March 26, 1961 - circulonaval.com€¦ · Web viewAll this was promised to us by Mr. Larry and Mr....

Operation Pluto. Guatemala by Dr. Alberto S. de Bustamante

“HISTORY IS ALWAYS WRITTEN BY THE ONE WHO WINS AND NEVER BY THE

ONE WHO LOSES”

Rays of Hope in the Men, Women and Children of Cuba in the

Fight for Freedom.

Table of Contents

Operation Pluto..........................................................2

March 26, 2961...........................................................3

March 31, 1961...........................................................7

2 Saturday, April 1, 1961...............................................9

3 Saturday, April 2, 1961...............................................9

4 Monday, April 3, 1961.................................................9

5 My diary of the training camps ended here............................10

The rest of the information that follows is from what I recall from those

days....................................................................10

April 18, 1961..........................................................13

of 20


9

GUATEMALA

Operation Pluto. (Code name for the Bay of Pigs invasion)

For a few months hundreds of Cubans were mysteriously leaving Miami,

New York, and other cities and joining the training camps in the jungles

of Guatemala.

In early March, 1961, I met Fernando García-Chacón and others in

who were in the underground in Havana and other cities inside Cuba.

They told me about the millions of dollars in arms sent and distributed on

Cuban soil preparing for the uprising for a still undetermined day.

A group of physicians, technicians and nurses were trained and

prepared in Miami between January and March, 1961, under the direction

of Dr. Aristides Menendez.

Dr. Menendez was an Internist who, for many years, was Director of the

Pan American Hospital in Havana, where most of the North American citizens

and Embassy personnel of the United States and other foreign countries

were treated.

of 20


Dr. Menendez was the perfect individual for this operation and he

served well, and the organization could not have been better by the time

we left for the training camps. were supposed to be working during the

invasion in a hospital ship with operating rooms and all types of

facilities.

Knowing then all those details we could not think that a military

operation that would function with a military hospital in the ocean would

have lack of support from the OAS (Organization of American States) or the

United States

I have never been able to find out at what time this part of the plan

was changed or by whom: I presume it was changed sometime between February

and March of 1961, and we were not notified until we arrived at Guatemala.

During those weeks before departure we were able to meet and get

acquainted with most of the members of the group. One of them was a great—

grandson of Antonio Maceo, the most brave and famous general of the Cuban Wars for Independence of 1868—78 and 1895—98. It was for me a moment of

great emotional significance because of my admiration all my life of

General Maceo and that group of gallant men who made a reality of our

independence from Spain at the end of the last century.

On Sunday, March 26, 1961, we went like every Sunday to the Church of

St. Rose of Lima, had lunch after church with all of Maggie's family at

the Howard Johnson of Miami Shores. In that afternoon, I notified Maggie

of our departure to the training camps in Guatemala in three to four days.

We joined a group assigned to meet in the Miami offices of the Consejo

Revolucionario and from there we were taken to an army base in Opa—Locka,

Florida. I will follow with a translation of a diary made by me during

those days:

of 20


March 26, 1961 11:30 p.m. From the headquarters in Miami of the Consejo

Revolucionario we were taken in a semi—truck to an abandoned air force

base one and a half hours from Miami. We concluded that this was part of

the Opa—Locka Base. We rested for 45 minutes inside a hanger in the

base. From the hanger we were taken again in the truck directly to the

planes. The airplanes were C-53’s, C-54’s and C-47’s camouflaged with

taped windows, and the planes were the type used to transport and train

airborne troops during the Second World War but without seats.

The windows were sealed and taped from the inside, so we could not

see to the outside or have an idea where we were located.

The whole process was under total secrecy directed by the Army

Intelligence and CIA Forces and no one was supposed to know where the

camp was located or how to get there.

Our plane, (Model C-47), could not start, and we had to wait three

hours for the repair to be completed.

The flight from Florida, which took approximately seven hours, was a

good flight, but exhausting because of the conditions inside the airplane

and not having a decent meal for 16 hours.

