MobilizationofInterestgroupsintheSpanishParliament

LauraChaquésBonafontResearchFellowattheInstitutBarcelonad’EstudisInternacionals(IBEI)

AssociateprofessorofPoliticalScienceUniversitatdeBarcelonalaurachaques@ub.edu

LuzM.MuñozMárquezLecturerofPoliticalScienceUniversitatdeBarcelona

Veryfirstdraft

PapertobepresentedattheGeneralConferenceoftheECPR,IcelandSection61­OrganisedCivilSocietyinEuropePanel173­InterestOrganisation

PopulationsinEuropeAugust,2011

The goal of this paper is to analyze the mobilization of interest groups in the Spanish

Parliament from 1996 to present. This means first to identify and classify the different

interestgroupsthathavebeencalledtoparticipateinanyofthehearings(comparecencias)

oftheCongresodelosDiputados;second,toanalyzetowhatextendmobilizationofinterest

variesacrosspolicyissues;andthird,totesttowhatextendvariationsonthemobilizationof

interestacrossissuesarelinkedtothechangingprioritiesoftheSpanishgovernmentor/and

politicalparties.Inthispaperwealsointroduceanewdatasetaboutthecomparecencias(or

hearings)ofinterestgroups,createdfollowingthemethodologyoftheAdvocacyandPublic

PolicymakingProjectandtheComparativeAgendasProject,inordertocapturethenumber

andtypeofinterestgroups,aswellastheissuestheyareinvolvedalongthreelegislatures.

Thisisafirststepofwhatwehopetobealargerresearchprojectorientedtoincreaseour

understanding of the role of interest groups in the Spanish political system, and also to

provide a new instrument to develop quantitative and qualitative comparative analysis

acrosscountriesandpolicysubsystems.

PreviousanalysisofinterestgroupsinSpainillustratethatmostofthemobilizationof

interest occurs in the governmental arena (Molins, 1989, Pérez Diaz, 1985; Giner 1988,

Jerez, 1992; Linz, 1982; Gomà and Subirats, 1998). Most policy areas, especially those

related to industrial and labor relations, are governed by policy communities in which

governmentalactorsplayakeyroleinfrontofotherpublicauthorities,likepoliticalparties

orregionalauthorities(JordanaandSancho,1999;Sanz1997;Chaqués,2002).Accesstothe

policymakingprocessislimitedtointerestorganizationsandmembersofgovernmentthat

exchangeresourcesandshareresponsibilities in isolationfromotherpolicyactorsandthe

general population. There is a tendency to institutionalize this relationship among actors,

keepingthestabilitynotonlyofthenumberandtypeofactors,butalsoofthepolicyissues

andideasthataretakenintoaccountinthepolicyarena.

Despite this, as the agenda setting perspective illustrates, no single institution has

themonopolistic control of a given policy issue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Jones and

Baumgartner 2005). Depending on the policy issue, interest groups content or ally with

other policy actors across different policy venues in order to have an impact on policy

outcomes.Theyarestrategicallymindedactorsthatengageinaprocessofsearchingforthe

venuethatcorrespondsbettertotheirwayofthinkingaboutanissue.Thevenueshopping

strategiestakenbydifferentpolicyactorsdependsontheexistingpoliticalandinstitutional

context governing each policy subsystem, but in general we should expect that interest

groupsseektooperateindifferentvenuesinordertofosterpolicychangeandnewwaysof

thinkingaboutexistingpolicyissues.Thisprocessofvenueshoppingisespeciallylargeand

complexinamultilevelsystemofgovernanceinwhichdifferentissuesproduceashiftingset

of alignments among national governments, interest groups, supranational and regional

authorities(Beyers,2002;Beyersetal,2008;Lowery,2008).

In this paper we focus on one venue: the Spanish parliament. Traditionally, the

Parliament,asavenuefor interestgroupmobilization,hasoccupiedamarginalrole inthe

analysisoftheSpanishpolicymakingprocess,withfewexceptions(Liebert,1999).Previous

researchsuggeststhat,theSpanishParliament,asmanyotherparliamentarydemocracies,is

not the target for interest groups mobilization mainly because it is seen as a reactive

legislaturethatsimplyrespondstowhatgovernmentsbringforward(Norton,2002).Despite

this,ourresults indicatethattheSpanishparliament isan importantvenuethroughwhich

interest groups in alliance with political parties, either push for the introduction of new

issues andways of thinking about these issues, ormobilize to preserve existing rules and

policyimages.

Anotherquestionishowandwhyinterestgroupsmobilizationattheparliamentary

arenavariesacrosspolicy issues. Inthispaperwefocusonthepoliticizationof issuesasa

driven force for the mobilization of interest, leaving aside other explanations related to

externalchangesinsocio‐economicconditionsforfurtherresearch(LoweryandGray,2001).

Following Baumgartner et al. (2009) we test whether correspondence exist between the

attention policy actors give to a particular issue (measured by the percentage of issue

attentionofparliamentaryandgovernmentalbillsbyyear),andthemobilizationofinterest

groups(measuredbythepercentageofhearingsinwhichinterestgroupsparticipatebyyear

and by issue). Our results indicate that interest groups mobilization varies across issues

depending on the level of politicization of issues. Correlation between parliamentary bills

andthehearingsofinterestgroupsishighandsignificant,butthisrelationshipdoesnotexist

forthecaseofgovernmentalbills.

