Colonel Hogaboom 's report stated :

On the premise that the helicopter offers a valuabl emeans of accelerating and dispersing the ship-to-shore movement, it is recognized that the complet ereplacement of all existing ship-to-shore conveyance smay at some future date be desirable. Under suc hconditions, it would appear necessary that there bedesigned a relatively small type helicopter for trans-portation of assault troops, as well as large type heli-copter capable of lifting all divisional loads . However ,examination of current technical developments indi-cates that the latter type may not be practical fo rsome time to come . Accordingly, it is considered mor erealistic to approach the problem in increments ,establishing initially the characteristics for a purel yassault conveyance . . . . 1 7

It is apparent that the board was considering ahelicopter similar to Piasecki's XH–16, which wasstill on the drawing board, as the large helicopte rfor lifting the divisional loads . As for the smal lassault helicopter, its requirements were in con-sonance with the stated abilities of the helicopte rindustry, but yet not entirely so, for the board wasbasing the desired capacity on a tactical consid-eration—maintaining integrity in the basic in-fantry combat unit . The report stated :

Such a machine should provide seating space fo r15 and a maximum of 20 infantrymen suitably arme dand equipped to initiate combat . The lower figure, con-sidered to be a practical minimum, will permit thetransportation, as a unit, of the basic rifle squad plu stwo additional individuals from platoon or compan yheadquarters . The maximum figure, considered to b efar more desirable, will permit the transportation asa unit of the basic rifle squad, plus a skeletonizedmachine-gun squad or 60mm mortar squad, alongwith several individuals from platoon or companyheadquarters . A capacity in excess of 20 men is no tdesirable in an assault helicopter since the craft wil lundoubtedly be extremely vulnerable . 18

"The ideal payload of 5,000 was a desirabl eoptimum," the report stated, with 3,500 pound squoted as the minimum acceptable load . The 5,000 -pound capability would greatly improve the valu eof the assault helicopter during the ship-to-shoremovement of light artillery . Other specifications

16


included a range of 200 to 300 nautical miles (500miles with an auxiliary fuel tank), a cruise spee dof 100 knots, a hovering ceiling of 4,000 feet, anexternal hook and hoist, and self-sealing fuel cells .One of the most critical considerations wa svaguely addressed—the aircraft ' s dimensions —the report stating only :

. . . the craft should be designed to meet the limit -ing dimensions of the hangar deck and elevator s[of the CVE or CVL aircraft carrier] .* However,if these restricting factors should cause a materia lreduction in payload or optimum dimensions of th ehelicopter, it is believed that steps should be takento investigate possible structural modifications in theCVE . 1 0

The Commandant reiterated the Academi cBoard's recommendations in a letter to the CNOon 24 March. He believed the Marine CorpsSchools ' report to be an excellent basis for direc-tion of future developments in the helicopter pro -gram .

The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) ,(DCNO (Air) ) , Vice Admiral Donald B . Duncan ,commented that the 20 combat troop and 5,000pound requirements were considered feasiblewhile only minor modifications were necessary i nthe airspeed and range specifications. The bigobstacle rested in the limitations imposed by CV Eand CVL elevators and hangar deck dimension sand "modification of CVE-CVL types to handlesuch an aircraft is considered to be a project o fmajor proportions . " 22 0 The DCNO (Air) was alsoconcerned that "actual construction of such anaircraft could not be reasonably expected priorto 1951 and the imposition of the CVE-CVL re-strictions would make the meeting of the minimu mrequirements [of the Marine Corps] very doubt-ful . " In conclusion, it was stated that until th etype, of aircraft carrier to be used for helicopte roperations was officially determined, further workon a design study which had begun in April i nthe Bureau of Aeronautics was being stopped . 2 1

The DCNO (Operations) , Vice Admiral ForrestP. Sherman, in a memorandum to DCNO (Air) ,recommended on 6 May that a two-step study b eundertaken to determine exactly which size heli-copter should initially be designed for the MarineCorps . In the memo, Admiral Sherman gave no

* CVE, Escort Aircraft Carrier ; CVL, Light AircraftCarrier . As an example, specifications are given here fo rthe Casablanca Class CVE (Thetis Bay, CVE-90) and th eIndependence Class CVL (Monterey, CVL-26) :

CasablancaTon s7,800

Length512 ft .

Bean ,108 ft .

Draft22 ft .

Speed ,19 kts .

Independence 11,000 622 ft. 109 ft. 26 ft . 32 kts.

assurance that a larger type aircraft carrier tha na CVE or CVL could be assigned for an amphib-ious operation employing helicopters as one o fthe assault elements ; therefore, he recommende dthat the DCNO (Air) investigate the practicabil-ity of alterations to hangars and elevators o feither CVE or CVL types to handle the helicopte rof 5,000 pounds capacity . "If this appears pos-sible without excessive cost and loss of othe rcharacteristics of the type, " the memo read, "pro-ceed with the design and procurement of the 5,00 0pound capacity helicopter ." 22 The second recom-mended step was almost identical to the first, onl ythe weight of the helicopter was changed to rea d3,500 pounds in lieu of 5,000 pounds .

By 3 June 1947, Admiral Duncan had conclude dthe studies as recommended in the 6 May memo-randum from Admiral Sherman . "It appears thatthe 5,000 pound helicopter would be of such di-mensions both in length and height as to preclud emodifying the CVE or CVL carriers except a texorbitant cost . " Admiral Duncan continued :

By overlapping the rotors in future designs i tappears possible to . . . permit stowage of a 3,500pound helicopter in the CVE—CVL class carrier swithout modification of the ship or elevators . . . .[therefore] the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics i sbeing requested to obtain design proposals for a3,500 pound payload helicopter . 2 3

While the office of the Chief of Naval Operation swas making every effort possible to resolve theCVL and helicopter compatibility issue, the Com-mandant was busily revising his original helicopte rdevelopment program . The new program was incompliance with a request contained in the CNO 'sreply to the Commandant 's letter written on 19December 1946 . The CNO reiterated Rear Ad-miral Sallada's (Chief of the Bureau of Aero-nautics) contention that procurement of 48 addi-tional HRPs for delivery in 1948 would involv eapproximately $11,000,000 which could only b eobtained at the expense of programs alread yplanned . "Therefore, " he commented, " it is esti-mated that 1948 deliveries of HRP–1 helicopter sto the Marine Corps will be sufficient only to brin gthe experimental squadron up to strength (12 air -craft) . Additional procurement will depend o nexperience gained with this type . " 22' The CNOconcurred in general with the Commandant ' srecommendations but pointed out certain factor saffecting the outlined time schedule and asked th eCommandant for revised recommendations on hi shelicopter program . 2 5

The revised program submitted by Genera lVandegrift on 4 June eliminated completely th e

THE ADVENT

1 7

request for the 48 HRP–ls and the additional de-velopmental helicopter squadron . Accordingly th eMarine Corps program for 1947 was changed t ocontain three elements : 1) A developmental squad-ron with as many helicopters as possible be pro-vided ; 2) A study of the techniques and tactics o fship-to-shore helicopter operations be conducted ;and 3) A request be made to the Navy to accelerat ethe development of transport helicopters . The new1948 recommendations sought to keep the on edevelopmental squadron at full strength and tocontinue experimentation to determine the suit -ability of the type helicopter being used, whiledetermining the additional specifications and char-acteristics of the helicopter desired for ship-to-shore movement. Based upon the results of theexperimentation, the Navy was to initiate procure-ment of suitable transport helicopters for deliver yin 1949 and 1950. A small-scale ship-to-shoreexercise employing helicopters during fleet exer-cises was further recommended for 1948.2° In thelast paragraph of his letter to the CNO, GeneralVandegrift mentioned that the 12 HRP–ls pro -posed for the Marine developmental squadronwould permit only a token exercise with a maxi-mum of two platoons. "It is considered, " he stated ,"that this action will provide much desired infor-mation on the problems of tactics and logistics in-volved . Expansion of this operating force should b eundertaken as soon as an improved helicopter i savailable . " The Commandant concluded by "rec-ommending that all remaining available funds b eused to accelerate development of a service typ ehelicopter . " 2 7

General Vandegrift recognized the HRP–1 a sonly a transition helicopter for experimental useand for the development of the ship-to-shore tech-niques and not suitable except for those purposes .The aircraft were very expensive and funds fo rhelicopter development were limited. He consid-ered the procurement of HRPs beyond the origi-nal 12, now authorized by the CNO for use in th edevelopmental squadron, as undesirable and thatthe funds should be used in accelerating the de-velopment of a new assault helicopter .2 S

On 9 July the Commandant made another im-portant change relating to the helicopter 's charac-teristics by specifying only one size helicopter of a5,000-pound minimum payload capability . It elimi-nated the requirement for the helicopter to b eaccommodated by the ship's elevator and stowedon the hangar deck and listed the overall dimen-sions as "small as possible . " The cancellation o fthe design proposal for a 3,500-pound helicopter ,as requested by the DCNO (Air) on 3 June, was

not mentioned, although it is assumed that it wa sdiscontinued .

The elimination of the elevator and hangar dec krequirement was initiated by the Chief of Militar yRequirements Section of DCNO (Air) . A memo-randum dated 3 June to the Assistant Chief o fNaval Operations (Marine Aviation), (ACN O(Marine Aviation)) , Major General Field Harris ,recommended that the Commandant eliminate th estowage requirements for the assault helicopter a sit imposed many undesirable design factors—themost pertinent one being "that a rotor overlap `'of approximately 75 percent to 80 percent would benecessary in order to meet the elevator dimen-sions ." The only helicopter closely meeting tha tcriteria at the time was the small Piasecki XHJP– 1which was still in the design stage and, in addition ,had a useful load of only 1,024 pounds, almost4,000 pounds less than the required minimum . Th eMilitary Requirements Section memorandum fur-ther mentioned that rotor overlap of such magni-tude imposed "a heavy unknown factor on th edesign . " The requirement for the helicopter to beserviced (stowed, repaired, and checked) on th ehangar deck of a carrier imposed the undesirabledesign factor thereby jeopardizing the success ofentire proposal . In order to meet the optimum re-quirement for a 5,000-pound payload the memo-randum mentioned flight deck servicing shoul dbe accepted in lieu of hangar deck "and manymarginal design factors and difficult design limi-tations would be eliminated ." 29 In addition, th eCommandant specified to the CNO a tactical rea-son for the change :

In order that the early landing may he provide d

with necessary continuity, it is necessary that com-

munications vehicles, recoilless weapons, and initial

resupply he provided at an early hour and, ideally ,

that these should be followed by artillery. This re -

quires a payload of approximately 5,000 pounds ." °

With the Commandant's 9 July revision to hi soriginal requirement of 24 March, the specifica-tions for the design of the assault helicopter weretemporarily settled . Following that, the CNO state din a letter to BuAer on 4 November that theNavy's New Development Program for 1949 as -signed a priority 3 to the Navy's antisubmarin ewarfare (ASW) helicopter development and apriority 2 to the Marine's assault helicopter . "Inview of the limited funds available for helicopterdevelopment during fiscal 1949, " the memorandumread, " it is requested that all [fiscal] 1949 funds

*A term used for a tandem-type helicopter to denot e

the percentage of overlap which occurs when the rear

rotor blade passes over the lower forward rotor blade .

18


be concentrated on meeting the requirements o fthe assault helicopter as set forth in [my letter of24 July] ." i1 The redirection of funds in favo rof the assault helicopter was taken to support theMarine Corps ' helicopter program at a time whenthe Navy was eagerly seeking a suitable helicopte rfor ASW operations, and when both procuremen tand research and development funds were excep-tionally low .

In spite of Admiral Sherman 's directive con-centrating funds on the Marine Corps ' assaulthelicopter, progress in its development was doomedto be slow. The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautic scast the assault helicopter transport program int othe development doldrums by linking it with th eAir Force's XH–16 program. The CNO was in -formed by BuAer on 24 December 1947 that addi-tional studies indicated the development of a larg ehelicopter meeting the requirements of the Marin eCorps was feasible, but it would involve a four -

or five-year program and require considerabl ymore funds than could be obtained in view of th econtinuing budget curtailments . "It now appears,"the Bureau Chief stated :

. . . that the assault helicopter characteristics ar every similar to those of the XH—16 helicopter contem-plated by the Air Force . . . and insofar as the basi chelicopter is concerned, are almost identical . In vie wof this fact, effort on the assault helicopter will h eundertaken on the basis of joint Air Force/Nav ydevelopment of the XH—16 . 3 2

The result of BuAer's action to combine the tw oprojects, an economic necessity on the part of th eNavy, delayed the development of a suitable assaul ttransport helicopter and made the Commandant ' sprogram fall far short of its goal . Two and on ehalf years later, essentially the same helicopte rrequirements would be presented to the CNO, an dat that time, action would prove to be more re-sponsive to the Marine Corps ' request .

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

Commissioning and Operations ofHMX— 1

While progress on the design of the Marin eCorps assault transport helicopter was under way ,Colonel Dyer also had been busy at Quantico pre -paring for the eventual organization of the newdevelopmental squadron . The Commandant ha dappointed him to command the future squadro nand concurrently relieved him of his assignmenton the Secretariat .

As the prospective commanding officer, ColonelDyer first had to find a suitable location . The ai rstation at Quantico was chosen as the most ad-vantageous site as it was relatively close to bot hhelicopter manufacturers, Sikorsky and Piasecki ,and was literally next door to the Marine CorpsSchools . At the same time it was far enough awayfrom FMF operations at Camp Lejeune an dMarine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Cherry Point ,to permit the squadron to work on purely experi-mental projects without being encumbered withthe operational problems so common to the fleetunits . '

For selection of personnel, Colonel Dyer turnedto the student body of Marine Corps Schools .Addressing members of the Junior Course in ses-sion during early 1947, he briefed them on th ehelicopter and plans for its future employment inthe Marine Corps . To the 60 officers present, Colo-nel Dyer displayed drawings of helicopters of th efuture, and charts depicting the speeds and pay -loads which helicopters were expected to achieve .Colonel Dyer later remarked about the results o fthe briefing :

I described what our squadron hoped to accom-plish and how we hoped to go about it . Then I said ,"Now there is a large body of opinion in the MarineCorps that figures that helicopters aren ' t going an yplace, so if you are interested stay here, and I'll ge tyour names . If you are not, don't waste your tim eor mine, just shove off right now! " At that I ' d sayabout two-thirds of everybody there got up and left .2

Although still more dropped out later, the ma -

jority of the interested officers who stayed con-stituted the nucleus of Dyer 's new squadron .

Plans for the commissioning of Marine Heli-copter Squadron 1 (HMX–1) (often incorrectl yreferred to as Marine Helicopter ExperimentalSquadron One or Marine Helicopter DevelopmentSquadron One) were published in the CNO ' sAviation Plan No. 57 on 23 June 1947 . This plantentatively scheduled the commissioning of HMX–1 for 1 July .' Unfortunately, at that early date ,there was an insufficient number of helicoptersavailable for assignment to HMX–1 and arrange-ments had not been made for helicopter pilot train-ing, so the commissioning date was delayed . Thenon 10 September, the CNO informed BuAer tha tplans had been made to form HMX–1 on approxi-mately 1 January 1948 . He additionally declare dthat the Navy had recently purchased 22 H03S–l sfrom the Sikorsky Aircraft Company with the 9th ,12th, and 13th aircraft of the total package desig-nated for delivery to HMX–l . The CNO furtherstated that the aircraft scheduled for HMX– 1would be retained and operated by VX–3 at NA SLakehurst until HMX–1 was commissioned .' Twodays later, the CNO proclaimed that the Navywas purchasing 20 HRP–ls from the Piaseck iHelicopter Corporation with the 5th, 6th, and 7t hHRPs going to HMX-1, and like the H03Ss, thesewould be sent to VX–3 until HMX-1 was formed . 'In view of this news, General Harris, ACN O(Marine Aviation), * proposed to the DCNO (Air )that HMX–1 be commissioned on 15 November .This would permit the Marine Corps to assemblethe necessary personnel, establish administrativ eand supply channels, and have hangar space an darea assigned so that the squadron would b ecapable of immediate operations upon receipt ofthe aircraft .' It was not until 22 November 1947 ,however, that the CNO directed the Commandan t

' The Director of the Division of Aviation/Assistan tCommandant of the Marine Corps (Air) concurrently heldan additional position within the CNO's office as AssistantChief of Naval Operations (Marine Aviation) .

19

20


to form and commission Marine Helicopter Squad-ron 1 on 1 December 1947 . '

In a related action two days later, the DCNO(Air) approved a plan for the decommissionin gof VX–3 at NAS Lakehurst in April of 1948 andthe concurrent formation of two fleet units, Heli-copter Utility Squadron 1 (HU–1) and HelicopterUtility Squadron 2 (HU–2), with the latter as-suming the training mission of VX–3. In the sam eplan, supplement No . 2 to CNO 's Aviation PlanNo. 57, it was explained that helicopter deliverie sabove VX–3's training requirements would b eapportioned among the three prospective squad-rons, including HMX-1 . s This action by CN Oessentially established a rotating basis upon whic hHMX–1 would receive its first group of aircraft .

Accordingly, HMX–1 was commissioned on 1December 1947 at MCAS Quantico, Virginia, withColonel Dyer as the commanding officer and solemember .' On 3 December six pilots joined ColonelDyer 's squadron : Major Russell R . Riley ; Cap-tains Paul J . Flynn, Charles D. Barber, andRobert A. Strieby ; First Lieutenants Roy L . An-derson and Robert A . Longstaff. All officers except

Captain Flynn and Lieutenant Longstaff had com-pleted helicopter training on 11 November a tLakehurst and were designated Naval Helicopte rPilots .' 0 Colonel Dyer was likewise a qualifie dhelicopter pilot having earlier, in September andOctober, completed 40 hours of flight instructio nat the Sikorsky plant in Stratford, Connecticut ,under the guidance of Dimitry D . (Jimmy) Viner ,Sikorsky's chief test pilot ." By 6 December, thre eenlisted men had arrived bringing the total com-plement of the squadron to 10 officers and enliste dmen .

Three days after commissioning, HQMC pub-lished the squadron's missions and tasks . As origi-nally issued, the two-fold mission was to : "Developtechniques and tactics in connection with themovement of assault troops in amphibious opera-tions, " and secondly, "Evaluate a small helicopte ras a replacement for the present OY aircraft ingunfire spotting, observation, and liaison mission sin connection with amphibious operations ." 1 2

The six tasks assigned to the development squad-ron under the two general missions were to :

Igor Sikorsky visits with officers of HMX—1, MCAS, Quantico, Va., in 1948 . The aircraft is a Sikorsky H03S—1 (Marin eCorps Photo A322389) .

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

2 1

1. Develop a doctrine for the aviation tactics andtechniques in the employment of the helicopter i namphibious operations as outlined in [the genera lmissions] .

2. Assist the Marine Corps Schools in the develop-ment of a doctrine covering the tactics and technique sof the employment of helicopters in amphibiousoperations .

3. Study the operations and maintenance of assigne daircraft.

4. Develop the flight proficiency of pilots an dcrewmen.

5. Develop and maintain the technical proficiencyof mechanics.

6. Submit recommendations for tables of organiza-tion, equipment allowances, and related data for fu-ture helicopter squadrons . 1 3

The squadron now had to prepare for the ar-rival of its first aircraft which were scheduled fordelivery in January . The ultimate complement o faircraft had been established by the CNO on 2 8November at 6 H03S–ls and 12 HRP-1s, with 5of each type expected to be assigned to the squad-ron by 1 June 1948." Although the Marine Corpswas hopeful of having helicopters operating i nHMX–1 in January 1948, the first two SikorskyH03S–ls did not arrive from VX–3 until 9 Feb-ruary. Three more reached the squadron by th eend of the month having been ferried directly fro mthe Stratford plant . As indicated in the CNO'sAviation Plan No . 57, Supplement No . 3, the ful lcomplement of six H03S–ls was not expected tobe reached until 1 July 1949 . 1 In the same avia-tion plan dated 6 April, it was indicated that onlysix HRPs were to be in the squadron 's inventoryby the same date . This announcement brough tgreat disappointment to Marine Corps planners a sthey were expecting to have the complete comple-ment of 12 transport helicopters by the July 194 9date .

Before HMX–1 received the H03S–1, the Nav yhad used its first four, purchased from Sikorsky ,on Operation HIGHJUMP during the winter o f1946 . Later, as more were accepted, the H03S swere evaluated by the Navy for plane guard duty ,mail delivery, personnel transfer, and also a straining aircraft . The helicopter was a minor modi-fication of the Sikorsky commercial model S–51 ,which was, in turn, a larger modification of th eNavy 's H02S–1—a version in itself of the Ai rForce's R-5 . A Wasp Jr. R–985–AN–5 450 -horsepower engine turned a single three-blade dmain rotor and torque compensating tail rotor .The aircraft could be equipped with dual control sand had accommodations for a pilot and threepassengers . Originally, the helicopter weighe d3,788 pounds empty with a maximum take-off

weight limited to 4,988 pounds . The model had atricycle landing gear and differed from the stand-ard commercial model by having an oil dilutionsystem—needed for operation in cold weather—installed in addition to provisions for one 50 -gallon fuel tank and a 300-pound capacity rescu ehoist . Because of the limited instrumentation inthe H03S, the aircraft was restricted to day flying ,visual flight rules (VFR), and a maxium air -speed of 90 knots ."

The Marines' new H03Ss were primarily in -tended for utility use ; however, the squadron a tQuantico was not too concerned with the officia lmission description listed in the BuAer publica-tions . The aircraft were first put to use in thetraining of the pilots and mechanics as an addi-tional four officers and nine enlisted men ha djoined the squadron during January . The firs tmission of an operational nature, exclusive o ftraining, was on 24 February when an H03S wa sused to lead a salvage party to an amphibiou sjeep ("Weasel") that had become mired in acreek .

Improvement of pilot techniques continue dthrough the month of March, and in addition ,various flights were made to determine the valu eof helicopters for aerial photography, artilleryspotting, reconnaissance, and wire laying . Manyindoctrination flights were also given to groun dofficers for the purpose of familiarizing them wit hthe helicopter ' s characteristics .] '

In early April 1948, a Bell Aircraft representa-tive and test pilot visited HMX–1 to demonstrat ethe company's new 47–D helicopter . Besides thedemonstration, the Bell test pilot gave the squadro npilots some very helpful and eagerly sought afteradvanced flight instruction . The Bell team alsodemonstrated the 47–D, the equivalent of th eNavy's new HTL–2, to members of the staff o fMCS, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, and 2d Marin eDivision audiences .

Initial Request fo ran Observation Helicopter

Until 1948 there was not a helicopter specificall ydesigned for military observation in actual produc-tion. In existence, however, was the Bell mode l47E in flight test at the Bell factory and the on eSikorsky S–52, which had already completedflight test ; both of which, it was believed, couldeasily be converted for military observation use.At the time though, the Navy's HTL–2, an im-

22


proved version of the HTL–1 which incorporate da larger engine and bubble canopy, was bein gproduced in quantity for the Navy as a traine rand represented a close approximation to the fina lconfiguration of what could be expected in futur eobservation helicopters . But until such time a seither the experimental Bell or Sikorsky observa-tion helicopters became operational and wereavailable in quantity, considerable operational ex-perience could be gained through operating asmall number of the Navy ' s HTL–2s . With thi sthought in mind, and with a desire to comply wit hthe squadron 's second mission of evaluating ahelicopter as a replacement for the OY fixed-win gaircraft, Colonel Dyer recommended, on 28 Apri l1948, that the Marine Corps procure three HTL–2trainers . 18 The new Commandant, General Clifto nB. Cates, who had relieved General Vandegrif ton 1 January 1948, requested on 13 May that th eCNO provide HMX–1 with the three HTL–2s .

General Cates, as well as his predecessor, ap-preciated the potential value of the helicopter a sit applied to amphibious assault techniques . Dur-ing World War II, he had commanded the 1s tMarines in the 1942 Guadalcanal campaign and i n1944 was the commanding general of the 4thMarine Division in the Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo

General Clifton B. Cates, 19th Commandant (Marin eCorps Photo 306430-A) .

Bell HTL-2s on board the USS Valley Forge in the earl y1950s (National Archives Photo 80-G-424772) .

Jima campaigns . In the period between 1942 and1944, General Cates was Commandant, Marin eCorps Schools . Returning to Quantico in 1945, hebecame president of the Marine Corps Equipmen tBoard for six months before being named as theCommanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico ,and ultimately, Commandant in 1948. On 23 Maythe CNO replied to General Cates ' letter concurr-ing with its content, but reduced the numbe rallotted to two aircraft . 19

Approximately 10 weeks later, on 9 August, th esquadron received the first HTL–2 from NASLakehurst, New Jersey . The Bell helicopter wa stwo-place, dual controlled, and powered by a 178-horsepower engine driving a two-bladed mainrotor . The cruising speed, similar to the H03S ,was 80 knots but unlike the H03Ss, the gros sweight was only 2,200 pounds . 2 0

Since most of the pilots had received a minimumof 15 hours in the HTL–1 while undergoing train-ing at HU–2, a familiarization syllabus was no tnecessary. Tests were immediately begun to com-pare the HTL–2 with the OY aircraft in artiller yspotting, liaison, and aerial photography work .The results of the preliminary evaluations indi-cated that the HTL was superior in all respects t othe OY, except that the OY's cruising speed wa shigher . 2 1

By November the evaluation had been com-pleted and the results sent to the Commandant b yColonel Dyer . Based upon Colonel Dyer's letter ,on 24 November General Cates asked permissionof the CNO to change the complement of a Marin eobservation squadron from its previously author-ized eight OY aircraft to four OY and four heli-copters . The Commandant stated that all of thehelicopters observed and tested as replacementsfor the OY aircraft, the latest model Bell HTL– 3and the Sikorsky S–52 closely met the Marine

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

2 3

Corps ' requirements of size, configuration, andgross weight, with the S–52 rated as the mos tdesirable of all models . 2 2

The Sikorsky S–52 was a two-place, three -bladed single-rotor-system utility helicopter buil tcompletely at Sikorsky's expense and concurrentlywith the larger and now practically defunct XHJS–1. The 2,100-pound gross weight of the S–52 per-mitted the aircraft to carry a useful load of ap-proximately 1,000 pounds at a maximum airspeedof 91 knots . The HTL–3 trainer was similar i ngeneral configuration to the HTL–2 except that a200-horsepower engine had been installed in plac eof the HTL–2s 178-horsepower engine which in -creased the useful load to approximately 70 6pounds.

As an interim measure, therefore, the Com-mandant recommended that 12 HTL–3s or S–52 sbe procured for the Marine Corps to implement th echange in the VMO ' s aircraft complement . As along-range recommendation, he requested that th edesign and procurement of a light helicopter b einitiated to meet specifically the requirements fo ra military observation helicopter .'- 3 At this poin tthe Commandant's request for the interim heli-copters "struck a snag when BuAer replied that th enew machines of the desired type were not avail-able"—for assignment to the Marine Corps .'

It was not until the next year that the CNO ' s

Aviation Plan Number 21–49, dated 7 April 1949 ,outlined the plans for outfitting the VMO squad-rons . The plan specified that the HTLs were con-sidered satisfactory for Marine observation re-quirements and that as the HTL helicopters becam eavailable they would replace half the observatio naircraft in existing VMO squadrons ."

Approximately three months after the 194 9aviation plan appeared, the Commandant sub-mitted to the CNO the Marine Corps ' specific re-quirements for the desired type of observatio nhelicopter . The letter, dated 1 July 1949, mentione dthat HMX–1 had conducted extensive evaluation ofhelicopters as replacements for the OY type air -craft for VMO squadrons and determined thatsome specific requirements were necessary if th eaircraft were to be suitable for observation work .Generally, the specifications required that thehelicopter carry a useful load of between 800 t o1,000 pounds, have dual controls, be capable o fflight at maximum gross weight for a duration o ffour hours, and carry a pilot, observer, and on eadditional passenger . The requirements listing themaximum air speed and dimensions were omitted . 2 6

One requirement which had been a problem insingle-main-rotor helicopters was the need to shif tthe ballast inside the aircraft either fore or aft .This was necessary to keep the helicopter withi nits designed flight control parameters—for, should

The Bell HTL—3 was an improved version of the HTL—2 (Marine Corps Photo 529989) .

24


the center of gravity change excessively, the heli-copter would become uncontrollable in the air . Intandem-configured helicopters a change in th ecenter of gravity was less critical due to the loca-tion of the lifting rotors . Therefore, the tande mrotor helicopter permitted a less stringent loadingrequirement—a feature which appealed to th ehelicopter pilots and loading crews . In this rela-tionship, the new observation helicopter require-ment stipulated that the aircraft should be capabl eof operations within allowable center of gravitylimits at minimum and maximum loading condi-tions without having to resort to shifts in ballast ,or equipment, to stay within operating center o fgravity limits . In relation to size, the aircraft wasto be small enough to lend itself to ease of con-cealment and transportability on a widely varie dnumber of vehicles, and to be able to operate fro msmall areas in the field ."

Published later, on 16 August 1949, was CNO ' sOperational Requirement AO-17503 (Liaison heli-copter) which defined, in further detail, the re-quirements desired for such an observation heli-copter. Seven such specifications were listed :

1. Maximum visibility.2. Extreme maneuverability .3. High rate of climb .4. Performance and internal space sufficient t o

carry two litters or a limited amount of cargo .5. Capability of sustained flight with all or part o f

one rotor blade missing .6. Interchangeable and foldable rotor blade fo r

simplicity of maintenance and stowage of aircraft .7. Provisions for quick (five minutes or less) in-

stallation of television and electronic reconnaissanc eequipment . '' S

As a result of the favorable flight evaluation ofthe Sikorsky S–52, BuAer initiated a contract wit hSikorsky for the S–52–2, a version of the originalS–52 (Navy designation H05S–1) . When furthermodified and later delivered to the Marine Corps ,it would be a four-place, 245-horsepower, three -bladed machine with a quadricycle landing gear .Official missions descriptions were listed as obser-vation-liaison, reconnaissance, gunfire adjustment ,evacuation of wounded, transportation of personnel ,and general utility . As a medical evacuation air -craft, the copilot's seat could be removed and tw olitter patients carried internally, in addition to th epilot and attendant. An unusual feature, one whichwould later amount to a great impairment in it suse, was that its take-off weight was limited t o2,769 pounds . With a' .pilot . and' observer, and afull fuel load of 222 pounds, the 245-horsepowerengine would allow for a skimpy 157 pounds of

payload! 29 The delivery date for the first aircraf twas scheduled for September 1951 .* 30

Operation PACKARD II

By the end of April 1948, HMX–1 had 12 of-ficers and 32 enlisted men on duty with an ad-ditional four officers and eight enlisted men tem-porarily attached while undergoing pilot an dmechanical training. Although the squadron hadbeen operating helicopters for only three months ,sufficient progress had been made by this date inboth the operational and maintenance sections t othe point where Colonel Dyer was receptive to asuggestion from Lieutenant Colonel Victor H.Krulak, Assistant Director of the Senior School ,that HMX–1 participate in the MCS forthcomin gtraining exercise, Operation PACKARD II .

The MCS amphibious command post exercise swere held annually by joint Navy and Marin eCorps forces to simulate a ship-to-shore assaul tlanding against an enemy-defended beach . Opera-tion PACKARD II represented an ideal oppor-tunity for HMX–1 to implement one of the heli-copter program objectives for 1948 and woul dpresent the first test in the movement of troop sby helicopters in a ship-to-shore operation .

Lieutenant Colonel Krulak was extremely knowl-edgeable on the subject of amphibious operations .During World War II he commanded the diver-sionary landing at Choiseul to cover the Bougain-ville invasion and had served as Assistant Chie fof Staff, G–3 for the 6th Marine Division the nunder the command of Major General Lemuel C .Shepherd Jr . Lieutenant Colonel Krulak earnedthe Legion of Merit for his part in the plannin gand execution of the Okinawa campaign . ColonelDyer later remarked about the conversation he hadwith Krulak : "No one could ever characterize aflight of five helicopters carrying three Marine sapiece as an overwhelming force, but Krulak felt—and I agreed—that we [HMX-1] should go o nboard ship and . . . make . . . a landing . " 31 Itwas also planned that because of the many un-known factors involved, that only a minimu msatisfactory performance should be sought rathe rthan a maximum endeavor which might develo p

'' The Sikorsky S–52 would he the first productionhelicopter to have all-metal rotor blades. In view of th eclimatic effects and sand abrasion on wood and fabri crotor blades, this represented a basic improvement in dura-bility and lifetime . During April 1949, the S–52 establisheda world' s speed record at Cleveland, Ohio, of 129 .55 milesper hour .

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

25

unforeseen difficulties and thereby jeopardize th eoperation . 3 2

The squadron was given a list of objectives fo rPACKARD II, three of which were :

1. To take a positive step forward in the develop-ment program by making an actual landing of troop sby carrier-based helicopters.

2. To gain experience in operating helicopters o nboard an aircraft carrier and experience in helicopte rlanding operations upon which a sound doctrine forthese operations could be written .

3. To determine probable military requirements fo rlanding force helicopters of the future.33, 3 4

As finally developed, and later executed, theoperational plan, prepared by the MCS studentstaff, provided for an element of the landing force ,the staff of a regimental combat team (RCT), an dHMX–1 to be embarked in escort aircraft carrier s(CVEs) . For problem purposes, the regimenta lstaff planned in full, and theoretically executed ,the ship-to-shore movement of a constructive regi-mental combat team using a problem force of 25 0HRP–1 helicopters operating from four CVEs .This movement and subsequent employment of th ehelicopter-borne force was part of, and integrate dwith, the overall attack plan of the naval attackforce and landing force. The RCT staff als oplanned the actual ship-to-shore movement of th eregimental headquarters and this was execute din reality by five HO3S-1 helicopters, consisten tas far as practicable with the theoretical plan ."The squadron spent the early part of May 194 8making plans and preparations for PACKARD I Iand on 18 May departed Quantico for Norfolk ,Virginia, where it flew on board the USS Palau(CVE-122) .

As the operation began on 23 May at 0930, thefive HO3S-ls took off from the USS Palau,anchored off Onslow Beach at Camp Lejeune ,North Carolina, and proceeded in formation t othe designated landing zone a few miles inland .The troops of the first flight were landed precisel yat 1000 . Thereafter, continuous flights were mad euntil all troops, less a small logistical group, wer elanded . Following the landing of the troops, a num-ber of flights were made simulating the movementof cargo loads requested by the regiment ashore .During the day's operations, a total of 66 Marinesand a considerable amount of communication sequipment were transported to the beach by heli -

* General Krulak states that "although unwritten ,the greatest and by far the most important objective o fthe Packard II helicopter element was to create a state of

mind among students, instructors, the Navy and observers ,as to the dramatic tactical horizons of the helicopter . "

copter . A total of 35 flights was made between th ePalau and the landing zone.3 G

The squadron concluded from its participationin PACKARD II that "transport helicopterscapable of carrying at least eight troops wer eurgently needed if combat troops were to be lande dexpeditiously and in battle formation . " Also, tha t" in order to use the space available in a CVE t ofull advantage, it would be necessary that em-barked helicopters be capable of movement up ordown on the ship's flight deck elevators, " and inorder to do this expeditiously, it was stressed "tha tautomatic blade folding devices must be devel-oped . " Two of the five recommendations made a tthe termination of the exercise stressed "that th ehelicopter objectives be extended in a similar op-eration in 1949" and "that every effort be mad eto equip HMX–1 with at least five HRP–1 heli-copters prior to December 1948 ." 3 7

Again, from the standpoint of HMX-1, this wa sthe first test to determine the value of the heli-copter in the movement of assault troops in a namphibious operation . Although there was no at -tempt made to exploit the capabilities of rotary -wing aircraft, the operation was entirely success-ful in achieving its limited objectives. Neithertheoretical nor actual insurmountable obstacleswhich could prevent future operations of masse dlandings of troops by helicopter were experienced .The success of PACKARD II proved that the heli-copter could achieve the desired troop build-u pashore . As a result, Marine Corps planners becam emore firmly committed to the new technique ofvertical assault in amphibious warfare. This wastruly the beginning .

Publication ofthe New Concept—PHIB—3 1

In response to the Commandant 's directive ofDecember 1946, officers of the MCS were busil yengaged in developing a concept covering th etactics and techniques of the employment of heli-copters in an amphibious operation and by Novem-ber 1948 the school had published the world 's firs tprinted textbook on the subject entitled Amphib-ious Operations—Employment of Helicopters(Tentative) . It was originally printed in mimeo -graph form in 1947 as an instructional guide fo ruse within the school and later was used for th eplanning of Operation PACKARD II . The bookletwas numbered 31 in a series of publications onamphibious operations and was written jointl ywith representatives from HMX-1, but under the

26


overall supervision of the Senior School's Directorand senior member of the Helicopter and Trans -port Seaplane Board,* Colonel Robert E . Hoga-

boom .Phib-31 provided the basis of doctrine govern-

ing helicopter landing operations . The preface de-fined its purpose :

The advent of troop carrying helicopters and it sestablishment as standard equipment within the Ma-rine Corps gives rise to a variety of questions relate dto the employment of such conveyances in the conductof amphibious operations . It is the purpose of thi spamphlet to explore the various aspects of helicopte remployment, discerning the manner in which th echaracteristics of the vehicle can best he exploite dto enhance the effectiveness of the amphibiou sattack . 3s

The publication spelled out the many advantagesof the helicopter to the new amphibious concept :

As a military conveyance, [it] possesses certaindistinctive characteristics which, if exploited, can en-hance greatly the speed and flexibility of the amphibi-ous assault, while at the same time permitting adesirable increase in the dispersion of the attackin gNaval forces . The ability of the helicopter to rise an ddescend vertically, to hover, and to move rapidly a tvarying altitudes all qualify it admirably as a sup-plement or substitute for the slower, more inflexibl ecraft now employed in the ship-to-shore movement .Furthermore its ability to circumvent powerful beac hdefenses, and to land assault forces accurately an dat any desired altitude, on tactical localities farthe rinland endow helicopter operations with many of th edesirable characteristics of the conventional airborn eattack while avoiding the undesirable dispersal o fforces which often accompany such operations . Thehelicopter, furthermore, when transported to the scen eof operations in aircraft carriers, makes operation spossible at ranges which have not yet been achieve dby the existing conventional troop carrier types . 30

These words which appeared in the introductio nto Phib-31 were written by Lieutenant Colone lKrulak . In later years General Krulak had this t osay about the book, "I wrote the words [to theintroduction but] Dyer was unhappy with them,and properly so, because no helicopters of that er acould do these things, or even approach them . "As for preface, and the rest of the book, it "waswritten jointly by Dyer and me [with the help ofeight board members] . We had so little to go on ;no data : just conviction ." 40, 4x * *

* This particular board had been formed for the pur-pose of devising a concept for the employment of both th etransport helicopter and the assault seaplane transport(AST) . Phib—31 was the first product of the board .

* • Phib—31 was truly pioneering and it is significantto observe that it was copied in all its essential element sby the U . S . Army in its first helicopter manual .

A final statement in the introduction expressed ,in a way, the attitude that prevailed among mos tofficers at the MCS responsible for the new con-ceptual document . As an indication of their con-viction and dedication in keeping the develop-mental pace of the concept ahead of the advance sin helicopter construction, it said :

. . . the evolution of a set of principles governin gthe helicopter employment cannot await the perfec-tion of the craft itself, but must proceed concurrentl ywith that development. Certain of these principles ar enow apparent, and a concept of employment basedthereon is presented in the sections to follow 4 2

Throughout its 52 pages, Phib-31 discussed, ineight separate sections, such features of helicopte remployment as : organization and command, tac-tical considerations, embarkation, and the ship-to-shore movement. Also included within the textwere such subjects as fire support, logistics, com-munications, and detailed lists of characteristics o nthe HRP–1 and the H03S–1 . Phib-31 was pub-lished by the MCS as a tentative guide for instruc-tional purposes and served as the guidebook fo ramphibious helicopter employment .

As General Krulak remarked years later, " thebest we could do was to rationalize the operationa lprinciples, praying they would turn out to be valid ,since we had no real experience . " 4 3

Other Significant Demonstrationsand Operations by HMX— 1

By early April 1949, HMX–1 was operatin gnine Piasecki HRP–ls, having received the firstHRP–1 on 19 August 1948. The development o fthe amphibious assault by helicopter had advancedsufficiently by that time to publicly demonstratethe technique . On 9 May, the squadron, in con -junction with Marine air and ground forces, gavea two-part demonstration to members of the 81s tCongress and senior Defense Department officials .The first phase of the show started with the guestswitnessing the actual assault preparations an dtakeoff of eight HRPs with 56 fully-equippe dcombat Marines from a simulated carrier deckpainted on the runway at MCAS Quantico . Thehelicopters took off, rendezvoused, and in forma-tion flew past the visitors . Then later in the day,the officials were taken to a combat area for th elanding phase where they saw the helicopters spee dinbound toward the landing zone under the cove rof fighter aircraft, which were strafing and layin gsmoke screens. The HRPs landed in the roughterrain, discharged their troops, and took off in

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

2 7

approximately 25 seconds. Following the landin gof the troops, a second wave of HRPs flew into th esame zone transporting 75mm pack howitzer sdangling from each helicopter 's hook . After theguns were placed into position the crews readiedthem for firing . Other type helicopters gave demon-strations in laying communication wire, spottin gfor artillery, and evacuating casualties ."

Following the Congressional demonstration, th esquadron took part in Operation PACKARD II Iwhich was the MCS amphibious command pos texercise of 1949 . The operation was held again atCamp Lejeune, North Carolina, and was basicallythe same as PACKARD II in which the squadro nhad participated the previous year .

The squadron had several objectives for PACK-ARD III . First, the squadron was to make a"definite advance in the employment of rotary -winged aircraft in amphibious warfare by operat-ing, for the first time, transport helicopters in th eship-to-shore movement." In doing so, HMX–1 wa sto contribute to the "formulation of tactical doc-trines and operating procedures by gaining prac-tical experience and stimulating thought in operat-ing large helicopters from aircraft carriers . " As afinal objective, the squadron was to "evaluate theoperations of a small observation helicopter fro man LST (Landing Ship, Tank) for artillery andinfantry observation and liaison missions . " "

For PACKARD III, the squadron 's aircraft weredivided into three separate sections. The mainechelon consisted of eight HRP–ls based on boar dthe USS Palau and, for problem purposes, repre-sented a full helicopter aircraft group of 184 HRP soperating from six CVEs for the lifting of a com-plete regimental combat team . The second groupwas three H03Ss land-based with the mission ofsearch and rescue . The last group was assigne don board LST-155 with the squadron 's HTL–2 fo rthe observation mission and shipboard evalua-tion. "

A rehearsal was held at Naval Amphibious Base ,Little Creek, Virginia, after which the ships move dinto position off the coast of North Carolina . Atwo-day invasion was held beginning on 22 Maywith landing boats storming Onslow Beach whil ethe HMX–1 helicopters transported troops inlan dto a point approximately six miles up the Ne wRiver inlet . They landed and discharged thei rtroops at a strategic road position . High windsand rough seas encountered during the entire op-eration swamped many landing boats as they ap-proached the beach and upon their return the yexperienced great difficulty in tying up to theirrespective attack cargo ships (AKAs) . The heli -

copter operations from the Palau were routine astheir efficiency was not impaired by these elements .Each HRP helicopter carried six fully-equippedcombat troops from the carrier for approximatel y10 miles under a heavy cover of fighter aircraftwhich were simulating smoke and strafing runs o nthe defending forces. A total of 230 passenger swere carried in addition to 14,000 pounds o fcargo .` '

During the exercise, the HTL–2 proved to b etotally successful during its evaluation . The smal lhelicopter operated for naval gunfire spotting an dobservation from the LST while the ship was bothunderway and at anchor . Although at times theLST pitched and rolled in the choppy seas, th eHTL proved that small helicopters could worksuccessfully from that type of vessel . '

The search and rescue group, which was base dat Peterfield Point, North Carolina, later rename dMCAS, New River, was on station over the fleetfor the entire daylight operation . The three H03Sshad no cause to be used in their primary role, butwere called upon for message drops and ship-to-shore transportation of personnel .