We arrived at a base in Guatemala about 11:00 a.m. on March 30,

approximately at 12:00 noon Florida time, and I reached the conclusion,

judging by the number of hours of the flight, that the pilot was flying

over Central America to make us lose sense of time and direction.

of 20


By flying directly, we could have had a clearer idea the location

of the base in the Central American area.

On our arrival the group was divided in two. The physicians and

medical personnel stayed for lunch at the base; the rest left for the

mountains a short time after arrival, about 35 of them.

I counted just seven planes, three of which were B—26’s with the

Cuban Air Force emblem on the tail and wing; others were C—47’s, C—46’s

and C—53’s.

Dr. Miró Cardona was giving a talk to some members of the Air Force

and I recognized a few friends in the distance, like Manuel Artime and

Pepe Andrew.

The first impression I had was negative and depressing.

It looked personally 1ike a suicide mission to me.

Based on the amount of men in the camps, we were told that there were

close to 5,000.

The first day, my estimate was between 1,400 to 1,800.

After a nice lunch at the Air Force Base we could tell the morale of

the troops and officers was outstanding. The stories of our Air Force and

the assurance by the American Intelligence and Training Officers that

Castro’s Air Force was going to be destroyed before the Invasion made me

feel more optimistic by that afternoon.

At 5:00 p.m. we departed to the Army Training Camps. We were taken in

army trucks with drivers from Guatemala. I don’t remember anyone else who

would drive at such speed on dangerous and primitive roads like that

of 20


This part of the trip lasted one hour, but it was a dark night by

5:30, raining the way it rains in those tropical jungles, and the camp was

at 6,500 feet high.

At the time of our arrival at Retalhulero the clouds were covering the

camp and we could finally see the Base Camp Trax (name of the Army Base).

We could not see much but at the supply center we saw some friends that

had left Miami earlier. We were given an aluminum tray (blue plate), a canteen for water and some eating utensils made of wood.

They spread our group in the Camp, so we could find a place to sleep.

The first night, some of us slept at the tent of the Corps of

Engineers and some with the Medical Corps.

With some mattresses in the dirt we tried to sleep the first night.

The stories of the cold nights were nothing in comparison to the

realities. The freezing temperature kept us awake most of the night.

The bugle woke us up at 6:00 a.m. and 15 minutes later, we were in

line for breakfast. We learned through Dr. Armstrong and Dr. Falla that the plan of the Hospital Ship was cancelled, probably while they were

preparing us in Miami for it a few weeks back. Another setback and

another reason for mistrust in our American advisers and instructors.

Drs. Armstrong and Falla told the Intelligence Officers the way they felt and how they resented the way we were manipulated by their fellow

officers.

Their reaction and answer to this was that they were free to go back

to Miami any time! Drs. Armstrong and Falla responded with the integrity

proved to us from the first day, that their position was with us, and the

troops and our group followed them with our faith and trust and they would

be part of us in a common destiny.

of 20


The rest of that day we spent getting organized and finding a place to

stay for a few days.

1. March 31, 1961 Another early rise at 6: 00 a.m. followed by breakfast.

We could observe already that some of the groups were preparing for departure. The distribution of equipment was already taking place.

They started to get us some equipment even though this morning was Good

Friday.

With the events ahead of us the feeling of our commitment as part of a

crusade became stronger

Life in this remote place was extremely hard and made us respect some

of the men that lived here under these conditions for five and six months.

We spent a good part of the day in the mountains and shooting range

getting acquainted with the M3 rifle and our Colt .45 pistols.

It was easy for some of us exposed to it many times in Cuba and new

for others who never handled a pistol or a rifle before.

Almost every day, the lack of water in the camp was routine. The

toilets were on top of one of the hills and everyone in the camp could see

you, like sitting on a throne.

The lunch, like the previous days, was not very attractive. I guess

this may change when you are really hungry.

This Friday afternoon we were preparing ourselves for some religious

services for Good Friday.

The Via Crucis was very impressive at each station. An officer of the

different units spoke; each represented a different profession also.