Theseresultsillustratethatinterestgroupsareespeciallyactiveinthediscussionand

analysis of those issues that are especially relevant for political parties, and this is partly

explainedbyinstitutionalfactors.Contrarytoothercountries,thereisnotasetofrulesthat

definetheirparticipationintheparliamentarianarena,neitherageneralregisterofinterest

groups.ThismeansaccesstothelegislativeprocessisfilteredbyMPsthathavethecapacity

todecidewhichinterestgroups(ifany)willfinallyinterveneinthediscussionofaparticular

issue in the comparecencias (or hearings). In this context, our results indicate that the

interaction between MPs and interest groups varies across issues depending on the

prioritiesofpoliticalpartiesandthelevelofpoliticalconsensus.

To answer these questions we have created a database that contains information

aboutthe2.686comparecenciasofinterestgroupsfrom1996to2008.Thisdatasetcaptures

the number and diversity of interest groups which have been coded according to the

AdvocacyandPolicymakingProjectdevelopedbyBaumgartner,Berry,Hojnacki,Kimballand

Leech;andalsothetypeof issuesinwhichinterestgroupshavebeeninvolvedwhichhave

beencodedaccordingtothemethodologydevelopedbyBaumgartner,JonesandWilkerson

for the Policy agendas project. In order to test the correspondence between the

comparecenciasofinterestgroupsandthepoliticalagendawerelyonthedatabasescreated

by the Spanish policy agendas about the bills (governmental and parliamentary bills) and

speechesofthePresidentedelGobierno.Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.Firstwebriefly

explainsomefeaturesofinterestgroupsintheSpanishpoliticalsystem;secondweexplain

the role of the Spanish parliament as a policy venue; third we describe the data and

methods.Fromherewedescribethemainresultsaboutinterestgroupsmobilizationinthe

parliamentary arena and finally we present a brief discussion about the correspondence

betweeninterestgroupsmobilizationandpoliticalparties.

InterestgroupsinSpain

TherepresentationofinterestgroupsinSpainfollowsaquitestablepatternforthelastfour

decades. As Linz (1982) highlights, transition to democracy lead to an important

transformationofstate‐interestgroupsrelations,eliminating theFrancocorporatistmodel

ofinterestrepresentation,andfosteringamoreopenanddiverseinterestgroupsystem.In

most cases, the end of the Franco regime was seen as an opportunity to challenge the

monopoly of representation of some interest groups, by those groups that have been

persistentlyexcludedformthepolicymakingprocessfordecades.Thisisthecasenotonlyof

most economic and industrial policies, but also welfare related issues (eg. Aguilar 1989,

Molins1989,PérezDiaz1985,Garvía,1993,Giner1988).Despitethis,state‐interestgroup

relationsweretransformedquiteslowly,andmostoftheexistingorganizationsofinterests

thatwerefunctioningundertheFrancoregime,werenoteliminatedbutadaptedtothenew

democraticpolitical system, keeping someof their privilegedmonopolyposition (Chaqués

2002,Lancaster1984,DeMiguelandRodríguez1988).

In some cases, this privileged position was the result of a historical prerogative

regulated by law, like in the case of the Chambers of Commerce, or the professional

associations like the Colegios profesionales; while in other cases the monopoly of

representationismorerelatedtothecapacityofsomegroupstocaptureandinstitutionalize

thisprivilegedpositionvís‐a‐víssomebranchesoftheSpanishgovernmentwithouttheneed

to enforce it by law. This is the case of industrial and labor relations that follow a neo‐

corporatist model of negotiation between the main business organizations (CEOE and

CEPYME),themaintwounions(CCOOandUGT)andtheSpanishgovernments(Cabreraand

delRey2000,Martínez1986).

Theparticipationofinterestgroupsoccursmainlyinthegovernmentalarena.Inthis

sense, the Spanish case follows the post‐parliamentarian thesis about the patterns of

governance in advanced democracies (Richardson and Jordan 1979, Mahoney and

Baumgartner2008).Mostpolicyareasaregovernedbypolicy communitiesandnetworks,

whichexhibitbothstability intherelationshipamongactors,exclusivenessandsometimes

highlyrestrictiveaccesstopolicymaking.Accesstothepolicymakingprocess is limitedto

fewactorsthatexchangeresourcesandshareresponsibilitiesinisolationfromotherpolicy

actors and the general population. There is a tendency to institutionalize this relationship

amongactors,keepingthestabilitynotonlyof thenumberandtypeofactors,butalsoof

thepolicyissuesandideasthataretakenintoaccountinthepolicyarena(Richardson2000;

MarshandRhodes,1992).Thisisespeciallyimportantwithinthetraditionalproductionand

labor relations, but also for the case ofwelfare policies . As Garvía (1993) demonstrates,

welfarepolicyrelatedtodisabledpeoplehasbeenmonopolizedformorethanfivedecades

by a single organization (the Organización Nacional de Ciegos de España/ National

Organization for theblind,FundaciónONCE). Thisorganizationaloneemploys in themid‐

ninetiesmorethan40.000paidworkers(about8.4%ofallnonprofitemploymentinSpain),

and with the Red Cross and Caritas plays amajor role in service provision and financing

throughoutSpain(RuizOlabuénagaetal,2000).

Thepredominanceofthegovernmentalarenaisexplainedbytheincreasingroleof

government activity in a broader range of economic and social sectors (Richardson and

Jordan, 1979; Navarro, 2000), but also by institutional factors, mainly executive‐

parliamentaryrelations.TheSpanishparliament,asmanyotherparliamentarydemocracies,

is a reactive legislature in the sense that it responds towhat governments bring forward

(Norton, 2000). The Spanish government has a predominant position not only in the

definition and implementation of the political agenda, but also in the legislative process1 –eg.

adoption rate of governmental bills is 88% in front of 10% of parliamentary groups bills—,

and in EU politics, monopolizing the control over the agenda on European affairs (Moravsick,

1994; König and Mäder, 2009; Palau and Chaqués, 2011). As a result, the Spanish

government is the main target of interest groups, and other policy actors like regional

authorities.