Operation PACKARD III was the most ambi-tious attempt to advance this type of helicopte roperation . Although the squadron used only eighttransport helicopters, it was convinced that acomplete regimental combat team could have bee nhauled successfully in a helicopter amphibiou sassault .}9 The operation confirmed the previousconclusions derived from Operation PACKARD I Iand offered an excellent contribution to the Marin eCorps' assigned function of developing amphib-ious tactics and techniques. The existing conceptfor the employment of helicopters in the amphib-ious assault, derived by MCS and HMX–1, wa stested through the medium of this problem an dproved "to be sound and workable in all re-spects ." 5 0

With the completion of PACKARD III, thesquadron returned to Quantico and for the follow-ing 12 months participated in a variety of projects .Emphasis was placed first on pilot training durin gJune in order to qualify more pilots to fly th eHRP–1 and to train the newer pilots who had re-cently rejoined the squadron after their initia lhelicopter training at HU–2 . The training activitywas necessary as by 30 June 1949 the personnelstrength had risen to 22 officers and 69 enlistedmen, as compared with an authorized level of 2 1officers and 89 enlisted . 51 The squadron also hadan increase in the number of helicopters which no wtotaled 14 ; 9 HRPs, 4 H03Ss, and 1 HTL-2 . TheCNO's Aircraft Complement and Allowance List,

28


dated 15 June, had fixed the number of aircraft a t10 HRPs, 3 HO3Ss, and 2 HTLs . 5 2

At the end of June, Colonel Dyer turned com-mand of the squadron over to Lieutenant ColonelJohn F. Carey, who during World War II earnedthe Navy Cross at Midway, then subsequentl yserved in an air mission in Peru . The change ofcommand ceremony was a sad occasion for Colone lDyer, but two months later he was to assume ye tanother challenging assignment as Commandin gOfficer, Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG–12) .

Lieutenant Colonel Carey continued the agres-sive pace of helicopter demonstrations and evalua-tions carried on by Colonel Dyer and immediatelybegan contributing many of his own ideas to theadvancement of the new technique . During Sep-tember, under Carey 's leadership, HMX–1 sen tfour HRPs to the Cleveland air races to demon-strate publicly the employment of the helicopteras a troop and cargo transport .

Between 25 November 1949 and 5 April 1950 ,operations with the HRP were halted as all aircraftof that model were grounded for mechanical rea-sons . Nevertheless, during December, Carey ' ssquadron experimented for the first time in nigh tflying with the H03S. For the evaluation, eachpilot was given two 45-minute periods of localflying during which a portion of the time wa sspent in making landings in an area marked b yflare pots . As a result of the night flying experi-ment, a request was sent to BuAer for landinglights and instruments adequate for night flying .These items were considered essential by thesquadron before any large-scale night helicopte roperations could be undertaken . 5 3

As HRPs were still not available during Febru-ary 1950, the squadron sent four HO3S-ls andthe one HLT-2 as a detachment to the Naval AirFacility (NAF), Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico o nthe 11th of the month to participate in the Flee tMarine Force, Atlantic (FMFLant) Fleet Exercise ,1950 . Later, on the nearby island of Vieques ,during the amphibious landing, an HO3S di-rected the landing boats during their movementtoward the beach by means of an externall ymounted speaker system . 5' Other than this novelexperiment, all aspects of the amphibious opera-tion were routine .

The HRPs returned to operational status i nApril after the long grounding period due to aproblem with the mid-transmission oil pump . Dur-ing that month, for the Sixth Joint Civilia nOrientation Conference at Quantico, and forOperation CROSSOVER, a 2d Marine Divisionmaneuver held at Camp Lejeune, HMX-1 per -

formed similar missions of delivering infantrytroops and 75mm pack howitzers into specifiedlanding areas . Also demonstrated by the heli-copters were the techniques of wire laying, re -supply, and the evacuation of the "wounded ." 5 5

The high point of May 1950 for HMX-1 wa sOperation PACKARD IV, which took place dur-ing the final week of the month . Six HRP–ls an dtwo HO3S–1 helicopters landed on board the US SMindoro (CVE–120) at Norfolk, Virginia, afte rwhich the ship sailed south to a point 15 mile soff the coast of Camp Lejeune. The operationlasted only two days during which five HRP sand two HO3Ss carried ashore a total of 120troops and over 20,000 pounds of cargo . As wa sthe case in Operation CROSSOVER, the exerciseafforded good training for the squadron althoughthere were no new techniques of the amphibiousassault exhibited . 5 6

On 15 June 1950, HMX–1 was given an op-portunity to demonstrate to President Harry STruman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff the man ytasks which Marine helicopters were now able t operform. A simulated amphibious assault wa sstaged for the guests as the helicopters were "pu tthrough their paces" in presenting a complet eamphibious demonstration similar to the Con-gressional exhibition given the previous year . Th enext day a parade and review was staged atQuantico in honor of Lieutenant General LemuelC. Shepherd, Jr ., the outgoing Commandant ofthe MCS, a position he had held since April 1948.At the close of the ceremony, six HRP–ls, si xHO3S-ls, and the HTL–2 made a "Fly-by" information . This was believed to have been th elargest group of helicopters to fly in formation t odate . 5 7

Reviewing the progress made by HMX–1 sinc eits commissioning date to June 1950, the squadro nperformed practically all aspects of its assignedmissions and tasks . Evidence indicated that theoperations of HMX–1 had been completely satis-factory . Although the Commandant's time-tablefor the helicopter program had slipped, HMX–1had used every conceivable opportunity to ensur ethat fulfillment of the program had been met tothe best of its capability .

Development of tactics and techniques in con-nection with the movement of assault troops hadbeen accomplished by participation in the PACK-ARD operations . The evaluation of a small heli-copter for observation purposes had been com-pleted and specifications submitted for its char-acteristics . Compliance with the last task assigne dhad also been completed when a proposed table

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

29

of organization was submitted for a typical Marin ehelicopter squadron .

Although the squadron did not possess 18 air -craft as the original planners had envisioned andCNO had approved, by the end of June, HMX–1was one aircraft in excess of the authorized level .The latest allowance list, dated 15 June 1950 ,established the maximum number of aircraft a t6 HRP-1s, 7 HO3Ss, and 2 HTL-2s . This corn-

pared with an actual on hand accounting of 6HRP-1s, 9 HO3Ss, and 1 HTL-3 . 58 An HTL– 3had replaced the HTL–2 after it had sustaine dsevere damage in a crash during April 1950 .

Personnel strength at the end of June was like -wise near the authorized level . It had been read-justed in April 1950 to 20 officers and 90 enliste dmen with the squadron reporting a total of 2 3officers and 86 enlisted . a9

CHAPTER 3

A REVITALIZED HELICOPTER PROGRA M

The Marine Corps Board

While HMX–1 was engaged in testing, evaluat-ing, and demonstrating the new amphibious tech-nique from the operational point of view, Marin eCorps Schools was developing the concept fro mthe academic standpoint . Back in June 1949, amajor impetus had been injected into the Marin eCorps ' helicopter program when the schools pre-sented to the Commandant the most broad an dintensive plan for expansion since the program ' sinitial submission in December 1946 .

The Marine Corps Board, MCS, headed byMajor General Oliver P . Smith, the Assistan tCommandant and Chief of Staff, HQMC, had beeninstructed by the Commandant in late 1948 t oundertake a new study . General Smith was di-rected to look into the matters concerning th e"measures which the Marine Corps should tak ein order to fulfill its obligations in maintaining itsposition as the agency primarily responsible fo rthe development of landing force tactics, tech-niques, and equipment . " In compliance with itsinstructions, the board during the early part o f1949, examined reports of Fleet Marine Forcepostwar maneuvers and found "little if any ad-vancement or improvement was being made inlanding force tactics and techniques . The postwa rmaneuvers had tended to become stereotyped withthe execution falling into mechanical patterns ."The practices "which had been developed to sucha high degree during World War II were more o rless standard procedures and were employed with -out variation . " 1

In searching for a means to develop new con-cepts and techniques for FMF maneuvers, theSmith Board reasoned that the "lack of flexibilit yand originality in the FMF was due at least i npart to limitations imposed by the equipmen tbeing employed ." It was considered that "untilsome quantum advance was made in equipment ,little new could be expected in the way of ad-vanced tactics and techniques ." 2

The board had observed with great interest th eemployment of HMX–1 in support of the MCS

landing exercises at Onslow Beach in Operation sPACKARD II and III and felt that "those exer-cises had successfully demonstrated that the heli-copter offered the most promising possibilities ofbeing the quantum advance for which the MarineCorps had been searching . " It was believed tha t" the time was rapidly approaching when operat-ing helicopter squadrons should be organized andplaced in support of FMF maneuvers . " The boar dwas convinced that in this way "a means wouldbe provided for putting new life into the amphib-ious problems and thereby take it out of thestereotyped forms toward which it was tending ." . 5

Four basic problem areas were :cited by Gen-eral Smith ' s board, all of which had to be solve dbefore helicopter squadrons could be placed i nsupport of FMF maneuvers . Allocation of neces-sary funds in the budget was listed first withprocurement of a suitable type helicopter see nas a second obstacle . The third and fourth prob-lems were provisions for a helicopter squadron i nthe CNO's operational plan and organization an dtraining of operational helicopter squadrons . '

It was obvious that a carefully prepared an dvigorously executed program extending over sev-eral years would be necessary before the realiza-tion of operational helicopter squadrons could b eachieved. The first step in such a program wasto obtain the allocation of the necessary funds i nthe budget. Since the preparation of the 195 1budget had already begun, the earliest fiscal yearin which funds could be allocated was 1952 .Therefore, the board stated, studies should b eundertaken immediately by the Division of Avia-tion, HQMC, with the view in mind toward ob-taining the necessary funds in fiscal year 1952 ." 5

In relation to the second problem, the board ' sreport explained :

An entirely satisfactory transport helicopter doe snot yet exist. However, types which can be in pro-duction by 1952 have acceptable characteristics fo rinitiating work with the FMF. The Board believes tha tthis program should not be delayed until the idea lmilitary requirements for a transport helicopter ar emet. The type which, in fiscal 1952, comes the closes t

30

A REVITALIZED HELICOPTER PROGRAM

31

to meeting our requirements should be procured at

that time. 6

Since procurement of aviation materiel was afunction of BuAer, the report mentioned that earlystudies should be undertaken by the Division ofAviation in conjunction with BuAer "to deter -mine the most effective means by which provi-sions for the requisite helicopter squadron couldbe made in operation force plans . " While thisproblem was purely an administrative one, i tnevertheless was difficult and complicated . "Thecreation of operational transport helicopter squad-rons will " the report continued, "require decision sas to what effect the activation of these squadron swill have on presently activated Marine Corp ssquadrons and what effect, if any, it will have o nthe ratio of aviation to ground strengths . " '

It was estimated that a period of eight month sto a year would be required for the organizationand training of a transport helicopter squadro nbefore it could be prepared to participate with theFMF in maneuvers . To ease the training load ,and also because it was estimated that the produc-tion rate of new helicopters would be slow, it wa sconsidered more feasible that new "squadronsshould be activated successively rather than simul-taneously . " General Smith ' s report terminated withonly one formal recommendation : " that a trans -port helicopter program with the objective ofactivating one 12-plane squadron [on each coast ]in 1953 and one such squadron in 1954 b einitiated immediately . " 8

The Second Attempt toProcure a 3,000-Poun d

Payload Helicopte r

General Smith's report was circulated at HQM Cbetween two main action agencies : the Divisionsof Aviation, and Plans and Policy . Meanwhile ,Colonel Dyer initiated a request from HMX–1 t othe Commandant stating that the "squadron 'srecent participation on Operation PACKARD II Ihad proved that helicopter operations were highlysuccessful within the limitations of the HRP–1 ,and therefore, development of a carrier-basedtransport was now justified . "9 He understood tha tthe Navy and Air Force were developing jointl ythe Piasecki XH–16 and, since it would un-doubtedly be of military usefulness, felt th eproject should be continued. Because of the tim erequired to perfect fully such a large helicopter ,and its doubtful ability to operate from small

aircraft carriers, Colonel Dyer stressed that "itappears advantageous to proceed with an addi-tional project for the development of a smal lhelicopter which will meet our minimum require-ments, which will be suitable for carrier opera-tions, and might well be more easily and quicklyobtained ." 1 0

In general terms, it was pointed out by Dyerthat "such a helicopter should be designed fo rcarrier-based operations . . . , capable of carryinga payload of about 3,000 pounds, (15 combat -equipped Marines) " and have "sufficient fuel foran operating radius of about 100 miles . " He note dthat "the specifications should meet the MarineCorps ' immediate military requirements and pre -sent a reasonable goal for technical development s[of the helicopter] . " The requirement specifie dthat the helicopter be of a weight and size "topermit movement on the smallest flight deck ele-vators and of an overall height which would no tprohibit storage on aircraft carrier hangardecks" 11—a mandatory requirement if large num-bers of helicopters were to operate from aircraftcarriers .

Colonel Dyer's letter, dated 25 June 1949, hi slast to the Commandant on this subject as com-manding officer of HMX–1, was endorsed by Gen-eral Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr ., Commandant ofMarine Corps Schools, who concurred with Dyer ' srecommendation and considered that "the develop-ment of such a helicopter should be in addition tothe development now in progress on the XH–16 ." 1 2

By 5 August Brigadier General Edwin A .Pollock, Director, Division of Plans and Policie s(DivP&P) and Major General William J . Wallace ,Director, Division of Aviation (DivAvn) agree dto form a joint study group at HQMC "to imple-ment the execution of the program," 13 as recom-mended in General Smith's report . General Polloc khad served, since 1945, successively as Com-manding Officer of the Basic School ; ExecutiveOfficer of the MCS ; and Chief of Staff of theMarine Barracks, Quantico . In June 1948 he wa sordered to HQMC as the Military Secretary to theCommandant, and when promoted to brigadie rgeneral, became Director, Division of Plans an dPolicies in July 1949. General Wallace, prior t oassuming the post of Director, Division of Avia-tion/Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps(Air) in 1948, was Commanding General, Air -craft, FMFLant and Commanding General, 2dMAW. Earlier he had been Commanding General ,Aircraft, FMFPac/Deputy Commander FMFPac.

The Commandant, General Clifton B . Cates, ap-pointed Lieutenant Colonel George S . Bowman,

32


DivAvn, as senior member of a seven-man stud ygroup. The membership was directed to conven e"as soon as may be practicable to study and re -port on a program for the activation of transpor thelicopter squadrons within the Marine Corps " 1 'and to determine the most effective means o fcomplying with the four problem areas of concernoutlined in General Smith 's report of 3 June.

While Lieutenant Colonel Bowman's board wa smeeting, the Commandant responded on 19 Augustto Colonel Dyer ' s letter of 25 June . Colonel FrankH. Lamson-Scribner, a veteran of Attu, Tarawa ,and operations in the Marshall and Gilbert Islandsduring World War II, and who had been mostrecently assigned to the DivAvn after serving a scommander Marine Air WestPac in China, pre-pared the Commandant's reply . It stressed thattime was not available to design and construc tthe proposed 3,000-pound payload helicopter priorto the estimated completion date of the first XH —16 in 1952 . It explained that the Marine Corp swas also investigating the feasibility of transport-ing troops from friendly bases to hostile beache sby assault seaplane transports, in addition to th eship-to-shore movement of troops by helicopter ,and that the assault seaplane concept had resulte din an engineering study contract being awarde dfor a "flying LST" to the Consolidated Vulte eCorporation, San Diego, California . It was con-sidered that any new programs could not beapproved at that time for it would require th eexpenditure of additional money when the Navywas still faced with a cut-back in funds for ne waircraft procurement . However, in spite of thefinancial situation, it was explained to Colone lDyer that a board was in session at the time a tHQMC to study and submit recommendations ona transport helicopter program . The board was t oconsider, among other factors, the specific typeof helicopter most suitable for Marine Corps use. 1 5

The final paragraph was most important as i tinitiated action to consolidate Marine Corps sup -port firmly behind one type of air assault vehicle .It was evident that this action was the propercourse to pursue if the Marine Corps desire da suitable helicopter in production prior to th e1952 date established in General Smith 's report .The paragraph directed :

If the 3,000-pound pay-load helicopter is considere dmore desirable than the XH—16 or the AST (Assaul tSupport Transport) or both, recommendations shouldhe made to this Headquarters relative to the reassign-ing of priorities for these projects . l"

Lieutenant Colonel Carey, continuing in th efootsteps of Colonel Dyer, regarded the reassign .

ing of priorities of the program, as mentioned byGeneral Cates, as a matter that could best b eaccomplished by a joint conference where al lpertinent information could be available . He sug-gested representatives should come from HQM Cagencies, DivAvn, Military Requirements Sectio nof CNO, BuAer, and members from his ow nsquadron . In addition to proposing the joint con-ference, Carey elaborated further on Colonel Dyer 'sreasons for establishing a 3,000-pound payloa dtransport helicopter program . He commented thatsuch a helicopter appeared to be the most feasibl emodel for operating from escort aircraft carriers ,whereas the XH—16 's size would make it doubtful .Additionally, the XH—16 represented a large ste pforward in helicopter technology and would re -quire extensive component and flight testing afte rthe anticipated completion date of the first tes taircraft in 1952. This would preclude the con-struction of production models for an appreciabl elength of time since only two experimental air -craft were being built .

Carey contended that sufficient information wa savailable to support further a new helicopter de -sign . Modifying an existing helicopter was onecourse of action suggested while making a modelbased upon "proven " and existing configuration swas the alternate proposal . It was considered tha textensive expenditures of funds for research anddevelopment would not be necessary in the"growth" version since a large part of the basicdesign and engineering was already completed .Procurement dates provided by the helicoptercontractors indicated that such helicopters coul dbe produced in quantity by 1952, the propose ddelivery date of the first XH—16 flight test article .'

The specific models of helicopters suitable formodification were omitted from Carey's letter.Again, Piasecki, an organization devoted exclu-sively to the design and production of militar ytransport helicopters, had in the advanced stagesof construction its PD—22 (Air Force YH—21), a"beefed-up " version of the HRP . Although theoverall dimensions of the YH—21 and the HRPwere almost identical and somewhat similar i nappearance, the YH—21 weighed twice as muc hempty (9,148 pounds), and had three times thehorsepower (1,425) and useful load carryin gcapability (5,556 pounds), while retaining ap-proximately the same air speed . The PiaseckiHelicopter Corporation, its new name since 1946,was developing the YH—21 as an Arctic rescu ehelicopter for the Air Force . Three other helicopte rmanufacturers were competing in the Air Force


3 3

evaluation with the initial testing of each com-pany's entry to begin in November .

On 13 October 1949, General Cates approvedCarey 's recommendation for a joint conference ."The cognizant agencies have indicated their de -sire to attend the conference" the Commandant' sletter stated, "which will be held as soon as prac-ticable after the current Transport HelicopterBoard has submitted its recommendations ." 18

The joint conference was not delayed by Bow -man 's board as General Cates received its reportthe following day . In considering the items befor eit, the board first determined the general require-ments for a transport helicopter which could b eprocured in 1952–1953 and which would mos tnearly meet Marine Corps requirements . Basedupon specifications submitted over the last tw oyears the assumed general specifications were :

Range : 250 nautical mile sPayload : 3,000 to 3,500 pound sCapacity : 13 to 15 combat troops 0), 225 pound s

2 pilots us 200 poundsStowage : To fit the elevator of a CVE-105-class air -

craft carrier and be capable of being stowed an dmoved about the hangar deck .

Date Required : 1952-1953 1 9

The board studied characteristics of existin ghelicopters and formed an opinion that none ofthe current models would be of sufficient improve-ment over the Piasecki HRP–1 to justify procure-ment, nor would they even approximate the board' sassumed required general specifications . Furthe rinvestigation by the board disclosed that only one—the YH–21 Air Force Arctic Rescue model —had the potential of closely approximating th edesired specifications . The main variation, though ,existing between Air Force and Marine Corp srequirements, was that the former had a greate rrange demand where the latter had a requirementfor larger troop capacity . It was felt that favor-able results of the forthcoming Air Force evalua-tion would have a direct bearing on the Marin eCorps ' ability to procure a suitable productio nmodel in the 1952–1953 period. It also appeare dthat the most effective means of obtaining mone ywould be to select an existing type helicopterwhich could be modified with production funds —since the availability of research and developmentfunds was extremely critical . Other significan topinions reached by the board were : 1 . That "theXH–16 did not meet the restrictions imposed b yoperations from escort carriers [CVEs and CVLs ]and would not be procurable in 1952–1953 ." 2 ."That the minimum requirement for the MarineCorps is two assault transport helicopter squadrons,

each capable of lifting one reinforced rifle com-pany, " 20 an opinion appearing for the first timein any helicopter study .

Other recommendations contained in Bowman 'sreport urged the Commandant to request that theCNO examine the feasibility of modifying anexisting helicopter and that the aircraft meet th egeneral characteristics specified in his report . Inaddition, he stated, the CNO should "providefor two assault transport helicopter squadrons i n1953–1954 without reduction of Marine squadron sthen in existence ." Finally, that HMX–1 "be di-rected to prepare and submit [to HQMC] a tenta-tive table of organization for the future assaulttransport helicopter squadron ." 2 1

The First Six Months of 1950

A vast amount of work remained for the MarineCorps at the beginning of 1950 if the prospect sfor continued advancement of the helicopter pro -gram were to be realized . Complete fulfillment o fthe original goal was impossible to achieve . Thehelicopter program was already two years behindthe 1948 date established in 1946 for the com-missioning of the first tactical helicopter squadron ,and it was drifting even further behind schedul ewith the 1953–1954 dates proposed by Genera lSmith's board . The pace had to be quickened.But how was the Marine Corps to accomplishthis infusion of helicopter units into its aircraf twings while at the same time it was carryin gout a schedule for a reduction in other areas ofits wing forces? For example, during the past tw oyears the Marine Corps had been required todecrease the number of its active combat squadron sfrom a July 1948 strength of 23 to 12 aircraftunits by 1 July 1950—a reduction made neces-sary due to a lack of appropriations . 22 Researchand development funds, production funds, aswell as operational money for fleet squadrons ha dall been equally hard hit by the paucity of money .The complete spectrum of naval aviation, whichincludes Marine aviation, had felt the pinch, an dthe idea of forming new combat helicoptersquadrons caught aviation planners at a timewhen they were being forced to think in termsof reducing strengths and expenditures rather thanincreasing them. Nevertheless, with no end insight to the unfavorable fiscal trend, the MarineCorps continued with tenacity to pursue for it sfleet forces the one new type of aircraft which i tknew would be the key to success in maintaining

34


world superiority in the field of amphibiou soperations.

On 12 January 1950, the Commandant madea request for the 13- to 15-man assault helicopter .General Cates asked that the CNO procure fo rthe Marine Corps a helicopter with the char-acteristics identical to those drawn up by th eBowman Board. He pointed out that employmen tof helicopters from the CVE–105 class carrier swas entirely feasible and practical . It was a rigidrequirement that the aircraft not only be capabl eof operating on the flight deck, but also be ableto move to the hangar deck for storage an dmaintenance . General Cates made it known tha tthe "helicopters employed by HMX–1 [the HRPs ,H03Ss, and the HTL] did not possess the re-quired minimum range, payload, and troop capa-city for Marine Corps employment as assaul thelicopters . " The XH–16's lengthy developmentperiod was seen as seriously retarding the Marin eCorps helicopter program and although it was notdesired to divert funds for its support, "emphasi sshould be placed on allocation of funds towar dthe proposed helicopter . . . and given numbe rone priority . " In respect to the number of air -craft assigned to assault squadrons, the Com-mandant increased the number in each of th etwo squadrons from 12 to 15 aircraft and urge dthat the squadrons "be provided for in additionto other Marine squadrons then in existence ." 2 '

Admiral Sherman acknowledged the Com-mandant ' s letter on 2 February with a short state-ment : "The importance of the assault helicopterprogram to the Marine Corps is recognized . Con-sideration of this problem by various OpNavDivisions and BuAer Branches is necessary an dis being undertaken ." 2 5

The informal conference, as recommended byCarey, was held on 28 March 1950. Fourtee nmembers were present from key CNO offices an dMarine Corps agencies to determine the best ap-proach to satisfy the requirements presented inthe Commandant's letter of 12 January for th e13- to 15-man helicopter . The BuAer representa-tive, Navy Captain Paul H . Ramsey, presente dwhat the conferees apparently felt was the logica lcourse of action . His opinion was that the Ai r

* As an indication of the effect of the appropriation' scut, the Marine Corps was reduced from its peak strengthof 485,000 in 1945 to 156,000 by 1 July 1946. Withinanother year the number had declined further to 92,00 0and by June 1950 the total had dropped to a fraction under75,000-of which only 28,000 were serving in the FMF .The remaining men were serving on board ships, at postsand stations, and in administrative billets at various loca-tions throughout the world.23

Force's Arctic Rescue helicopter would be an un-satisfactory assault helicopter " and believe dthat the helicopter industry could now produce ahelicopter capable of carrying 20 to 26 troops ,go below decks of the CVE–CVL class carrier, an dmeet the other requirements established by th eMarine Corps. The solution, as presented byCaptain Ramsey, for obtaining the new assaul thelicopter for the Marine Corps involved fiv eseparate steps which at the time were the norma laircraft procurement procedures and represente dnothing new nor expedited the procurement pro-cess . They were :

1. Establish an operational requirement for a 20 -man helicopter.

2. Provide research and development funds for th eprocurement of experimental flying articles .

3. Solicit proposals from industry on a competitivebasis .

4. Obtain and test the experimental assault heli-copters .

5. Award a production contract to the manufacture rof the winning entry:2 6

It was his opinion that the time saved by ob-taining the Arctic Rescue helicopter on the en dof the Air Force contract would amount to aboutfour months less than his proposed solution . I twas also estimated that the first production air -craft, under this proposal, would be delivere dsometime in 1954. The representatives concurre dthat the Marine Corps would benefit from th eshort delay by ultimately having a helicopte rspecifically designed and tested for the assaul tmission . His recommendation was accepted at th econference as the best solution for the helicopte rprogram, but apparently no thought was given t omeeting the requirements of the helicopter pro -gram during the intervening four years . It waspointed out, however, that before BuAer couldproceed with the proposal, the Commandant woul dhave to withdraw his previously submitted require-ment for the 13- to 15-man helicopter as well a shis support for the XH–16, both of which wereseen as receiving favorable consideration . Inmatters of financing, the diversion of the remain-ing XH–16 Navy research and development fund swas also viewed as meeting with CNO approva lprovided the Navy could be persuaded to terminateits support of the XH–16 project . 2 7

The following week, the Navy's Air Readines sDivision revised the operational requirements foran assault helicopter of the type specified in Gen -

* There is no evidence in the official records to indi-cate why Captain Ramsey supported this point of view, bu tas Colonel Harold J . Mitchener recalls, size and compata-bility with the carriers were his primary concerns .


3 5

eral Cates ' letter of 12 January to reflect therecommendation of the conference of 28 Marchand transmitted it to BuAer for action . Thespecifications were contained in the Navy Re -search and Development Plan, Operational Re-quirement Number AO–17501 (Rotary Wing As-sault Helicopter) . The listed requirements were :"develop a rotary wing assault craft capable o ftransporting combat equipped troops (or th eequivalent in combat equipment) from transpor tvessels to beachheads in support of landing opera-tions . . ." and "that 20 combat equipped troop sbe transported with the weight of each man com-puted at 225 pounds . " The assigned functions inAO–17501 for the helicopter were to "operatefrom a CVE or larger carrier, or between carrier sand suitable equipped transport ships, carryin gassault troops with their initial requirements i nsupply, communications and organic weapon s. . . ." "- s Two of the main features listed wer ethat it be multi-engine equipped and of an overal ldimension compatible with movement on the ele-vator of the CVE–105 class carrier . Although theoperational requirement did not assign a modeldesignation, the twin-engine assault helicopte rwould subsequently bear the Sikorsky S–56 trade-mark and the Navy designation of XHR2S–1 . "

Further Action b ythe Marine Corps Board

Still disenchanted with the progress of the heli-copter program, the Marine Corps Board a tQuantico submitted yet another report to the Com-mandant on 27 April 1950. This was the secon dreport on the same subject in less than 10 month sand was again signed by Major General Oliver P .Smith, the Assistant Commandant, as Chairman .The board reviewed the progress made since th ehelicopter program was initiated in 1946–1947 an dwas concerned about the trend of events that hadtaken place over the past years, and, in particular ,the last year . Cited as a typical example of thedelays encountered in the helicopter program wa sthe recommendation made by the recent join thelicopter conference to "revert to the drawin gboard" for an assault helicopter rather thanrecommending procurement of an existing typewhich would come closest to meeting MarineCorps requirements . In summary, it was state d

* Operational Requirement Number AO–17501 (Ro-tary Wing Assault Helicopter) may he referred to here -after in the text as the XHR2S–1 .

that the Marine Corps transport helicopter pro -gram faced two distinct problems. First, "a lackof availability or even prospects of availabilit yin the immediate future of a new and modernhelicopter with increased operating capabilities . "Secondly, an ever increasing maintenance an davailability problem with existing [aging] heli-copters" in HMX–l. In stating the recommenda-tions for solving the primary problem, the boar dstressed "the standard approach to this problemof implementing the transport helicopter programhas failed . It is apparent that drastic action onthe part of the Marine Corps is the only remain-ing recourse available ." General Smith's repor twent on to say that "strong representation mus tbe made to the CNO to obtain sufficient funds t oimplement this program. Unless these funds ar emade available now and a new helicopter isdeveloped soon, 1953–1954 will arrive findin gthe Marine Corps again without operational trans -port helicopter squadrons ." 29

As a solution to solving temporarily the sec-ond problem, the board recommended, as an in-terim measure, that "an urgent effort be mad eto obtain all HRP–ls now in existence for th eMarine Corps . With these additional helicoptersit is felt that HMX–1 can continue its effort stowards the practical development of air tactic sand techniques . . ." while awaiting the newassault transport helicopter . 3 o

General Smith's report received immediate ac-tion and formed the basis for a letter from Gen-eral Cates to the CNO, Admiral Sherman . Theletter, written on 12 May 1950, stressed the ur-gency of obtaining new and adequate equipmen tfor the Marine Corps to cope with the manifes tthreat of the atomic bomb to the conventiona lship-to-shore movement. "The HRP," the Com-mandant said, "has never been considered as aservice type helicopter, but rather a means t odevelop the techniques and tactics of this ne wart . The Marine Corps is now at the crossroads.It possesses the knowledge but not the means t oapply this knowledge. If the art of amphibiou swarfare is to be pursued, adequate means must b eprovided . " To stress his point further, Genera lCates said, "The Marine Corps is effectively cur-tailed from performing this new concept in am-phibious assault by one factor—the lack of suitabl ehelicopters ." Finally, Admiral Sherman was re -quested to take urgent action on these points, pri-marily to : raise the priority for the XHR2S–1 fro mits presently CNO-assigned status of 1C to 1B, an dadditionally, "to see that experimental helicopter sbe procured and evaluated with a view to procuring

36


two 15-plane assault squadrons . . . as soon aspossible." 3 1

In order to find a method by which the MarineCorps could further expedite and improve upon thenew assault concept during the period 1950 t o1954, and also, to be able to find a solution t othe ever-increasing maintenance problems of th eaging HRPs, another joint helicopter conferenc ewas held on 22 May 1950. Attending were mem-bers from: BuAer, DCNO (Air) Aviation Plans ,DCNO (Air) Readiness, and HQMC . The Marin erepresentatives were Major General Wallace(DivAvn) and Brigadier General Pollock (Plan sand Policies) .

After a discussion of the problem by the con-ference members, it was determined that th ehelicopter program of the future should be com-posed of two parts. First, and as the longer-rang esolution, the Marine Corps should continue withthe program to obtain a carrier-based assaul thelicopter which would meet the requirements o fAO–17501 (XHR2S–1), as was recommended b ythe March helicopter conference, and simultane-ously attempt to persuade the Army and Air Forc eto cancel the XH–16 project and join with th eMarine Corps in developing the XHR2S–1 . 32

Secondly, and the one related to immediateMarine Corps needs, was the proposal to procur ean interim assault helicopter from the best designcurrently available . General Wallace 's conferenceproposed that the most practical and expeditiou sway to obtain an interim helicopter, and acceleratethe program's pace, was to establish a board t omake a survey of all current designs and produc-tion helicopters which gave promise of meetin gMarine Corps requirements . The survey boardwould examine the production capability of eachhelicopter manufacturer . The capability of a manu-facturer to produce the required number of assaulthelicopters would be one of the prime considera-tions in the choice of design . Dependent upo nCNO approval of the aviation plan calling fortwo Marine assault helicopter squadrons in 1953–1954, a production contract would be let for 40off-the-shelf interim assault helicopters ; 16 foreach of the squadrons, and eight for support. 3 3

The Marine Corps planners were also concerne dthat an attempt should be made to increase th enumber of total aircraft allowed in Marine avia-tion so that no cut-back in current fixed-win gaircraft would result from this program . However,it was agreed by Generals Wallace and Pollock"that if the numerical ceiling for Marine Corpsaircraft could not be increased, they would accep ta reduction in other type aircraft in order to

have sufficient aircraft billets to provide for th etwo assault helicopter squadrons . "

Nine days after the conference, General Catessigned a letter addressed to the CNO outlinin gthe two-step helicopter program as proposed byGeneral Wallace. Admiral Sherman was advise dthat the delay involved in research and develop-ment for the XHR2S–1, while unavoidable, wouldprevent the delivery of an operational helicopterfor about five years . The Commandant explainedthat it was necessary to provide "both Fleet MarineForces with the means for training combat unit sin assault helicopter operations," and also neces-sary to provide the helicopters in order to "in -crease the combat readiness of the Marine Corps . "The letter continued : " implementation of this pro -gram is considered to be of vital importance, "and even though the "Army and Air Force areto be invited to join in the support of this pro-ject [XHR2S–1] . . . with or without their as-sistance, it is necessary to proceed concurrentl ywith the procurement of the interim model ." 3 5

During June, the CNO replied to the Com-mandant ' s letter and in essence gave the Marin eCorps a substantial sense of satisfaction. Theresponse, originated by Vice Admiral John H .Cassady, DCNO (Air), outlined a specific pro -gram similar to the one suggested by Genera lCates . Cassady 's letter specified that priority o fAO–17501 would be evaluated by a special re -view board (within CNO offices) in relation t oall existing priorities . Also, if agreement coul dbe reached with the Air Force to discontinu esupport of the XH–16 project, the $200,000 re-maining in the Fiscal Year 1951 funds would beapplied to AO–17501 and design competitionwould be initiated for the XHR2S–1 . It wasreiterated that it would take five years before aproduction helicopter could be produced whic hwould meet the requirements of AO–17501 .Admiral Cassady stated that agreement had bee nreached within his offices to investigate th epossibility of procuring an interim helicopter asrequested by the Commandant, one which coul dbe delivered in about 33 months . The Bureau o fAeronautics had also agreed to survey industr yfor the most suitable helicopter which coul dhe modified to obtain the closest approximationof the XHR2S–1, and to secure the necessar yinformation so as to award a contract prior t oSeptember 1950—only three months away . Finally ,Cassady mentioned that the CNO had approve dan aviation plan authorizing the two 15-plan esquadrons with HMX–1 being redesignated as oneof the future operational squadrons . 3G This re-


designation of HMX—1 did not set well withMarine Corps planners as they had hoped t oretain the experimental squadron as well as gainthe two proposed operational units .

During the first half of 1950, visible progres shad been made toward accelerating the helicopte rprogram. Events during the following six months,however, not only saw the two-step plan imple-mented, but expanded to an extent far beyond al lexpectations.

37

Initial Interest in theKaman Helicopte r

While the assault transport helicopter progra mwas being worked out, and prior to its expansion ,another development had been taking place whic hin the future would have an effect upon th eMarine Corps observation squadrons. Only on emonth after CNO had published his 1949 aviationplan designating the Bell HTL as the observationhelicopter for the Marine Corps, the BuAer ' sdaily publication, BuAer Log, announced that th eKaman Aircraft Corporation, Windsor Locks,Connecticut, desired to show its new Model K—19 0observation helicopter. The demonstration woul dbe held at National Airport, Washington, D . C . ,where BuAer and Division of Aviation personnelwould be given the opportunity to view and, ifdesired, fly in the helicopter . Later it was to b edemonstrated at MCAS, Quantico, for member sof the air station and HMX—1 .

Charles H. Kaman, president of the company ,had begun experiments in 1945 to develop a ne wtype of closely intermeshed twin two-bladed rotor swhich he developed on a test rig made from achassis of a 1933 Pontiac automobile . A novelfeature was that the control of the rotor blade swas executed through an aerodynamic servo flapwhich twisted the rotor blade as it passed throug hthe air. In flight, the close proximity of the twi nintermeshing contra-rotating rotors made the heli-copter appear as a single rotored helicopter . Th eK—190, powered by a 190-horsepower engine, wascapable of transporting three passengers . The air-craft was certified for its first flight by the CivilAeronautics Administration on 15 April 1949 . 3 7

Since the Kaman machine possessed some ad-vanced, unique, and desirable features not in-corporated in the helicopters at HMX—1, on 1 4September 1949, the Commandant directed tha tMCS and HMX—1 submit recommendations as tothe desirability of adding another experimental

The Kaman K—190 featured twin, intermeshed, two -bladed rotors . Only one model was purchased by theMarine Corps (Kaman Aerospace Corp . photo) .

type of helicopter to those then under considera-tion. It was made clear by the Commandant tha tprocurement of the K—190 would be in additionto any procurement scheduled for types alread yunder test . 3 8

BuAer had evinced interest in further develop-ment of the K—190 and was purchasing one fo rfuture technical tests . The bureau indicated thatfunds might possibly be made available for pur-chase of a second machine to be assigned to th eMarine Corps, provided the Marine Corps wa sinterested . 3 9

On 6 October, the Commandant submitted arequest for one Kaman K—190 to the CNO . "I twas felt," the Commandant said, "that the Kaman190 helicopter would prove to be of value to theMarine Helicopter Development Program . " Al -though "it is not desired if it is to interfere withour present program by replacing any other typehelicopter now scheduled for procurement an dassigned to the Marine Corps ." 4 0

BuAer was directed by the CNO to provide theNavy's one K—190 to HMX—1 upon completion o fthe bureau's evaluation . In this case it was rea-

38


soned that the second K–190 would not b eneeded .' I The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics,Rear Admiral Alfred M . Pride, responded to th eCNO directive on 23 December 1949 . He indicate dthat the overall evaluation program of the Kama nservo system (a major component of the fligh tcontrol system) justified the purchase of an addi-tional helicopter and that the bureau would initiat eaction for the procurement of one additional K–19 0for the Marine Corps with delivery, unfortunately ,not possible for some months to come .' 2

The Beginning in Retrospect

As the decade of the 1940s ended, it was ob-vious that the Marine Corps helicopter progra mwas beginning to forge ahead . For 3 1/2 years th eMarine Corps had struggled to change the char-acter of its World War II style of amphibiou soperation by introducing a new element of assaul ttroop mobility, one which would eliminate th emassing of ships closely off the coast and prac-tically, if not entirely, eliminate the engagemen tof the adversary at the most vulnerable point ofcontact—the water's edge. The helicopter, withits ability to land troops and supplies inland i ngood order from ships to any relatively flat an dclear terrain, provided the method to achieve thenew three-dimensional concept . The change to"vertical envelopment, " as it was also termed, ha dnot been easy, nor had it been as swift as th eplanners and operators desired .

By the end of 1947, the new Marine progra mappeared to have a sense of direction and momen-tum. Organizationally, the first helicopter squadro nhad been formed in December for the purpose o fdetermining the operational feasibility of th evertical envelopment concept . Plans for executio nof the concept in terms of aircraft were base dupon the eventual acquisition of a very larg ehelicopter—the Piasecki XH–16. In preparatio nof a concept, the special group designated as theHelicopter and Transport Seaplane Board ha dbeen formed to develop a tentative doctrine forthe employment of helicopters in amphibiousoperations.

Unfortunately, two years later, the whole pro-cess had reached a developmental plateau whic hjeopardized the entire helicopter program. Lackof continued progress could be attributed to th einability to realize that the helicopter manu-facturers were unable to comply with their ow npredictions for meeting the specifications and

requirements which they had so willingly accepted .Additionally, an exceptionally long developmenta lperiod was required once the decision on thetype of helicopter was made and the money bud-geted to coincide with its development .

In spite of the delays, and in reviewing th ecomplete spectrum of progress for all the servicesduring 1947 to 1950, the Marine Corps hadcertainly not been relegated to a second rate com-petitor in the helicopter field, but, rather, wa sthe leader . Each service desired the helicopterfor performing missions peculiar to its ownneeds. The development of amphibious vertica lassault techniques made the Marine Corps theleader in its own area of endeavor, as the vertica lenvelopment operation entailed practically all as-pects of helicopter applications .

The main interest of the Navy, as it had beensince 1943, was in obtaining a helicopter withsufficient hovering capability to perform antisub-marine warfare missions . Of secondary importanc eto the Navy was the need for the utility helicopter,which for the time was being filled by the PiaseckiHUP-1 .

The Army Field Forces had used small heli-copters since 1947. Army helicopters were use dfor tasks similar to those performed by th e"jeep . " The Army too saw the advantages of largerlift helicopters for use in the movement of heav yartillery pieces, bridging material, and the tacticalmovement of combat troops .'

After the Armed Services Unification Act o f1947, Air Force interest in helicopters was limitedto the pursuit of a helicopter suitable for searchand rescue services . Like the Air Force, the CoastGuard was also interested in a search and rescu ehelicopter and would most likely adopt one o fthe Navy's designs to meet its requirement .

Throughout this period each service was re-quired to settle for far less lift performance fro mhelicopters than planners desired . The list o fexperimental helicopters on both the drawin gboards and in the various stages of developmentwas exceptionally long, with most of the experi-mental machines supposedly capable of satisfyingthe most demanding specification of the militar yplanners . In the interlude, though, this meant tha tthe existing helicopters had to fill roles for whichthey were not designed . They served as an "in-terim" machine for rescue, ASW, assault, liaison ,observation, or for whatever tasks were necessar yand could be performed .

