Mansfeld, Jaap. Ambiguity in Empedocles B17, 3-5 - A Suggestion (1972)

8/13/2019 Mansfeld, Jaap. Ambiguity in Empedocles B17, 3-5 - A Suggestion (1972)

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Ambiguity in Empedocles B17, 3-5: A Suggestion

Author(s): J. MansfeldReviewed work(s):Source: Phronesis, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1972), pp. 17-39Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181871.

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Ambiguityn EmpedoclesBi7, 3-y A Suggestion

J. MANSFELD1. TheProblem

Though the final words of this section of fragment B 17, &peMasa&L?zQ, are due to conjecture, I propose to base my discussion uponthe text as printed by Diels-Kranzl*

8OL' 3& VJTCV Ye"VCCL5,aOL' 8' =O'M',L+Lrv LV yop 7wasVr)VCVO0Oo TELXTELT O??XEL 1?,a8craOLV 8tL0CYU[4eoVWV pCpbTeCa &7r7r7. (5)"Double is the coming-to-be of mortal things, double their passing-away . . ." How cruciallyimportant these three lines have been for theinterpretation of Empedocles' cosmic system need not, I trust, beexpounded here. As a matter of fact, for a respectable number ofyears the theory of a cosmic cycle in four periods containing twodistinct worlds,i.e. two oppositecosmogoniesand two equally opposite

zoogonies, has almost undisputedly dominated the field. In recentyears this theory has been questioned (quite successfully, as I be-lieve) by several scholars,2though it has also been defended againstsuch attacks by D. O'Brien, who proposed an ingenious and well-argued revision.3I may perhapsbe excused from extensively quoting* For modern works referred to in this article, please see Bibliography on pp.38-39.I The manuscripts DF of Simplicius, Phys. 158, 3-5 Diels have pucp,&eao8pen E has 8pu &eacz 8peird'. Ati=j was conjectured by Scaliger, O&petasXby Panzerbieter. Bollack, [42] p. 19 - in Bollack, fr. 17DK is fr. 31 - opts for8pucp4da' and conjectures &roip6ere (cf. also [46] p. 439). It is not reallynecessary to decide between the elegant emendations of Scaliger-Panzerbieterand Bollack's rather uncouth reading, since, as I hope to show in the followingpages, the interpretation which I am about to defend suits both these versionsequally well. In view of this it is better maybe to follow a by now traditional text.

However, once in a while I feel that &pucpeotpa ap?9a or 4puc?a,L' k&p6CD("is produced while being scattered") is a remote possibility, cf. B 30, 1 MurapMet [Aya NcZxovq Le???aaLV pf?.2 Solmsen [34], Holscher [40], and Bollack [35], [42], [43].

3 [41]. It should be noted that Bollack's commentary and O'Brien's book bothappeared in the same year. O'Brien's excellent bibliography contains no itemslater than 1965. Bollack's more selective bibliography, [43] p. 658 ff., has anitem as recent as 1969, but does not list Hoffmann-Loss, [36]; for his opinion ofO'Brien see r461.

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the various argumentseither in favour of or against this cosmic cycle,since earlier opinions, including those of H6lscher 1965 [40], Solmsen[34]and Bollack [35] have been usefully reviewed by O'Brien, 41]p. 156ff. I may perhapsbe permitted to state at the outset that I believe thetheory of the cosmic cycle of four symmetrical periods, even in itsrevised form, to be doomed. On the other hand, I am not whollysatisfied by the explanations of B 17, 3-5 offered by those who opposethe theory which has O'Brien as its most recent spokesman. For itcannot be denied that the interpretation defended by O'Brien,whichmoreoverin the past enjoyed the powerfulsupportof a quite venerablecommunis opinio, is based upon a translation which, at least at firstsight, is a very natural and easy one indeed4.Its difficulties appearonlywhen other evidence is taken into account, as is fully apparent fromthe variety of partially conflicting attempts to imagine the details ofthe cycle which up to now have been made.O'Brien rightly considersB 17, 3-5 to be his chief asset.6He writes,[41] p. 157: "fromthis" (i.e. Panzerbieter's&peypecxsonjoinedwithScaliger's 8Lt-r7rr) "it followed, as Panzerbieter rightly appreciated,that there were two worlds of mortal being from Sphere to Sphere";and again, p. 167: "once 49pecpkZaaa8LaCTnl s restored, it is im-possible to understand these lines except as Panzerbieter and Zellerunderstood them". However one should concede that among theremains of Empedocles' ipsissima verba hese are the only lines whichseem to give active support to the theory of the "two worlds of mortalbeings". Muchingenuity and imaginationis required n order to makeother fragments fit into the pattern. There is, of course, also the evi-dence of Aristotle. O'Brien argues that this evidence is compatiblewith his interpretation,6 but so does Bollack,7 whose reading ofEmpedocles is incompatiblewith O'Brien's. It would be unobjection-able (or so I think) from a methodical point of view to leave out thevarious bits and shreds of evidence to be found in Aristotle altogether,at least in so far as the presentarticle is concerned. As H. Chernisshasdemonstrated, with Aristotle it is always difficult if not impossible

4 Even Solmsen, [34] p. 138, speaks of the "plain and unambiguous words" ofB 17, 3-5, though his interpretation, for which cf. below, p. 20-21, is notthe traditional one defended by O'Brien.5 For B 26, 5 cf. below, n. 20.6 [41] p. 7 ff., p. 59 ff., p. 169 ff.7 [35] p. 43 ff.18


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to distinguish between report, discussion, and criticism.8Though I donot wish to concur unconditionallywith Cherniss'negative verdict asto Aristotle's reliability (the overall trend undoubtedly is whatChernisshas shown it to be, but the burden of proof has to be shoul-dered anew for each individual case), it will be safest to assume thatAristotle's testimony is acceptable if and only if it can be supportedin a satisfactory way by the original statements of those authorswhose ideas he happensto discuss,or by otherindependentand in itselfreliable evidence. These considerationsbring us back to the problemof the interpretation of B 17, 3-5.

Though O'Brien writes that his reading of these lines is the only'possible'one, an alternativeline of explanation9may be taken, and hasin fact been taken. It was first suggested by Karsten who howeverrejected it outright,'0 reformulated by Stein,"l revised by Von8 Cherniss, [11] and [16]. Cf. e.g. [11] p. 347: "When Aristotle's references toPresocratic philosophy have been read in their context, and when these refer-ences and criticisms have been studied as integral parts of the positive argumentsin which they are set, it becomes clear that one cannot safely wrench them awayto use as building-blocks for a history of Presocratic philosophy". For Aristotle'soften idiosyncratic treatment of Empedocles see Cherniss [11] passim. A recentand reliable study is that by Hoffmann-Loss, [36]: on GC334a5 ff. (= A 42) 'r6vx6ar?ov 6[Lolqg XcLV-nlVtd 'txr ro5 vctxouc OvvxXI P6p&rpovid T'r6 9 L?XEI, see [36]p. 196 ff., esp. p. 205 ff., where it is argued that this is what Aristotle concluded,not what he found in Empedocles, and that it is this conclusion which agrees withthe critical observations and conclusions at Phys. 250 b 26 ff. and 252 a 7 ff.(== A 38) (on these passages in the Physics cf. Hoffmann-Loss, p. 158-9,p. 160, p. 162); onCael. 301 a 15-6 (= A 42) see p. 166 ff., p. 170, p. 172-3,p. 207-9: Aristotle's remark, "he leaves out the cosmogony of Attraction", isbased upon the conclusions drawn from his critical assessment of Empedocles'physics. Cf. also Seeck, [38], who attempts to distinguish between statement offact and criticism in Aristotle, but who e.g. shows that the periods of restbetween the motions caused by Attraction (OtlX6'r) and Repulsion (Netxoq)mentioned at Phys. 250 b 26 ff. belong to the critical part of Aristotle's argu-ment ([38] p. 32-6).However, one can understand that Aristotle was baffled occasionally (see alsoSeeck, [38] p. 53). The diagram representing the cosmic process in Bollack, [43]p. 51, a schema certainly not intended to illustrate a cycle containing twodistinct worlds, nevertheless may be read in such a way as to represent thatcycle. See also below, n. 13 in fine.9 This alternative interpretation is independent of the readings preferred atB 17,3: Solmsen, [34] p. 138 and n. 79 sticks to Panzerbieter-Scaliger, Holscher,[40] p. 212, opts for &puqa?Za,while Bollack went his own way, cf. above n. 1.10 Karsten, [1] p. 193-4, rejected &o 8 and conjectured roLe8e.Though thisconjecture is not necessary, his criticism of the hypothetical alternative inter-