Moments like those were fil1ed with deep significance and emotion. We felt

that in fighting for the right cause, God was with us and with the ted

of 20


States backing us in this operation, which increased our faith in the War

for Liberation.

After the religious services, we had the opportunity to talk to some

of the officers of the Brigade that we knew, like Manuel Artime.

I, personally, had my doubts and concerns knowing that we were going

to fight in Cuba with forces directed by the devil's mind of Fidel Castro.

Artime and the others always answered to this that the base and

success of the operation was our power of fire!

To summarize, the plan was:

The destruction of the Castro Air Force before the Invasion and the recognition of the OAS and the provisional Government inside Cuba that

would legalize the support of the Free World. The uprising that would

follow would create the War of Liberation.

The night of March 31 we were able to sleep in the same tent with

Warry Sanchez and Jorge Arnoldson, in the section of the Air Force and the

Parachute Training Force. Maceo, Iglesias and others of our group went to

the section of the Corps of Engineers. We were told then that a few

minutes before our arrival there was an accident in practice and that a

soldier whose nickname was “The Mexican" got a wound in the abdomen and

was taken to Guatemala City with Dr. Armstrong for surgery.

It was the second casualty since our arrival. The first one was the

day of our arrival when Cuervo-Rubio was killed in an accident in one of

the trucks.

Cuervo—Rubio was the only son of Dr. Gustavo Cuervo-Rubio,

famous gynecologist of Havana, and Vice—Presidential Candidate in the Cuban elections of 1948, won by Prío Socarrás.

of 20


2. Saturday, April 1 1961 After the two nights, we finally were moved to a section of the

headquarters and Arnoldson, Maceo, Iglesias and I found a place we

considered ours temporarily. That night of April 1st, they showed a war

movie of Dana Andrews, the first and only entertainment we had those days.

That first night at headquarters, Warry Sanchez woke up everybody

screaming in his sleep that a burglar was inside the tent. After a few

nights we got used to this!

3. Saturday, April 2, 1961. I joined a large group for a Mass at 8:30 a.m. and had communion with

most of them. We were told by Father Macho of the Parachute Battalion that

we could have communion even after eating while in the training camps or

at war.

Father Macho that day made remarks again about our historical mission

for the future of Cuba and the American Continent.

took my first shower, freezing to death, at 9:30 p.m. that night.

Jorge Arnoldson, my cousin, was dealing with a terrible infection in

his thumb and it concerned us that gangrene could set in and that possibly

he could lose part of his hand. We were hoping for a response to the

intense antibiotics therapy and Jorge improved in a few days. Dr.

Fernandez joined our group and had his first experience with Warry’s

screams and nightmares.

That night, Warry, after a jump in the middle of the night, fell over

my bed.

4. Monday, April 3, 1961 We woke up this morning with Mandy Gutierrez sick with chills and high

fever, apparently a virus. After getting him some help, we tried to go to

of 20


the range, but we were not able to get permission from the officers in

charge.

We had another training exercise with the net and trench and

watched the practice of the 57mm recoiless rifle in the afternoon.

They gave us the insignias for our uniforms and our white

handkerchief identity of the Medical Corps. (Each unit had a different color for identification.)

My number of the Brigade was 3939. The number 2506 of the Brigade came

from the number of the first casualty in 1960 during training exercises,

and it was Carlos Rodriguez Santana (Carlay).

My diary of the training camps ended here.

The rest of the information that follows is from what I recall from those days

After April 3, 1961, we could not see any arrival of new groups, so we

expected to be moved soon for the real action.

They started moving us in a similar fashion as our arrival and from

the planes we were moved to railroad livestock cars with sealed windows

and moved inside a town that looked like Nicaragua.

The town was closed by Army troops and isolated from the ouside world.

Once we reached the beach by the ocean, we saw all the ships for the

invasion. The ships were dilapidated, rusty and old merchant ships of the

Garcia Line, not the impressive real war ships that you a1l see in the

movies.