Credit for energizing the helicopter program i nearly 1950 can be attributed to the crusadingzeal of the Marine Corps Board and the sub-


39

The Piasecki HUP-1, shown practicing a rescue lift, was one of the last helicopters introduced in the 1940s and wa sthe first of the multipurpose helicopters (Marine Corps Photo 529604) .

sequent actions by the Division of Aviation . The

be filled during that period by an additional pro -five-year waiting period for the ideal assault heli-

gram which meant that a less-than-optimum assaul tcopter could not be reduced . On the other hand,

helicopter had to be adopted to keep the concep tthe Marine Corps realized that the vacuum had to

and program viable .

CHAPTER 4

KOREAN WAR EXPANSION

Plans for an Accelerate dHelicopter Program

United States military assistance to the Govern-ment of South Korea against invading CommunistNorth Korean forces forced a change in MarineCorps helicopter development plans . The planne dformation in 1953 and 1954 of two assault trans-port helicopter squadrons as authorized by th eCNO was now unrealistic in view of the war .Before that timetable could be revised to an earlie rdate, however, a suitable helicopter would have tobe selected and be available in definite quantitie swithin a reasonably short period of time.

The Division of Aviation took the initial actio nfor accelerating the pace . On 21 July 1950, Gen-eral Wallace addressed a memorandum to theCNO 's Air Readiness Division requesting tha t"necessary steps be taken to immediately procur e40 [interim] transport helicopters, preferably o fthe Sikorsky H04S—1 type . " 1 Admiral Cassady ,DCNO(Air), acted promptly on the request, for -warding it to BuAer . The admiral's directive in-structed the Bureau of Aeronautics to procure 40H04S—1 for equipping the two 15-plane squad-rons . "The H04S—1, " Admiral Cassady erroneouslyindicated, "is capable of transporting 10 troops(225 [pounds] per man) for a distance of 15 0miles . . . . Procurement is predicated on deliver ycommencing in six months after notification t othe company ." 2 In addition to the Marine Corps 'immediate needs, Cassady stressed the point tha tthe time-table should be rearranged and ac-celerated for future procurement of the 20- t o26-man ultimate assault transport helicopter de -fined in operational requirement AO-17501 . 3"The program," he said, "should be aimed atproduction commencing in 18 to 24 months fro mits initiation ." He urged further that immediateaction be taken by BuAer to initiate the program ,which meant the solicitation of design proposalsfrom the manufacturers . The initial purchase o fno less than 40 new helicopters was considered to

be minimum by the CNO after the design had beenselected . '

The H04S—1 was the Navy's designation forthe Sikorsky commercial Model S—55 . The heli-copter was built by Sikorsky without the aid o fgovernment funds and first flown in November1949 . It had been designed originally to compet eagainst Piasecki's PD—22 (H—21) for use as th eAir Force ' s Arctic Rescue helicopter. In May 1950 ,after the Air Force had chosen the H—21, th eNavy purchased 10 S—55s for use in an evaluatio nproject to determine its value as an interim AS Whelicopter.

The transport version of the H04S—1 was re-designated as the HRS—1 . Its design features in-cluded one Pratt and Whitney R—1340—57 600-horsepower engine installed behind clam-shel ldoors in front of the helicopter . Brigadier Gen-eral Noah C. New in recalling this helicopter ,states : "Placing the engine in the nose of th eHRS—1, where it was easily accessible, was in-genious . It not only had tremendous advantage sin servicing the aircraft, but it completely eli-minated the critical center of gravity problem spreviously encountered by placing the payloaddirectly below the rotor hub." ' A drive shafttransmitted engine power to the three-blade dmain rotor through the center rear section of th ecockpit. The cabin, which had foldable seats fo r10 passengers, was situated directly beneath th emain rotor . The HRS 's empty weight was 4,462pounds with its gross weight originally predicte dand listed as 8,070 pounds . The maximum for -ward airspeed was 90 knots . Other features in-cluded all metal main and tail rotor blades, instru-ments suitable for night VFR flight, and an ex-ternal cargo sling and hook situated underneat hthe fuselage . The aircraft stood 14 feet high, ha da rotor blade diameter of 53 feet, and measure dapproximately 42 feet long with its blades folded . 'It was built upon similar, but enlarged, mechanicalcomponents of the H03S—1 . In appearance it wa sentirely different although it retained the typica lSikorsky single main rotor design .

The reason for the Marine Corps ' choice of the

40


41

The H05S—1 was used for observation in Korea (Marine Corps Photo A346328) .

The Sikorsky HRS-1, also known as the H04S-1, at Quantico, Va . (Marine Corps Photo 530002) .

42


Sikorsky S–55 was readily apparent . SinceSikorsky had not received the contract for th eArctic rescue model, the company could com-mence production immediately on a first-come,first-serve basis with delivery of the first aircraf tin six months . Piasecki, on the other hand, als ohad the capability of building an assault versionof its H–21, the PD–22C, although delivery coul dnot be made until approximately September 1951 ,a difference of eight months . The PD–22C's spe-cification appeared somewhat similar to the HRS– 1as the model was predicted to have the capabilityto carry 15 combat troops or 3,400 pounds over ashort radius of 50 miles . A three-months addi-tional wait beyond the September date woul dhave provided Piasecki with sufficient time to con-struct its proposed PD–22D ; a version similarto the PD–22C except for the incorporation of amuch larger engine . According to Piasecki, itwould have been able to carry a load of 20 com-bat troops, or the equivalent weight in cargo, overan operating radius of 70 miles .' Time was o fthe essence to the Marine Corps, however, and th emost readily available model was chosen, th eHRS-1 .

Meanwhile, the Marine Corps had activated th e1st Provisional Marine Brigade at Camp Pendle -

ton, California shortly after the outbreak of th eKorean War. The brigade was formed under th ecommand of Brigadier General Edward A . Craig ,a World War II veteran of Bougainville, Guam ,and Iwo Jima . The new organization consisted ofthe 5th Marines and Marine Aircraft Group 3 3(MAG–33) . Commanding the MAG was Brigadie rGeneral Thomas J . Cushman who had recentl ybeen Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marin eForce, Pacific . General Cushman's MAG was com-posed of three Marine fighter squadrons andVMO-6.

The observation squadron, VMO–6, had beenoperating with eight OY–2 fixed-wing aircraft a tCamp Pendleton, California, but was expandedin early July for deployment as a composit esquadron by the addition of four HO3S–ls . Alongwith the four helicopters came seven officers an d30 enlisted men from HMX–1 . Taking comman dof the newly reorganized squadron was Majo rVincent J . Gottschalk . With the addition of th ehelicopters, VMO–6 became the first squadron o fits kind . The squadron sailed from San Diego ,on 14 July on board the USS Badoeng Strai t(CVE–116) bound for Korea .

Within a month of its departure from the WestCoast, the 1st Provisional Brigade plunged into th e

The HRS–1 with its front-mounted engine was a breakthrough in helicopter design . These aircraft from HMR–16 1land 4 .5-inch rocket launchers at Panjong-ni, Korea, in 1952 (Marine Corps Photo A163934) .


43

desperate battles of the Pusan Perimeter, reinforc-ing U . S . Army and South Korean United Nations

troops . The brigade, maneuvering rapidly, repeat-edly counterattacked the North Korean penetra-tions of the perimeter . In this series of improvised

mobile operations, the helicopters of VMO—6 mor ethan proved their worth. As General Craig put it :

Marine Helicopters have proven invaluable . . .They have been used for every conceivable type o fmission. The Brigade utilized helicopters for liaison ,reconnaissance, evacuation of wounded, rescue o fMarine flyers downed in enemy territory, observation ,messenger service, guard mail at sea, posting andsupplying of outguards on dominating terrain fea-tures and the re-supplying of small units by air s

Colonel Gottschalk recalled another significant

use of helicopters by the brigade . He declared :

. . . perhaps the most important use of the helicopterin the early months of the Korean War concerne dcommand and control . The flexibility provided th eBrigade Commander to control his forces, chang edirection of movement, give personal instructions t osubordinate commanders, and observe the resultan tbattlefield movement in a dynamic fast moving situa -tion provided a new dimension to tactical control o fthe battlefield in a difficult terrain setting .°

The usefulness of the helicopters of VMO—6 led

General Craig to call for more . He recommended

that "a transport type helicopter squadron, equipped

with Sikorsky 55 type aircraft" be sent to Korea

or at least that "eight liaison and two transpor t

type helicopters be added to the observation squad-ron for employment by Marine Divisions . " Antici-pating on a limited scale later airmobile tactics, h epointed out :

. . . The mountainous terrain of Korea presents adifficult problem for security of flanks and rear and o fbivouac areas . The troop carrier type of helicopte rwould be ideal for use . . . to post patrols on high ,dominating terrain which it would take hours t oclimb and which -quickly exhausts the troops . . . .It is believed their use would materially contributeto the effectiveness and security of our operations an dinsure the earlier defeat of the enemy . . . .1 0

Lieutenant General Lemuel C . Shepherd, Jr .

Commanding General, FMFPac, after an inspec-tion trip to the war zone during which he wasbriefed on and viewed the operations of the brig-ade and of VMO—6, echoed General Craig's prais e

of helicopters and repeated his call for more o f

them :

There are no superlatives adequate to describe th egeneral reaction to the helicopter . Almost any indi-vidual questioned could offer some personal story t oemphasize the valuable part played by the five H03S

planes available .* Reconnaissance, liaison, visualflank security, movement of security patrols from on ekey locality to the next, posting and supply of se-curity detachments and many more . There is no doub tthat the enthusiasm voiced by the brigade is entirelywarranted . Moreover the usefulness of the helicopteris not by any means confined to a situation such asencountered in Korea . No effort should be spared toget helicopters—larger than the H03S-ls if possibl e—but helicopters in any form, to the theater at onc e—and on a priority higher than any other weapon . 1 1

In view of General Shepherd ' s statement per-taining to the helicopter in Korea, Brigadier Gen-eral Clayton C . Jerome, who relieved Major Gen -eral Wallace as the Director of Aviation on 1September 1950, sent a memorandum to Admira lCassady in which he included General Shepherd' sstatement . General Jerome said "this emphasizesthe [remark] I made the other day in connectionwith the requirements for helicopters, more heli-copters, and more helicopters in the KoreaArea . " 12 Major General Lamson-Scribner recalle dthe period :

Just prior to the receipt of General Shepherd's letter,General Jerome and I attended a conference [at] whichAdmiral Cassady, was chairman of the Navy AircraftProcurement Program for Fiscal 51 . The program wa sfor only a relatively few helicopters . We insisted tha twe needed more than programed for purchase . Ad-miral Mel Pride, Chief of BuAir, remarked in es-sence `If you know as little about helicopters as w edo you would not get into one .' Admiral Cassady said ,`Mel, the Marines want them . Make some changes inthe program to provide more helicopters for th eMarines .' 1 3

General Jerome's memo was only the latest ofmany attempts to convince the Department of th eNavy to increase the Marine Corps ' inventory ofaircraft for the Korean buildup . On 19 July, Gen-eral Cates submitted a request to the Secretary ofthe Navy for an additional four Marine fightersquadrons in an effort to increase the total to 12 .Then, a month later, on 23 August 1950, Genera lCates made a further request to the CNO on be-half of the helicopter program . The Commandan texplained the value of the helicopter to the Marin eCorps in carrying out amphibious and land war -fare . He quoted an excerpt from a letter written b yGeneral Craig which indicated the "incalculabl evalue of the helicopter as an implement of presen tand future armed conflict" and further : 1-1

VMO-6 was flown to Pusan from Japan . Theseaircraft have been invaluable in reconnaissance an dthe helicopters are a Godsend in this type of terrain ,not only for reconnaissance but for supporting o f

'` VMO-6 had received an additional H03S after i thad arrived in Korea.

44


Brigadier General Edward A . Craig, Commanding Gen-eral, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, in Korea (Marin eCorps Photo A-1309) .

combat patrols in mountainous terrain ; for supplyof food, water, ammunition ; but also for the evacua-tion of casualties . . . . By separate dispatch to yo u. . , a request has been made to bring out element sof the Helicopter Transport Squadron . It is believe dthat this innovation will meet with outstanding resultsin combat in this mountainous terrain for the landin gof patrols on top of mountain ranges. . . . The heli-copters presently available have been invaluable be-yond expression . . . [However] I feel they will no tbe able to sustain all the demands . 1 5

The Commandant also reiterated that BuAer, b yproduction contract number 51–075, dated 1 7August, had obligated the Navy to purchase 40HRS helicopters for the Marine Corps and tha tSikorsky anticipated delivering the first productio naircraft sometime during February 1951 . " In viewof the extremely urgent need for helicopters, "General Cates urged, "every effort should be madeby BuAer and the Sikorsky Division to deliver th eHRS (interim assault) helicopter as soon a spossible." Moreover, the Commandant sai d

. . . [helicopters] are of such urgent nature tha tit is requested that BuAer be directed to authoriz ethe Sikorsky Aircraft Division to increase deliver-ies to the maximum ." lc

Vice Admiral Cassady acted on General Cates '

letter by requesting BuAer to contact all manu-facturers who held, or whom BuAer contemplate dholding, helicopter contracts to ascertain the kin dof delivery rate which could be obtained by :"Increasing present contracts numberwise by 50per cent . . . and by 100 per cent . " 1 7

Emphasis was also placed upon procuring ob-servation helicopters as well as transport heli-copters . The first contract of this sort provide dfor 12 Sikorsky HO5S–ls ; four for each of th etwo VMO squadrons and four as replacements fo rthe HO3S–ls in HMX–1 . Delivery was expected tobe at a rate of not less than three per monthbeginning in March 1951 ." During July thenumber was raised from 12 to 22 aircraft 19 andshortly thereafter was again enlarged to 42 .` 0This demand for observation helicopters was basedon planning which called for replacing all O Yfixed-wing aircraft in VMO squadrons with th ehelicopter . In addition, the number of aircraft pe rsquadron was raised again to 12 from the origina lnumber of eight due to the activation of two forceartillery battalions—which increased the require-ment for observation missions ."

So far, the action taken by HQMC to procur emore aircraft did not solve the immediate problemof providing additional helicopters to the 1st Pro -visional Brigade . Something had to be done to fillthe gap until such time as the HRSs and the HO5S sbecame available. Although the HO3S–ls wereperforming a valuable service and were practicallyindispensible to the brigade, the fact remaine dthat they were not a suitable military helicopte rdue to their deficiencies in payload, range, flightinstrumentation, and communication equipment .As a temporary measure to solve the problem, th eDivision of Aviation, as recommended in a lette rfrom the Commanding Officer of HMX–1, initiate da plan which proposed the assignment of 10 Nav yBell-manufactured HTL 'is to the Marine Corps .The CNO subsequently approved the plan with th efirst three to be made available in October 195 0and the last one before the end of December . TheNavy had only recently purchased 16 of the ne wmodels for training aircraft, but due to the urgenc ycreated by the Korean situation it was tentativelywilling to release 10 of the 16 . The HTLs were t obe used in VMO–6 until production deliveries o fthe Sikorsky HOSSs began ."

The HTL–4 was similar to the previous Bel lmodels except for a few added refinements . Twofeatures affecting its appearance were the removalof the tail boom covering aft of the cabin, which


45

The HTL–4 saw action as a medevac and observation aircraft in Korea (Marine Corps Photo 529982) .

made the helicopter 156 pounds lighter, and th esubstitution of a skid type landing gear in lieuof its wheels . The cabin could accommodate tw opassengers besides the pilot, whereas, all previousHTL models could carry only one passenger . Th eaircraft came equipped with provisions for carry-ing two external litters, each mounted parallel withthe cabin across the top of the skid . The empt yweight was 1,546 pounds with a maximum take-off weight of 2,350 pounds . Sea level air speed wa srestricted to 80 knots, almost identical to that o fthe HTL-3s . 2 3

Although the Marine Corps was fortunate in itsability to procure the HTL for use by VMO-6, i twas only beginning to view progress in obtainin gthe most sought-after of all helicopters—the ulti-mate assault transport .

A Bell HTL-5 demonstrates wire laying at Quantic o(Marine Corps Photo KVI.4173) .

46


Awarding of the FirstAssault Transport Helicopter

Contract

Late in 1950, in response to BuAer 's request, thehelicopter manufacturers competing for the assaul ttransport helicopter presented their proposals .Thereafter, in March 1951, the bureau selected tw oaircraft companies to build the helicopter ,McDonnell and Sikorsky .

McDonnell Aircraft received a contract for twoexperimental models of an extremely advance ddesign . It incorporated the conventional singl emain rotor configuration ; however, the power wa sto be provided by jet burners located in each roto rblade tip . Also unique in the McDonnell design ,and a feature which made it a compound heli-copter, was the installation of twin gas turbin epropeller engines mounted externally in wings ."The compound helicopter was designated as th eXHRH–1 (H-helicopter, R-transport, H-heavy) an dwas estimated to carry a useful load of 13,00 0pounds at a cruising speed of 150 to 200 knots .The empty weight was estimated at a little ove r26,000 pounds . 2i The flight technique for the HR Henvisioned the machine taking off as a conven-tional helicopter, then as its airspeed increased itwould convert to fixed-wing flight ; with the re -verse procedure for executing the landing phase .

Sikorsky Aircraft Company submitted two dif-ferent designs . One, a basic helicopter referre dto as XHRS–A, and a second design, a compoun dhelicopter somewhat similar to McDonnell's al -though the propulsion for the main rotor wa s"conventional" wherein it did not propose the us eof rotor blade tip burners .* The compound de-sign was designated by Sikorsky as the XHRS-B . 26

The proposed XHRS–A had twin engines locate din wing-mounted external nacelles which trans-mitted their power to a single main transmission .The design called for a main rotor with five blade sand a torque-compensating tail rotor of fou rblades ; both rotors were of all-metal construction .Sikorsky claimed that the XHRS–A could carry 3 6combat-equipped troops or an alternate amount o fcargo in the 1,250-cubic-foot cabin . Loading andunloading of vehicles the size of jeeps could tak eplace through clamshell doors which opened in thenose . This feature, however, restricted the heli-copter's performance since it could not be flownwith the doors open which delayed the loading /

This method of propulsion is also referred to as th e"pressure jet principle . " To produce thrust, compresse dair is routed to each rotor blade tip where it is then mixe dwith fuel and ignited .

unloading operation, thus extending the time o nthe ground . Other features were : automatic blad efolding, retractable landing gear, and a form o fautomatic pilot (automatic stabilization) . Thehelicopter measured almost 88 feet in length an d20 feet high with the blades spread . Cruisingspeed was listed at 140 knots . 2 7

The XHRS–B had essentially the same fuselag edesign with identical engines and transmissio nfacilities . Increased performance over the XHRS– Awas proposed by the addition of foldable oute rwing panels extending beyond the engine nacelle sand the incorporation of standard propellers o nthe front of the engines . These additional featuresof the HRS–B were proposed as a logical futur edevelopment of the XHRS–A basic helicopter .Both the basic and compound designs could b epowered by reciprocating or gas turbine engines ,depending upon BuAer ' s desires . The first HRS–Aaircraft was estimated to be available within 1 8to 20 months from date of contract . 2 3

The straightforward "pure" helicopter, theXHRS–A, was a much less complicated aircraft .It appeared to involve fewer problems of develop-ment, logistics, and maintenance in the field an dwas one which could be built in the shortest time .Therefore, BuAer awarded Sikorsky a contract fo rfive experimental aircraft realizing that even wit hthe simplest design there would be unforesee nproblems and delays in the program . Y °

The awarding of dual contracts for the sameoperational requirement (AO–17501) appeare djustified in view of the complexities involved i nboth McDonnell 's and Sikorsky's proposals . Thetwo-phase program was established in order toprovide the Marine Corps with maximum protec-tion in the event one of the designs failed tomaterialize. In this case, progress in the develop-ment of the assault transport helicopter wasplanned to provide two helicopters in logical se-quence with the XHRH going beyond existingrequirements . The procurement provided for th edevelopment of equipment to satisfy future re-quirements by taking advantage of technologica lprogress beyond that incorporated in the HRS–A . 3 0

Completion dates for Sikorsky's five experi-mental models were established ; however, inMcDonnell's case, the original contract did no tspecify such a date nor did the CNO assign apriority number . Later, on 9 April 1952, the CNOassigned a priority of 1C to the XHRH,31 and sub-sequently BuAer published a proposed first flightdate of December 1955 .3 2 The first HRS–A (laterdesignated by Sikorsky as its S–56, and by theNavy as the XHR2S—1) had been given a priority


47

The HR2S—1 was the first large, cargo/assault helicopter used by the Marines . The first aircraft was received i nSeptember 1956 (Marine Corps Photo 529980) .

of 1B and was predicted to make its initial flightduring May 1953, 3' after which a period of ex-perimentation would follow before a productio ncontract would be granted.

Related Events to theExpanded Helicopter Progra m

Since the CNO had approved BuAer contractin gfor 40 HRS—ls as interim assault transport heli-copters, the Marine Corps had to make plans fo rcommissioning, locating, and manning the squad-rons to which the helicopters would eventually b eassigned . The first planning effort for the expande dprogram took place at a conference at HQMC i nearly September 1950 . Representatives from th eHQMC General Staff, (G-1, G-3, G-4), an dDivision of Aviation devised a comprehensive pla nfor implementing an enlarged helicopter program ,initially as a basis for discussion with CNO ,DCNO, and BuAer representatives . ; ' After a slightmodification and eventual approval by the Com-mandant, it was sent to the CNO on 19 October .The plan provided for the commissioning of twoassault helicopter squadrons, referred to a sHMR—1 and HMR—2, and the redesignation an dconversion of Marine observation squadrons(VMO) to Marine helicopter observation squad-rons (HMO) all during Fiscal Year 1951 . Com-missioning dates for the two HMR squadrons wer eset at 15 January and 1 April 1951 with the firstunit to be formed on the West Coast and the secon don the East Coast . A cadre of personnel was toremain at Quantico in order to accept, test, andready the aircraft for delivery to the squadrons . It

was also considered necessary that the units becommissioned on the coast where their operationand training was to be conducted . It was antici-pated that the commissioning date established fo reach squadron would be approximately one monthprior to the receipt of its first aircraft . 3 5

To supply personnel for the additional squad-rons, the Marine Corps improvised new trainin gorganizations . Until October 1950, the U . S . Navyhad trained Marine helicopter pilots at Lakehurst ,New Jersey, but the requirements of the Korea nexpansion exceeded the Navy 's training capabili-ties . The Marine Corps, therefore, pressed its heli-copter squadron, HMX—1, into service as a trainin gcommand . The squadron, commanded from late1950 to 1952 by Lieutenant Colonel Keith B .McCutcheon, trained the nucleus of pilots an dmechanics for the first Marine Helicopter Trans -port Squadron (HMR) 161 ." In turn, HMR—16 1and the FMF squadrons that followed took ove rmost of the development of tactics, for which the ywere better equipped than was HMX—1 . Even-tually, the Marine Corps planned to have all heli-copter training conducted by the Naval Air Train-ing Command at Pensacola so that the experimenta land operational squadrons could concentrate ontheir primary missions . 3 6

The new plan further anticipated that durin gFiscal Year 1952, two additional squadrons ,HMR-3, and HMR-4, would be formed on 1 Jul yand 1 September 1951 . All HMRs, 1 through 4,would be equipped initially with 15 HRSs . Whenthe ultimate HR2S—1 assault helicopter becam eoperational, HMR—5 and HMR--6 would be forme d

The designation HMR represents : H, helicopter ,M, Marine, R, Transport .

48


with 15 aircraft each with commissioning antici-pated sometime during the Spring of 1953 . Even-tually as the HR2Ss became more plentiful, theywould phase out all the HRSs . According to th eplan, therefore, by 1954 the Marine Corps expecte dto have an inventory of 148 helicopters : 90HR2S–ls, 40 H05S–1s, and a mixture of 18 ex-perimental and operational helicopters i nHMX-1 . 3 7

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, near SantaAna, California, was selected as the location fo rthe first HMR with MCAS Cherry Point, Nort hCarolina, as the location for forming HMR–2 . Thepattern of alternating the commissioning site be-tween the two coastal air stations was to be con-tinued as each new unit was formed .

This completed the plans for expansion excep tfor a third VMO squadron. Since VMO–1 andVMO–6 were already functioning squadrons, theformation of HMO–2 was to be delayed unti lJanuary 1952. The redesignation of all the VMOsto HMOs was to become effective upon receipt o fthe H05S–ls by the squadrons. 38 In respect t oHMX–l 's redesignation to an operational squad-ron, nothing further was mentioned in the plan .

In responding to the helicopter plan, the CNOapproved the proposal for Fiscal Year 1951 i nwhich the first two squadrons were to be formed .Approval of the program for Fiscal Years 195 2through 1954 was withheld pending further desig-nation of forces for that period . Tentative plans ,however, for Fiscal Year 1952 were indicated i nthe CNO 's reply and fortunately coincided wit hthose which the Commandant had requested fo rthat period . 3 9

By way of informing the Director of Plans an dPolicy as to the number designation and title ofthe helicopter squadrons, General Jerome state dthat the first squadron to be commissioned on th eWest Coast would be designated "Marine Assaul tHelicopter Squadron 161," short designation"HMR–161" and the second squadron commis-sioned on the East Coast would be HMR–261 . Heexplained that the "numerals were selected in anextension of the current numbering system o fMarine aviation units . The highest digit previousl yused for Marine Aircraft Groups designation bein g5 (MAG–15, 25, etc .) , it is logical to use 6 as thegroup designator of the future HMR Groups ."General Jerome concluded by explaining that "th efirst HMR organized in the First Marine AircraftWing becomes 161, and the first HMR in th eSecond Marine Aircraft Wing becomes 261 . " 4 0

Coincidentally, however, as the Aviation Sectio nof the Educational Center at the Marine Corps

Schools was reviewing a related study on Marin eaviation, it noticed that when reference was madeto helicopter squadrons they were continually re-ferred to as "Assault Helicopter Squadrons ." I twas pointed out in its comments on the study tha tthe designation should be changed to "Helicopte rTransport Squadron" and omit the word "assault . "It reasoned that while the helicopter did in fac thave the initial and primary mission of assault, i tadditionally had an equal "direct support" capa-bility and responsibility in connection with mis-sions involving observation, general utility, supply ,medical evacuation, and many more tasks once th einitial assault phase of the landing had been com-pleted . Therefore, they commented the ter m"assault " would tend to limit its employment tothe ship-to-shore phase and deny its use for th every important other day-to-day post-assault opera-tions .'

The point was taken under consideration by th eDivision of Aviation and on 22 November 1950 ,the Plans and Policy Division was re-informe dthat henceforth the new HMR squadron designa-tion would be "Marine Helicopter Squadron ." " Itwas short-lived, however, as in early 1951 th eDivision of Aviation, referring to a CNO directive ,changed the designation again to "Marine Trans -port Helicopter Squadron ." "

The Tactics and Technique sBoard Reports of 1951

If the Marine Corps was to employ effectivel yits anticipated six squadrons of helicopters, plan sfor their employment had to be made . The firs tstep was contained in Marine Corps Equipmen tPolicy, 1950, which proposed a concept of futur eamphibious operations based primarily on theemployment of the assault helicopter . Salient as-pects of the concept were :

1. Emphasis on tactical surprise, featuring a verticalenvelopment by helicopter in ultimate conjunctio nwith dispersed assaults capable of rapidly penetratin gselected points in the beach defenses.

2. Commencement of the assault proper with th elaunching of assault troops in helicopters and am-phibian vehicles from ships underway in cruising o rother dispersed formations .

3. Landing of helicopter forces in landing zone sfrom which one or more objectives might be seized.

4. Landing of further troop components by am-phibian vehicles (taking advantage of success achieve dby the helicopter borne troops) for beach approac hand assault at dispersed points .

5. Early logistic support following the pattern ofthe assault itself, using helicopters to deliver supplies


49

to deep positions, and amphibian vehicles and trailer sto transport heavy material across the beach to usingunits or dispersed interior units ."}

The Equipment Policy recommended that de-velopment of an aircraft carrier-type ship be ini-tiated to transport the troop elements and heli-copters of the landing force . It was further pro -posed that the construction of helicopter platformson other type ships involved in the amphibiou soperation also be studied .'

In view of the concept proposed in the MarineCorps Equipment Policy, 1950, and in particula rthe amphibious shipping aspects, General Cate sinformed the Commandant, Marine Corps Schools,that "the Navy had no firm plans at that time fo rproviding properly configured ships for the em-ployment of assault transport helicopters in ac-cordance with the current concept . " Therefore, i twas requested that the MCS, based upon the useof both the HRS and HR2S, make separate de -terminations on the following for each typ ehelicopter : ' 0

1. The recommended size and composition of th e

helicopter landed elements of the landing force as-suming the landing force consists of one Marin e

Division .2. The most desirable means of embarking an d

transporting the troop elements and helicopters tha tare to execute the ship-to-shore movement in heli-

copters.3. The technique of executing the ship-to-shore

movement of helicopter landed troops.4. The Marine Corps operational requirement fo r

appropriate shipping to permit the employment o fassault transport helicopters in accordance with the

above [items1 . d 7

General Cates concluded by saying : "Due to theimportance attached to this program, it is re -quested that this project be assigned a high pri-ority and that the information requested . . . besubmitted to this headquarters as it becomes avail -able ." ' S

The Landing Force Tactics and TechniquesBoard, Marine Corps Landing Force Developmen tCenter, Marine Corps Schools was tasked to con -duct the study on the points delineated by th eCommandant . The first interim report was sub-mitted as early as 16 December with the fina lreport dated 5 January 1951 . The study was en -titled Employment of Assault Transport Helicop-ters .'' The document was the first of its kind an dwas used extensively in conjunction with the Divi -

'` As in so many cases where only copies of th e

original report are available, the names of participatin gmembers are omitted, and in some cases, the senior mem-

ber's name itself does not appear. Regrettably, this is th ecase in this particular study .

sion of Aviation 's helicopter plan as a guide fo rthe next five years .

The task assigned to the board was difficult a sit required translating a group of general premise sinto material sufficiently concrete to serve as abasis for future specific guidance and computa-tions . The board studied deeply all four area smentioned in General Cates ' letter of instruction .In determining the composition of the helicopter -landed force, the study group proposed employin gone Marine division consisting of two regimenta llanding teams, an artillery group, and a divisioncommand group, totalling 10,000 officers and men .It was determined that this force would requir e3,000 to 4,000 short tons of supplies and equip-ment . The most desirable means of embarking an dtransporting the troop elements and helicopter swas that the helicopter-borne troops, equipment,supplies, and the helicopters should be transporte dtogether in aircraft carrier-type shipping .'9

In relation to the technique of executing th eship-to-shore movement, the board recommende dthat control be exercised by the landing forc ecommander who would have in his task organiza-tion a control unit capable of providing adequat econtrol of mass flights of helicopters . A flight of10 helicopters was considered desirable to facili-tate flight control and the flights formed into wave sof two or more flights to satisfy the tactical re-quirements . But in this area no satisfactory contro lorganization nor guidance system existed suitabl efor controlling mass movements of helicopters ." 0

The solution to the problem of determining th eappropriate type and number of ships required t oexecute the ship-to-shore movement required con-siderable study . Earlier in the report it had beenestablished that the number of helicopters re-quired to lift the main force was no less than 520FIRS-type helicopters each carrying 8- to 10-menor 208 HR2Ss carrying 20 to 25 troops each . Theshipping requirements to accommodate the 8- t o10-man helicopter was established at 20 CVEs. Inaddition, all CVEs had to be converted to hav ethe capability to operate at least 10 HRSs on th eflight deck and store 10 on the hangar deck, plu sspares . Facilities were also needed on each CVEfor 500 to 600 combat troops plus approximately200 personnel of the helicopter squadron . Turningto the larger 20- to 25-man type helicopter, theboard determined that eight newly designed shipsor converted CVs (fleet aircraft carriers)' "

** The length of the CV class carriers varied from

739 feet for the Yorktown class CV to 901 feet for th e

larger Lexington class. Both CV class ships had a to p

speed in excess of 30 knots.

50

MARINES AND HELICOPTERS 1946-196 2

would be required ; each one having the capacityto operate 10 helicopters from its flight deck an dstore 10, plus spares, in its hangar deck. In thiscase, 1,200 to 1,500 billeting spaces would b eneeded for the assault troops plus the helicopterpersonnel. Cargo requirements were also listed as150 to 200 short tons for the CVEs and 450 to 55 0tons for each of the new or converted CVs . 5 '

In replying to the questions posed by GeneralCates, the board found other related points whichit felt should be noted . The first was derived froma comparison of the abilities and requirementsfor the two types of helicopters studied . There wasno doubt in the minds of the board members tha tthe larger helicopter was far superior in everyway, more so in proportion than its difference i nsize would tend to indicate . The number of heli-copters, helicopter personnel, ships, landing areas ,and the complexity of the guidance system al lpointed to the strong desirability of concentratin gon the larger helicopter . Another point was that atime limit was suggested for making a determina-tion upon which type of ship program to pursue .The additional remarks stated that if design an dprocurement of the 20- to 25-man helicopte r(HR2S) was found to be less than two years, the nthe larger program should be undertaken . If, onthe other hand, an adequate number of HR2S scould not be procured, then the CVE conversionand the 8- to 10-man helicopter courses should b efollowed . Regardless of the adopted path of action ,the board urged "that aggressive efforts had to b emade immediately to obtain and convert a suf-ficient number of CVEs for use in conjunction withthe first HRS squadrons for operational testing an dexperimentation of the entire helicopter-borne con-cept ."

The board vigorously urged that immediat eaction be taken on the concept so that the lesson slearned and the techniques developed could b eincorporated in the future production progra mfor both the helicopter and its associated shipping .The board felt strongly that the "entire future o fthe helicopter-borne concept depended largely onoperational testing with suitable ships and opera-tional helicopters . " It believed that "no furthersubstantial progress could be made in the field o fhelicopter operations on board ship and in th etechnique of executing the ship-to-landing zon ehelicopter movement unless a ship procurementprogram was established ." s a

Two months after the completion of the lengthyand detailed January study, the Tactics and Tech-niques Board was requested to conduct anotherstudy on a closely related subject which was to deal

with the more immediate problems of the Marin ehelicopter transport program . The requirementswere "to provide a comprehensive concept for theemployment of currently authorized HMR squad-rons in amphibious operations ." Secondly, theboard was "to determine Marine Corps operationa lrequirements for Naval amphibious shipping whic hcould be made available to support the currentl yauthorized helicopter strength ." '

As stated earlier, by this date the Marine Corp swas planning to equip four HMR squadrons wit hthe interim HRS and two additional units with th eHR2S. However, the authorized force structureincluded only the four HRS squadrons . The boardapparently had advance information that the CN Otentatively planned to approve immediate forma-tion of all six Marine squadrons . In fact the CNO'sAviation Plan 11-51, published subsequent to theTactics and Techniques Board's report, authorizedcommissioning of the last two of the six helicopte rsquadrons sometime during February 1952 in lieuof the original 1954 date .'`' This meant that th eHRS would be used to equip all six projected heli-copter squadrons .

The Tactics and Techniques Board completedits second report of 28 February 1951 . Dates forcommissioning and the employment of all sixsquadrons were laid out along with a propose dinitial mission assignment for each unit . The date snearly coincided with those previously requestedin the Commandant's October 1951 plan, exceptfor the last two squadrons . A major varianceexisted in this latest plan wherein it envisioned allunits as being commissioned on the East Coastto work with the troops of FMFLant for test an devaluation . For five of the six squadrons, th efollowing commissioning schedule was pub-lished :

HMR-261 1 April 195 1(5 April 1951, MCAS Cherry Point )

HMR-162 30 June 195 1(30 June 1951, MCAF Santa Ana )

HMR-262 1 September 195 1(1 September 1951, MCAS Cherry Point )

HMR-163 15 November 195 1(1 December 1951, MCAF Santa Ana )

HMR-263 1 February 1952(16 June 1952, MCAS Cherry Point) "

The first Marine transport helicopter squadron ,HMR-161, had already been commissioned on 1 5January 1951 at MCAS El Toro in accordance withprevious planning . Lieutenant Colonel George W .

* For comparative purposes, the actual location anddates of commissioning are shown in parentheses . Themajor difference from the Tactics and Techniques Boar drecommendations was in the commissioning site .


5 1

Herring, a Georgia-born Naval Academy graduate ,was the squadron's commanding officer . He hadpreviously been assigned at HMX as its executiv eofficer . The board recommended that HMR—16 1be equipped with the HRS as rapidly as aircraf tdeliveries would permit and that on approximately1 July, the squadron be deployed to Korea " forcombat service evaluation with troops ." The idea,due to the urgent need for helicopters in the 1s tMarine Division, was that HMR—161 would serv ein a dual role by operationally testing and evaluat-ing the HRS, and the concept for its use, whil econcurrently supporting the 1st Marine Division .Although the squadron 's primary amphibiousmission would not be performed by HMR—161, i twould, nevertheless, be used in a secondary rol eof supporting tactical elements incident to normalland warfare . 5i Later, on 15 August, HMR—161departed for Korea, only six weeks after th erecommended date established by the studygroup . *

The date of 1 September 1952 was establishe dby the Tactics and Techniques Board as the targe tdate for assembling the five squadrons on th eEast or West Coast to evaluate collectively th ehelicopter employment concept . "It is possible,"

the board reported, " to accomplish partial evalua-tion of this concept only if all five properly trainedsquadrons and their supporting . . . [shipping ]are available at the same time and the same place ."

Only partial evaluation of the concept could beaccomplished as the board felt that even if all fiv e

of the authorized squadrons were to be concen-trated, they still would be inadequate to effect th emain effort of one division in an amphibious

operation . To be more exact in this respect, th eboard determined that all six HRS squadron swould be capable of lifting only two lightly rein -

forced infantry battalions, or the equivalent ,within one hour. A time/distance factor of greaterthan one hour was considered undesirable . Aftercompletion of the operational testing, all squadron swere to be assigned individually or collectively t oFMFPac or FMFLant, whichever command hadan operational commitment wherein the helicopter

Lynn J . Montross' Cavalry of the Sky is suggeste das offering the best source of abundant detail covering th eKorean operational history for both HMR–161 an dVMO-6 . Mr. Montross, a well-established writer and his-torian, was employed at HQMC for approximately 1 0years, during which time he served as the Head of th eKorean Histories Unit .

squadrons could perform their primary or sec-ondary missions . 5 8

The shipping aspect of the study was investi-gated thoroughly . The erection of helicopter plat-forms on various types of amphibious ships re-vealed that on conventional transports, APA(attack transport) and AKA (attack cargo) ships ,space for only one helicopter could be providedwithout seriously limiting the ship 's normal am-phibious capability . This type of ship was dis-missed from further study as it would requir ean excessive number of vessels to operate a sig-nificant number of helicopters . The LSD (landin gship dock) was found to have the capability t otransport up to 60 helicopters but it too couldonly launch one aircraft at a time without ex-tensive modification resulting in the loss of it soriginal function . The LST (Landing Ship Tank )had the capability to operate five helicopters fro ma modified deck or transport up to 30 and thenonly operate two simultaneously . However, sinc ethe LST was slow, extremely vulnerable, and wa sconsidered to be of reduced application in futur eoperations, it also was not considered further b ythe board . Seaplane tenders, the board pointe dout, could operate only one helicopter at a tim ewhile an oiler could handle three to five, but agai nit was doubtful that these ship types could b ediverted from their primary mission . Therefor eit was concluded that a modified CVE carrier o ra helicopter transport vessel specifically designe dfor helicopter and troop transport was the bes tsolution. The CVE requirement to support th eapproved program was determined to be a tota lof four ships in service by 1 September 1952 ,with the first ship needed by 1 November 1951 . J 9

The type of CVE recommended for conversio nto a helicopter carrier had been changed from thepreviously desired Commencement Bay class t othat of the Casablanca class. The Tactics an dTechniques Board's report of 5 January stated :

. . , it had been discovered that the Commencemen tBay (CVE–105) class aircraft carrier was bein gadapted to ASW missions and did not appear to h eavailable for modification . Other class CVEs were i nreserve, and as far as the board could determine, therewas no immediate requirement for their use . Of these ,the Casablanca class (CVE–55) appeared to be thebest choice because of its greater speed, in additio nto being available in larger numbers . In this light, th ehoard 's recommendation was for the Commandant t orequest the modification of the four carriers of th eCasablanca class (CVE–55) or its equivalent. 60

52


Activation of the 3d MarineAircraft Wing

While the Tactics and Techniques Board wasinvolved in laying out the future helicopter pro -gram, other planning had been underway for th emobilization of Marine forces to meet the demandsof the Korean situation. Included in the overallbuildup was the activation of the 3d Marine Air -craft Wing and the 3d Marine Division . The reduc-tion of forces put into effect after World War I Ihad left the Marine Corps with only two activ eMarine aircraft wings and divisions . The 1stMarine Aircraft Wing was located on the Wes tCoast at MCAS, El Toro, California, and the 2 dWing was stationed at MCAS, Cherry Point, NorthCarolina, on the East Coast . For reasons ofeconomy and availability of air base facilities andairfield complexes, the plan for the 3d Wing place dit also on the East Coast at a former naval ai rstation at Miami, Florida . Planning called for th eformation and commissioning of three additionalhelicopter squadrons in the 3d Wing at the Miam ibase . 61 Logic, however, dictated that helicopte rsquadrons be within reasonable flying distance o fthe ground FMF units which they were oblige dto support. In view of the fact that the 3d Marin eDivision was forming at Camp Pendleton, Cali-fornia, the plan was changed to have the sevent hthrough the ninth helicopter squadrons commis-sioned at MCAF, Santa Ana, California, in lieu ofthe Miami base.6 2

All previous planning had allowed the helicopte runits to be formed and placed within the interna lorganization of the aircraft wing as special unitswithout an intermediate command . On 15 June1951, the Marine aircraft wing organization wa sreorganized to make it a balanced task organiza-tion and, for the first time, combined the helicopte runits under a parent helicopter aircraft grou pheadquarters . In addition to the headquarter ssquadron and the three helicopter units in th egroup organization, there were two supportingunits : an air base squadron and an aircraft main-tenance squadron. The Marine Helicopter Trans -port Group (MAG (HR)) structure was almos tidentical to the organization of fixed-wing groups .The new Marine aircraft wing, with its fixed win gand helicopter assets, was thus organized to sup -port independently a Marine division . 6 3

On 23 October 1951, the Commandant release dMarine Aviation Plan 1-52 for Fiscal Year 1952 .A cross-section of affected commanding general sand commanding officers of forces, units, an dstations within the Continental United States were

ordered to HQMC during November 1951 an dbriefed in detail on its aspects. As a result ofmonetary shortages, however, it was not until th enext calendar year that implementation finally be-gan . 6 ` As a consequence, changes were madewhich varied from the plan outlined in the Novem-ber meeting and, as a result, a revision was pub-lished on 11 January 1952 . Contained within it sprovisions were proposed commissioning dates andlocations for the three helicopter aircraft groups .MAG(HR)-16 was scheduled for commissionin gduring February with MAG(HR)-26 and -3 6dates set for the following June . Also, the heli-copter groups (headquarters squadrons) had aproposed allowance of four aircraft ; two fixed-wing transports and two utility helicopters . Thefour group aircraft were in addition to the num-ber and types in custody of the subordinate threetactical squadrons . In this connection, aviationplans for both 1951 and 1952 indicated that eac htactical squadron was also to have two utilit yhelicopters besides the 15 transport helicopters . 6 5

On 31 January 1952 the Commandant announce dthat the revision to Aviation Plan 1-5 had beenapproved by the CNO and that it represented theofficial guideline for the expansion of Marin eaviation ."