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Arnim,12 and recently fortified and defended by Holscher, Solmsenand Bollack. It is to the arguments of the latter three scholars that Iwill now turn.Solmsen, [34] p. 138-40, rightly stresses the ontological aspects ofB 17 as a whole: Empedocles is primarilyconcerned with the statusof the elements as qualitatively unchanging and eternal beings. Byexplaining the birth and death of individual beings as a combinationand a separation of elemental particles he is able to save both thephenomenaand eternal Being. But this would not be all: accordingtoSolmsen, Empedoclesmade a further discovery, viz., that combinationand separation are mutually dependent. "On the way toward the &vthere is not only genesis, but also destruction (of the compounds);correspondingly, in the process of 8LxcpUea;authere is, before thecomplete separationof the elements,genesis of compounds,i.e. mortalbeings".'3Solmsenadmits that the stating of this discoveryinterruptsthe argument of B 17 as a whole, and that it cannot be paralleledanywhere else in the fragments:14he calls it a 'corollary', "a contri-bution in the realm of pure thought". This is rather difficult, for atB 17, 3-5 something in the nature of a general principle or law ispretation is excellent: "mirum enim, quaenam possit esse duplex ista generatioet duplex interitus, quum Empedocles ubivis non nisi unum agnoscat ortuis,unum interitu's modum, alterum gL, alterum L&Ma?xoLv. . At existimet quis,duplicem ortum et interitum ita interpretandum esse, quasi altero coeunte,dissipetur alterum, et vicissim, dissipato altero, alterum componatur. Suntsane duo ista arcte inter se copulata et alterum ex altero pendet neque tamenidcirco dissolutio copulat, concretio dissipat". However, this criticism does notapply to Holscher, [40] p. 202 ff.11 Stein, [2] p. 38: "dupliciter res et gignuntur et interimuntur: gignuntur cumelementa in unum coeunt, quo simul, quae ex eis elementis res fuerant compo-sitae, evanescunt; rursus cum elementa ex unitate discedunt, quae in ea fuerantres, diffluunt, at e difflatis elementis res novae nascuntur".12 Von Arnim, [4] p. 26; cf. also Kafka, [8] p. 87. However, Von Arnim disagreeswith Stein in thinking of the reciprocal relations between elements and Sphereonly. But 'mortal' is not, as far as we know, said of the Sphere.13 Cf. [34] p. 139: "What may be said, though only in a parenthesis, is thatthe behaviour of the elements on the cosmic scale, where they are separated toform a Cosmos and then brought together again to create ~4xa,s an extension orprojection of what is here stated about their characteristic cyclical pattern".Nevertheless Solmsen's statements might be read as conforming to the theoryof the cosmic cycle in four periods.1 Cf. already Karsten, above n. 10. Solmsen writes, [34] p. 140: "in other pas-sages Empedocles thinks it adequate to say that ykveaLq (or i6atq) = ,utq,,&&vaoq = 8L xc,L. Here he goes further".

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formulated, and it seems to be quite foreign to Empedocles' practicefor such a principlenot to be taken up again.15Furthermore, t is quiteunlikely that such an otherwise irrelevant corollarywould be accept-able within the context in which it is found embedded;it interruptsthechain of argument of a very important section of Empedocles' poem,a section moreover which appears to have stood near its beginning,16and it seems to be contradictedby the immediate sequel at B 17, 6-8.Bollack's earlier discussion of B 17, 3-5 is rather terse and opa-que,17so we had better follow his explanation as substantiated in hiscommentary, [43] p. 49 ff. Bollack assumes,correctly,as I believe, thatline 4, Sr-vCurv,efers to 3, y'vemq(only), and line 5, qU, to 3, &MO?Xa+Lq(only). He is also right in assumingthat 3, &v-yTrov,efers to compounds("tout ce qui devient dans le monde")).'8 However his explanationof 4,7rcXV-V,trikes me as distinctly odd; in view of what we read at B 17,6-13, this word is most easily referred to the elements,'9 but Bollacktranslates "tout ce que nait au cours du devenir",'8 again thinking ofcompounds (only). Equally strange is his explanation of 5, &ayuo,uEVCv,which he believes does not refer to 4, 7r&v'n&v,ut to 3, 5v7yr&v;surely7&v-rawv= the elements) should be understood as being referred to by8cuoX6vxv,20gain in view of what is stated at B 17, 6-13. Hisexplanation of B 17, 3-5 is analogous to that of Solmsen.2'For mortalthings, coming-to-be would be 'double' in so far as it is "provisoire,15 See Munding, [20].16 Simpl., in Phys. 157,27 Diels &v rc7 pcrPc0-rov DuaLtxc(v;bd. 161,14 DielscCM u, v &pXt7ocpocsrvra (both quoted at B 17 in DK). DK as well as Bollackput fgt. B 17 near the beginning of book I.17 I refer to the ambiguous phrase, [35] p. 118: "le devenir suppose le doublemouvement de la dispersion et de l'union", which is more or less explainedp. 119, n. 1: "Von Arnim avait bien raison . .. quand il d6montra que 1'&7r6)EL4atqde la pluralit6 faisait la genese de l'Un et vice versa". On Von Arnim cf. above,n. 12.18 On H6lscher's interpretation, for which see below, p. 22-23, this formula couldinclude the elements as well, but Bollack makes it quite clear that he thinks ofcompounds only.L9 Cf. Holscher, [40] p. 206.20 The possible objection that in certain compounds (cf. B 96) not all theelements are involved, for which see Zeller, [6] p. 947, note, and Bignone, [5]p. 551, is captious, for Empedocles appears to formulate a general law. Whensomething is assumed of compounds generally, all the elements are involved(cf. Bollack, [35] p. 119 n. 1). Zeller refers to B 17,7 and B 35,5, but he has toadmit that B 26, 5 (where x6a[koq, y the way, means the microcosm, cf. Holscher,[40] p. 182-3) is an exception to his view, and he omits to cite B 20, 2-3.21 Cf. the reference to Solmsen, [43] p. 52.