Our group was the last to arrive and the last to leave toward Cuba

because we were not supposed to go on land unti1 two days, the third day

of the invasion. Most of the ships left before us on the 14th at 5:00 a.m.

of 20


We were able to see General Somoza, who came to the area and gave a

brief speech, wishing us luck and asking us for a piece of Castro's beard

as a trophy. Until then, we were not sure we were in Nicaragua.

El nombre clave “ATUN” es incorrecto, de acuerdo al Plan Pluto debe de ser

“AGUJA”.

Our ship, the "Lake Charles”, was the last one to leave Puerto Cabezas. All the other ships- the Barbara J, SS Rio Escondido, SS

Atlantico, SS Caribe, Santa Ana, Blagar and the Sea Gull, with the LCU’s

Number 1, 2 and 3 had already left.

Our medical team of 15 and the (Operation 40) Army Intelligence Group of 90 men under the command of Colonel Leon, plus all the officers

and crew of the Lake Charles, went aboard under Captain Fernando Maruri’s

command.

of 20


The group of Army Intelligence was trained to do screening in occupied

territory and cities and, like us, were supposed to move in when the

supplies were already on land and the airport was controlled by our

forces.

In the Operation 40, sharing this experience with us I would

like to mention friends for many years: Miguel Cosío, Nestor

Carbonell, Antonio Campiña and Javier Fernandez Rouco.

The lower decks of our ship were full of supplies, jeeps, ammunitions,

arms, gas for the planes, etc…. I slept in the top deck close to a big

bulldozer. The huge blade of the bulldozer was just on top of my head and

at night I could see it moving back and forth with the movements of the

ship.

You learn to ignore all these things under circumstances like these.

Inside Cuba, the situation was going from bad to worse the week before

the invasion. The underground was stronger than it ever was before

Castro's takeover in the last year of the Batista Regime. One night about

40 bombs exploded in Havana while we were in the ship on the way to Cuba.

The biggest department store, Encanto in Havana, was burned to the ground

by a terrorist group.

After two or three days in that floating bomb, we saw in the distance

one of our ships coming in the opposite direction, and they made all kinds

of signs that we could not understand. After the invasion, we learned that

was the group of Nino Diaz that was supposed to disembark at the Oriente province to create a diversion to the Castro forces, before the invasion

took place at the Bay of Pigs in the South of Cuba (see Maps).

Apparently, there was a leak and the Communist forces were waiting in

Oriente for the landing of the Nino Díaz group.

of 20


The scout team of Commander Díaz found out about it, exploring the

beach and decided to turn back.

I reached the conclusion that this diversion by the CIA turned the

Díaz group into guinea pigs and all of them would have been killed.

The action started early in the morning of April 17, 1961 when our

ship, the “Lake Charles”, was about 10 to 15 miles from the coast.

Our Air Force consisted of 16 B—26 attack bombers, four C—54 transport

planes and about five C—47 transport planes, all trained at Trax Base in

Guatemala, but during the invasion they operated from a base called “Happy

Valley” in Nicaragua.

The morning of the invasion we saw about 22 jets with our war insignia and

the Cuban banner that flew over our boats. Dagoberto Darias, Commander of

one of the transport vessels, confirmed that a radiogram from “The

American Flagship", directing the operation, received April 18, 1961 at

11:00 a.m. said, "Air cover will arrive at 2:30 p.m. that day”.

saw those planes and they were not Castro’s Air Force nor were they

ours, so logically they were U.S. jets prepared for the air cover promised

to us. That never came because it was cancelled at the last moment by

President Kennedy.

The air strike missions were called Gorilla, Linda and Puma. On the

first mission called Gorilla, 16 B—26’s were supposed to participate.

On April 12? President Kennedy told Deputy Director Bissell, "Well, I don’t want to send them on that scale. want it minimal”.

Only eight crews were to carry the first air strike.