During the past year, 195]., the transport squad-rons had been commissioned very near the dat erecommended by the Tactics and Technique sBoard . Under the revised Aviation Plan 1-52 ,the three new helicopter squadrons of MA G(HR)-36 and HMR-263 of MAG(HR)-26 wer edesignated for commissioning during 1952 as fol-lows : *

HMR-361 February 1952 (25 February 1952 )HMR-362 April 1952 (30 April 1952 )HMR-363 May 1952 (2 June 1952 )HMR-263 June 1952 (16 June 1952)

The planned and actual dates for commissioningof each group headquarters squadron along withits air base and maintenance squadrons took placeon : 6 7

MAG (HR) -16

1 March 1952MAG(HR)-36

2 June 195 2MAG (HR) -26

16 June 195 2

Thus on 30 June 1952, Marine aviation wascomprised of three aircraft wings, each compose dof three fixed-wing aircraft groups and a heli-copter group of three tactical squadrons . In addi-tion, each wing had a fixed-wing transport groupof two squadrons, plus a photographic, a corn -

* For comparative purposes the actual dates of com-missioning are indicated in parentheses .

54

MARINES AND HELICOPTERS 1946—196 2

The K–225 was the first turbine-powered helicopter. Built by Kaman, it was powered by a Boeing 502–2 free turbin e(Kaman Aerospace Corp . Photo 115-1) .

posite, and an observation squadron:* ss (Fig-ureI) .

The formation of the last helicopter group an dsquadron, MAG(HR)–26 and HMR—263, meantthe planned growth of the helicopter program hadbeen achieved. However, reaching the goal of nin etactical units did not mean that Marine Corp splanners would relent in their effort to increasethe maximum assault lift capability of the thre ehelicopter groups. If an additional capability wa sdesired in the near future, it would have to beachieved by different means than by increasin gthe number of helicopter transport squadrons .

1952 Aircraft Plansfor the Future

While plans were in effect for the forthcomin gHR2S to replace the HRS interim assault trans -

* Even though these units were commissioned, theystill experienced an extreme shortage of personnel an dequipment.

port helicopter, procurement of utility (HU) an dobservation (HO) aircraft was not quite as de-finite. Nevertheless, plans were being made t oobtain both types. The evaluation of the KamanK–225 observation helicopter—the model pur-chased by BuAer in lieu of the earlier K–190 —found the design to be superior in its flight char-acteristics, particularly in stability, control, an dease of flying . Since Sikorsky's HO5S–1 was no tmeeting its expected performance ratings due t othe low horsepower output of its engine, BuAerawarded a production contract during 1952 t oKaman Aircraft Company for 46 K–225s as aneventual replacement for the HO5S–1 . The Kamanmachine would be designated as the HOK–1 (H-helicopter, 0-observation, K-Kaman) with thefirst of them expected to be delivered to theMarine Corps during 1954 . 9 The HOK–1 hadtwo side-by-side main rotor shafts with a two -bladed rotor attached to each shaft . The blade sintermeshed and turned in opposite directions .Four people could be carried : pilot, copilot, and


55

two passengers . The Pratt and Whitney R—1340—48engine was installed behind the cockpit/cabin an dproduced 600 horsepower . The left side of thecockpit plexiglass bubble opened to allow loadingof two litters one above the other, fore and aft i nthe cockpit ; however, the copilot's seat and flightcontrols had to be removed . The actual weights ,as the aircraft eventually evolved, amounted to4,334 pounds empty with a maximum allowable o f5,995 pounds . Maximum sea level airspeed wa srestricted to 88 knots . 7 0

The selection of a utility helicopter was ex-tremely important as the Marine Corps desperatel yneeded an all-around utility aircraft. It was notrecognized at the time, but the choice wouldeventually have a definite influence upon th eentire Marine helicopter program . The smal lH03Ss and the HTLs were being used in autility role since there were no other helicopter savailable. The Marine Corps desired to assigntwo new and larger utility aircraft to each heli-copter MAG headquarters squadron for carryin gcargo and bulky aircraft replacement parts . Also ,two utility helicopters were to be assigned to eachMarine aircraft wing headquarters squadron, eachmajor air station, and air facility . 71 Then, as asecondary mission, the utility aircraft could b eused to transport combat troops and evacuatewounded personnel."

On 5 December 1952, the CNO informed BuAe rof the Marine Corps' utility helicopter require-ment . It was explained that in order to meet th especification, it appeared that modification to anexisting Navy program would be desirable in th einterest of economy rather than initiate a ne wdesign . In this respect, the CNO was referring toa new Navy ASW model, one being developedby the Sikorsky Aircraft Company . 7 3

The origin of the new Sikorsky design began

The HOK—1 was the production version of the K—225 .It was also known as an OH—43D (Marine Corps PhotoA35013) .

in 1951 when the Navy was searching for anASW helicopter capable of operating from battle-ships and cruisers. The Bell-manufactured XHSL—1 helicopter was chosen originally in lieu of aSikorsky aircraft in 1950 to meet this require-ment, but had been in the developmental stage fo rwell over a year . Many problems arose duringthe XHSL—l 's construction which resulted in anincrease in weight and size to the point where itbecame completely unacceptable to the Navy . Atthis point Sikorsky submitted its design to BuAeras a solution to the Navy's waning ASW pro -gram. The helicopter was described as a HRS—4 ;a modified HRS with a larger engine and cabi nin addition to a differently designed tail cone an dlanding gear. But as the design evolved, so manychanges were made to the basic HRS that it coul dnot be considered a modification, but rather acompletely different helicopter .

Basically, the Navy 's requirement for an ASWhelicopter specified that it be capable of carryin ga pilot, copilot, sonar equipment and ordnance ,and two crewmen . It was to have a three-hourflight duration and be compatible for storage in ,and operating from, the same class of ship s(battleships and cruisers) as the XHSL . "

By February 1952, the CNO had become con-vinced that the Bell XHSL—1 would not meet th eASW specifications nor be ready for deliver ywithin an acceptable length of time . On the 27th ,he directed BuAer "to proceed without delay witha program for the development of the Sikorsk yHRS aircraft with the large engine--ASW con -figured ." The first flight of Sikorsky's HRS— 4was predicted to occur in November 1953 withthe delivery of the first production aircraft sched-uled for January 1955 . 74

The HRS—4 had to be modified to meet theutility requirements of the Marine Corps whichconsisted largely of rearranging the interior ofthe cabin . The necessary changes involved re-moval of the ASW equipment, installation of acargo deck with tie-down rings, provisions fo rcarrying 8 litters or 12 combat equipped troops ,a 400-pound rescue hoist, and a 5,000-pound ex-ternal cargo hook . 75 The basic weight of theutility version was 8,598 pounds with a maximu mtake-off weight eventually approved at 13,30 0pounds . This allowed for a payload of approxi-mately 4,000 pounds without fuel . The forward ai rspeed was restricted to 123 knots . The 65-foo tdiameter 4-bladed main rotor was driven by a

a Acco-ding to Navy plans, a much larger twin engin ehelicopter was to perform the ASW mission from aircraftcarriers .

56


A HOK—1 from VMO—2 during Operation SEAHAIC'K at Pohang, Korea, 1960 . The HOK—1 was used for reconnaissance(Marine Corps Photo A182678) .

1,525-horsepower Wright engine where the smalle rHRS had a 600-horsepower engine propelling only3 main rotor blades . The Navy ' s official designa-tion for the HRS–4 later became the HSS–1 an dthe Marine version the HUS–1 (H-helicopter, U -utility, S-Sikorsky) . Sikorsky designation was th eS–58 . "

When the CNO instructed BuAer to develop th eHUS–1 for the Marine Corps in December 1952 ,he also defined its procurement status . Fortunatelyin this respect, the Fiscal Year 1954 aircraf tprocurement list was revised by the CNO t oallow for the modification of 33 HSS–ls to HUS –1s . This meant only that money would be avail -able for beginning its fabrication . Delivery of thefirst production HUS–1 to the Marine Corps wa sinitially estimated as occurring sometime durin g1955 ."

Initial planning documents defining aircraft re-quirements for the fiscal year 1954 and 1955 als owere submitted to the CNO during 1952. Bothdocuments indicated a Marine Corps require-ment for nine HR squadrons, each with 15 trans-port helicopters for a total tactical inventory o f135 aircraft . The VMOs were to stay at 12 fixed -wing and 12 observation helicopters, and HMX– 1was to operate 12 transports and six observatio naircraft . The total Marine helicopter requirement splanned through 30 June 1955 were : 147 trans -port (HR), 36 utility (HU), and 48 observationhelicopters (HO) . 78 In the fall of 1953, the heli-copter procurement program was slightly modifiedby the CNO in order to stay within the Marin eCorps total operating limit of 1,425 aircraft .HMX–1 was reduced to an inventory of nine HRand three HO aircraft and each group headquarters


57

The HUS—1 by Sikorsky was the first major Marine utility helicopter . Its forerunner was the HRS—1 (background)

(Marine Corps Photo 529979) .

squadron was denied its two utility helicopters .Subject to budgetary, production, and engineeringrestrictions, 144 HRs, 39 HOs, and 36 HUs wereapproved for the Marine Corps by the end o fJune 1955 .'"

In the interim between submission and approva lof plans for these requirements, the Division o fAviation was reviewing its tactical assignment o fthe forthcoming HUSs . On 18 September 1953 ,Colonel Edward C . Dyer, who was now assigned a sdeputy assistant director of the Division of Avia-tion after graduating from the National War Col-lege, prepared a memorandum for the Com-mandant concerning the helicopter program. "Th eHUS-1, " the memorandum read, "is being pro -cured to meet utility helicopter requirements .Initially, however, it will be used as a transpor thelicopter . Upon replacement by the HR2S, theHUS will revert to utility billets ." 8 0

Internal documents of the Division of Aviatio nindicated that changing the role of the HU Sfrom utility to troop transport had been unde rconsideration since the early part of the year .A graphic presentation of the desired complemen tfor nine helicopter squadrons was prepared on 7April 1953 and depicted how the progressio nfrom all HRS squadrons to an all HR2S programwas anticipated . Figure 2 also illustrates chrono-logically where the HUSs were intended to b eused . 8 1

Yet amidst all the planning for future years ,the Marine Corps had by this time substantiallyincreased its helicopter inventory. Although nearthe end of 1952 the operating squadrons werenot up to their authorized strengths, the tota lnumber of helicopters, including those assigned to

short activities (non-FMF), had reached 166 . Thetypes reflected in the total were 106 HRs, 3 9HOs, 18 trainers (HT), and 3 tired HRPs . Bythe end of 1953, and with the Korean War over,the number of helicopters on hand had steadil yincreased to a total of 202 with models of th eHRS accounting for 141 of the total .8 2

Peripheral Aspect sof the Period

During this period, the helicopter program ha dgrown at an unprecedented rate compared to th epainfully slow pre-Korean War pace . In this sameperiod, a few helicopter programs met wit hfailure . These unsuccessful ventures cannot b eignored since many of them were viewed as bein gequally essential to the Marine Corps ' amphibiousmission as were those which eventually proved t obe worthwhile .

One of the more notable projects was the re -

Squadrons 1954 1955

1956 1957

195 8

HMR-1 HRS HUS

HUS HR2 SHMR-2 HRS HUS

HUS HR2 SHMR-3HMR-4HMR-5HMR-6HMR-7HMR-8HMR-9

HR SHRS

HR2SHR2S

HRS ---HR2S—HR2SHRS

HR2SHRSHR2SHR S

HRS HR2S

Figure 2

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quirement and subsequent development of a one -man helicopter . It was viewed as a machine foruse within infantry units and one which couldbe piloted by an average combat Marine afte rminimal training . The potential of the light-weightdevice made it extremely attractive for performin gmissions of observation, liaison, rescue, and th emost promising of all, maneuvering of smal ltactical units .

Although the experimental one-man helicopterproject survived for many years, others were no tso successful . The McDonnell XHRH–1 was one i nparticular . Its short life was attributed to an econ-omy move which required the diversion of its fundsto a similar and equally unsucecssful helicop-ter, the Navy 's XHCH–1 (H-helicopter, C-cargo ,H-heavy) . The XHCH was designed to carry load sfor very short distances as a flying crane wit hthe capability of operating off aircraft carriersand being used for replenishment operations ,lifting unflyable aircraft, and in general suppor tof amphibious operations . Its payload was ex-pected to be 15,000 pounds lifted over a distanc eof 20 miles, and in an "overload " condition ,capable of carrying 25,000 pounds . S3 Its demise ,like that of the XHRH–1, eventually came as aresult of insufficient funds to carry out develop-ment of the power plants, rotor head, and rotorblades .

During the developmental period of theXHRH–1, General Cates had made repeated re -quests to CNO for the continuance of developmentfunds as the helicopter appeared to offer th eMarine Corps a greater assault lift capability thanthe HR2S. Nevertheless, the CNO had remainedimpervious to the Commandant's requests an dpinned all hopes for success of a heavy helicopte ron the XHCH .

Throughout the past years, Piasecki had con-tinued the development of its XH–16, originall ythe Marine Corps' hope for a large assault trans-port helicopter. However, it too—although stillunder construction during this period—would soonjoin the list of unsuccessful ventures .

Disregarding the unfruitful endeavors, the fact

must be recognized that the Marine Corps ac-cepted the "successful " helicopters of less tha ndesired performance and aptly applied them, whil enever giving up hope for obtaining those ex-periencing developmental difficulties . The proble mwhich Marine planners had encountered, an dwould continue to face in future planning, wa sthat the Marine Corps helicopter concept, for th emost part, was based on the aircraft meeting th especifications listed in the operational require-ments and not on the resultant flight article . Amarked difference is revealed when comparin gthe original requirement against the finishe dproduct . Of course, the planners had no idea ho wa certain helicopter would vary from its propose ddesign . The difference can be explained somewha tby examining a CNO policy statement, wherein h erecognized that modifications would exist be-tween the original design and the productio nmodel :

In all material developments, the Chief of Nava lOperations considers timely availability and suit -ability of first importance . The performance factor sgiven in [the] requirement are goals, except wherespecifically noted as minimums. During the course o fpreliminary design or development it may be foun dthat in meeting these goals a large and comple xarticle will result ; whereas it may be possible todevelop a much simpler and therefore, more readilyavailable and suitable equipment short of the ultimat especified, but which nevertheless will constitute aconsiderable advance over presently available equip-ment . When this situation arises, the developing agenc yshall so inform the Chief of Naval Operations inorder that consideration may be given to making a nappropriate modification of the operational require-ment. s a

The next major step taken by the Marine Corp sin developing its helicopter program would bederived from the products of a study group a tQuantico called the Advanced Research Group .The material produced by the assemblance of 1 0Marine colonels, most of whom were destined fo rthe rank of brigadier general, would have a pro -found impact upon the helicopter program, and ingeneral, the future course of the entire MarineCorps amphibious concept .

CHAPTER 5

SEEKING A NEW ORDER OFMOBILITY

A Concept forFuture Amphibious Operation s

On 17 July 1951, the Commandant proposedto the CNO a Marine Corps concept for futur eamphibious operations . Certain conceptual aspect shad appeared in both Equipment Policy 1950

and in the studies submitted by the 1951 Tactic sand Techniques Board . The Commandant declaredthat the time had come to settle on a fairly definiteconcept for employing helicopters in amphibiou soperations . He recommended the initiation of aprogram to develop the detailed techniques fo rlarge-scale ship-to-shore movement, one whic hwould provide the fleets with some measure ofability to exploit the growing helicopter capability .In this respect, General Cates remarked to th eCNO that it would be "prudent, practical, an dtimely to provide within the fleets the capabilit yto land by helicopter the assault elements of on eMarine division in continuous echelons ." In ac-cepting the optimistic troop-carrying capacity o fthe HR2S-1, as predicted by Sikorsky, GeneralCates also mentioned that the helicopter industr ywould soon produce a 36-man helicopter and tha t144 of these aircraft could land the desired num-ber of troops in execution of the concept . "Studiesand past experience, " he continued, "indicate thatthe most desirable type of assault shipping fo rsuch a force will be ships which can accommodatethe necessary embarked troops, the helicopters t oland them, and the crews to operate and maintainthe helicopters." General Cates concluded : "It i sbecoming increasingly urgent to commence a shi pconversion or building program that will parallelthe availability of . . . the 36-man helicopter . " 1

The Commandant 's letter also defined the spe-cifications for transport shipping, an essential ele-ment of his future doctrine . From the landingforce viewpoint, the most effective tactical landingwould consist of a helicopter-borne attack mounte dfrom a transport ship capable of embarking ap-proximately 1,500 assault troops and operating at

least 18 of the 36-man transport helicopters fromthe same ship. A ship with a minimum flight deckcapacity of 10 such helicopters was considered t obe acceptable . 2

In a letter to the Commandant on 13 Augus t1951, the Acting Chief of Naval Operations ,Admiral Donald B . "Wu" Duncan, approved th eMarine Corps ' concept of landing one division byhelicopter . He questioned, however, whether th estate of development of transport helicopter sjustified settling, at that time, on a definite metho dfor conducting such operations and beginning aship conversion or building program . He fearedacceptance of the Marine Corps' concept of trans -porting troops, equipment, stores, and helicoptersall in the same ship would automatically requir eradical changes to existing types of ships or th econstruction of specially designed new types .Either course would involve a large expenditur eof funds . The decision rendered by the Actin gCNO was that further experimentation and in-vestigation should be conducted into the matter .Laying aside the Commandant ' s shipping request ,Admiral Duncan declared, "The CNO will deter -mine whether it is feasible, within the limits o fships and funds available, to commence . . . theprogram during the current fiscal year [1952] . " 3

Initial Determination ofthe Marine Corps' HelicopterAircraft Carrier Requirements

Long before July 1951, the Commandant ha dmade Marine Corps shipping requirements knownto the CNO. As early as February, General Cate shad recommended that one helicopter aircraf tcarrier of new construction, or one converted fro ma CV or CVL, be included in the Navy 's ship -building program for the next fiscal year, i .e. ,1952 . The Commandant pointed out that develop-ment of amphibious ships of all types had laggedin recent years and the time had arrived whe n

59

60

MARINES AND HELICOPTERS 194 .6–1962

constructive progress in this area was becomin gnecessary . In April 1951, the Director of Marin eAviation, General Jerome, told the Deputy Chiefof Naval Operations for Air (Op–5B), that th eMarine Corps needed a prototype amphibiou stroop/helicopter transport ship and that it wa sessential that such a ship be developed from th ekeel up . That part of the Marine Corps concep twhich required troops, equipment, helicopters, an dreasonable maintenance and operational facilitie sbe combined in one type of ship was also pointe dout . Four days later, the Commandant submitte dto the CNO a request for the use of a CV or aCVE in evaluating the employment of assaul ttransport helicopters . Unfortunately, all requestsappeared to have been made in vain as the ShipsRequirements Board failed to provide funds fo rthe construction of a new ship or the conversio nof a CVE in the shipbuilding programs for FiscalYears '52 and '53 . 4

On 12 October 1951, the CNO initiated actio nto settle the questions raised by the Commandant 'sconcept of future amphibious operations . Althoughthere had been general agreement that in anassault elements of one Marine division woul dbe landed by helicopter, yet to be determined wa sthe type of platform the assault would be launche dfrom. To this end, the CNO directed the Com-mander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet "toevaluate the capabilities of transport helicopter sand to develop doctrine, techniques and proce-dures for ship-to-shore movement of helicopte rtransported troops . >>

Representing the Marine Corps in the conductof this evaluation was General Graves B. Erskine ,Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlan-tic, a much-decorated veteran of World War I anda pioneer in the development of amphibious war -fare doctrine . In the early years of World War I Ihe had been Chief of Staff, V Amphibious Corp sand later commanded the 3d Marine Division onIwo Jima .

To develop the assault helicopter concept i nFMFLant, on 20 December 1951 General Erskineconvened a board with Major General FieldHarris, the Commanding General, Aircraft ,FMFLant as the senior member . General Harris 'board met on 2 January 1952 and decided . thatthe best method for obtaining a solution to th eproblem was to hold a series of ship-to-shor eexercises during the early part of the year . As aresult, HELEX I and II took place between 2 0January and 28 February . Participating in bothexercises were the newly formed helicopter squad-rons HMR–261 and -262 . Operating from the

deck of the USS Siboney (CVE-122), the tw osquadrons lifted troops of the 1st Battalion, 8thMarines into landing zones at Camp Lejeune . Inaddition, the squadrons airlifted their own per-sonnel and equipment ashore after the tactica lportion of the exercise had been completed . 6

General Harris ' board made two major deter-minations from the results of HELEX I and II .The first conclusion was that the CVE–105 classcarrier could adequately handle aircraft, per-sonnel, and logistically support a vertical envelop-ment from the sea . Secondly, the board evaluatedthe employment of a mix of two different types ofships, i.e ., a helicopter transport and a trooptransport with a helicopter deck, and conclude dthat such combination of ships was tactically un-sound. The factors militating against the use o fseparate ships were found in the limited troop -carrying capacity of the HRS and the additionaltime required for the aircraft to land, load withtroops, and relaunch from the troop transport . ?

On 5 March 1952, shortly after the terminationof HELEX I and II, General Cates requested tha tGeneral Erskine make additional recommenda-tion on three related items which could be derive dfrom the recent tests . Two of the subjects hadnot been addressed in prior reports but the thirdhad been treated by the Tactics and Technique sBoard in February 1951. The three areas to b econsidered were :

1. The suitability of the CVE class carrier and anymodifications necessary to make it more suitable fo rassault helicopter operations .

2. The general characteristics required for a heli-copter transport vessel for future construction .

3. Based upon 1 . and 2 . above, the shipping re-quirements to support helicopter operations involvin gthe assault elements of one Marine division .s

General Harris ' board responded to the Com-mandant's request on 29 March 1952 . It deter -mined that the CVE–55 class carrier, with a fewmodifications, appeared to be suitable for assaulthelicopter operations with the HRS . For opera-tions with the HR2S, additional modification swould be necessary . In this connection it wasrecommended that a design study be conducte din order to determine the extent of the alterationsneeded to make the ship compatible for HR2 Soperations .

No determination was made on the second objec-tive as the board believed that additional heli-copter assault exercises should be held prior t osettling on the general characteristics for such aship. The estimated shipping requirements fortransporting the assault elements of one Marine

SEEKING A NEW ORDER OF MOBILITY

6 1

division (12,000 to 14,000 troops and relate dhelicopter personnel) were given as 20 CVE--55 sif the HRS was the only type helicopter used .If the HR2S was to be employed in lieu of th eHRS, then 13 CVEs would be necessary. How -ever, as an immediate course of action, sinc ethere were not enough HRSs available to lan dthe divisional assault elements, General Harrisrecommended that only four CVE–55s be modifie dfor helicopter operations and suggested that onl ya minimum modification be accomplished . In anycase each ship should be modified to accommodat eat least 20 HRSs, 850 troops, and 75 tons ofsupplies .9

General Harris ' report was forwarded throughappropriate headquarters to the CNO . GeneralCates concurred with the recommendations an dstated in his endorsement on 28 April that modi-fication of four CVE–55 class aircraft carriers wa sconsidered satisfactory as an inaugural step in im-plementing the development of the helicopter as-sault capability . He mentioned that additional con -versions would be necessary at an early date to fil lthe desired requirements . General Cates conclude dby stating that the ship modification measures "areviewed as essential in maintaining the momentu mof the helicopter program [and] to insure earl yavailability of a Fleet Marine Force helicopte rassault capability in connection with fleet amphi-bious operations ." 1 0

Following the Commandant ' s request, the CNO ,on 8 September 1952, directed the Chief, Burea uof Ships, to undertake a study to determine th efeasibility of modifying a CVE–55 class aircraftcarrier. Two months later, the CNO was advisedby BuShips that the feasibility study had bee ncompleted and the CVE–55 class appeared to b ean excellent ship for such use and the suggeste dconversion to rotory-wing operation was recom-mended to permit service evaluation . 1 1

Unfortunately, by the time BuShips had com-pleted the study it was too late to have themodification included in the 1954 Fiscal Yea rbudget . To ensure incorporation of the four Land-ing Platforms for Helicopters (LPHs) in the 195 5budget, the Commandant, on 26 November, re-peated his request for the conversions of th eCVE–55s . Soon thereafter, on 5 February 1953 ,General Cates revised his shipping requirements .He informed the CNO that the Marine Corps no whad a specific need for a total of 16 LPHs insteadof 12 ; four modified CVE–105s and 12 CV&-55s .These requirements were taken from a study com-pleted earlier by the Tactics and Techniques Boardat Quantico. The 16 helicopter aircraft carriers

were the minimum number of ships which theTactics and Techniques Board felt could accom-modate the assault elements of one Marine divi-sion .

Therefore by early 1953 the CNO had not onl ybeen appraised in general terms of the Marin eCorps ' shipping requirements—that of parallelin ghelicopter production but also of the specific type sand numbers needed to make the vertical assaul tconcept an effective tool of amphibious warfare .In short, while certain preliminary steps had no wbeen taken by the Commandant to obtain heli-copter platforms from which to expand the heli-copter concept, the Marine Corps, in actuality, ha dno ship in sight from which to operate and n oship scheduled for either construction or con-version . l'-

The Advanced Research Grou p

Among the functions for which the Marin eCorps was responsible, according to the amende dNational Security Act of 1947, was the develop-ment of those phases of amphibious operationsthat pertain to the tactics, techniques, and equip-ment used by landing forces . This responsibilitywas of paramount concern to senior Marine of-ficers at both Headquarters Marine Corps an dthe Marine Corps Schools, especially in thos eagencies involved with development, planning, an dprogramming .

Although Marines were still fighting in Korea ,there was an obvious requirement to determin ethe shape and posture of the post-Korean WarMarine Corps . Equally obvious was the fact tha thelicopters were to play a major role in thecomposition of the postwar Corps and in th eamphibious warfare techniques employed by theMarines .

When he assumed the Commandancy on 1January 1952, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr . ,who relieved General Cates, touched in his in -augural address on the successes achieved by thehelicopter and the role it played in the Korea nWar when he said :

Seven years have passed since the development o fthe helicopter as a troop carrier was begun, but in th efall of 1951, in the bleak Korean countryside, theworth of the ungainly looking craft was finally proved .Just as the amphibian tractor came to the fore as atroop carrier over the reefs of Pacific atolls durin gWorld War II, so the helicopter became the greates tsingle innovation during the Korean conflict as atactical and humanitarian medium of transporta-tion . . . .

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The fact that we have a suitable helicopter trans-port now in sight, . . . [leaves usl with a sense o fconfidence. I believe that the Marine Corps, with ourskilled close air support and our own helicopters t opave the way for the amphibious landing, is capabl eof following up an atomic attack with the most power-ful assault punch possessed by any nation in the worl dtoday . 1 3

General Shepherd had good reason to sound con-fident in his statement . By late 1953 the helicopterprogram had expanded to the point where th eMarine Corps was capable of undertaking a mor epositive step in developing further its helicopterconcept . In this respect, the Marine Corps hadmore experience in helicopter operations, possessedmore helicopters, trained pilots, and crewmen tha nany other military organization in the world .Brigadier General Noah C . New recalled :

Even as early as 1951, BMX–1 had experimentedwith mounting machine guns and 2 .75 inch rocket son the HTL-4, but there was little interest in develop-ing a helicopter for the close air support role . Man ypilots with Korean combat experience were definitel yagainst arming the helicopters . Also the ceiling limitof 1425 aircraft mitigated against procuring a lightlyarmed and vulnerable helicopter to substitute in th eplace of a fixed wing close air support aircraft)-

The combination of these factors led Genera lShepherd to form a special study group of highlyexperienced Marine officers to expand upon th e1951 concept . As one of its main tasks, the groupwould have the objective of deriving an ultimat econcept for the conduct of future amphibiou soperations .

There was also another reason for forming suc ha group. On 19 January 1953, General Shepherdinformed General Cates, who was now at Quantic oas the Commandant of Marine Corps Schools ,that within the Marine Corps educational structur ethere were no provisions beyond the Senior Cours efor intellectual development of Marine officers i nmatters relating specifically to special problem sof the Marine Corps. He believed that the de-ficiency did not permit formalized advanced stud yin the field of amphibious operations, nor did itensure the adequate and uniform indoctrinatio nof senior Marine officers in considerations affectin gformulation of Marine Corps policy . In order tocorrect this situation the Commandant stated :

[II desire to establish a Marine Corps Advance dResearch Group . . . [whichl will comprise a smal lgroup of officers performing original research in theinterest of their own professional development an dfor the purpose of achieving solutions to certain of theMarine Corps' basic problems ."

The Commandant's directive defined the missionof the Advanced Research Group as "to provideopportunity for advanced study and original re -search for Marine Corps officers of the rank o fcolonel." '° One major item under the outlineof study for the Advanced Research Group (ARG )was the "advancement of theories and practice srelated to landing operations ." As a matter o fpolicy, however, the basic project problems wer eto be selected by the Commandant. Each nine -month session of the group was to correspon dwith the academic year of the Marine Corp sSchools 1 7

Accordingly, the group met at Quantico in th efall of 1953 . In the original outline of study fo rthe group, the Commandant assigned three specifi cresearch projects, all of which were to be solve dduring the academic year . General Shepherdfurther directed that a fourth project be selectedby the group, which could be on any subject solong as it was a matter of significant concern tothe Marine Corps . As the first of the three pro-jects, General Shepherd directed the 10 colonels to :

Develop a concept of future amphibious operation sthat will require maximum utilization of the Flee tMarine Force as a mobile force in readiness . Base dupon this concept determine the validity and ade-quacy of the current tactical doctrines, organization ,equipment development policies and training pro -grams within the Marine Corps 18

The Advanced Research Group stated that th esolution to this problem had to be based on th erealities of the day, and on such developments a scould reasonably be expected during the nex tdecade . A challenging objective had to be estab-lished ; a definite long-range target towards whichthe Marine Corps could strive in the followin gyears . This was of paramount importance becaus eall areas involved in future amphibious operation shad to be easily discernible and provide a commo napproach to the problem. The concept arrived atby the group consisted principally of the following :

1. The high speed movement of helicopter assaul tforces to the objective area, in company with a fas tcarrier task force .

2. The use of nuclear weapons to destroy hostile ai rwithin tactical aircraft range of the objective area ,and to neutralize the landing area .

* One of the prerequisites stated that member scould not be within four years of selection to brigadiergeneral. The group of 10 relatively junior colonels chose nfor the session during 1953-1954 were : Thomas J . Colley ,John P . Condon, August Larson, Joseph N . Renner, Car-son A. Roberts, Samuel R. Shaw, George R . E . Shell ,Eustace R . Smoak, William J . Van Ryzin, and Richard G .Weede. It is interesting to note that eight of the 10 officersretired as general officers .


63

3. The rapid exploitation of atomic preparatoryfires by helicopter assault forces, from the sea, seiz-ing key terrain features within the objective area .

4. Maneuver by helicopter troops, with the use ofatomic support, to extend the area of amphibioustroop control within the objective area .

5. Use of helicopter forces, teamed with comba tair and atomic and conventional support, and inten -sive air reconnaissance combined with vigorous patrol -ling, to maintain, consolidate and extend the area.

6. Use of helicopters for logistic support during th eassault phase.19

These objectives had several promising feature swhich, if exploited to the fullest, would provid ea Fleet Marine Force with a force-in-readines scapability far beyond that previously envisioned .The "all-helicopter" assault would give the landin gforce mobility, flexibility, and speed which woul dpermit the commander to mass, reinforce, or re-deploy task forces of division size . It was con-sidered that even if tactical nuclear weapons wer enot used, or in Marine operations short of all-outwar, the concept would still result in a much mor epowerful amphibious assault than was possible a tthe time.

While the ARG proposals could not be achievedimmediately, they were ones which the Marin eCorps could attain in the foreseeable future . TheCommandant approved, on 27 April 1954, th ebasic proposals realizing that progressive steps ha dto be taken for the development of the technique sand procedures to be employed in an "all-heli-copter assault . " In doing so, General Shepher ddirected that these new concepts now representedthe long-range objective of the Marine Corps . 2 0

The approval of ARG Project I led to a con-sideration of fields in which long-range orientationprograms would be required. The areas of or-ganization, equipment, training and techniques ,and procedures would be affected . The Marin edivision would be required to segregate, or re -move from its organic structure, those element swhose normal functions were not compatible wit hthe new concept . In the area of equipment, em-phasis had to be shifted to development of am-phibious shipping which could support an all-heli-copter assault .

Further, Marine Corps techniques and proce-dures for the conduct of amphibious operations a swell as the training program which refined themdid not meet the requirements of the atomic era .Atomic weapon systems had to be made avail -able and become organic to the ground units an dmade totally helicopter transportable . The logisticalsupply system needed equal attention and revisio nif it was to be responsive to needs of the division .

During the forthcoming years, therefore, a serie sof programs had to be promulgated by the Marin eCorps in order to reorient and accelerate develop-ment in these fields .

As the result of these considerations, Marin eCorps Test Unit No . 1 (MCTU #1) was activatedat Camp Pendleton, California, on 1 July 1954.Colonel Edward N . Rydalch was designated com-manding officer of the regimental-size unit an dlater officially took command on 2 September . 2 1

The statement of missions assigned to ColonelRydalch required the test unit to delve into prac-tically all aspects of the major areas of concernbrought about by the adoption of the new concept .

One of the core areas in which MCTU # 1would be active was in the determination of thefeasibility of conducting amphibious operation swith atomic weapon support . In order to prov ethese techniques, the test unit would participatewith troops and helicopters in a series of atomictests to be conducted at the Nevada Provin gGrounds .

The first test of this nature, however, hadalready taken place the previous year, 1953, in-volving the 2d Marine Corps Provisional Atomi cExercise Brigade, at about the same time as th eARG's Project I was being conceived . BrigadierGeneral Wilburt S . "Bigfoot" Brown, Command-ing General, Force Troops, FMFPac, a combatveteran of both World Wars, the Nicaraguancampaign, and Korea, was assigned additionalduty as commanding general of the Camp Pendle-ton-based brigade .

Helicopter support was provided by HMRs—361 ,-162, and -163 of Colonel Harold J . Mitchener' sMAG(HR)-16 . A total of 39 HRSs participatedin the exercise with a few aircraft augmentin gfrom MAG (HR) -36 . Code named DESERT ROC KV, the exercise solidly proved that helicopter -borne forces could be used to support the mai neffort of an amphibious assault in relatively closeproximity to a nuclear explosion . In the forth-coming years, MCTU #1's participation in sub-sequent DESERT ROCK exercises would sub-stantially expand the data obtained durin gDESERT ROCK V . 2 2

Advanced Research Group Project IV

Throughout the academic year of 1953—1954, th eARG generated many possible subjects for Pro-ject IV. The original solution to Project I opene da number of areas which required further de -tailed study before the concept could be effectively

64


implemented . Some of the problems brought tolight were :

1. The tactics and techniques of helicopter opera-tions ashore .

2. The Marine Corps helicopter requirements .3. The development of tactics and techniques o f

fighter escort and close support of transport heli-copters.

4. Shipping requirements .

After careful consideration of all the subject sfor Project IV, the group chose to study the on erelating to helicopter requirements . They realize dthat combat helicopter requirements, in terms o fnumber and type, were not now clearly define dinasmuch as the Commandant had only recentlyapproved the new concept presented in Projec tI . It became apparent that Project IV had to dealwith helicopter requirements, with emphasis placedon a transition period—if the Marine Corps wa sto meet the long-range objective of an "all heli-copter" assault capability. The Advanced Re -search Group, therefore, identified its fourth pro-ject as "Marine Corps Transport Helicopter Re-quirements for the Immediate Future ." 2 3

The statement of the problem as written by th egroup was to "develop the Marine Corps' transporthelicopter requirements for the immediate futureas a step toward achieving the ultimate objectiv eof the concept of future amphibious operations ."The initial goal was to achieve the capability o flifting the assault elements of one Marine divi-sion and the related elements of one Marine air -craft wing . Thereafter, as conditions would per-mit, and as requirements dictated, the Marin eCorps would expand its capability to meet it spotential under the concept .

The group appreciated fully that, as in landin gcraft, several types of helicopters would be re-quired to execute effectively the several opera-tions of lifting cargo, vehicles, and personnel .Also helicopters would be needed for reconnais-sance, casualty evacuation, pathfinding, and th eexercise of command and control . For these opera-tions there was seen a definite requirement for a"family" consisting of HR2Ss for heavy equip-ment and large personnel loads and a need fo rthe HUSs and HRSs in lifting lighter loads o fequipment and troops. While the Marine Corp shad considerable numbers of the lighter heli-copters, the shortcoming was in the quantity o fthe heavier transport helicopter—the one mos tessential to any significant landing operation . Forthis reason the colonels devoted their study t oconsideration of the larger transport helicopte ronly. 24

A comparison was made between the existin ghelicopter lifting capability and that which wasprogrammed for 1957—the time when all nin eMarine transport helicopter squadrons would b eequipped with the HR2S . It was figured that itwould take seven hours in 1954 to land th eassault elements of one battalion landing tea m(BLT) with one MAG (HR) consisting of thre e15-plane HRS squadrons . By 1957, the increase dlifting capability of the HR2S would permit th esame size MAG to land a complete Marine divisio nin approximately 15 hours . The comparison wasmade using the "K" series Table of Organizatio n(T/0) with supplies sufficient for three days 'operations . The radius of assault for the HR Shelicopter group was 15–20 miles whereas th eHR2S MAG was figured at a radius of 50 miles .An average load for the HRS was computed a t1,300 pounds and at an amazing 8,000 pound sfor the HR2S . 2 '

In a close analysis of the HR2S–landed division ,however, it was determined that the number o fhelicopters was still inadequate . It was felt thatthe minimum assault force should consist of fou rbattalion landing teams landed simultaneously withadditional support provided on the second wave .Also, it was calculated that sufficient helicopter swould not be available for providing support fo rtactical operations ashore while concurrentlyexecuting the ship-to-shore movement . These de-ficiencies could be remedied, the group stated ,"by increasing Marine Corps transport helicopterunits to a total of 12 squadrons with a combine dstrength of 180 aircraft." In addition, it would b enecessary for the helicopters to be capable of carry-ing "an emergency payload of 35 passengers o r12,500 pounds for the initial assault and for heav ylifts . " The increase of 45 HR2Ss, the group be-lieved, would meet the initial lift requirement an dprovide tactical support ashore during the earlyphases of the assault . In the case where helicopter swere needed in operations ashore during the earl yphase, the overall time to land the complete divi-sion would then be on the order of 12 to 1 4hours ."

Resupply requirements of the division, combinedwith the total requirements necessary for lifting aMarine aircraft wing, were examined next withthe view of determining the capability for landin ga division-wing team with the 180 HR2Ss . Byallowing 217 trips per day for resupply of thedivision, the wing could be moved ashore with 3 0days supply in a period of 50 hours, provide dthe wing equipment was helicopter transportable .This period would be increased to 70 hours should


65

one MAG of HR2Ss be employed to suppor toperations ashore after the initial landing . = '

As a matter of false optimism, the AdvancedResearch Group members had been led to believ ethat the HR2S could be modified to have th ecapability to lift 12,500 pounds . The only chang eto their planned field trips during their sessionwas the addition of a visit to the Sikorsky Air-craft Company. 2S Considering this, it can be in-ferred from studying their report that during th ecourse of their visit to Sikorsky a means had bee nproposed to them by which the lifting ability o fthe helicopter could be increased ." 29 The grouplisted in its report three ways this could be done :"By installing engines of sufficient power . . . byincreasing the rating of the present engines to2,500 horsepower . . . or by installing rotor ti pjets . " 30 The group knew that the importance o fobtaining a payload of 12,500 pounds could notbe over-emphasized as it would then be possibl eto helicopter-lift the most crucial heavy pieces o fdivision property : the 155mm howitzer and th etwo and one-half ton truck.

The board 's Project IV report to the Com-mandant concluded that 180 HR2S–1 helicopter swere needed to meet the interim transport heli-copter requirements . After reviewing the study ,General Shepherd gave his approval on 22 July1954 but directed that "a new study be initiate dimmediately to determine the feasibility of achiev-ing the helicopter-landed wing" portion of thedivision-wing team . 31 It had been indicated in th eDivision of Aviation 's comments on the stud ythat in the initial stage of the concept it mightnot be necessary, nor desirable, to helicoptertransport all the elements of a Marine aircraftwing to a shore base during an amphibiousoperation .

Following his approval of Project IV, GeneralShepherd submitted his request to the CNO fo rthe additional number of helicopters on 23 October1954 . "The validity of the concept outlined i n[the letter of 17 July 1951], " he stated, "hasbeen borne out by events which have sinc etranspired . It now appears that we are ready for—in fact, obliged to take—the next step in logical

* This assumption is supported by a statement con-tained in a memorandum from the Director of Aviatio nto the Chief of Staff on 8 April 1954 . Although comment-ing on ARG Project I, the Director of Aviation mentions :

This T—56 [gas turbine engine) growth potential o fthe HR2S would provide an aircraft capable of th eperformance noted on page 13, Part 1I : 12,000 poundpayload, 100 nautical mile radius, 130-150 knot speed .However, that would be about the growth limit of th eHR2S .

progression toward development of our helicopte rcapabilities . . . . " The general continued, "I pro -pose that each of the nine Marine helicoptertransport squadrons be provided with 20 HR2 Saircraft " at the earliest practicable time . " Hefurther pointed out to the CNO that this woul drepresent an increase from 135 helicopters in th epresent program to a total of 180 . 3 2

Landing Force Bulletin Number 1 7

Following the Commandant 's approval of theAdvanced Research Group 's Project I, action wastaken to obtain a Navy Department policy state-ment supporting the concept . Although this wasnot forthcoming until late in 1955, the Com-mandant, in the meantime, had been guarantee dNavy Department support . In a letter to th eCommandant of Marine Corps Schools, Genera lShepherd stated that in this matter, "the CNOhas already assured us of Navy support of th econcept, and has so instructed his staff and th ebureau chiefs . " 33 The CNO, Admiral Arleigh A .Burke, gave his formal concurrence to the newconcept on 8 December 1955 . He concurred wit hthe Marine Corps ' ultimate goal of conductingfuture amphibious operations by the means o fvertical envelopment utilizing ship-based heli-copters, although he realized that complete achieve-ment of the goal was not readily apparent in th eimmediate future . Admiral Burke agreed that"plans must be laid for a gradual transition fromWorld War II concepts of landing entirely ove rthe beaches to the ultimate goal of landing all th eassault elements by VTOL T "" type [helicopter ]transport aircraft ." 3 4

The CNO outlined the areas which were re-garded as intermediate goals and attainable within5 to 10 years :

1. Preliminary softening up and isolation of th earea by fast carrier task force and long-range shore -based aircraft and guided missiles.

2. Elimination or reduction to a minimum of ad-vance force operations to increase the element of sur-prise . Reconnaissance of landing areas to be accom-plished by photo planes and personnel operating fro msubmerged submarines.