Despite this, as Baumgartner and Jones (1993) emphasize no single institution has

monopolistic control over a given policy issue. Dominant interest groups, inside a policy

subsystem, caneventually loseout in frontotherorganizationswho choose tooperate in

1 According to the Spanish Constitution the executive has the capacity to enact decree‐laws andlegislative decrees, which represent about 25% and 5% of the laws passed from 1978 to 2008.Second,Parliamentaryrulesgivetotheexecutiveapredominantpositioninthelegislativeprocess–forexample,executivebillshavepriorityoveranyotherbill—,andthird,mostofthelawsthatareactuallypassedbytheSpanishParliamentareinitiatedbytheexecutive.

different venues in order to foster policy change. Different authors (eg. Richardson 2000,

Beyers et al 2008, Tarrow 2005) stress how major political transformations, mainly the

consolidation of a multilevel system of government, have increased these possibilities of

interestgroupstoseekforalternativevenueswerepolicymakingcouldbe influenced. Ina

multilevelsystemofgovernance“policymakingwithinEuropeanstatesandattheEUlevelis

morefluidandunpredictableandlesscontrollablethanseemstobeimpliedbyenthusiasts

of thenetworkapproach.Whilts thereareundoubtedlypolicy communitiesandnetworks

whichexhibitbothstabilityandexclusivenessanddocontrolpolicyagendas,thereappearto

be counter tendencies which lead to lack of control, policy instability and unpredictable

outcomes” (Richardson 2000). The questionwe pose here is to what extend the Spanish

parliament isa relevantvenuefor interestgroupstopromotepolicychange, leavingaside

othervenueswhichbecomeincreasinglyimportantintheSpanishpolicymakingprocess.

TheSpanishParliamentasapolicyvenue

TheSpanishParliamentisanimportantvenueforinterestgroups,especiallythosewillingto

raisethepublicprofileofanissue,fosterpolicychangeand/ortoalterexistinginstitutional

controlonpolicyissues(Norton,2000).Butcontrarytoothercountries,themobilizationof

interestattheparliamentarianarenaisfilteredbypoliticalparties,whichhavethecapacity

todecidewhichinterestgroups(ifany)willfinallyinterveneinthediscussionofaparticular

issue in thecomparecencias (orhearings).This ismainlyexplainedby institutional factors:

thereisnotasetofformalrulesthatdefinetherightanddutiesofinterestparticipationat

the parliamentarian arena, neither a general register of interest groups (García Lorenzo,

2003).

Informal forms of mobilization of interest vís‐a‐vís parliamentary groups certainly

exist. Authors like Linz (1982), Giner (1988) or Cabrera y del Rey (2007) explain the

connectionbetweenthemainbusinessorganizations(CEOEandCEPYME)andconservative

parties,orthemainunions,UGTandCCOOwiththesocialist (PSOE)andcommunistparty

respectively during the seventies and first eighties. Chaqués (2002) also give some

information about the link between the pharmaceutical industry andConvergencia IUnió

(CIU),a regional conservativepartyofCatalonia,wheremostof the largerSpanish‐owned

pharmaceutical firms are located.By the same token, Chaqués andPalau (2011) illustrate

thelinkbetweentheCatholicChurchandthePartidoPopular,CIUandUPNwhilediscussing

moral issues like abortion, same sex marriage or stem‐cell research, andDubouchet and

Klöti (2004)explainthelinkbetweenthePSOEandmainmedicalorganizations.

TheseanalysessuggestthatinSpain,thereisacrosspartyrepresentationofinterestsgroups

combinedwith cross‐party lobbying on the part ofmajor interest groups (Liebert, 1999).

Interestgroupscontactdifferentpoliticalpartiesacrosstimeandacrossissuesdependingof

their preferences. This feature has been reinforced from the nineties to present, as a

response to the decline of public trust on political parties and governmental institutions

(Putnam 2000, Salamon, et al, 2003). Interest groups, especially NGOs and major

foundations define themselves as non‐political organizations, highlighting their autonomy

from traditional policy actors,mainly political parties and the government, as ameans to

legitimatetheirpositioninfrontofpublicopinion.Asaconsequence,despitehistoricaland

ideologicallinksexistsbetweenpoliticalpartiesandinterestgroups,theseconnectionshave

beenlessevidentandvisibleforthelastdecades.

Parliamentarygroupsinviteinterestgroupstoparticipateinthecomparecenciasnot

only according to their ideologicalpositions,but alsodependingonwhether they suffer a

severe information deficit. For some issues, especially those involving a low level of

consensus like abortion or same‐sex marriage, to invite interest groups to the

comparecencias(orhearings)couldbeasourcetosimplyboosttheimageofapoliticalparty

in frontofpublicopinion. Inother cases, likeAssistedReproductionTechniques (ART) the

participationof interestgroupscouldbemoreconnectedwiththe lackof informationand

technical knowledge by MPs. This is especially important in a context of increasing

complexityandheterogeneityoftheissuesinvolvedinthelegislativeprocessthatoccursfor

thelastdecades.

Fromhereweexpectthatthemobilizationofinterestgroupsattheparliamentarian

arenawillvaryacrossissues,anditwillbedirectlyrelatedtothepreferencesandpriorities

ofpoliticalparties.Thisis,followingBaumgartneretal.(2009)wedepartformtheideathat

thepoliticizationofissuesisadrivenforceforthemobilizationofinterest,andaccordingly,

we expect to find a important connection between the attention policy actors give to a

particular issue (measured by the percentage of issue attention of parliamentary and

governmental bills by year), and the mobilization of interest groups (measured by the

percentageofhearingsinwhichinterestgroupsparticipatebyyearandbyissue).