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servant comme de support aux naissances futures" ([43], p. 52). Lateron (p. 53) this is explained in the following way: Attraction, "ayantd'abord favoris6 la naissance de certaines formations... abolitaussitot les conditions qui les ont rendu possibles pour favoriser, 'a unniveau plus 6lev6, de nouvelles naissances". Attraction destroys (B 17,4 O?XE) in order to promote unity on a higher level. - But is thisreculerpourmieuxsauterof INX6'rjqo be found in ourtext? Destructionof formercompounds may be a conditiosine quanon for the formationof new, possibly better or fitter, compounds,but it is wholly doubtfulwhether, on the basis of B 17, 3-5, Empedocles has to be saddled witha confusion between sufficient and necessary cause. It is far morecompatible with what we elsewhere find in Empedocles to argue thatAttraction can start to operate if and only if Repulsion has (some-where and at some time) done its job, i.e. that the sufficient cause ofbecoming can become active only if the conditio sine qua non prior tobecoming has been fulfilled.22 can find no evidence whatsoever thatit is Attraction itself which "abolit les conditions. . .".Holscher translates, [40] p. 202: "Von zweierlei Art aber ist dasWerden der Sterblichen,von zweierlei ihr Schwinden; einerseitsist esder Zusammenschluss aller Stoffe, der sowohl erzeugt wie zerst6rt;andererseits geschieht wieder durch ihre Scheidung Werden und".23 e is right in arguing, p. 204-5, that line 3, AvctJ,refers to the individual compounded beings within the world (cf.B 35, 14 ff.) and that y'vecaL cannot mean something like "the worldof becoming".24However, on p. 205 he has it that B 17, 4 t'v e,v,refers to both ykveaLqand &T 6XSLIL,25 viz., '?v i?V (ye"VaLV) OUV080os(x'rLand - a-voaoq (nv a7oXetLv - internal accusative -) 0>Xex. Soalso B 17, 5: "Das andre Werden nahrt sich umgekehrt aus der22 Cf. again Karsten, above n. 10 in fine; also Zeller, [6] p. 947, note.23 See above, n. 9.24 Liddell and Scott s.v. ykvcaLs, IV, probably following Ast s.v., p. 376, referto Plato, Phaedr. 245 d-e it&v'T Tr oupaXv6v 7&ackv re ykvecav (natura Cicero) andTim. 29e yeviaea4 xodtx6a,uou... &pX7v.But at Tim. 29e Cornford, [12] p. 33suggests "principle of becoming", a translation which fits Phaedr. 245 e as well.Arist., Met. 983 b 28-9 is not wholly parallel. Bollack, [43] p. 53, aptly comparesII. XIV, 201, 'Qxeav6v &eCv ykveawv. Maybe it is no coincidence that the only'early' passage where y'veaL- = "the world of mortal beings" is in a spuriousfragment of Philolaus (B 21). For the pair y6vecst-&7r6XeLt f. Heracl. B 91auvta-rotz-ro xcdt &itO?XLetn (on the authenticity of these words Kirk, [27] p. 383)and Diog. Apoll. B 7 T(ov 8&T&ptV ylveTmL, TX 8? XOk ?Tet." As is also suggested by Guthrie, [33] p. 153.22


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at usxt... Auch hier ist, wie im ersten Satz, der Gegenbegff derMMr6XestLitgemeint". This way of construing is unnecessarilycom-plicated, since it is far morenatural to have 4, 'v Cuev,efer to 3, yevecat,and 5, n 8, to 3, 7r&i6s4XL.26According to H6lscher, coming-to-beis 'double' in that both combination and separationinvolve a coming-to-be as well as a passing-away, since the elements become 'mortal'(B 35, 14) whenever individual compoundsare being produced (B 35,4 ff.). Consequently mDvoaoqf elements might at the same time bespoken of as their 'Untergang' (B 17, 4 oBxet). There is a flaw in thisargument. As Holscher argues, B 17, 3 &v1Cv,refers to compounds;so on his analysis, 'rv Cuev (yiveartv sc. YvqrICv) aVvoaoq EXrtsr andT Ovoao4 T-v &n6Xc4Ctv (0vv&v) OkXtL should, I think, refer to ytvEcsand O67M0XeLtg4f compounds,27 and not to yev't of compounds andOM6XetRtqf elements. H6lscher's analysis is therefore self-contra-dictory. I fully agree that it makes sense, for Empedocles, to say thatthe elements become 'mortal'when involved in composition and thatto a certain extent they disappear within the compound (e.g. onlytheory showswhichelements makeupthe substanceof bone orblood) 28Also, Holscher'sexplanationof B 17, 3-5 is superiorto that of Solmsenand, I think, Bollack in that it puts these lines firmly within the wholeof Empedocles' physics.29 However that the elements, in a sense, aremortal, i.e. affected by yEveaL4and &7ro'eL+L, is not at all what is saidat B 17, 3-5; this sophisticated idea is expressed only later on inB 17, and is only possible on the basis of the more general thesis putforth in the earlier lines.From the above discussion it will, I hope, have become clear why Ihold that the interpretationsoffered by Solmsen,Bollack and H6lscherare not wholly satisfactory. Solmsen's (and Bollack's) interpretation

26 Cf. Bollack, [43] p. 54 and p. 55.27 Cf. Solmsen, quoted above p. 20: "but also destruction (of the compounds)".28 B 26,7 a6xev &vcup5u'v'rc 'r6 v 'vep@ y6nTaL is referred by H6lscher, [40]p. 182-3, to mortal beings, and apparently by Bollack as well, [43] p. 129:"quand 1'Amour 6tend son empire i tout ce qui est ... la vie disparatt"; how-ever, on p. 131 he says: "les el6ments . . . s'effacent pour former le tout". Iagree with Bollack, that it would be false to assume that the elements"p6rissent sans recours". Solmsen, [34] p. 126, remarks that the elements aresubdued in the Sphere "to the point of being invisible (B 27)"; see also Hoff-mann-Loss, [36] p. 98 and p. 102-3.29 The interpretation of Luth, [45] p. 49-50, who mainly follows the earlierversions of H6lscher's explanation, need not be discussed separately.

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isolates B 17, 3-5 from the mainstream of Empedoclean thought.30The grammatical suggestions put forth by Bollack as well as byHdlscher are both too numerous and too delicate to be really con-vincing. Holscher's more Empedoclean version of the vita alterius morsalterius, though corresponding to utterances found elsewhere in thefragments, is not yet what is meant in our passage.

2. A New InterpretationThe interpretation which I am about to suggest does not, I think,suffer from these drawbacks. From a grammatical point of view it isquite simple. It does not oblige us to fall back upon the cosmic cyclewith its two distinct worlds; neither does it oblige us to consider B 17,3-5 as a more or less Heraclitean corollary. It may be regarded, if oneso wishes, as a further refinement of the theories of the three scholarswhom I have just criticized.