3. Seizure of all initial objectives, including beac hdefenses, by troops landed in helicopters and sup -ported by naval gunfire and carrier-based aircraft .

4. Clearance of obstacles from beaches and beach

'* Adding five additional HR2Ss to each of the nin ehelicopter squadrons would be equal to forming one addi-tional MAG (HR) with three 15-plane squadrons .

*** Vertical takeoff and landing.

66


approaches and preparation of beaches to receiv elanding ships and landing craft by :

a. Personnel landed by helicopter .b. Minesweepers.

5. Landing of supporting troops, heavy equipmen tand supplies over the beaches .

6. Continued employment of assault helicopters toland reinforcements and to provide tactical mobilit yand logistic support to troops engaged in expandin gthe beachhead .

7. Use of the sea echelon concept to eliminate con-centration of shipping in the vicinity of beaches .

8. Adherence to principles of dispersion of ships ,landing beaches and troop elements to provide maxi-mum practicable passive defense against enemy atomi cattack . 3 6

Admiral Burke concluded his letter to Genera lShepherd by mentioning that the rate of progresstowards achievement of the ultimate goal woul ddepend on many factors . "One of the most im-portant," he stated "is the amount of moneywhich is made available by the Congress for im-plementation of the Navy's annual shipbuildin gand conversion program . Therefore, it is believe dthat a reappraisal of the goal outlined above . . .should be made at least annually." 36

In the meantime, Marine Corps Schools ha dprepared a landing force bulletin outlining th econcept which had been proposed in the ARG' sProject I . The school had been tasked with th eproject in mid-1954 and had submitted a proposedbulletin to HQMC during December . After under -going extensive revision, the Marine Corps of-ficially published its concept of future amphibiou soperations on 13 December 1955 in Landin gForce Bulletin Number 17, only nine days afte rformal recognition of the concept by the CNO .

Landing Force Bulletin Number 17 (LFB—17 )elaborated on the CNO 's position and parallele dthe concept delineated in Project I . The last para-graph summarized in the following manner :

This concept has as its ultimate goal an all-heli-copter assault which will endow the amphibious attac kwith maximum impact and maximum freedom o faction . We have already progressed to a point a twhich our doctrine embraces a powerful two-pronge dattack, one prong a vertical envelopment `' by heli-copter, the other a surface assault across the beac hby conventional means, with the latter constitutin gthe main effort . In the future, while improving ou rstill-essential beach-assault ability, we must adapt ou rorganization and equipment, and our tactics, tech-niques, and training, so as to place major stress onthe helicopter assault . Later, as new amphibious ship sjoin the fleet, and as helicopters with greater load

., This appears to he the first case where the term"Vertical Envelopment " appears in an official Marin eCorps document . It had appeared earlier in the MCS ' sdraft copy of LFB–17 to CMC in December 1954.

capacity become available in quantity, the beach as-sault can be reduced still further . Eventually, whenthe concept is fully realized, the beach assault can beeliminated altogether, leaving only follow-up troop sand supplies, exploitation forces, and base-develop-ment units and material to be landed over beaches orthrough ports in the beachhead area . 37

The latest improvements in amphibious tactic sand techniques had been promulgated in two othe rMarine Corps documents during the period, bot hof which complemented the concept outlined i nLFB—17 ; Landing Force Bulletin Number 2( " Interim Doctrine for the Conduct of Tactica lAtomic Warfare" ) and Landing Force Manual 24( "Helicopter Operations" ) . These two documentsgave wide circulation to the most important spe-cific elements of the new concept and mad epossible the inclusion of new material in loca ltraining programs . Operating forces were thusenabled and encouraged to participate more ac-tively in the development and refinement of ne wideas and to augment the efforts of the Advance dResearch Group, Marine Corps Test Unit Num-ber 1, and the Marine Corps Development Center.

The Smith Board

The requirements for a medium helicopter ,which were intentionally omitted from the ARG ' sProject IV, were taken up by a board which con-vened later at HQMC in January 1955 . Genera lShepherd had directed, on 23 December 1954, tha ta board of general officers be appointed to stud ythe composition and functions of Marine avia-tion in order that a determination could be mad eon the relative apportionment of personnelstrengths between ground and aviation organiza-tions . Lieutenant General Oliver P. Smith wasappointed as the senior member. Major GeneralsRobert O . Bare, Director of the Marine Corp sEducation Center, Homer L. Litzenberg, Inspecto rGeneral of the Marine Corps, and Brigadier Gen-eral John C . Munn, who was on duty at the tim ewith General Smith as Assistant Commandin gGeneral, FMFLant, were the additional boardmembers . 3 s

General Smith was fully familiar with the heli-copter program as he was one of three general son the Commandant's special board which dre wup the original helicopter program in 1946 . Be-tween 1948 and 1950, General Smith had beenAssistant Commandant and Chief of Staff, HQMC .He took command of the 1st Marine Division inJune 1950 and during the Korean War he led his


6 7

division in its epic breakout from the Chosin Res-ervoir . After his return to the U . S. in May 1951 ,he commanded the Marine Corps Base at Cam pPendleton and in July 1953 became Commandin gGeneral, FMFLant .

General Smith's board reported, in relation tothe smaller helicopters, that it was concerned withthe emphasis being placed on the large transporthelicopters at the expense of the medium types ,such as those being operated by the nine transport

squadrons . The HR2S-1, the board said, was alarge aircraft which would require a much larger,level landing area than the HRS . Open level area scapable of receiving a squadron of HR2Ss wer ecomparatively rare in many types of terrain . Theyfelt that one of the advantages of the mediu msize helicopter was its ability to land in almos t

any type of terrain . An organization with onlylarge helicopter transports would not have th eflexibility in the selection of landing zones tha twas enjoyed by the HRS squadrons . In statin gits position in this matter, the board said, "weforesee a definite and continuing requirement fo rmedium size helicopter transports (HRS, HUS, o requivalent) and believe that one squadron perwing is an absolute minimum ." 3

9

General Smith's board, in making its recom-mendation stated that "each Marine aircraft win g[should] contain one group of three squadrons o f20 large [HR2S] rotary-winged transports, an done squadron of 15 medium [HRS/HUS] rotary -wing transports . " The total number of 180 HR2S swas reaffirmed by the board as the appropriat enumber of heavy transport helicopters ."4 0

On 24 May 1955, the Commandant officiallyannounced his decisions on the recommendationsmade by the Smith Board . In matters relating tothe helicopter program, General Shepherd not onlyapproved the idea of adding medium helicopter sto the aircraft wing organization, but increased thenumber from one medium squadron to two suchunits per aircraft group . By his action Genera lShepherd thereby approved for planning purposesthe first additional expansion to the helicopte rprogram since its initial massive enlargement i n1951 ."

Although the May 24th letter officially pub-lished General Shepherd ' s position, the CNO ha dbeen apprised of his decision nine weeks earlier .On 1 April 1955 the Commandant requested tha t"the need for a vehicle to rapidly shuttle supplie sto the forward elements, to execute tactical move-ments of small units, and to evacuate battle casual-ties points to the use of a utility helicopter suchas the HUS." General Shepherd pointed out that

the problem had been closely studied by the Marin eCorps and "that it had been determined that twosquadrons of 15 HUS helicopters each will be re-quired to support each Marine division, or a totalof six squadrons and 90 HUS helicopters to sup -port the three Marine divisions . I cannot over-emphasize, " the Commandant continued :

. . . the importance I attach to the helicopterfor the employment by the Fleet Marine Force i nthe future . I strongly urge that every means he takento increase the Marine Corps helicopter lift capabilit yas rapidly as possible. The favorable prospects o fadditional production capacity becoming available atthe Sikorsky 's plant makes feasible the procuremen tof additional HUS helicopters in the Fiscal Year 1957 .The requirements of the Marine Corps for the HR2Saircraft are in no way altered by this letter. A recentstudy of the entire Marine Corps aviation by a boar dof Marine Corps generals, is still under review, how -ever, preliminary analysis indicated that the addi -tion of 90 HUS helicopters . . . can be achievedwithin the present aircraft ceiling assigned to theMarine Corps. 4 2

On 2 May the Division of Aviation had alerte dthe Vice Chief of Naval Operations as to the pro -posed aircraft group organization envisioned foraccommodating the new utility helicopter squad-ron . "Relative to the commissioning of HMRunits equipped with the HUSs," the memo stated,"it is intended to designate the new groups as MA G(HR) Light, and the squadrons as HMR (L) .Upon transitioning from HRSs to HR2Ss, it i sintended to redesignate the existing groups asMAG (HR) Medium, and the squadrons as HMR

(M) "h 3The three light helicopter groups, each compose d

of two HUS squadrons, a headquarters and main-tenance squadron (H&MS), and a Marine airbase squadron (MABS), were programmed fo rcommissioning between 1 April 1956 and 1 Jul y1958. The three medium helicopter groups wer esimilar to the existing MAG structure with eachgroup having three HR2S squadrons, a H&MS ,and a MABS . The dates set for commissionin granged from November 1956 through Augus t1959 ."

On 16 June 1955 the CNO replied to Genera lShepherd's previous requests for 180 HR2Ss an d90 HUSs . The CNO's answer presented a less de-sirable program than the Commandant had hope dto obtain. It approved an increase in the totalnumber of helicopters, although on the other handit made a compensatory reduction in the numbe rof Marine fixed-wing aircraft . He approved anoperating program for Fiscal Year 1959 of 18 0HR2S helicopters and 45 HUSs .'' r'

On 19 August the Commandant appealed to the

68


CNO requesting that the original number of 9 0HUS helicopters be purchased and no reductio nbe made in the total number of fixed-wing aircraft .The CNO answered General Shepherd on 11 Oc-tober 1955 declaring that his letter had not bee nreceived in sufficient time to have the request fo rthe additional 45 HUSs included in the Fiscal Yea r

1959 budget . The CNO stated that "it is requestedthat the Commandant of the Marine Corps sub-mit justification for the increase of forty-five (45 )helicopters in the 1959 operating program . Thisshould encompass the present helicopter progra mand any changes in numbers or organization tha tare contemplated ." 4 °

A Reduced HR2S Program

As correspondence relating to procurement o fthe HR2S continued between the Commandant andthe CNO, the program underwent drastic revisions .The first action taken by the Commandant occurre don 19 October 1955 when he informed the CN Othat information then available to him indicate dthat actually there were two versions of the HR2 Sbeing considered for initial production, and tha tboth fell considerably short of meeting the speci-fications set forth by BuAer . Three problem area sin particular were of concern : the combat radiu shad been reduced two-thirds and the ability tohover out of ground effect * had decreased t oapproximately half the altitude specified . Whilethe two foregoing problems were directly relate dto an excess in weight, the third difficulty involve dthe inability of the helicopter to automatically fol dits blades . These shortcomings severely restrictedits operational use .

In view of these problems, the Commandan trecommended that the CNO restrict deliveries ofthe HR2S to 15 aircraft and that production an ddelivery of the HUS—1 be accelerated to the exten tnecessary to provide the Marine Corps with an

* Ground effect is encountered when a helicopter i shovering at a height above the ground of less than it srotor diameter .

Figure

operating inventory of 90 HUSs by the end o f1957 . These two recommendations of Genera lShepherd were made to afford a longer interval o ftime for the development of the HR2S. In theinterim, the HUS would partially fulfill the urgen tlift requirements of the Marine Corps .4 7

Shortly thereafter, on 23 November 1955, th eCommandant again modified his recommendation sconcerning the desired operating strengths fo rboth the HR2S and the HUS. In his correspond-ence with the CNO, General Shepherd mentione dit had been discovered through informal discus-sions with BuAer and Sikorsky Aircraft, that tw oof the factors affecting the actions which he recom-mended the previous month had changed consid-erably. Mainly, these factors centered around th efact the turbine version of the HR2S had now beendelayed two years and that the results of a recen tweight reduction conference on the HR2S reveale dit was possible to accomplish sufficient reduction sin weight to provide improved performance of thefirst production models . In view of this, GeneralShepherd requested that the recently curtaileddelivery rate of the HR2S be increased from 1 5to 60 helicopters by the end of 1958 . He alsofavored an increase in the numbers of HUSs, sinc eboth the Army and Navy versions of the S—5 8(H—34 and HSS—1) were proving to be a highlysatisfactory aircraft' s In fact, it had been reporte dto the Commandant that the Army was increasin gthe number of seats in its H—34s from 12 to 1 8and that the Army aircraft was consistently carry-ing loads ranging from 3,750 pounds to 4,00 0pounds with over an hour's fuel on board . 49 Real-izing 60 HR2Ss was far from the original numbe rof 180, General Shepherd desired that the CN Omake a further compensatory acceleration in theHUS procurement which would provide for a noperating strength of 140 helicopters by the en dof 1958. 5 °

In reply, a review of the procurement programfor the HR2S was made by the CNO and presente dto the Commandant on 12 April 1956 . Tabulated i nFigure 3 was the CNO 's summary as it related to

3

FY 1957 Budge tCycle Fiscal Year Procurement Program s

Step

Date

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

TOTA L

1 Jun 1955 7 12 43 36 30 15 82 Oct

1955 .. 7 12 43 36 30 1283 Oct 1955 7 12 43 0 0 6 24 Nov 1955 7 12 15 0 0 34


69

the Fiscal Year 1957 budget cycle and to overallprocurement of the HR2S–1 . It is interesting t onote that the total number of HR2Ss had declinedin a series of actions from a total of 158 aircraft inJune 1955 to only 34 by November the same year .The drastic reduction was explained in the follow-ing manner :

In June 1955 the FY 1957 HR2S—1 procurementsubmitted to OB&R [Office of Budget and Review ]consisted of sixty (60)—[see Step 1 .] OB&R review ,and as agreed to by BuAer because of deficiencie s. . . uncovered in the HR2S—1, resulted in reducin gthe quantity to thirty (30) [for FY 57] . This quan-tity (30) was submitted to OSD [Office of the Secre-tary of Defense] for review—Step 2 . OSD review,again as a result of [the helicopter's] mechanical de-ficiencies, resulted in eliminating both the thirty (30 )HR2S—1 in the FY 1957 program and the thirty-si x(36) in the FY 1956 program—Step 3. In late October[the Marine Corps] requested that the number o fHR2Ss . . . be held to a maximum of fifteen (15) .. . . Accordingly, total procurement was further re-duced—Step 4—and this procurement program, a sthereby finalized, was incorporated in the President ' sbudget . Subsequently, [in November, the Marin eCorps requirement] for an operating strength o fsixty (60) was received . However, it was impossibl eto incorporate this revision in the Budget at that lat edate. 5 1

Also in the reply, signed by Vice AdmiralThomas S . Combs, Deputy Chief of Naval Opera-tions, was the statement of views relative to futur eprocurements of the HR2S–1 . He indicated thatpresent planning contemplated the purchase of 1 2additional helicopters, thereby increasing the over -all HR2S–1 total to 46 . The last 12 were necessaryin order to provide for sufficient FY 1958 "follow -on re-order lead time ." It was felt that if and whenthe HR2S–1 demonstrated, by actual test, it coul dsatisfactorily meet BuAer specifications, the pro -

curement program would be accelerated and wouldbe designed to meet the Marine Corps operatin grequirements . However, Admiral Combs stressed ,"until this circumstance occurs it is considere donly prudent to restrict procurement to that levelwhich will provide an adequate test quantity an da minimum production line which can be accel-erated . " It was pointed out that irrespective o fprocurement planning, Marine Corps requirementswould never be met until the HR2S–1 actuallyproved its capability to perform its designed mis-sion. In conclusion Admiral Combs said, "It i stherefore considered that present HR2S–1 procure-ment is sound as present conditions permit . TheCNO is fully aware of the Marine Corps ' need fo rthe HR2S type helicopter and will take action tomeet this need as soon as possible . " 5 2

Admiral Combs' letter firmly placed the numberof HR2Ss at approximately one-fourth of th edesired 180. Disappointing as it was, the Marin eCorps' overall helicopter program was far frombankrupt . This turn of events did, however, estab-lish a trend in which the Marine Corps began t oadopt the light, but more trouble-free, helicopte ras its main assault transport . The prospects o fobtaining the smaller HUS–1 appeared to bebrighter at this time due to the developmenta lproblems in the HR2S program and the fact th eHUS was a much less expensive aircraft . Resist-ance to the reduction in quantity of the HR2S wa sonly a natural reaction since Marine Corps plan-ning for the execution of its new concept wa sbased on using the larger helicopters as the mai nassault transport . Although the numbing agent t othis stinging blow had been provided earlier in th eyear in the form of CNO approval for procuremen tof nearly 140 HUSs, it did, nevertheless, subse-quently require the reorientation of the entir ehelicopter program .

CHAPTER 6

A PERIOD OF REEVALUATION—A MODERATE CAPABILIT Y

Following the CNO 's action in 1956 limiting theprocurement of the HR2S helicopters, the Marin eCorps made three studies which significantly in-fluenced the course of the entire helicopter pro -gram. The first study was prepared by the G–3Division, HQMC . Completed in May 1956, it deal twith the employment of helicopters within theFleet Marine Force during the years of 1956 t o1960. The G–3 report was followed by the publica-tion of the Marine Corps Aviation Program forthe Fiscal Years 1957 to 1962 . The third report ,that of the Hogaboom Board, was completed i n1957 and addressed the organization of the FMF .Although it affected the ground FMF to a large rdegree than FMF aviation, it was the most detailedreport of the three pertaining to the overall Marin eaviation structure .

HQMC G—3 Study Number 3—195 6

G–3 Study Number 3, a Memorandum for th eCommandant, was completed in late April 1956and approved by the Assistant Commandant fo rAir, Lieutenant General Vernon M . Megee, on 8May. The report, "Employment of HelicoptersWithin the FMF During the Period of 1956 t o1960," concentrated on the distribution of al lMarine Corps tactical helicopter squadrons . Theprimary point addressed was the question o fwhether the majority of helicopters would b eassigned to lift one division to attain a maximum

divisional lift capability, or whether they would b eapportioned among each of the three divisions .

As a guideline to estimating the future avail -ability of helicopters by type and proposed squad-ron organization for the period under study, th eG–3 study group used a series of charts prepare dby the Division of Aviation . The DivAvn heli-copter estimates included the years 1956 through1960 and reflected a gradual growth from 9 to 1 5helicopter squadrons . The G–3 Study projectedthe anticipated growth rate of the helicopter forceover the five-year period as presented in Figure4. It was a complete reversal from the SmithBoard and prior boards' reports as the total num-ber of HR2Ss was reduced from 180 to only 45 —three squadrons of 15 aircraft each . The existin gnine HRS squadrons would continue to operat ewith the HRS and later change to the HUS whenit became operational . Three additional HUS unit swere to be formed later. This study reflectedfor the first time the fact that the Navy budget hadallowed for only 45 HR2Ss to be constructed bythe end of 1960 and that the additional HUS swould most likely have to compensate for the losttroop lift capability of the HR2S . '

In view of the five-year projection, the grou pmade recommendations ranging from the deploy-ment of helicopter squadrons to the desired siz eof assault force which should be lifted simultane-ously . In relation to the assault force, the studygroup stated that the BLT organizational structur epossessed the minimal requirements for communi -

Figure 4

Existing

1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961

Squadrons By Type 9HRS 7 HRS 5 HRS 5 HRS 4 HRS 3 HR SHelicopter 2 HUS 4 HUS 6 HUS 8 HUS 9 HU S

Total Squadrons 91 HR2 S

102 HR2S

112 HR2 S

133 HR2 S

153 HR2 S

1 5Total Light Helicopter 180 180 180 220 240 24 0Total Medium Helicopter 0 15 30 30 45 45Grand Total Helicopter 180 185 210 250 285 285

70

A .PERIOD OF REEVALUATION

7 1

cations, control, and support needed to execute acombat helicopter assault and sustain operation sfor a limited time . A regiment, it felt, or a com-parable organization, would probably be bette rorganized, staffed, and equipped for the mission ,but a corresponding large increase in helicopters ,would be required . Although the final number ofaircraft by number and type would evolve as th econcept developed, the planners stressed that in-terim specific figures had to be determined . Thes ewould facilitate development of the concept andprovide the aviation establishment with guidanc ein relation to helicopter deployment and HMRsquadron distribution . In this connection, th egroup's recommendation was that initially eachMarine division should provide for a minimu msimultaneous (one-wave) lift of assault elementsof one BLT consisting of approximately 50 0troops, i .e ., two rifle companies and a comman dgroup . A combat radius of 25 miles was establishe das the minimum capability required to implemen tthe vertical lift concept. This represented a dras-tically reduced initial assault force from the fou rBLT one-wave assault recommended three yearsearlier in ARG's Project IV. It should be pointe dout that while the ARG was trying to helicopter -land the assault elements of a division-wing team ,the G–3 study was interested in landing the mini -mum effective number of troops towards the even-tual goal of lifting one and one-half divisions .` "

The study group ' s planning for FMF helicopteremployment was reflected in two recommendations ,both of which tended to support the existin gprogram. The group endorsed the contention o fthe Smith Board that the Marine Corps neede ddifferent types, or families of helicopters . Secondly ,the group believed that helicopter procuremen tprograms for 1956 through 1960 would provide asignificant increase in helicopter availability fo rthe FMF to the extent that a substantial helicopte rassault capability could be achieved . The currentdistribution policy of providing one HR MAG t osupport one division was concurred in with th eproviso that the initial division helicopter assaultcapability should be achieved through selectiv edeployment of newly procured helicopters rathe rthan redistribution of the presently deployed heli-copters. The concept behind the study group ' s

* General Shepherd had indicated in 1955 whe ncommenting on the recommendations of the Smith Boardthat in relation to the minimum helicopter lift that "[I Iapprove all recommendations except the phrase ` in orde rthat Marine Corps Aviation, as a whole, have the capacit yof lifting one division . ' I consider that the Marine Corpsmust achieve a helicopter capability sufficient to lift 1 142divisions at the earliest possible time . "3

recommendation was that as the Marine Corp sreceived its new helicopters during the 1956–1960period, they would be used to expand graduall yone MAG at a time until each reached the capa-bility to provide the single-wave BLT lift . Priorit yfor helicopter assignment was given to the heli-copter MAG supporting the 1st Division . After -wards, the MAGs supporting the 2d and 3d Divi-sions would be built up to meet the minimu massault capability . '

General Randolph McC . Pate, Commandantsince January 1956, took action on the G–3 Stud yin the form of letters to CG FMFPac and C GFMFLant on 4 September 1956. In addition t oreiterating the essential elements of the study, th eCommandant told his two FMF commanders tha tthe new concept ultimately required sufficient heli-copters to support, in combat and training opera-tions, all Marine divisions and aircraft wingsavailable for such operations . "This capability, "he said, "will not be achieved until after 1960, bu tthe attainment of lesser lift capabilities is a nessential intermediate objective ." The reason fo rlimiting the combat radius for helicopter assaultsto 25 or 35 miles, General Pate explained, was t oenable Marine Corps planners to compute th efuture required number of helicopters. His final

General Randolph McC . Pate, 21st Commandant (Ma-rine Corps Photo A402599) .

72


statement directed that both FMFs provide fo rearly attainment of a proficient, though limited ,helicopter assault capability for lifting one BL Tin each division . '

Marine Corps AviationFive-Year Program 1957—196 2

In early 1956, before the results of the G—3study were out, General Pate had forwarded to th eCNO, Admiral Burke, a basic Marine Corps avia-tion objective plan for pre-mobilization for eac hFiscal Year 1956 through 1961 . It represented th eMarine Corps ' requirements for the support o fthree divisions in combat short of general war .The plan was based upon information available a tthe time and reflected the requirements for attain-ment of the objectives to support the Comman-dant's new concept .

Admiral Burke replied to General Pate in May1956 stating he favored the plan, however, base dupon the projected budgetary and personnel limi-tations which had been imposed upon the Navy ,approval of General Pate's Five-Year Plan couldnot be given without having adverse effect on otheressential functions of the Navy . The CNO encloseda proposed force operating level for Marine avia-tion for General Pate ' s consideration. The Com-mandant then directed that a comprehensive revie wbe made of the original plan in order to develop aprogram that would provide for a reasonabl echance of approval by the CNO . The fundamentalguidance was the projected budgetary and per-sonnel limitations which were expected to be im-posed upon the Navy and Marine Corps for th eforeseeable future. The main consideration indeveloping a revised program was that the cur-rently authorized Marine Corps operating level o f1,424 aircraft would remain through the period.An increase in the number of aircraft could notbe accommodated and any changes reflecting ne whelicopter requirements would have to be accom -

panied by a compensatory reduction in fixed-win gaircraft . This was necessary in order to maintai nprocurement and operating costs at approximatel ya constant level through the next five years . '

As the revised plan was being developed, it wa sobvious that the ultimate objective of the new con-cept could not be achieved, although a limited ver-tical assault capability appeared attainable by th eend of Fiscal Year 1962 . The expansion of th ehelicopter program during the five-year perio dprovided for an operating inventory of 180 HUS,or light helicopters . The activation of new unit swould take place as the aircraft became available .It was anticipated that the Marine helicopte raviation force, as depicted in Figure 5, would havenine squadrons of 20 HRS/HUSs each and sixsquadrons of 15 HR2Ss each by the end of th eperiod . The build-up to the maximum number o fHR2S helicopters was to be dependent upo nimproved performance of the helicopter and there -fore considered to be highly subject to change . '

The total number of helicopter squadrons in th ehelicopter program remained at 15 in both th eG—3 Study and DivAvn's Five-Year Plan . Thesignificant difference was that the five-year planproposed the formation of six HR2S squadron sinstead of three, and retained the nine HRS/HU Ssquadrons at their existing level . The more opti-mistic Five-Year Plan gave the CNO an estimat eof what the Marine Corps desired, whereas th eG—3 Study was a memorandum for General Pat eand reflected a realistic projection of the pro -gram's growth in consonance with the approvedbudget .

Another logical planning change occurred afte rthe CNO reduced the procurement of the HR2S .This development reflected the reversal of designa-tions of the light (L) and medium (M) aircraf tgroups . In view of the small "buy" of mediu mhelicopters, new plans were made to assign theHR2Ss to the two-squadron utility (L) groups andto redesignate them as MAG (HR(M)) and t oretain the three HRS/HUS groups as light . Thi s

Figure 5

FY '57 '58 '59 '60 '61 '62Tota l

Aircraft

No. of HMR(L)s 9 9 10 9 9 9A/C per Sqdn 20 20 20 20 20 20 180No. ofHMR(M)s .. 1 2 3 6 6 6A/C per Sqdn 15 15 15 15 15 15 90No . of VMOs 3 3 3 3 3 3A/C per Sqdn 24 21 18 18 18 18 54

A PERIOD OF REEVALUATION

7 3

was a completely opposite plan from the one pro -posed by the Smith Board . Essentially then, ac -cording to the revised Five-Year Plan, each Marin eaircraft wing would still retain two helicopte rgroups within its structure with the MAG(HR(M)) having two HR2S squadrons of 1 5planes each and three 20-plane light squadrons i nthe MAG (HR (L) ) . Another decision also ren-dered during this period placed the VMO squad-rons in the light helicopter group structure . Theircomplement of aircraft was to be eventuallyreduced from 12 fixed-wing and 12 helicopters toonly nine of each type .

The Hogaboom Board of 195 6In order for the Marine Corps to achieve it s

new concept as rapidly as possible, while still pre -serving its past and present capabilities, it had t oundertake a vast reorganization of its forces. I thad kept the organization of the FMF underconstant review with the latest change made in195 5.by the Smith Board which undertook a nexamination of the entire aviation structure . Late ron 4 June 1956, the Commandant appointed MajorGeneral Robert E. Hogaboom as president of a16-man board" to conduct a thorough and com-prehensive study of the entire FMF, includingaviation, with the purpose of making recommenda-tions for the optimum organization, composition ,and equipment of the FMF . The results of thi sorganization and composition study were to set thepattern for all major organizational changes withi nthe FMF during the remaining part of the decade .

General Hogaboom's permanent assignment wasDeputy Chief of Staff (Plans), HQMC, a post h ehad held since his return from Korea in 1955 . In1949 he had attended the National War College ,and from 1951 to 1952 he had been the Marin e

* A total of 16 officers was appointed to the 195 6FMF Organiation and Composition Board . Those namedin addition to the president, Major General Robert E .Hogaboom, were :

BGen Ronald D . Salmon (Relieved on 16Ju156 )BGen Edward C. Dyer (Joined on 16Ju156 )Col Bruce T. HemphillCol Frederick P . Henderso nCol Odell M . ConoleyCol Herbert H . WilliamsonCol Cliff Atkinson, Jr .Col Henry H . Crocket tCol David W . Stonecliff eCol Lewis W. Wal tCol William R . CampbellCol Norman J . AndersonCol Keith B . McCutcheonCol Allan Sutte rCol William K. Jone sMaj Frank R . Young (Recorder)

Corps liaison officer in the office of the CNO . InJuly 1952 General Hogaboom became the assistan tcommander of the 2d Marine Division, and later ,during 1954 and 1955, he served in Korea asassistant commander and later as commandin ggeneral of the 1st Marine Division .

General Pate provided General Hogaboom'sboard with a six-paragraph letter of concepts an dcriteria . In relation to the helicopter, he explainedthat the helicopter would become the principalmeans of achieving tactical surprise and flexi-bility . He mentioned that surface landing craft andland vehicles would continue to be the principalmeans of mobility at the objective until sufficien thelicopters of improved capabilities were availabl eto permit the landing, tactical maneuver, an dlogistical support of all assault elements of aMarine division . It was considered that as th ehelicopter capability increased, the need for sur-face landing craft and land vehicles would de -creases

The primary purpose of the Hogaboom Boardwas to determine what the FMF needed to meet th einitial requirements for achieving the new con-cept for amphibious warfare, beginning with Fisca lYear 1958. Additionally, the study was to deter -mine the phase objectives of the FMF in organi-zation and composition for the foreseeable future .'

In preparing its study, the board interviewe dand gave careful consideration to a large body ofMarine officers . The staffs of the Education Center,Development Center, Marine Corps Test Uni tNumber 1, and HQMC were the source of man yhighly competent and experienced officers wh oappeared before the board . Also the board con -ducted a thorough and comprehensive examinatio ninto the tactical concepts of the FMF and took duecognizance of such documents as LFB—2 (Interi mDoctrine for the Conduct of Tactical Atomic War -fare) and LFM—24 (Helicopter Operations) .

In arriving at its conclusions, General Hoga-boom's board had relatively little difficulty i ndealing with its recommendations for equipmen tand armament for Fiscal Year 1958 . In many case sthe members felt there was little choice in thi smatter as they had to take that which was currentlydeveloped and available . The basic and most diffi-cult problem then was to find the soundest possibl ebalance of units and equipment for the FMF or-ganization . With respect to the phased objectives ,the board projected itself as far into the future a sresearch and development reasonably wouldallow.'

The board then proceeded in a detailed examina-tion of the "current organizations, the organiza-

74


tional thinking, and in the thinking of the Marin eCorps in general . " This was considered necessar yin order to isolate those parts of the organizationa lstructure which were incompatible with the essen-tial requirements of the helicopter assault concept .It very soon became apparent to the board thatsome of the prevailing thoughts as to how thes erequirements were to be met were far from conclu-sive, and, in some cases, erroneous . 11 The boardstated :

An area which the board believes particularly re -quires clarification is the subject of just how thelanding force as a whole is to be projected onto thehostile shore . There appears to be a considerabl ebody of opinion in the Marine Corps today whichholds that in the foreseeable future all movementfrom ship-to-shore will be by helicopter . Thus the"all helicopter assault" concept has somehow becomethe "all helicopter concept ." This idea the board be-lieves to be invalid and should be corrected immedi-ately . It leads among other things to requirementsbeing stated specifying helicopter transportabilit yfor all the arms and equipment of the Fleet Marin eForce . This requirement is in fact written into thecurrent issue of the Equipment Development Polic yand Guide as an ultimate goal .

The board believes that this line of thinking ha sperhaps obscured the continuing importance of cross-ing the beach operations in our modern concept. Webelieve that for the foreseeable future a substantia lportion of the men and materiel required in effectin ga lodgement on a hostile shore must still cross thebeach in a " conventional" fashion . This is not in ou ropinion inconsistent with the "all helicopter assault"concept, or with the requirement for the projectio nof seapower ashore without the necessity of direc tassault on the shoreline. Reduced to its simplest term sthe board visualizes an operation wherein the flexi-bility of the helicopter-borne assault forces would beexploited to uncover and secure the beaches and t oseize critical areas which will he required to enabl eus to phase in the additional means to maintain th emomentum of the assault and secure the objectiv earea .

The board considers that helicopters will be em-ployed initially to displace the assault elements o fthe landing force from ships at sea to attack position sashore from which they can seize the critical terrai nfeatures.

In subsequent operations ashore helicopters willbe employed to maneuver disengaged units int oattack positions from which they can launch a nattack against critical objectives at a decisive time . 1 2

In the end, the reorganizational changes recom-mended by the board resulted in a reduction ofabout 2,000 personnel in each division . A few ofthe more significant changes in the organizatio nof the Marine division, although not accountin gfor the major reductions, may be summarizedas :

1 . Addition of a fourth rifle company in the in-fantry battalion .

2. The division tank battalion transferred to Forc eTroops .

3. Expansion of the division reconnaisance com-pany into a reconnaissance battalion .

4. Addition of an antitank battalion equipped wit h45 ONTOS .

Changes were also made in the Force Troop struc-ture which affected the areas of command andcommunication, artillery, antiaircraft, tanks, am-phibian units, and reconnaissance . 1 3

In reviewing the overall structure of FMF avia-tion, an assumption was made that short of ageneral war, not more than two Marine division sand two Marine aircraft wings would be deployed .Based upon this assumption, the board determinedthat the best functional balance attainable withinthe authorized 27 attack and interceptor squadron swas to set the ratio at 9 fighter, 6 all-weathe rfighter, and 12 attack squadrons . It was also deter -mined that the wing, being primarily a task organi-zation rather than a T/O organization such as th edivision, could not be categorically structure dexcept in functional groups . The aircraft wing ha dto be organized, the board felt, to perform th eessential air support tasks in the overall mission sassigned . As shown in Figure 6 the board pre-sented a typical Marine aircraft wing, recognizingthat a structure identical in all respects to the on epresented would be the exception rather than therule!

Although there were no substantial changesmade in the organization or composition of th enine fixed-wing aircraft groups, it was suggestedthat the light helicopter group structure be modi-fied to fulfill the transportation requirementsvisualized by the concept for employment of th edivision's reconnaissance battalion . In addition ,it was considered necessary that helicopter crew sbe intimately familiar with the tactics and tech-niques of the reconnaissance battalion and b eavailable to the battalion for training and comba toperations . More specifically, operational concept sfor the reconnaissance battalion envisioned con-tinued requirements for helicopters to perfor mmissions of observation, utility, and transportation .To accomplish this, one squadron in each MA G(HR (L) ) was to be designated as a "Helicopte rReconnaissance Squadron," HMR(C), (C-Com-posite) and assigned an aircraft complement o f12 HRSs and the 12 HOKs . The HOKs were to b etransferred from the VMO squadron . The othertwo HMRs within the group would retain thei rdesignation but would have the number of air -craft increased from 20 to 24. This reorganization ,as shown in Figure 7 was made to insure vigor-


77

ous development of the reconnaissance aspect forthis type of air support. As for the VMO squad-rons, they had been assigned earlier in the yea rto the MAG (HR(L)) as a supported unit, onesquadron to each group. The board established th eVMO complement at 12 fixed-wing aircraft . Thestructure of the two-squadron medium MAGs i nFigure 8 were not changed by the organization an dcomposition board . 1 5

The board declared that reorganization of theground and aviation units was a practical firs tphase objective in light of existing equipment an dtactical concepts under which the Marine Corp shad to operate . It was further decided that certai nareas needed immediate emphasis in order to in -crease the Marine Corps ' capability to operateunder the modern concept . Among those seen aspertaining to the helicopter were the need foradditional helicopters of improved performance ,more adequate and efficient amphibious shippingwith emphasis on the LPH type, and assaultweapons and equipment which would be heli-copter transportable—particularly the antitankand close support weapons. The board emphasizedthe need for a gradual reduction and simplifica-tion in the number of different types of all weap-ons and equipment, in addition to maintainingcontinued emphasis on decreasing the weight andbulk of FMF equipment . This requirement paral-leled the central theme of the study which was t omake the entire assault force helicopter-transport-able and the division all air-transportable .

From a consideration of the several factor swhich would influence the speed and extent ofattaining a full capability to operate under the

modern concept, the board recommended, in rela-tion to the helicopter program, that the followingobjectives be established :

1 . Phase I ; 1957–1958a . The phasing in of sufficient helicopters of im-

proved performance to attain a capability to land an dsupport one BLT in each Marine division .2 . Phase II ; 1958–1961

a. The phasing in of sufficient additional helicop-ters of improved performance to attain a capability toland and support one RLT in each Marine division .

b. The attainment of three additional LPH ship sin the amphibious forces of the fleet .3 . Phase III, 1961–1965

a. The improvement of the helicopter lift capa-bility developed during Phase II .

b. The attainment of seven additional LPH ship sin the amphibious force of the fleet . 1 6

As shown in Figure 9, the board recommended agraduated expansion of both the light and mediu mMAGs to a structure of 15 helicopter squadrons .The board failed to mention, however, the flyingdistance involved in the execution of the lift an dwhether or not the lifting of the assault elementsof the BLT during the Phase I period, and theRLT in Phase II, was to be performed in on esimultaneous lift . The plan closely resembled theDivision of Aviation 's schedule in the AviationFive-Year Plan published earlier in July . Addi-tionally, the phased build-up suggested a gradua lincrease in the number of LPH type ships to amaximum of 12 ; six on each coast. 1 7

General Hogaboom's board completed its repor tand made a presentation to the Commandant an dhis staff late in December with the written repor tdistributed on 7 January 1957. General Pate 's

Figure 9

FY5 8No . No.

FY59 FY6 0No . No .

FY61No . No .

FY6 2No . No .No. No .

Units A/C Units A/C Units A/C Units A/C Units A/C

MAG (HR–L) 3 — 3 3 — 3 — 3 —H&MS .._ 3 6 3 6 3 9 3 11 3 11MABSHMR (L)

3 — 3 3 — 3 — 3 —

(24 a/c )HMR (c)

6 144 7 164 , ; 6 144 6 144 6 144

(24 a/c) 3 72 3 72 3 72 3 72 3 72VMO 3 36 3 36 3 36 3 36 3 36

MAG (HR–M) 1 1 2 3 3H&MS __________ 1 3 1 3 2 4 3 6 3 6MAB SHMR

_________ _(M)

1 1 2 3 3

(15 a/c) 2 30 3 45 6 90 6 90 6 90

* One squadron (20 a/c) HAIR (L) .

78


immediate action subjected the newly propose dstructure to field testing which was completed by30 June . The recommendations from the variousFMF testing units were consolidated with com-ments from the HQMC staff sections into one pack -age which the Commandant subsequently reviewe dand approved for implementation . The provisiona l"M" series of tables of organization (T/0) andTables of Equipment (T/E) were also preparedand sent to all FMF organizations and by Sep-tember 1958 all elements of the FMF had bee nreorganized . General Pate, reflecting back on thereorganization at the General Officers ' Conferenc ein 1959, said :

The idea of the helicopter-borne assault first ap-peared in 1946 . It was subjected to a quite thoroughtheoretical examination in the late 40s and early 50s .By 1956 we knew the concept was valid . Our respon-sibility, then, was to put it to work—to develop th eability for applying the theory to practical situation s. . . [Reorganization of the FMF I was a long ste pforward, and an important one . Taking it broke a lo gjam of resistance based on the traditions of earlie rdays . I am not unmindful of the trauma the chang evisited upon some of our people—but it was some -thing that had to be done . 1 8

Forced Reduction

While the FMF was being reorganized, the en -tire Marine Corps had to undergo a severe reduc-tion in personnel and aircraft due to drastic mili-tary-wide budget cuts . On 12 August 1957, theSecretary of the Navy directed that certain forc elevel reductions be made in both the Navy an dMarine Corps during the forthcoming Fiscal Year s1958 and 1959 . As an indication of the magnitud eof this reduction, the total officer and enliste dstrength had to drop from over 200,000 on 30 Jun e1957 to approximately 175,000 by midyear 195 9and was to continue near the lower level until1962 .

Working with the new guidance provided by th eSecretary of the Navy, the Division of Aviatio nrevised its Five-Year Plan. The revision was pub-lished on 23 September 1957 as the Marine CorpsAviation Program Changes for Fiscal Years 1958to 1962 . One of the guidelines used in achievingthe necessary changes was that no alterationswould be made which might decrease the progresstoward the goal of vertical envelopment. This wasa difficult task as the total number of Marine air -craft had to be reduced from 1,425 to approxi-mately 1,200 by 1 July 1959, approximately a15 percent loss, and still further to about 1,000 by

mid-1962, for a total 30 percent loss .* ThreeMarine aircraft wings were kept in force ; however ,the aircraft complement of some units was, b ynecessity, lowered. In addition, some units werecompletely eliminated and those which remainedwere manned at approximately 80 percent of thei rT/O strength . The basic structure of Marine avia-tion at full T/O strength as defined by the Hoga-boom Board and approved by the Commandan twas based on an operating program of 1,42 4aircraft . "

Despite the austerity move, the existing heli-copter structure fared considerably well, althoughsome of the expansion called for in the Five-Yea rPlan had been cancelled . The medium helicoptersquadrons were placed within the MAG " light"structure, one medium unit to each MAG. Thisarrangement eliminated the need for the establish-ment of the three two-squadron medium groups .In all, the greatest loss suffered by the helicopte rprogram occurred in the medium helicopter group sas only sufficient funds remained available fo rcommissioning three of the programmed six me-dium squadrons . 2 0

In addition to the budget cuts, mechanica ltroubles still plagued the HR2S, thereby justifyin gthe reduction in numbers from 90 to 60—thre esquadrons of 20 each . Another factor influencin gthe reduction of HR2Ss was that a new type air -craft, a VTOL (non-helicopter), appeared to be adesirable future replacement . To compensate fo rthe loss of the fourth, fifth, and sixth mediumsquadrons, the number of HUSs were adjuste dupward from the previous total of 180 to 210, withthe latter figure to be reached by 1959 and main-tained through 1962 .** 2 1

The reduction of the budget not only affecte dpersonnel and aircraft programs but also hampere dthe Navy ' s shipbuilding schedule . Of major con-cern to the Marine Corps was the serious shortag eof amphibious shipping, and, in particular, th elack of helicopter aircraft carriers . This had bee n

* As a comparison the Navy suffered a 25 percen tloss of its operating aircraft through the forced reductio nmove.

** There were many suggestions on how to distribut ethe last 30 aircraft of the 210 light helicopters . DivAvn 'srevised program, 1959-1962, indicated a structure of si xlight squadrons of 24 each and three composite squadron sof 12 each ; making a total of 180. Obviously, the increas eof 30 light helicopters was to compensate equally for th edifference in the reduced number of medium helicopter s(90 to 60) . Although two additional light squadrons wer esubsequently formed during the period, one in 1959 an dthe other in 1962, which absorbed the extra 30 helicopters,they were apparently omitted altogether from this five-yea rplan .