President Kennedy later cancelled all the other air raids, including

the "Linda" and “Puma”.

of 20


April 18, 1961. That morning our ship was getting closer to the action, and we saw two

war ships about ten miles from the coast, also with our war insignia and

the Cuban banner. These were part of the reinforcements for the second

stage, when the provisional government was in Cuban territory and was

recognized by the OAS. Then they were to go in and reinforce the invasion

force.

All this was promised to us by Mr. Larry and Mr. Wail (nicknames for

the CIA commanders) and confirmed by us with our own eyes and denied

later by the Kennedy Administration.

Some of the survivors visiting Washington later saw in uniform some of

the officers of the training force in Guatemala, that were never

identified as members of any U.S. military unit.

Between April 17 to April 19, 1961, we were able to hear some of the

radio messages from the Brigade Commander San Roman, at Blue Beach in Cuban territory.

Some of the messages were:

1 AW to Air Command

Must have jet support. He is under heavy attack by Migs, jets and

heavy tanks. Signed Pepe.

2 AW to Air Command April 18, 1961

Where is F-five ones (F-51s WWII fighter planes) and transport? Enemy tanks attacking east side Blue Beach.

Signed Pepe.

3 To Air Command

of 20


Can you throw something into the vital points of the battle? Just

let pilots loose Signed Pepe.

To BaseMarsopa proceeding to Blue Beach with three LCU’s, if low jet

cover not furnished at first light believe we will lose those ships,

Blue Beach under attack by T—33 and Sea Fury.

Request immediately jet support or cannot hold. Signed Pepe.

On the morning of April 19, 1961, our ship was about five miles

from the coast, the Rio Escondido and the SS Houston were sunk with most of the supplies still aboard. We rescued Jorge Macie (Yeye), who

was on the lower deck of the Houston with chicken pox on the morning

of April 17 and jumped into the ocean when the ship was sunk. Yeye is

a second cousin of my wife Maggie and a good friend from Havana. We

received orders from the flagship commander to get back at 2:00 p.m.

April 19 to disembark and by then we knew we were history! But

still, we wanted to go in and die with the rest of the invasion

force.

Some of the Sea Fury’s passed by, fair1y close, but amazingly we

were not shot at! With supplies, gas tanks and ammunition aboard, it

was easy to blow us apart

Three more messages were heard that morning at the Lake Charles

radio room.

To BaseDo you people realize how desperate the situation is? Do you back

us or quit? All we want is jet support and jet cover, enemy has this

support! I need it badly or cannot survive, please do not desert us.

Out of bazooka and tank ammunitions. Tanks will hit me at dawn.

of 20


To Air Commander

Blue Beach under attack by B-26, where is promised cover? Signed,

Pepe.

Those were the circumstances when we were getting out of Lou’s in

the water. At that time another message was received by radio.

To Lake Charles

Turn back. Head to San Juan to supply oil to one of surviving ships

then back to base. (Puerto Cabezas).

There is no way to describe the feelings of desperation, frustration,

resentment for the betrayal, but the worst I state without any doubt

is the feeling of disloyalty, for not fighting with the rest of the

troops until the last moment and not being allowed to die with them.

Most of the supplies, 72 tons of arms and ammunition, that was

supposed to be unloaded on D-Day April 17th, were not unloaded.

Another 1500 tons allocated for the subsequent weeks of the fight were

never sent ashore.

We were never able to find out why or from where the orders not to

disembark came from.

On the way back we saw the periscopes of three submarines, either

American or Russians? I guess we will never know!

At that time, we were convinced that one of the submarines would sink

our ship, so we could never tell the story to the outside world. Cuba was

lost and with it our faith in the United States!

of 20


After 24 hours of heading to San Juan, Puerto Rico, orders were

received to go back to base (Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua).

During those days the emptiness, the lack of news, was terrible!

We counted on most of the Invasion Force having been killed…

We arrived at Puerto Cabezas on April 23rd. We were on the ocean

approximately ten days, and still didn’t know what they were going to do

with us, and I guess they didn’t know either.

On arrival to Nicaragua, we were not allowed to come ashore and get

out of the ship or to notify our families.

Then a new concern hit us!