The adherents of the theory of a cosmic cycle containing the for-mation and destruction of two distinct worlds take B 17, 3 8otokin apurely numerical sense: 'two'.31 The opponents of this theory seem tobe in favour of interpreting 'double' as meaning 'in a double sense'. SoBollack, [43] p. 52: aoL 32 implies that each individual birth is 'am-bivalente', which he, however, as we have noted, interprets as referringto its temporary character ("servant comme de support aux nais-sances futures"). Coming-to-be and passing-away happen to be "dedeux manieres": in each yeveat, a future &7t6XeL4L4s implied in orderthat y6rveaL may continue to take place; and each 7o6Xecg points30 It would not be out of place, of course, in Heraclitus. This is one of thereasons why Zeller, [6] p. 947, note, rejected Stein's interpretation; he protestedagainst a confusion with the Heraclitean &mqep6,uevov&utip au &pEroXt (Her.B 51 and Plato, Symp. 187a, Soph. 242 d-e; cf. Kirk, [27] p. 204 ff.). A blend ofthis kind is found, as a matter of fact, in the Hippocratic tract De victu, I, 4(p. 6,1 ff. Joly), where you have an Heraclitized Empedocles. See furtherHoffmann-Loss, [36] p. 143 ff., who however is concerned with the consequencesof this 'verhangnisvolle' equation more for the interpretation of Heraclitus thanfor that of Empedocles. The motives for Aristotle's criticism at Met. 985 a 23 ff.(= A 37) and 1000 b 9 ff., viz., that in Empedocles Attraction often does thejob of Repulsion and vice versa have been thoroughly discussed by Hoffmann-Loss, [36] p. 25 ff., p. 124 ff.31 If this were justified, however, the text would probably have read 8otctyCvicrL4 (H6lscher, [40] Hermes p. 31; cf. also Bollack, [43] p. 52).32 Cf. [43] p. 52: "Emp6docle emploie le singulier pour souligner le doubleaspectd'une meme chose" (my italics).24


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ahead to future y6vsat.33 Holscher's explanation is similar: eachyevzatg of a compound is conditioned by the temporary O&cokt6XeL4felements.34 Bollack furthermore states that Attraction destroys theconditions which had resulted in the formation of the compound,which seems to imply that the dealings of Attraction are double inthat it also fulfills the function of Repulsion.35 Though I do not agreewith these explanations of the ambivalent nature of y6vsatC andaC67C?OSLx, do believe that taking 'double' to signify 'in two senses','ambiguous', puts us upon the right track. Before following this up,however, I wish to make a few grammatical remarks concerning B 17,3-5.

B 17, 4 'LxteL and 6?,X?L (TLXTEL r' O'Xe XC) as well as 5, &pepthiaoand (45pne&epspZam 3'c-n) should be understood as denoting simul-taneous events, not as referring to successive ones. This is suggested by,e . . . Tc in line 4 and by the two aorist-forms n line 5, which are bestexplained as gnomic.36 I have already pointed out37 that it is simplestto assume that yeveaLq nd only yevecnq is the reference of B 17, 4, T-r?v[Lev,and likewise M&r6t qsand only &7r6Xse4c of B 17, 5, B 86. Line 4,7U&vrxo)v, refers to the elements, which are also understood at line 5,

uop6v&v38 the antithesis being between rcavrcovaCvo8o0 and 760XtvaLxacuO,ucV)V).I suggest that the 'double' nature of y'veat is reflected in T'tXtzL

X'Oexet e, a paradoxicalconjoiding"9 of antithetical terms, as that of&7t6XeLX)Ls reflected in the equally paradoxical combination ap?za9,Zc

33 Cf. above, pp. 21-22.34 Cf. further above, p. 22-23. I do not agree with Holscher, [40] p. 207, that PlatoPhaed. 71 a-c, is a good parallel. Plato speaks of yevkantqn opposite directions,and he strives to formulate his point of view as clearly as possible; (71 a 12 ff:)[Tva oc[L(pOr6pcV 7r&vrcav tci)V EVOCV-rtLV uOLV6VToLv86o yeV6aELq, X=6 pLiv ou &ripoU&Td TO69Tepov, Ot6 8'a5 TOVi rETpou l&XLV Td TO 9TrepOv . . (71 c 7) cxtyev6act ...aoJToZvteE QuoLv v7olv .. . It is this explicitness which is wholly lacking inEmpedocles, and for a reason, for he means something quite different.35 Against this cf. above, p. 22 and n. 30.36 So O'Brien, [41] p. 168 n. 1 on Mi7trr. Following Bollack's reading (above, n. 1)one would have the conjoining of a gnomic aorist (8pUcp?ta') and a timelesspresent (Cro8pU T-rL), the latter being parallel to TiX-ceL and 6O?zeL at line 4. Thisconjoining of aorist and present tense however is one of the reasons why I amnot wholly satisfied with Bollack's emendation.37 Above, p. 21 and n. 26.38 Cf. above, p. 21.39 Cf. e.g. Od. 6,208 6at 6Xiyrn re cpX r?.

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MIXT'n.40At line 4, 'v should be regardedas being the directobject ofX-re as well as of 6)IM, and not as direct accusative with 6XEXeLnd

as internal accusative with L'XteL; the latter, ratherharsh constructionis not to be preferredto the more simple construction as long as thissimple one makes excellent sense. Consequently,we may translate asfollows: "double is the coming-into-being of mortal beings, doubletheir passing-away;for the coming-togetherof all (elements) producesas wellasdestroys he first (i.e.yev'aE) while thelatter (i.e. r6O?e4fiq)vanishes when produced as again they (i.e. the elements) grow apart".What is the meaningof this enigmaticstatement?It is, I believe, this:accordingto my (i.e. Empedocles') theory of the elements, which arealways coming together in temporary combinations, but which werealways there before the combination happened, there is in reality noyevsmGL, no coming-into-being (as people think) of something new, ofsomething which was not there before and which henceforth wouldhave had to come to be fromnothing (cf. B 12, 1 sx te y&p olca.'?6'Vo704 &pvZOVVv eaTL yeVECOL; B 11, 2 "men are stupid, o' 8' yLyvCaAat7Crpoc oUx Cov ?tL40ualv"),41 In reality there is only a7rcv-rv rMtvoaos,coming-together of unborn (B 7 &ywvjroc)beings. It is this coming-together which produces the phenomenon or event which people arewont to call by the name of 'genesis'. Since this coming-togetheris aunion of unborn and immortal elements, it so to speak destroys theidea of an absolute yrVeaL4. The correct theory of phenomenaleventscertainly saves the phenomena, but it destroys our false conceptionsconcerning what really is the case (cf. B 15, which expounds thefunction of theory). So there is no genesis in a strict or ontologicalsense. The sameline of reasoningappliesto tno6XeL4Lt;he phenomenalevent of ho6XeLgLq is produced by the parting of the elements, but asthis parting is a secession of elements, M'76?XL4Lg i.e. in a strictoronto-logical sense) has vanished (cf. B 12, 2 xcdc' i6v iO?MOc&aXL&v0vu6aovxoa &7rUaTov;B 11, 3 "men are stupid, expecting that TCLXOX(T0XtLV

xcEa ?Xi Caa L7r Iv- '")42.