Dataandcodingmethods

Inordertocapturetheparticipationofinterestgroupsintheparliamentarianarenawerely

ontheComparencenciasorpublichearings intheCongresodelosdiputados.Accordingto

thestatutesoftheCongresodelosdiputados2,thesecomparecenciasarethesingleexisting

formal venue through which interest groups can directly participate in the Spanish

Parliament. Theyare always conductedbyparliamentary committees (or subcommittees,

alsocalledponencias)aimedtofulfillthreebasicfunctions:oversightpolicyimplementation

bytheSpanishgovernment;togatherinformationfromthedifferentactorsinvolvedinthe

policymakingprocess;andtocapturetheexistingissueconflictandideologicalpositionsof

theactorsinvolvedinthelegislativeprocess.

Comparecenciasarenotlimitedtotheparticipationofinterestgroups,butalsoother

actors,mainlymembersofthegovernment,toppublicofficials;andotherpersonalitieslike

experts, ex‐public officials, ex‐members of government or/and public officials in office of

otherslevelsofgovernment(regional,local,or/andEU).Astable1illustrates,mosthearings

correspond to representativesof theSpanishgovernmentand toppublicofficials,but the

participation of interest groups increases dramatically in the last legislature, from 15%

(1996‐2000), to22% (2004‐2008).These results somehowcontradictpreviousanalysis like

Liebert (1999), where comparecencias are described as a venue restricted to invite

representatives from government and public corporations, with the marginal or null

interventionofotherpolicyactors,likeinterestgroups.

Table1abouthere

2Seearticle44aboutthefunctioningofpermanentcommisions,andarticles52.2and64.4forthefunctioningofnon‐permanentcommissions

Thesourceofthedatabase istheSpanishCongresswebpage3thatcontainsall the

data about the different types of comparecencias. Overall, the database contains 2.686

records,one foreachof thecomparecencias of interestorganizations from1996 to2010,

althoughourintentionistogofurtherbackintimeinordertocoverthewholedemocratic

period. Following Gray and Lowery (2008) and the Advocacy and Public Policymaking

Project,wehavegatheredinformationnotonlyofinterestgroupsbutalsoofotherinterest

organizationslikethinktanks,publicinstitutions,orregionalauthorities.Despitethat,inthis

paper we have only considered interest groups, leaving aside these other organizations,

whichwillbeconsideredinfurtherresearch4.

Theinformationhasbeensystematizedinthefollowingway:(1)wehaveclassified

policy actors according to the codebook of the Advocacy and Public Policymaking

Project5(table2); (2)toclassifythetypeof issues inwhich interestgroupsare involvedwe

havefollowedthecodingsystemoftheComparativeAgendasProjectalreadyadaptedtothe

SpanishcasebytheSpanishpolicyagendasproject(www.ub.edu/spanishpolicyagendas,and

table3).Besideswehavecreatedthefollowingindicatorsforeachcomparecencia:(1)date

ofthehearing,(2)year,(3)legislature,(4)nameoftheexpertortheindividualrepresenting

theorganization,(5)nameoftheorganization,(6)typeofactor,(7)maintopicorpolicyarea

ofthepolicyactor;(8)subtopicofthepolicyactor,(9)nameofthecommittee,(10)topicof

theissueunderdiscussion;(11)subtopicoftheissueunderdiscussion.Wehavealsocreated

two dummy variables: one to define the type of committee (whether it is a standing

committee or ad‐hoc committee created to deal with a specific issue; and another to

capturethetypeofresults,thisiswhetherthehearingwasfinallycelebrated(ornot).Only

609ofthehearingswerenevercelebrated,about22%ofthetotal.

3http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Iniciativas4InthewebpageoftheCongresodelosDiputadostheinformationaboutcomparecenciasisorganizedinfoursections:Comapareneciasofgovernmentofficials;compareneciasoftoppublicofficials;comparenciasrelatedtotheheadofstate(theCrown);andcomparecenciasrelatedtootherpersonalities.Thedatabasecontainsalltheinformationrelatedtotheseotherpersonalities.5http://lobby.la.psu.edu/

Table2abouthere

Finally, in order to test whether the participation of interest groups is driven by

governmental activities or/and the priorities of political parties we rely in the databases

created by the Spanish policy agendas project about the Speeches of the Presidente del

Gobierno,governmentalbills,andparliamentarygroupsbills.Each bill and speech has been

coded according to a coding system based on 19 major topic categories (table 3), and 247

subtopics. This coding system first developed by the US (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Jones

and Baumgartner 2005), has been adapted to the characteristics of the Spanish political

system introducing some revisions like questions dealing with the national health system or

ETA terrorism.

Table 3 about here

Finally, thedevelopmentof thisdatabase is aimed toprovideanew tool tobetter

understand the role of interest groups in the Spanish political system. At present, the

information about associations, foundations and professionals associations is highly

fragmentedinseveralregistersdistributedbypolicyareasandterritories(national,regional

andlocal).TheNationalRegisterofAssociationsoftheMinistryofHomeAffairs(MHA)isthe

mainregister informingaboutthenumberofactive interestgroupsperyearfrom1985to

present–.According to theannual reportofMHA, thenumberoforganizations increases

from 3.310 in 1985 to 32,353 active associations in 2008—. It also classifies interest

organization across 9 policy areas (cultural and ideological, Sports, health, economic and

professional, family related and elderly, women, education social and community

organizations. But this database do not provide information about whether these

organizations get involved in lobbying activities, and mobilize in order to foster policy

changeacrossdifferentpolicyvenues.Ourgoalistocontributetofillthisgapintheanalysis

ofinterestgroupsinSpain.