Somoza now would probably get rid of us, and wash his hands of

responsibility in the Invasion after this fiasco and the reaction

of the United States Government

Our group was then divided into two. One group was taken to the

Air Force Base and taken by plane back to Miami. The second group, in

which of course I was included, had to stay and go in the ship to

another port.

All our arms and ammunitions were taken from us and locked

on the lower deck of the ship by Somoza's Army troops.

The night of April 24th, a group of us had decided to try to escape to the mountains and thought that with luck we could get to Mexico or Guatemala.

of 20


The troops at Puerto Cabezas outnumbered us, but we had enough

firepower to overpower them and increase our chances of survival!

During the night, we were able to sneak out with Warry Sanchez,

being the smallest, getting inside the locked compartment and taking

our arms out.

Early the next morning, three members representing us went ashore

with permission and notified the Nicaraguan officer in charge that we

were not going back to the Lake Charles and, if necessary, we would

die for it!

We asked them to notify the American officers of our position and

that we wanted to meet our families in Miami as soon as possible.

Two hours later, we were notified that they would fly us to Miami

as soon as possible

That night, we were taken to the Air Force Base (Happy Valley),

after we gave up all our weapons, and arrived at Homestead Air Force

Base in Florida at 4:00 a.m., April 26,1961.

A few cars of the CIA and FBI were waiting for us at the runway

and we were divided into groups of four or five and taken to our homes.

On my arrival at our apartment at 14th Terrace near Brickell

Avenue in Southeast Miami I was able to call Maggie, who during all

those days considered me dead.

Desperate like most relatives in Miami she kept looking for our

names on the list of the casualties.

of 20


My father and mother in Havana visited every hospital looking for

my body or news about the survivors.

They were notified after April 26th when the phone communications

were established that we were alive.

My conclusions after the failure of the Invasion were the following:

Castro consolidated his power.

The Cuban underground was destroyed. Two hundred thousand Cubans,

including women and children, were locked in prison in less than a

week.

The heads of the Cuban underground were expecting the invasion on

May 1, 1961. The invasion was sent April 17th and the CIA network

didn’t notify the underground of the change by President Kennedy.

Dr. Miro Cardona and other civilian members of the Consejo

Revolucionario were kept incommunicados by the CIA in a house at Pa1m

Beach during the Invasion.

I found something very interesting many years later in an article

in "Reserve”, the official magazine of the Army Reserve Officers

Association, and confirmed in the book by Howard Hunt, "Give Us This

Day”, with information of the CIA activities before and during the

Bay of Pigs:

of 20


The list with the code names of the Cuban underground were taken

to a special meeting of the CIA in Mexico City four days before the

Bay of Pigs and the list was stolen, apparently by a communist agent.

Until I found that information, I could not understand how Castro

could find in one week the leaders of the underground after he

couldn’t locate them in over a year of activities against his Regime.

2. The failure demoralized the forces against Castro to such a point that the Cubans lost the opportunity of a War of Liberation for two generations or maybe forever.

3. The Monroe Doctrine was eliminated, and the Rio Treaty of 1947 ignored.

4. The stronghold for the spread of Communism to other countries in Central and South America was consolidated and a freeway created for the Soviet Union to establish a base 90 miles from the U.S.A.

In an interview with General Eisenhower shortly after Bay of Pigs

regarding this historical episode, General Eisenhower blames Kennedy

and his administration for the changes in the original plans, the

cancellation of the air raids and the lack of air cover at the time

of the Invasion, and pointed to the timidity of President Kennedy and

the poor advice of some members of his Administration In that

interview he made the best summary, stating, and I quote:

"History is written always by the one who wins and never by the one

who loses”.

1961 was supposed to be the Year of Education by the Castro

propaganda machine,It turned out to be the year of the firing

squad...

of 20

March 26, 1961 - circulonaval.com€¦ · Web viewAll this was promised to us by Mr. Larry and Mr....

Documents

Transcript of March 26, 1961 - circulonaval.com€¦ · Web viewAll this was promised to us by Mr. Larry and Mr....