40 Or Bollack's 8pu&te a' &7to8pi57vcL.hen Ho1scher's choice of &puqr&cta spreferred, one is permitted to write p;poj where he leaves a lacuna which is tobe filled by an antithetical term; the resulting combination is again paradoxical.Cf. above, n. 1.41 The lines following in B 12 and B 11, treating of passing-away and men'sfalse conceptions about passing-away, will be quoted presently.'2 The preceding lines of B 12 and B 11 have been quoted above. Also in thesefragments, coming-into-being and passing-away are connected polar terms.26


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If this interpretation is acceptable,B 17, 3-5 is fully compatible withEmpedocles' general theory of the elements, both in its ontological andin its epistemological aspects. These lines are no longer parenthetical,strange or somewhat out of place, but have become a properlink in awhole chain of reasoning. As is well-known,43Empedocles followedParmenides in assuming the eternity of Being, but corrected him insplitting up the one Being outside our world into four elements whichhe placed inside it ;44 in this way a true theory of phenomena and ofcosmic motions was made possible. What happens in our world is theultimately real, if only our understanding of this reality is not ledastray by the wrong notions implied by everyday language.45 Thiscritical approach toward everyday words is itself a typically Eleatictrait, as will be apparentwhenthe familiar passageswhich I shall quotein support of my interpretation are put beside quotations from Xeno-phanes and especially Parmenides: EmpedoclesB 8, there is (`trLv)noPat of hvrto (compounds,46 s at B 17,3) but only Lp.q yty'vrv,no&aV&toLo47 7Sreeu but only &&a?Ba,:cp, aLc 8' ?Cn ToZq 6voftoLu&V4pr7COLaLV, and men are fools (B 11). 4U6aL4, correctly interpreted byPlutarch as being equivalent to yZvsalc,48s but the human word for theminglingof what is mixed. B 12: in reality, there is no ye'veas,since itis impossible for "whatis" to come into being from "whatis not"; thisfragment repeats a familiar Parmenideantenet. So also B 9: men (whoare fools, cf. again B 1149) use words such as "birth" and "unhappyfate" when speaking of the beginning by composition and the end by43 E. g. Guthrie, [33] p. 138 ff., esp. p. 147-8.44 Or rather: he conferred certain predicates of the one and only Being whichParmenides had not attributed to the two elements of his so-called Doxa uponhis own elements, and decided to have four of them. Cf. further below, p. 35 ff.46 For Empedocles' conception of language cf. Heinimann, [14] p. 46-54 andp. 84-5, who already compares Xenoph. B 32,1 and Parm. B 8,38-41; Westman,[21] p. 55-60, p. 243-51; Solmsen, [34] p. 140.46 Bollack, [43] p. 89, understands 'elements': "quand meurent les chosesdevenues, les el6ments sont mortels avec elles".47 (explicative).4R Adv. Col. 1112 A. See Westman, [21] p. 244; Guthrie, [33] p. 140 n. 1; Kahn,[24] p. 23, p. 75; Hoffmann-Loss, [36] p. 64-5. Aristotle's explanation of ?U'c asouato at Met. 1014 b 35 ff. has been explained by Seeck, [38] p. 36 ff.: Aristotleapparently means that i aK= [iZELt is ou:ax in the sense of vX, not of eltoc.41 It is quite possible that originally B 11 was the immediate sequel to B 9, sothat B 11,1 v7LrtoLwould qualify the subject of B 9,5 xaBXouat Bollack, [43]p. 91-2, p. 96). Anyhow a close connection between these two fragments as totheir contents is, I think, certain.

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dissolution of the lives of men, animals, plants and birds - but thisis a not wholly properuse of words.50The Eleatic antecedents of thistheory are to be found at Xenoph. B 32, 1 i,v -' 'IpLvXoXe'oUaL,vepOTXoaL O5TOrtcpux?,nd in Parmenides, esp. B 8, 38-4051rFo'avr' NoVQ,(M)~at(L,52 / ScOx pporot xtr1vero 7or6ete Ivoaa5t,i* /eyvsatC 'xoc 6,X?uaot3u For Emp. B 17, 4 t6v [v yap TcvtXv .oexe cf. Parm. B 8, 21 Tug Fy?VeatqUV MP-aea-crw, hile Emp. B 17, 57' 'e. 7r'n'recalls53 the secondhalf of that Parmenidean ine, Parm.B 8, 21 . . x. xoi &tucaot054 ?E0pO4. Cf. also Parm. B 8, 27-8 E'n y?VeatqXcd ?spOg /X?,-paX' Ehaxv. Of certain subjects, certain predi-cates may not be used; in such instancesconceptsaredestroyed,vanish(Empedocles) or are extinguished, never heard of, driven far, faraway (Parmenides).But Empedocles did not adopt Parmenides' heory without adaptingit. Just as he saved the phenomenaby modifyingParmenides'ontologyto such an extent that going beyond immanent reality was no longerunavoidable, so he revised Parmenides'theory of 'names' in order tosave ordinary language. False 'names' may refer to true and realphenomena, since they do not correspondto these phenomenain thesense of mirroringthem. Once we have understoodthat the referenceof a 'name' such as y6vSasL is different from its meaning which hasto be rejected in view of the Parmenideanontological argument ac-50 Although the text of B 9 is in certain places hopelessly disfigured, the overallpurport of lines 1-4 is clear; cf. e.g. Bollack's translation, [42] p. 28. At line 5,where most editors, followed by O'Brien, [41] p. 165 and n. 6, supply ,Bollack supplies , [42] p. 29 and [43] p. 94-5. I prefer to follow the earliereditors; cf. however below, n. 55.51 Already cited at Emp. B 8 by Bignone, [5] p. 396; cf. also Heinimann, [14]p. 50 ff. Also Parm. B 8, 53 ff., B 9, 1-2, B 19,3 may be adduced for this concep-tion of 'names' as corresponding to untrue phenomena, untrue, that is to say,when compared to the truth of the one and only Being. For Parmenides' theoryof 'names' cf. Mansfeld, [32] p. 110, p. 111, p. 142; for a general treatment of'deceptive words' in Parmenides see also A. P. D. Mourelatos, [44] p. 222 ff.Cf. further below, n. 63, n. 84.52 Mourelatos, [44] p. 180 ff., following Woodbury, [22], defends &v6pncata.Heargues that n refers to Being, but 'names' are not given by mortals to Being,but to what happens to be the case and to things in their world. When 6v6.tFoa-roLis preferred to 6voL(oc)a-ro, the verb should be taken as being used absolutely(or brachylogically), cf. Il. XI, 757-8 'AXELaIOU,0ao1 X vrxfxX7 and theother parallels quoted by Verdenius, [28] p. 12. T6 means 'consequently'.53 So also Munding, [20] p. 135; ibd., p. 136 n. 1, he translates at&kr*rby 'isterloschen'. O'Brien, [41] p. 164, aptly compares Emp. B2,4: &rTxC.54 At B 12,2 Empedocles says that the eiamoX&aNctf "what is" is &6bCaSov.28