InterestgroupsintheSpanishparliament:afirstdescriptionFollowingGrayandLowery (1993)wemeasure interestgroupsdiversityas thenumberof

interest groups participating in the comparecencias celebrated in the Congreso de los

Diputadosfrom1996to2008.Astable4illustrates,855interestgroupshaveparticipatedin

thesecomparecencias;mostofthemareNGOs(34%),followedbytradeassociationsdealing

with a specific economic/industrial sector (26%) and corporations (16%). Most of these

organizationsonlyparticipateonce(678interestgroups)–theaverageratioofhearingsper

interest organization is 1,5— with important differences across interest groups. Actually,

some organizations like unions, and business organizations have participated with more

intensitythantherestwitharatioof3.3and2.2hearingrespectively.

Table4abouthere

Table 5 shows that the top 20 interest groups concentratemore than 20% of the

hearings, highlighting an important concentration of interest representation in a few

organizations(mainlybusinessorganizationsandunions).Actually,thislistgivessupportto

someoftheexistinganalysisaboutinterestrepresentationinSpain:(1)economicandalso

someofthemostrelevantwelfarerelatedissueslikepensionsaremonopolizedbythetwo

mainunions(UGTandCCOO)andbusinessorganizations(CEOEandCEPYME)whichcapture

morethan10%ofthehearings;(2)asexplainedbyRuízOlabuénagaetal(2000)thethree

most important non‐profit organizations devoted to the provision of social services –the

fundaciónOnce, Caritas and theRedCross—with theCERMI (SpanishCommittee for the

handicapped)areamongthetopteninterestgroupsparticipatingin4%ofthehearings,(3)

amongthesetop20 interestorganizationsarealsothreefarmersorganizations(four ifwe

consideredthetop21)whichillustratesthefragmentationintherepresentationofinterest

in this sector (Palau, 2009), but also the importance of agricultural issues in the political

agenda (especially related to scandals like the linen‐subsidies, or themad cow case); (4)

fragmentationalsoexistsintherepresentationoffeministmovements,whichareespecially

involved in the discussion of issues like gender inequalities, abortion or violence against

women,andconsumersassociations.

Table5abouthere

Figure1 illustratesthattherearesomevariations inthenumberofhearingsacross

time. First, as expected, the number of hearings decreases in election years (1996, 2000,

2004,and2008),andthisisespeciallythecasein2004,whenthePartidoPopular(PP)loose

general elections after eight years in government in front of the socialist party (PSOE).

Amongotherthings,parliamentarysessionsareshorterduringelectionyears,andoncethe

newchambersareconstituted,thegovernmentandparliamentarygroupsneedsometime

to introduce a new bill and, in the case of MPs, to prepare the hearings related them.

Actually, the comparecencias of interest groups always increases during the second and

third year of the term, and tend to decrease during the last year (with the exception of

1999).

Second, participationof interest groups is especially large in the first legislatureof

José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004‐2008)with 268 interest groups hearings, and the first

legislatureofJoseMariaAznar(1996‐2000)with242,whilethenumberofhearingdecreases

to 168, when the Partido Popular is governing under majority, from 2000 to 2004. The

enlargement of the database back in time will allow us to test whether the type of

government–majority‐minority—islinkedtothesevariations.

Third,thereareimportantvariationsintheparticipationofdifferenttypesofactors

across time. Business associations and corporations decrease their participation in the

comparecenciasquitedramaticallyfrom1996to2008,whiletheoppositeoccursinthecase

of NGOswhich increase their participation from 73 to 110, and trade associations which

increase from 80 to 168 comparecencias. As we argue below, these variations in the

participation of interest groups are mainly related to the prioritization of issues by

parliamentarygroups.

Figure1abouthere

Figure2showsthetypeofissuesinwhicheachinterestgrouphasbeenmoreactive.

First,corporationsareespeciallyactiveinthedebateaboutgovernmentalaffairswhichare

mainlyrelatedtotheprivatizationofpublicenterprises(capturing64%ofallthehearingsof

interest groupsdealingwith these issues); energywhich ismainlyprovidedby large firms

(61%)andresearchanddevelopment,especiallyrelatedtotheprivatization,andregulation

of telecommunications (48%). All these issues were especially important in the political

agendaofthelatenineties,whentheconservativegovernmentofJoséMariaAznarengage

inafinalprocessofprivatizationandde‐regulationofpublicservices.

Figure2abouthere

Second,ONGsareespeciallymobilizedforthediscussionofrightsrelatedissues(58%

of all the hearings related to rights) especially women rights, homosexuals, gypsies, and

immigration,andalsolabour(42%),especiallypensions,theenvironment(41%)socialpolicy

(58%),andforeignaffairs,mainlyrelatedtoforeignaidandcooperationpolicy(34%).Third,

trade associations explain about 50% of the hearings related to agriculture, housing,

commerce and foreign trade, and about 30%of the hearings related to economic affairs.

Fourth, unions are especially active in education policy (30,4%), law and justice (20%),

mainly related to the police, and research and development. And also rights issues. Fifth,

professionalorganizationsareespeciallyactiveinhealthrelatedissues,mainlydominatedby

medical associations,andcommerceand industrialpolicy,which ismainly connectedwith

property rights issues. Finally, foundations devotemost of their attention to social issues

whilebusinessorganizationsare focused in thediscussionof labour issuesandcommerce

andindustrialpolicy.

