Marc Sageman [email protected] - Applied … Sageman [email protected] 2 Evidence Based...
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Transcript of Marc Sageman [email protected] - Applied … Sageman [email protected] 2 Evidence Based...
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Evidence Based Terrorism Research
• Specific threat to the U.S.• Application of scientific method to terrorism research• Started with 9/11 Perpetrators as index sample• 400 biographies of terrorists: Open Source information
– Trial transcripts• US, France, Germany, Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, Canada
– Press accounts (FBIS)• English, French, German, Arabic, Spanish, Turkish, Dutch
– Academic publications– Internet (corroborated)
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Global Salafi Jihad• Violent Islamist born-again social movement• Fight for justice & fairness:
– Build a better world; utopia modeled on the community of the Prophet & his companions (Salaf)
• Four phases:– Peaceful capture of the state (al-Banna – Muslim Brothers)– Against the near enemy (Faraj – “the forgotten duty”)– Global expansion of defensive jihad (Azzam)– Global offense against the far enemy (Zawahiri & bin Laden)
• Expel the West from the Middle East• Use of violence against non-Muslim governments or
population to establish an Islamist state
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Evolution of al Qaeda• Three processes of self-selection of the most militants:
– 1988-9: the most militants, who had come to fight the anti-Soviet jihad & could not go home, stayed behind and formed al Qaeda
– 1991-2: the most militants expelled from Pakistan went to Sudan– Switch of strategy from “near enemy” to “far enemy”– 1996: 150 militants expelled from Sudan returned to Afghanistan
• 1996-2001: Golden age of al Qaeda:– Control of “Golden Chain:” exclusive funding for terrorism– Control of training camps & establishment of shelter– Staff for planning & coordination– Afghanistan, as failed state, has little ability to control al Qaeda
• Al Qaeda controlled social movement & focused it on “far enemy”
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Poverty?: Family of origin (SES)
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Upper Middle Lower
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Islam?: Devotion as youth
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Religious Secular Christian
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Madrassa?: Educational background
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Madrassa Secular Christian
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Naïve teenagers?: Age at joining
Average Age: 25.690
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Ignorance?: Levels of education
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<HS College MA
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Religious?: Type of education
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HS/Voc Humanities Soc Sci Tech/NatSci
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Lack of opportunity?: Occupation
020406080
100120140160
Unskilled Semi-professional
Professional
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No sex?: Marital status
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Single Married
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No responsibility?: Family status
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No Children Children
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Just bad?: Criminal background
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No Prison Crime PoliticalActivism
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Criminal Background
• Vast Majority: no crime• Some major crime
– Robbery (Roubaix gang, Kelkal gang, JI)• Petty crime: Maghreb logistic cells
– Credit card fraud, false documents, insurance fraud– Drug traffic (more common now)
• Those least likely to do harm individually are most able to do so collectively.
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Simply mad?: Mental health
• Very little evidence of mental illness• Very little evidence of personality disorder
– No narcissism (willingness to sacrifice for the comrade & cause)
– No pathological hatred– Very little trauma in family studied: usually
overprotected youths
• Overall, “good kids,” except second generation Maghreb Arabs, who lived life of petty crime
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Place where they joined jihad
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Native Expatriate
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Diaspora
• Global Salafi Jihad is a Diaspora phenomenon– Expatriate + Second/Third Generation
• 84% of Global Salafi Mujahedin have joined the jihad, while living in a Diaspora (87% in Western Europe)
• Link between terrorism & Diaspora predated “globalization” & not specific to religion or Islam– Anarchists, IRA, LTTE, ETA
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Joining the Jihad
• Friendship (pre-existing): 68%– “Bunch of guys” collectively deciding to join– Joining childhood friends
• Kinship: 20%– Fathers, brothers, first cousins– Importance of in-laws & marriage to cement friendship
bonds
• Discipleship: 10%– Students of Sungkar & Baasyir from Jamaah Islamiyah
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Trajectory of Muslim expatriates• Upwardly & geographically mobile (“best & brightest”)• Mostly from religious, caring & middle class families• Global citizens, conversant in 3 or 4 languages, skilled in
computer technology• Separated from traditional bonds & culture• Homesick, lonely, marginalized & excluded from society• Seek friends• Drifted to mosques for companionship, not religion• Moved in together (halal food), formed cliques
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Trajectory of 2nd generation immigrants
• Two main paths– Second generation in the West– Young economic immigrants to the West
• Upwardly mobile, & completely secular background• Excluded from society
– Dropped out of school• Petty crime (false documents & drug dealing)• Drug addiction
• Discriminated by society– Resentful & activation of collective identity– Personal experience resonate with Salafi ideology
• Groups of friends, who grew up together & collectively drifted to religion to escape their situation