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3. AmbiguityI have not been able to find parallelsfor8oL6- "ambiguous",but thissense is well-attested for its synonyms 8tzXoi5q nd -60.57 At B 17, 1Empedocles had used &7tr(&) n a purely numerical sense, so possiblyhe chose &OLOqn order to avoid confusion; moreover, the singular isimportant58since, as far as I know, the plural is the only form to beused before the Hellenistic age (with the exception of EmpedoclesB 17, 3). However, the idea that words can be ambiguous, .e. that theydo not refer to what they at first sight appearto mean can be paralleledquite easily. First, though, I wish to cite two instancesof what could betermed a consciousnessof the fact that once in a while there is some-thing the matter with quite ordinarywords.Hesiod, Erg. 11-2 states: oix Gpa ?oOUvovVqv EpL8c,v 6vo4,&?);'nxy&iov/ ELa'l 89X; he probably corrects his own earlier conception ofgp4 as voiced at Theog.225-6. Probablyif you orI had come to Hesiod'sconclusion, we would have thought that the word rpcq pparently hastwo senses, that it is ambiguous. Hesiod however thinks otherwise;for him there have to exist two equally real 4o&qeach of which we areequally justified in calling gps, though one of them is good, the otherbad.59 Where there is a meaning, there has to exist a something cor-respondingto this meaning.60A quite differentapproachis found in apassage in Euripides, though it reads like an echo6l of Erg. 11-2, viz.,Hipp. 385 ff.: "many things keep us fromdoingwhat is good; laziness,lust, small talk and shame (oc'L&cre). gLac:L 8' Ciavv, 1 Xlv oU xxXA,

| &X7&G tXG)V* eL 8 O XaLpoq hV aot(p1, / oux xv au 7]a'-v 'rahT' govTE7 There is a whole family of words with the connotations 'two', 'double','either ... or', 'ambiguous', e.g. MvAotm' (derived, of course, from 8oL6q) 'towaver', &aLTi 'to hesitate', the Homeric 8L6VALXa,81xO, 8&XiNi, 8LX4z8Lo0; seefor these (and some more) examples Mourelatos, [44] p. 229, n. 3. For 8L7rXo5qand &,'r6; cf. below, n. 81.a8 Cf. above n. 31.9 One might also say that to Hesiod, the ambiguity of gptc is a 'good ambi-guity'; for this and the difference from 'bad ambiguity' see Robinson, [13].Presumably, ykVWaLo Empedocles would be an instance of 'bad' ambiguity.60 "The Greeks believed that names are no arbitrary labels but embody thereal nature and even the actual existence of the thing ... concerned" (Verde-nius, [28] p. 125, who quotes some examples.) This belief is the background oftheir fondness for etymological speculation, for which cf. e.g. Kirk, [27] p. 119.For the presence of these ideas in Parmenides and in Heraclitus cf. below,p. 33 ff and n. 63, n. 77.61 Cf. W. S. Barrett, [30] ad 1., and Gentinetta, [25] p. 82-3.30


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yp4o4aTa." Undoubtedly Euripides has been influenced by contem-porary Sophistic theories of language,62 which themselves derivemainly from Eleatic theory.63 He first speaks naively, like a secondHesiod, but then corrects himself, as behoves a cultured gentleman-better avoid confusion,better employ different words(meanings)wheredifferent objects of reference must be assumed. Also note that hestarts out by using 8&aa6 in a purely numerical sense, but that thenapparently this sense slides on to that of 'ambiguous'.64In this way we may become aware of the fact that a word may havedifferent 'meanings'. But this is not all. Words quite innocent inthemselves may be used and combined in such a way that an ambi-guity is suddenly achieved. I allude to a phenomenon which must havebeen quite familiar to Empedocles, viz., the way in which oracles andriddles are often formulated. It is even typical for Greekoracles to bestated in ambiguous form, to admit of a first and wrong as well asof a second and correctinterpretation.65The ambiguousoracle deliv-ered to Cleomenes that he will "takeArgos" (Hdt. VI, 76) is fulfilledin an unexpectedway; Cleomenesacceptsthis as beingall in thegame.66Occasionally oracles are wrongly interpreted, i.e. taken as beingunambiguous: e.g. by the Spartans, Hdt. I, 66; particularly famousis the case of Croesus,who by his naive confidencein the words of thegod stands out as a paragonof barbarism67the oracleconcerningthedestructionof a great empire by the crossing of the riverHalys, Hdt. I,62 Gentinetta, 1. c.63 Heinimann, [14] p. 46 ff., p. 116 ff., p. 156 ff.. For ambiguity in Parmenides cf.Mourelatos, [44] p. 229, p. 246 and p. 262 where he remarks upon Parmenides'"role in the development of the concept of 'systematic ambiguity', or, morecorrectly, 'systematic equivocity"'. Perhaps, though, this attributes both toomuch and too little to Parmenides, in whose view all 'names' are ambivalentin that they correspond to a reality which, when compared to the fully real,both is and is not; but names as such truly correspond to this lower level ofreality (cf. Verdenius, [28] p. 123-4). The use of certain terms both for thefully real and for the lesser reality of everyday experience certainly makesthese terms ambiguous - but the ambiguity is 'good', in so far as the meaningmakes sense for both references. Again, Parmenides forbids the use of cer-tain words which presumably make sense only when used of phenomena, forthe description of Being. Cf. also below, n. 84.64 So &aa6g itself here is an ambiguous word, but the ambiguity is 'good'.66 This has been convincingly proved by Klees, [29], on the basis mainly of acomparative study of the Greek and barbarian oracles in Herodotus.66 Cf. Klees, [29] p. 72-3.67 Klees, [29] p. 91-3.

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53, I, 91,68 the oracle about the mule, Hdt. I, 55, I, 91). The latterexample is interesting as showingthat the ambiguity of an oraclemaybe contained in a single word; tdovoqs used metaphorically. Un-doubtedly, collections of oracles were made quite early; and so werecollections of riddles.69The authorshipof such a collection of riddleswas ascribed e.g. to Cleobulus of Lindos or to his daughter Cleobu-line.70 The PeripateticphilosopherClearchus, he only author to havewritten a monograph itep'LypvpFjv frr. 84-95 Wehrli) distinguishedseven types of riddles: I am especially concernedwith the last type, ofwhich an interesting specimen quoted by Clearchus (95 Wehrli)survives, namely that of the man who was no man, seeing and notseeing, hitting and not hitting with a stone that was no stone a birdwhich was no bird sitting upon a piece of wood that was no pieceof wood. This riddle was already familiar to Plato, who at Rep.479b 11 ff. cites it as an exampleof ambiguity cf. .tOC09TCpLoUaGLV,which is neuter): ToZ; ?V TaZq Etr.XoCGLV, e, rpcpyo-rep[4OUaV 90LXfV,XOCXX(x6 T&V 7COCE&V OCVYLOCLTF 7rEwp' T05 i)wvou'ou, Tqg PeoXB 7re'ptnVux'epL&;, ooe ?p' OV 0CU6V av-rv 0vLTTOv'rZC v3xXriv.Riddles of thiskind involve the use of familiar words in an unfamiliar and meta-phoricalway (the riddle of the cupping-instrument,7' he riddle of the

Sphinx) or a play on the double meaningsof words: as opposed to ananimal a eunuchis a man, but he isn't a man of course.Anotherquitefamiliar early riddle of this type is that of Homer and the youngfisherrmen,ited by Heraclitus, B 56.7268 "Das Halys-Orakel (lebt) als das Muster eines zweideutigen Orakelspruchesdurch die Jahrhunderte fort" (Klees, [29] p. 91). Cf. also below, n. 84.*9 Cf. Wilamowitz, [3] p. 39-40 n. 3; Vogt, [23] p. 220-1, on the fifth-centuryantecedents of the riddles (&'CpL536XOLyvFJlLOCL)in the Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi,i.e. on the earlier materials used by Alcidamas.70 Dissoi logoi, 3, 11 (II, p. 411, 2-6 DK): &kc)Si d XXL7noLLT(O'Vv naXoortip&vLpapLoV &Iroyay6axowKXeoPouX[vrj.Tr.X.fr. 2 Diehl, the riddle of the cupping-instrument, follows). That Cleobuline was a 'typical' figure can be deduced fromthe fact that Cratinus of Athens wrote a comedy of riddles called K?eoou?-Zvat(Diog. Laert. I, 89; cf. Schulz, [7] p. 95; the few remaining shreds of this comedyare collected in Kock and in Edmonds, fgts. 85-94). Riddles were quite popularat symposia, cf. e.g. the quotation from Plato on this page. Schulz's article, [7],is very instructive.71 Cf. above, n. 70. The first line is also quoted by Arist., Poet. 1458 a 23 ff.,where he explains the riddle as a conjoining of metaphors which, when taken intheir literal sense, together produce a meaningless impossibility; cf. also Rhet.1405 b 1 ff. (However, a single metaphor may also constitute a riddle, cf. theexample of the oracle of the mule, quoted above.)32