79

a continuing area of concern since the end of theKorean War and with the recent congressiona lbudget reduction, the existing shortage of moneyfor shipbuilding purposes was compounded .

Tightening of the fiscal purse strings did no tmean that the Marine Corps was without a heli-copter aircraft carrier . The first results of th eCommandant's request for LPHs in early 1953were realized on 20 July 1956 when the USSThetis Bay (CVE—90) was commissioned afte rundergoing a conversion in the San FranciscoNaval Shipyard . Redesignated as the CVHA— 1(Assault Helicopter Aircraft Carrier), the ThetisBay was designed to afford the Marine Corps th eopportunity to evaluate the vertical assault con-cept . Although it was not intended that the con-verted ship be the prototype for future LP H(CVE) conversions, it did provide the MarineCorps with the opportunity to evaluate some fea-tures desirable in new construction . 22 Later re-classified in 1959 to LPH-6, the CVHA—1 had a noverall length of 512 feet, a beam of 108 feet, adisplacement of 11,000 tons full load, and a maxi -mum speed of 19 1/2 knots . Approximately 1,000combat troops and 20 HRS helicopters could b eaccommodated .2 3

The Fiscal Year 1955 budget called for tw osuch conversions, but due to monetary shortag ethe second CVHA, the USS Block Island (CVE-106), was not started until January 1958 . Theconversion of the Block Island was never com-pleted though, mainly as the result of an austerit ymove . By late 1958, the Marine Corps had gaine dvaluable operational experience with the ThetisBay and the Commandant had determined thatthe best solution for meeting assault helicopter air -craft carrier requirements was through new con-struction or by modifying other type World War I Icarriers . The Block Island was classified as theLPH—1 on 22 December 1957 although it wa snever used as an amphibious assault ship .

Growth and Changes UnderAustere Conditions, 1956—196 2

The structure of the helicopter groups remaine dconstant from 1952 until the latter half of 1956when changes began to appear . Some of thes echanges were the transfer of VMO—1 and -6 t oMAG (HR(L) ) -16 and -36, respectively . Previ -

ously they had been attached to a Marine Win gHeadquarters Group (MWHG) .* Another changeimplemented during 1956 was the addition o fthe designator " light" to the transport groupsand squadrons titles as envisioned in the progra mplans . Most of the redesignations were effective o n31 December 1956, since a distinction was nownecessary as the Commandant desired to commis-sion the first HR2S squadron in January 1957 un-der the "medium" designation .** 2 1

Following the title changes in December 1956 ,the Marine Corps began forming its first mediu mhelicopter squadrons . In January 1957, HMR(M) -461, under the command of Lieutenant Colone lGriffith B. Doyle, was commissioned at MCAF ,New River . The new squadron received theMarine Corps ' most sought after helicopter,the HR2S—1, during March .***''6 On the wes tcoast, in November of the same year, HMR(M)—462 was formed within MAG (HR(L) )—3 6with Lieutenant Colonel Alton W. McCully as th ecommanding officer . The following year the thir dmedium squadron, HMR(M)—463, was commis-sioned in September in MAG (HR(L) ) -16 unde rMajor Kenneth L . Moos. The squadron was shor tlived, however, due to the scarcity of HR2Ss, an dnine months later it was deactivated .2 7

The replacement helicopter for the HRS wa sreceived shortly before the HR2S . In February1957, both HMR(L)—261 and -363 began ex -changing their HRSs for the larger and fasterHUS—1 . Since the HUS—] was essentially the sam eaircraft as the Navy 's HSS—1 except for the cabin 'sinterior arrangement, flight evaluation at Patuxen tRiver was waived, thereby expediting its avail -ability to the operating units . During 1957, theextent of modernization of the helicopter progra mcan be seen by comparing its composition on 1January 1957, in Figure 10, with that of 30December 1957 . 2 8

* VMO—2 had previously been attached to MA G(HR(L)-16.

o° In spite of the forced reduction in 1957, the ex-isting three HMR MAGs retained their "light " designa-tion even though there were no medium groups commis-sioned . In 1959, however, the MAG (HR) designationwas changed again to Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) ,dropping the "Helicopter Transport" (HR) portion of it stitle .

Although the first HR2S had been accepted i nApril 1956, it had been used for test purposes at th eNaval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland . Als oHMX—1 had been operating the HR2S on a similar re -search and development basis during the same year . Th eMarch 1957 date represented its initial assignment to atactical squadron .

80


Figure 10

TypeAircraft FMFPac

1957 Helicopter Totals and LocationsTotalFMFLant HMX—1

Jan—Dec Jan—Dec Jan—Dec Jan—Dec

HR2S 0 0 0 12 2 2 2 1 4

HUS -------------------- 0 22 0 21 0 6 0 49

HRS -------------------- 83 79 47 44 10 8 140 13 1

HOK -------------------- 22 20 3 18 3 3 28 41

Implementation of theHogaboom Board Recommendation s

In June 1958, as the result of the Hogaboo mBoard recommendations and the subsequent im-plementation of the "M" Series T/0, the helicopte rgroup structure underwent the recommended modi-fication . The major alterations involved the re -assignment of aircraft within the group . It re-duced VMO to 12 light fixed-wing observationmodels and created a composite squadron of 12HOKs and 12 HRSs . The trading of aircraft didnot involve the creation of a new unit within th egroup, only the redesignation of one HMR (L) toMarine Helicopter Reconnaissance Squadro n(HMR (C) ) . The remaining two light units ha dtheir helicopter strength increased from 20 to 24aircraft each . The change of aircraft between unitswas made in MAG (HR(L) )—26 and -36 involv-ing HMR—263 and -363, leaving the Oppama,Japan-based MAG (HR(L) )—16 under an all ligh tHMR arrangement ." 29

The composite structure was tested in MAG—2 6for slightly less than 10 months . The New Riverhelicopter group was then under the command o fColonel Keith B . McCutcheon, an officer who ha dbeen active in the helicopter program for man yyears and who had served as recorder to the Smit hBoard .

Colonel McCutcheon had received a Master o fScience degree in aeronautical engineering fromthe Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 194 4as a lieutenant colonel, and later participated i nair operations with MAG—24 at Bougainville ,Luzon, and Mindanao . In World War II he earnedthe Distinguished Flying Cross and six Air Medal sin the Solomons, New Guinea, and Philippin eIslands combat areas . After the war, ColonelMcCutcheon instructed in the Aviation Section ,Marine Corps Schools, and from 1946 to 194 9served in the Pilotless Aircraft Division of BuAer.

* Since there were only two HMR(L)s in MAG–16 ,no redesignation to HMR(C) was made . The third squad-ron (HMR(C)–161) was Hawaii-based under MAG–13 .

In 1950 he was ordered to Quantico where h eassumed command of HMX—1 . From December1951 to October 1952 he commanded HMR—16 1in Korea. Leaving the Korean area, and after atwo year tour in Europe, he again returned toQuantico in 1954 to assume the duties as Chief,Air Section, Marine Corps Equipment Board . Thenin June 1957, Colonel McCutcheon moved toJacksonville, North Carolina where he assume dcommand of MAG-26 .

The group commander gave his appraisal to th eCommandant concerning the problem of operatin gunder the new "M" Series T/O . "The greatestsingle deficiency," Colonel McCutcheon stated ,"occurs at the group level. This is the loss o f

Major General Keith B . McCutcheon, one of the leader sof the Marine helicopter program (Marine Corps PhotoA413009) .


8 1

flexibility in carrying out assigned missions du eto the reduction of light transport squadrons fro mthree to two . " He made four recommendations toGeneral Pate :

1. Disband the HMR(C) squadron .2. Reform three HMR(L) squadrons with 20 air -

craft each .3. Reform VMO with 12 HOKs and 12 OEs .4. Assign HUS helicopters to all light transpor t

squadrons as expeditiously as possible . 3 o

On 31 July 1959, General Pate replied toMcCutcheon 's recommendations . Although no defi-nite decision was rendered, the Commandant as-sured the group commander that the contents o fhis letter were under study along with other avia-tion program changes . The final results were soonforthcoming as both HMR(C)—263 and -363 wer edirected to revert to their prior HMR(L) designa-tions during February 1960 and the VMOs re -constituted to their original 12 fixed-wing and 1 2helicopter complement . The reconnaissance missio nof the division was to be absorbed by VMOs or th eHMR (L) s . 3 1

By this time, however, the Division of Aviatio nhad made plans for increasing the helicopter lift

capability as proposed in Phase II and III of Gen-eral Hogaboom's Organization and CompositionBoard Report . This action resulted in the commis-sioning of HMR(L) -264 in MAG—26 on 30 Jun e1959 under the command of Lieutenant Colone lEdwin O. Reed, a future commanding officer o fHMX—1 . 32 In further expanding the program, th eDivision of Aviation published its Progra mChanges for Fiscal Years 1961—1964, which al -lowed for the graduated increase in the lightstructure from 10 to 15 squadrons . The numberof helicopters assigned to each of the 15 units wasto vary from 18 to a maximum of 24 dependin gupon the total number of aircraft available in th eMarine Corps inventory, and the mission of th esquadron . Only two medium units were pro-grammed to be in existence throughout the entir eperiod due to further reductions in HR2S procure-ment . 33 The last squadron to be commissionedprior to 1962 was HMR—364 in MAG—36 on 1September 1961 . The relationship between th enumbers of helicopters in the Marine Corps an dthe number projected by the Division of Aviationfor the years 1960 to 1962 is presented in Fig-ure 11 .

Figure 1 1

Recapitulation of Helicopter Program 1960—1962

FY 1960 FY 1961 FY 196 2

Sqd. Acft Sqd. /left Sqd. AcftPlanned On Hand Planned On Hand Planned On Han d

VMO 72 63 3 66 89 3 63 7 3HMR(L) 208 245 10 228 255 11 246 30 8HMR(M) 35 27 2 26 28 2 28 31

The number of aircraft in the on hand column includes all helicopters assigned to FMF, HMX, and shore activities . 3 4

CHAPTER 7

BEGINNING THE TRANSITIONTO TURBINE•POWERED HELICOPTER S

Selection of the CH—46

Military planners are faced continually with th eproblem of obsolescence of combat equipment .This is particularly true of aircraft . In the late1950s when the Marine Corps was faced with th eproblem of maintaining three combat ready divi-sions and aircraft wings under a severely restricte dbudget, it had to prepare for the replacement o fthe aircraft being introduced into service . GeneralMcCutcheon touched on this subject and althoughhis remarks were made almost a decade later, the ywere just as appropriate for this period as theywere then . He said, "Aviation is a dynamic pro-fession . The rate of obsolescence of equipment ishigh and new aircraft have to be placed in th einventory periodically in order to stay abreast o fthe requirements of modern war ." In relation tothe helicopter program, this involved suitable re -placements for the piston-engine-powered HR2S ,HUS, and HOK models . '

Despite the tightening budget, the Commandan ton 9 January 1958 informed the CNO that theMarine Corps required a replacement for its light(HUS) helicopter fleet . General Pate noted theinadequacy of the HUS–1 to fulfill future assaultrequirements and requested that 210 troop an dcargo versions of the Navy's newest ASW heli-copter, the twin-jet engine HSS–2, be procure dduring the 1962–1966 time frame . At the time ,there appeared to be no other helicopter availablewhich was competitive with the Sikorsky-builtaircraft from either a cost or technical viewpoint .The recommended designation for the transportversion of the HSS–2 was HR3S–1 .''

It was not until 16 March 1959 that the CN Opublished Operational Requirement Number AO-17501, the second revision of the new transport .One year later, on 7 March 1960, he issued De-velopmental Characteristic Number AO–17501–2 ,VTOL Assault Transport Helicopter, as AppendixII to the 1959 operational requirement. This sec-ond revision spelled out a requirement for a heli-copter capable of carrying a payload of 4,000

pounds, or 17 combat-equipped troops, over a100-nautical mile radius . Additional requirementsspecified that it have multi-engines, a rear loadin gramp, automatic blade-folding capability, carry acrew of three, and cruise at a speed of not less than125 knots . It further stated that the specification slisted in the developmental characteristics had t obe met by a modification of a helicopter alreadydeveloped and that it must be ready for operationa levaluation by 1963 . 3

While detailed specifications for the HR3S– 1were being developed by BuAer, Sikorsky discov-ered that in order to modify the HSS–2 to a rear-ramp-loading transport, an extension to the for -ward fuselage would be necessary .

Due to the delay caused by this problem, theHR3S was now being compared to another air -craft. The Vertol Corporation had developed theYHC–lA transport for the Army and the com-mercial version of this helicopter, the 107M ,offered a high degree of competition to th eSikorsky HR3S . As a result, BuWeps " repre-sentatives in June 1960 gave a presentation i nwhich the capabilities of both helicopters were out -lined . In the proceedings, the HR3S–1 was show nto be a significantly cheaper aircraft and to haveobvious logistics and training advantages ; how -ever, the Vertol 107 was presented as being full yas adequate, technically, as the HR3S–1 to accom-plish the assault mission .' '

On 1 July 1960, the Director of the Marin eCorps Landing Force Development Center atQuantico, Brigadier General William R . Collins ,(and a former president of the Tactics and Tech-niques Board), informed General David M . Shoup ,the Marine Corps' 22d Commandant, that the De-velopment Center was monitoring closely the prog-ress of both helicopters and that the data given atthe BuWeps briefing differed considerably fro m

* On 1 December 1959 the Bureau of Naval Weapon swas established and absorbed the functions of the abol-ished Bureau of Aeronautics and Bureau of Ordnance .

82

TRANSITION TO TURBINE-POWERED HELICOPTERS

83

that available at the development center . Genera lCollins pointed out that " there was a considerabledivergence which, if valid, shows the Vertol 10 7in a much more favorable light. It appears to bein the best interest of the Marine Corps to make amore comprehensive evaluation of the two air -craft ." Accordingly, the general recommended thata comparative flight evaluation be conducted be-tween the Vertol 107 and the Sikorsky HR3S–1 . 5

As a result of the pressure generated at Quantic ofor an objective comparison between the two com-peting designs, BuWeps assured the Commandan ton 8 September that proposals from both Verto land Sikorsky would be obtained . The next monthBuWeps sent invitations for bids to the two com-panies . The following February, BuWeps an-nounced its decision, declaring Vertol 's design asthe winner of the competition . Subsequently, th efirst flight of the HRB–1 was scheduled by Boeing-Vertol for June 1962 with delivery to FMF unitsprojected for early 1964. 6

The official military designation of HRB–1 (H -Helicopter, R-Transport, B-Boeing) was given th e107 along with the nickname of Sea Knight . TheIIRB–1 followed the typical Vertol design havin gtwo rotors in tandem . Two General Electric T-58shaft turbine engines, exactly the same as thos ein the HSS–2, were mounted in the rear and ontop of the 46-foot-long fuselage and powered the51-foot diameter rotors . For the primary assaul tmission, the empty weight was listed as 11,64 1

A CH-46A Sea Knight lands on board the U .S .S . Guadal-canal. The Sea Knight carried 17 combat troops at a speedof 137 knots and became the mainstay of the Marine heli-copter force (Marine Corps Photo A411783) .

pounds and a maximum gross weight limited t o8,621 pounds. The cabin section of the fuselage

measured approximately 24 feet long, 6 feet high ,and 6 1/2 feet wide allowing for 17 combat-equippe dtroops or 15 litter patients . The helicopter wasmanned by a crew of three with the maximum sealevel airspeed limited to 137 knots . The overalllength of the prospective assault aircraft was quit elong, 84½ feet. A hydraulically operated rampwas incorporated in the rear of the cabin in orderto facilitate loading and unloading of troops an dlarge pieces of cargo . '

Choosing a Heavy Helicopter

In early 1958, in response to a request from th eOffice of the Secretary of Defense, BuAer con -ducted a study of the feasibility for a single VTO Laircraft development to satisfy the requirementsof the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army.When the study had been completed it showedconclusively that it was feasible and practical t odevelop a pressure-jet convertiplane/compoun dhelicopter which would meet the requirements o fall services . At the time, however, each service hadtheir own ideas on the issue. The Army indicatedthat it wanted to proceed unilaterally with the de-velopment of a 6,000-pound payload, gear-driven ,tandem helicopter being produced by Vertol asthey felt that a pressure-jet convertiplane, as pro -posed by BuAer, would not be suitable for it smission . Later, the Air Force indicated an unwill-ingness to pursue such a development as it neede dan aircraft with an extensive range capability fo rsearch and rescue purposes . The Department ofDefense (DOD) reluctantly authorized the Armyto proceed with its program but agreed that th eNavy-Marine Corps' position of developing apressure-jet convertiplane was feasible and tech-nically sound and authorized the Navy to procee dwith its research and development . $

The existing operational requirement (AO —17501) under which the HR2S had been devel-oped, was revised by the Marine Corps to reflec tthe desired characteristics for such an aircraft toreplace the HR2S which was scheduled to b ephased out in the 1964–1965 period . The Com-mandant submitted the document to the CNO on26 November 1958 . On 16 March 1959, it wa spromulgated as Operational Requirement Numbe rAO–17501–2, with Developmental CharacteristicNumber AO–17501–1 (VTOL Assault Transport )as Appendix Number One . The operational re-quirement stated that the VTOL aircraft should be

84


capable of carrying a payload of 8,000 poundsoutbound to a distance of 100 miles at a cruisin gspeed of 200 knots and return with a 4,000-poun dpayload . A maximum airspeed of 250 knots wasalso specified. '

By 27 January 1961, the Air Force and Armyhad shown a renewed interest in a VTOL aircraftand through a series of DOD actions an agreemen thad been reached wherein all services consente dto participate in the development of a prototyp eVTOL transport. BuWeps, the DOD-appointedmanager for the tri-service aircraft, then issued arevised statement of requirements which specifie dthe same payload but extended the aircraft 's radiu sto approximately 250 miles and increased thecruising airspeed to 250–300 knots and the maxi -mum airspeed to 300–400 knots . However, for theMarine Corps mission, the requirement stated tha tthe fuel load could be reduced so that the maxi -mum gross weight would not exceed 35,000 pound sso long as a 100-mile nautical radius of actioncould be flown . 1 0

By August 1961, the Navy recognized that thefour-engine tilt-wing aircraft, the design whichhad now been selected for the tri-service evaluationinstead of the compound helicopter, would be un-suitable for Navy or Marine Corps use and with -drew from the program. Long before this time,however, the CMC and CNO had recognized tha tany production aircraft resulting from the high -speed VTOL program would not reach the fleet intime to replace the HR2S . In view of this, and atthe Commandant's urging, the CNO issued on 2 7March 1961 a revised developmental character-istic (AO–17501–3) for a medium assault trans-port helicopter with essentially the same require-ments as the convertiplane (AO–17501–2) bu twith a cruising airspeed of only 150 knots . Thegross weight was also to be limited to a maximu mof 35,000 pounds ." '

Since it had been determined that such a shor ttime existed before the new helicopter was neede din the fleet, a replacement aircraft would againhave to be a development of an existing model .The initial competition was therefore betwee nthree major helicopter manufacturers ; Kaman ,Sikorsky, and Boeing-Vertol . The Kaman AircraftCompany had shown an interest in competing fo rthe contract but dropped out before submittin ga formal bid ."

Vertol proposed that it could meet the require-ments of AO–17501–3 by modifying its ArmyHC–1B Chinook, an enlarged version of its 107,or HRB–1 . Sikorsky, on the other hand, based itsdesign for the large helicopter on a revision of its

jet-powered S–64 Flying Crane, an aircraft bein gbuilt completely from company funds for futur esale to West Germany. The general description o fthe proposed transport helicopter revealed that itwas to utilize a sixbladed single main rotor and a16-foot diameter tail rotor . The cabin measured 3 0feet long, 6 1/2 feet high, and 7 I/2 feet wide with a

rear loading ramp . It featured a watertight hull,seats for 30 combat equipped troops, tricycle re -tractable landing gear, twin turbine engines, auto-matic blade folding, and required a crew of twopilots and a crew chief . The aircraft had an overalllength of 88 feet, a gross weight of 32,000 pounds,and an empty weight of approximately 19,000pounds . The cruising speed at the designed grossweight was listed at 150 knots with a maximumairspeed of 171 knots at sea level .* 1314

Request for proposals on the large transpor thelicopter were sent to the competing manufac-turers by BuWeps on 7 March 1962 . Sikorsky an dVertol replied in May, and on 24 August 196 2BuWeps announced the Sikorsky Aircraft designas the winner. Not only had Sikorsky submittedthe lowest bid, but there was a decided preferencebased on technical, production, and maintenanceaspects of the Sikorsky proposal . 1 '

The first aircraft was to be delivered durin gMay 1964 with fleet deliveries beginning the fol-lowing year . The original designation of H-H(X )was given the assault helicopter (H-Helicopter ,H-Heavy, (X) -Experimental) . It was later desig-nated by Sikorsky as its S-65 and by the Navyas the CH-53A .1 6

During September 1962 the designation for al lNavy-Marine Corps aircraft changed . Class HO(helicopter observation) became HL (helicopter -light) ; Helicopter Light (HL) was changed t oHelicopter Medium (HM) and Helicopter Me-dium (HM) became Helicopter Heavy (HH) .Squadron designations were also changed durin gthe same year : HMR(L) became HMM, HM R(M) became HMH. The VMOs retained thei rdesignation . In addition, the Department of De-fense changed the helicopter designations for theHRS to CH–19, HOK to OH-43D, HUS–1 to UH–34D, and the HR2S–1 to CH–37A ."

n Mr. Lee S . Johnson, President of Sikorsky Aircraf tmentioned to BuWeps that the company had not, as o f14 August 1961, received a formal request for proposal .Therefore, the details of his letter (proposal) for theheavy helicopter were based on a limited knowledge of theMarine Corps detailed requirements for such an aircraft .


85

The CH—53A was developed during 1962 and placed in service in 1964. It is a heavy assault transport with a cruisin gspeed of 172 knots and a troop capacity of 38 (Marine Corps Photo A412901) .

The Selection of anAssault Support Helicopter (ASH )

At the same time the Marine Corps was workingon the development of its heavy and medium heli-copters, it also was attempting to obtain a replace-ment for its light helicopter fleet. A forerunnerin this category was the proposed Hiller Aircraf tCompany turbine-powered CAMEL (Collapsibl eAirborne Military Equipment Lifter) . This typeof light helicopter received considerable suppor tfrom the Development Center and was seen as anessential element of strategic and tactical mobilityduring the later 1950s . It was to have the capabil-ity of being disassembled for transport by air orin any class of amphibious shipping to a comba tarea where it would be reassembled later and madeready for flight . It was not until 1960, though, thatthe Marine Corps began to see results of its effort sto obtain a replacement for its HOK and OE air -craft, both of which were to be completely phasedout by 1965. In the past, vain attempts had beenmade to obtain funding for a single VTOL obser-vation aircraft, or an ASH . It became apparen tthat to offset a forthcoming inventory shortage inthese aircraft, immediate funding of a new pro -gram would be required .

The decision to pursue a program to provide asingle rotary-wing type aircraft was the fruit o flengthy staffing at HQMC. As a result, the Divi-sion of Aviation submitted Developmental Char-

acteristic Number AO–17503–3 to the CNO durin glate April 1960 for approval and promulgation .The desired characteristics for the ASH listed th egross weight at 3,500 pounds, a payload capabil-ity of 800 pounds or three troops, and a cruisin gairspeed of 85 knots. 1 8

The Developmental Characteristic was publishe dby the CNO on 9 August 1960 . Concurrently, how-ever, the Army had also stated a requirement fo ra light observation aircraft (LOA) which was verysimilar to that of the ASH . The Army placed em-phasis on volume procurement of such a machineas a replacement for its fixed-wing and helicopterobservation aircraft . An opportunity therebyexisted for the Marine Corps to establish a jointservices procurement program which would greatl yreduce the unit cost for both services . This wasalso an advantage to the Marine Corps as there wa snow insufficient time to embark on a new develop-ment program unilaterally."

The Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing ForceDevelopment Activities (CMCLFDA), Lieutenan tGeneral Edward W . Snedeker, took a different vie wtoward the headquarters proposal for the ASH .Snedeker, a veteran officer who had commande dboth the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions and servedas Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3 at HQMC, reiter-ated the position developed at Quantico . In No-vember 1960, a proposed developmental charac-teristic had been sent to CMC specifying a heli-copter with a 100-knot, 1,000 pound payload and

86


100-mile radius of action, which the Hiller ' sCAMEL was capable of meeting . The same speci-fications had been submitted earlier by the De-velopment Center but it was now officially sub-mitted as a proposed developmental characteristi csince it was felt that AO–17503–3 (ASH) di dnot measure up to the requirements stated i neither the Marine Corps Landing Force Develop-ment Center or HQMC research and developmen tplans for that type of aircraft. A lengthy rebutta lto the concept of using one type aircraft as a re -placement for the HOK and OE was also included .The letter pointed out that the Army's LOA re-quirement was within the framework of an aircraft"family" completely different than that envisione dfor the Marine Corps . General Snedeker empha-sized that the Marine Corps needed a separate re -placement for each, a 100-knot ASH for the HO Kand an STOL (short takeoff and landing) ligh tattack-reconnaissance aircraft to replace and ex-pand the mission of the OE aircraft . 2 0

In March, the following year, the CNO sug-gested to BuWeps that a limited competition beconducted to select an aircraft to fulfill the Marin eCorps ASH mission . He stated that once a satis-factory selection and model evaluation had beenmade, every effort would be expended to effec tnecessary programming of funds within the F Y1962 budget to permit the accelerated purchase o foperational aircraft. Soon thereafter, BuWeps con -ducted a study of those helicopters under consid-eration for selection as an ASH. The results re-vealed that each prospective model failed to qualif ybecause of one or more deficiencies in size, cost ,capability, or simply lack of overall qualification .It became apparent that a compromise had to b emade in regard to selection of an aircraft proto -type 2 5

Time was now an important factor since theHOKs were programmed for replacement in les sthan two years as they had been in the VMO squad-rons continously since May 1956. The DeputyCNO (Air), Vice Admiral Robert B. Pirie, hadstated earlier that it would be in the best interes tof the Marine Corps to accept the burden of in-creased size and cost of an operationally qualifie dmodel rather than gamble on a reduced capabilityor a possible protracted and costly developmenta lprogram such as the Hiller CAMEL or Army ' sLOH. He mentioned that the potential of an exist-ing trainer, or light utility aircraft, might well beconsidered by the Marine Corps planners as it sASH. The Deputy CNO also recommended toBuWeps that a request for proposal be issued assoon as possible with reasonable latitude in con-

sideration of helicopter capability of performin gthe ASH mission . "The imperativeness, " AdmiralPirie said "of positive action leading to a selec-tion of this increasingly critical subject cannot b eoveremphasized." 2 2

BuWeps acted promptly to Admiral Pirie's di-rective. On 16 October 1961, requests for bidswent to 10 helicopter manufacturers and by 2 7November seven companies responded with thei rproposals ." '- 2 After considering all the factor sof each proposed design, BuWeps decided on 2March 1962 that an existing Bell-manufacture dhelicopter, the Army-designated HU–1B, coul dfill the Marine Corps ' ASH role .'

A number of elements entered into the decisio nwhich led to the choice of the Bell HU–1B. Theparamount consideration was the time factor . TheArmy ' s LOH was not programmed for productio nuntil 1965 where the Marine Corps ' ASH wasneeded by 1963 . Additionally, the LOH was to b eequipped with a smaller engine than the MarineCorps deemed necessary and provisions were notmade in the LOH for carrying litters internally .The Marine Corps version (UH–IE) differed fromthe standard Army HU–1B in that it was necessar yto remove most of the Army communication an delectronics and install standard USMC/USN equip-ment. Other changes included the incorporation o fa rotor brake for shipboard operations, a rescuehoist, and replacement of magnesium skin withaluminum to reduce salt water corrosion prob-lems . 2 5

Although the UH–lE utility helicopter was afairly large and heavy aircraft, it met or exceede dthe specifications of AO–17503–3 in all categories .The performance summary listed the empty weigh tat 4,734 pounds, maximum gross takeoff of 8,60 0pounds, and the payload at approximately 1,300pounds with a full fuel load . A combat radius of100 miles was given along with a cruising speednear 100 knots and a maximum airspeed of 14 0knots . The single-turbine engine, two-bladed heli-copter had a rotor diameter of 44 feet and an over -all length of 53 feet . The cabin had large slidingdoors on each side allowing straight-through load-ing. A total of three litters could be accommodate dand they could be loaded from either side or fro mboth sides simultaneously. Seats for five passengerswere provided . Only one pilot was needed, al-though provisions were incorporated for a copilot .

e The seven aircraft companies submitting bids t oBuWeps were : Bell, Hiller, Kaman, Lockheed, Piasecki ,Republic, and Sikorsky . Cessna, Gyrodyne, and Doma nwere the three companies which failed to respond t oBuWeps request for bids .


87

The UH—1E was designed in 1962 and placed into service in 1964 . It is the smallest and lightest aircraft in the modernMarine helicopter service .

The first flight of the UH–1E was scheduled forFebruary 1963 with delivery to the fleet the follow-ing month . The selection of the UH–1E was viewe das a wise choice from the developmental point o fview since by the time the Marine Corps wouldget its first -1E more than 400 –lBs would be inArmy service . 2 6

The Essex Class Carrieras an Interim LPH

While preparation and negotiation had beenunderway for the transition to an all-turbine-powered helicopter fleet, major changes had bee nmade in the Navy shipbuilding program. Thedisappointing factor in this case was the unavail-ability of helicopter aircraft carriers (Amphibiou sAssault Ships—LPHs) . Although the Thetis Baywas providing the Marine Corps with a floatin ghelicopter platform for training and evaluatio npurposes, it was inadequate as a full-fledged assaul thelicopter carrier . The Marine Corps had beenhopeful, however, that by the late 1950s it woul dhave the desired numbers of LPHs but the Nav yhad placed a priority on other types of ships thusdelaying the LPH development .

Originally the amphibious assault ship program

called for conversion of CVA–55 and -105 clas saircraft carriers . Knowing that converted CVE scould not accommodate fully the larger types o fhelicopters and that they would have a limited ser-vice life expectancy, the Commandant reversedhis prior position and recommended that all suc hships be built from the keel up as LPHs. In May1956, after strong urging by the Navy and afte rconsiderable compromise on the part of the MarineCorps, General Pate agreed to a program whichwould provide one new LPH and one converte dCVE–105 each year through the period of 1958through 1962. 2 1

With the approved five-year program to com-mence in 1958 and the LPH conversion and con-struction periods requiring two and three year srespectively, an equal number of years woul dlapse during which the Marine Corps would b ewithout the services of properly designed shippin gfrom which to conduct an amphibious vertica lassault . At the earliest, it would be 1960 befor ethe first converted LPH would be operational ,therefore another solution was needed . The relie fcame in the form of a suggestion from Rear Ad-miral Frederick N . Kivette, a member of th eNavy's Standing Committee, Long Range Ship -building and Conversion.* At a meeting of th e

° The Marine Corps was represented by one officeron this committee after mid-1956 .

88


committee on 29 July 1957, he introduced the sub-ject of utilizing Essex-class CVSs (ASW suppor taircraft carrier) as interim LPHs since some car-riers of this type were scheduled for retirement .

Actually this thought had been presented a searly as 1954 in a proposed CMC letter to the CN Orecommending the use of CVSs or CVAs for heli-copter operations . However, it is believed that th eletter was never sent . Colonel James C . Murray ,Head, Policy Analysis Division, HQMC, whencommenting on the proposed letter, stated to th eChief of Staff on 28 April 1954 :

While this letter (the use of CVS and CVA carrier sfor helicopter operations) was prepared prior to th eapproval of the New Marine Corps concept (tha tproposed in LFB—17), it can now be associated wit hthat concept.

So far as I can determine, no formal discussion hadbeen held which would provide assurance that thi srequest will be approved .

I do not feel that we should risk a formal dis-approval on what might be regarded as an element o fthe new concept until we have attempted to gainNavy acceptance to the concept itself . . . .

In summary, in the absence of any informal prio rindication that this recommendation will be approved ,its submission at this time may result in a disapprovalwhich would tend to crystallize CNO opposition t othe concept itself. It is recommended that : (a) th eletter be delayed until the new concept has beenpresented to the Navy or (b) if time is pressing, tha tthe matter be taken up on an informal basis to assur eapproval prior to the submission of a formal recom-mendation .z s

The suggestion emphasized economy since thenecessary modifications needed to make the Essex -class carrier into an acceptable LPH were esti-mated to be minimal . Additionally, the Navy couldmake the CVSs available to the Marine Corpswithin a relatively short period of time .

The outcome of Admiral Kivette's proposal wasnot known until 2 May 1958 at which time GeneralPate officially informed the CNO of the Marin eCorps decision . In a memorandum to AdmiralBurke the Commandant remarked :

. . . [onl 15 March 1958 I stated that I woul dadvise you of my views concerning the use of the CV Sas an interim LPH following a report of their useduring LANTPHIBEX 1—58 .* 29 This report has

' LANTPHIBEX 1—58 took place in early 1958 offthe coast of Onslow Beach, North Carolina. In addition t oevaluating the feasibility of using the CVS as an interi mLPH, it was the largest test up to this time of th evertical envelopment doctrine. Helicopters from Colone lMcCutcheon's MAG–26 lifted in the ship-to-shore move-ment a complete RLT of the 2d Marine Division . Operat-ing from the USS Tarawa (CVS—40), Valley Forge (CVS—45), and the Forrestal (CVA–59), the aircraft grou pdemonstrated the soundness of the portion of the doctrin ewhich envisioned the simultaneous use of more than oneLPH .

been very gratifying and indicates that the CVS withlimited modification will be a suitable type to mee texisting needs until new LPH[sl are available in th efleet. . . . I recommend for your consideration that aleast two CVS's which are scheduled to be deactivatedin the near future, be modified to meet landing forc erequirements and made available for deployment wit hthe amphibious forces as soon as possible . 3 o

The Essex-class aircraft carrier had characteris-tics which made it quite compatible for helicopteroperations and suitable as a platform from whichto launch a ship-to-shore movement, but yet it alsohad some drawbacks. The shortcomings weremainly in its poor cargo-handling and combattroop-billeting facilities . Another undesirable con-dition, one imposed by the Navy, was the Marin eCorps ' obligation to provide Marine officers an denlisted men to augment the Navy crew . Thosefeatures which made the ship appealing, however ,were its 889-foot flight deck, three aircraft eleva-tors between the hangar and flight deck, 14 ormore HUS launching locations, and a top speed i nexcess of 30 knots. Additionally, it was figuredthat a total of 30 HR2Ss or up to 60 HUSs coul dbe transported when utilizing all available space .In wartime situations, an Essex-class ship had acomplement of personnel, both ship 's company an dair group, that often reached as many as 2,800, afar greater capability than that of the Thetis Bay . 3 1

Comparing the features of the Essex-clas scarriers against the newly constructed LPHs, th eolder CVSs appear, in many respects, superior.The newly constructed LPHs would have a 590 -foot flight deck with deck spots for only eigh tHUS helicopters, two elevators, and a top speedof about 20 knots. The maximum number oftransported helicopters would vary from 20 to 40depending on their type and the method of storage .However, the modern command facilities, lates ttype cargo and material handling system, plus ade-quate space for the movement and berthing o fcombat troops would made the new ships mor edesirable in these areas . The new LPHs were notintended to compete with the larger aircraft car-riers but rather they were designed particularly t ocombat load, transport, and land a Marine BLTof up to 2,000 personnel with an embarked Marin etransport helicopter squadron .3 2

Accordingly, the USS Boxer (CVS–21) wasreclassified as the LPH–4 on 30 January 1959 an dthe USS Princeton (CVS–37) reclassified as LPH5 on 2 March . A third ship, the USS Valley Forge ,(CVS–45) joined the ranks of amphibious assaul tships on 1 July 1961 as the LPH–8 . 3 3

The three converted CVSs "filled the gap" a sinterim LPHs until sufficient number of new con-

TRANSITION TO TURBINE-POWERED HELICOPTER S

Figure 12

89

LPH*

Name

New Construction LPH

Auth in FY Commissioned

2 Iwo Jima 58 26 August 19613 Okinawa 59 14 April 19627 Guadalcanal 60 July 1963 *," °9 Guam 62 January 1965 * "

10 Tripoli 63 *" August 1966 * "11 New Orleans 65** November 1968 * *12 Inchon 66 ** June 1970 **

* LPH-1 Block Island ; LPH-4 Boxer ; LPH-5 Princeton ; LPH-6 Thetis Bay ; LPH-8Valley Forge .

** Projected dates .

struction LPHs were in service, with the plans fo rconverting the five CVEs subsequently bein gdropped. Figure 12 gives the data on the ne wships as it was planned at the time s '

One-Man Helicopters * 3 "

Other projects, not as successful as those whic hhave been mentioned, were subjected to length yand detailed evaluation. The Marine Corps soughta wide range of helicopters capable of fulfillin gnearly every requirement of the ground com-mander .

The smallest size helicopter to undergo Marin eCorps evaluation was the one-man helicopter. I twas this project the Marine Corps actively pursue dfor over an eight-year period and was seen origi-nally as some sort of "pinwheel" which could b estrapped to a man ' s back and would be capable o ftransporting him short distances . The concept wastranslated in 1952 into an operational requirement(AO-17503), when the Commandant apprised th eChief of Naval Operations of the Marine Corps'need for a one-man helicopter. General characteris-tics of this device were :

1. Capacity—One man with combat equipment(240 lbs )

2. Operating Range—10 to 15 miles3. Weight—50 to 75 lbs (one man portable )4. Endurance—15 minutes5. Speed—30 mp h6. Capable of autorotative landing s7. Require minimum training by nonpilot s8. Inexpensiv e9. Packaged in a one-man load and capable o f

being readied for flight by one man in not more tha nfive minutes.

* The contents of the following subsections wer econdensed and taken exclusively from a study on MarineCorps helicopter requirements prepared by the T&TBoard, MCLFDC, Quantico, dated 2 May 1961 .

In order to keep one-man helicopters from be -coming an aircraft inventory item, in 1954 theCNO redesignated the one-man portable helicopteras an item of equipment, called the "Rotorcycle . "In 1956 the CNO published a revised OperationalRequirement AO—17505 reflecting a few change sto the original requirement which subsequentlybecame the basis for testing several other experi-mental air vehicles .

Of the several types tested, none proved capabl eof satisfying the Marine Corps requirements . Tw omandatory requirements were that it be lightenough for one man to carry and simple to operat eso that no specialized training for the "driver "would be necessary. The Gyrodyne RON—1 and th eHiller ROE—1 were the most promising models bu tthey weighed in excess of 300 pounds empty, an dwere tricky "aircraft " which required the skills o fan experienced helicopter pilot . Other models ,such as Rotorcraft's "Pinwheel, " Kellet' s "StableMable," DeLackner' s "Aerocycle, " or Hiller' s"Flying Platform, " while easy to fly and maintain ,

The dream of a one-man, portable, flying machine neve rmaterialized. The closest operational device was this Roto -cycle (Navy Photo Np/45/5834) .

90


proved unacceptable because of size, a requirementfor exotic fuel, or the inability to autorotate to asafe landing after an in-flight power failure .

It appeared that while a valid requiremen texisted for some sort of small, inexpensive vehicle(not an aircraft) which would be available to theunit commander as his personal " jeep" and freehim from the limitations of terrain-mobility, con-struction of such a vehicle would have to depend onsome new technological development . MarineCorps exploration in the field of simple, light -weight aerial vehicles was cancelled by the Com-mandant in October 1960 and the satisfaction o fthis unfilled requirement, therefore, would have torely on overland transportation or the use of autility-type helicopter .

The Flying Crane Helicopter

A flying crane was generally visualized as asort of heavy cargo unloader consisting of a skele-ton fuselage, lift and power systems, and a pilot ca bcontaining the flight and power controls . The flyin gcrane ' s use would be to transport heavy pieces o fmateriel, rolling stock, engineer equipment, o rlarge tonnages of bulk supplies . Initially, the firs tMarine Corps requirement for a flying crane heli-copter was submitted to the CNO on 21 Novembe r1950 . The primary mission envisioned was totransfer aircraft from replenishment class 55 o r105 carriers to the Midway class CVLs andsmaller Independence class CVBs. Soon thereafter ,on 27 December, the CNO published a letter to al lhis departments setting up a requirement for th eflying crane helicopter with the specification tha tit be capable of lifting a payload of 25,000 pound sover a radius of 10 miles .

Later in 1954, a Marine Corps Developmen tCenter study on helicopter requirements saw aneed for a 20,000-pound payload XHCH–1 (Carg oUnloader Helicopter) to land the ONTOS (anti -tank weapon system) and 2½-ton cargo trucks .The XHCH was then an experimental helicopte rbeing built by McDonnell Aircraft Corporation i naccordance with the CNO ' s 1950 requirement, butit was never produced . In 1956 the Marine Corp sEquipment Development Policy and Guide also sa wa requirement for a cargo unloader helicopter ,again with a 25,000-pound payload capability.

In 1959, the Director, Marine Corps Develop-ment Center stated a requirement for a crane heli-copter . He specified in a letter to the Commandant :

One of the most serious deficiencies in our vertica lassault capability that exists today is the inability to

lift heavy equipment essential to the landing forc e. - . It is considered that the number of pieces o fequipment requiring heavy lift in support of a landin gforce would not be great . . . It now appears tha tdevelopmental advances in rotor design and gas tur-bine engines is such that with proper direction, sup -port and guidance, a helicopter capable of lifts up t o25,000 pounds could be obtained in a few years . It is ,therefore, recommended that Headquarters, U . S .Marine Corps :

a. State an operational requirement for a cran etype helicopter capable of carrying a payload o f12,000 pounds with a minimum combat radius o f50 nautical miles. Encourage and support the air -craft industry to develop on an expeditious basis acrane type helicopter to meet this requirement.

b. Program continued development of a cran etype helicopter capable of carrying a payload o f20,000 pounds with a minimum combat radius o f50 nautical miles but with a greater combat radiusif it can be achieved .

c. Procure at an early date at least two proto-types of the most promising "Flying Crane" typ ehelicopter for user test.

In March 1960, the Coordinator, MCLFDA sub-mitted to CMC a "Proposed Operational Require-ment for Landing Force VTOL Aircraft ." Includedtherein was a "VTOL Cargo Unloader Aircraf t(Flying Crane) " with a lift capability of 25,000pounds . One significant fact concerning these viewswas that they were an expression of the "All heli-copter concept" philosophy of LFB–17 .