• Radicalized collectively
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Mobilization• Spontaneously self-organized “bunches of guys” of trusted
friends, from the bottom up• No top down Al Qaeda recruitment program
– No campaign, shura or budget dedicated to recruitment– Selection: 15-25% of volunteers accepted
• Gaps in the distribution (U.S., Palestine, Iran)• No evidence of “brainwashing”: they simply acquired the
beliefs of their friends• No evidence of “recruiter”: total proselytizing environment
they all mutually recruited each other• Social bonds came before ideological commitment• Group processes: no Robinson Crusoe narrative
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Motivation • Insidious process:• Low risk participation with an increasingly closer set of
friends• Medium risk proselytism for an ideal way of life• Importance of specific script for the global Salafi jihad: 12
Islamist institutions generated 50% of sample• Salafi ideology: new values (Islam & ummah)
– Faith & commitment grounded in intense small group dynamics– Gradual development of a collective identity– Greater jihad: “born again”, imitate Salaf through personal
example• Complete transformation of values
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In-group love
• Dynamics of dense social networks promotes in-group love
• Self-sacrifice for comrades and the cause– Secular religious– Material spiritual– Short-term opportunity long-term vision– Individual concern communitarian sacrifice– Apathy active engagement– Traditional morality takfir group morality– Worldly gains otherworldly rewards
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Out-group hate
• Grounded in everyday experience of discrimination & exclusion from highest levels of society– Endemic in Middle East & Western Europe
• Grounded in group dynamics:– “Bunch of guys” escalation of mutual complaints about
the unfairness & injustice in society– Endorse conspiracy theories
• Endorse takfir doctrine sanctions commission of crimes v. society
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Group Dynamics
• Explanation in normal group dynamics, rather than individual mental pathology
• Once in the movement, difficult to abandon it without betraying close friends & family
• This natural & intense loyalty to the group, inspired by a violent Salafi script, transforms alienated young Muslims into fanatic terrorists
• High risk terrorist operations– In-group love + out-group hate (under specific violent
script, often religious) mass murder + suicide
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The Network
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Pre-existing social bonds
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Operational LinksBali, 2002Jakarta, 2003Singapore Plot, 2001
Strasbourg, 1999
France, 1995
LAX,. 1999
Casablanca, 2003
Morocco, 1994
Istanbul, 2003
9/11/01
Emb, 1998
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Personal v Operational Links
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Continued Evolution
• Success of Post 9/11 Counter-Terrorism campaign– Elimination of sanctuary, funding, communication & key leaders– Neutralization of al Qaeda proper
• Physical break up of formal global Salafi jihad networks– Expansion of home-grown initiative due to lack of leadership &
restraints– Local autonomy, self-financing & self-training– Informal communications, difficult to monitor– Fuzzy boundaries: no formal initiation or fixed numbers– New local, more aggressive & reckless leadership
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Operational Terrorist Processes
• Engineering (General Staff) Paradigm:– Ideology strategy tactics– Decision plan (target analysis) execution
• Reality is full of contingencies & events are results of variety of negotiations:
• “Al Qaeda is patient, plans for years, and is meticulous about details.”
• Image is astute strategist, backed up by general staff, which carefully crafts battle plans with detailed target analysis to defeat the West.
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3/11 Operation• Spontaneous, self-organized home-grown groups• No sleeper cells• Autonomous, locally funded & trained• No need for Command & Control from aQ Central
– No C2 links with aQ Central (not aQ, but acting on behalf of aQ)• Critical importance of Internet (ideology, guideline, strategy, tactics)• Explosive merger of criminal Brawn (links to dynamite) & religious Brain
(organizational skills)• Amateurs making mistakes but taking advantage of ours• Importance of chance links (prisons ~ Afghan camps?)
– So many chance events prove that this was not planned top down operation• Change in Mujahedin profiles (less well educated, more criminal elements,
less responsibilities)• Blurs distinction between suicide and traditional terrorism
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Toward a Global “Leaderless” Jihad
• Decentralized, loosely connected network– Mobilized and motivated autonomously– No more 9/11, but lots of 3/11 or 7/7, especially in Europe– Threat to the West comes from the West
• Military role (no hard targets)– sanctuary denial in potential failed or friendly states
• Importance of the Internet– Virtual “Invisible hand” organizing terrorist operations: C2– Social transformation of the jihad– Enemy Center of Gravity:
• Vision of Salafi utopia unites the leaderless jihad• Ideological battleground (War of Ideas)
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Identifying the networks: Triangulation
• Background attributes– Diaspora– Young: 15-30 (mostly men, but women becoming more common)– Underemployed, spending lots of time on Internet– Travel abroad (or new passport)
• Syria, Pakistan, Iran, Yemen, Turkey, Egypt• Behavioral attributes
– Salafi• Dramatic change: embrace new community, isolated from old community• Looks: short pants, beard, mark on forehead (veiled wife)• Proselytism: people around them, mosque• Takfir: dispute with imam & crime (white collar & drugs)
– Action predisposition• Martial activity: paintball, shooting practice, camping (no training camp)
• Online attributes– Jihadi chat-rooms, jihadi websites
• Suspicious behaviors– Interest in terrorist activities (downloading info); ideas or plans about terrorist activities;
communicating inappropriate interest in target; casing target; getting means of destruction