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Heraclituswas fond of speaking in riddles himself.73As a matteroffact, the enigmatic oracles which I have quoted above have been oftenadduced in the literature on Heraclitus.74Heracl. B 93 speaks of theriddlinglanguageof the Delphic god, and "there are. . . statements inthe fragments unintelligibleat first, which can properlybe understoodonly as riddles"75 e.g. B 12, B 16, B 26, B 60, B 120); he as it wereexploits the possibilitiesfor ambiguity inherent in everyday language."7However, just as the words themselves which are used in riddles andoracles may suddenly reveal their true intention when we ponder themlong and keenly enough, so also in the Heracitean sayings the trickywords may admit of an explanation which, to Heracitus, is the firststep toward a correct understanding of what really is the case.77 Cf.especially Heracl. B 32: 'v To cop6v poiUvov syea~Mt ix ?6E,X xal1,5XXL78Ziv6V Ovo,uz; he first principle which steers the universe maybe called by the name of the traditional father of gods and men.79Butto call it Zeus is not enough,80since this name is not pertinent in sofar as the first principle s by no means to be identified with the superior72 The story was put into the Certamenby Alcidamas; cf. Vogt, [23] p. 201 ff.,p. 219-21.73 Timon fr. 43 Diels, ap. Diog. Laert. IX, 6, ... 'Hp&x?sL-roq,oclvLxq .. Cf.also Plato's characterization of the style of Heraclitus' 'followers', Theaet.180 a: pa%Lmr[ax&mtyLocc8n. At 152 c, 155 d, 162 a Plato playfully but alsofor a serious purpose attributes a double truth to Protagoras.7 E. g. H6lscher, [39] p. 136 ff.; Holscher also treats of the riddles in Heraclitus.Cf. also Kirk, [27] p. 8, p. 119-20, who amends Snell's pioneering study of ambi-guity in Heraclitus ([9], esp. p. 367-73).76 Kahn, [31] p. 193. Kahn's article is excellent on this aspect of Heraclitus.76 Kahn, [31] p. 193.77 Kirk, [27] p. 119-20 comments on B 48 (..6. t60 6,vo,a P3o;, lpyov 86 ax

vaocTq . ..): "the real ambiguity" (i.e. what is entailed by the theory of opposites)"in things and events is sometimes reflected" (my italics) "in their names, andcorrect behaviour in relation to these ambiguities depends upon the exerciseof intelligence and discretion in the resolution of the verbal cruces". On B 48see also the illuminating comments of Rank, [17] p. 10. The case of the nameof Zeus (B 32), though slightly different, is similar: the "one and only Wise" isanalogous to 'Zeus'; Zejg may also have been interpreted etymologically(Verdenius, [37] p. 92). On 'names' as partly revealing what is the case seefurther H6lscher, [18], and [39] p. 139 ff.; Ph. Merlan, [19]; Kirk, [27] p. 119-20;Guthrie, [33] p. 414 ff.78 Cf. the riddle of the eunuch, quoted above, p. 32 (... &vp Te xoAux&vip/6pvrCz Xo'UX 6pvOY t8coVr xoUx t8Mv x.'r.X.).78 Cf. Heracl. B 108; B 64; and Hes., Theog. 853-4. On Heracl. B 32 see furtherHeinimann, [14] p. 55; Kirk, [27] p. 392 ff. Also above, n. 78.80 Heinimann, [14] p. 55.

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It is worthwhileto develop somewhat further his connectionbetweenthe explanation of the world of human expenence as expounded byParmenides n the Doxa and the theory of Empedocles. Parmenideshadattributed full reality to absolute Being only; what is within our worldis real only in a partial and derived sense.85The world of man is to bereduced86 o two elements, Fire and Night, created by men.87Togetherthese two elements constitute our world, a world which is bound todisappear together with its constituent parts.88 Parmenides' twoelements are generated as well as mortal and thus subject to ygveatgand 6Xekpoq;n this respect they differtotocoelo from the unbom andimmortal Being (Parm. B 8, 6; B 8, 13-4; B 8, 19-21; B 8, 27-8). Byequating his four elements, as to their immunity from coming-into-being and passing-away,with Parmenides'one and only Being, Empe-docles abolishes the unbridgeable gap between the reality of thetranscendentlyreal and the world of human experience.The universeof the fourelements is the ultimate reality. Consequently, Empedoclesneed not feel obliged like Parmenides to regard'names', i.e. the wordsof human speech, as a sort of actsconstitutive of a secondary realitywhich lacks the validity of the absolutely real.89Empedocles B 17 is the first9? arger piece expoundingthe theory ofelements. The rectification of conventional human notions concerningwhat is the case as formulatedat lines 3-5 is thereforequitewellplacedwithin its context - not only in itself, but also in view of the ontologicalcharacterof the exposition as a whole. It is, I believe, no coincidencethat Parmenidesdevoted a part of his large ontological dissertationtothe establishing (B 8, 38-41) of the consequences of his ontology forour conception of ordinary language.B 17, 1-13 is above all an ontological piece. Empedocles turns theweapons furnished by Parmenidean ontology against this ontologyitself. Deliberate echoes of Parmenideanmotives and of the ar?[OC'mfBeing (cf. Parm. B 8, 2) constantly occur, but the vital differencebetween the rejected theory and the new theory is invariably broughting to the phenomena behind this experience (the elements of the Doxa andtheir combinations, B 8,53 ff., B 9,1-2, B 19,3). Cf. above, n. 51, n. 52, n. 63.85 Cf. Mansfeld, [32] p. 134 ff., p. 136-43, p. 151-5, p. 160, p. 213-4.86 Cf. above, n. 84.87 Cf. Mansfeld, [32] p. 160.88 Cf. ibd., p. 213-4.89 Cf. ibd., p. 126, p. 130, p. 214, p. 219.90 Cf. above, n. 16.36


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out. At B 17, 13 the elements are &x(vnrot,"s is Parmenides' Being(Parm. B 8, 26), but they are so in a different sense.92And whenwe hear that the life of the elements is not e[meaO4Emp. B 17, 11)we are - so DK ad 1. - at once remindedof the stability of Parmenides'Being (Parm.B 8, 30 9exeov ocu' ue'veL),hich stability in Parmenides'view even is a consequenceof Being's immobility.Whenthe suggested nterpretationofEmpedoclesB17,3-5is accepted,these lines become functional and aptly fit into the whole line ofargument of B 17, 1-13. What people are accustomed to call 'coming-into-being' and 'passing-away'is in reality nothing but a manifestationof the eternal life of the elements and of the eternal (cf. B 16) forcesof Attraction and Repulsion. Moved by these eternal forces theeternal elements are again and again coming together and separating.This is what really happens; words such as 'birth' and 'destruction'are deprived of their ordinary implications and used as labels. Conse-quently, even of the eternal elements themselves it may be said thatthey 'come to be' for a finite period of time (B 17, 11). But the shownever stops (B 17, 6 and 12), the elements go on and on being &xLV7yJOLxoxroc uxXov.Here as elsewhere93xuXo willrefer to the ever-alternatingmotion of opposites: p.ZL4Lwill be followed by 8&CXa)OL4L,ta&Xo by,iZt, and so on to eternity; over and over again Attraction followsupon Repulsion, Repulsion upon Attraction.94Again andagain the ii-tial stage is repeated. There is, as I believe, a cosmic cycle in Empe-docles. But this cycle is not the eternal succession of distinct andopposite cosmic systems, but the eternal life of the universe itself,which continually renews itself, both in its individual parts and, Isuppose, as a whole.95Filoso/isch Instituut, Utrecht.