Inordertomeasurethelevelofconcentrationoftheagendaofinterestgroupsatthe

SpanishparliamentwehavealsocomputedHerfindhalscores6i.Asfigure3illustratessome

interest groups –especially foundations, andprofessional organizations—haveparticipated

in the discussion of a few issues, while others –ONGs, unions, trade associations and

corporations—haveamoredispersedagenda,participating tomoreor lessextendacross

mostissues.

Mostofthehearingsof interestgroupsoccur inpermanentcommittees(75%),and

are related to legislativeactivities (bill initiatives).Hearings innon‐permanent committees

areonly272,andmostlyrelatedtocrisissituationsliketheAl‐Qaedaterroristattackof11th

ofMarch2004,thelinenscandal(misuseofEUsubventionforlinenproduction),Gescartera

(financial scandal),or theOil Spillof thePrestige—.Non‐permanentcommitteesalsodeal

withnewissuesthatincreasinglycapturetheattentionofpolicymakerslikeclimatechange,

pensionsreform,trafficaccidentprevention,drug‐abuse,armyreformorwomenissues.In

mostcases,thecreationofaspecificnon‐permanentcommitteeonly lastsone legislature,

with the exception to women issues that from 2004 is transformed into a permanent

commission(table6).

Table6abouthere

Participationof interestgroupsisalwaysmoreimportant inpermanentcommittees

andthisisexplainedbythefunctionsdevelopedbyeachtypeofcommittee.Non‐permanent

commissionsaremainlyaimedtooversighttheimplementationofaparticularpolicybythe

government, like the case of pensions policy, or Al‐Qaeda terrorist attacks, or to provide

informationaboutissuesthatareveryspecificandcomplexlikeclimatechange,andtoaless

extend,tocapturethedifferentpolicypositionsaboutaspecificissues,likethecaseofarmy

reform, orwomen issues (abortion). As a consequence, participationofmembers and ex‐

6Thisindicatorgivesinformationaboutthecompetitionamongissues–howinterestgroupsattentionisspreadamongissues—.Itisdefinedasthesumofthesquaresoftheagendasharesofeachissue.InordertosimplifyresultsweusethenormalizedversionoftheHerfindalhindexthatrangesfrom0to1.AHindexbelow0.1indicatesanunconcentratedindex;aHindexbetween0.1to0.18indicatesmoderateconcentration;whileaHindexabove0.18indicateshighconcentration

membersofthegovernmentandtoppublicofficialsishigherinthecaseofnon‐permanent

committees.

By the contrary, participation in permanent committees is more related to the

legislativeprioritiesofeitherpoliticalpartiesorthegovernment,anddealwith issuesthat

are more than one legislature in the political agenda (this is especially the case of

immigration, property and consumers rights). Interest groups participation in these

permanentcommitteesisespeciallyhighforthecaseofprofessionalandtradeassociations

(more than 90% of the hearings in which they participate are dealt in permanent

committees),andUnions(84%).Fortherestoforganizations–ONGs,Unions,Foundations,

BusinessassociationsandCorporations—participation innon‐permanentcommitteesrises

to25%‐30%.

Figure4abouthere

Policyprioritiesandinterestgroups

Figure 5 shows that that the mobilization of interest groups at the parliamentarian arena varies

across issues. We can distinguish among three types of issues: (1) those that capture more

than 10% of the comparecencias of interest groups like rights related issues, labor, education,

law and justice, social policy and commerce and banking; (2) those issues that capture about

5% of the comparecencias like energy, the environment, agriculture, health, transportation

and foreign affairs, and (3) issues that capture about 1-2% of the comparecencias like

housing, defense, foreign trade, the economy and governmental affairs.

Figure 5 about here

AsTable7 illustrates, attentiongiven to issues in the comparecenciaspresents

important differences in relation to the attention captured by these issues by the

government(specheesofthePresidentedelGobierno,andgovernmentalbills)andtoa

lessextendpoliticalparties(parliamentarybills).Thesedifferencesaremainlyrelated

to the governmental agenda inwhich economic issues, foreign affairs, commerce and

industrial policy and governmental issues capture more than 50% of the attention

versus 13% of the comparecencias, and about 25% of parliamentary bills. By the

contrary, issues like labor, education, social policy and rights capture and important

share of the attention of both parliamentary groups (40%) bills and comparecencias

(45%) versus 15% of governmental bills. There are two issues, law and justice and

researchanddevelopmentthathaveasimilarshareofattentioninallvenues,andthree

issues, health, the environment and energy policy that capturemore attention in the

comparecenciasthantherest.

Table7abouthere

Inordertogofurtherintheanalysis,andtotestwhethertheparticipationofinterest

groupsat theSpanishParliament is linked to theprioritiesofpolicymakerswecomputed

the correlation between the percentage of issue attention of parliamentary and

governmental bills by year, and the percentage of hearings in which interest groups

participate by year and by issue. As we stated above, we depart form the idea that the

politicizationofissuesisadrivenforceforthemobilizationofinterest,andaccordingly,we

expect to find an important connection between the attention policy actors give to a

particular issue (Baumgartner et al. 2009). Our results indicate that correlation is not

significantand low for thecaseofgovernmentalbills (.068),andspeeches (.255),while in

thecaseofparliamentarybillscorrelationishighandsignificant(,611**)(0.1significance).