Why not a flying crane helicopter before 1960 ?Basically, the manufacturers could not produce on ecapable of lifting the desired weight . The firstmodel of Piasecki's XH–16 was truly a flying cran eas it was designed to carry its load in detachable"pods . " Piasecki's second XH–16 had a large cabi nand was the type which had interested the Marin eCorps as an assault transport . Both aircraft failedprimarily because the state of power plant an dtransmission development had not advanced suf-ficiently to match the demand . Also the Navy -funded McDonnell's XHCH-1 failed due to thesame shortcomings. During 1956-1958, the U . S .Army Transportation Research and Engineerin gCommand (TRECOM) actively studied the tech-nical aspects of flying crane helicopters . Researchcontracts to conduct design and cost analysis werelet to leading aircraft manufacturers . TRECOMexamined the flying crane concept and evaluatedthe conclusions reached by the several manu-facturers. Two of the most significant conclusion swere : 1. The flying crane had singular require-ments and design considerations which were notinherent in helicopters then in operation, and wa svery sensitive to changes in design, operatin gradius, and payload. For each payload and rangecombination there was an optimum power plant

TRANSITION TO TURBINE—POWERED HELICOPTERS

9 1

(shaft drive/tip-jet drive) and rotor (single, tan-dem, quad) combination . 2 . Flying cranes werevery large, very heavy aircraft . Rotor diameter son the order of 120 feet and empty weights in ex-cess of 30,000 pounds were representative of flyin gcranes designed for payloads of 12 tons an doperating radii of 50 nautical miles . A pure flyingcrane helicopter would have been of little value t othe Marine Corps as there was only a limitedopportunity for its useful employment in comba tand, because of its size, it was difficult to load inamphibious shipping .

To satisfy the requirement for heavy lifts with -out a true flying crane, it was envisioned that aheavy cargo helicopter could be stripped of itsauxiliary power unit, communications/navigatio nequipment, and other removable equipment an doperate with a reduced fuel load and minimu mcrew. It then could become a flying crane, of sorts ,capable of lifting five or six tons of external carg ofor a tactically significant distance .

Handicapped by not having a flying crane, th eMarine Corps' course of action would be to con-tinue to make up light loads, and sectionalize heav yitems of equipment, and employ the future CH—5 38,000-pound payload helicopters in a limited flyin gcrane role until technology could produce asmaller, more versatile, and efficient crane heli-copter .

Robot (Remotely Controlled )Helicopters

The Marine Corps for several years had bee ninterested in the feasibility of employing pilotlesshelicopters . Basically, they were viewed as being areplacement for manned vehicles on missionswhere survival probability would be unacceptablylow and also on missions which would not neces-sarily require the decision-making capability of apilot .

In April 1954, the Marine Corps Developmen tCenter, at the direction of the CMC, submitted abrief research paper entitled "Study of MarineCorps Requirements for Remotely Controlled Ro-tary Wing Aircraft . " This study recommended th eacquisition of a limited number of remotely con -trolled helicopters for service use in order to eval-uate their effectiveness in the following roles :

(1) As an atomic weapons close support deliver ysystem remotely controlled and positioned by radar .

(2) As a remotely controlled platform for tele-vision cameras, airborne early warning or other in-telligence gathering devices .

(3) As an "umbrella " of atomic aerial mines fo rdefense against enemy aircraft and missiles .

(4) As a transporter of battlefield illuminationdevices .

(5) As a vehicle utilized for the routine shuttlin gof supplies.

In May, after reviewing the study, the Comman-dant established with the Chief of Naval Opera-tions a tentative requirement for a few robot heli-copters for test and evaluation purposes .

The next year a proposal was submitted byKaman for "The Kaman Drone Helicopter Sys -tem . " This proposal saw the advantages of a dron ehelicopter as :

(1) The possibility of operating under hazardousconditions without endangering lives of pilot an dcrew .

(2) The possibility of operating under all-weatherconditions using relatively unskilled operators becaus ethe helicopter is, at all times, completely stabilizedand locked to a remote electronic control system .

(3) The possibility of lifting very small usefu lloads with a proportionately small vehicle because o fthe absence of pilot and attendant weight items.

(4) A considerable reduction in aircraft weight toaccomplish any given mission .

Similar to the 1954 Marine Corps Developmen tCenter study, the Kaman proposal saw the dron ehelicopter applicable to a number of Navy-Marin emissions, including : ASW, battlefield illumination ,troop logistical support, minefield clearance, and ,by installation of drone controls, as an all-weathe rnavigation system for manned transport and utilit yhelicopters .

Continuing to pursue the requirement, the 1956Marine Corps Equipment Development Policy andGuide contained a statement expressing a need fo r

Research in drone helicopters has continued from thedays of the autogyro . HTK—1 testing in 1958 lead to theconclusion that the major use of drone helicopters woul dbe for cargo transport (Kaman Aircraft Corp . Photo2570-1) .

92


remotely controlled helicopters answering the fol-lowing description :

A family of helicopters, remotely controlled by sur-face or airborne devices, capable of transporting sup -plies and equipment, in weight categories of 100 ,1,000 and 3,000 pounds, for use by the landing forc eduring all phases of amphibious operations . Thes ehelicopters will operate from vessels of the amphib-ious task force on scheduled or programmed route sto specific or selectable landing areas . Operators wil lcontrol landing and take-off operations . Provisions fo rcommand and control during all phases of operation sare mandatory.

In 1959 the Operations Research Analysi sBranch at Headquarters, Marine Corps, under th edirection of Dr. Alexander L. Slafkosky, made adetailed study which proceeded on the assumptio nthat :

If a robot cargo carrying helicopter could he de-veloped which would be capable of handling a par tof the logistical load of the manned helicopter, thelimited number of manned helicopters and traine dhelicopter pilots might be utilized more effectivel yfor tactical operations .

The report concluded with a recommendation tha tthe Marine Corps pursue the development of robot sin order to achieve an adequate vertical lift capa-bility over a radius of 25 nautical miles or more .

Meanwhile, the Kaman Aircraft Corporation an dthe Bell Helicopter Company had been activel yengaged in research and development of remotelycontrolled helicopters, primarily in pursuit o fOffice of Naval Research and BuWeps projects .They had made numerous proposals and ha ddemonstrated successfully robot versions of thei rHTK and HUL models .

During early 1959, the Marine Corps LandingForce Development Center and HMX—1, at th edirection of Headquarters Marine Corps, soughtto determine Marine Corps requirements for robo thelicopters and at the same time to evaluate th eKaman HTK—1 Drone, a trainer version of theHOK—1 . Three test objectives of this project wereto determine : the Marine Corps ' requirements forrobot helicopters, the performance characteristic sdesired in robot helicopters, and the operatingcharacteristics from which to develop concepts o femployment . An analysis of the report of theMCLFDC/HMX—1 project does not indicate anexhaustive pursuit of the extensive problem. How -ever, those conclusions reached were worthy ofnote insofar as they reflected the thinking a tMarine Corps Schools at that time.

1 . The Kaman robot helicopter system was suitabl efor point-to-point cargo transport utilizing enlistedpersonnel as controllers . But the system was not suit -

able for performing reconnaissance, pathfinding, radi oand radar relay and radiological monitoring missions .

2. The Marine Corps had a requirement for carg ocarrying drone helicopters but did not have a require-ment for drone helicopters capable of performing avariety of missions as : reconnaissance, pathfinding ,radio and radar relay, radiological monitoring . Th eavailability of drone helicopters, and their use as th eprimary means for resupply of tactical units, wouldresult in a significant increase in the mobility o ftactical elements of the Marine division .

3. The desired performance characteristics of carg ocarrying robot helicopters were listed as having a100 mile radius of action, 90 knot cruising speed an dcapable of lifting a 6,000-pound payload .

The only clear result of the 1959 MCLFDC /HMX—1 evaluation was the demonstration that asingle helicopter could be droned and controlled ina local area by either ground or air controllers .Tactical or practical applications of drone em-ployment were not evaluated .

Hopeful that the Kaman system would prov esuccessful, the Marine Corps Aviation Program sfor 1959—1964 were changed on 8 March 1960 toprovide for the formation of one helicopter dron e(cargo) squadron during FY 63 and two mor eduring FY 64 . Commissioning these squadronswas to be subject to budgeting, development, andproduction variables, and not to be chargeableagainst the operating aircraft inventory . The for-mation of a squadron with drone helicopters neveroccurred since they did not prove to be inexpensiv eor so reliable and easy to operate as to provid ea clear advantage over the manned helicopters .

VTOL Aircraft as They Pertai nto Helicopters

Such advanced VTOL design as the compoundhelicopter or convertiplane, tilt-rotor, tilt-prop, tilt -wing, ducted fan, lift fan, and tail sitter had al lshown promise of being operational realities an dwere seen by many to be a desirable replacemen tfor the helicopter . Also there was a stated opera-tional requirement for a 30-passenger 250-kno tVTOL assault transport. Its characteristics were de-scribed in Operational Requirement AO—17501—2 ,which said in part :

The concept of VTOL Assault Transport systems i sconsidered sound and is based on the requirement fo rsignificantly greater speed, range and ton mile capa-bility in the conduct of amphibious vertical liftassault operations and for reduced vulnerability i nexpected operating environment from hostile groundand air weapons.

The statement appearing in AO-17501 .2 con-

94


tained the fundamental basis for replacing th ehelicopter with VTOL transport aircraft : "Speedwith which to purchase greater combat surviva-bility and speed with which to purchase greate raircraft productivity." Obviously, all other varia-bles being equal, the faster an aircraft could fly th eless it would be exposed to enemy fire and th eprobability of it being destroyed would also b ereduced . However, speed was not the only elemen tof combat survivability . Aircraft design and tactic swere considered more important effects on surviva-bility than speed . It was thought that a faster air -craft designed with exposed engines and fuel cells ,or an unprotected crew may actually be more vul-nerable than a slower aircraft with these essential swell protected .

Speed was, however, an essential element o fproductivity, and an aircraft capable of carryin gthe same load faster should enjoy greater pro-ductivity. Speed was not the only essential elemen tof productivity ; radius of action, logistic suppor tneeds, and Marine Corps aircraft-LPH compati-bility were among the many factors which coul dinfluence aircraft productivity .

VTOL transport development did not prove t obe as productive as helicopters for the shor trange/low altitude mission representative ofMarine Corps helicopter operations . One of th emost important reasons for the relatively poo rshort-haul/low altitude productivity of VTO Ltransports was found in the tremendous power-to-hover requirements for these aircraft, a require-ment which renders the aircraft uneconomical tooperate until it can transition into conventionalflight .

Another important factor was cargo handling .High-speed aircraft would have to carry carg ointernally and fly at considerable altitude at desig ncruising speed . Large items of combat equipmen teasily carried externally by conventional heli-copters could not be carried at all by many VTO Ldesigns . Others, like the convertiplane, could

transport heavy items but only for short distance sand with considerable loss of aircraft efficiency .

Helicopter-LPH compatibility was a factor o fmajor importance in determining the suitabilityof a particular aircraft for Marine Corps use .Generally speaking, the higher the payload-sizeratio, the better the aircraft. Most of the VTOLdesigns examined in any detail did not comparefavorably with true helicopters in this respect .

Inherent in the design of any advanced VTO Laircraft was the problem of "downwash," thehypervelocity winds directed at the ground duringlanding, take-off, and hovering flight. Conventionalhelicopters generated high velocity downwashwinds, often uncomfortable and a nuisance, butstill tolerable. As an example, the most severedownwash generated from a helicopter came fro mthe HR2S which had a "disc-loading" of 7 .5 lbs /sq. ft . The downwash of the HR2S helicopter wa sstrong enough to blow men and equipment abou ta ship's deck or create clouds of sand and dirt a tunprepared landing sites. The convertiplane typ eVTOL "disc-loading " would probably have beenon the order of 10 lbs/sq ft, while those of mor esophisticated designs as high as 35-50 lbs/sq ft ,making well-prepared landing sites a prerequisit efor useful employment .

It appeared that for the typical Marine short-range/low altitude troop support mission there wa slittle requirement for VTOL aircraft of advance ddesign . Their productivity could not compete withhelicopters and the enhanced combat survivalpotential offered by speeds in excess of 200 knot swas offset by poorer productivity and logistic sup -port problems .

The helicopter had a long infancy and was nowreaching the fullness of its operational potential .This would have been an inopportune time for th eMarine Corps to trade the new-found maturity o fmodern helicopters for a new design, still to b eproven .

NOTES

Most of the documents cited are located in the His-torical Reference Section, History and Museums Division ,Headquarters, U . S. Marine Corps, Washington, D .C .Other materials may be found in the Classified ControlCenter, Marine Corps Development and Education Com-mand, Quantico, Virginia ; Classified Files Section, Head-quarters, U. S. Marine Corps ; and the U. S. NavyOperational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington ,D .C.

INTRODUCTIO N

Early Helicopter Development s

L CO Aircraft One, 1stMarBrig, FMF, Quantico, Va .Memo to Brig Comdr, dtd 16Ju136, USMC Avn A4-1Navy Record Section, National Archives as cited inLynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky (New York :Harper, 1954) .

2. Frank J . Delear, The New World of Helicopters(New York : Dodd, Mead and Company, 1967), p. 14.

Initial Procurements and Designs

17. CNO ltr to Adees, dtd 6Jun46, Subj : Establishment ofHelicopter Development Program.

18. Marine Corps Schools, Quantico msg to Majo rArmond H. DeLalio, 06420, dtd 13Ju146, Subj : Re -assignment, Officers Mis Correspondence and OrdersJacket, National Records Center, St . Louis, Mo., p.698-715 .

19. Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, p . 182 .20. CO HT-18 ltr to CMC, dtd 29Aug72, Subj : Chronolog-

ical List of Qualified Helicopter Pilots, Encl. (1) .21. BGen Noah C. New ltr to DirMCHist&Mus, dtd

2May75. Comment File, "Development History of th eHelicopter in the USMC 1946-1962. "

Early Outlook

22. Igor I . Sikorsky, "Helicopter-Today and Beyond,"Aero Digest, Jan47, p . 85.

23. CNO ltr, Army and Navy Helicopter Developments ,p . 4 .

CHAPTER 1The Advent

3 .

Sikorsky

Aircraft,

The

Miracle

of

the

Helicopter(Stamford, Connecticut : Sikorsky Aircraft, 1961), p . 2 .

The Quest for an Alternative

4 .

BuAer

Record

of

Aircraft

Acceptance

1936-1946, 1 . CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 18Jun46, Subj : Establishmen t(Aer 5013B) of Helicopter Development Program .

HRP-1 Development2 . Capt Davis Merwin, HQMC Memo to Dir of Avn ,

HQMC, dtd 19Ju143 .3 .4 .

LtGen Roy S . Geiger ltr to CMC, dtd 21Aug46 .CMC ltr to Chairman, Special Board, dtd 13Sep46 ,

Subj : Effect of Atomic Explosion on Amphibious War -

fare .

5 . CNO ltr to CMC, dtd 30Jan47, Subj : Army and Nav yHelicopter

Developments,

encl.

(1),

p .

2,

hereafterCNO ltr, Army and Navy Helicopter Developments .

6 . Ibid . 5. BGen Edward C. Dyer, Tnscrpt of intvw by Oral7 . BuAer-E-13-GT VV (2) Memo for Admiral Davidson ,

dtd 21May42, Subj : P-V Engineering Forum, Recen tExperimental Helicopter Study .

HistU,

Hist&MusDiv,

HQMC,

dtd

16Feb71

(OralHistCollection, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), p. 199, here -after Dyer Interview.

8. Ibid .6 . Ibid.

9. Ibid . 7. Ibid.10. Ibid . 8 . Dyer Interview, pp . 199-200.

The HJP-1 Utility and Rescue Evaluation9 .

10 .Ibid., p . 198 .Chairman, Special Board, CMC, Advanced Report o f

11 .

Cdr William C . Knapp, USN, "Helicopter in Naval CMC, dtd 16Dec46, Encl. (c)

part I, cited in Mon -

tross, Cavalry of the Sky, p . 63.Aviation, " Journal of the American Helicopter So -ciety, Vol .

1, No .

1, Jan56, p. 3, hereafter Knapp ,Helicopter in Naval Aviation .

11 . CMCS ltr to CMC, dtd 10Mar47, Subj : Employmen tof Helicopter in Amphibious Warfare, Encl . (a), Mili -

12 . Ibid. tary

Requirements of

Helicopter

for

Ship-to-Shor e

Movement, p . 1 .

Helicopter Applications 12 . Ibid ., p . 2 .13 . Ibid ., p . 3 .

13. CNO Planning Directive 96-A-43, dtd 18Dec43 ,Subj : Navy Helicopter Program .

14. Knapp, Helicopter in Naval Aviation, p . 13 .15. CNO Planning Directive, dtd 18Dec43, op, cit .16. CNO msg 161915May56 cited in CNO ltr to Adees ,

dtd 6Jun46, Subj : Establishment of Helicopter De -velopment Program .

A Helicopter Program for 1947

14. OP-05 Memo to OP-03, dtd 21Mar47, Subj : Futur e

Amphibious Operations .15. Chief of BuAer ltr to OP-5, dtd 25Feb47, Subj :

Future Amphibious Operations .

95

96


16. DCNO(Ops) Memo to DCNO (Air), dtd 6May47 ,Subj : Employment of Helicopters in AmphibiousWarfare, p . 2 .

Assault Helicopter Characteristics an dDesign Problem s

17. Ibid., p . 7 .18. DCNO (Ops) Memo to DCNO(Air), dtd 6May47 ,

Sub : Employment of Helicopters in Amphibious War-fare .

19. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 19Dec46, Subj : Future Am-phibious Operations .

20. DCNO(Air) Memo to DCNO(Ops), dtd 15Apr47 .21. Ibid .22. DCNO(Ops) Memo to DCNO(Air), dtd 6May47 ,

Subj : Employment of Helicopters in Amphibiou sWarfare .

23. DCNO(Air) ltr to DCNO(Ops), dtd 3Jun47, Subj :Employment of Helicopters in Amphibious Warfare .

24. CNO ltr to CMC, dtd 23Mar 47, Subj : Future Am-phibious Operations .

25. Ibid.26. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 5Jun47, Subj : Future Amphi-

ous Operations .27. Ibid .28. Div of Avn Memo for the Dir of Plans and Policy, dt d

23May47, Subj : Proposed CMC ltr Ser 003Al2947,comments on .

29. Chief, Aviation Military Requirements Section (Op —55R) Memo to Op—52, dtd 3Jun47, Subj : Employmentof Helicopters in Amphibious Warfare .

30. CMC Itr to CNO, dtd 9Ju147, Subj : Employment o fHelicopters in Amphibious Warfare .

31. CNO ltr to BuAer, dtd 4Nov47, Subj : Assault an dASW Helicopter Program .

32. BuAer ltr to CNO, dtd 24Dec47, Subj : Amphibiou sWarfare Assault Helicopter Program—Joint Ai rForce-Navy Participation .

CHAPTER 2Concept Development

Commissioning and Operations of HMX—1

1. Dyer Interview, p . 209.2. Ibid ., p . 210 .3. OP—50 ltr to DCNO(Air), dtd 23Jun47, Subj : Heli-

copter Program, titled : Aviation Plan No . 57, with 1stend. fm DCNO (Air) to Dist, dtd 10 .111147.

4. CNO hr to BuAer, dtd 10Sep47, Subj : Planned Em-ployment of H03S—1 Helicopter .

5. CNO ltr to BuAer, dtd 12Sep47, Subj : Planned Em-ployment of HRO—1 Helicopter.

6. ACNO (Marine Aviation) memo to OP—50, dtd 4Nov 47, Subj : Marine Helicopter Squadron .

7. CNO msg to CMC dtd 22Nov47 (DTG 221359Z) .8. OP—50 ltr to DCNO(Air), dtd 21Nov47, Subj : Heli-

copter Program, titled : Aviation Plan No . 57, Sup-plement No . 2 . with 1st end . fm DCNO(Air) to DistList, dtd 24Nov47 .

9. HMX—1 Muster Roll, 1-31Dec47 .10. CO, Helicopter Training Sqdn Eight ltr to CMC, dtd

29Aug72, Subj : Certification of Marine Corps Traine dHelicopter Pilots .

11. Dyer Interview, p . 214 .12. CMC ltr to CO MCAS Quantico, dtd 3Dec47, Subj :

Marine Helicopter Squadron One, employment of .13. Ibid .14. CNO ltr to CO MCAS Quantico, dtd 28Nov47, Subj :

Aircraft Complement and Allowance of HMX—1 .15. OP—50 ltr to DCNO(Air), dtd 6Apr48, Subj : Heli-

copter Program, titled : Aviation Plan No . 57, Supple-ment No . 3, with 1st end . fm DCNO(Air) to Dis tList, dtd 8Apr48.

16. Navy Dept, BuAer Standard Aircraft Characteristics,NavAer, 1335, Performance Summary, Sikorsk yH03S—1, dtd 1Feb49 .

17. HMX—1 SqdnHist, lDec47—30Jun49, p . 3 .

Initial Request for an Observation Helicopte r

18. CO HMX—1 ltr to CMC, dtd 28Apr48, Subj : Typ eHTL—2 Helicopters, procurement of .

19. CNO ltr to CMC, dtd 23May48, Subj : Aircraft Com-plement and Allowances of Marine Helicopter Squad-ron One, revision of .

20. Navy Dept, BuAer Standard Aircraft Characteristics,NavAer 1335A, Performance Summary, Bell HTL—2,dtd 1Mar50 .

21. HMX—1 SqdnHist, lDec47—30Jun49, p . 8 .22. CMC Itr to CNO, dtd 24Nov48, Subj : Change of Com-

plement, Marine Observation Squadron .23. Ibid .24. Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, p. 101 .25. ACNO (Aviation Plans) ltr to DCNO(Air), dtd

7Apr49, Subj : Helicopter Program, titled : Aviatio nPlan No . 21—49, with 1st end . fm (DCNO(Air)) toDist List, dtd 18Apr49.

26. CMC ltr to CNCI, dtd IJu149, Subj : Military Require-ment for Artillery Observation Helicopters .

27. Ibid .28. CNO Itr to Dist List, dtd 16Aug49, Subj : Navy Re-

search and Development Plan ; Operation Require-ment No . A0—17503 (Liaison Helicopter), p . 2 .

29. Navy Dept, BuAer Standard Aircraft Characteristics,NavAer 1335A, Performance Summary, Sikorsk yH05S-1, dtd 1May51 .

30. Ivan A . Sikorsky, The Technical History of SikorskyAircraft and its Predecessors (Stratford, Conn ., May

1966), p . 191 .

Operation PACKARD I I

31. Ibid .32. HMX—1 Amphibious Command Post Exercise, Opera-

tion PACKARD II, 10—26May48, p . I—1 .33. Ibid .34. LtGen Victor H. Krulak Itr to Dir MCHist&Mus, dtd

26Mar75 . Comment File, "Developmental History ofthe Helicopter in the USMC, 1946-1962 ."

35. HMX—1, Operation PACKARD II, op . cit.36. Ibid ., p . III—7.37. Ibid ., p . VI—7 .

Publication of the New Concept—PHIB—3 1

38. MCS Amphibious Operations—Employment of Heli-copters (Tentative), NavMC—4544 (Quantico, 1948) .

39. Ibid .40. LtGen Victor H . Krulak ltr to Dir MCHist&Mus, dtd

NOTES 97

3Aug70. Comment file, "Developmental History of the 15 . CMC ltr to CO HMX-1, dtd 19Aug49, Subj : Trans -USMC, 1900-1970 ." port Helicopter, development and procurement of .

41 . Krulak ltr, dtd 26Mar75, op . cit. 16 . Ibid .42 . Krulak ltr, dtd 3Aug70, op . cit . 17 . CO HMX-1 ltr to CMC, dtd 12Sep49, Subj : Transport43 . Krulak ltr, dtd 26Mar75, op . cit . Helicopters, development and procurement of .

18 . CMC ltr to CO HMX-1, dtd 130ct49, Subj : Transpor tOther Significant Demonstrations and Operations Helicopters development and procurement of .

by HMX-1 19. Senior Member, Board to Study and Submit Recom-mendations on a Transport Helicopter Program, Re-

44. CO HMX-1 ltr to CMC, dtd 1Aug49, Subj : Progress port to CMC dtd 140ct49, Subj : Transport HelicopterReport Period, IJan-30Jun49, p. 6. Board, Report of, p . 2 .

45 . HMX-1 Amphibious Command Post Exercise, Opera - 20 . Ibid ., pp . 3-6.tion PACKARD III, 18-24May49, p . I-1 . 21 . Ibid ., p . 6 .

46 . Ibid., p . III-3 .47 . Ibid., p. III-3—I11-7 .48 . Ibid., p . V-1 . The First Six Months of 195049 . HMX-1 SqdnHist, 1Dec47-30Jun49, p . 15 .

22. Op-52 memo to Op-501D, dtd 16Jun50, Subj : Op-5 050 . HMX-1, Operation PACKARD III, op . cit., p. V-1 . (Marine Aviation) Historical Summary for the Perio d51 . CMC ltr to CO HMX-1, dtd 20Jun49, Subj : Author - lOct-31Dec49, Encl (1), p . 4.ized Allowances of Personnel, as ref in CO HMX-1 23 . Maj Norman W. Hicks, A Brief History of the Unitedltr to CMC, dtd lAug49, Subj : HMX-1 Progress Re - States

Marine

Corps

(Washington :

HistBr,

G-3port for Period lJan-30Jun49.HQMC, 1964) , p. 42 .52 . CNO Aircraft Complement and Allowances for Naval

24 . CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 12Jan50, Subj : Marine Corpsand Marine Corps Aircraft, OpNav 503C, 1003, dt d5Jun49 . assault helicopter requirements .

25 . CNO ltr to CMC, dtd 2Feb50, Subj : Marine Corp s53. HMX-1 SqdnHist, lJul-31Dec49, p . 3.54 . HMX-1 SqdnHist, IJan-30Jun50, pp . 1-5.

assault helicopter requirements .26 . DivAvn memo to Op-50, dtd 10Apr50, Subj : Confer -55. Ibid .

ence to determine assault helicopter program .56 . CO HMX-1 to CMC, dtd 30Ju150, Subj : SqdnHist, 27 .

Ibid.Period IJan-30Jun50, encl (1), p . 3-4.

28 .

CNO ltr to Dis List, dtd 4Apr50, Subj : Navy Re-57 . Ibid ., p. 5 .search and Development Plan ; Operational Require-58. CO HMX-1 ltr to CMC, dtd 20Jul50, Subj : Progress ment No. AO-17501

(AL-01502 revised),

(RotaryReport for period lFeb-30Jun50 .59 . Ibid . Wing Assault Helicopter), end (1), pp . 1-3.

Further Action by the Marine Corps Boar d

29. Chairman Marine Corps Board ltr to CMC, dtd27Apr50, Subj : Report on project .

30. Ibid .31. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 12May50, Subj : Operationa l

1 . Chairman, Marine Corps Board ltr to

CMC,

dtd Requirement No. AO-17501 ; request for higher pri -

3Jun49. ority.32 . OP-52 memo for the record, dtd 24May50, Subj :2 . Ibid.

Assault helicopter requirement for the Marine Corps.3 . Ibid .4 . Ibid. 33 . Ibid.

5 . Ibid. 34 . Ibid.

6. Ibid. 35 . CMC ltr to CNO dtd 31May50, Subj : Interim Heli -

7 . Ibid . copter.

8. Ibid . 36 .

CNO Br to CMC dtd Jun50, subj : Operational Re -quirements No . AO-17501 .

CHAPTER 3A Revitalized Helicopter Program

The Marine Corps Boar d

The Second Attempt to Procure a 3,000 Poun dPayload Helicopter

9. CO HMX-I ltr to CMC, dtd 25Jun49, Subj : TransportHelicopters, development and procurement of .

10. Ibid .11. Ibid.12. Ibid ., CMCS 2d end ., dtd 5Ju149 .13. BGen Edwin A. Pollock, Dir Div P&P, HQMC ,

memo for Dir of Avn, dtd 8Ju149, Subj : Joint DivAvn ,Div P&P, Study Group for Transport Helicopter Pro -gram, formation of.

14. CMC ltr to LtCol George S . Bowman, Jr., dtd5Aug49, Subj : Board to Study and submit recom-mendations on a transport helicopter program for th eMarine Corps.

Initial Interest in the Kaman Helicopte r

.37. Frederick G . Swanborough, Vertical Flight Aircraftof the World (New York : Aero Publishers, 1964) ,

p . 54.38. CMC ltr to CMCS, dtd 14Sep49, Subj : Kaman Heli-

copter, procurement of for experimental purposes.39. Ibid .40. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 60ct49, Subj : Kaman Heli-

copter Aircraft, procurement of for experimental pur-poses.

41. CNO ltr to BuAer, dtd 200ct49, Subj : Kaman Heli-copter procurement of for experimental purposes .

42. BuAer ltr to CNO, dtd 23Dec49, Subj : Kaman Heli-copter procurement of for Marine Corps evaluation .

98


The Beginning in Retrospec t

43 . MajGen Charles L. Bolte, USA, Asst Chief of Staff,G—3, Office of the Army Field Forces, Liaison Group ,memo for the Secretary of the Army, dtd 13Dec50 ,Subj : Army Helicopter Transport .

CHAPTER 4Korean War Expansion

Plans for an Accelerated Helicopter Program

1. OP-52 memo to OP-55, dtd 21Ju150, Subj : Transpor tHelicopter, immediate procurement of .

2. CNO ltr to BuAer, dtd 27Ju150, Subj : Marine CorpsAssault Helicopter Program, with copy to CMC .

3. Ibid .4. Ibid .5. BGcn Noah C. New ltr to DirMCHist&Mus, dt d

2May75 . Comment file, " Developmental History of theHelicopter in the USMC 1946-1962 ."

6. Navy Dept Standard Aircraft Characteristic Per-formance Summary, Sikorsky HRS—1, dtd 1May50 ,p . 4 .

7. Harry S . Pack, Vice President, Piasecki AircraftCorp ., Dr to Gen Cates, dtd 22Aug50 .

8. Special Action Report, 1st Prov. Marine Brigade,1950, extract in LtGen Edward A . Craig ltr to His-tory and Museums Division, dtd 7Apr75 . Comment fil e"Developmental History of the Helicopter in th eUSMC 1946-1962 . "

9. Col Vincent J . Gottschalk ltr to DirMCHist&Mus, dt d8May75 . Comment file, "Developmental History of theHelicopter in the USMC 1946-1962 . "

10. Special Action Report, 1st Prov. Marine Brigade ,extract in Craig ltr to History and Museums Div, dtd7Apr75, op . cit.

11. Cited in BGen Clayton C . Jerome memo to VAd mCassady, RAdms Soucek, Duckworth, Pride, and Goe ,dtd 19Sep50, no Subj, hereafter cited as Jerom ememo .

12. Jerome memo .13. MajGen F . H. Lamson-Scribner (Ret.) ltr to Di r

MCHist&Mus, dtd 23Mar75 . Comment file, "Develop -mental History of the Helicopter in the USMC 1946 —1962 . "

14. CMC Dr to CNO, dtd 23Aug50, Subj : Increases i nDelivery Schedule of Marine Assault Helicopter .

15. Ibid.16. Ibid.17. Ibid.18. G-3, HQMC memo to Dir P&P, dtd 21Jun50, Subj :

Procurement of an interim assault helicopter an dadditional liaison type helicopter .

19. Ibid .20. Dir of Avn memo to Dir P&P, dtd 25Sep50, Subj :

Increased Complement of Observation Type Heli-copter .

21. CMC ltr to CG FMFLant, dtd 26Sep50, Subj : Re -placement of OY aircraft in Marine ObservationSquadron One ; plan for.

22. Op—52 memo to Op-50, dtd 110ct50, Subj : HTL—4Helicopters for possible deployment, request for, wit hattached DivAvn routing sheet comments, dtd 90ct50 .

23. Navy Dept, BuAer Standard Aircraft Characteristics ,Performance Summary, Bell HTL—4, dtd Nov51 .

Awarding of the First Assault TransportHelicopter Contrac t

24. BuAer ltr to CNO, dtd 210ct53, Subj : Assault trans-port and Cargo helicopters ; research and developmen tprogram for.

25. DivAvn route sheet comment on DA-17560, dtd16Dec54, Subj : Model XHRX-1 Assault Transpor tHelicopter ; info concerning .

26. Ivan A . Sikorsky, Technical History of Sikorsky Air-craft and its Predecessors (Stamford, Conn ; May1966), pp . 197-198.

27. Ibid .28. Ibid .29. Ibid.30. CNO ltr to CG FMFPac, dtd 19Sep52, Subj : Am-

phibious Material New Development Guide, Jul y1951 ; comments and recommendations concerning ,review of .

31. CNO ltr to Commander Amphibious Forces, U .S .Pacific Fleet, dtd9Apr52, Subj : Amphibious Materia lNew Development Program Guide.

32. BuAer Schedule of Important Flight dates, dt d1Dec51, p . 10.

33. Ibid .

Related Events to the Expanded Helicopte rProgram

34. Head, Plans, Operations and Training Branch Mem oto Dir of Avn, dtd 11Sep50, Subj : Plans for th eHelicopter prograrn.

35. Op—52 memo to OP-05, dtd 190ct50, Subj : Marin eCorps Helicopter Plans.

36. Been New ltr, dtd 2May75, op . cit . ; CMC ltr to Dis tList, dtd 270ct50, Subj : Helicopter Program, Im-plementation of .

37. Op-52 memo, dtd 190ct50, op . cit.38. Ibid .39. Op—50 memo to Op—52, dtd 14Dec50, subj : Marin e

Corps Helicopter Plan .40. DivAvn memo to Div P&P, dtd 17Nov50, Subj : Marin e

Assault Helicopter Squadron ; number designation .41. MCS memo to President, Marine Corps Board, dtd

19Sep50, Subj : Marine Corps Board ' s study on th emission of Marine Corps aviation and its supportin gestablishments .

42. DivAvn memo to Div P&P, dtd 22Nov50, Subj : Marin eCorps Assault Helicopter Program.

43. DivAvn memo to Dir P&P, dtd 20Mar51, Subj : Marin eCorps Transport Helicopter Program .

The Tactics and Techniques Board Reports of 195 1

44. Cited in MCS, MarCor Landing Force Developmen tCenter, Landing Force Tactics and Techniques Board,Staff Study : Employment of Assault Transport Heli-copter, dtd 5 Jan51, p . 2 ., hereafter T&T Board Studyof 5Jan51 .

45. Ibid .46. CMC hr to CMCS, dtd 22Nov50, Subj : Marine Corp s

Assault Helicopter Program.47. Ibid.48. Ibid.49. T&T Board Study of 5Jan51, App . A, p . 10 .

NOTES 99

.50 . Ibid., p. 30 . 80 . DivAvn memo to CMC, dtd 18Sep53, Subj : Helicopter

51 . Ibid., pp . 29-35 . information, encl. (2) .52 . Ibid., p . 30. 81 . DivAvn routing sheet, dtd 7Apr53, Subj : Additional

53 . Ibid., p . 34 . HRS helicopter procurement.

54 . MCS, MarCor Landing Force Development Center,Landing Force Tactics and Techniques Board, Staff

Study : Marine Helicopter Transport Program, dt d28Feb51,

p .

1 .,

hereafter

T&T

Board

Study

of

82.

CMC ltr to Dist List, dtd 23Nov52, Subj : MarineAviation Status Board Photograph, encl. (1) ; CM Cltr to Dist List, dtd 29Dec53, Same Subj, encl. (1) .

28Feb51 . Peripheral Aspects of the Perio d55.

CNO ltr to Dist List, dtd 12Mar51, Subj : Aviatio nPlan 11-51 (Planned Expansion of the Naval Aero-nautical Organization during the remainder of Fisca lYear 1951 and Fiscal Year 1952) .

56. T&T Board Study of 28Feb51, App . C, p. III . The ac-tual commissioning dates and locations are cited fro mMontross, Cavalry of the Sky, pp . 234-239 .

57. T&T Board Study of 28Feb51, App . C, pp . III-IV .58. Ibid.59. Ibid ., App F, pp. I-II.60. T&T Board Study of 5Jan51, p . 24 ; T&T Board Stud y

of 28Feb51, p . 5.

Activation of the 3d Marine Aircraft Win g

61. Op-52 memo to Op-50, dtd 1Sep50, Subj : Marin eAviation Shore Establishment and Aircraft Require-ment through Fiscal Year 1953.

62. Op-53 memo to Op-50, dtd 20Nov51, Subj : Tentativ eNaval Aeronautical Organization .

63. CMC ltr to Dist List, dtd 27Aug51, Subj : The Curren tMarine Corps Aviation Organization .

64. CMC ltr to Dist List, dtd 11Jan52, Subj : Plans for ex-panding Marine Aviation .

65. Ibid .66. CMC ltr to Dist List, dtd 31Jan52, Subj : Plans fo r

expanding Marine Aviation, implementation of .67. CMC ltr, dtd 11Jan52, op. cit . The actual commis -

sioning dates are cited from Montross, Cavalry of th eSky, pp . 234-238.

68. DivAvn memo to Asst C/S G-3, dtd 25Aug52, Subj :Annual report for the CNO for FY-52, encl. (1), p. 9.

Performance Summary, Kaman, OH-43D (HOK-1) ,dtd 1Ju167, p. 4 .

71. CNO ltr to BuAer, dtd 5Dec52, Subj : Utility versionof the XWSS-1 helicopter (HUS), Marine Corps re-quirement for.

72. CNO ltr to BuAer, dtd 27Feb52, Subj : ASM Heli-copters, development of.

73. CNO ltr, dtd 5Dec52, op . cit .74. Ibid.75. Ibid.76. Navy Dept. BuAer Standard Aircraft Characteristics ,

NavAer 00-110AH34-1, dtd 1Ju167, pp . 2-5 .77. CNO ltr, dtd 5Dec52, op . cit.78. Op-52 memo to Op-52, dtd 24Mar52, Subj : Aircraft

requirement to support FY54 program objectives ;CMC hr to CNO, dtd 15Dec52, Subj : Department o fthe Navy program objectives, FY-55 .

79. Op-50 ltr to Op-52, dtd 4Aug53, Subj : Revised FY-5 5Marine Aircraft Requirement (within 1424 operatin gceiling) .

83. BuAer ltr to Commander Naval Air Test Center, dt d20Apr53, Subj : Letter of intent for contract No . 52 -947 : Model XHCH-1 (Cargo Unloader) helicopter .

84. Cited in MarCor Development Center, Staff Study :Employment in Marine Observation Squadrons in a nAmphibious Operation, dtd Jan54, Anx D, p . 3, Op-erational Requirement No. CA-17505 .

CHAPTER 5Seeking a New Order of Mobility

A Concept for Future Amphibious Operation s

1. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 17Jul51, Subj : Concept fo rfuture amphibious operations .

2. Ibid .3. CNO ltr to CMC, dtd 13Aug51, Subj : Concept of

future amphibious operations .

Initial Determination of the Marine Corps 'Helicopter Aircraft Carrier Requirement s

4. BGen Albert D. Cooley ltr to Been Frank H. Lam-son-Scribner, dtd 30Jul51, no subject ; Op-52 memo t oOp-05B, dtd 6Apr51, Subj : Helicopter tender (proto-type), requirements and development of.

5. Cited in MajGen Harris ltr to CGFMFLant, dtd29Mar52, Subj : Development of Helicopter Concept.

6. FMFLant, Final Report in HELEX I and II, dt d7Apr52, p. 2.Ibid ., p . 4 .Ibid .MajGen Field Harris ltr to CGFMF, dtd 29Mar52 ,

Subj : Development of Helicopter Concept, pp . 2-4 .CMC 2d end., dtd 28Apr52, on CG FMFLant ltr t oCNO, dtd 1Ju152, Subj : Development of Helicopter

Concept .11. CNO ltr to Chief, Bureau of Ships dtd 8Sep52, Subj :

CVE-55 Class Aircraft Carrier ; modification fo rrotary wing type aircraft operations ; Chief, Bureau o fShips ltr to CNO, dtd 20Nov52, Subj : Shipbuildin gand Conversion Program for Fiscal Year 1955, recom-mendations for.

12. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 26Nov52, Subj : 1955 Ship -building and Conversion Program; CMC ltr to CNO,dtd 5Feb53, Subj : Development of Helicopter Con-cept, CVE-55 class conversion, cited in : DirAvn memoto CMC, dtd 27Feb53, Subj : Information for the Com-mandant's briefing of the Secretary of the Navy, " Th eMarine Helicopter Program . "

The Advance Research Grou p

13. Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, p . 226 .14. BGen Noah C. New ltr to DirMCHist&Mus, dtd

1952 Aircraft Plans for the Future 7 .8 .

69 . DivAvn memo to CMC, dtd 18Sep53, Subj : Heli -copter information, encl. (2), p . 2.

9 .

70.

Navy Dept BuAer Standard Aircraft Characteristics, 10 .

100


2May75. Comment File, "Developmental History of 44 .the Helicopter in the USMC, 1946, 1962 ." 45 .

15.

CMC ltr to CMCS, dtd 19Jan53, Subj : Marine CorpsAdvanced Group . 46 .

16. Ibid .17. AC/S, G-1 memo to CMCS, dtd 7Dec61, Subj : Ad -

vanced Research Groups, roster of, years 1953-1957 .18. "A Summary of the General Officers' Conference ,

HQMC," dtd 14-16Jul54, p . 31 .19. Ibid., p . 39.20. Ibid., p . 40.21. H&SCo, MarCorTU#1, Unit Diary, dtd 2Sep54.22. CG FMFPac Troops ltr to BGen Wilbert S . Brown ,

dtd 27Feb53, Subj : Activation of 2d Marine CorpsProvisional Atomic Exercise Brigade (MCPAEB) ;CG MCPAEB ltr to CMC, dtd 19May53, Subj : Exer -cise DESERT ROCK V-MarCor, report on, p . 12 .

23. 1953-1954 Advanced Research Group, Project IV ,Marine Corps Transport Helicopter Requirements fo rthe Immediate Future, p. 4 .

24. Ibid., pp . 6-7 .25. Ibid., pp . 9-51 .26. Ibid., pp. 35-37 .27. Ibid.28. Col John A . Saxton, G-3, HQMC, memo to Advanced

Research Group Panel, n .d., Subj : Proposed programfor the 1954-55 Advanced Research Group .

29. Dir of Avn memo to C/S, dtd 8Apr54, Subj : Solutionto Advanced Research Group Project I "Concept o fFuture Amphibious Operations," comments and rec-ommendations regarding, p. 3 .

30. 1953-54 Advanced Research Group, Project IV, op .cit ., p . ' 55 .

31. CMC memo to C/S, HQMC, dtd 22Ju11954, Subj :

Ibid .CNO ltr to CMC, dtd 16Jun55, Subj : Marine Corpsrequirements for helicopters .CNO ltr to CMC, dtd 11Oct55, Subj : Marine Corpsrequirements for helicopters .

A Reduced HR2S Progra m

47. CMC Itr to CNO, dtd 190ct55, Subj : Procurement o ftransport helicopters for the Marine Corps ; recom-mendation concerning .

48. CMC hr to CNO, dtd 23Nov55, Subj : Procurement o ftransport helicopters for the Marine Corps, recom-mendations concerning .

49. MajGen Henry R . Paige ltr to Gen Randolph McC .Pate, dtd 24Jan56, no subj .

50. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 23Nov55, op. cit .51. CNO ltr to CMC, dtd 12Apr56, Subj : HR2S-1 Pro-

curement Program .52. Ibid .

CHAPTER 6A Period of Reevaluation-A Moderat e

Capability

HQMC G-3 Study Number 3-1956

1. G-3, HQMC Study No. 3-1956 memo to CMC, dtd8May56, Subj : Employment of Helicopters within th eFMF during the period 1956-60 .