91 The masculine gender is not difficult: the elements are Gods (Emp. B 6, cf.DK ad 1.). B 17,12 xtiv&&aLvecalls the epic formula ,col xtAiv&6vtc (e.g. II. I, 290,Hes., Theog. 21).92 They do not 'move' in the sense of 'change', but do move in a locomotivesense (cf. e.g. Solmsen, [34] p. 134, n. 1).93 Cf. Mansfeld, [31] p. 22-3, p. 27."4 Unending time never will be empty of either (B 16).*8 I wish to thank Professor Timothy for correcting my English.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY[1] S. Karsten, Empedoclis Agrigentini carminum reliquiae, Amsterdam 1838.[2] L. Stein, Empedoclis Agrigentini fragmenta, Bonn 1852.[3] U. von Wilamowitz, Die TextgeschichtedergriechischenLyriker, Berlin 1900.[4] H. von Arnim, Die Weltperiodenbei Empedokles, in: Festschrift Gomperz,Wien 1902, 16 ff.[5] E. Bignone, Empedocle, Torino 1916 (repr. Roma 1963).[6] E. Zeller-W. Nestle, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichenEntwicklung, I, 2, VorsokratischePhilosophie, Zweite Hdlfte, Leipzig 61920,repr. Darmstadt 1963.[7] W. Schulz, Rdtsel, Pauly-Wissowa Bd. 1A, 1920, 62 ff.[8] G. Kafka, Die Vorsokratiker,Munchen 1921.[9] B. Snell, Die Sprache Heraklits, Hermes 61, 1926, 353 ff.[10] J. Burnet, Early GreekPhilosophy, London 41930 (repr. 1952).[11] H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, Baltimore 1935(repr. New York 1962).[12] F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology,London 1937, 41956.[13] R. Robinson, Ambiguity, Mind 50, 1941, 140 ff.[14] F. Heinimann, Nomos und Physis, Bern 1945 (repr. Darmstadt 1965).[15] R. Robinson, Plato's Consciousness of Fallacy, Mind 51, 1942, 97 ff. (repr.in: Essays in GreekPhilosophy, Oxford 1969, 16 ff.).[16] H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, Baltimore 1944(repr. New York 1962).[17] L. Ph. Rank, Etymologisering en verwanteverschijnselenbij Homerus, thesisUtrecht 1951.[18] U. H6lscher, Der Logos bei Heraklit, in: Varia Variorum, Festg. Reinhardt,Munster-Koln 1952, 69 ff.[19] Ph. Merlan, Ambiguity in Heraclitus, in: Act. XI. Congr. Int. Phil. Bruxel-les, 1953, Vol. XII, 56 ff.[20] H. Munding, Zur Beweisfiihrung des Empedokles, Hermes 82, 1954, 129 ff.[21] R. Westman, Plutarch gegen Kolotes, Helsinki 1955 (Acta PhilosophicaFennica, VI I).

[22] L. Woodbury, Parmenides on Names, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology,63, 1958, 145 ff.[23] E. Vogt, Die Schri/t vom Wettkampf Homers und Hesiods, RheinischesMuseum N. F. 102, 1959, 193 ff.[24] Ch. H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of GreekCosmology, New York1960.[25] P. M. Gentinetta, Zur Sprachbetrachtung bei den Sophisten und in derstoisch-hellenistischenZeit, Winterthur 1961.[26] R. K. Sprague, Plato's Use of Fallacy, London 1962.[27] G. S. Kirk, Heraclitus, The Cosmic Fragments, Cambridge 1954, 21962 (somecorrections).[28] W. J. Verdenius, Respect for, and criticism of, currentviews in Greek hought,Maia N. S. 15, 1963, 120 ff.[29] H. Klees, Die Eigenart des griechischen Glaubens an Orakel und Seher,Stuttgart 1963.38


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[30] W. S. Barrett, Euripides, Hippolytus, Revised Text with Intro. and Comm.,Oxford 1964.[31] Ch. H. Kahn, A New Look at Heraclitus, American Philosophical Quarterly1, 1964, 189 ff.[32] J. Mansfeld, Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt,thesis Utrecht 1964, Assen 1964.[33] W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, II, The Pre-SocraticTradition from Parmenides to Democritus, Cambridge 1965.[34] F. Solmsen, Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmogony, Phronesis 10, 1965,109 ff. (repr. in: Kleine Schriften I, Hildesheim 1968, 274 ff.).[35] J. Bollack, Empddocle, 1, Introduction a l'ancienne physique, Paris 1965.[36] M. Hoffmann-Loss, Die Wiedergabeder empedokleischenPhysik bei Aristo-teles, thesis G6ttingen 1966.[37] W. J. Verdenius, Der Logos bei Heraklit und Parmenides (1), Phronesis 11,1966, 81 ff.[38] G. A. Seeck, Empedokles B 17,9-13 (= 26,8-12), B 8, B 100 bei Aristoteles,Hermes 95, 1967, 27 ff.[39] U. H6lscher, Heraklit, in: Anfdngliches Fragen, G6ttingen 1968, 130 ff.[40] U. Holscher, Weltzeiten und Lebenszyklus,Eine NachpriufungderEmpedokles-Doxographie, Hermes 93, 1965, 7 ff. (repr. with revisions and additions in:Anfdngliches Fragen, G6ttingen 1968, 173 ff., from which I quote).[41] D. O'Brien, Empedocles'CosmicCycle, Cambridge 1969.[42] J. Bollack, Empedocle, 2, Les Origines, td. crit. et trad. d. fragm. et tdm.,Paris 1969.[43] J. Bollack, Emp6docle, 3, Les Origines, Commentaire (2 tomes), Paris 1969.[44] A. P. D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides, A Study of Word, Image andArgument in the Fragments, New Haven and London 1970.[45] J. C. Luth, Die Struktur des Wirklichen im empedokleischenSystem 'Lber dieNatur', Meisenheim a. Glan 1970.[46] J. Bollack, Rev. of [41] O'Brien, Gnomon 43, 1971, 433 ff.

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Mansfeld, Jaap. Ambiguity in Empedocles B17, 3-5 - A Suggestion (1972)

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Transcript of Mansfeld, Jaap. Ambiguity in Empedocles B17, 3-5 - A Suggestion (1972)