These first results suggest that theparticipationof interest groups ismoredirectly

linked to theprioritiesof political parties, than the governmental agenda. Political parties

devotemore timeand resources todiscusswith interest groups issues that areespecially

relevanttothem,givinglessattentiontotheprioritiesoftheSpanishgovernment.Thecase

ofrightrelatedissuesisagoodexample:whilenogovernmentalbillwasintroducedtodeal

with prostitution, homosexuals and gypsies discrimination, attention to these issues was

increasinglyimportantbyleftandfar‐leftpoliticalparties.Thesepoliticalparties,inalliance

withdifferent interestgroups,pushtheseissuesintotheparliamentaryagendainorderto

promoteaninstitutionalshiftandfosterpolicychange.

Fromherefurtheranalysisshouldbedevelopedinordertoexplainwhetherinterest

groupsparticipationismoreconnectedtoissueswithalowlevelofconsensus,likethecase

of abortion; to what extend the low correlation with governmental bills is a rational

response of political parties in an institutional context in which adoption rate of

governmentalbillsisespeciallyhigh(88%ofthegovernmentalbillsarepassed);whetherthe

typeofgovernmenthasanimpactftheparticipationofinterestgroupsattheparliamentary

arena; or/and whether political parties call for the participation of interest groups as a

means to fill an information gap, or by the contrary to engage in filibustering practices

orientedtostopthe legislativeprocess.Actually, the fact that theparticipationof interest

groups is sohigh for some issues, like same‐sexmarriage,orabortioncouldbe related to

thesepracticesbyconservativepartieswillingtopreventpolicychange.

Somepreliminaryconclusions

The mobilization of interest groups at the Spanish Parliament is especially linked to the

prioritiesofparliamentarygroups(correlationishighandsignificant)butnottothepriorities

oftheSpanishgovernment.Parliamentarygroupsdevotemostoftheirtimeandresources

todiscussandexchangeinformationvís‐a‐vísinterestgroupsaboutissuesthatareespecially

relevantforthem,leavinginasecondstage,thediscussionof issuesthatareapriorityfor

the Spanish executive.We argue that this is partly connected to institutional factors. The

participation of interest groups is filtered by political parties, which have the capacity to

decide who is going to participate in the comparecencias. Despite this further analysis

shouldbemadeinordertotesttherelevanceofotherinstitutionalfactors,mainlythetype

ofgovernmentandthecompositionofparliamentarycommittees.

Inthispaperwealsoshowthatmobilizationofinterestvariesacrossissues:interest

groups participation is especially relevant about right related issues, energy and the

environment,while theoppositeoccurs for issues like foreignaffairs,governmental issues

and/or the economy which capture an important share of the governmental agenda.

Differences also exist across type of actors in terms of issue attention of degree of

mobilization.MobilizationisespeciallylargeforthecaseofNGOsandtradeassociationsand

alsoverydispersedacrossawiderangeoforganizationsthatonaverageonlyparticipatein

one comparecenciaorhearing.Despite this,our results also indicate that therearea few

organizations thatparticipatemore thanothers (the top20 interestorganizations capture

20%ofallhearings),andthisisespeciallythecaseofthetwomainunions(CCOOandUGT)

andthetwomainbusinessorganizations(CEOEandCEPYME).

Finally,inthispaperwealsointroduceanewdatasetaboutthecomparecencias(or

hearings)ofinterestgroups,createdfollowingthemethodologyoftheAdvocacyandPublic

PolicymakingProjectandtheComparativeAgendasProject,inordertocapturethenumber

andtypeofinterestgroups,aswellastheissuestheyareinvolvedalongthreelegislatures.

Thisisafirststepofwhatwehopetobealargerresearchprojectorientedtoincreaseour

understanding of the role of interest groups in the Spanish political system, and also to

provide a new instrument to develop quantitative and qualitative comparative analysis

acrosscountriesandpolicysubsystems.

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TablesandfiguresTable1:ComparecenciasbytypeofactorattheSpanishParliament,1996to2008. 1996‐2000 2000‐2004 2004‐2008

Typeofactor N % N % N %Members ofgovernmentinoffice

1.508 32,74 1.687 40,42 1.309 32,27

Publicofficialsinoffice 2.439 52,95 1.898 45,47 1.870 46,09Interest groups andotherpersonalities

659 14,31 589 14,11 878 21,64

TOTAL 4.606 100 4.174 100 4.057 100

Table2:AdvocacyandPublicPolicymakingProject:TypeofActorcodes

Description CodeActorType

Citizen,ideological,orcause‐orientedgroupFoundations,non‐profitproviders,etc.UnionsProfessionalAssociation(membersindividualprofessionals)TradeAssociation(memberscorporationsorbusinesses)BusinessAssociation (suchas theBusinessRoundTableortheChamberofCommerce;businessgroupsnotassociatedwithoneparticularindustry)

Corporation–forprofitStateandLocalGovernmentOfficialIndividualOutsideExpertOthers

2356

7821505456

Table3PolicyAgendasMajorTopicCodes

1. Macroeconomics 12.Internalaffairsandjustice

2. Civilrights 13.SocialPolicy

3. Health 14.Housing

4. Agriculture 15.Commerceandindustrialpolicy

5. Labour 16.Defence

6. Education 17.ScienceandTechnology

7. Environment 18.ForeignTrade

8. Energy 19.InternationalAffairs

10. Transportation 20.GovernmentandPublicAdministration

21.PublicLandsandwatermanagement

Table4.‐NumberofinterestgroupsintheSpanishParliament1996‐2010TypeInterestgroup

Numberofinterestgroups

% NumberofHearings

% Hearings/interestgroups

NGOs 294 34,39 425 32,5 1,45Foundations 48 5,61 61 4,6 1,27Unions 57 6,67 188 14,4 3,3