2. Ibid., pp . 2-6 .3. CMC hr to C/S, dtd 24May55, Subj : Board to Stud y

Composition and Functions of Marine Corps Aviation .Marine Corps Transport Helicopter Requirements . 4.

G-3, HQMC Study No . 3, dtd 8May56, op . cit ., pp .7-8 .

5 . CMC Itr to CG FMFPac and CG FMFLant, dtd32 .

CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 230ct54, Suhj : Aircraft re -quirements for Marine Helicopter Transport Squad -rons .

Landing Force Bulletin Number 17

4Sep56, Suhj : Helicopter Assault Capabilities, 1957 -1960 .

Marine Corps Aviation Five-Year Progra m33 . CMC hr to CMCS, dtd 7Dec55, Subj : Program for th e

implementation of the Marine Corps Amphibious Con -cept.

1957-1962

6 .

A

Summary

of

the

General

Officers'

Conference ,HQMC, dtd 12-17Ju156, pp . 37-45 .

7 .

CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 5Ju156, Subj : Marine Corp s34 . CNO ltr to CMC, dtd 8Dec55, Subj : Concept o f

Future Amphibious Assault Operations .35 .

Ibid.36 .

Ibid.37 . HQMC, Landing Force Bulletin Number 17 : Concep t

of Future Amphibious Operations, dtd 13Dec55 .

Aviation Program, Fiscal Years 1957-1962, p. 2 . toencl . 3 .

The Hogaboom Board of 1956

8 . HQMC, Report of the Fleet Marine Force Organiza -The Smith Board tion and Composition Board, dtd 7Jan57, App. C ,

encl . (1), p. 7, hereafter Hogaboom Board-1956.38 .

CMC ltr to LtGen Oliver P. Smith, dtd 23Dec54, Subj : 9. Hogaboom Board-1956, part 1, p . 1.Precept convening board to study the composition and 10 . Ibid.functions of Marine Aviation . 11 . Ibid ., Part II, p . 14.

39 . HQMC Study : The Composition of and Functions of 12 . Ibid.Marine Aviation, dtd Jan-Feb55, p . 21. 13 . Ibid., Part III, pp. 2-7 .

40 .

Ibid., p . 51 . 14 . Ibid., Part III, p . 9 . Fig . 1 taken from Part VII, p .41 . CMC memo to C/S, dtd 24May55, Subj : Board to 180 .

Study

the

Composition and

Functions of

Marine 15 . Ibid., Part III, p. 10 . Figs . 7 and 8 taken from Par tCorps Aviation . VII, pp . 194 and 212 .

42. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 1Mar55, Subj : Marine Corps 16 . Ibid., Part V, p . 7 .requirements for helicopter utility aircraft . 17 . Ibid., Part V, p. 8.

43 . Op-52 memo to Op-09M, dtd 2May55, Subj : Informa- 18 . A

summary

of

the

General

Officers '

Conferenc etion on transport helicopter program . HQMC, dtd 13-15Ju159, p. 5 .

NOTES

10 1

Forced Reductio n

19. HQMC, Marine Corps Program Summary, dtd Jan-May59, Avn Program Sec, pp . 1-7 ; HQMC, Summaryof the General Officers' Conference, dtd 13-15Ju159 ,pp . 47-55 .

20. Dir of Avn memo to CMC, dtd 23Sep57, Subj : MarineCorps aviation program changes Fiscal Years 1958-1962 under current guidance for force level reductions,encl . (2), p. 2 .

21. Ibid . ,encl . (5) .22. CNO ltr to CMC, dtd 11Apr56, Subj : Amphibiou s

Assault Ship requirements to support the mobility o fthe FMF.

23. Jane's Fighting Ships 1961-1962 (London : Jane ' sFighting Ships Ltd ., 1962), pp . 316-319 .

Growth and Changes Under Austere Condition s1956-1962

24. CMC ltr to CG FMFPac and CG FMFLant, dtd11May56, Subj : Assignment of Marine ObservationSquadrons to Marine Helicopter Groups .

25. CNO spdltr Op-332D to CMC, dtd 18Feb59, citedin UD RUC 01074, reel 14-59, p . 99 .

26. Avn UHist File, RefSec, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC.27. CMC Dr to Dist List, dtd monthly, 1956 and 1957 ,

Subj : Aviation Status Board Photographs, dist, of ,end (1), hereafter CMC AvnStaBrdPho, with rele-vant year.

28. CMC AvnStaBrdPho, Jan57-Dec57.

Implementation of the Hogaboom Boar dRecommendation s

29. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 14Mar58, Subj : Establishmentand redesignation of certain Marine squadrons ; CO,MAG-16 ltr to CMC, dtd 14Mar58, Subj : Organiza-tion of MAG-16, pp . 1-7 ; CMC AvnStaBrd Pho, 1958 .

30. CO, MAG-16 ltr to CMC, dtd 22Apr59, Subj : Or-ganization of MAG-16, pp . 1-7.

31. Avn UHist File, RefSec, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC .32. Ibid .33. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 8Mar60, Subj : CMC ltr o f

31Mar59, encl (2), Aircraft Operating Program .34. CMC AvnStaBrdPho, Jan60-Dec62 .

CHAPTER 7

Beginning the Transition toTurbine-Powered Helicopters

Selection of the CH-4 6

1. LtGen Keith B . McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation i nVietnam 1962-1970," Naval Review 1971, p . 134.

2. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 9Jan58, Subj : Future procure-ment of a transport version of HSS-2, cited in CN ODr to CMC, dtd 8Feb58, same subj .

3. CNO ltr to Dist List, dtd 7Mar60, Subj : Develop-ment Characteristic No . AO-17501-2 (Subj : VTOLAssault Transport Helicopter), promulgation of,end (1), pp. 1-3 .

4. BuWeps Program Report, Model HRB-1 Helicopter,dtd 8Feb62, sections A-1 to A-3 and B-1 to B-4 .

5. Dir MCLFDC ltr to CMC, dtd 1Ju160, Subj : Compari-son of the Vertol 107 with the HR3S .

6. BuWeps Summary Report, dtd 8Feb62, op . cit.7. Ibid .

Choosing a Heavy Helicopte r

8. Dir of Avn ltr to Dist List, dtd 25Nov59, Subj : VTO LAssault Transport Program .

9. Ibid.10. BuWeps . RA2v Memo for the record, dtd 16Nov62 ,

Subj : H-H (X) Assault Transport Helicopter Com-petition, Evaluation and Recommendations, encl (2) ,pp. 1-3, hereafter BuWeps memo, dtd 16Nov62 .

11. Ibid.12. Ibid .13. Lee S. Johnson, President, Sikorsky, ltr to BuWeps ,

dtd 14Aug61, Subj : Four-ton Assault Helicopter forMarine Use—Proposal for.

14. Ibid .15. BuWeps Memo, dtd 16Nov62 .16. Ibid .17. Ibid . ; Department of Defense Directive 4505 .6, dtd

6Ju162, Subj : Designation, Redesignation and Namin gof Military Aircraft.

The Selection of an Assault Support Helicopter(ASH )

18. DivAvn Memo to DC/S, R&D) dtd 29Sep60, Subj :Aircraft Briefs, end (2), p. 2 .

19. CMC ltr to CMCLFDA, dtd 4Feb61, Subj : AssaultSupport Helicopter .

20. Dir MCLFDA memo to CMC, dtd 4Nov60, Subj :Study Project 70-59-09 (Marine Corps Helicopte rRequirements) Phase I, completion of.

21. CNO ltr to BuWeps, dtd 5Sep61, Subj : Assault Sup -port Helicopter (ASH) Program .

22. Ibid.23. Ibid.24. Ibid.25. Ibid . ; DC/S Air Memo to C/S, HQMC, dtd 26Dec63 ,

Subj : Hiller OHSA (entry in Army LOH Competi-tion), Information concerning .

26. BuWeps NavAir 00-110AH1-1, Standard Aircraf tCharacteristics, p . 3 ; lstLt Joe D. Browning, " Meetthe Assault Support Helicopter, " Marine Corps Ga-zette, V. 46, No . 11 (Nov62), p . 16 .

The Essex Class Carrier as an Interim LPH

27. CNO ltr to CMC, dtd 11Apr56, Subj : AmphibiousAssault Ship requirements to support the mobility o fthe FMF ; CNO ltr to CMC, dtd 27Jun56, same subj ;Col Samuel R . Shaw memo to Chairman, Standin gCommittee, Shipbuilding and conversion, dtd 14Aug57 ,Subj : Use of CVS (Unconverted Essex) AircraftCarriers as LPH .

28. Head, Policy Analysis Division memo to the C/S, dt d28Apr54, Subj : Proposed CMC ltr to CNO re use o fCVS or CVA for helicopter operations .

29. DC/S (RD&S), HQMC memo to DirMarCorHistMus ,dtd 25Nov70, in Comment File, "Developmental His-tory of the United States Marine Corps, 1900-1970 . "

102


30. CMC memo to CNO dtd 2May58, Subj : Use of CVSAircraft Carriers as Interim LPH .

31. Jane's Fighting Ships 1959—1960 (London ; Jane' sFighting Ships Ltd ., 1960) pp . 366—371 ; U.S . Arm yArmor School, United States Marine Corps Referenc eData (Fort Knox, Kentucky : March 1966) pp . V-3-V—7 .

32. Ibid.33. Ibid.

34. BuShips, Monthly Progress Report on Shipbuildin gand Conversion, dtd monthly 1958—1967 (Naval Hist -Div, Ships HistBr., Washington, D .C . )

One-Man Helicopters

35. MCLFDC, T&T Board Report : Marine Corps Heli-copter Requirements, Project #70—59-09, dtd 2May61 ,App A—1 to F—9 (CCC, MCB, Quantico) .

APPENDIX A

ABBREVIATIONS

ACNO Assistant Chief of Naval Operations FMF Fleet Marine Forc eAKA Attack Cargo Ship FMFLant Fleet Marine Force, Atlanti cAPA Attack Transport Ship FMFPac Fleet Marine Force, PacificAsst Assistant HMR Marine Transport Helicopter Squadro nBLT Battalion Landing Team HMX Marine Helicopter Squadro nBuAer U.S . Navy Bureau of Aeronautics HQMC Headquarters, U .S. Marine CorpsBuWeps U.S. Navy Bureau of Naval Weapons Lex Landing Exercis eCG Commanding General LPH Amphibious Assault Shi pCMC Commandant of the Marine Corps LSD Landing Ships, DockCMCS Commandant Marine Corps Schools LST Landing Ships, Tan kCNO Chief of Naval Operations Ltr LetterCO Commanding Officer MAG Marine Aircraft GroupCV The letters designating an aircraft carrier . MCAS Marine Corps Air Statio n

The third letter is added to distinguish be - MCDC Marine Corps Development Centertween the various types : MCEB Marine Corps Equipment Board

CVA—Attack Aircraft Carrier MCEC Marine Corps Educational Cente rCVE--Escort Aircraft Carrier MCS Marine Corps School sCVHA--Escort Helicopter Aircraft Carrier Memo MemorandumCVL—Light Aircraft Carrier NAS Naval Air Statio nCVS—Support Aircraft Carrier RLT Regimental Landing Tea m

DCNO Deputy Chief of Naval Operations USA U .S . ArmyDiv Division USAF U .S. Air Forc eDivAir Division of Aviation USMC U .S. Marine Corp sDiv P&P Division of Plans and Policies USN U .S. Nav yEncl. Enclosure VMO Marine Observation Squadron

103

APPENDIX B

HELICOPTER DESIGNATIONS

The first letter *, in Navy and Marine Corps usage ,denotes the type of machine, the second its primary func-tion (mission) . The third letter identifies the manufac-turer. A number inserted between the function an dmanufacturer's letter indicates the model number of th edesigner's aircraft in the same class—the first model o rdesign number "1" is always omitted . The number follow -

* The letter "X" or "Y" may precede the entiredesignation . In this case the letter "X " is used for denot-ing experimental aircraft. The letter "Y" is used for themore advanced experimental types and also to denot eaircraft procured in limited quantities to develop th epotentialities of the design .

ing the dash indicates the number of modifications to th ebasic model, i .e., the HR2S–1 is defined as a (H) heli-copter, (R) transport, (2) second model, (S) Sikorsky ,and (–1) first modification .

ManufacturerB—Boein gK—KamanL—BellP—Piasecki (after 1952 )P—Pitcairn (before 1937 )S—SikorskyU—Vought–Sikorsk y

Type letter

H—HelicopterHO—Observatio nHR—Transpor tHS—Antisubmarin eHT—TrainerHU—Utility

104

APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY

1932

May

Marine Corps received Pitcairn OP–1 auto -gyro at Quantico, Virginia .

28 Jun

Evaluation of OP–1 began in Nicaragua .

193 9

14 Sep Igor I. Sikorsky test flew the VS–300, the firs tpractical helicopter in the Western Hemi-sphere .

1946

18 Jun

CMC established Marine Corps helicopte rprogram .

8 Aug

Major Armand H . DeLalio became first Marin eto be designated as a helicopter pilot .

21 Aug General Geiger, after viewing A Bomb tests ,expressed concern to CMC of nuclear weapon seffect on future amphibious operations .

13 Sep

CMC tasks Special Board to find solution t oamphibious warfare in an atomic environment .

16 Dec Special Board recommended development of ahelicopter program as one solution for con-ducting amphibious operations in an atomi cenvironment .

19 Dec CMC directed implementation of a helicopte rprogram and outlined concept of future am-phibious operations .

194 7

1 Dec

HMX–1 Commissioned.

194 8

9 Feb

HMX–1 received first helicopter, Sikorsk yH03S–1 (S–51) .

23 May

HMX–1 executes first vertical assault in Op-eration PACKARD II .

9 Aug

HMX–1 received first Bell HTL–2 (H–13) .

19 Aug

HMX–1 received the HRP–1 (PU–3) .Nov MCS publishes PHIB–31 (Amphibious Op-

erations—Employment of Helicopters (Tenta-tive)) .

1949

3 Jun

Marine Corps Board recommended the activa-tion of the first two 12-plane transport heli-copter squadrons to commence in 1953 .

6 Oct

CMC requested Kaman 190 helicopter forevaluation as an observation helicopter .

195 0

12 Jan

CMC requested 13–15 man assault helicopters .

28 Mar

Informal Helicopter Conference drew upspecifications for a 20-man assault transport

helicopter which subsequently became Opera-tion Requirement No . AO–17501 for th eSikorsky HR2S–1 (S–56) .

22 May Joint Helicopter Conference recommended atwo-phase helicopter program : Long-rang esolution was AO–1750 (HR2S) and short -range the procurement of an interim heli-copter to satisfy immediate requirements .

14 Jul

VMO–6 departed San Diego for Korea wit hfour H03S–1 helicopters .

21 Jul

CMC requested the Sikorsky HRS–1(S–55 )as an interim assault helicopter .

. 195 1

5 Jan Tactics and Techniques Board published it sstudy, Employment of Assault Transport Heli-copters .

15 Jan

Marine Corps commissioned HMR–161, thefirst Marine transport helicopter squadron .

28 Feb

Tactics and Techniques Board published itsstudy, Marine Helicopter Transport Program .

20 Mar

Sikorsky awarded the contract to build th eHR2S–1 .

5 Apr

HMR–261 commissioned .14 Jun Marine aircraft wing reorganized . Helicopter

squadrons placed under a parent aircraftgroup headquarters .

30 Jun

HMR–162 commissioned .

1 Jul

HMR–161 deployed to Korea .17 Jul CMC published concept of future amphibiou s

operations urging CNO to provide a ship -building program to parallel the availabilit yof the HR2S–1.

13 Aug CNO approved CMC concept of future am-phibious operations of landing the assaul telements of one Marine division by helicopter .

1 Sep


15 Nov


1952

11 Jan

CMC published Marine Aviation Plan 1–5 2which allowed for the expansion of Marineaviation with the commissioning of MAG(HR)–16, MAG (HR) -26, and MAG(HR)–36 .

25 Feb

HMR--361 commissioned .

1 Mar

MAG(HR)–16 commissioned .29 Mar MajGen Harris submitted report on HELEX I

and II outlining the suitability and require-ment for CVE and CVL class carriers as modi-fied LPHs .

28 Apr

CMC requested four converted CVE–55s b emodified for helicopter assault operations .

30 Apr


105

106


2 Jun

HMR—363 commissioned .2 Jun

MAG(HR)—36 commissioned .16 Jun

HMR–263 commissioned .16 Jun

MAG(HR)–26 commissioned .5 Dec

CNO instructed BuAer to develop the HUS– 1(S—58) for the Marine Corps.

1953

5 Feb CMC revised Marine Corps assault helicopte raircraft requirements to a total of 16 LPHs ;four converted CVE—105s and 12 CVE—55s .

1954

27 Apr CMC approved the Advanced Research Group sProject I thereby establishing the concep tcontained therein as the long-range goal o fthe Marine Corps .

1 Jul

Marine Corps Test Unit One activated .22 Jul CMC approved Advanced Research Group

Project IV, Marine Corps Transport Heli-copter Requirements for the Immediate Future .

23 Oct CMC requested CNO authorize an increase i nthe number of HR2S–1 helicopters from 13 5to 180, i .e ., nine squadrons of 20 aircraft eachvice 15 each .

1955

24 May CMC announced decision on Smith Boardwhich resulted in two medium utility heli-copter squadrons being added to each aircraf twing organization .

24 May CMC established a goal of helicopter liftin gthe assault elements of one and one hal fdivisions by helicopter.

16 Jun

CNO approved Marine Corps helicopter pro -gram of 180 HR2S–ls and 45 HUS–ls .

13 Dec Landing Force Bulletin Number 17 approve dwhich officially promulgated the Marine Corp sconcept of future amphibious operations .

1956

8 May G—3 Study Number 3 completed recommendin gan increase from nine to 15 transport heli-copter squadrons ; 245 light and 45 mediu maircraft .

22 May CMC agreed to a five-year shipbuilding pro -gram producing five new construction LPH sand five converted from the CVE—105 class .One of each type per year from 1958 to 1962 .

4 Jun Hogaboom Board appointed to study the orga-nization and composition and equipment of th eFMF.

5 Jul Marine Corps Aviation Five-Year Progra msubmitted to CNO. Plan called for nine lighthelicopter squadrons of 20 aircraft each an dsix medium squadrons of 15 Aircraft each ,plus three VMOs of 18 aircraft each, all b y1962.

20 Jul

Thetis Bay (CVS–90) commissioned a sCVHA—1 .

31 Dec

HMR squadrons began changing designatio nto HMR(L) .

195 7

7 Jan Hogaboom Board report published, outlinin gthree phase objective, 1957 to 1965, for th ehelicopter program .

12 Jan

HMR(M)—461 commissioned .

13 Feb

Marine Corps received first HUS in a tactica lsquadron.

3 Nov

HMR (M) -462 commissioned.

1958

9 Jan

CMC requested replacement for the HUS—1 .2 May CMC informed CNO that Marine Corps con-

sidered the CVS as an acceptable interimLPH .

1 Jun Helicopter groups reorganize under "M" seriesT/0 as recommended by Hogaboom Board .Two HMR(L)s and one HMR(C) in eachgroup .

1 Sep

HMR(M)—463 commissioned.

1959

30 Jan

USS Boxer (CVS—21) reclassified as th eLPH—4 .

2 Mar

USS Princeton reclassified as the LPH—5.

16 Mar

MAG(HR) designation changed to MAG .

30 Jun

HAIR (L) -264 commissioned.

1960

1 Feb Helicopter groups revert to "L" series T/0structure . Three HMR (L) s vice two HMR (L) sand one HMR(C) .

7 Mar

CNO published Developmental Characteristi cNumber AO—17501—1 for the CH—46A .

9 Aug

CNO issued Developmental Characteristi cNumber AO—17503—3 for the ASH .

196 1

20 Feb BuWeps announced that Boeing—Vertrol woul dbuild the replacement for the HUS—1, th eCH—46A (BU—107II) .

27 Mar

CNO issued Developmental Characteristi cNumber AO—17501—3 for the CH—53A (S—65) .

1 Jul

USS, Valley Forge reclassified as the LPH—8.

1 Sep

HMR—364 commissioned.

1962

1 Feb

HMR(L)s began changing designation t oHMM and HMR(M) s to HMH .

2 Mar BuWeps announced that Bell Aircraft Com-pany would build the Marine Corps ASH, th eHU–1E (BELL—204) .

24 Aug

BuWeps announced Siorsky 's CH—53A woul dreplace the HR2S—1 .

AP

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65'7

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of P

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88

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312

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96

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1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

HR

P-1

56

5

HR

P-2

23

31

H0

3S

-15

85

43

12

2

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22

1

HT

L-2

11

11

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22

1

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L-4

811

125

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-147

3536

2725

278

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S-2

7160

5211

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7711

312

311

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211

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214

3736

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3735

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4912

415

919

925

530

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-23

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1525

7616

620

218

816

717

923

832

228

630

434

338

9

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2224

1417

2443

4541

5341

4237

3934

2225

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de

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end

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.

INDEX

Advanced Research Group, 58, 62—66, 7 1"Aerocycle, " 89Air Force, 18, 21, 31—34, 36, 38, 40, 83—84Air Readiness Division, 30, 3 4Amphibious Operations—Employment of Helicopters (Ten-

tative), 2 5Anderson, Col Norman J., 7 3Anderson, lstLt Roy L ., 2 0Armed Services Unification Act of 1947, 3 8Army, 9, 26, 36, 38, 43, 68, 82—8 7Army Air Corps, 2Army Air Forces, 4, 7, 1 5Army Field Forces, 38Army Transportation Research and Engineering Comman d

(TRECOM), 90Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Marine Aviation) ,

(ACNO (Marine Aviation) ), 17, 1 9Assistant Commandant for Air, 7 0Assault Support Helicopter (ASH), 85, 86Atomic Age, 11

.Attu, 32Aviation Plan 1—5, 5 2Aviation Plan 1—52, 5 2Aviation Plan Number 21—29, 2 3Aviation Plan No . 57, Supplement No . 3, 2 1

Bare, MGen Robert 0 ., 66Barber, Captain Charles D ., 20Basic School, 3 1Battalion Landing Team (BLT), 7 0Bell Aircraft Corporation, 3—4, 7, 21—22, 44, 86, 92Bell, Larry D ., 4Bikini, 8, 1 1Boeing Vertol Company, 3, 83—8 4Bougainville, 11, 24, 80Bowman, LtCol George S ., 31—33Bowman Board, 34Bridgeport, Conn ., 1Brown, BGen Wilburt S ., 6 3Buffalo, New York, 3Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), 4—5, 7—8, 14—19, 21, 23—24,

28, 31—32, 34—38, 40, 43—44, 46—47, 54-56, 68—69, 80 ,82—8 3

Bureau of Naval Weapons (BuWeps), 82—84, 86, 9 2Bureau of Ordnance, 82Bureau of Ships (BuShips), 6 1Burke, Adm Arleigh A ., 65—66, 72, 88

Campbell, Col William, 7 3Carey, LtCol John F ., 28, 32—34Carl, LtCol Marion B ., 1 3Cassady, VAdm John H ., 36, 40, 43—44Cates, Gen Clifton B ., 22, 31—36, 43—44, 49—50, 58—6 2Cavalry of the Sky, 5 1Cessna, 86Chance Vought Division, 1Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, 16, 1 8Chief of Military Requirements Section, 17

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 7—8, 11, 14—24, 29—30 ,32—38, 40, 43—44, 46—48, 50, 52, 55—56, 58—61, 65—70, 72 ,82—86, 88—9 1

CNO's Air Planning Group, 1 5China, 1, 11, 32Choiseul, 2 4Chosin Reservoir, 6 7Civil Aeronautics Administration, 4, 8, 3 7Coast Guard, 7—8, 3 8Colley, Thomas J ., 62Collins, BGen William R., 82—8 3Combs, VAdm Thomas S ., 6 9Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, 6 0Condon, John P ., 62Conoley, Col Odell M ., 73Consolidated Vultee Corporation, 32Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing Force Developmen t

Activities (CMCLFDA), 85Craig, BGen Edward A ., 42—44Crockett, Col Henry H ., 73Operation CROSSOVER, 2 8Cushman, BGen Thomas J ., 4 2

DeLalio, Maj Armond H ., 8— 9Department of Defense (DOD), 26, 83—8 4Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO), 47, 6 9Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) (DCNO (Air) ) ,

16—17, 19—20, 36, 40, 60, 86DCNO (Air) Aviation Plans, 3 6DCNO (Air) Readiness, 36DCNO (Operations), 16Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans), 73Exercise DESERT ROCK, 6 3Director of the Division of Aviation/Assistant Commandant

of the Marine Corps (Air), 19, 3 1Director of Marine Aviation, 12, 43, 60, 6 5Director of Plans and Policy, 4 8Division of Aviation (DivAvn), Headquarters Marin e

Corps (HQMC), 11, 30 .32, 36—37, 40, 44, 47—49, 57, 65 ,67, 70, 72, 77—78, 81, 8 5

Division of Plans and Policies, 3 1Dogship, 5Doman, 86" Downwash " , 94Doyle, LtCol Griffith B ., 79Drone Helicopter, 9 1Duncan, VAdm Donald B ., 16, 5 9Dyer, BGen Edward C ., 12—13, 19—20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 31—32 ,

57, 7 3

Eddystone, Pennsylvania, 3Elizabeth City, North Carolina, 8Employment of Assault Transport Helicopter, 4 9"Employment of Helicopter with the FMF During th e

Period of 1956 to 1960," 7 0Erskine, Gen Graves B ., 60Executive Order 8929, 8

109

110

INDEX

Five-Year Plan, 78Fleet Marine Force (FMF), 19, 30-31, 34, 36, 52, 62-63 ,

67, 70-71, 73-74, 77-78, 8 3Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLant), 21, 28, 31, 50,

51, 60, 66-67, 71, 8 0FMF Organization and Composition Board, 7 3Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), 31, 43, 51, 71, 80Floyd Bennett Field, Brooklyn, New York, 7- 8"Flying banana " , 5"Flying Crane", 9 0"Flying LST", 3 2"Flying Platform", 89Flynn, Capt Paul J ., 20Force Troops, FMFPac, 6 3Force Troops, 74

Gardenville, New York, 3Geiger, LtGen Roy S., 1, 4, 1 1Germany, 1Gilberts, 32Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J ., 42-4 3G-3 Division, HQMC, 7 0Ground effect, 9G-3 Study Number 3, 70

Guadalcanal, 12, 22, 8 9Guam, 11, 15, 89Gyrodyne, 86

Harris, MGen Field, 11-12, 19, 60-6 1Headquarters (HQMC), 14, 20, 30-33, 36, 44, 47, 61, 66,

73, 78, 85-86, 90, 92HELEX I, 6 0HELEX II, 6 0Helicopter Types :

CAMEL, 85-8 6CH-19, 84CH-37, 84CH-53, 91CH-53A, 84-85Focke-Achgeles 61a, 1H-21, 40, 4 2H-34, 6 8HC-1B, Chinook, 8 4HJP-1, 7HNS-1, 7HNX-1 (R-4), 9H02S-1, 2 1H03S, 19, 21-22, 27-29, 34, 43, 5 5H03S-1, 3-4, 31, 25-26, 28, 46, 42-4 4H04S-1, 9, 4 0H05S, 44H05S-1, 24, 44, 48, 5 4HOK, 74, 80-82, 84-86HOK-1, 54-55HOS-1 (R-6), 8-9HR2S, 48-50, 54, 57, 60-61, 64-65, 67-70, 72-73, 78-84 ,

88, 9 4HR2S-1, 47-48, 59, 64, 67, 69, 79, 8 4HR3S, 8 2HR3S-1, 82-8 3HRB-1, 83-8 4HRP, 15-17, 19, 21, 26-28, 32, 34-36HRP-1, 5-6, 13-16, 19, 21, 25-29, 31, 33, 3 5HRP-2, 6HRS-2, 6HRS, 40, 44, 47-51, 54-57, 60-61, 63-64, 67, 70, 72, 74 ,

79-80, 84

HRS-A, 46HRS-B, 4 6HRS-1, 40, 42, 47, 57HRS-4, 55-56HSS-1, 68HSS-2, 8 2HTK-1 Drone, 91-92HTL, 7, 22-23, 27-28, 34, 37, 44, 55HTL-1, 22HTL-2, 21-23, 27-2 9HTL-3, 22-23, 29, 45HTL-4s, 44-45, 6 2HTL-5, 4 5HU-1B, 8 6HUL, 92HUP-1, 7, 3 8HUS, 57, 64, 67-70, 72, 78, 80, 82, 88HUS-1, 56-57, 68-69, 79, 82, 84K-190, 37-38, 54K-225, 54-5 5LOA, 85-8 6LOH, 8 6Model 30, 4Model 30-1, 3Model 30-2, 3Model 30-3, 4Bell Model 47, 4, 7OH-43D, .55, 84PD-14, 7PD-22, 32, 40PD-22C, 4 2PV-2, 3-4PV-3, 5PV-15, 7R-4 (HNX-1) , 2, 4, 7, 1 1R-5 (H02S-1), 2-3, 7, 2 1R-6, 2, 4, 1 1S-52, 21-24S-55, 40, 42-43S-56, 3 5Sea Knight, 83UH-1E, 86-8 7UH-34D, 84Vertol 107, 82-8 3Vought-Sikorsky 300 (VS-300), 1-2, 4XH-16, 7, 13, 15, 18, 31-34, 36, 38, 9 0XH-21, 33XHCH, 58XHXH-1 (Cargo Unloader Helicopter), 58, 9 0XHJD-1, 7-8XHJP-1, 7, 1 7XHJS-1, 7, 2 3XHR2S-1, 35-36, 46XHRH, 46XHRH-1, 58XHRP-X, 5XHRP-1, 7XHRS-A, 4 6XHRS-B, 46XHSL-1, 55XR-4, 2YH-21, 32YHC-1A, 8 3

Helicopter and Transport Seaplane Board, 26, 3 8Hemphill, Col Bruce, T ., 7 3Henderson . Col Frederick P ., 7 3Herring, LtCol George W., 50

INDEX

Operation HIGHJUMP, 4, 2 1Hiller Aircraft Company, 85-86Hogaboom, MGen Robert E ., 15, 26, 73, 77Hogaboom Board, 70, 73, 78, 80-8 1

Inchon, 89Iwo Jima, 15, 22, 42, 60, 8 9

Jacksonville, North Carolina, 8 0Japan, 4 3JATO, 9Jerome, BGen Clayton C ., 43, 48, 60Johnson, Mr . Lee S., 8 4Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28Jones, Col William K ., 7 3Junior Course, 19

Kaman, Charles H ., 37–3 8Kaman Aircraft Corporation, 37, 54, 84, 86, 9 2Korea, 42-45, 51, 61, 80Korean War, 42, 57, 61, 66, 7 9Kellet OP-2, 1Kivette, RAdm Frederick N ., 87-88Krulak, LtCol Victor H ., 13, 24-26Kwajalein, 15

Lakehurst, New Jersey, 9, 15, 47NAS Lakehurst, 19-20, 22Lamson-Scribner, Col Frank H ., 32, 4 3Landing Force Bulletin #2, 66, 7 3Landing Force Bulletin Number 17, 65–66, 90Landing Force Manual 24, 66, 7 3Landing Force Tactics and Techniques Board, 49LANTPHIBEX 1-58, 8 8Larson, August, 6 2Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 19, 25, 27-28, 60Litzenberg, MGen Homer L ., 6 6Lockheed, 86Longstaff, lstLt Robert A ., 20Luzon, 8 0

Makin, 15Marine Barracks, Quantico, 22, 3 1Marine Corps Advanced Research Group, 6 2Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Cherry Point, 19, 48 ,

50, 5 2MCAS, El Toro, California, 48, 5 0MCAS, New River, North Carolina, 27, 7 9MCAS, Santa Ana, California, 50, 52MCAS, Quantico, Virginia, 20, 26, 3 7Marine Corps Board, MCS, 30, 35, 3 8Marine Corps Development Center, 66, 82, 85–86, 90–9 1Marine Corps Equipment Board, 22, 8 0Marine Corps Equipment Development Policy and Guide ,

90-9 1Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center ,

(MCLFDC), 49, 82, 86, 90, 92Marine Corps Schools (MCS), Quantico, Virginia, 12–16 ,

19, 21-22, 24-28, 30-31, 37, 49, 61-62, 65-66, 80, 9 2Marine Corps Transport Helicopter Requirements for th e

Immediate Future, 6 4Marine Corps Units

I Marine Amphibious Corps, 1 2III Amphibious Corps, 1 1V Amphibious Corps, 6 0Aircraft, FMFLant, 60

11 1

Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, 42Aircraft One, Fleet Marine Force, Quantico, Virginia, 1Marine Air WestPac, 3 21st Marine Aircraft Wing, 48, 522d Marine Aircraft Wing, 31, 4 83d Marine Aircraft Wing, 521st Marine Division, 12, 51, 66, 71, 73, 852d Marine Division, 21, 28, 71, 73, 85, 8 83d Marine Division, 15, 52, 60, 7 14th Marine Division, 226th Marine Division, 11–12, 241st Provisional Marine Brigade, 11, 42, 442d Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade ,

63Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12), 2 8MAG-13, 8 0MAG-16, 80MAG (HR(L) )-16, 79-8 0MAG (HR)-16, 52, 63MAG-24, 8 0MAG-26, 80-81, 88MAG(HR(L) )-26, 80MAG (HR) -26, 52, 54MAG-33, 42MAG (HR(L))-36, 8 0MAG (HR)-36, 52, 6 3MAG-36, 79, 8 11st Marines, 2 25th Marines, 42HMO-2, 48HMR-1, 47HMR-2, 47-48, 57HMR-3, 47, 57HMR-4, 47, 5 7HMR-5, 47, 5 7HMR-6, 47, 57HMR-7, 5 7HMR-8, 5 7HMR-9, 5 7Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron (HMR) 161, 42 ,

4 7Marine Helicopter Assault Squadron (HMR) 161 ,

50-51, 80HMR-162, 50, 63HMR-163, 5 0HMR–261, 48, 50, 60HMR-262, 50, 60HMR-263, 50, 52, 54, 80HMR-361, 52, 63HMR-362, 5 2HMR-363, 52, 79-8 0HMR-364, 8 1HMR(C)-161, 80HAIR (C)-263, 81HMR(C)-363, 8 1HMR(L)-261, 7 9HMR (L) -264, 81HMR(M)-461, 7 9HMR(M)-462, 7 9HMR(M)-463, 7 9Marine Helicopter Squadron 1 (HMX–1), 1, 19–25, 27 -

31, 33-37, 42, 44, 47-48, 56, 62, 79-81, 92HSS-1, 7 9HSS-2, 8 3Helicopter Utility Squadron 1 (HU–1), 2 0Helicopter Utility Squadron 2 (HU-2), 20, 22, 27

48,

112

INDEX

VMO-1, 48, 7 9VMO-6, 42-45,486th Pioneer Battalion, 1 2Marine Corps Test Unit No . 1 (MCTU #1), 63, 66, 7 3

Marshalls, 32Martin Aircraft Company, 4McCully, LtCol Alton W ., 79McCutcheon, Col Keith B ., 47, 73, 80, 82, 8 8McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, 7, 46, 9 0MeGee, LtGen Vernon, 70Midway, 28Military Requirements of Helicopter for Ship-to-Shor e

Movement of Troops and Cargo, 15Military Requirements Section, 17, 3 2Mitchener, Col Harold J ., 34, 63Montross, Lynn J ., 5 1Moos, Maj Kenneth L ., 7 9Munn, BGen John C., 66Murray, Col James C ., 88

National Security Act of 1947, 6 1Naval Air Facility (NAF), Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico ,

6 1NAS, Patuxent River, Maryland, 1 3Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland, 8, 13 ,

7 9Naval Air Training Command, 47Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia, 2 7Navy, 3-5, 7-9, 11, 14-15, 17-19, 21-22, 24-25, 31, 34, 38 ,

40 44, 47, 49, 55-56, 59, 66, 72, 78-79, 83-84, 87-88Navy Department, 7, 65Navy Helicopter Squadron 3 (VX-3), 8-9, 15, 19, 20-21 ,

3 1Navy Research and Development Plan, Operational Re-

quirement Number AO-1750 (Rotary Wing Assault Heli-copter), 35

Navy Standing Committee, Long Range Shipbuilding an dConversion, 8 7

Nevada Proving Grounds, 63New, BGen Noah C ., 40, 62New Development Program for 1949, 1 7New Guinea, 80New Orleans, 89New River, 27, 80Nicaragua, 1Norfolk, Virginia, 25, 2 8Normandy, 1 1Northern Solomons, 1 2Northern Troops and Landing Force, 1 5

OE, 81, 85-86Office of Budget and Review, 6 9Office of Naval Research, 9 2Office of the Secretary of Defense, 69, 83Okinawa, 11-12, 24, 89Onslow Beach, North Carolina, 25, 27, 30, 8 8ONTOS, 74Operations Research Analysis Branch, 92OY, 20, 22-23, 44Operation PACKARD II, 24-25, 3 0Operation PACKARD III, 27, 30-31Operation PACKARD IV, 2 8

Palau, 25Panjong•ni, Korea, 42Pate, Gen Randolph McC., 71-73, 77-78, 81-82, 87-88

Pearl Harbor, 1 2Peleliu, 11-1 2Camp Pendleton, California, 42, 52, 63, 6 7Pensacola, 4 7Peterfield Point, North Carolina, 2 7Philippines, 1, 12, 8 0Piasecki Aircraft Corporation, 1 3Piasecki Helicopter Corporation, 3, 19, 32, 42, 58, 86, 9 0Piasecki, Frank N ., 3-5, 7, 13, 15, 17, 19, 26Piasecki-Venzi, 3Pilotless helicopters, 9 1"Pinwheel", 8 9Priie, VAdm Robert B., 8 6Pitcairn Op-1 autogyro, 1-2Plans and Policy Division, HQMC, 31, 36, 48Platt-LePage Aircraft Company, 3Pohang, Korea, 5 6Policy Analysis Division, HQMC, 8 8Pollock, BGen Edwin A ., 31, 3 6Pride, RAdm Alfred M ., 38, 4 3Project I, 64Project IV, 64-6 5Pusan, 4 3P-V Engineering Forum, 3

Quantico, Virginia, 1, 13, 19, 21-22, 25-26, 28, 47, 58, 61 -62, 80, 82-83, 85

Ramsey, Captain Paul H ., 34Reed, LtCol Edwin 0 ., 8 1Reitsch Henna, 1Renner, Joseph N ., 62Republic Aviation, 8 6Riley, Maj Russell R ., 2 0Roberts, Col Carson A ., 62ROE-1, 89RON-1, 8 9" Rotorcycle ", 8 9Rydalch, Col Edward N ., 6 3

" Sagging Sausage", 5Sallada, RAdm Harold B ., 15Saipan, 2 2Salmon, BGen Ronald D., 7 3Secretary of the Navy, 8, 43, 78Senior Course, 62Senior School, 24, 26Sharon Hills, Pennsylvania, 3Shaw, LtCol Samuel R ., 12, 62Shell, George R . E ., 6 2Shepherd, Gen Lemuel C . Jr ., 11, 12, 24, 28, 31, 43, 61 ,

63, 65-68, 7 1Sherman, VAdm Forrest P ., 16, 18, 34-36Ship Types :

AKA (Attack Cargo Ship), 27, 5 1APA (Attack Transport), 5 1AST (Assault Support Transport), 3 2CV (Aircraft Carrier), 49, 5 9CVA (Attack Aircraft Carrier), 8 8CVB, Independence class, 90CVE (Escort Aircraft Carrier), 16, 25, 27, 33-35, 49-51 ,

60-61, 8 7Casablanca Class (CVE-55), 51CVE-55 class, 60-61, 8 7CVE-105, 33-35, 60-61, 87CVHA (Assault Helicopter Aircraft Carrier), 79CVL (Light Aircraft Carrier), 16, 33, 59

INDEX

11 3

Midway class CVL, 90CVS (ASW Support Aircraft Carrier), 8 8LSD (Dock Landing Ship), 5 1LST (Landing Ship, Tank), 27, 5 1LPH (Landing Platforms for Helicopters), 61, 77, 79,

8 8Yorktown Class CV, 49

Ships, U . S . Navy :USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116), 42USS Block Island (CVE-106) (LPH-1), 79, 89USS Boxer (CVS-21) (LPH-4), 88-89USS Commencement Bay (CVE-105), 5 1USS Forrestal (CVA-59), 88LST-155, 2 7USS Mindoro (CVE-120), 28USS Monterey (CVL-26), 1 6USS Palau (CVE-122), 25, 27USS Princeton (LPH-5), 88-89USS Siboney (CVE-122), 6 0USS Tarawa (CVS-40), 88USS Thetis Bay (CVE-90) (CVHA-1) (LPH-6), 16,

79, 87-8 9USS Tripoli (LPH-10), 8 9USS Valley Forge (CVS-45) (LPH-8), 22, 88-8 9

Ships Requirements Board, 60Shisler, LtCol Clair W ., 12Shoup, Gen David M ., 82Sikorsky, Igor I ., 2, 9, 1 3Sikorsky Aircraft Company, 3-4, 7-8, 13, 19-24, 40, 42 ,

44, 46, 55-57, 59, 65, 67-68, 82-84, 86Sikorsky Aircraft Division, 1Sikorsky Aviation Corporation, 1Sixth Joint Civilian Orientation Conference, 2 8Slafkosky, Dr . Alexander L., 92Smith, Gen Oliver P ., 11-12, 30-33, 35, 66-6 7Smith Board, 30, 67, 70-71, 73, 80Smoak, Eustace R ., 6 2Snedeker, LtGen Edward W ., 85-86Solomons, 12, 80Special Board, 14"Stable Mable", 8 9STOL, 8 6Stonecliffe, Col David W ., 73

Strategic Air Force, 12Stratford, Connecticut, 1, 20—2 1Strieby, Capt Robert A ., 2 0Sutter, Col Allan, 73

Tactics and Techniques Board, MCLFDC, Quantico, 48 ,50-52, 59-61, 82, 89

Tarawa, 32Tinian, 15, 22Transport Helicopter Board, 33Treasury Department, 8Truman, President Harry S ., 28Tsingtao, China, 1 2Twining, Col Merrill B ., 12—1 3

United Aircraft, 1United Nations, 43United States Naval Regulations, 1 4

Vandegrift, Gen Alexander A ., 11, 14-17, 2 2Van Ryzin, Col William J ., 6 2Vertical Assault Concept for Amphibious Operations, 1 4"Vertical Envelopment", 38Vertol Division, Boeing Company, 3Vertol Aircraft Corporation, 3, 82—8 4Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 6 7Vieques, 28Viner, Dimitry D . (Jimmy), 20Visual Flight Rules, 40Vought-Sikorsky, 2VTOL Aircraft, 65, 78, 83-85, 92, 94

Wallace, MGen William J ., 31, 36, 40, 43Walt, Col Lewis W., 7 3"Weasel ", 2 1Weede, Col Richard G ., 6 2Williamson, Col Herbert H ., 73World War I, 1, 6 0World War II, 4, 7-8, 11, 13, 15, 22, 24, 28, 30, 32, 38, 42 ,

52, 60-61, 65, 80

Young, Maj Frank R ., 7 3

U.S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1977 0—214—692

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