1,64ProfessionalAssociations

72 8,42 118 9,1

1,29Tradeassociations 223 26,08 288 22,1

2,2Businessorganizationsandchambersofcommerce

25 2,92 55 4,2

Corporations 136 15,91 173 13,2 1,27Totalgeneral 855 100 1.308 100 1,53

Table5.Top21nterestgroups

Comparecencias(%)

Comparecencias(N) Nameoftheorganization

Typeofactor

3,89 50 CCOO 53,50 45 UGT 5

1,79 23ConfederaciónEspañoladeOrganizacionesEmpresariales(CEOE)

8

1,63 21 ComitéEspañoldeMinusválidos(CERMI) 2

1,09 14 FundaciónONCE 3

0,78 10ConfederaciónEspañolaPequeñayMedianaEmpresa(CEPYME)

8

0,70 9 CruzRojaEspañola 3

0,70 9CoordinadoradeOrganizacionesdeAgricultoresyGanaderos(COAG)

7

0,62 8OrganizacióndeConsumidoresyUsuarios(OCU)

2

0,62 8 Cáritas 2

0,62 8UnióndePequeñosAgricultoresyGanaderos(UPA)

7

0,54 7 ConfederaciónIntersindicalGalega(CIG) 5

0,54 7ConfederaciónSindicalIndependientedeFuncionarios(CSIF)

5

0,54 7UniónEspañoladeEntidadesAseguradorasyReaseguradoras(UNESPA)

7

0,47 6 AsociacióndeMujeresJuristasTHEMIS 6

0,476 FederacióndeAsociacionesdeMujeres

Progresistas2

0,47 6 GreenpeaceEspaña 20,47 6 EcologistasenAcción 2

0,476 ArtistasIntérpretesoEjecutantes

SociedaddeGestióndeEspaña(AIE)6

0,476 ConfederacióndeCooperativasAgrarias

deEspaña(CCAE)7

0,47 6 AsociaciónAgrariadeJóvenesAgricultores(ASAJA)

7

Table6.IssueattentionacrosslegislaturesIssuepermanency intheagenda

1996‐2000Partido Popular underminority

2000‐2004Partido Popular undermajority

2004‐2008PSOEunderminority

Crisis andfocusingevents

TaxfraudFraud related to EUsubsidies for lineproduction

Prestige(oilspill)Gescartera (financialscandal)11‐M Al‐Qaeda terroristattack

Two or morelegislaturesintheagenda

WomenrightsImmigrationDrugabuseIssuesrelatedtothehandicappedAgingandretirement(PactodeToledo)NuclearenergyRoadsafetyPropertyrightsConsumerrights

Only one

legislature in the

agenda

IndustrialPolicyHealthreformEMULabourreformMinority rights (Gipsy,homosexuals)PoliceDomesticviolenceIllegaltrafficwithchildrenandwomenArmyreform

Social responsiveness ofCorporationsProblemsrelatedtoSmallandMediumEnterprisesEducationalreform

Social responsivenessofCorporationsHealth reformProstitutionClimateChangeAbortionTobaccoPharmaceuticalsLabourreformDomesticviolence

Table7.Percentageofissueattentionacrossissuesindifferentpolicy‐makingchannels,1996‐2008

comparecenciasParliamentarygroupsbills

Governmentalbills speeches

Economy 2,65 4,65 18,08 14,46

Rights 12,99 10,31 4,42 5,92

Health 6,10 2,02 3,46 2,99

Agriculture 3,76 0,81 3,65 0,92

Labour 12,25 10,82 5,00 8,88

Education 10,10 7,68 3,08 7,40

Environment 6,28 2,53 2,69 1,40

Energy 3,45 0,20 1,35 0,64

Transportation 3,08 3,03 5,38 1,95

Lawandjustice 12,25 15,07 12,50 15,07

Socialpolicy 9,30 8,80 0,96 2,29

Housing 0,37 2,63 1,15 1,73

Commerceandbanking 5,54 5,36 12,88 1,62

Defense 0,86 5,26 3,65 3,35

ResearchandDevelopment 3,94 4,15 4,04 3,07

Foreigntrade 1,60 0,00 0,58 1,09

ForeignAffairs 3,94 1,31 5,58 11,67

Governmentalaffairs 1,54 13,85 8,65 14,15

Figure1:Numberofcomparecencias(hearings)peryear

0

50

100

150

200

250

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Corporations

BusinessAssociations

TradeAssociations

ProfessionalAssociations

Unions

Foundations

ONG

Figure2.Comparecencias(Hearings)bytopicandtypeofactor

0,00

10,00

20,00

30,00

40,00

50,00

60,00

70,00

80,00

90,00

100,00Econom

yRights

Health

Agriculture

Labour

Education

Environm

ent

Energy

Transportation

Lawandjustice

Socialpolicy

Housing

Commerceandbanking

Defense

ResearchandDevelopment

Foreigntrade

ForeignAffairs

Governmentalaffairs

Corporations

BusinessAssociations

TradeAssociations

ProfessionalAssociationsUnions

Foundations

ONG

Figure 3: Concentration of the agenda of interest groups across policy issues at the SpanishParliament,1996‐2009

00,020,040,060,080,10,120,140,160,18

HerZindhalindexnormalized

Figure4.ParticipationofinterestgroupsbytypeofCommittee,1996‐2009

0102030405060708090100

nopermanent

permanent

Figure5.Percentageofattentionacrossissues(Comparecenciasofinterestgroupsfrom1996to2009)

0,00 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00 12,00 14,00

EconomyRightsHealth

AgricultureLabour

EducationEnvironment

EnergyTransportationLawandjustice

SocialpolicyHousing

CommerceandbankingDefense

ResearchandDevelopmentForeigntradeForeignAffairs

Governmentalaffairs

i